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Managing Technological Leaps:
A Study of DEC'S Alpha Design Team
Ralph Katz*
WP # 87-93
April 1993
Revised Jime 1993
INTERNATIONAL CENTER
FOR RESEARCH ON
MANAGEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Sloan School of Management
Cambridge, Massachusetts
The International Center for Research
on the Management of Technology
Managing Technological Leaps:
A Study of DEC'S Alpha Design Team
Ralph Katz*
WP# 87-93
April 1993
Revised June 1993
Sloan
*
WP#
3557-93
Northeastern University and M.I.T.
To be published in Research Advances in Organizational Change
and Development. JAI Press, Volume 7, 1993
©
1993 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Sloan School of Management
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
38 Memorial Drive, E56-390
02139-4307
Cambridge,
MA
ABSTRACT
RifeD organizations are always trying to
make
those critical 'leaps' in technology that will
give their products significant competitive advantages in the marketplace.
The dilemma
is
not in identifying what these possibilities might be, but in getting the business organization to
commit
to
chosen the
how
one of them while there
'right' path
or
is still
its feasibility.
considerable uncertainty as to whether they have
The development of
the
Alpha chip
a maverick group of technologists was able to overcome management's
cancellation of
its
efforts
and build the
significant technical advances.
with the
company's
attention
from relying on
advancements
in a
political
Only when
the
strategic business interests
much
at Digital
shows
initial
base that allowed them to achieve their
team learned
to integrate their technical goals
were they successful
their 'core' technology to relying
less familiar technology.
at shifting
management's
on promised, but unproven,
All you had to
(ISSCC)
in
do was attend the 1992 International Solid-State Circuit Conference
San Francisco
to
know
something special had happened.
that
the technical leader of Digital Equipment's
mobbed
after his presentation.
siege!"
Technologists from
Intel,
words of one German
In the
many of
Dan Dobberpuhl,
Alpha Chip design team, was simply being
reporter,
"Dan was under
the world's most respected organizations, including
Sun, HP, IBM, Hitachi, Motorola, Siemens, and Apple, were pressed around him,
anxious to get or
As one of
overhear his responses to their follow-up questions.
at least
the
chip's lead designers described the conference scene to his colleagues back at Digital,
"You'd have thought they'd found Elvis!"
Clearly, the
Alpha chip was being heralded as
one of the more significant technical developments in the microprocessor industry in recent
years'.
But
how
Why
did this team of designers accomplish such a noteworthy advancement?
were they successful? There were many other excellent microprocessor design teams
throughout the world; there were even other chip design teams within Digital.
managerial and organizational perspective, what enabled
technological leap?
Was
well-organized effort;
this technical
or was
it
more
people happened to come together
this
group of designers
From
to
a
make
this
achievement a deliberately planned, well-managed,
accidental, mostly a matter of luck in that the right
at the right
time to work on the right project for several
years?
ALPHA - A HIGH PERFORMING TEAM
One could
easily
argue that the Alpha team was successful because
elements normally attributed to a high performing team.
clear goal with a shared sense of purpose to design a
(i.e.,
chip.
a
RISC
chip) that
The team
would be twice as
leadership
was
fast as
After
all,
the team
members had
the
a
any comparable commercially available
The team members were
the individuals functioned as a cohesive unit, characterized
team
all
strongly committed, highly respected, and very credible both
technically and organizationally.
trust,
possessed
Reduced Instruction Set Computer chip
also extremely motivated,
dedicated, technically competent, and tenacious about solving problems.
mutual support and
it
spirit,
More
importantly,
by a collaborative climate of
and strong feelings of involvement and freedom of
1
They became "psychologically
expression.
communicating effectively with one
close,"
another, working hard together, and valuing each other's ideas and contributions.
While
certainly useful to generate such a descriptive
it is
characteristics, the
How,
attributes.
How
did the
more
critical
Alpha team
initially
to
achieve and ultimately maintain
In addition to this focus
so
many
management of
its
these
strong, unified sense of
Why
such difficult and risky technical objectives?
very creative engineers able to work,
Alpha team related
of high performing team
does one establish and manage these characteristics over time?
in fact,
purpose and commitment
the
list
questions surround the creation and
trust,
were these
and communicate with each other so effectively?
on team dynamics,
it
may
also
be constructive
to learn
how
and managerial areas, especially since
to other outside organizational
other technical teams that have enjoyed these same high performing characteristics
have ended up unsuccessful
was strongly committed
in their efforts.
For example, although the Alpha design team
to delivering its technical
advances within an extremely
tight
and
aggressive development schedule, the team did not have the strong, unqualified support of
the senior
management within
skeptical about
the systems and software groups,
what the Alpha team was trying
management was
supportive, outside Digital
additional resource support
to do.
many of whom were very
Furthermore, although semiconductor
management could not give
the team any
from other technical or system development groups, given
existing product stream focus and
commitments. For the most
part, the
their
team was not viewed
by management or by many other groups within Digital as a well-disciplined, highperforming team.
To
the contrary, these individuals
were often perceived
arrogant, albeit respected, "band of high-powered technical renegades."
members may have
semiconductor area.
How
successful!
trusted each other
-
they did not, however, trust
Yet, despite these apparent obstacles, the team
fully appreciate the success of the
management outside
the
the
was incredibly
-
A CHIP CALLED PRISM
Alpha design team, one has
completely the historical context in which this technical effort took place.
members of
somewhat
come?
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
To
as a
The Alpha team
to
understand more
Many key
Alpha team had originally worked together for many years, under the
s
Dan Dobberpuhl and Rich Witek,
leadership of
new RISC/UNIX
respectively, to design a
They had hoped
industry.
the chip's chief designer and chief architect,
architecture that
that the design of this
the basis for developing and commercializing a new,
Having been
products.
VAX
would be
more powerful
the major technical designer behind the first
line of
Digital
computer
PDP-11 and
the
first
on a single chip, two of Digital's most successful product platforms, Dobberpuhl had
been able
to attract
Given
some of
new RISC
design of this
the best technical
his history of success within Digital,
leadership also
minds
to
work with him and Witek on
made working
for
Dobberpuhl was highly credible within both the
His informal, reasonable, but pacesetting technical
him very appealing
to other
competent technologists.
This developmental effort had not been the only attempt
technology; in
fact, there
by David Cutler.
became
were three other major
efforts, the
to
merge these
efforts into a single
Cutler assumed responsibility for the overall
new RISC
chip.
This convergence around
new RISC
this
selling well
RISC-based
could not be
RISC
being led in Seattle
architecture
enough
line of
program
architecture, code
new
named
architecture and
operating system while
team assumed responsibility for the design and development of PRISM'
his
design team's difficulties, however.
need for
critical
PRISM program
the technical leader behind the development of a
Dobberpuhl and
at getting Digital into
most
After several years of competitive activity, however, corporate research
management decided
PRISM.
the
chip, including Jim Montanaro, one of the chip's lead designers.
technical and managerial communities.
were
the fastest in the
new microprocessor would provide
to
PRISM
did not end the program's or the chip
DEC's
VAX
was not very
great.
Since
technology was
And
computers
to
complement DEC's already successful VAX-based machines
to Digital's senior executives.
assumptions within management was that
CISC (Complex
much
since the
management of
marshal
Moreover, one of the major
Instruction Set
technology would always be better and more preferred than
to
RISC
the systems groups kept changing.
Computer)
technology.
outside managerial interest in or support for
As a
PRISM,
The design team
constantly being "battered around," having been stopped and redirected
course of several years.
flying high, the
DEC's computers
meet projected revenues, the case for developing a whole new
made convincingly
was hard
still
as long as
many
result,
it
especially
felt that
it
was
times over the
Over
this
RISC technology became more proven and
time period, however, as
accepted within the marketplace, especially in workstations. Digital's management became
increasingly interested in having
its
own RISC
heavily lobbied by representatives from
and future family of RISC chips.
that
machines.
MIPS Computer
Although
PRISM was
Senior managers were also being
Systems, Inc. to license
had significantly higher performance potential than the
not completely finished
the associated
MIPS, on
its
was much
this rationale, Digital's senior leadership
from MIPS
at the
same
chip, the Digital
still
in the
was more important
it
foothold in the open systems market than to wait for
-
existing
More
team had
importantly,
development
stage.
further along both in terms of hardware and software.
Digital's senior executive committee decided
Based on
MIPS
design work; nor had the chip been fabricated.
computer and operating systems software were
the other hand,
its
a cleaner, better engineered design
them
for
PRISM' s more
to get a quick
elegant but late design.
agreed to adopt the
time, however, they also decided to cancel
RISC
architecture
PRISM!
ALPHA - LIFE AFTER PRISM
The
decision to cancel
and the team, none of
in the
whom
PRISM
not only shocked Cutler but also Dobberpuhl, Witek
had attended the
committee's subsequent deliberations.
MIPS
As
presentation or had even been involved
a result, they
all
refused to accept the
committee's explanation and became somewhat hostile towards them.
hard work and effort, the team simply
semiconductor area.
To
give up their
felt
betrayed by
own
on a small outside company made no sense
must have
really sold those
This reaction
is
Instead,
it
its
work
and
was
the
to them.
In the
words of one designer, "MIPS
all politics!"
is
known about such kinds of win/lose
Given the strong feelings and commitments
that are reinforced
progresses, the losing team refuses to believe
it
legitimately lost.
searches for outside explanations, excuses, and scapegoats upon which to blame
the purported "fair" decision.
intact
- it
After several years of
management outside
technology and architecture and rely completely
understandable in light of what
situations (Schein, 1988).
within a team as
guys
senior
is
given a
motivated, ready to
new
Interestingly enough, however, if the losing
opportunity to "win," the team will often
work harder
to
succeed on
this
next round.
group remains
become even more
In such a situation, the
losing group tends to learn
effective as the loss
more about
and
itself
put to rest and the
is
is
likely to
members begin
They can even become more savvy about what
attempt.
become even more cohesive and
and organize for their next
to plan
it
work
takes to succeed if they
together to identify previous obstacles and mistakes that they either have to
overcome or
don't want to see reoccur.
This scenario
team.
is
very similar to what seems to have happened
Because of his high
credibility
negotiate an agreement with his
to the
management
move
to
his
hardware team
Development area where they would conduct advanced "clocking"
could also discretely finish the
design and
chip was produced.
It
worked even
new
indicating that
test
to the
studies, but
MIPS
management had
just decided to
PRISM
He
what they were purchasing from MIPS.
its
DEC. Armed
it
that
to his
did succeed, however, in arousing the interest of
VMS
expert
(VMS
is
Kronenberg called Dobberpuhl
the software operating system for
to discuss the status
working but had no computer operating system
of
that could utilize
VAX
to use the
new RISC
committee
RISC
chip that was
VMS,
that if
then
chip as the basis for developing
technology were being reached faster than expected and
that
VMS
VAX
technology.
The
new
new
Kronenberg was
had recently been chartered to examine alternative
strategies for prolonging or rejuvenating
modified
VAX
She suggested
products would be needed as quickly as possible to increase sales revenue.
part of a high-level
Nancy
PRISM which was
it^.
architecture could be modified to 'port' (i.e., 'work with')
limits of
to
a
memo, management was
memo
The
to start
as "sour grapes."
Dobberpuhl's
machines.
was two
had hoped
Kronenberg, a senior
management might be convinced
memo
cancellation decision but this did not
Although a great many engineers responded positively
not impressed, most likely seeing
PRISM'S RISC
where they
team had expected,
chip being licensed by
throw away a technology
dialogue that might get management to reconsider
machines).
to
Advanced
even though the project had been
evidence, Dobberpuhl distributed throughout Digital a scathing
three times better than
occur.
it
better than the
almost three times faster than the comparable
with this
chip design
Within a few months, the design was completed and a fabricated
officially cancelled.
PRISM
RISC
PRISM
and history of success, Dobberpuhl was able
possiblity of using a
compatible was not one of the committee's current
Witek were
considerations, especially since Dobberpuhl and
cancellation of
PRISM
that they had declined to be
members of
The more Dobberpuhl thought about Kronenberg's
He
became.
convinced Witek that they could bring
and once they were back
in business, they
sufficiently upset with the
this task force.
option, the
RISC speed
more appealing
to the
VAX
might even be able to supplant the
it
customer base
MIPS
deal.
After several weeks of discussion, Dobberpuhl, Witek, and Kronenberg were sufficiently
excited that they
Sites,
were ready
to present a proposal to the
He just
proposed option.
software to
RISC
didn't think
VMS
to port
-
could not clearly demonstrate
With
this
new
it
why
it
new RISC
could then be used to extend the
Alpha chip was
EVAX
(i.e.,
- it
really
VAX
was
feasible!
task force
chip that would port
life
feasibility
would be too hard
When
Dick
strategy task force.
to
of the
move CISC
challenged, however. Sites
wouldn't work, and after several weeks of working on
it
basis of support, the
the proposal to design a
could work
customer applications.
the problem, he slowly realized that
the
VAX
one of the key task force members, was very skeptical about the
of
VAX
Sites
had become a "convert."
was now more
VMS.
inclined to endorse
This new RISC architecture
technology; hence, the original code
name
for
Extended VAX). The Budgeting Review Committee
formally approved a proposal to 'flush out' an overall technical and business program but
the objectives and specific details to the Vice Presidents and the program's leadership.
addition, since Sites'
own
project on cooled chips had recently been cancelled, he and his
small design group were very anxious to join Dobberpuhl and Witek' s team to design a
RISC
As
architecture that
left
In
would be the foundation
a result, the Alpha chip design team
was
for
some of
essentially
Digital's
new computer
new
systems.
formed through the merging of two
small groups of extremely talented individuals whose recent projects had been suddenly
cancelled and
who were determined
not to get cancelled again!
STRATEGIZING AND ORGANIZING FOR SUCCESS
Even though they had been blessed by senior management, the Alpha team remained
skeptical.
their
From
their prior experiences with
PRISM, however, Dobberpuhl, Witek, and
team had learned some very valuable lessons.
per se would not be sufficiently convincing to
Technical advances and achievements
shift Digital's
base architecture from
VAX
to
The Alpha team would need a
RISC.
to put
life')
on a true
demonstration vehicle to truly win support for
Senior management had never seen
test."
you needed
talk technical, but
PRISM
'boot' (i.e., 'bring to
a computer system.
The team
also realized they could not rely
just too
project
was a
on the
busy working to meet
relatively small
their short
systems groups within
official
computer for the chip within the project's
Digital to build a test
were
real
As pointed out by Montanaro, "You could
their architecture.
tight schedule.
These groups
The Alpha
term product development targets.
semiconductor effort that did not as yet have sufficient clout or
sponsorship to capture the immediate attention or interest of the large system development
groups.
Within Digital, the semiconductor area had been a component organization
not played a strong role in leading the corporation's computer system's strategy.
that
had
Although
they were an extremely critical component, Digital's semiconductors had not been a driving,
As a consequence,
influential force.
and shape
its
own
would have
it
to learn
how
to control
destiny.
To accomplish
own computer
the team realized
system,
this,
Dobberpuhl and Witek agreed
i.e., their
own
Using
test vehicle.
that they
would have
their informal
to build their
networks of
technical contacts, they successfully enrolled three very gifted technologists, namely,
Conroy, Thacker, and Stewert, to develop on
that
would be based on the new RISC
their
architecture.
own
an Alpha Development Unit
(ADU)
Since no computer system had ever been
designed to the kind of speeds projected for Alpha, management was incredulous as to
whether a computer system could be built easily and inexpensively
such a
The
fast processor.
real challenge to the
ADU
that could
keep up with
group, therefore, was to build such a
computer system using only off-the-shelf components.
The Alpha team
also learned that
showing management tangible
something exciting
would need
to
-
first
As
would be very risky
to
go too long without
indicated by one designer,
something that would capture
their imagination."
"You had
As a
to
show them
result, the
team
develop as quickly as possible a prototype version of the chip that could be
demonstrated on the
would
results.
it
ADU
test vehicle.
This led to a two-tier approach in which the team
design and fabricate an early version,
full functionality
i.e.,
EVAX-3,
but which could be convincingly validated.
A
that did not include Alpha's
fully functioning
Alpha chip.
EVAX-4, would
then be designed and fabricated using Digital's
more advanced CMOS-4
process technology.
FUNCTIONING FOR SUCCESS
In addition to paying close attention to these outside
issues, the
Alpha team members functioned incredibly
management and organizational
effectively as a unit.
group was comprised of individuals whose values, motivations, and work
very similar nature.
management,
it
Because the objectives of the Alpha chip were
was up
team as
to the design
to
how
how
be
that a
200
they would accomplish
at least
twice as
the project's 3-year
They were
fast as
MHz
it.
all
PRISM
chip, the
know
Nevertheless, they were driven to design a chip that would
development schedule^
also individuals
who
did not complain about hard work, long hours, or
Alpha design team recruited and interviewed
who had
or replaced individuals
with fire in the belly, people
and people
No one
work on Alpha because they'd be
voluntarily agreed to
talking about,
the
anything that might be available within the industry by the end of
"pushing frontiers," which were fun and neat things to do!
the
made on
chip was feasible even though they really didn't
midnight E-mail as long as they were doing "neat things."
had
were of a
interests
ambiguous by senior
ambitious they were going to be.
Extrapolating from the significant technical advances they had
team was confident
left
The design
to leave.
who
In the
its
and
As was customary within
own members
up
as they scaled
words of Conroy, "They looked
did not try to 'snow' you but
who would
had been assigned; they
"testing the fringes"
who knew what
not panic or get discouraged
when
Digital,
in size
for people
they were
they found
themselves in over their heads."
Members of Alpha were
and
who
experienced individuals
who
could fiinction independently
did not need a lot direction, hand-holding, or cheerleading.
They were not
preoccupied with their individual careers; they were more interested in having their peers
within the engineering
community see them
as being
one of the world's best design teams.
Ambition, promotion, and monetary rewards were not the principal driving forces.
Recognition and acceptance of their accomplishments by their technical peers and by society
was, for them, the true
test
of their creative
abilities.
Although team members had very different backgrounds, experiences, and technical
strengths, they
were stimulated and motivated by common
criteria.
words of one
In the
Alpha member, "We see eye-to-eye on so many things." This diversity of
talent but singular
mindset materialized within Alpha not through any formalized staffing process but as a
consequence of Digital's
may
process that
fluid
boundaries and self-selection to projects.
look messy and
result in synergistic
may
lead to
It is
an organic
many unproductive outcomes; but
it
can also
groups where the individual talents become greatly amplified through
mutual stimulation and challenge.
The
intensity of the
make
"firsts," i.e., to
Alpha team's motivation not only stemmed from
the world's fastest chip, but also
cancel them at any time, as they had done with
schedules not only because
possibility
was
it
of cancellation as
PRISM. They
the right thing to
real.
from fear
that
its
desire to
do
management could
stuck to aggressive goals and
do but also because they perceived the
This "creative tension" between the team and management
kept the group working "on the edge," making them even more close-knit with a "we'll show
them
The group became
attitude. "
practices, seeing
them
all
be a manager or wanted
"Dobberpuhl
is
resentful of
to
be one.
No
one on the team claimed
The group even kidded among themselves
a great manager to have as long as you don't need one."
members had a kindred
spirit
to rely less
their task activities,
to
that
Just as the
team
about technical work, they developed a uniform perspective
about managerial practices and philosophies.
Alpha group
management and normal management
as one big bureaucratic obstacle.
This "anti-management" viewpoint allowed the
on formal management structures and procedures for carrying out
and concentrate more on creating the team environment
in
which
self-
directed professionals could interact and problem solve together quickly and effectively.
Without the normal managerial
success depended greatly on
themselves.
its
roles, plans,
ability to
and reviews, the Alpha team knew
its
communicate openly and honestly among
Because the team was relatively small and physically co-located, there was
constant passing of information and decisions in the hallways.
People didn't "squirrel"
away; instead, each member was cognizant of what the other team members were doing.
Since the team also had to discover
ideas had to be tried.
To
new
circuit techniques, all kinds
aid in this effort, the
group
itself instituted
of wild and creative
a series of weekly
"
In these 1-hour long meetings,
"circuit chats."
preparation to present his or her
work
an individual would be given 10 minutes of
in progress.
report or rehearsed presentation, rather
it
This was not meant to be a formal status
was an opportunity
to see each others' problems,
As explained by Montanaro, "The
solution approaches, and mistakes.
was
intent
to establish
an atmosphere where half-baked options could be freely presented and critiqued in a friendly
manner and allow
all
team members
The Alpha team
would have
circuit design
from each
to steal clever ideas
to
be optimized across levels and boundaries rather than the
suboptimizations that typically characterized previous designs.
designing
that
may
PRISM,
the
Alpha team already knew where a
Members would have
not have been necessary.
lot
From
The
initial
their experience in
of compromises had been made
to understand
consequences of their individual design efforts on each other's work
compromises.
other.
also realized that to get the performance speed they had targeted, the
to
more
fully the
overcome such
Alpha documentation, therefore, was not so much one of detailed
descriptions and design rules, but one of intentions, guidelines, and assumptions.
knowing more about
that designers
the intentions
and what was trying
would have a broader exposure
the circuit implementation
to
be accomplished,
it
By
was hoped
both the microarchitecture of the chip and
to
from which the best tradeoffs could then be made.
In the absence
of management, members would have to be trusted to resolve their design conflicts by
On
themselves.
the chance that
it
might be needed, a "Critical Path Appeals Board, was also
created within the team to resolve intractable conflicts.
The Alpha team even discussed
the
advantages of holding "Circuit Design Confessionals" during which members could admit to
some
error or design
compromise and then
solicit clever
suggestions for fixing or repairing
the problem.
The team's
behaviors.
effectiveness
was
also facilitated
The group was conscious
interfere with their joint
power senior people on
They did not
just
fill
not to allow status or hierarchical differences to
problem solving
activities.
were
the team, they
out forms and
tell
all
Even though
there
were some very high
senior people involved in technical work.
people what they wanted; they were also doing
from performing power and resistance calculations
members had
by certain normative and egalitarian
to stay late during particular
to designing fancy circuitry.
crunch times,
10
it
was
the custom that
it,
When team
good dinners
(not pizza)
be brought
and served
in
to
them by the senior people.
This degree of
involvement and support helped solidify the group's confidence and
trust in
each other and
prevented technical intimidation from becoming a problem.
A
number of important behavioral norms were
was expected,
Alpha team.
It
one realized
that
trouble;
it
also established and reinforced
one would inform other members as soon as
for example, that
one could not make a given deadline or milestone.
was not okay
There was zero tolerance for trying
but to go for help.
problem or discussion.
It
hard were okay, but
it
was important
was also important
was okay
be in
to
to give
productive.
Humor and
have fun.
to
away"
your way through a
to "bull"
be tenacious and not
to
when you were no longer being
also essential to realize
It
Individuals were not expected to "grind
to surprise people.
by the
up
easily, but
was
it
Pushing and working
good-natured teasing
were commonplace occurrences.
Dobberpuhl was also instrumental
aggressive goals.
the
members
to
Generally speaking,
want
to
keeping the group strongly committed to
in
when a group
change the nature of
their
gets in trouble, there
commitments
either
is
its
a tendency for
by extending the
schedule, enlarging the team, reducing the specified functionality, reducing features,
accepting higher costs, etc.
or
"I'll try
People would prefer
to play
it
safe
by saying
"I'll
do
my
best"
By
harder" rather than voluntarily recommitting to achieve the difficult result.
not allowing these kinds of slack alternatives, Dobberpuhl challenged the team to search for
creative solutions to very difficult problems.
example, that the Alpha chip and
its
When management
associated
new products would be needed
year earlier than originally scheduled, Dobberpuhl
team could not possibly reduce the schedule by
schedule, however, the team
was forced
to
suddenly discovered, for
knew
that
that
as
was being developed. This
not be cancelled;
extraordinary
it
steadfast
as a
by simply working harder, the
much. By committing
to the
fmd and incorporate what turned out
very creative breakthrough modifications in the design of the microprocessor and
it
much
commitment not only ensured
speeded up
to
be some
in the
that the project
way
would
energized the technologists to stretch their creative abilities for
results'*.
As so many high performing
advances cannot be achieved by playing
it
safe (e.g.,
1985).
11
projects have discovered, breakthrough
Nayak and
Kettering, 1986; Pinchot,
Finally,
it is
important to realize that a design project like Alpha must have
considerable support from other groups
ways
The
to
work around
CAD
tools that
group was
if it is to
be successfully completed
such an
in
Following the persistent lead of Montanaro, the Alpha team found
aggressive timeframe.
the
management bureaucracy
to get the help
it
needed from other areas.
especially critical for providing very advanced design and verification
were not generally
They were
available.
software to the requirements of the
new
also willing to modify and extend the
circuit design.
The
CAD
group was responsive
because they assumed that the Alpha team was probably working on something very
important and because they were an interesting and unusual group of "techies"
on
who
delivered
their promises.
There were also a number of other design groups within Digital with good-natured
rivalries taking place
among them. Montanaro and
other team
members were
sufficiently
well-connected to individuals within these other groups that they could temporarily
(not raid or steal) additional personnel, resources,
Alpha team complete
Even though
resources,
way
to say
Montanaro
etc., as
its
it
and even design documents
design.
was common practice within Digital
Montanaro soon
"thank you."
realized that
it
was
to beg,
also important for
borrow, and scrounge for
him and
the team to find a
Using adult-type toys he purchased from a mail-order catalogue,
started to give people
phosphorescent insects and fishes, or floating eyeballs,
a means of thanking them for their assistance.
in the design,
borrow
to help the
For example,
if
Montanaro would give them a phosphorescent roach or
someone found a bug
fish; if
they found a
bigger bug, then he would give them a bigger bug or fish, e.g., a phosphorescent squid.
the
Alpha team, these toys became a
problem or for stepping on people's
fantastic
toes.
way
for getting around the "us vs.
They became a
people collected them, they took on strong symbolic value.
were distributed
that
when
the
Hudson
For
them" turf
great ice-breaking vehicle and as
So many phosphorescent toys
plant had a sudden blackout,
many of
the
employees
discovered that they did not have to leave the darkened building as they could easily continue
their
work by
the glows of light from their fish toys!
12
SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Equipment
Digital
Not only
to use
DEC
is
Alpha
Windows
is
banking very heavily on Alpha technology
marketing
in their
its
own
line
Microsoft
product offerings.
operating system called
to lead its resurgence.
of Alpha computers, but other vendors are starting
is
using an Alpha machine to tout
Windows NT. Cray Computer
has announced that
its
new
its
next
generation of parallel processing supercomputers will be designed around large arrays of
Alpha
In addition, Mitsubishi has recently agreed to
chips.
become
a second manufacturing
source, thereby, adding substantial credibility to the Alpha product's viability.
hoping
Alpha can eventually be used and adopted as an open market
that
Why,
then,
was the Alpha chip
factor.
work towards a singular-minded
These were not team-playing individuals
-
objective
all
is
even
is
self-selection
and natural
a strong contributing
they were a collection of talented
individual contributors willing to play together as a team
they were
DEC
standard.
Clearly, the fact that a very high-
effort a success?
power group of individual technologists had come together through
evolution processes to
PC
!
For previously explained reasons,
eager to commit to a very aggressive set of goals and very willing to accept the
risks that such a
commitment
entailed.
There were no
artificial barriers in the
design process
and the creative juices that flowed from the group's communication and problem solving
interactions
were
critical.
At times they worked
like
maniacs, totally immersed in their
project activities and buffered successfully from the normal managerial and bureaucratic
demands and disruptions by Dobberpuhl. Because of
motivational interests around technology, there was
issues that often characterize other teams.
ownership
in
their singular
little
purpose and
common
of the in-fighting and turf-related
There was a genuine and unified team feeling of
having contributed to the technical achievements as can be seen by the large
number of names
that
have appeared on the technical publications and patent applications.
All of the afore-mentioned characteristics focus primarily
dynamics and were probably very instrumental
"technical" success.
It is less likely,
in
on the group's
allowing the group to achieve
however, that these dynamics contributed
"organizational" success of the product.
PRISM was
13
internal
its
strong
to the
also a successful technical achievement
PRISM
and the
team was very similar
Only when
group process
to
the
Alpha team
worrying about
Alpha
to
PRISM
Yet, the Alpha chip and not the
shifted
how
it
in
its
emphasis from concentrating on
irate
and strengthen, over time,
memo, Dobberpuhl had
this risk,
its
Unlike the
its
able
out an
version of Alpha and
architecture, the
Alpha team was able
CEO
excited that he soon wanted
that could run both
we be doing
helped link
at that time,
to
nor his
Olsen did, however, see a true demonstration of the
became so
demonstration had been a galvanizing
who
company. By making sure they had an
Neither Ken Olsen, Digital's
in action.
open systems platform product
dialogue from "Will
new RISC
demonstrate the
PRISM
was
By sending
taken a risk, albeit he had a strong basis from which to take
sponsorship even further.
senior staff had seen
EVAX-3
to
internal
episode, Alpha
but he managed to capture the attention of a few senior sponsors
machine ready
increase
PRISM
sponsorship within the organization.
his technical interests to the strategic interests of the
ADU
its
should relate to other organizational constituents did
the seeds for organizational success get planted.
to gain
terms of group membership and process.
chip will be commercialized.
moment
this?" to
VMS
and
UNIX
for the project, shifting
"Of course we're going
Alpha
to
become an
operating systems.
to
The
management's
do
all this!"
Dobberpuhl, Witek, and the Alpha team had learned not only the importance of developing
new technology
but the importance of protecting and marketing
it
within a large organization
so that the technological leaps and decisions get integrated and effectively connected with the
strategic interests
and decisions of the established businesses, products, and services.
IMPLICATIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL CHANGE
As a
how
discipline, organizational
development has always been concerned not only with
organizational change takes place, but
change can be planned and implemented
more importantly, with how organizational
effectively.
While a great deal has been written
about organizational change and innovation, most recently about cultural changes, not much
is
known about how
to
manage and plan
for those
key technological changes and
breakthroughs that could become the basis for significantly new product lines or businesses^
14
One
of the missions of the research and advanced development functions, as was true for
Digital Equipment,
is to
experiment and learn about those
critical 'leaps' in
could give the company's products a significant competitive advantage
Cooper's research over the
last
technology that
in the
marketplace.
decade, for example, has convincingly confirmed that the
most important factor accounting for new product success
lies in the
development of a new
product that customers perceive as having a substantial performance advantage (Cooper,
1986).
The
problem for the research and advanced development functions
real
is
not
identifying such technological possibilities, but in getting the broader organization to invest in
some
specific alternatives while there is
picked or committed to the
still
considerable uncertainty as to whether they have
'right' technological
(1988), emphasizes this by pointing out that
it is
paths (Katz and Allen, 1988).
the ability to
move
advancements out of the research laboratory and into commercialized products
test
of effective technological change and innovation
creation of ideas and suggestions, for there
one
is
is
in
Roberts
technological
an organization
usually a 'ton' of ideas.
-
that is the true
and not just the
As a
result,
whether
dealing with organizational change or technological change, the most critical part of
the change process lies not in the generation of ideas and possibilities but in their
implementation!
much
The key dilemma
in creating a
Alpha team, as previously described, was not so
for the
new technology per
se
(RISC was well-known, having been worked on
and developed since IBM's John Cocke reported his original research
in 1971), but in getting
DEC'S management
management's
to take their efforts seriously*.
from relying on improvements
in the
They had
to shift
company's established technological base
attention
to relying
on
promised, but unproven, advancements in a much less familiar technology.
Based on
his studies
and consulting experiences with companies such as Citibank,
Coming, and Xerox, Nadler (1988) argues
inherent in the
management of any
motivation and resistance,
i.e.,
that there are essentially three basic
large change process^.
problems
First, there is the issue
the need to motivate people to find and internalize
of
new ways
of behaving and managing their organizational environments, relationships, and tasks.
Rather than remaining comfortable
in the status
quo and
resistant
towards changes that
threaten existing practices and procedures, individuals must
new methods
or strategies
if,
become
receptive towards the
proposed changes are going
in fact, the
to take
hold and be
implemented successfully.
A
second
effectively
issue,
according to Nadler, involves the need to manage the transition
from what was the past
normal course of events,
change takes place
in
it is
to
what
will
be the
future.
Since change disrupts the
necessary to control the process by which the innovation or
order to avoid confusions, miscommunications, and misunderstandings.
People must not only agree on where they are going but also on
how
they are going to get
there!
Finally, there
is
the need to shape and influence the political dynamics of change.
Since organizations with multiple products and multiple technologies are organized around
groups of individuals with very different
interests,
responsibilities, then these organizations are,
certain
power
by
backgrounds, resources, rewards, and
their very nature, political entities in
impede the proposed change*.
centers can develop either to support or
major innovation
must find ways
to
to
move through
gamer
power groups while
it is
understandable
implementation of change.
of getting things done.
why
For
this
there
is
so
much
issues, i.e., motivation, control,
ft^stration surrounding the effective
In his recent book, Pfeffer (1992) describes three possible
One
alternative
formal structures and arrangements,
and procedures.
trying to assuage or
from any opposition buildup.
Given the broad scope of these three generic problem
and power,
For a
the organization successfully, those leading the charge
the visible support of key
neutralize the arguments emerging
which
method
to
mechanism
i.e.,
is
ways
through the use of the organization's
through formally established relationships, roles,
work
effectively, hierarchical direction, responsibility,
and accountability not only have to be clear and unambiguous, they must also be seen as the
legitimate basis of authority and decision-making.
Another way of getting things done
organizational culture.
goals, a
common
As described by
is
by developing a strong shared vision or
Pfeffer (1992), "if people share a
perception of what to do and
how
to
accomplish
vocabulary that allows them to coordinate their behaviors, then
16
it,
common
and a
set
of
common
commands and
hierarchical
authority are of
much
less
importance."
problem-solve together more
from those
Individuals can then communicate, share ideas, and
effectively without always waiting for orders
in higher-level positions.
The use of informal power and
influence
is
a third process advocated by Pfeffer and
others for getting things implemented in organizations.
political nature
and even advisable given the
According
one has
it is
possible,
This approach puts the emphasis on
methods rather than relying on formal structures and systems.
the use of informal influence
effective,
to Pfeffer,
of organizations, to manipulate and influence
without having to resort to the use of formal authority.
To be
and directions
to decipher the organization's political terrain, build a strong
and
supportive political base, and determine which influence strategies and tactics are most likely
to
be successful given the particular context and
situation.
While Pfeffer discusses the strengths and weaknesses of these three
alternative
approaches, emphasizing the importance of power and influence, the description and analysis
of Digital's Alpha chip episode illustrate just
how
important
it is
to use all three of these
methods for enhancing the likelihood of successful organizational and technological change.
As summarized
in
Figure
1
,
the development of a shared vision and organizational culture
within the Alpha team was vitally important for generating and sustaining the high levels of
motivation and cooperative problem-solving activity.
It
was
also essential that the efforts and
advances of the Alpha team become strongly integrated with the transitional strategies and
decisions being formulated and acted upon by those in positions of formal responsibility and
accountability.
learned just
And
how
finally
necessary
and perhaps most
it
was
to
critically, the
members of
be mindful of and active
the
Alpha team
in the political processes that
surround the attainment of sponsorship and the making of key strategic decisions, especially
under uncertainty.
Rather than simply commiserating with each other, isolating and
buffering themselves even
emerged
more from
as a high performing
team
Digital's
that
management, the Alpha team eventually
was able
motivation; (2) control and coordinate effectively
to: (1) establish
its
an incredibly high level of
developmental
activities;
and
(3) deal
successfully with the kinds of subjective judgements and political dynamics that take place in
almost
all
organizations.
17
Problem Areas
"
developed, according to Toshi Doi, the project leader, by an "oddball band of engineering
misfits.
Projects like these do not originate in a 'top-down' fashion; instead, they evolve as
pockets of individuals interact and excite each other about important technical developments,
Management
problems, and possibilities.
their businesses to
type' efforts.
If
be receptive
management
to the
is
is
many
just too caught
by working
of running
in the pressures
serious about fostering these kinds of accomplishments,
must do more than simply empower technologists
strategize
up
uncertainties and risks associated with 'leapfrog-
to take risk
and not fear
failure.
It
it
must
jointly with the R«S:D organization to plan and actively sponsor those
project developments that not only react to environmental changes but those that could help
create or shape market changes.
capitalists
who have
learned that
In
some
sense, the trick
when dealing with a
and
justifying their investments in the track records
is to
be
like successful venture
great of uncertainty, they are primarily
talents
of the individuals behind the ideas
rather than in the ideas themselves.
This relationship
organization's
in
R&D
is
best achieved
activities
Alpha, are more readily established
when
their 'neat ideas,' not in technical terms
those
who
when
strong linkages are built between the
and the overall business
per
strategies.
And such
connections, as
the technical leadership discovers
how
to present
but in terms that are meaningful and real to
se,
are managing and running the businesses.
Without
this
kind of partnership, the
organization runs the risk of exacerbating differences between important technical and
managerial parts of the organization rather than ameliorating them.
does become a success, the
rifts
and lack of supportive
trust
For even
if the
between these two
project
distinct
constituencies can endure such that the instances of the "good guys" versus the "bad guys"
"us versus them"
become
the images that the key players
And
remember.
if
-
these
dispositions are allowed to linger and strengthen, especially if technical people feel that they
are not being equitably recognized and rewarded as has happened in
many of
these cases,
then the long term continuity of technical development can be seriously impaired through
decreased morale and increased levels of turnover particularly
contributors'.
An
among
the key technical
organization must not only sponsor the research projects that get
19
it
into the
game;
keep
it
it
must build the long term hierarchical and crossfunctional "people alliances" that
in the
game!
20
NOTES
1.
As DEC'S
first
announced microprcKessor
in
Computer) technology, the Alpha chip nins
speed of
its
nearest competition; and
Book of World Records
it
RISC (Reduced
at
more than two
now been
has
Instruction Set
to three times the
included in the Guiness
as the world's fastest microprocessor with a clock
speed of more than 200 megahertz (MHz).
2.
When PRISM was
advanced operating system
As
would be used by
that
this chip also
became
upset.
verbalized by David Cutler, the leader of this software development area,
to his team:
down
"We
the drain."
really got
As
screwed
this effort
operating software team soon
was
left
-
years of development
Although the
PRISM
Digital to
chip ran at 75
work just went
located in Seattle, Cutler and
work
for Microsoft
succeeded in producing the software operating system
3.
new
cancelled, the software group working to develop the
MHz,
known
as
the team had learned
many of
his
where they've
Windows NT.
enough from
their previous design efforts to feel confident that they could "drive the
technology"
4.
Management
way beyond what
realized that the
others in the industry were forecasting.
Alpha chip would be needed much sooner than
expected in order to obtain substantial additional sales revenue from
products.
If the
Alpha chip was going
to
remain a viable option for
new
filling this
'revenue gap', then the schedule would have to be speeded up; otherwise, the
project
would once again run the
risk of being cancelled in favor of
some
other alternative product strategy.
5.
For some of
the
most recent publications on organizational culture, see Beer,
Eisenstat, and Spector (1990),
Senge (1990), Martin (1992), and Kotter and
Heskett (1992).
21
As with
Digital,
IBM
also rejected the concept of a
especially since revenues and profit margins
still
RISC-based computer,
its
mainframe business were
doing very well.
For a more in-depth description of
place within Xerox, see
A
from
start-up
is
the 7-year transformational
Keams and Nadler
a very different kind of organization, since in a start-up
functions and groupings are usually focusing on the
product.
change
As a
result, differences in
that
took
(1992).
all
of the
same technology and end
backgrounds, resources, rewards,
etc. are
not as salient or as problematic.
What
often happens
is that
sponsoring managers,
and positions as a
i.e.,
result
guys, receive relatively
the technical people see the non-participative, non-
the "bad" guys, ending up with
more
of the project's success while they,
little
for their persevering efforts.
22
i.e.,
exciting
work
the "good"
REFERENCES
Beer, M., Eisenstat, R.,
&
Spector, B.
Why
(1990).
change programs don't produce
Harvard Business Review £6,158-166.
change.
.
Cooper, R.
Katz, R.,
1986.
&
Winning
Allen, T.
new products
at
Managing
collection of reading s: 442-456,
Keams, D.,
&
&
Kotter, J.,
Nadler, D.
Heskett,
J.
MA:
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Organizational issues in the introduction of
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Reading,
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New
(1992).
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Corporate culture and performance
New
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Martin,
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Cultures in organizations: Three perspectives
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(1988).
Concepts for the management of organizational change. In M.
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Nayak,
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York: Rawson Associates.
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Schein, E.
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Managing
New
York:
The International Center for Research on the Management of Technology
Sloan School of Management
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Filerman
32-91
CAD System Use and Engineering Performance in Mechanical Design
Allen
1/91
33-91
6/91
35-91
2/91
Investigating the Effectiveness of Technology-Based Alliances: Patterns and
Impacts of Supervisory Promotion and Sodal Location on Subordinate Promotion in an
RD&E Setting: An Investigation of EHial Ladders
Katz
Tushman
Demography and Design: Predictors of New Product Team Performance
Ancona
Caldwell
Allen
1/91
37-91
2/91
George
Consequences of Inter-Firm Cooperation
(Rev. 11/91)
36-91
Robertson
The Changing Role
of
Teams
in Orgjmizations: Strategies for Survival
Number
Date
38-91
Author(s)
Title
Schrader
Informal Alliances: Information Trading Between Firms
3/91
39-91
3/91
40-91
3/91
Supplier Relations and Management:
and
U.S.
Strategic
A Siarvey of Japanese,
Japanese-Transplant,
Cusumano
Takeishi
Auto Plants
Maneuvering and Mass-Market E>ynamics: The Triumph
of
VHS
Over Beta
Cusumano
Mylonadis
Rosenbloom
41-91
The Softw^are
Factory:
An
Entry for the Enq/clopedia of
Software Engineering
Cusumano
3/91
42-91
Dominant Designs and the Survival
Su^ez
of Firms
Utterback
4/91 (Rev 7/92)
43-91
An Environment for Entrepraieurs
Roberts
Technology Transfer from Corporate Research to Operations: Effects
of Perceptions on Technology Adoption
Nochur
6/91
44-91
7/91
45-91
When Speeding Concepts
to
Allen
Market Can Be a Mistake
Utterback
Meyer
3/91
Tuff
Richardson
46-91
Paradigm Shift: From Mass Production
to
Mass Customization
Pine
6/91
47-91
8/91
48-91
Murotake
Compmter Aided Engineering and Project Performance: Managing
a Double-Edged Sword
The Marketing and
Allen
R&D Interface
Griffin
Hauser
10/91 (Rev. 2/92)
49-91
Systematic' Versus Accidental" Reuse in Japanese Software Factories
Cusumano
10/91
50-91
Hexibility
and Performance:
A
Literature Critique
and
Strategic
Framework
Suarez
Cusumano
11/91
Fine
51-91
11/91
52-91
12/91
53-91R
1993
54-91R
Sp/93
55-91
Shifting Economies:
From
Craft Production to Flexible
Cusumano
Systems
and Software Factories
An Analysis of Entry and Persistence among Scientists in an Emerging Field
Institutional Variations in
Scientists in
Problem Choice and Persistence among
Debackere
Rappa
an Emerging Field
Youth and Scientific Innovation: The Role
Development of a New Field
of
Young Sderttists
Technological Communities and the Diffusion of
Rappa
in the
Debackere
Rappa
Knowledge
Debackere
12/91
56-91
The Voice
of the
Griffin
Customer
Hauser
10/91
57-92
1/92
Rappa
Debackere
(Rev. 9/92)
The Influence
of Inter-Project Strategy
on Market Performance
in the
Auto Industry
Nobeoka
Cusumano
Number
Date
58-92
1/92
59-92i?
Title
Linking International Technology Transfer with Strategy and Management:
A Literature Commentary
Scientists in a Field:
The Case
of Cochlear Implants
9/91
62-92
Garud
Debackere
Garud
A Sodo-Cognitive Model of Technology Evolution:
The Case
of Cochlear Implants
On the
Persistence of Researchers in Technological
Garud
Development
Rappa
An International Comparison of Scientists
Life
on the
The
Social Construction of Technological Reality
Frontier:
in
an Emerging Field
Debackere
Rappa
1/92
64-92
Garud
Rappa
(Rev. 2/93)
12/91
63-92
Rappa
Rappa
Technological Progress and the Duration of Contribution Spans
2/92
61-92
Cusumano
Elenkov
Modeling Contribution-spans of
4/92
60-92i?
Author(s^
65-92
2/92
Core Competencies, Product Families and Sustained Business Success
66-92
Windows Of Opportimity:
3/92
Garud
Rappa
1/92
Utterback
Meyer
Creating Occasions For Technological
Adaptation In Organizations
Tyre
Orlikowski
(Rev. 9/92)
—
67-92R
4/93
Puritan - Bennett
the Renaissance™ Spirometry System: Listening
to the Voice of the Customer
68-92
Time
2/92
Flies
When You're Having Fim: How Consumers Allocate Their Time When
Evaluating Products
(Rev. 11/92)
69-92
Moving
Ideas to Market and Corporate Renewal
7/92
70-92
Hauser
Hauser
Urban
Weinberg
Meyer
Utterback
Project
Management
in
Technology Innovation, Application and Transfer
Frankel
5/92
71-92
Investments of Uncertain Cost
Pindyck
9/92
72-92
Identifying Controlling Features of Engineering Design Iteration
9p/92
73-92
Smith
Eppinger
Objectives and Context of Software Measxirement, Analysis and Control
Cusumano
10/92
74-92
An
Empirical Study of Manufacturing Flexibility in Printed-Circuit Board Assembly
11/92
Suarez
Cusumano
Fine
75-92
11/92
76-92
11/92
(Rev. 3/93)
Japanese Technology Management: Innovations, Transferability, and the
Limitations of 'Lean' Production
Customer-Satisfaction Based Incentive Systems
Cusumano
Hauser
Simester
Wemerfelt
Number
Date
77-92i?
Title
The Product Family and the Dynamics
of Core Capability
Utterback
4/93
78-92
11/92
79-92
and Organizational Coordination
Automobile Product Development
Multi-Project Strategy
Pattern of Industrial Evolution:
in
Dominant Design and the Survival of Firms
12/92
80-92
11/92
81-92
AuthorCs)
Meyer
Innovation from Differentiation: Pollution Control Departments and
Innovation in the Printed Circuit Industry
Answer Garden and
the Organization of Expertise
Nobeoka
Cusumano
Utterback
Suarez
King
Ackerman
1/92
82-92
Skip and Scan: Qeaning
Up Telephone
Interfaces
2/92
83-92
Developing Nev^r Products and Services by Listening to the Voice of the Customer
Resnick
Virzi
Roberts
8/92
84-92
A
Comparative Analysis of Design Rationale Representations
3/92
85-93
1/93
86-93
An Introductory Note for Using
Analyze Nodes, Relationships, Partitions and Boundaries
Relational Ditta in Organizational Settings:
AGNI and Netgraphs
An
Asset-Based
to
View of Technology Transfer in
International Joint Ventures
2/93
87-93
Lee
Lai
George
Allen
Rebentish
Ferretti
Managing Techirological Leaps:
A Study of DEC's Alpha Design Team
4/93
(Rev. 6/93)
Paper numbers with the
suffix
R
are reprints
Katz
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