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ALFRED
P.
WORKING PAPER
SLOAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT
Management
in
Centrally
Technology
Planned Economy
of
Jong-Tsong Chiang
WP
February 1990
3130-90-BPS
MASSACHUSETTS
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
50 MEMORIAL DRIVE
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02139
lAPRlS. 1990
O
ij
c?'<
)
Management
in
Centrally
Technology
Planned Economy
of
Jong-Tsong Chiang
WP
February 1990
The author
is
grateful
International
the
to
Systems Analysis (IIASA), the
Institute
3130-90-BPS
Institute
of Social
for Applied
Management of
Bulgaria, the Prague University of Economics, the Czechoslovak
Academy of Sciences and
the
USSR Academy
of Sciences for their
financial support and other assistance in doing the field research.
is
also deeply
advice,
help,
indebted to
many
and interpretation.
friends'
invaluable information,
He
—
"
II
fritiwi.^-"-^
Management
Technology
of
Economy
Planned
Centrally
in
Abstract
This paper studies the management of technology in centrally
planned economies, namely, the
From
USSR
and East European countries.
cross-technology perspective,
a
mainly cover military, nuclear power and computers
investigation
with a view to contrasting their distinctions.
arguments made, technologies
new
biotechnology and
appropriate.
In
space,
like
materials
also
are
COMECON:
to
that
main
are the
laser,
further support the
automation,
new
mentioned where
management of technology
the West,
in
framework of the
Economic Assistance)
the Council for Mutual
depict the patterns of
opposed
To
addition to the cases in different national contexts,
the international cooperation within the
To
under
technologies
in
is
CMEA
(or
discussed.
the East as
only systematically determined issues
The preliminary conclusions reached
foci in this paper.
are:
Relative to the
1.
West
USSR)
the East (mainly the
system technologies, and
in
(and, in military field, mainly the U.S.),
has performed well in military and space
nuclear power technology but at the
great expense of safety terms.
others like laser, robotics,
new
computer technology and several
In
materials and
new biotechnology,
the
overall records of the East are quite poor.
2.
The Eastern
strikingly
uneven performance
in
various
technologies of strategic importance suggests the existence of
systemic
patterns
some
between national institutions and
of "interactions"
technologies of different characters.
3.
With respect
to the
dynamic nature of technology, a centrally
planned system tends to perform relatively poorly when technology
progress
manifests
"paradigm change"
which requires autonomous
and entrepreneurial initiatives to capitalize on the opportunities.
with
typically
commitment,
are in
strong,
this
"trajectory"
centralized
system
leadership
may work
phase.
1
But
and long-term
satisfactorily
in
technologies that
system
in
a
follower position tends to perform better in system
technology than
in
calculation
the shelf" or in
because the
basic technology,
freedom and autonomy
rational
command
Limited to military technology, a centralized,
4.
prosper,
to
and the former mainly applies
Should major innovations arise
"trajectory" phase.
the "element technology"
level
needs more
"element technologies" mostly "on
integrating
in
latter
at
on the competitors' side, the time lag
before they are incorporated into the system
system a chance to make up for
may
give a
command
possible weakness in system
its
technology.
5.
military
The technological
sector and a
"dual structure" consisting of a strong
weak
civilian
sector tends to inhibit "spin-off"
and "spin-on" effects, nullify "virtuous circle" between military and
civilian
6.
technologies,
and underutilize "dual use" technologies.
The "doubly"
international
initiatives
levels
centrally planned
tends
to
seriously
across national boundaries.
system
at
the national
suffocate joint
In
technological
the meantime,
market mechanisms will retard economically motivated
transfer
and joint
R&D.
and
lack of
technology
Contents
1.
2.
Introduction
Science and Technology Development System and Innovation
2.1.
"Dual" and Compartmentalized Structure
2.2.
Systemic Barriers
3.
Innovation
to
Military Technology
3.1.
Comparison of Military System and Basic Technologies
3.2.
Management of
3.3.
Design Strategies and
3.4.
Similarities in Space
4.
Military Technology Programs
New
Technology Challenges
Technology
Nuclear Power Technology
4.1.
Progress in Nuclear Power and Related Technology
4.2.
Management of Nuclear Power Technology and Consequence
5.
Computer Technology
5.1.
Early Development and Joint Program of Computer Technology
5.2.
Diverse National Strategies in Computers and Outcomes
6.
International
Cooperation within
CMEA
Framework
6.1.
Limits to Fraternal and Gratuitous Cooperation
6.2.
Limits to Institutions without Market Mechanisms
7.
Managerial Implications
7.1.
Uneven Performance
7.2.
Centrally Planned System for Various Technologies
7.3.
"Dual Structure" and "Spin-off and "Spin-on"
7.4. Distinction in
8.
in
Three Technological Fields
Managing System and Basic Technologies
Concluding Remarks
Introduction
1.
When
was being collected and
the relevant information
study done, Eastern Europe and the
USSR
For an analysis of current
transitions.
"Soviet-type,"
terms like "the East,"
"Soviet bloc" or "centrally planned economy," and
now
questionable
all
were undergoing drastic
state,
Economic Assistance (CMEA)
organizations like the Council for Mutual
are
given the present prevailing
reforms and centrifugal forces within the East bloc.
however,
mainly
is
to
at
least
structural
This paper,
study the crucial managerial issues in
technology development
with
in
planned economies
centrally
"classic"
moderately industrialized
Hence many
level.
economic
the East bloc so far are mostly confined to political and
General phenomena
in
(S&T)
science and technology
have not been deviated very much from the past track.
most of the arguments are supposed
With
a
view
to
comparing
to
activities
Therefore
hold for the present situation.
management of
patterns of
the
facts
Besides, the changes in
under investigation have long been existing.
arena.
field
technology (not managenient of science) between the East and the
West,
paper will focus on systematically determined issues
this
relating to the centrally planned
economic
situations,
other aspects
development
specific
to
Though policy
system.
stage,
historical
loci
decisions,
and many
individual programs and countries cannot be
overlooked, only those which can rather reasonably be attributed to
Because of the
systemic character will be discussed.
to
reliable
research
information^
process, 2
and personal
field
many
visit
and the language barrier encountered
reports with English
It
is
would not seriously hamper the objective
main threads
2.
Science
for a brief "pattern
and
Technology
"Dual"
and
the
language translation
hoped
in
that these limitations
this
research to grasp
analysis."
Development
System
Innovation
2.1.
in
and impression without rigorous
observation
data support have to be relied on.
the
difficult access
Compartmentalized
Structure
and
^
The
pivotal role of
S&T
in
socio-economic development
is
Ever since the Bolsheviks
set
recognized in classic communism.
to industrialize the
agenda.
high
USSR, S&T
^
out
has been on the party-state central
Despite the policy fluctuation in the early decades between
self-dependence and more interaction with the West, the strong
mobilization of
activities
R&D
S&T
resources and nationwide institutionalized
S&T tradition.
S&T system in the USSR
characterize the Soviet
was also
War Two, the
modeled by or, as many have argued, imposed upon Eastern Europe
To some extent. Communist
after the USSR dominated this area.
After World
But the case of China
China adopted a system of similar character.
involves deep "South" (as opposed to "North") features in addition to
"East" (as opposed to "West") ones^ which are the foci of this paper.
It
is
thus not to be discussed except in rather self-evident occasions
needing no special elaboration.
The approach of "Soviet-type"
activities
to
to avoid
competition
S&T
system
the flaws of Western pattern
is
R&D
to centralize
(e.g.,
inefficiency due
and duplication among secretive independent firms
and frequent lack of adequate financial support from government),
and to insulate them from the "noise" of daily production and
making so as
to concentrate
on
profit-
This
"really important" topics.
system, by simplicity, can be regarded as consisting of three levels
and, at the second and third levels, three major subsystems.
At the top level
is
some kind of commission planning and
S&T activities on a nationwide basis.
S&T subcommission or some responsible
However, the
coordinating
defense
authorities
normally exerted much more influence over military
have
S&T
development than the non-military counterparts have done over
non-military matters.
Moreover, the influential military, which
resulted in part from a continuous and pervading
threat
from the West, has also biased resource allocation
expense of non-military sector.
Therefore,
immediate or potential military applications
coordinated and monitored.
a typical market
state
sense of military
This
economy where
planning and control,
is
is
in
S&T
is
the
development having
far
contrast with
the military,
at
better
supported,
what happens
in
a major force applying
confined to areas of apparent military
The
relevance.
by commercial motives, possesses rather
and prompted
resources
endorsed with relatively more
sector,
civilian
As
strong technological capabilities.
a result, the relative
technological strength in military and non-military sectors in a
economy
centrally planned
typical
is
reality
in
far
more "unbalanced"
than that in an advanced market economy.
At the second level-the ministerial
level,
there
three
are
"pyramids": the academy of sciences responsible for basic and
R&D
fundamental research, the industrial ministries for applied
relating
industries,
their
to
and the ministry of education (mainly
department for higher education) for education related research.
The
many
level consists of
third
frontline
R&D
and technical
Because these
institutes
and labs that carry out specific projects.
institutes
and labs are normally responsible vertically
respective
ministries
or
academy, the horizontal and
to
their
lateral
communication and personnel mobility are seriously hampered.
Without strong
initiatives
R&D
concert highly prioritized
the
top level
authorities
scanty.
across the organizational boundaries,
There
human
is
little
market force as a major impetus to mobility of
resources, exchange and transaction of technical
information,
investment in risky but potentially profitable
innovations,
and commercialization of new products and processes.
2.2.
to
exchange and cooperation between these three "worlds" are
active
R&D
empowered by
Systemic
Barriers
to
Innovation
Without taking into account the adverse effects of Western
embargo mainly through
Committee
S&T
for Export to
framework of the Coordinating
the
Communist Area (COCOM),
development system has
barriers,
albeit
especially
First,
to
technological
to
number of systemic
innovation.
unlike in Western countries where
concurrently military and civilian
rules
general a
varying degrees in different countries, hindering
non-military
the
in
restrict
the Soviet-type
the diffusion
R&D
many
firms execute
and production (though with
of classified information), these two
missions in the East are normally implemented by different formal
organizations,
and
military
related
departments
are
strictly
insulated
9
^
from non-military departments.
research
and
is
on the basis of
classified
is
immune
Besides, far too
its
scientific
importance
military
stated
This results in very
to criticism.^
much
little
technology
diffusion from military sector to civilian sector.
Second, because of the compartmentalization of three
"pyramids,"
universities
as teachers and of challenge
the
from lack of high calibre researchers
suffer
academy of sciences
from advanced research projects; labs
which are
traditionally
research and at the "blackboard end" are
the
application
phase;
are
working
best
incremental
innovative
at
in
strong in theoretical
getting through to
and technical units under industrial ministries
only on
and
short-term trouble-shooting
improvements without steady infusion of more
ideas
from
scientific
community.^
Third, the separation of major
production and market
potential
weak
in
effect
in
R&D
users of their
R&D
impedes
results,
organizations from
R&D
units'
contact with
and deprives them of better and
quick understanding of and response to the real world demands.
This weakness can hardly be overcome by the effort made by the
state
planning and coordination bodies, because they are normally
distant
from and thus poorly informed of the
Fourth, the non-profit character of
the
may
R&D
real
world practices.
activities
suppresses
economic incentives of both organizations and individuals, which
otherwise encourage commercialization of
technical services to industries.
projects to
aim
at
R&D
results
or
many
This character also frees
world advanced targets regardless of local
and the achievements,
if
R&D
reality,
any, are very often difficult to apply in the
industry.
Fifth,
the
system of financing
institutes
rather than
projects
helps create and strengthen a tendency of budget allocation
R&D
according to the size of
organizations.
This tends to reduce
performance competition, encourage size-expansion
and
internal
promotion based on seniority rather than merit, and demotivate
devoted and talented
staff, ^o
Sixth, the best educated
or are assigned to
R&D
of the research work.
new comers normally seek
institutes
As
to ensure
R&D
jobs,
the quality and standard
a consequence, outstanding scientists and
^
R&D
engineers tend to cluster in some prestigious
great capability gulf between
persists. 1
R&D
and a
institutes,
and production units thus
^
Seventh, the industry, due to the lack of relatively strong
technical staff and close linkages with advanced
usually technically obsolescent.
facilities
and services needed
advanced
in
impeding many advanced
seriously
institutes,
is
also unable to provide proper
is
It
R&D
S&T
R&D
thus
projects,
programs.^
Eighth, a combination of the lack of market competition
pressure
leads
state
common
and the
a strong conservative
to
toward innovation
weak innovative
Ninth, the
production
sector
incentives and capabilities
stymies the exploitation
further
imported from the West.
may
and even negative attitude
industry.
the
in
by the
output goals requested
quantitative
of the
of technology
Therefore the cost of technology imports
very often be more than the benefit, leading to the deteriorating
The
of payments. ^^
balance
industrial
content between
technical
products'
two decades^'* seems
for the past
Finally,
the
political
widening gap of most
fact that there is a
to
the
indirectly
and bureaucratic
East and the West
support this concern.
rigidity,
delays,
interference
and misconceptions not only suffocate many
autonomous
initiatives,
staff.
many
To pursue
also
demoralize working level research
the scientific enquiry of interest to themselves,
regularly exploit the ignorance
scientists
program administrators
the indulgence of
result,
but
many S&T
are
activities
actually
to
of policy-makers and
their
much
advantage.
As
a
deviated from the
original plans or unlikely to yield any real value to national
interests. 15
What
inclusive.
"regular"
has been mentioned above
is
It
not intended to be
just a qualitative description
of the general and
phenomena with many "exceptions" discounted.
Nevertheless
it
is
quite evident that most problems
and even self-reinforcing.
whole
is
picture,
many
technologies as will
understandable.
To
Based on
this
are
rough knowledge about the
management of more
be discussed below would be more
issues in the
contrast
the possible distinctions,
8
interrelated
specific
three
important
strategically
technologies— military,
nuclear
power and
computers--are mainly chosen for in-depth comparison, along with a
of space technology, laser, robotics,
brief elaboration
biotechnology
new
and
materials
new
supplement the mainstream
to
analysis of the three fields.
Technology
Military
3.
3.1.
Comparison of Military System and
Basic
Technologies
Without question, the Soviet hegemonistic position
is
mainly based on
Besides,
strength.
its
it
world
the
in
superior military muscle rather than economic
dominates the Eastern military technology
because the advanced weapon systems
in
Warsaw Pact
the
are
mostly of Soviet development and even production.
The Soviet
military technology, in striking contrast with
civilian technology, has been a remarkable success
story.
its
Two
decades after three devastating crises—the First World War,
revolution and civil war, the fledgling Soviet industries and
laboratories
World War.
matched what Germany could produce
Again about two decades
later the
against the technological might of the U.S.
in
USSR
the
Second
own
held their
All this feat has been
achieved with an industrial and technological base always smaller
and
less
advanced than
its
competitors'.
In military technology, the U.S. Department of Defense
recently has
made
irrespective
of
a comparison between the U.S. and the
how
achieved. ^^
Among
the
(DoD)
USSR,
20 aggregate basic
technologies which are thought to have the greatest potential for
improving military capabilities
in
the next
10 to 20 years and are "on
the shelf" available for applications, the U.S. leads the
significant margin in
software,
microelectronics
manufacturing,
sciences.
materials
signal
But the
"traditional"
is
advanced structural materials,
and integrated
processing,
USSR
items,
by a
most categories, including computers and
guidance, optics,
sensors,
USSR
circuits,
automated
telecommunications and
life
roughly on a par with the U.S. in the more
such as aerodynamics, conventional and nuclear
warhead, power sources and directed energy
(laser).
However,
in
most
where the U.S.
fields
Only
being eclipsed.
ahead of the USSR, the U.S. position
is
computers and software, the U.S. lead
in
is
is
believed to be widening.
On
overall
the other hand, evidence
superiority
considering
exists
scenario,
many
in
missiles, the
and
in
command,
3.2.
some
In
strategic
antisatellite
appears to excel.
ballistic
missiles
weapon systems
like
weapons and surface-to-air
In tactical air and naval forces
communications and intelligence (C3I), the
control,
As
U.S. has the upper hand.
eroding.
Without
or other operational
training
including intercontinental
forces.
USSR
does not have
judges that parity between the two superpowers
defense,
missile
that the U.S.
system technology.
quantity,
tactics,
fields,
(ICBMs) and land
ballistic
military
DoD
the U.S.
factors,
in
shows
a whole, however, the U.S. lead
is
again
^^
Management
Programs
Technology
Military
of
Plausible explanation for the above "facts"
there are
some
exploitation
clues.
of the
On
is
far
from easy.
But
the Soviet side, concentration of priority,
"follower's advantage,"
ingenuity in offsetting the
weakness of an inferior economy, determined military and
political
and intense development of military science and
leadership,
engineering are generally argued to be the major reasons.^
More
specifically, the
military-related
has coped with the increasing "basic
weapon systems by close
science content" in the
military industry
USSR
and the Academy of Sciences.
research
units
*
ties
between the
Well-known
under the roof of the Academy
include the Institutes of Atomic Energy, Radio Engineering, and
Precision Mechanics and Computing Technology clustering
Department of Engineering Sciences, which
abolished
among
and whose original
industrial
ministries
functions
flexible
1960s was
were partly redistributed
The funding
for military
R&D
is
and project-oriented rather than rigid budgeting.
And many Academy
as
the early
and partly taken over by the Department
of Mechanics and Control Processes.
prioritized,
in
around the
researchers
serve
consultants.
10
military-industrial
customers
own
their
capable
R&D
number of
a
industries,
military-related
the
In
have
ministries
For example, the Ministry of Aviation
labs.
R&D
aerodynamics,
Industry maintains
six
engines,
equipments, production technology and flight
materials,
principal
The ministry and
performance respectively.
responsible
for
R&D
frontier
conservative.
In
also
^
9
application
several
decades. ^o
addition
in
the
in
to
normal
its
Therefore the centralized
of technology has been institutionalized
similar strategy of centralization and
reflected
era the General
weapon system development,
planning and development.
military
USSR
the post-Stalin
in
procurement and deployment,
military forces
A
though
and are famous for their role as an innovator, not
Staff has been in the center of
integration,
institutes,
encourage and conduct
consistently
uniformed military,
the
for
and thus inevitably inclined toward
standard-setting
uniformity,
conservative
institutes
for
systematization
is
Commission (VPK) under
Military-Industrial
also
the
Council of Ministers to coordinate defense industries and
oversee the acquisition and application of foreign technology. ^i
strong,
centralized
command system may
degree
a considerable
to
This
explain the Soviet shorter cycle than the U.S. in utilizing novel
technologies and deploying
time
it
On
USSR
It
is
estimated that the
one and a half generations.22
the U.S. side, despite
technologies,
is
systems.
takes the U.S. to deploy a single generation of military
systems allows the
level
new
its
stronger capabilities in creating
its
narrowing lead especially
attributed
mainly to the
at
the
new
system technology
and bureaucratic constraints
political
on long-range planning and technology project management, and the
increasing complexity of regulatory regimes
related
R&D
More
in
affecting
military-
industry and universities.^^
specifically, funding in the U.S.
is
found particularly
vulnerable in procurement or later stages of development.
Funding
also fluctuates widely from year to year because of Congress
budgetary process, and
planning. 24
this
is
very disruptive to long-term
in competing for key technical and managerial
personnel, the DoD's ability
is
declining. 25
1
1
In technology development,
tradition,
Services run, as a long
three
R&D
technology programs and
their
institutes
differently.
The Army emphasizes decentralization and owns many relatively
small labs; the Navy stresses in-house R&D from basic research
through pre-production stages and has larger and integrated labs;
and the Air Force contracts out more of
In addition,
Services.
R&D
than the other two
Advanced Research
there are the Defense
Agency (DARPA, formerly ARPA) taking care of technology
Projects
that
its
does not
neatly into what the Services want to do, and the
fit
newly formed Strategic Defense
Initiative
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
Organization (SDIO) for the
Basically, the
dominated by bottom-up approach: most
whole planning
decisions
real
The Office of
within the component organizations.
are
is
made
the Secretary of
Defense only provides general guidance and reviews Service
programs without exercising any strong role
in
molding them.
In
other words,
DoD
for planning
and coordination, except for some special cross-Service
does not have a central headquarter-level system
programs, such as VHSIC,
Though
system
this
is
MMIC,
knowledge needed
nevertheless
lacks
3.3.
top level
program
Design
manage individual programs,
to
strategic
and
Strategies
weapon designs
economy
in
constraints
to
stress
response to
in
it
is
a tradition in the Soviet
commonality, heredity and
uneven and inferior technological base,
its
One example
its
as
many
parts as
Generally
more complex, and therefore
more slowly once production
also required to get the "bugs" out of
crews to be proficient
The
fighter's engine.
U.S. equivalent of the day.
speaking, U.S. equipments tend to be
tend to get built
is
MIG-21 contains about one-tenth
the engine used in F-4,
train the
Challenges
production capabilities, and limited access to imported
Soviet engine for
is
planning and coherent and
New Technology
simplicity,
equipments and materials. 28
time
it
coordination. 27
should be noted, however, that
It
the recent SDI.
not necessarily bad in the light of the
professional
consistent
STARS,26 and
SEI,
in their use.
starts.
Much more
new systems and
to
This reflects a
technological emphasis on higher performance at the expense of
12
other factors such as cost and maintainability, and an emphasis on
design technology over production technology, resulting in more
But once the bugs are
costly systems.
have proven more
In recent years,
many newly emerging
impose more constraints upon the
recent U.S. systems
maintainable and operable. ^9
available,
reliable,
many
out,
USSR
technologies seem to
than upon the U.S. in
decades, most
military
technology development.
military
(and even civilian) technological innovations were mainly
In
the
earlier
based on known principles and proven applied science and
knowledge. ^^
engineering
electronics,
Military mechanization, aviation, early
nuclear weapons and strategic delivery systems are
good examples,
USSR
which the
in
But
mastering and catching up.
where increasingly more basic
all
has shown distinguished records in
many modern
in
technological fields,
discoveries
scientific
are
directly
connected, 31 broader array of disciplines and higher precision
components, materials and equipments are needed,^^ and
industries are
moving
to
"dual"
manifested severe problems.
A
Western
3.4.
fact,
the
commitment and
in
launched in 1957
Space
strong,
is
Its
earth's
legendary.
Its
perseverance.
It
stable,
management
centralized
first
artificial
first real
17 failing attempts shows
after
its
the Soviet
the U.S. and
some
a
long-term
is
also
satellite
used in
Sputnik
success in the study of
succeeded in 1986 studying Halley's Comet.
Now
it
has at
And
it
its
technology sufficiently advanced for implementing
effectively most practical space applications.
But the fact that the
Soviet technological and industrial base remains relatively narrow
also reflected in
relies
1
very tenacity and
recently re-embarked on the study of Mars.
disposal
is
Technology
development pattern of
Soviet space programs.
Venus
good example
countries.
Similarities
In
development base and pattern have
modern avionics and C3I behind
significant lag in
technology, "33 the
the cutting edge of "dual
Soviet overall weaker and
civilian
its
space programs.
is
Although the Soviet spacecraft
heavily on automated control with cosmonauts as backup,
crewmembers have,
in
many
instances,
13
assumed broader duties than
their U.S.
counterparts to
make up
Space technological applications
automation. 34
in
telecommunications,
meteorology,
in
reconnaissance, eavesdropping, remote
navigation,
earth resources, etc.
unsophisticated
have
of the
sensing
been developed, but with
all
which are heavy and unreliable, and have
satellites
poor performance and a short
satellites.
for failures
life
span relative to advanced Western
Films of the civilian earth observation are
still
brought
back on board retrievable capsules, whereas the U.S. Landsat or the
SPOT
French
have been transmitting accurate
for years
satellites
This relative technological weakness
pictures.
may
why
explain
the
Soviet space activities are far ahead of the rest of the world in terms
of quantity: over 600 tons of payload put into near-earth orbit each
year, a
number
three to four times that of the U.S.^^
The "Soviet-type" development
technology programs
in
and space
military
Communist China.
also used in
is
strategy
Despite
its
very backward civilian technology and industry. Communist China
"unexpectedly"
satellites,
strong
But
production. 37
and
shortcomings" similar to the
Progress
shows
its
own
"structural
USSR.
in
Nuclear
Power and
attention
because of
its
highly complex technology and
the East European countries
Even
developing
its
GDR
USSR
deserves
self-dependence in this
GDR
and Czechoslovakia, none of
have any signiHcant nuclear science
start
their
and Czechoslovakia, the
HWGCR
the
unique development pattern and
its
experience or industrial capacity to
programs.
in
nearly total
With the exception of
consequence.
Technology
Related
power
In civilian technology, nuclear
special
it
also has
Power Technology
Nuclear
4.1.
It
launch vehicles and ground support facilities of
development
4.
nuclear weapons. ^^
strategic
in
is
own
nuclear energy
latter failing in
(heavy water-moderated, carbon dioxide gas-
cooled reactor), have been fully based on reactors supplied from the
USSR
like the other East
discussion
is
European countries.
solely about the Soviet case. ^ 8
14
Therefore the following
Like the U.S., the fundamental technology of Soviet nuclear
power was
developed and tested for military purposes, and
first
transferred to the civilian industry.
later
USSR
1937
started a
number of
nuclear physics, the
In
scientific institutes
built the Europe's first small cyclotron.
it
mid- 1930s.
the
in
1939
In
In
the
spontaneous fission of uranium 235 was simultaneously discovered
in the
USSR.
During World
program" was started
bomb was
exploded.
in
In
War Two,
the military.
1953 the
a large-scale "uranium
1949 the
In
first
Soviet
first
Soviet atomic
H-bomb was
tested,
only ten months later than the U.S.'s.
Due
to
the
economic reason which includes heavy
industrial
energy consumption, shortening fossil energy supply, and costly
remote sources exploitation, the Soviet energy policy
era
was oriented mainly
to
nuclear energy. 39
world's
its
post-war
the
in
first
MWe) was put in operation in
scale, LWGRs (light water-cooled,
or, in Russian abbreviation, RBMK) (100
experimental nuclear power station (5
On
1954.
a real industrial
graphite-moderated reactors
MWe
PWRs (pressurized water reactors or, in Russian
VVER) (210 MWe each) were put into commercial
1958 and 1964 respectively. In 1988, in the USSR 58
each) and
abbreviation,
operation in
reactors in total were in operation,
45 units under planning, showing
27 units under construction and
its
strong determination to "go
nuclear."'*o
In addition to the nuclear fission reactors, the
the fusion research and fast breeder reactors
1968
it
developed the world's
confinement for fusion.
and 550
MWe)
first
(FBRs) top
also gives
priority.
In
tokamak, the magnetic
Presently in the
USSR two FBRs
are in operation, a third one (750
construction and a fourth one (1500
USSR
MWe)
MWe)
(135
MWe
under
under planning.
In the
West, only France, whose government has been more successfully
silencing public concerns about nuclear power, has
fast breeder reactors
(LMFBRs) (250
construction project started in
MWe
1974 but
and 1200
its
MWe).
metal
FRG's
Except France and
other industrialized countries have serious
15
liquid
completion has been
postponed year after year and not yet Hnished.
FRG, no
two
FBR
programs.
^
Management
Consequence
Power Technology and
Nuclear
of
4.2.
The Soviet nuclear power technology in terms of progress in
output scale and new reactor R&D is remarkable.
This record can
again be attributed to the state leadership and determination in
stable,
long-term investment.
The designers,
open challenge or
little
This
countries.
in
criticism,
where public opinions and mass media
the
plant
West,
"interrupt"
and
construction
to
utilities
defend
and equipment suppliers and designers compete for
safety,
by no
is
satisfactory.
larger in
MWe
Soviet nuclear power station per installed
the
First,
is
There
classified.
But the result of the Soviet-type development
market.
means
is
even from East European
independent regulatory agencies force
operation,
state
all
striking contrast with the situation in the
in
is
law.
like
is
time for some prescribed dates
However, much of the information
rewarded.
has been
state plan
operators and inspectors are
Completion of projects
employees.
is
suppliers,
In reality, the
effect
and usage of construction materials, and considerably
size
higher in the number of operation and service personnel than the
comparable stations
in
Second, safety
instance,
the
two
They were found
is
France and FRG.'*i
very problematic, clearly reflected
stations
in,
for
exported to Finland in the mid-1970s.
unsatisfactory
by Western standards and thus
needed the U.S. firm Westinghouse's additional work
containment
in
and reserve cooling systems.'*
Third,
the
Soviet weakness in modern computers,
microelectronics and automation, which are essential to the control of
nuclear power,
productivity,
in
questionable reliability, safety and
and serious shortage of simulators'*^ which help
personnel and
The
results
upgrade decision making quality.
disastrous Chernobyl
far-reaching
train
implications
to
accident in
1986 has brought about
Soviet development
reactor design and management.
including
strategy,
USSR
After the accident the
openly published highly sensitive information and invited
Western experts
to investigate
and provide advices.
Chernobyl-type reactors would have never got license
16
It
is
in
rather
many
judged that
the West.^'*
6
Despite the Soviet official report that the main cause
human
is
negligence, by Western standards the flaws in safety design are
evaluated to have put excessive demands on plant operators.'*^
Though
in
USSR
large public discussion or protests either in the
or
any East European country has not been evoked, the State
Committee of
the
USSR
to supervise safety related conduct, including
training and construction quality,
Ministers
also
made many
prohibitions and
was
created.
not
concrete,
responsibility
leading figures was underway.
LWGR (RBMK)
shift from LWGR
construction projects of
there has been a clear
LWGR
abstract,
And
assignments.
In the
The USSR Council of
recommendations,
the reshuffle of
meantime, a number of
have been susp)ended, and
to
PWR
(VVER), because
Chernobyl-type.'*
is
The Soviet experience
as mentioned
above shows
much
that
of
the technical progress in nuclear power, especially in light of the
military origin
and technological complexity, can be enhanced by
strong leadership and
state
long-term commitment.
hand there exist many serious
suppliers
may
implementation
pitfalls.
Lack of competition by
lead to complacency in cost-effectiveness.
may produce compromises
in
quality.
independent regulatory checks and enforcement
Given
that
But on the other
governments
in
may
Politicized
Absence of
sacrifice
safety.
most Western industrialized countries
play a very influential and even direct role in nuclear power
technology, the seemingly extreme case in the
thoughts,
reality
seem not so extreme.
more
or less share
a matter of degree.
some
Many Western
Others, due to
weak
5.1.
state
may, on second
countries
similarities with the
lack the indigenous capabilities in nuclear
5.
USSR
USSR.
may
in
is
It
only
endorsement, entirely
power technology.
Computer Technology
Early
Development and Joint Program of Computer
Technology
While there was no doubt about the necessity of nuclear
energy, cybernetics (including early computer science) in the
was retarded by negative ideological
17
attitude in
the early
USSR
years.
It
was denounced
as
a
mechanical system-oriented
reducing the workers to an unthinking being.
made a
Academy of
Soviet government
division in the
developed,
if at
decision to close
"pseudo-science"
Even
down
in
1962 the
the
computer
Hence computer science was
Sciences.
And
under cover names and on a small scale.
all,
computer technology and production were mainly the preserve of
the ministries.
Only
in
1983 did the Academy take the
step to
first
remedy and create a new Department of Informatics, Computer
Technology and Automation.
Owing
low quality and small number of hardwares and
the
to
and their incompatibility provided by different countries,
softwares,
mainly the USSR, most countries
the Soviet bloc
in
were oriented
toward the Western computers throughout the whole 1960s.
embarrassing situation resulted
CMEA
Russian abbreviation,
ESEVM)
USSR, GDR, Czechoslovakia,
program.
technical
for the production of
series.
1970s in a
There were
RYAD
(or, in
countries--the
six
Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria-joining
accordance with signatory countries' level of
In
expertise
and production potential, each member focused
USSR
on some special models except the
spectrum of computers.
GDR
beginning of the
agreement upon the Unified System of Electronic Computers
(USEC) derived from IBM models
this
the
at
This
was responsible
which covered the whole
For attachments and related equipments,
for magnetic
tape data storage equipments,
Czechoslovakia for tapes, punch card machines and consoles for
graphic registers, Poland for print-out equipments, Hungary for
input-output
equipments including visual-display
some other
peripherals and components, and the
involved in
all
IBM 360
About
its
first
this
For the USSR,
field.
In
1974
USSR
RYAD
1
Bulgaria
for
again was
modeled
and 370 series came into existence, about 9 years
machines were
rushing
kinds of production.
units,
after
after
IBM
introduced in the Western markets.'*^
program, no consensual evaluation could be found.
this
program
bloc's resources
definitely has been a valuable
into this strategic but severely
Therefore, this project
fraternal cooperation in the
is
means of
lagging
often cited as an example of fruitful
CMEA
by the USSR.
other participant countries are ambivalent,
18
Comments from
ranging from praise to
A
complaint.^8
decade
RYAD
series
computers were
in
still
Software support was poor, reliability low,
serious short supply.
compatibility
later,
questionable,
and installation
and after-service slow.
Until recently, there are no supercomputers in the civilian sector in
But
the Soviet bloc.
space and nuclear energy departments
military,
Most
medium
large and
West
the
better.
15-25
Ironically, while struggling to catch
1980s.
the
in
its
perhaps larger lag behind
personal computers than in large and
in
Now
computers.
up the
the East again missed the
size computers,
of personal computers, resulting in
tide
much
This leads to a strong reorientation toward personal
computers
in
is
computers being used are obsolescent, usually
central
years old.
West
believed that the situation in the Soviet
is
it
medium
only small quantity of personal computers are
produced using many imported Western components. In the
IBM
meantime many kinds of imported
found but
very high prices.
at
computer usage
As
clone computers could be
a whole, the density of personal
very low, and very few personal computers,
is
terminals and word-processing facilities are available.
supply of diskettes, ribbons, computer paper,
And
problems.
in
some
other
it
etc.
USSR
said that the situation in the
is
CMEA
has
Even
the
serious
is
worse than
countries like Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and
GDR.49
5.2.
Diverse
GDR
National
Strategies
in
Computers and Outcomes
and Bulgaria are the two most enthusiastic East European
countries embracing
RYAD
program.
They have done heavy
investment and developed their computer industries of some
In
potential.
VEB
medium
capacity mainframes and minicomputers,
Kombinat Robotron,
a computer and telecommunications
conglomerate consisting of 21
to
be the
CMEA's
leader.
GDR
enterprises,
was
is
generally acknowledged
the first in the
CMEA
to start the
production of
RYAD
1
are with the
USSR,
both almost totally relying on components
manufactured by
models.
CMEA
other countries' supplies,
production.
GDR's
Within the
CMEA
GDR's major
linkages
members.
But because of the bad quality of
GDR
had
later
to relied
GDR's products and technology
19
more on
its
own
are highly appreciated
by
the
USSR
which accounts for the
export market.
strategy,
In
every key aspect:
GDR
computers and system softwares.
microprocessors,
DEC VAX
series,
GDR
could produce
1-Mb
DRAM
GDR's computer
"uniformly imitative" in nearly
is
Western products modeled include
370 and 3300
of
lion's share
Intel
11/7XX
8008, Zilog Z-80,
and Microsoft
series,
16-bit microprocessors
all
Western models.
it
own, though
its
presently not competitive in the Western markets.
GDR
runners.
In
computers
in
its
The
1988.
in
micro- or
in
base
is
Technologically,
time.
more than one generation behind
production,
But
has overlooked their potential and not
supported Robotron's manufacturing effort
lags by
its
has undoubtedly established a
credible technological and productive base of
GDR
1988
in
introduced 6-7 years later than the copied
Nonetheless
personal computers,
But
360,
MS-DOS.
and demonstrated
(dynamic random access memory) chips.
computers were
IBM
Western front
the
small, estimated
60,000
at
scarcity of personal computers so far also
precludes the rise of "computer culture" in this country .5
As
CMEA
virtually the least developed country in the early
organization chiefly based on agriculture in the early post-war era,
Bulgaria's development for the past few decades
within
successful
triggered
called
a
the
group. 5 1
movement of
"preustroystvo,"
has been relatively
But the stagnation
decentralization
in recent years has
and self-management, so-
Bulgarian version of "perestroika."52
the
For
regaining national independence from the Ottoman Empire through
Russians' help, Bulgaria has the most
East European countries.
In
its
pro-USSR
attitude
among
the
post-war industrialization Bulgaria
has also benefited significantly from being closely affiliated with the
CMEA
in general
and the
USSR
in particular.
generous assistance from the USSR.
It
has received
like
its
new
CMEA
CMEA
Within the framework of
cooperation and specialization,53 Bulgaria was assured the
market to establish
much
industrial
base with economies of scale,
the production of fork-lift trucks, electric telphers and electric
vehicles.
But
its
computer industry had not been existent
mid-1960s.
Through
commitment
to
its
specialization
small computers and
in
electronics and firm
some peripherals
drives, Bulgaria has put itself in a better position in
20
until
like
disk
computer
the
development than even the more industrialized Czechoslovakia.
strategy Bulgaria
also outright imitative.
is
cooperation with the West.
Unlike
GDR,
In
seeks
it
produced Motorola microchips, worked
It
with Hitachi and Toshiba in computers, and set up a center for
Japanese specialists to train local technicians in robotics and other
electronics. 5^
But
its
computers are regarded as unreliable,55 and
Production management and quality
disk drives as low quality.56
control
stay
still
at
a rather primitive level by Western
standards.^^
However, the large capacity investment with major machines and
instruments mostly imported from the West in two state companies,
DZU,
Pravetz and
manifests Bulgaria's ambition and possible
But the often shortage of some peripherals, attachments
potential.
and repair parts usually could not be quickly corrected by domestic
CMEA
or other
members' production or Western imports. ^^
As one of Europe's
Czechoslovakia
is
still
and technological leaders,
industrial
strong in traditional engineering
rather
industry, for instance, heavy machinery and diesel engines.
electronization and computers are a big failure despite
capacity
substantial
in
Nowadays most
engineering. 59
Western numerical control
compete
is
a small
components
for 8-16
a hard disk
up
to
however,
industrial
autonomy,
of
parts,
and computer related
machines have
bit
computers with 1-2 floppy disk drives and
RAM
memory
of 256Kb- 1Mb,
owned by JZD Agrokobinat
ideal
model
in
East bloc.
But
This
Slusovice, an agro-
managerial
operated in a more or less capitalist
Gorbachev as an
to incorporate
xhe only production of personal
cooperative which, with rather highly
is
originally
its
assembly factory mostly using imported
20Mb, and
is
its
its
notably Siemens', in order to
the world markets.^^
in
computers
factory,
electronics
precision,
But
it
way and
sells
praised by
computers on a
condition that about half of the price should be paid in hard
currency, making
it
very difficult for local private users and even
schools and other organizations to purchase.^ ^
enterprises
spite
have any presence
of the fact that in
Microelectronika was set
in
personal
Ironically,
no
state
computer production,
in
November 1987 a scientific-production union
up with 45 members to coordinate
microcomputer production, cooperation with foreign firms,
21
standardization,
unification,
compatibility,
applications in industry, education, etc.
component imports,
In
short,
the poor situation
of computer industry in Czechoslovakia can be attributed to at least
One
two reasons.
responding
to
is
its
system failing in
rigid centrally planned
microelectronics
challenge.^2
RYAD
CMEA's
path of half-hearted effort in
Another
is its
middle
program and hopeful
glances toward Western technology which unfortunately has long
been under embargo.
It
turned out that the latter "dual policy"
locked Czechoslovakia out of both Western and Eastern markets
because of the low quality unacceptable to the West and the weak
production base for the East.^^
Like Czechoslovakia, Poland also suffers from
in
computer
development.^'*
Its
"dual policy"
its
situation has been
further
exacerbated by the decision to specialize in heavy industry, such as
CMEA
ship-building and steel, in the
in
the
mid-1970s without
paying and shifting attention to new microelectronics.*^^
The computer development
picture. 66
rather
CMEA
Farther than other
on Western components. ^7
perfunctory,
CMEA's
incompatible with
Its
resulting
Hungary presents quite
in
in
members, Hungary mainly
CMEA
participation in joint
early
RYAD
unique
a
and
hardwares
systems.68
relies
effort is
softwares
Around 1970, Hungary's
computer industry was one of the region's most underdeveloped.
the late
1980s
it
is
CMEA's
largest producer of
IBM-compatible
personal computers, and provides regularly smallest model of
systems
in
conformity with
CMEA's
specifications.
It
Unlike
all
the other
market-oriented system in the
CMEA
CMEA
RYAD
also exports
computer products and services, most notably software,
markets.
In
to
Western
members, Hungary with
its
most
has a dynamic and rapidly
growing entrepreneurial computer industry, consisting of hundreds
of private cooperative firms,^^
many
of which contract work to
"moonlighting" individuals and small groups
hours.
Hungary has a
private individuals:
who work
large installed base of computers
more than 150,000 computers
at
1986, a number dwarfing the mere 39,000 machines
official
organizations.^^
The
after
regular
owned by
the end
of
owned by
diffusion of personal computers and
abundant supply of computer books and software disks have created
22
^
a "computer culture" in Hungary
Despite
countries.
weakness
its
much
CMEA
and components
larger computers
in
other
farther than in
2
Hungary's unique orientation toward Western technology
industry,
and markets and entrepreneurial private sector help
at
it
hold a
least
niche in the modern computer world.
As
to the
USSR,
and space programs
backward
available for this research.
is
non-military
In
computer technology and production are evaluated as very
the
areas,
information about computers in military
little
relative to the
West and even
as a crisis.
The USSR has
imported a large amount of GDR's mainframes and minicomputers to
equip
R&D institutes, and there
CMEA users about Soviet
key government departments and
its
has been widespread complaint from other
personal computers, the production of 8-bit Mikrosha
products.
In
was not
started
until
Cooperation
International
6.
6.1.
Limits
1987.^1
and
Fraternal
to
Gratuitous
Without paying much attention
organizational
CMEA
within
to the
Framework
Cooperation
historical
arrangements to tackle intra-CMEA
the following discussion
locus of
S&T
cooperation, ^
would only focus on the main features and
trends which could be seen as a "mirror" to the Western pattern.
By
CMEA
standard process, international
framework consists of
S&T
cooperation within the
at least four levels
of concerted effort:
coordination of the five-year and annual plans at the national state
planning commission level, cooperation of national branch ministries
arranged by the standing
CMEA
Commissions, coordination of
S&T
activities
by a special subcommittee of the Executive Committee, and
bilateral
and
multilateral
agreements
Because each country always
external relations,
central
is
authorities,
difficult.
lengthy
The
tries
to
and payment settlements.*^
insulate domestic
affairs
from
without explicit permission of the respective
lateral
communication across national boundaries
CMEA S&T
collaboration
and cumbersome national
and
direction.
23
is
thus characterized by
international
bureaucratic
Historically, formal
propounded during the
starting with
S&T
cooperation in the East bloc was
working year of the
first
CMEA
1949,
in
which was a practical
the so-called "Sofia Principle"
expression of the injunction of communism: "from each according to
his ability to each according to his need,"
gratuitous cooperation and assistance.
and called for fraternal and
Under
this
protocol, only
marginal cost of exchanging pertinent information and delegating on
a temporary
basis
scientists
and technicians to other member
This principle was intended to reduce
countries would be charged.
the
among members,
disparities
but the
recipients
obligated
themselves to utilize the knowledge gained solely for their domestic
development and not
Due
markets.
of
R&D
to
undercut the donors' national and foreign
to
the concern
more developed members were lukewarm about
investment,
this collaboration pattern.
benefited
As
over reciprocity parity and amortization
especially
less
So
it
was chiefly pushed by
to
a matter of fact, this principle virtually eliminates the
may withhold
assist
USSR, and
developed members.^'*
market for technology and has several disadvantages.
donors
the
up-to-date
the recipients
Second, the recipients
in
may
the
knowledge
transferred.
thus lack pressure to do their
may be
less
effort.
Fourth, lack of
discourage the donors to innovate.
rule of market restriction
own R&D,
economically relevant,
hence misguiding the recipients' direction of
may
the
knowledge and have no incentives
exploiting
Third, knowledge exchanged
appropriability
First,
imposed on the recipients
is
Finally,
difficult
the
to
police. ^5
As time
elapsed, the Sofia Principle
was gradually replaced by
ad hoc forms of compensation in practice.
drawbacks of
part of
this
In recognition of the
principle and the growing unwillingness on the
some members
to
engage
in
gratuitous exchange, the
CMEA
Executive Committee in 1970 formally called for the collaborative
arrangements to consider the interests of every individual country,
and to effect technology transfer under conditions similar to those
prevailing
in
world markets, without excluding the generous
assistance
to
the
least
developed countries.
24
Limits
6.2.
Market
without
Institutions
to
Mechanisms
But such "normalization" was seriously constrained by the
means of payment.
insufficiency of methods of pricing and
traditional
centrally
knowledge
are
treated
as
state
of pricing these intangibles.
tradition
international
payment settlement
of these intangibles.
S&T
property available to be exploited by
without any particular payment.
enterprises
state
planned economy, inventions and
In a
There
no
is
Moreover, the complex
further
In this regard, a joint
complicates
R&D
the
transaction
project in the
CMEA
context can provide a good illustration.
To
calculate the contribution share, the input capital
is
disaggregated into construction, labor and tradables, each of which
common
evaluated in local prices and then translated into a
is
currency
usually the transferable ruble (TR), according to ad hoc
unit,
exchange
rates
CMEA
used for certain types of
For
transactions.
labor cost, normally special exchange rates are as a rule utilized.
similar approach
is
more
difficult to use for pooling
But
know-hows,
and estimating commercial
sharing
resultant
value.
Therefore to harmonize the interests of various members in
intellectual
joint endeavors is a very
property,
complex
And
task.
multilateral
arrangements are far more formidable than bilateral ones.
In recognition of the necessity of radical reconstruction
CMEA
cooperation, the Comprehensive Programs of Scientific and
Technological Progress of the
2000
in
(hereafter called
CPST
1985.
and cooperate
new
of the
calls
CPST) was adopted
on CMEA members
five
in
CMEA Member
areas—electronics,
Countries to the Year
at the
41st
CMEA
Session
to concentrate their efforts
automation, nuclear energy,
materials and biotechnology, and hopes for doubling factor
productivity over the next fifteen years.
initiatives,
tens,
and themes were proposed, and hundreds of
topics
institutes
involved.
CPST
which are
totally
initiatives
this
time, however, emphasizes four
novel:
and direct relations
greater degree
CMEA
hundreds and thousands of different levels of
projects,
features
Like several previous
at
encouragement of autonomous
the enterprise
on market mechanisms,
communication, and
utilization
facilitation
of international
25
level,
reliance to a
of bottom-up
institutions
and
mechanisms
concerted effort in key areas. ^^
buttress
to
strategy apparently cannot
fit
national
old context,
into the
But
and most old systemic barriers to innovation
international,
Without fundamentally restructuring the centrally planned
the prospect for
CPST
is
Therefore
dismal.
new
and
persist.
system,
not surprising that,
is
it
this
up to now, too much of the collaboration remains on paper, and most
member countries only pay lip service without real enthusiasm.''^
To make matters worse, there is a long history of wide
resentment among the Soviet allies that the USSR has tapped East
European S&T expertise and resources to its own needs.^^ One
evidence
is
that
most key collaborative
USSR, absorbing
the
toward the USSR.^^
projects
to
Another evidence
centers are located in
good equipments and people
disproportionately
is
that quite a
biased toward solving problems which
are
Soviet domestic needs. ^^
the
R&D
and manifest, from Soviet
allies
Therefore there
S&T
against the
number of
most relevant
are
is
joint
resistance, latent
integration centering
around the USSR.
The preceding
are
no easy solutions
endemic
to
The current
CMEA
the
analysis of
to
national
trend
seems
CMEA's
CMEA
innovation
to
Uneven
in
this
bloc are leading
This implies that the intra-Eastern
Implications
Performance
in
The preceding discussion
about military,
technologies in the East.
Three
reveals
Technological
Fields
very different pictures
three
nuclear power and computer
Relative to the
mainly the U.S.), the East (mainly the
military
causes are so
based on the traditional framework will diminish.
Managerial
respectively
Its
downplay the cooperation within the
framework, and the centrifugal forces
cooperation
7.1.
crisis.
and international politico-economic systems.
the reforms oriented to the West.
7.
cooperation suggests that there
West
USSR)
(and, in military field,
has performed well in
technology, especially system technology.
technology, the East (mainly the
USSR)
In
nuclear power
has also performed well in
technical terms but at the great expense of safety terms.
In
computer technology, the overall records of the East are quite poor.
26
Because these three technologies are
to the
USSR
or
CMEA
all
support and direction,
national
countries and under party-state strong
uneven performance may
some systemic causes
Concerning the national
the East
institutions,
by centrally planned and directed systems.
capabilities
in
Besides,
dominant
in
its
public
is
weak
sector
sector's
relative
to
its
overwhelmingly
is
most countries.
As regards technology,
the degree of
its
dynamic nature
appears to be of most relevance to the present discussion.
military
the
characterized
civilian
Its
technological innovation are very
military counterpart's.
how
relating to
technology development.
tackle
institutions
strikingly
their
largely be attributed to
of utmost importance
all
technology,
the
Soviet different performance in
In
system
technology and basic technology relative to the U.S. also deserves
some
elaboration.
By comparing
institutions
the
interactions
between the Eastern national
and technologies of different characters, many relevant
and timely implications for managing technology may emerge.
7.2.
Centrally
Planned
The CMEA's
overall
System
weakness
Various
for
in
Technologies
computer technology,
including the Soviet significant gap with the U.S. in military
applications (e.g., C3I) and with the
West
and simulation, has
the basic
its
deep root
technology progress inherent in
in
its
power control
in nuclear
assumption about
administrative
and managerial
approach.
In
after the
nuclear power (mainly fission) technology, the progress,
initial
for military
breakthroughs and fundamental
purposes, was basically incremental in
predictable directions, or in the so-called
its
R&D
high technological and
commitment and
had been done
some roughly
"trajectory"
phase. ^^
Given
system engineering complexity, long-term
large-scale
investment according to some
prescribed, perhaps rather rigid, plans could
work
to
the
extent that
they are well organized and no critical parameters and aspects are
neglected.
The Soviet experience has dramatically proven both
excellent technical
performance records, which were under
27
sides:
state
intense direction,
and bad safety designs, which were not prioritized
and thus largely neglected.
By
modem
contrast,
computer technology
represents a "paradigm" change which
radical
its
a broader field, IT
based on a combination of
Jq
product, process and organizational innovations,*^
potential,
it
In other words,
society rests on the degree of
success of a
the relative
match between the emerging new
paradigm and the adjustment of
framework.
institutional
CNfEA's general backwardness,
centrally
it
seems
assert that the
to
planned system, characterized by vertical channels of
linkages and autonomous initiatives from bottom up,
new IT paradigm.
compatibility with the
computers which were
in
But
work
the centrally planned system cannot
"trajectory"
at
this
not in
does not mean that
In
all.
is
lateral
imitating
IBM
phase in the 1970s, the
determination and heavy investment by
even
view of
In
communication, mainly top-down direction, not coupled by
less
exploit
also requires changes in the structural and
framework.
institutional
the
is
or,
GDR
and,
most notably, the
developed Bulgaria have without doubt produced some results
if
imitating
not comparable to the performance of Japanese firms also
IBM
on the stage
computers.
the late
until
But
1970s and since then expanded
CMEA,
enormously, the whole
personal computers which were not
in
with a few exceptions like the
Hungarian private sector and a Czechoslovak cooperative, missed the
express
train.
It
demand more
not because personal computers
is
advanced and sophisticated technological capabilities than larger
computers do.
mechanism
in
It
because there
is
is
the East to grasp this
little
entrepreneurial spirit and
dynamic opportunity.
Besides electronics and nuclear power, in
biotechnology,
new
materials and automation
areas identiHed by the
joint
program CPST.
"paradigm change"
to
CMEA
fact,
are
new
the
other three
for extra and novel systemic efforts in
may be questionable for the term
be used for new biotechnology and new
Even
if it
materials, both as well as automation (which could be included in the
broad IT field) show very dynamic character quite different from
"trajectory"
technology.
28
CMEA
automation, most
In
countries have had long experience
But
in traditional engineering industry.
very
much behind
industry,
become
successful
modem
Lack of competition pressure
to
in
automation and
microelectronics
innovate
In traditional biotechnology, the
But
modem
ground for
nurturing
Lack of
robot technology.
history.
large capacity of car
unlike in Western countries, their car industry has not
but,
a
They have
the West.
novel robotics, most lag
in
is
one reason.
is
another.^^
CMEA
has also had long
"new biotechnology," which was triggered by genetic
new
engineering in the mid-1970s, there has been no sign of
products introduced by
CMEA
Despite the scientific
countries.
community's recognition of the importance of new biotechnology and
its
forefront
rather
The prevailing lack of incentives
are inactive.
findings
scientific
fundamental research, the industrial activities
commercialize the
pointed out as the main reason.^'*
is
with the West where
contrast
to
many
This
is
also in
innovative enterprises and
small
new
established large firms are active in capitalizing on the
opportunities.
"new
In
purposes, the
the
CMEA
also trails the West.
stage of understanding
support applied
behind which
enough
basic
The shortage of high
materials.
to
except structural composites for military
materials,"
the
to
is
R&D
Most research remains
properties
and structure of
precision and sophisticated facilities
and industrial production
the direct cause,
is
the rigid bureaucracies that could not respond
new
countries
USSR
this research, the fact that, the
are
fast
challenge.*^
Although basic science and fundamental research
scope of
at
strong
particularly
in
is
beyond
the
and most East European
mathematics and theoretical
physics as well as fields requiring large single facilities such as
observatories or accelerators, but
multitude
of
smaller,
weak
sophisticated
in
instruments
custom-designed materials and reagents,
electronics,
biological
such
or
as
be explained by the foregoing same arguments.
in
ultra-pure,
chemistry,
and medical sciences,*^ could
system may be successful
which need a
the fields
to
That
some degree
is,
the Eastern
dealing with "centralized" issues with
29
rather clear direction of effort, but
of dynamic
As
it
and "decentralized" character.
a matter of fact, the Eastern national pattern of tackling
technologies
is
C\f£A
also reflected at the
resulting in a very different picture
West,
many
come from
initiatives
from the Western one.
reviews.
CMEA
national and
or bottom-up,
transfer and joint
levels
most broad guidelines and
at
R&D
most
suffocate
initiatives,
at
both
be they top-
alone the adverse impact on technology
let
caused by
payment
international
the
like
cumbersome bureaucratic systems
the East,
In
In the
"action organizations" and are
European Economic Community with
7.3.
multinational level,
by governments and international bodies
supported
down
very weak in handling topics
is
"artificial"
systems of pricing and
settlement.
"Dual Structure" and "Spin-off" and "Spin-on"
"Dual structure"
technology progress.
technology
As
the Soviet bloc has inhibited
in
As
a matter of fact,
may
civilian
also retard military
development.
the U.S. experience shows,
including
it
many
many modern high
technologies,
computers and semiconductors, originated from military
(and, to a lesser degree, space) mission-oriented
R&D.
They then
were followed by the so-called "spin-off" phenomenon,87 process of
which could be
briefly depicted as such.
In the beginning, military
procurements account for most of the production.
autonomous
civilian
industry
But the strong and
competes for applying the early
technological success for commercial profit.
This expands markets
and production, drives the cost down, improves the quality, extends
the
applications,
"industry."
upgrades the productivity, and even forms a
This in fact
military (and
is
new
a "virtuous circle," in turn supporting
space) missions.
In
the
meantime the government
mission departments and agencies continue to provide substantial
endorsement for both basic research and high-risk, high-cost
development projects
is
that could
have major impacts
in
the future.
worth noting, however, that successful "spin-offs" are rarely
planned in advance by the U.S. mission agencies.
unexpected phenomenon
"joined"
It
is
basically an
by civilian autonomous
30
initiatives.
It
For the Soviet
allies,
might be
it
difficult to
expect significant
R&D
"spin-ofr effects given their presumably much smaller military
But as the
expenditures relative to the U.S.'s.
amount of resources, only matched by
space technology development,
been no evidence of similar "spin-ofr
example.
view of
In
its
follower's advantage, the
surprising
effects.
capabilities
USSR
has
there
modem
IT as an
must have known the direction of
space systems suggest that
in
Take
that
and
obviously imitative strategy to take the
technological effort for the relevant industry.
military and
spent huge
the U.S., in the military
rather
is
it
USSR
Many
of
its
advanced
must have possessed some
it
advanced microelectronics, computers and
telecommunications, regardless of their quantity, quality and actual
cost (which
is
USSR
But the
related to yield rate as in the case of semiconductors).
A
base comparable to the West.
plausible reason
technologically capable and autonomous
USSR,
or even in the whole
weak
CMEA,
would be
non-military
sector could not
development succeeding the
that a
sector
in
the
has been largely neglected by the
As
by the centrally directed system.
party-state or stifled
this
technological and industrial
failed in creating a "viable"
a result,
implement the "second phase" technology
much
investment, as in the U.S., to accumulate
R&D
(and space)
military
initial
learning experience in
and markets, mass production, and incremental
diverse applications
innovation, and then to in turn support the military requirements
abundant supply, lower cost and higher
there has been
sectors.
no "virtuous
The former has
circle"
former's
on
latter
sector
is
itself in
both technological
could not benefit from the
advancement.
technological
The disadvantage stemming from
civilian
In other words,
reliability.
between military and civilian
to rely solely
and productive respects, and the
by
also evident even
the Soviet and
CMEA's weak
when compared with Japanese
experience.
Without any significant military presence relative to the
U.S. and the
USSR,
pull of the
let
enormous
alone military
civilian
R&D,
applications,
but through the market
including
its
world number
one consumer electronics production,^^ Japan has been successful
establishing
its
indigenous semiconductor and computer base.
base has become a cornerstone of
ail
31
its
IT products and even
in
This
Now
military and aerospace systems.
deep concern over
its
microelectronics. 89
the
dependence upon Japanese "dual use"
Using a convenient term as opposed
Japanese pattern could be called
from
originating
civilian
sector
utilized
is
CMEA
In
for military
applications.
USSR
civilian sector in the
thus also deprives them of any "spin-on" opportunity.
albeit with
all,
to "spin-off,"
"spin-on"— technology
The absence of a technologically strong
and the
shown
the U.S. military has
some high-tech enclaves under
state
and support, the country with "dual structure" will be very
direction
disadvantageous especially
Laser
in
face of potentially
"dual use"
because they tend to underutilize them.
technologies,
is
another example illustrating similar pattern of
discrepancy between the East and the West as noted above.
that
full
two Soviet and one American
scientists
fact
shared
1964 Nobel Prize
USSR
and
indicates that the fundamental research in the
achieved roughly the same level.
The
Twenty years
later the
the U.S. are evaluated as roughly equal in military laser
in
the U.S.
USSR
(i.e.,
and
high-
power guided energy) technology, both mainly supported by the
The fundamental research of basic properties of various
military. 90
CMEA
kinds of laser in the
in the
But
West.
relatively
in the
primitive,
is
whole
also judged to be roughly equal to that
CMEA,
the civilian applications are
and the civilian industry
is
just
beginning,
lagging far behind the West.^i
7.4.
Distinction
in
Managing System and Basic Technologies
The difference between system technology and basic
Without much
technology has some managerial implications.
generalization, the following analysis
military
is
mainly confined
to
the
technology as precedingly discussed.
Military
definition,
(and space) system technology starts with mission
feasibility
analysis
and system specifications taking into
account of the availability of subsystem or "element" technologies.
In practice,
major system designs have
to be
based on some
assumptions about the scientific and technological progress, and have
to be
"frozen" before
more
detailed tasks begin.
This implies that
normally the system level designs cannot incorporate subsystems
32
and elements of too much uncertainty or needing major
breakthroughs that are very unpredictable.
In
other words,
the
subsystem and element technologies under consideration to support
system designs are mostly "on the sheir or
the rather predictable
phase, and the major challenge to the system level
"trajectory"
on the integration of "lower aggregate level (or element)
rests
efforts
in
technologies" to meet the criteria at the system level, such as
effectiveness,
reliability,
maintainability,
and economic
feasibility,
and their trade-offs.
When
unexpected major innovations take place
may
they
levels,
supportability,
significantly contribute
the
to
at
ergonomics
the
element
higher aggregate
system levels, or even change the system concepts.
But
their
impact
on the whole system may take some time because the innovations,
adopted,
may
create
inequilibrium,"
internal
hence
incompatibility
necessitating
also in other parts of the system,
"system
adaptations
the
Conversely, innovative "ideas"
new "system
at
of which are directly derived
the
which would
equilibrium."
level,
from mission requirements, may
may be
system level innovations, however, there
to
advancements
system technology
also guide innovative efforts at the element levels.
alternatives:
or
which may take the form of
product or process, in order to reach
many
or
if
To
realize the
multiple
mainly wait for the element technological innovations
later
be incorporated into the system, to mainly
advance the system integration technology with or without major
changes
in
the
"portfolio"
of element technologies that are already
"on the shelf," or a combination of both.
possibility
of loose linkages between system technology innovation
And
and element technology innovation.
to military
element
technology.
technology the
USSR
with an overall inferior basic
seems to have greatly narrowed the gap behind
the U.S. in military system technology.
Without getting into more
about various items, the Soviet relatively remarkable
achievements
strategy
basic technology, in relation
and space mission systems, possesses the character of
As previously mentioned,
details
This fact points to the
at
the
system technology level
and management system.
may
be attributed to
In strategy, as noted above,
33
the
its
USSR
puts different emphases than the U.S. on system design
parameters to compensate for
weakness,
technological
overall
its
hence achieving system technology "more comparable" to the U.S.'s.
management, the Soviet more centralized commanding system,
In
which by "common sense definition" may well mean stronger request
in
following prescribed routes, more pressure for collective actions,
rooms
less
for
autonomous
initiatives
more
the lower levels, and
at
"mechanistic" (as opposed to "dynamic") organizational character,
may
lead to greater efficiency,
all
others being equal, in integrating
"on-the-shelf" technologies for the given missions.
What
more, the
is
frequent time lag between the major basic technology innovation and
induced system technology innovation
the
for a follower in the basic technology to
By
leader in the system technology.
may
also provide
a
chance
narrow the gap with the
estimating the potential impact
of the innovative basic technology upon the system technology, the
USSR
can
start
working on novel systems, perhaps
the old ones, while in the
meantime advancing
its
parallel with
in
newly lagging
Under
basic technology by imitation or other acquisition means.
worst circumstances, the
USSR
can
to use
try
new
the
"portfolios" of
existing elements to match the U.S. in system performance.
Despite
its
possible advantage in managing system technology,
command management
this
pattern will
lose
much
of
approaching basic technology, because basic technology
directly
power
its
is
in
more
connected to scientific discoveries and fundamental research,
which require more freedom and autonomy.
8.
Concluding
Remarks
Recently Gorbachev, while downgrading the status of military
commanders
industrial
in
several
symbolic ways, has praised the military-
system and space and missile programs as a model for the
rest of the Soviet industry to follow.
In his reform, the basic practice
of military-industrial establishments has not been altered.
contrary,
than
more
military-industrial
ever before and
many
executives
military-related
have
On
the
been promoted
ministries
have been
requested to contribute to the modernization of civilian economy.
34
The close user-supplier
relations
establishments
military-industrial
between uniformed military and
and
the
quality
system
control
through "military representatives" are also modeled in the civilian
industry. '2
On
the
the other side, the appointment of
USSR Academy
the State
Marchuk
as president of
of Sciences in 1986 and Tolstykh as chairman of
Committee on Science and Technology (GKNT)
clear the Soviet strong intention to heal
GKNT
electronics.
is
its
1987 made
in
modem
"Achilles' heel" in
mainly responsible for technology policy and
technology acquisition, and the Academy for fundamental
foreign
Earlier heads of these
science policy.
background
in
two organizations usually had
thermodynamics, chemistry or mathematics.
physics,
But Marchuk and Tolstykh both specialize
in
electronics:
Marchuk
doing computer basic and applied research and working with
industry and
in
the
CMEA
computer programs, and Tolstykh employed
aerospace, military and consumer electronics factories and as
deputy minister of the electronics industry of the USSR.^^
Besides the actions to apply the military and space
management experience
key leaders
to
to vitalize
the civilian
strengthen modern electronics,
other measures in the
USSR
sector,
there
and
assign
to
have been some
attempted to remedy the "structural
For example, hundreds of centers, associations and complexes
flaws."
keeping
all
stages of the
R&D
cycle under one umbrella have been set
some operated by production
Academy of Sciences. A sharper
up,
ministries
and others by the
difference of pay scale rewarding
achievements rather than formal rank or seniority has been
introduced in
R&D
organizations.
Greater democracy in the
and delegation of more authority down
been promoted.
A
to its
Academy
17 departments have
system of financing research projects on a
competitive basis, some by peer review, has been tried.^^
In other
away from
CMEA
the Soviet
countries, the present radical transitions
model make the attempt
to reorient
moving
and
new S&T development system not very appealing. The
major effort in this field would come only after new and rather
consolidate
stable
politico-economic institutional frameworks take shape.
35
It
is
now more
urgent to concentrate on the latter arena, which in fact
S&T
context and infrastructure for
the
development and innovation.
USSR
All the actual evolution in the
CMEA
and other
Given the deep-rooted
remains to be seen.
is
countries
and momentum,
tradition
and many systematically determined causes which have been
entangled together in a rather "internally coherent" way,
wisdom and
quite long time and require great
may
it
take
effort to realize the
and "glasnost" of technology development and
"perestroika"
innovation in the East.
Notes
^
commonly known
is
It
the
been
has
available
express
their
official
stands,
A number
2
inability
to
also
is
it
and
and talk
to
information
release
to
still
constrained
seriously
^
The combination of "North-South" and "East-West"
^
technology
This
is
see,
transfer
due
for example,
is
Parrott
discussed
briefly
For more details
6
See Sagdeev (1988).
^
This phenomenon
the
USSR.
^
For the weakness of the Soviet
is
said
lot
in
to
the
bloc.
the
(1983).
nature
of Communist
Chiang (1987).
in
a general observation in most East European countries, the
Communist China.
this
with
people freely.
For a historical review,
in
in
to
freely
to
conformity
in
and local friends helped a
interpreters
3
China
not
do behavioral and policy study
But the progress was
read
Due
by governments.
varying degrees
difficult to
of professional
publicly
which make many people reluctant
control
opinions
true
research.
field
and
much information
Soviet bloc
the
in
manipulated to
culture
political
that
to
in
the
USSR,
without
persist
see
Graham
much change
USSR
and
(1987).
recently
until
in
See Sagdeev (1988).
S&T
administration, see,
for example,
Sagdeev
(1988).
^
see
^^
For some exceptions,
like
Siberian Branch of the
USSR Academy
of Sciences,
Dickson (1988).
For the Soviet system of flnancing
institutes
as
compared with the U.S.
system of fmancing projects, see Gustafson (1980), pp. 35-38.
* ^
As an example,
(approximately
in
1982 only
equivalent
to
U.S.
3%
of people with degree of "kandidat"
doctoral
36
degree)
worked
in
the
Soviet
By
industry.
employed by industry
12
24%
about
contrast,
in the
of
U.S. in
doctoral
all
and engineers were
See Graham (1987),
1975.
Por the physical setting of research
scientists
5.
p.
see Gustafson (1980), pp. 48-
institutes,
54.
'3
Sec Stent (1989) and Winiecki (1987).
It
due to the
is
inability
of the Soviet
Bloc to harness Western technology as effectively as once believed that some
in
West advocate
the
for looser control
See Goldman (1984).
of technology export to the Soviet Bloc.
For a similar situation
in
Communist China, see Simon
(1990).
^^
This
Sec Winiecki (1987),
products.
1^
measured by the
is
relative
p.
of comparable
prices
engineering
117 and 142.
For the discrepancy of policy making, program administration and
world
R&D
see
activities,
real
Main (1988).
16
DeLauer (1984).
1^
For a more recent study of the situations
in the
U.S. and the
USSR
and the
U.S. eroding position, sec U.S. Department of Defense (1986).
18
Gustafson (1988), pp.
19
Gustafson (1988), pp. 21-30.
20
Currie (1984).
21
Gustafson (1988),
22
This was testified by U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar
U.S.
p.
1-3.
57.
For
2^
For military technology funding
U.S.
26
details,
OTA
see Merrill (1985).
Circuits,
Monolithic
Institute,
and
This
is
sec U.S.
issues,
OTA
(1988), pp. 34-37.
(1989), p. 9.
The abbreviations
27
See
Department of Defense (1983).
23
25
W. Weinberger.
respectively
Microwave
Software
refer
to
Integrated
Very High Speed Integrated
Software
Circuits.
Technology for Adaptable, Reliable
one of the main conclusions
in a recent
OTA
Engineering
Systems.
report.
Sec U.S.
OTA
(1989), pp. 12, 19-22 and 41-60.
28
29
Brower (1982).
U.S.
OTA
(1988), pp. 1-2.
30
This
U.S.
Department of Defense
is
the
main conclusion reached by the Project Hindsight, sponsored by
to
trace
the
systems developed from the end of World
contribution
War Two
37
to
of basic science to weapon
the early
1960s.
3^
For the
But so
of "science-based technology," see Freeman (1982), pp.
rise
rigorous
terms
military
technology
increasingly
the
since
the
^^
The increasingly important
technology
and U.S.
34
35
36
U.S.
general observation
OTA (1989). pp.
OTA (1983). p. 4.
more
science
to
without support by rigorous study.
role
of civilian
industries
OTA
discussed in more details in U.S.
is
in
1960s.
This
a
of basic
contribution
direct
^^
is
show
has been no update research which can
there
far
1-104.
modem
in
military
15-17 and 42-46,
(1988), pp.
161-187.
Dupas (1987).
For a brief discussion of Communist China's recent military technology
development,
Chiang (1987).
see
37
For
Min
(1987).
38
Except being specifically indicated, the information about the Soviet
power technology development
nuclear
39
of Communist China's space programs, see Liu and
brief discussion
a
mainly
is
For the nuclear energy policy and cooperation
(1984). pp.
^0
to
under planning, the
Sweden
represent
USSR
12-0-0,
is
the
reactors
in
58-27-45. the U.S.
110-11-0.
^^
This
1988 the
average of one
is
23-2-0, the U.K.
This information
USSR
in
May
had only two simulators.
four
to
in
Technical
See also Janouch (1988b).
1989.
simulator per three
is
International.
based on the interview with the director of reactor lab
is
Research Center of Finland
This
see Sobell
FRG
Engineering
This comparison was made in Czechoslovakia.
'*'*
CMEA,
under construction and
operation,
^^
In
the
(1988b).
France 54-9-6, and Japan 38-12-16.
from the independent database of Nuclear
^3
in
Janouch
35-72.
Using x-y-z
40-3-3,
from
By
contrast, the
West has an
reactors.
judged by a former safety chief of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, who did
field
investigation
of the Chernobyl
accident.
See Sweet
(1989). p. 51.
A number
^5
IAEA
issues,
^6
of reports
about Chernobyl
and several Western countries.
accident have
been published by
For a brief discussion about the technical
see Sweet (1989).
For more details about the Soviet post-Chernobyl actions, see Janouch
(1988b).
38
^"1
For early history and development of computers
in
(1988a). Gustafson (1988). pp. 69-70. Sobell (1984). pp.
the
CMEA,
see
Janouch
159-171. and Kassel
(1986).
^^
given
^^
the
This
November
could
impression
be
1988.
and July, September,
no accurate information
is
found
in
Janouch
Judy
October and
available.
Similar field visit
(1988a).
For a brief discussion of the computer development
example,
^^
August
in
There
1989.
comments should be taken cautiously
impression from the field visits and discussion in five East
a general
is
allies'
situation.
political
European countries
^0
But the Soviet
See Judy (1988).
in
GDR,
for
see,
(1988).
For a brief comparison of
CMEA
members' development records, see Marer
(1989).
52
For the recent restructuring
CMEA
53
For
54
Stent (1989). pp. 90-91.
55
in
Bulgaria,
June
in
1989.
This
is
GDR
57
This
is
based on the observation of field
Bulgaria
problems
factory
in
June
mainly
The
1989.
producing
disk
drives
59
For the technology
6^
This
September
This
a
is
This
Prague
in
to
two most advanced
factories
quality
seems
control,
and
the
other
better.
visitors'
observation and local users'
1988 and June 1989.
Czechoslovakia, see Levcik and Skolka (1984).
in
main finding
in
a big machinery
fair
in
Brno, Czechoslovakia in
1989.
is
Gottwaldov
62
visit
producing personal computers has many
of some Western
a combination
is
factory
management and
production
in
This
Robotron's experience of using Bulgaria's disk drives.
opinions during two visits to Bulgaria in July
6^
(1988).
cooperation and specialization, see, for example, Sobell (1984).
56
58
Doumayrou
This opinion was expressed by most users met during field research in
Bulgaria
in
see
based on a
in
is
field
September
visit
and discussion
in
JZD Agrokobinat
Slusovice in
1989.
based on the interviews with government officials and scholars in
September 1989.
63
Clough (1988).
64
Clough (1988).
See also Janouch (1988a).
39
^5
This
department
^^
A
in
the
in
This
also
is
much
found
be
can
and only used
1989.
with statistics
Judy
in
October
in
(1988).
field
in
visit
Budapest
components produced by the East bloc are
said that the
is
It
reliable
less
language
main fmding from the interviews and
a
August 1988.
Warsaw
of the computer industry in Hungary
Hungarian
from
Planning Office in
Central
State
brief review
translated
^^
based on the interviews with the director and staff of the research
is
in
products to be exported to other East bloc
countries.
68
Davis and
6^
A minimum
^0
These numbers were published by the Hungarian Central
in
a
and
(1978).
of IS members
"Tasks,
study
Processing
^1
Goodman
Use
of
Hungary.
Statistical
Office
and Socioeconomic Interdependence of Data
Conditions
the
required to form a cooperative in
is
Technologies."
Information
For a brief discussion about the Soviet computer technology, see Janouch
(1988a).
"72
For a brief
review, see Sobell (1984). pp. 211-224.
historical
73
Fallenbuch (1988).
7^
For example, according to the interviews and
and June
Bulgaria
1989,
benefited
greatly
from
field
Soviet
study in
Bulgaria in
assistance
gratuitous
the
post-war
75
Van Brabant
(1988a).
76
Sinclair and
Slater (1988).
77
For the unsatisfactory implementation of CPST, see Judy (1988).
government
expressed
Systems Analysis
(II
in
1989,
AS A)
in
asserted
by some participants
Moscow
in
November
and
in
Vienna
in
a
Budapest
the
seminar
in
in
high-ranking
August 1988,
International
Institute
Prague
in
for
Applied
the
USSR Academy
of Sciences in
Judy (1988).
Van Brabant (1988b).
80
Many
projects in biotechnology
Rimmington
The
are
good examples
in
this
regard.
See
(1988).
"trajectory"
detailed in Dosi
vs.
"paradigm
change"
(1982).
40
in
This phenomenon was also
1989.
in
with
Similar
1989.
79
81
interviews
several
of the East bloc in
officials
September and October
78
in
period.
were
opinions
May
in
technological
innovation
is
82
Freeman (1988).
8^
For automation and robot technology
84
For "new biotechnology"
85
For "new materials"
86
see
For more
details
well
documented.
Flamm
9^
Hopwood
(1988).
Rimmington (1988).
sec
Renuepis (1988).
see
research
(1988)
in
the
and basic science,
development of computers and semiconductors
For government role
for
in
the
early
days,
sec
See U.S.
Vickery
OTA
see,
is
for example,
computers and Asher and Strom (1977) for semiconductors.
For the connection between consumer electronics
Japan,
90
CMEA,
see
Gustafson (1980).
The U.S. experience
89
CMEA,
about the Soviet fundamental
87
88
the
in
the
in
CMEA.
the
in
and
semiconductors
in
(1989).
(1988). pp. 13-15.
DeLaucr (1984).
For
a
comparison of laser research, civilian applications and industry
between the East and the West, see Laude and Wautelet (1988).
92
For the expansion of military-industrial
application
of their experience
to
civilian
influence
and
the
Gustafson (1988),
pp.
80-
establishments'
sector,
see
98.
93
For more details about Marchuk's and Tolstykh's background, see Graham
(1987), pp.
94
12-18.
For the Soviet recent reform
24-38, and Sagdeev
in
S&T
(1988).
41
development, see Graham (1987), pp.
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^b^^^:i
^-'3/^
An Anatomy
of Failure,
Date Due
(^-it-Cfc
FES 15
Lib-26-67