United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
Report to Congressional Committees
March 2011
DEFENSE
ACQUISITIONS
Assessments of
Selected Weapon
Programs
GAO-11-233SP
a
March 2011
DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS
Accountability • Integrity • Reliability
Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Highlights of GAO-11-233SP, a report to
congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study
What GAO Found
This is GAO’s ninth annual
assessment of Department of Defense
(DOD) weapon system acquisitions,
an area that is on GAO’s high-risk list.
The report is in response to the
mandate in the joint explanatory
statement to the DOD Appropriations
Act, 2009. It includes observations on
the performance of DOD’s 2010
portfolio of 98 major defense
acquisition programs; data on
selected factors that can affect
program outcomes; an assessment of
the knowledge attained by key
junctures in the acquisition process
for a subset of 40 programs, which
were selected because they were in
development or early production; and
observations on the implementation
of acquisition reforms. To conduct
this review, GAO analyzed cost,
schedule, and quantity data from
DOD’s Selected Acquisition Reports
and collected data from program
offices on performance requirements
and software development;
technology, design, and
manufacturing knowledge; and the
implementation of DOD’s acquisition
policy and acquisition reforms. GAO
also compiled one- or two-page
assessments of 71 weapon programs.
These programs were selected based
on their cost, stage in the acquisition
process, and congressional interest.
Since 2008, DOD’s portfolio of major defense acquisition programs has grown
from 96 to 98 programs, and its investment in those programs has grown to
$1.68 trillion. The total acquisition cost of the programs in DOD’s 2010
portfolio has increased by $135 billion over the past 2 years, of which $70
billion cannot be attributed to quantity changes. A small number of programs
are driving most of this cost growth; however, half of DOD’s major defense
acquisition programs do not meet cost performance goals agreed to by DOD,
the Office of Management and Budget, and GAO. Further, 80 percent of
programs have experienced an increase in unit costs from initial estimates;
thereby reducing DOD’s buying power on these programs.
DOD disagreed with GAO’s use of
total program cost growth as a
performance metric because it
includes costs associated with
capability upgrades and quantity
increases. GAO believes it remains a
meaningful metric and that the report
explicitly accounts for the cost effect
of quantity changes.
View GAO-11-233SP or key components.
For more information, contact Michael J.
Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or
sullivanm@gao.gov.
Changes in DOD’s Fiscal Year 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense Acquisition Programs over the
Past 2 Years (Fiscal Year 2011 Dollars in Billions)
Total estimated research
and development costs
Total estimated
procurement costs
Total estimated
acquisition cost
Estimated
portfolio cost
in 2008
Estimated
portfolio cost
in 2010
Estimated
portfolio cost
growth since
a
2008
Percentage
growth since
a
2008
$407
$428
$15
5%
1,089
1,219
121
11
1,531
1,680
135
9
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
a
These columns do not include $6 billion in research and development and $9 billion in procurement
cost changes for the Ballistic Missile Defense System. DOD does not consider these adjustments to
represent cost growth because the program has been allowed to add 2 years of new funding with
each biennial budget.
GAO continues to find that newer programs are demonstrating higher levels of
knowledge at key decision points, but most are still not fully adhering to a
knowledge-based acquisition approach, putting them at a higher risk for cost
growth and schedule delays. For the programs GAO assessed in depth, GAO
found that a lack of technology maturity, changes to requirements, increases
in the scope of software development, and a lack of focus on reliability were
all characteristics of programs that exhibited poorer performance outcomes.
Last year GAO reported that DOD had begun to incorporate acquisition
reforms that require programs to invest more time and resources at the
beginning of the acquisition process refining concepts through early systems
engineering and building prototypes before beginning system development.
Many, but not all, planned acquisition programs are adopting these practices.
As GAO has previously recommended, more consistently applying a
knowledge-based approach, as well as improving implementation of
acquisition reforms, can help DOD achieve better outcomes for its portfolio of
major weapon system programs.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Foreword
1
Letter
4
Observations on DOD’s 2010 Major Defense Acquisition Program
Portfolio
Observations on Factors That Can Affect Program Outcomes
Observations from Our Assessment of Knowledge Attained by Key
Junctures in the Acquisition Process
Observations about DOD’s Implementation of Recent Acquisition
Reforms
Assessments of Individual Programs
Two-Page Assessments of Individual Programs
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellite
AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM)
Apache Block III (AB3)
Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (Army IAMD)
B-2 Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability,
Increment 1
BMDS: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
BMDS: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Aircraft
System (UAS)
C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program 
(C-5 RERP)
C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP)
CH-53K - Heavy Lift Replacement
CVN 21 Future Aircraft Carrier
DDG 1000 Destroyer
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE)
Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery 
Projectile
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV)
F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter)
Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T)
Global Hawk (RQ-4A/B)
Global Positioning System (GPS) IIIA
GPS III OCX Ground Control Segment
Gray Eagle
Increment 1 Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT)
Intelligent Munitions System-Scorpion
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GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Contents
Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM)
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM)
Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV)
Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor
System (JLENS)
Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS)
Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System
(AMF JTRS)
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Ground Mobile Radios 
(GMR)
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Handheld, Manpack, and Small
Form Fit (HMS)
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
Littoral Combat Ship-Mission Modules
LHA Replacement Amphibious Assault Ship
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) / Mobile Landing 
Platform
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS)
Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT)
P-8A Poseidon
PATRIOT/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS)
Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit
Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System
Ship to Shore Connector (SSC)
Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), Increment II
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High Program
Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) Extended Range Active Missile 
(ERAM)
Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(VTUAV)
Virginia Class Submarine (SSN 774)
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) 
Increment 2
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) 
Increment 3
One-Page Assessments of Individual Programs
Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR)
B-2 Defensive Management System (DMS) Modernization
B-2 Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability, 
Increment 2
BMDS: Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB)
BMDS: Flexible Target Family (FTF)
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GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Contents
C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA)
DDG 51 Destroyer
Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS)
Enhanced Polar System (EPS)
F-22A Raptor
H-1 Upgrades (UH-1Y/AH-1Z)
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
KC-X Program
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS)
Navy Unmanned Combat Air System Aircraft Carrier Demonstration
(UCAS-D)
Nett Warrior Increment I
Ohio-Class Replacement (OR) / Sea Based Strategic Deterrent
Space Fence
Stryker Modernization (SMOD)
Three Dimensional Expeditionary Long Range Radar 
(3DELRR)
V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft (Osprey)
Presidential Helicopter (VXX)
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
136
137
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143
150
151
152
153
Scope and Methodology
157
Changes in DOD’s 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense
Acquisition Programs over Time
169
Current and Baseline Cost Estimates for DOD’s 2010
Portfolio of Major Defense Acquisition Programs
170
Knowledge-Based Acquisition Practices
175
Technology Readiness Levels
177
Comments from the Department of Defense
179
GAO Contact and Acknowledgments
181
144
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147
148
149
Appendixes
Appendix I:
Appendix II:
Appendix III:
Appendix IV:
Appendix V:
Appendix VI:
Appendix VII:
Related GAO Products
184
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GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Contents
Tables
Figures
Table 1: Changes in DOD’s 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense
Acquisition Programs over the Past 2 Years
Table 2: Changes in Total Acquisition Cost and Program Acquisition
Unit Cost for 10 of the Highest-Cost Acquisition 
Programs
Table 3: Program Office Composition for 44 DOD Programs, as of
2010
Table 4: Changes in DOD’s 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense
Acquisition Programs over Time
Table 5: Current Cost Estimates and Baseline Cost Estimates for
DOD’s 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense Acquisition
Programs
Figure 1: Programs Meeting DOD, OMB, and GAO Cost
Performance Metrics
Figure 2: Change in Planned Quantities and Program Acquisition
Unit Cost for the F-22 Raptor and DDG 51 Destroyer
Figure 3: Relationship between Key Performance Parameter
Changes, Research and Development Cost Growth, and
Delays in Achieving Initial Operational Capabilities
Figure 4: DOD’s Acquisition Cycle and GAO Knowledge Points
Figure 5: Implementation of Knowledge-Based Practices by a
Program Beginning Engineering and Manufacturing
Development since 2009
Figure 6: Implementation of Knowledge-Based Practices by
Programs Holding Their Critical Design Review since
2009
Figure 7: Implementation of Knowledge-Based Practices by
Programs Holding Their Production Decision since 
2009
Figure 8: Depiction of Notional Weapon System Knowledge as
Compared with Knowledge-Based Practices
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GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Contents
Abbreviations
BMDS
DAMIR
DOD
IAMD
MDA
NA
OMB
RDT&E
SAR
TRL
Ballistic Missile Defense System
Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval
Department of Defense
Integrated Air and Missile Defense
Missile Defense Agency
not applicable
Office of Management and Budget
research, development, test, and evaluation
Selected Acquisition Report
Technology Readiness Level
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GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
A
Comptroller General
of the United States
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, D.C. 20548
March 29, 2011
Leter
Congressional Committees
I am pleased to present GAO’s ninth annual assessment of selected weapon
programs. This report provides a snapshot of how well the Department of
Defense (DOD) is planning and executing its major defense acquisition
programs—an area that is on GAO’s high-risk list.1 It comes at a time when
DOD is pressing forward with implementation of the weapon acquisition
reforms put in place over the past few years and searching for efficiencies
that will allow it to instill fiscal discipline into weapon programs and obtain
better buying power for the warfighter and taxpayer. These reforms and
efficiency initiatives are consistent with the recommendations we have
made over the years emphasizing the need for DOD to acquire greater
knowledge about programs’ requirements, technology, and design before
they start; improve the realism of cost estimates for both ongoing and new
programs; and achieve a balanced mix of weapon systems that are
affordable, feasible, and provide the best military value to the warfighter.
To its credit, DOD has demonstrated a strong commitment, at the highest
levels, to address the management of its weapon system acquisitions, and
the department has started to reprioritize and rebalance its weapon system
investments. Since 2009, the Secretary of Defense has proposed canceling
or significantly curtailing weapon programs, such as the Army’s Future
Combat System, which he characterized as too costly or no longer relevant
for current operations. Congress’s support for several of the recommended
terminations indicates a willingness to make difficult choices on individual
weapon systems and DOD’s major defense acquisition program portfolio as
a whole.
The focus of this year’s report is slightly different than in years past. We still
provide information on the cumulative cost growth experienced by the 98
programs in DOD’s 2010 portfolio of major defense acquisition programs,
but much of our cost analysis examines program performance over the last
2 years. This allows us to better focus on the department’s management of
its major defense acquisition programs since key acquisition reforms were
put into place by Congress and DOD. In addition, our cost analysis now
explicitly accounts for cost growth associated with changes in weapon
system quantities, identifies the programs that drive most of DOD’s cost
1
GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-11-278 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 16, 2011).
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GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
growth, and assesses DOD against cost performance goals agreed to by
DOD, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and GAO.
Our review this year indicates that DOD is making decisions that put most
new or planned programs in a better position to succeed, but still faces
challenges to effectively managing its current weapon system programs.
DOD can help assure it delivers the promised return on investment for its
weapon system spending by using the knowledge-based acquisition
approach that is now embodied in law and policy. Our review this year
found continued improvement in the knowledge DOD officials had about
programs’ technologies, designs, and manufacturing processes for
programs that recently progressed through key points in the acquisition
process. However, most programs are still proceeding with less knowledge
than best practices suggest, putting them at higher risk for cost growth and
schedule delays. In fact, a majority of DOD’s major defense acquisition
programs did not meet cost performance goals agreed to by DOD, OMB,
and GAO for total cost growth over 2-year and 5-year periods and from
their initial program estimates. More consistently applying a knowledgebased approach, as well as improving implementation of acquisition
reforms, can help DOD achieve better outcomes for its portfolio of major
weapon system programs.
While recent acquisition reforms have put newer programs in a better
position to field capabilities on-time and at the estimated cost, existing
programs such as the Joint Strike Fighter—which began without following
knowledge-based acquisition strategies—continue to drive poor outcomes
for DOD’s major defense acquisition program portfolio. Over the last 2
years, the total acquisition cost of the programs in DOD’s 2010 portfolio has
grown by $135 billion (in fiscal year 2011 dollars). About half of this growth
can be associated with quantity changes, versus poor management and
execution problems, but at least $70 billion is indicative of such problems.
The cost growth on the Joint Strike Fighter alone accounted for almost $34
billion of that amount. Cost overruns of this magnitude on programs that
have already spent years in development can only be meaningfully offset by
reductions in planned capabilities or quantities. Serious consideration by
DOD of these types of tradeoffs will be essential to getting cost growth
under control.
This report provides insights that will help DOD place programs in a better
position to succeed, thus helping the department maximize its investments.
The current acquisition reform environment, coupled with fiscal
imperatives, constitute an opportunity to leverage the lessons of the past
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GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
and manage risks differently. This environment is shaped by significant
acquisition reform legislation, constructive changes in DOD’s acquisition
policy, and initiatives by the administration, including making difficult
decisions on individual weapon systems. To sustain momentum and make
the most of this opportunity, it will be essential that decisions to approve
and fund acquisitions be consistent with the reforms and policies aimed at
achieving better outcomes. Such decisions will need the support of both
DOD and Congress.
Gene L. Dodaro
Comptroller General of the United States
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A
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, D.C. 20548
March 29, 2011
Leter
Congressional Committees
This is GAO’s ninth annual assessment of selected Department of Defense
(DOD) weapon programs and the third in response to the mandate in the
joint explanatory statement to the DOD Appropriations Act, 2009.1 This
report provides a snapshot of how well DOD is planning and executing its
weapon programs—an area that is on GAO’s high-risk list. Congress and
DOD have long explored ways to improve the acquisition of major weapon
systems, yet poor program outcomes persist. In the past 2 years, we have
reported improvements in the knowledge programs attained about
technologies, design, and manufacturing processes at key points during the
acquisition process. However, we have found that most programs continue
to proceed with less knowledge than recommended, putting them at higher
risk for cost growth and schedule delays. Recent reforms place additional
emphasis on applying knowledge-based acquisition practices, which, if
implemented, put programs in a better position to field capabilities on time
at the estimated cost.
This report includes (1) observations on the performance of DOD’s
portfolio of 98 major defense acquisition programs, (2) data on factors,
such as performance requirements and software management, that can
affect program outcomes, (3) our assessment of the knowledge attained by
key junctures in the acquisition process for a subset of 40 weapon
programs—primarily in development or the early stages of production—
from the 2010 portfolio, and (4) observations on the extent to which DOD is
implementing recent acquisition reforms.
There are three sets of programs on which our observations are primarily
based in this report. We assessed all 98 major defense acquisition programs
for our analysis of portfolio performance; 40 programs in development or
early production for our analysis of factors that can affect outcomes and
knowledge attained by key junctures; and 14 planned major defense
acquisition programs for our analysis of DOD’s progress in implementing
selected acquisition reforms. To develop our observations on the
1
See Explanatory Statement, 154 Cong. Rec. H 9427, 9526 (daily ed., Sept. 24, 2008), to the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act Fiscal Year 2009, contained in Division C of the
Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub.
L. No. 110-329.
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GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
performance of DOD’s portfolio of 98 major defense acquisition programs,
we obtained cost, schedule, and quantity data from DOD’s Selected
Acquisition Reports (SAR) and from the Defense Acquisition Management
Information Retrieval Purview system.2 For unit cost reporting, DOD
breaks several of these 98 programs into components. Therefore, some of
our analysis is based on 100 or 101 programs or components. To analyze
factors that can affect program outcomes and to assess how well programs
are adhering to a knowledge-based acquisition approach, we examined a
subset of 40 major defense acquisition programs and components from
DOD’s 2010 portfolio that were in development or early production as of
June 2010. We submitted a questionnaire to program offices to collect
information on aspects of program management including performance
requirements, manufacturing planning, software development, and
program office staffing. All 40 major defense acquisition programs we
surveyed that were in development or early production responded to our
questionnaire. We also obtained information on the extent to which they
follow knowledge-based practices for technology maturity, design stability,
and production maturity using a data collection instrument provided to 40
programs. To examine the extent to which DOD is implementing recent
acquisition reforms, we used additional information from a questionnaire
submitted to 17 planned major defense acquisition programs approaching
program start; 14 of these planned programs responded. In addition to our
observations, we present one- or two-page assessments of 71 weapon
programs. We chose these 71 programs based on their estimated cost, stage
in the acquisition process, and congressional interest.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2010 to March 2011 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings based on our audit
objectives. Appendix I contains detailed information on our scope and
methodology.
2
Major defense acquisition programs are those identified by DOD that require eventual total
research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) expenditures, including all planned
increments, of more than $365 million, or procurement expenditures, including all planned
increments, of more than $2.19 billion, in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars.
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Observations on DOD’s
2010 Major Defense
Acquisition Program
Portfolio
Since 2008, the number of programs in DOD’s portfolio of major defense
acquisition programs has increased from 96 to 98, and DOD’s total planned
investment in these programs has increased by $45 billion to $1.68 trillion.3
Thirteen programs with a total estimated cost of $174 billion left the
portfolio.4 Fifteen programs with an estimated cost of $77 billion entered
the portfolio.5 These programs are smaller, on average, than those already
in the portfolio. Our analysis of the 98 programs in DOD’s 2010 portfolio of
major defense acquisition programs allows us to make five observations
about the overall portfolio, as well as about the performance of individual
programs. First, the total cost of the programs in DOD’s portfolio has
grown by about $135 billion, or 9 percent, over the last 2 years, of which
about $70 billion cannot be attributed to quantity changes. We focused on
this 2-year period instead of program performance against initial estimates
in order to assess the department’s recent management of major defense
acquisition programs.6 Second, over half of the portfolio’s total cost growth
over the last 2 years is driven by 10 of DOD’s largest programs, which are
all in production. As these programs leave the portfolio through completion
or cancellation, their cost will leave with them. Third, about half of the
programs in the portfolio have experienced cost increases that exceed cost
3
All dollar figures are in fiscal year 2011 constant dollars unless otherwise noted.
4
The 13 programs that have left the portfolio include the Advanced Deployable System
(AN/WQR-3), Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter, Defense Integrated Military Human
Resources System, Extended Range Munition, Future Combat System, Advanced Anti-Tank
Weapon System-Medium (Javelin), Minuteman III Guidance Replacement Program, Mission
Planning System, Small Diameter Bomb Increment 1, Ship Self Defense System, Ohio Class
SSGN Conversion, T-45TS Naval Undergraduate Jet Flight Training System (Goshawk), and
Presidential Helicopter Replacement (VH-71) Program.
5
The 15 programs that have entered the portfolio include the Airborne Signals Intelligence
Payload-Baseline, Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense, Broad Area Maritime
Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System, C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft, EA-6B Improved
Capability III, Gray Eagle Unmanned Aircraft System, Global Positioning System IIIA,
Increment 1 Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team, Integrated Defensive Electronic
Countermeasures, Joint High Speed Vessel, Joint Precision Approach and Landing System,
Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System, Predator Unmanned
Aircraft System, Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System, and Warfighter Information NetworkTactical Increment 3. Not all of these programs are new starts. Several began as acquisition
category II programs before growing in cost.
6
We chose a 2-year period instead of a 1-year period because DOD did not issue annual,
comprehensive Selected Acquisition Reports in December 2008.
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performance goals agreed to by DOD, OMB, and GAO.7 Fourth, almost 80
percent of the programs in the portfolio have experienced an increase in
unit cost when compared to their original estimates, thereby reducing
DOD’s buying power on these programs. Fifth, on average, the majority of
cost growth materialized after programs entered production, meaning they
continued to experience significant changes well after the programs and
their costs should have stabilized. Additional details about each of these
observations follow.
• The total cost of DOD’s 2010 portfolio of major defense
acquisition programs has grown by $135 billion, or 9 percent,
over the past 2 years, of which about $70 billion cannot be
attributed to changes in quantities of some weapon systems. As
shown in table 1, since 2008, the total cost to develop and procure all of
the weapon systems in this year’s portfolio has increased by $135 billion,
or 9 percent.8 About $65 billion of that growth can be attributed to
quantity changes on 57 programs.9 The DDG 51 Destroyer, Joint Mine
Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, and C-17A aircraft programs
experienced the largest cost increases due to increased quantities and
account for almost half of that growth. The remaining $70 billion in cost
growth is not attributable to quantity changes. For example, the
procurement cost of the Joint Strike Fighter program increased by $28
billion in the last 2 years without a change in quantities. This type of cost
growth could be indicative of production problems and inefficiencies or
flawed initial cost estimates. Additionally, research and development
costs increased by $15 billion over the past 2 years. Five programs—the
Joint Strike Fighter, CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement, F-22 Raptor, Space
Based Infrared System High, and Advanced Extremely High Frequency
Satellite—accounted for 70 percent of this increase with each
7
DOD, OMB, and GAO agreed upon outcome metrics designed to evaluate program
performance by measuring acquisition cost growth over the last year, the last 5 years, and
since their original program estimate.
8
App. II includes 5-year and baseline estimate comparisons for the overall 2010 portfolio.
9
Programs that increased quantities had $87 billion in cost growth attributable to those
increased purchases and programs that reduced quantities had $22 billion in cost decreases
attributable to those reduced purchases. To calculate the portion of the procurement cost
growth attributable to quantity changes, we compared a program’s average procurement
unit cost from December 2007 with its average procurement unit cost from December 2009.
When quantities changed, we multiplied the change by the previous average procurement
unit cost to determine the cost growth due to these quantity changes. See app. I for
additional information on our scope and methodology.
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experiencing research and development cost growth of over $1 billion.
With the exception of CH-53K, these programs are all in production, but
are still incurring additional research and development costs. For the
most part, these programs began with unrealistic business cases, which
contributed to these poor outcomes.10
Table 1: Changes in DOD’s 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense Acquisition Programs over the Past 2 Years
Fiscal year 2011 dollars in billions
Estimated portfolio
cost in 2008a
Estimated portfolio
cost in 2010
Estimated portfolio
cost growth since
2008b
Percentage growth
since 2008b
Total estimated research and
development cost
$407
$428
$15
5%
Total estimated procurement cost
1,089
1,219
121
11
Total estimated acquisition cost
1,531
1,680
135
9
–
–
5 months
8
Average delay in delivering initial
capabilities
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: In addition to research and development and procurement costs, total acquisition cost includes
acquisition operation and maintenance and system-specific military construction costs. Details on
program costs used for this analysis are provided in app. III.
a
The 2008 estimate includes costs for the 83 programs that are at least 2 years old, and the first
available estimate for the remaining 15 programs that are new to the 2010 portfolio.
b
The portfolio cost columns include the reported cost of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS);
however, the portfolio cost growth columns do not include $6 billion in research and development and
$9 billion in procurement cost changes for the BMDS. DOD does not consider these adjustments to
represent cost growth because the program has been allowed to add 2 years of new funding with each
biennial budget.
In addition to higher costs, programs in the 2010 portfolio have also
experienced additional delays within the past 2 years. The average delay in
delivering initial capabilities increased by 5 months. When examined from
a longer-term perspective, the average delay in delivering initial capabilities
is 22 months for these programs when measured against their first full
estimates. See appendix II for our analysis of cost growth and delays in
10
GAO, Tactical Aircraft: Recapitalization Goals Are Not Supported by Knowledge-Based
F-22A and JSF Business Cases, GAO-06-487T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2006); Defense
Acquisitions: Despite Restructuring, SBIRS High Program Remains at Risk of Cost and
Schedule Overruns, GAO-04-48 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2003); and Defense Acquisitions:
Space System Acquisition Risks and Keys to Addressing Them, GAO-06-776R
(Washington, D.C.: June 1, 2006).
Page 8
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
delivering initial capabilities against first full estimates for DOD’s 2010
portfolio of major defense acquisition programs.
• Ten of DOD’s largest acquisition programs account for over half
the portfolio’s total acquisition cost growth over the past 2
years. DOD’s largest programs represent more than half of its total
investment in major defense acquisition programs. These programs
range in age from 3 to 32 years; all 10 are in production; and 8 have
attained initial operational capability. Collectively, the estimated cost of
these programs is $853 billion. These 10 programs account for $79
billion in cost growth over the last 2 years, or over half of the $135
billion in total cost growth for this period. Of the $79 billion in cost
growth, $35 billion is attributable to increased purchases—primarily of
the C-17A aircraft, DDG 51 Destroyer, and Joint Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected family of vehicles, which has been in high demand because of
the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. When examined from a more
historical perspective, the total acquisition cost of these 10 programs
has grown by $196 billion over their first full estimates, which is almost
half of the $402 billion in total cost growth for the 2010 portfolio. As
these programs leave the portfolio through completion or cancellation,
their cost will leave with them. While some of these programs are
nearing the end of their procurement, others such as the Joint Strike
Fighter, Virginia Class Submarine, V-22, and CVN 21 will continue to
demand large amounts of annual funding. Table 2 provides a summary of
10 of the largest DOD acquisition programs.
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GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Table 2: Changes in Total Acquisition Cost and Program Acquisition Unit Cost for 10 of the Highest-Cost Acquisition Programs
Total acquisition cost
(fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Program
2008 estimate
Program acquisition unit cost
(fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Change over
2010 estimate the last 2 years
2008 estimate
Percentage
change over
2010 estimate the last 2 years
Joint Strike Fighter
249,690
283,674
33,984
101.7
115.5
13.6
DDG 51 Destroyer
77,382
94,344
16,961
1,248.1
1,328.8
6.5
C-17A Globemaster III
75,046
82,347
7,301
395.0
369.3
-6.5
Virginia Class
Submarine (SSN 774)
83,194
82,193
-1,002
2,773.1
2,739.8
-1.2
F-22 Raptor
75,200
77,393
2,193
408.7
411.7
0.7
V-22 Joint Services
Advanced Vertical Lift
Aircraft (Osprey)
56,659
56,061
-598
123.7
122.4
-1.1
F/A-18E/F Super
Hornet
52,824
54,625
1,801
107.1
106.1
-1.0
Trident II Missile
50,611
51,410
799
90.2
91.6
1.6
Joint Mine Resistant
Ambush Protected
(MRAP)
22,792
36,375
13,583
1.5
1.6
7.2
CVN 21 Future Aircraft
Carrier
30,513
34,186
3,673
10,171.0
11,395.2
12.0
852,607
78,696
–
–
–
Total
773,911
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Figures may not add due to rounding.
• Fewer than half of the programs in DOD’s 2010 portfolio are
meeting established performance metrics for cost growth. In
December 2008, DOD, working with OMB and GAO, developed a set of
outcome metrics and goals to measure program performance over time.
As shown in figure 1, less than half of the programs in DOD’s 2010
portfolio met the total acquisition cost growth goals that were set.11 The
metrics also show that those programs experiencing significant cost
growth—more than 15 percent over initial estimates—dominate DOD’s
11
These metrics are designed to capture total cost growth performance over 1-year and 5year periods and from the original program estimate. We modified these metrics to measure
a 2-year comparison since cost data were not available to make a 1-year comparison.
Page 10
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
portfolio, representing about 72 percent of DOD’s total investment in its
major defense acquisition programs.12
Figure 1: Programs Meeting DOD, OMB, and GAO Cost Performance Metrics
100
90
80
28%
44
49
49
51
51
70
60
50
40
30
72%
57
20
10
0
2-year
5-year
Baseline
comparison comparison comparison
<4%
<10%
<15%
growth
growth
growth
Percent of DOD’s total
investment in major
defense acquisition
programs
Programs that meet criteria
Programs that do not meetcriteria
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: The number of programs represents those in the 2010 portfolio—those with December 2009
SARs—which break down several programs into smaller elements for reporting purposes. One
program, Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload (ASIP)-Baseline, was not included in 2-year and 5-year
comparisons because data were not available to make those comparisons.
• DOD’s buying power has been reduced for almost 80 percent of
its portfolio of major defense acquisition programs. Of the 100
programs or components in DOD’s 2010 portfolio that reported program
acquisition unit cost data, 79 are planning to deliver capabilities at
12
The original estimates we used are primarily programs’ cost estimates at development
start. These may differ from DOD baseline estimates used for Nunn-McCurdy cost growth
purposes, which can be reset after a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical
threshold.
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GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
higher unit costs than originally estimated, while only 21 are planning to
deliver capabilities at or below initial estimates.13 We did not examine
whether these programs delivered a lower or higher level of
performance than initially promised. To quantify the change in DOD’s
buying power, we examined changes in program acquisition unit cost
and quantities.14 An example of a program that experienced reduced
buying power is the F-22 Raptor. Despite a 70 percent reduction in
quantities for the program, total acquisition costs have only decreased
by 14 percent, due to research and development and average
procurement unit cost increases. As a result, program acquisition unit
costs for the F-22 Raptor have almost tripled, from $139 million to $412
million per airplane. For the current 188 aircraft program, the $273
million increase per plane translates to $51.3 billion in lost buying power
for the F-22 program as a whole. Conversely, some programs are
planning to deliver more quantities than planned at a lower program
acquisition unit cost, which translates into increased buying power for
DOD. For example, despite research and development costs almost
tripling and the total program cost increasing by $79 billion, the DDG 51
Destroyer’s program acquisition unit cost has decreased by about 20
percent, because it has spread out those research and development
costs over significantly higher quantities and its average procurement
unit cost has decreased over time. For the currently planned fleet of 71
ships, the $333 million reduction per ship corresponds to $24 billion in
increased buying power for the program as a whole.
13
Program acquisition unit cost is the total cost for development, procurement, acquisition
operation and maintenance, and system-specific military construction for the acquisition
program divided by the number of items to be produced. DOD’s 2010 portfolio includes 98
programs with SARs; however, DOD’s SAR summary tables break down several of these
programs into smaller elements. We did not include the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA)
Ballistic Missile Defense System because comparable cost and schedule data were not
available, or the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System,
because quantities were reduced to zero.
14
We calculated the effect on DOD’s buying power from a program by multiplying the change
in the program acquisition unit cost by the current planned quantities.
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GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Figure 2: Change in Planned Quantities and Program Acquisition Unit Cost for the F-22 Raptor and DDG 51 Destroyer
F-22 Raptor
DDG 51 Destroyer
Number of units
Number of units
Dollars (in millions)
Dollars (in millions)
1,800
90
700
700
$1,662
648
1,600
80
600
600
71
70
$1,329 1,400
60
1,200
500
500
$412
400
400
50
1,000
300
300
40
800
30
600
20
400
188
200
200
$139
100
100
10
0
0
Baseline
estimate
9
200
0
0
Current
estimate
Baseline
estimate
Current
estimate
Total quantity
Program acquisition unit cost
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
• On average, the majority of cost growth materialized after
programs entered production, meaning they continued to
experience significant changes well after the programs and their
costs should have stabilized. For the 56 major defense acquisition
programs in DOD’s 2010 portfolio that had production cost estimates as
of the end of 2009, we found that the average program experienced the
majority of its research and development and procurement cost growth
after its production decision. Fifty-two percent of the average program’s
research and development cost growth was incurred after production
start. Additionally, 65 percent of the average program’s procurement
cost growth materialized after production start. On average, these
programs are 14 years old. Given the age of the programs in this group,
most of them were started before DOD acquisition polices were revised
to promote a knowledge-based, evolutionary acquisition approach.
Therefore, newer programs that follow a knowledge-based approach
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GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
may be better positioned to avoid cost growth this late in the acquisition
cycle.
Observations on
Factors That Can
Affect Program
Outcomes
For 40 individual weapon programs in DOD’s 2010 portfolio, we collected
and assessed data on DOD’s management of requirements, software, and
program office staffing. We previously reported that both requirements
changes and increases in the scope of software development were
associated with poor program outcomes.15 We found similar results this
year. Our analysis of the data allows us to make three observations. First,
over half of the programs in our assessment made a change to a key
performance requirement after development start and experienced higher
levels of cost growth and longer schedule delays than programs with
unchanged requirements. Second, half of the programs in our assessment
that provided data on software lines of code saw the scope of software
development increase after development start, which also corresponded
with poorer outcomes. Third, programs continue to use contractors to
make up for staffing shortfalls, though programs’ reliance on
nongovernment personnel has declined from last year’s assessment.
Additional details about each of these observations follow.
• Programs that modified key performance requirements after
development start experienced higher levels of cost growth and
longer delays in delivering capabilities. Of the 39 programs in our
current assessment that reported tracking requirements changes since
development start, 21 reported having had at least one change to a key
performance parameter—a top-level requirement. Specifically, 10 of the
21 programs reported adding or enhancing a key performance
parameter; 3 of the 21 programs reported reducing, deferring, or
deleting a key performance parameter; and 8 of the 21 programs
reported making both types of changes to key performance parameters.
Most of the programs that experienced requirements changes are
programs that started prior to 2005. While changing requirements
creates instability and, therefore, can adversely affect program
outcomes, it is also possible that some programs experiencing poor
outcomes may be decreasing program requirements in an effort to
prevent further cost growth. As shown in figure 3, programs with
changes to performance requirements experienced roughly four times
15
GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-09-326SP
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2009).
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GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
more growth in research and development costs and three to five times
greater schedule delays compared to programs with unchanged
requirements. Similarly, programs with increases to key system
attributes—lower level, but still crucial requirements of the system—
experienced greater, albeit less pronounced, cost growth and schedule
delays than other programs.
Figure 3: Relationship between Key Performance Parameter Changes, Research and
Development Cost Growth, and Delays in Achieving Initial Operational Capabilities
Percentage
100
90
84
80
75
70
60
50
40
40
30
27
18
20
8
10
0
Programs with
decreased, deferred,
or deleted
requirements
(11 programs)
Programs with
new or enhanced
requirements
(18 programs)
Programs with
no change in
requirements
(18 programs)
Average increase in research and development costs
Average increase in length of acquisition cycle
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: Programs that had both increases and decreases in key performance parameters are included
in both categories. Cost and schedule data were not available for the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff
Missile Extended Range variant, which had a new or enhanced requirement.
• Substantial increases in the scope of software development
efforts after development start also correspond to higher cost
growth and longer schedule delays. In our last several assessments,
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GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
we reported that programs experiencing more growth in software lines
of code since development start had higher development cost growth
and longer schedule delays than other programs. Similarly, for the 25
programs in our current assessment that reported data on lines of code,
we found that increases in total lines of code after development start
correlate highly with both increases in research and development costs
and longer delays in achieving initial operational capability. Over half of
these programs, or 14 of 25, estimated that the number of lines of code
required for the system to function has grown or will grow by 25 percent
or more. These programs tend to be those that began development more
than 5 years ago. Newer programs have also experienced some software
growth, though it has been less severe, on average. In addition to
measuring growth in software lines of code, we have previously
reported that collecting earned value management data for software
development is a good management practice. Thirty-two of the 40
programs in our assessment reported collecting such data to help
manage software development by allowing visibility into schedule and
cost performance of software. These programs generally had software
efforts that were more than twice as large, on average, as those
programs that reported not collecting earned value data for software
development. Finally, we have previously reported that tracking and
capturing software defects in-phase is important because discovering
defects out of phase can cause expensive rework later in programs. For
the 21 programs that reported collecting some type of software defect
data, on average, only 69 percent of the defects were corrected in the
phase of software development in which they occurred.
• Programs continue to use contractors to make up for staffing
shortfalls, but reliance on nongovernment personnel has
decreased. Congress and DOD have made it a priority to ensure the
acquisition workforce has the capacity, personnel, and skills needed to
properly perform its mission. Most programs, however, continue to
struggle to fill all staff positions authorized. Specifically, 36 of the 44
programs we surveyed reported having been authorized all the positions
they requested, but a majority—23 programs—were unable to fill all of
them.16 A majority of programs we assessed reported that they are in the
process of staffing unfilled positions. Several cited delays and difficulty
in finding qualified candidates as reasons for not being able to fill these
16
In addition to data from 40 major defense acquisition programs, our analysis of program
staffing includes data from four MDA elements.
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GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
positions. Additionally, almost all programs—39 of 44—reported using
support contractors to make up for shortfalls in government personnel
or capabilities.

Program offices’ reliance on contractors has decreased since last year’s
assessment. As shown in table 3, more than half (55 percent) of all
program office staff for the 44 programs in our assessment were
government personnel—a reversal of the downward trend in the
percentage of government personnel that we have reported in the
previous 3 years.17 The percentage of support contractors declined in
every discipline. Support contractors still fill the majority of
administrative support positions; however, the greatest numbers of
support contractors continue to be in engineering and technical
positions.
Table 3: Program Office Composition for 44 DOD Programs, as of 2010
Program
management
Engineering
Contracting
Business
functions
Administrative
support
Other
Total
Military personnel
30
7
6
3
8
11
10
Civilian government
43
45
84
57
30
25
46
Total government
73
52
90
60
37
36
55
Support contractors
Percentage of staff
27
40
10
38
61
64
39
Other nongovernmenta
0
8
0
2
2
0
6
Total nongovernment
27
48
10
40
63
64
45
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
a
Other nongovernment includes federally funded research and development center and universityaffiliated employees.
17
We reported last year that 49 percent of program office staff were government personnel.
The program offices we collected data from differ year to year. However, in both years, we
focused on programs that were in development or the early stages of production.
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GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Observations from Our
Assessment of
Knowledge Attained by
Key Junctures in the
Acquisition Process
Good acquisition outcomes require the use of a knowledge-based approach
to product development that demonstrates high levels of knowledge before
significant commitments are made. In essence, knowledge supplants risk
over time. In our past work examining weapon acquisition issues and best
practices for product development, we have found that leading commercial
firms pursue an acquisition approach that is anchored in knowledge,
whereby high levels of product knowledge are demonstrated by critical
points in the acquisition process.18 On the basis of this work, we have
identified three key knowledge points during the acquisition cycle—
development start; design review, which occurs during engineering and
manufacturing development; and production start—at which programs
need to demonstrate critical levels of knowledge to proceed. Figure 4
compares DOD acquisition milestones with the timing of the three
knowledge points.
18
GAO, Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve
Weapon System Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-99-162 (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 1999); Best
Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to Better Weapon System
Outcomes, GAO-01-288 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2001); Best Practices: Capturing Design
and Manufacturing Knowledge Early Improves Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-02-701
(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002); Defense Acquisitions: A Knowledge-Based Funding
Approach Could Improve Major Weapon System Program Outcomes, GAO-08-619
(Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2008); Best Practices: High Levels of Knowledge at Key Points
Differentiate Commercial Shipbuilding from Navy Shipbuilding, GAO-09-322
(Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2009); Best Practices: DOD Can Achieve Better Outcomes by
Standardizing the Way Manufacturing Risks Are Managed, GAO-10-439 (Washington, D.C:
Apr. 22, 2010).
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GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Figure 4: DOD’s Acquisition Cycle and GAO Knowledge Points
DOD acquisition milestones
Development start
(milestone B)
Production start
(milestone C)
Engineering and manufacturing development
Technology
Development
GAO knowledge points
Integration
Knowledge point 1
Technologies and
resources match
requirements
Demonstration
Knowledge point 2
Design performs
as expected
Production
Knowledge point 3
Production can meet
cost, schedule, and
quality targets
Source: GAO.
The building of knowledge consists of information that should be gathered
at these three critical points over the course of a program:
• Knowledge point 1: Resources and requirements match. Achieving
a high level of technology maturity by the start of system development is
an important indicator of whether this match has been made. This
means that the technologies needed to meet essential product
requirements have been demonstrated to work in their intended
environment. In addition, the developer has completed a preliminary
design of the product that shows the design is feasible.
• Knowledge point 2: Product design is stable. This point occurs
when a program determines that a product’s design will meet customer
requirements, as well as cost, schedule, and reliability targets. A best
practice is to achieve design stability at the system-level critical design
review, usually held midway through system development. Completion
of at least 90 percent of engineering drawings at this point or 100
percent of the 3D product models for ships at fabrication start provides
tangible evidence that the product’s design is stable, and a prototype
demonstration shows that the design is capable of meeting performance
requirements.
• Knowledge point 3: Manufacturing processes are mature. This
point is achieved when it has been demonstrated that the developer can
manufacture the product within cost, schedule, and quality targets. A
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GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
best practice is to ensure that all critical manufacturing processes are in
statistical control—that is, they are repeatable, sustainable, and capable
of consistently producing parts within the product’s quality tolerances
and standards—at the start of production.
A knowledge-based acquisition approach is a cumulative process in which
certain knowledge is acquired by key decision points before proceeding. In
other words, demonstrating technology maturity is a prerequisite for
moving forward into system development, during which the focus should
be on design and integration. Additional details about key practices at each
of the knowledge points can be found in appendix IV.
For 40 individual weapon programs in development and early production in
DOD’s 2010 portfolio, we assessed the knowledge attained by key junctures
in the acquisition process. In particular, we focused on the 17 programs
that progressed through these key acquisition points since 2009 and
evaluated their adherence to knowledge-based practices. While we
continue to find that newer programs are demonstrating higher levels of
knowledge at key decision points, most are still not fully adhering to a
knowledge-based acquisition approach, putting them at a higher risk for
cost growth and schedule delays.19 Only one program in our assessment
began system development since 2009, and it did so with all its critical
technologies nearing maturity, in accordance with DOD and statutory
requirements. However, it did not fully mature its critical technologies
before beginning development, in accordance with knowledge-based
practices, and only three nonship programs in our assessment had done so
by development start. Six of nine programs that held a critical design
review since 2009 did so with a stable design; however, these programs did
not implement other practices that increase confidence that the design is
stable and capable of meeting performance requirements. Finally, almost
all programs that held a production decision since 2009 identified key
product characteristics and critical manufacturing processes; however,
none of the programs demonstrated that critical manufacturing processes
were in control and only half tested production-representative prototypes
prior to this decision. Additional details about these observations follow.
19
Not all programs provided information for every knowledge point or had reached all of the
knowledge points—development start, design review, and production start. Because
knowledge points differ for shipbuilding programs, we exclude them from our assessment
of certain knowledge-based practices. App. IV contains a list of knowledge-based practices
at each of the three knowledge points.
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GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
• The one program in our assessment that began development
since 2009 did so with all its technologies nearing maturity, but
few programs overall began development with fully mature
technologies. The Army’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)
program began development in 2009 with all critical technologies at
least nearing maturity—that is, demonstrated in a relevant
environment—in accordance with DOD and statutory requirements,20
but did not demonstrate them in a realistic environment as GAO has
recommended.21 Our analysis of the 26 nonship programs in our
assessment that provided technology data shows that only three of
these programs began development with fully mature technologies—
that is, demonstrated in a realistic environment. Our analysis also shows
that mature technologies are associated with improved program
outcomes. Specifically, the 3 programs that began development with
fully mature technologies have experienced 4 percent less growth in
research and development costs over their first estimates, on average,
compared to the 11 programs that began development with all
technologies at least nearing maturity, and 33 percent less growth, on
average, than the 12 programs with at least one immature technology at
the start of system development.

In addition, as shown in figure 5, the IAMD program did not implement
other knowledge-based practices before beginning development,
including holding a program-level preliminary design review and
constraining the length of system development. We have previously
reported that before starting development, programs should hold key
system engineering events, such as the preliminary design review, to
ensure that requirements are defined and feasible and that the proposed
design can meet those requirements within cost, schedule, and other

20
According to DOD policy, in order to be considered mature enough to use in product
development, technology shall have been demonstrated in a relevant environment or,
preferably, in an operational environment. Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02,
Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, enc. 2, para. 5.d.(4) (Dec. 8, 2008). In addition,
a major defense acquisition program may not receive milestone B approval until the
milestone decision authority certifies that the technology in the program has been
demonstrated in a relevant environment. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 801 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2366b(a)(3)(D)).
21
Demonstration in a relevant environment is Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 6.
Demonstration in a realistic environment is TRL 7. See app. V for a detailed description of
TRLs.
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GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
system constraints.22 IAMD did hold a system requirements review and a
system functional review before development start, which is a major
improvement over other programs in our assessment, which held these
reviews, on average, 18 months and 25 months after development start,
respectively. Knowledge-based acquisition practices also recommend
that a system or increment be developed in 5 to 6 years or fewer.23
Further, DOD acquisition policy states that a condition for exiting
technology development is that a system or increment can be developed
for production within a short time frame, defined as normally less than 5
years for weapons systems. Constraining development time increases
the predictability of funding needs and the likelihood of program
success. While IAMD plans to follow an incremental approach, system
development will take almost 7 years.
Figure 5: Implementation of Knowledge-Based Practices by a Program Beginning
Engineering and Manufacturing Development since 2009
Knowledge-based practices at development start
IAMD
Knowledge point 1
Mature all critical technologies
Hold system requirements review
Hold system functional review
a
Hold preliminary design review
Constrain development phase to 6 years or less
Practice implemented by program
Practice not implemented by program
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
a
The IAMD program received a waiver for the requirement to hold a preliminary design review before
beginning system development.
22
GAO-09-326SP. A major defense acquisition program may not receive milestone B approval
until the program has held a preliminary design review and the milestone decision authority
has conducted a formal postpreliminary design review assessment and certified on the basis
of such assessment that the program demonstrates a high likelihood of accomplishing its
intended mission. Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-23, §
205(a)(3) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2366b(a)(2)). IAMD received a waiver from this
requirement.
23
GAO-08-619.
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GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
• Six of nine programs in our assessment that held a critical design
review since 2009 did so with a stable design; however, these
programs did not implement other knowledge-based practices to
increase confidence that the design is stable. Knowing a product’s
design is stable before system demonstration reduces the risk of costly
design changes occurring during the manufacturing of productionrepresentative prototypes—when investments in acquisitions become
more significant. The overall design knowledge that programs have
demonstrated at their critical design review has increased over the last
few years, and six of nine programs that held a design review since 2009
did so with a stable design. However, as shown in figure 6, none of the
nine programs in our assessment that held their critical design review
since 2009 demonstrated that their design is capable of meeting
performance requirements by testing an integrated prototype before the
design review. We have previously reported that early system prototypes
are useful to demonstrate design stability and that the design will work
and can be built. On average, the nine programs tested or plan to test an
integrated prototype 13 months after the critical design review, which is
an improvement over the 31-month average we reported in last year’s
assessment.
er
ap
Re
PA
TR
ME IOT
/
A
Fir DS C
eU
A
nit P
S
JP
AL
IIA
SI
GP
FA
BT
CH
-53
FJ
AM
AB
3
Knowledge point 2
K
TR
S
Knowledge-based practices
at design review
Inc
re
E-I men
BC t 1
T
Figure 6: Implementation of Knowledge-Based Practices by Programs Holding Their Critical Design Review since 2009
Mature all critical technologies
Release at least 90 percent of design drawings
Test a system-level integrated prototype
Use a reliability growth curve
Conduct producibility assessments to identify
manufacturing risks for key technologies
Complete failure modes and effects analysis
Practice implemented by program
Practice not implemented by program
Practice not applicable or information not available
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Page 23
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Many of these programs are also still concurrently developing
technologies and finalizing designs, which can lead to cost and
schedule inefficiencies and rework. Of the nine programs, only three
had fully matured all critical technologies at this point in the acquisition
cycle. The remaining programs accepted technologies into their
product’s design based on no more than a laboratory demonstration of
basic performance, technical feasibility, and functionality instead of a
representative model or prototype in a realistic environment.
Despite not demonstrating that their design is stable, many of these
programs are taking steps to plan for production. Almost all programs
that held their critical design review since 2009 reported completing
failure modes and effects analysis to identify potential failures and
early design fixes and conducting producibility assessments to identify
manufacturing risks for key technologies. However, only three
programs reported having a reliability growth curve at the time of the
critical design review. Reliability growth testing provides visibility over
how reliability is improving and uncovers design problems so fixes can
be incorporated before production begins. Our assessment of programs
in development or early production that provided cost data shows that
on average, programs using a reliability growth curve have experienced
about one-third the research and development cost growth after
development start than programs that have not used a reliability growth
curve.
• Almost all programs that held a production decision since 2009
took steps to plan for manufacturing; however, none of the
programs demonstrated that critical manufacturing processes
were in control, and only half tested production-representative
prototypes prior to this decision. Capturing critical manufacturing
knowledge before entering production helps ensure that a weapon
system will work as intended and can be manufactured efficiently to
meet cost, schedule, and quality targets. Identifying key product
characteristics and the associated critical manufacturing processes is a
key initial step to ensuring production elements are stable and in
control. As shown in figure 7, almost all of the programs in our
assessment that made a production decision since 2009 reported
conducting these activities before entering production. However, none
of the 10 programs that made a production decision since 2009
demonstrated that their critical manufacturing processes were in


Page 24
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
statistical control at production start.24 Bringing processes under
statistical control reduces variations in parts manufacturing, thus
reducing the potential for defects, and is generally less costly than
performing extensive inspection after a product is built.
2
nt
WI
N
Inc -T
rem
e
-6
SM
A
P-8
T
NM
Inc
re
E-I men
BC t 1
T
Gr
GP
SI
ay
E
IIA
HE
DA
E-2
C-
AB
3
Knowledge point 3
13
0A
MP
Knowledge-based practices
at production decision
ag
le
Figure 7: Implementation of Knowledge-Based Practices by Programs Holding Their Production Decision since 2009
Mature all critical technologies
Release at least 90 percent of design drawings
Identify key product characteristics
Identify critical manufacturing processes
Demonstrate critical processes are in statistical
control
Demonstrate critical processes on a pilot
production line
Test a production-representative prototype
Practice implemented by program
Practice not implemented by program
Practice not applicable or information not available
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Several programs also began production without knowledge they ought to
have gained much earlier in their acquisition process. One program—
Increment 1 Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT)—entered
production without mature technologies or a stable design. Another
program—Gray Eagle Unmanned Aircraft System—also did not have
24
DOD policy states that the knowledge required for a major defense acquisition program to
proceed beyond low-rate initial production shall include demonstrated control of the
manufacturing process and acceptable reliability, the collection of statistical process
control data, and demonstrated control and capability of critical processes. Department of
Defense Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, enc. 2, para.
7.c.(2) (Dec. 8, 2008). Since we focus on the low-rate production decision, we did not
specifically assess compliance with this requirement.
Page 25
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
mature technologies by its production decision, while the Standard 
Missile-6 (SM-6) began production without completing its design. These
programs are at risk of continued cost growth.
Additionally, many of these programs are still not testing productionrepresentative prototypes before committing to production. We previously
reported that production and postproduction costs are minimized when a
fully integrated, capable prototype is demonstrated to show that the system
will work as intended in a reliable manner. These benefits are maximized
when tests are completed prior to a production decision, because making
design changes after production begins can be both costly and inefficient.
Moreover, DOD’s December 2008 revision to its acquisition policy requires
programs to test production-representative articles before entering
production. Only 5 of the 10 programs that held a production decision since
2009 reported testing a production-representative prototype before their
production decision. However, 11 of the 13 programs that are scheduled to
hold their production decision after 2010 and provided data do plan to test
a fully configured prototype before that decision.
Observations about
DOD’s Implementation
of Recent Acquisition
Reforms
Last year we reported that DOD had begun to incorporate recent
acquisition reforms into the strategies of new programs. These reforms—in
DOD’s December 2008 revised acquisition policy, the Weapon Systems
Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, and recent defense authorization acts—
require programs to invest more time and resources at the beginning of the
acquisition process refining concepts through early systems engineering
and building prototypes before beginning system development, among
other requirements. In addition, for ongoing programs, DOD policy and
statute require establishment of annual configuration steering boards to
review all program requirements changes as well as to make
recommendations on proposed descoping options that could help maintain
a program’s cost and schedule targets. Our examination of the extent to
which weapon systems are adhering to recent acquisition reforms indicates
that many, but not all, programs are implementing these reforms.
Our assessment allows us to make five observations concerning DOD’s
progress in implementing legislative and policy reforms. First, almost all of
the 14 planned major defense acquisition programs we reviewed intend to
hold preliminary design reviews before beginning development, but fewer
are taking other actions, such as developing prototypes, that could improve


Page 26
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
their chances of success.25 Second, seven of these programs reported
making major cost, schedule, or performance tradeoffs to-date, as required
under a DOD and statutory requirement that programs make appropriate
tradeoffs before beginning development. Third, six of the planned
programs have acquisition strategies that include competition after the
start of development. Fourth, of the 40 programs in our assessment that
have begun development or are in the early stages of production, about
one-third have not yet held a configuration steering board meeting, and
only five programs reported presenting descoping options at this meeting.
Finally, as part of DOD’s effort to “do more without more,” the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics is beginning
to implement a range of efficiency initiatives that focus on affordability,
tradeoffs, and portfolio reviews, and are consistent with past GAO
recommendations. Additional details about these observations follow.
• Almost all of the planned major defense acquisition programs in
our assessment intend to conduct a preliminary design review
before development start, but fewer are taking other actions,
such as developing prototypes, that could improve their chances
of success. Thirteen of the 14 planned major defense acquisition
programs we reviewed intend to hold a preliminary design review,26 and
all 10 that provided dates for this review plan to hold it before milestone
B—the beginning of system development—as required by the Weapon
Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. Nine of the 14 planned
programs intend to develop prototypes of the proposed weapon system
or a key system element before milestone B.27 Programs can seek a
waiver of the prototyping requirement, as provided by the policy.
Holding a preliminary design review before beginning development can
help ensure that program requirements are defined and feasible, but by
not developing prototypes, some programs might be missing an
25
We refer to DOD’s designated pre–major defense acquisition programs (pre-MDAPs) as
planned programs throughout this report.
26
The Common Vertical Lift Support Platform program does not plan to hold a preliminary
design review because the program is planning to enter the acquisition cycle at production
start.
27
According to DOD acquisition policy, the technology development strategy for a major
defense acquisition program shall provide for prototypes of the system or, if a system
prototype is not feasible, for prototypes of critical subsystems before the program gets
approval to enter development. Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-027—Implementation of the Weapon
Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, attachment 1, para. 4 (Dec. 4, 2009).
Page 27
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
opportunity to further reduce technical risk, refine requirements,
validate designs and cost estimates, and evaluate manufacturing
processes.
Programs can also put themselves in a better position to succeed by
implementing incremental acquisition strategies that limit the time in
development and constrain requirements. Seven of the 14 planned
programs in our assessment reported using DOD’s preferred
incremental, or evolutionary, acquisition approach, while the other 7
programs planned for a single-step-to-full-capability. The single-step-tofull-capability approach affords few, if any, opportunities to
incrementally, and thus more quickly and inexpensively, adapt the final
system to the changing needs of the warfighter. Conversely, an
evolutionary acquisition strategy emphasizes a more flexible approach
that can help reduce risk because it delivers the weapon system in
more manageable increments. In addition, six of the nine planned
programs in our assessment that provided data plan to deliver
capabilities in less than 6 years, the recommended time limit for system
development, while the remaining three programs are planning for
longer development periods. We have previously reported that
constraining development cycles increases the predictability of funding
needs and the likelihood of program success, while unconstrained and
lengthy cycle times lead to higher costs and diminished military
effectiveness.
• Half of the planned programs we reviewed reported making
major cost, schedule, or performance tradeoffs before beginning
development. DOD acquisition policy and statute require that the
Milestone Decision Authority certify, before a program begins
development, that appropriate tradeoffs among cost, schedule, and
performance objectives have been made to ensure that the program is
affordable. Seven of the 14 planned programs in our assessment
reported making major cost, schedule, or performance tradeoffs during
the technology development phase to-date. For example, in an effort to
reduce cost, the Mobile Landing Platform program reduced
requirements for size, personnel accommodations, and cargo fuel. The
Joint Requirements Oversight Council is also statutorily required to
consider cost, schedule, and performance tradeoffs when validating
joint military requirements.
• Fewer than half of planned programs have acquisition strategies
to ensure competition throughout the acquisition cycle. The
Page 28
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 requires that DOD
ensure that the acquisition strategy for each major defense acquisition
program includes measures to ensure competition, or the option of
competition, throughout the program’s life cycle. These measures may
include developing competitive prototypes, dual-source contracting,
and periodic competitions for subsystem upgrades. Incorporating
competition throughout a program’s life cycle can be used to drive
productivity and thereby reduce program costs. Six of the 14 planned
programs in our assessment reported having acquisition strategies that
call for competition post–milestone B at the system or subsystem level.
• About one-third of the major weapon programs in our
assessment reported that a configuration steering board meeting
has not been held for the program, and few program managers
presented descoping options. Under DOD’s revised acquisition policy
and in statute, ongoing programs are required to conduct annual
configuration steering boards to review requirements changes and
significant technical configuration changes that have the potential to
result in cost and schedule effects on the program. Since January 2009,
10 programs in our assessment reported changing either a key
performance parameter or key system attribute, but only 4 of these
reported holding a configuration steering board meeting during that
period. In addition, as of June 2010, 12 of the 40 programs in our
assessment reported never having held a configuration steering board.
In addition to conducting an annual board meeting, the program
manager is expected to present descoping options that could reduce
program costs or moderate requirements. Only five programs in our
assessment reported having presented descoping options and four
programs had their options approved.
• The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics is beginning to implement a range of efficiency
initiatives that focus on affordability, tradeoffs, and portfolio
reviews, and are consistent with past GAO recommendations. In
September 2010, the Under Secretary issued a memorandum intent on
obtaining greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending.
Several of the proposed initiatives build on the recent acquisition
reforms that DOD has already begun to implement. For example, the
memorandum emphasizes the need to set shorter program timelines and
manage to them to avoid costly delays in delivering capability to the
warfighter. To target affordability, the memo directs program managers
to treat affordability as a requirement before programs are started. In
Page 29
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
addition, the memo underscores the policy and statutory requirement
for making tradeoffs among cost, schedule, and performance objectives
using systems engineering analysis prior to system development. To
ensure competition throughout a program’s life cycle, the memo
proposes requiring the presentation of a competitive strategy at each
program milestone. Finally, the Under Secretary proposed conducting
portfolio analyses to eliminate redundancies across programs, providing
the potential for substantial savings.
Assessments of
Individual Programs
This section contains assessments of individual weapon programs. Each
assessment presents data on the extent to which programs are following a
knowledge-based approach to system development and other program
information. In total, we present information on 71 weapon programs. For
49 programs, we produced two-page assessments discussing technology,
design, and manufacturing knowledge obtained, as well as other program
issues. Each two-page assessment also contains a comparison of total
acquisition cost from the first full estimate for the program to the current
estimate. The first full estimate is generally the cost estimate established at
development start; however, for a few programs that did not have such an
estimate, we used the estimate at production start instead. For shipbuilding
programs, we used their planning estimates if those estimates were
available. For programs that began as non–major defense acquisition
programs, we used the first full estimate available. Forty-one of these 49
two-page assessments are of major defense acquisition programs, most of
which are in development or early production; 3 assessments are of
components of major defense acquisition programs, including elements of
MDA’s Ballistic Missile Defense System; and 5 assessments are of programs
that were projected to become major defense acquisition programs during
or soon after our review. In addition, we produced one-page assessments
on the current status of 22 programs, which include 13 pre–major defense
acquisition programs, 4 major defense acquisition programs that are past
their full-rate production decision, 2 elements of MDA’s Ballistic Missile
Defense System, 1 major defense acquisition program that was recently
terminated, 1 major defense acquisition program that is a commercially
derived aircraft, and 1 technology demonstration program.
How to Read the Knowledge
Graphic for Each Program
Assessed
For our two-page assessments, we depict the extent of knowledge gained
by key points in a program using a stacked bar graph and provide a
narrative summary at the bottom of the first page of each assessment. As
Page 30
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
illustrated in figure 8, the knowledge graph is based on three knowledge
points. The key indicators for the attainment of knowledge are technology
maturity (in orange), design stability (in green), and production maturity
(in blue). A “best practice” line is drawn based on the ideal attainment of
the three types of knowledge at the three knowledge points. The closer a
program’s attained knowledge is to the best practice line, the more likely
the weapon will be delivered within estimated cost and schedule. A
knowledge deficit at development start—indicated by a gap between the
technology maturity attained and the best practice line—means the
program proceeded with immature technologies and faces a greater
likelihood of cost and schedule increases as risks are discovered and
resolved.
Figure 8: Depiction of Notional Weapon System Knowledge as Compared with
Knowledge-Based Practices
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
Projection
De
si
re
d
le
ve
lo
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
Technology
maturity 96
0
Development
start
DOD
GAO Production
design review decision
review
Source: GAO.
An interpretation of this notional example would be that system
development began with critical technologies that were partially immature,
thereby missing knowledge point 1, which is indicated by the orange
Page 31
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
diamond. By the design review, technology knowledge had increased, as
indicated by the orange bar, but all critical technologies were not yet
mature; only 33 percent of the program’s design drawings were releasable
to the manufacturer, as indicated by the green bar. Therefore, knowledge
point 2, which is indicated by the green diamond, was not attained. At the
time of GAO’s review, this program had matured all of its critical
technologies and released approximately 75 percent of its design drawings,
as indicated by the green bar. When the program plans to make a
production decision, it expects to have released all of its design drawings
and have half of its critical manufacturing processes in statistical control.
The expected knowledge at this future point is captured in the outlined
region marked “projection.” This program is not projected to reach
knowledge point 3, which is indicated by the blue diamond, by the time it
makes a production decision. For shipbuilding programs, knowledge point
1 occurs when a program awards a detailed design and construction
contract, and knowledge point 2 occurs when the lead ship starts
fabrication. We do not assess production maturity at knowledge point 3 for
shipbuilding programs.
Page 32
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: AEHF
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellite
The Air Force’s AEHF satellite system will replenish
the existing Milstar system with higher-capacity,
survivable, jam-resistant, worldwide, secure
communication capabilities for strategic and tactical
warfighters. The program includes satellites and a
mission control segment. Terminals used to transmit
and receive communications are acquired separately
by each service. AEHF is an international program
that includes Canada, the United Kingdom, and the
Netherlands. We assessed the satellite and mission
control segments.
Source: © 2009 Lockheed Martin Corporation. All rights reserved.
Production
Design
review
(4/04)
Development
start
(9/01)
GAO
review
(11/10)
Initial
capability
(TBD)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 33
Latest
12/2009
$7,346.3
$5,573.3
$12,919.6
$2,153.272
6
170
Percent
change
51.7
289.0
105.8
71.5
20.0
53.2
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
lo
The first AEHF satellite (AEHF-1) was launched in
August 2010; however, an anomaly with the
satellite’s propulsion system will delay the satellite
from reaching its planned orbit and will affect the
launch dates of the two satellites currently in
testing. According to the program office, all 14
AEHF critical technologies are mature and its
design is stable. However, the program is
investigating the cause of the propulsion failure.
We have not assessed the AEHF’s production
maturity because the program office does not
collect statistical process control data. The Air
Force plans to acquire six AEHF satellites that are
expected to be clones except for changes to
address obsolete parts, and is evaluating
requirements and alternatives for meeting future
military satellite communication needs beyond the
sixth satellite.
As of
10/2001
$4,843.9
$1,432.6
$6,276.5
$1,255.309
5
111
le
ve
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin
Program office: El Segundo, CA
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $566.8 million
Procurement: $2,765.5 million
Total funding: $3,332.3 million
Procurement quantity: 2
First
launch
(8/10)
d
Program Essentials
Production
decision
(6/04)
si
re
Program
start
(4/99)
System development
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
0
Development
start
(9/01)
DOD
design
review
(4/04)
Production GAO
decision review
(6/04) (11/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: AEHF
AEHF Program
Technology, Design, and Production Maturity
According to the program office, all 14 AEHF critical
technologies are mature and its design is stable with
all of its expected design drawings released.
However, the program office is investigating the
cause of a propulsion system failure on the first
launched satellite. The propulsion system was not a
critical technology and did not experience problems
during prelaunch testing. We did not assess the
AEHF’s production maturity because the program
office does not collect statistical process control
data.
Other Program Issues
AEHF-1 was launched in August 2010 on an Atlas V
rocket; however, an anomaly with the propulsion
system will delay the satellite from reaching its
planned orbit and will affect the launch dates of the
two satellites currently in testing. According to Air
Force officials, the satellite separated from the
rocket, as planned, and was expected to reach its
intended orbit in about 3 months using its liquid
apogee engine and hall current thrusters. The
satellite’s software aborted the liquid apogee engine
burns due to low acceleration of the spacecraft, and
this engine was rendered unusable because of the
propulsion system anomaly. The Air Force plans to
use the propulsion systems designed for controlling
and repositioning the satellite to raise the satellite
into its planned orbit. As a result, the satellite arrival
on orbit will be delayed by about 7 to 9 months.
Once the satellite is in its designated orbit, the
program office will conduct about 100 days of
satellite checkout and system testing before the
satellite becomes available for operations. The
planned February 2011 launch of AEHF-2 was
intended to provide enough time between launches
to allow the first satellite to reach orbit and
complete on-orbit checkout so any problems
identified could be corrected in AEHF-2. Following
the same model, the program office will delay the
AEHF-2 launch until (1) it is cleared for flight in light
of the AEHF-1 propulsion system anomaly and (2)
AEHF-1 is on orbit and tested. AEHF-3 will launch
about 8 months after AEHF-2. The program’s initial
operational capability, which requires two on-orbit
satellites to achieve, will be delayed as well. The
program office plans to complete a review to
identify the root cause of the propulsion system
Page 34
anomaly by the end of 2010. After that, the program
office will determine what actions are required to
clear AEHF-2 and AEHF-3 for launch.
The Air Force plans to procure three additional
AEHF satellites—for a total of six—which will be
clones of the first three except for obsolete parts.
There will be an approximately 4-year break in
production between the third and fourth satellites.
The program office is working to resolve several
obsolescence issues and has identified between 12
and 15 flight boxes that have parts that are no longer
available from the original manufacturer. Program
officials do not anticipate encountering significant
technical challenges, but integrating, testing and
requalifying the new parts will require additional
time and money. The notional launch dates for
satellites four through six are 2017, 2018, and 2020,
respectively. The Air Force is in the process of
developing a new acquisition program baseline that
includes these satellites.
With the cancellation of the Transformational
Satellite Communications System (TSAT) program
in April 2009, the Air Force is in the process of
reevaluating its military satellite communications
requirements beyond the sixth AEHF satellite. It
plans to conduct an analysis of alternatives to assess
options for meeting future requirements, including
the possible use of commercial satellite
communications.
Program Office Comments
The AEHF program office provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: AARGM
AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM)
The Navy’s AARGM is an air-to-ground-missile for
carrier-based aircraft designed to destroy enemy
radio-frequency-enabled surface-to-air defenses. The
AARGM is an upgrade to the AGM-88 High Speed
Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM). It will utilize the
existing HARM propulsion and warhead sections, a
modified control section, and a new guidance
section with Global Positioning System and
improved targeting capabilities. The program is
following a phased approach for development. We
assessed Phase I.
Source: U.S. Navy.
System development
GAO
review
(11/10)
Initial
capability
(TBD)
Full-rate
decision
(TBD)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 35
Latest
07/2010
$702.8
$1,135.5
$1,838.3
$.958
1,919
TBD
Percent
change
11.9
19.6
16.6
8.7
7.2
NA
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
lo
The AARGM program entered production in
September 2008 with its critical technologies
mature and design stable, but without
demonstrating production maturity. Since then,
the program has experienced multiple test delays,
which could affect the program’s planned delivery
of initial operational capability in May 2011. The
program began operational testing in June 2010
after a 9-month delay due to deficiencies in the
missile’s reliability and situational awareness and
concerns about the production-representativeness
of test missiles. The Navy halted operational
testing in September 2010 after hardware and
software issues caused a series of missile failures.
According to Defense Contract Management
Agency officials, the program is working with the
contractor to identify the cause of the failures and
develop corrective action plans.
As of
07/2003
$627.8
$949.4
$1,577.2
$.881
1,790
85
le
ve
Prime contractor: ATK Missile Systems
Company
Program office: Patuxent River, MD
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $7.8 million
Procurement: $1,018.5 million
Total funding: $1,026.3 million
Procurement quantity: 1,814
Low-rate
decision
(9/08)
d
Program Essentials
Design
review
(3/06)
si
re
Development
start
(6/03)
Production
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
0
Development
start
(6/03)
DOD
design
review
(3/06)
Production GAO
decision review
(9/08) (11/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: AARGM
AARGM Program
Technology Maturity
The AARGM program began system development in
2003 with its two critical technologies—the
millimeter wave software and radome—nearing
maturity. According to the program office, these
technologies were mature and demonstrated in a
realistic environment when the program entered
production in September 2008. However, during
development tests, the program identified
deficiencies related to the missile’s reliability and
situational awareness that delayed the start of
operational testing. As a result of these deficiencies,
the program requested and received approval to
defer demonstration of its lethality requirement for a
specific target in a specified scenario until follow-on
operational testing and evaluation. The Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), noted in
its fiscal year 2009 assessment that software
development challenges, including those related to
the millimeter wave, continue to pose a risk to the
program’s schedule and the missile’s reliability.
Design Maturity
The design of the AARGM appears stable and all
drawings were releasable to manufacturing by the
start of production.
Production Maturity
The AARGM program’s production processes were
not mature when it entered production in September
2008. According to the program office, the
contractor identified 18 critical manufacturing
processes, of which 5 are currently in statistical
control. The program plans to demonstrate that all
18 processes are mature during the second lot of
low-rate initial production. Since entering
production, the program has experienced multiple
production delays and operational test failures.
According to Defense Contract Management Agency
(DCMA) and DOT&E officials, the test failures were
caused by both hardware and software issues. The
hardware failures involved multiple subcontractors
and were primarily attributed to poor parts quality.
DCMA officials said that the contractor is
conducting detailed supplier assessments to
determine the cause of the failures and formulate
corrective action plans. According to DOD’s
manufacturing readiness level deskbook,
assessments of critical suppliers should be
performed before a program enters production. Due
Page 36
to the operational test failures, the program halted
missile deliveries. According to DCMA officials, the
program will return all delivered production missiles
and production-representative test rounds to the
contractor to implement any corrective actions.
Prior to the test failures, the AARGM program office
had already been working with the contractor to
improve manufacturing planning, risk identification,
and reporting. It also included a requirement for the
contractor to develop a detailed manufacturing plan
in the second low-rate production contract, awarded
in July 2010.
Other Program Issues
The AARGM program has experienced multiple test
delays, which could affect the program’s planned
delivery of initial operational capability in May 2011.
The program began operational testing in June 2010
after a 9-month delay due in part to concerns from
DOT&E about the production-representativeness of
test missiles. The Navy halted operational testing in
September 2010 after hardware and software issues
caused a series of missile failures. According to
DOT&E, the program plans to conduct additional
developmental tests and a new operational test
readiness review in April 2011 before restarting
operational tests.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the
Navy stated that the Program Executive Office, with
the support of the Office of the Director of Air
Warfare and the Commander, Operational Test and
Evaluation Force, decertified AARGM from
operational testing as a result of intermittent
weapon failures and inaccurate weapon health
reporting to the aircrew. Upon decertification, the
program established a review team to assist in root
cause analysis and system-level assessments. The
team found immature manufacturing processes and
software coding errors. A software development and
test program is underway and has demonstrated
improved performance. Manufacturing processes
are being updated. The first rescreened missiles will
enter flight testing by December 2010. An integrated
test phase has been coordinated with DOT&E and
the Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation
Force, to reduce risk upon reentering operational
test. The Italian Air Force remains committed to the
program. Italian missile deliveries begin in 2011. The
Navy also provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: AB3
Apache Block III (AB3)
The Army’s Apache Block III (AB3) program will
upgrade AH-64D Longbow Apache helicopters. It is
expected to improve performance, situational
awareness, lethality, survivability, interoperability,
and the prevention of friendly fire incidents. Each
Apache goes to the factory for hardware changes.
Software improvements can be installed in the field,
which reduces the time an aircraft is away from the
unit and increases the training time for soldiers in
the field. Upgraded AH-64Ds are scheduled to enter
service starting in 2011.
Source: U.S. Army.
Concept
System development
Development
start
(7/06)
Program Essentials
Prime contractor: Boeing
Program office: Huntsville, AL
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $799.7 million
Procurement: $8,726.3 million
Total funding: $9,526.0 million
Procurement quantity: 682
Production
System
design review
(1/08)
Production
design review
(3/09)
Low-rate
decision
(10/10)
GAO
review
(11/10)
Full-rate
production
(7/12)
Initial
capability
(5/13)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
As of
08/2006
$1,138.4
$5,996.7
$7,135.1
$11.852
602
79
Latest
07/2010
$1,629.6
$11,112.6
$12,742.2
$18.334
695
82
Percent
change
43.1
85.3
78.6
54.7
15.4
3.8
Latest cost and quantities include 56 new-build helicopters.
Page 37
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
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dg
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288
design, and
technology
maturity
si
re
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lo
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
De
In October 2010, the AB3 received approval to
enter production with mature critical technologies
and a stable hardware design. AB3 upgrades
involve a time-phased series of hardware and
software-related technical insertions. According
to program officials, the design reviews for the
hardware portion of the program have been held,
all the expected design drawings are releaseable
to manufacturing, and the last two softwarerelated design reviews are scheduled for fiscal
years 2012 and 2014. In May 2010, the Director,
Defense Research and Engineering, assessed the
AB3 as ready for production using engineering
manufacturing readiness levels, a metric that
includes technology and design maturity and
production readiness. The AB3 program
experienced a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of
the critical threshold in June 2010, due to the
addition of 56 new-build helicopters to the
upgrade program.
Technology
maturity 96
0
Development
start
(7/06)
DOD
design
review
(3/09)
Production GAO
decision review
(10/10) (11/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: AB3
AB3 Program
Technology Maturity
The AB3 program’s one critical technology—an
improved drive system—is mature. This is the first
time this technology will be used in a helicopter
transmission, and it is expected to provide more
power and be more reliable than the existing
transmission. A developmental test aircraft has
successfully completed flight tests and has
demonstrated the maturity of the drive system in a
realistic environment.
Design Maturity
The AB3 hardware design is stable. AB3 upgrades
involve a time-phased series of hardware and
software-related technical insertions. The design
reviews for the hardware portion of the program
have been held and all the expected design drawings
are releasable to manufacturing. According to
program officials, the last two critical design
reviews, which are software-related, should not
significantly affect the total number of design
drawings. These reviews are scheduled for fiscal
years 2012 and 2014—after upgraded AH-64Ds are
scheduled to start to enter service. According to
program officials, the AB3 program uses a contract
provision requiring the completion of 85 to 90
percent of the estimated design drawings for each
design review as a mechanism for ensuring design
stability. In addition, the success of each design
review determines whether the program will move
forward.
involved taking legacy aircraft and remanufacturing
them with upgraded capabilities. However,
decreases in the numbers of legacy aircraft available
for remanufacture due to combat losses, combined
with increasing wartime demands and the addition
of a 13th Combat Aviation Brigade, has resulted in a
new acquisition strategy that includes acquiring 56
new-build aircraft. Since new-build Apaches cost
three times more than a remanufactured Apache, a
cost breach occurred. As part of its Nunn-McCurdy
restructuring, the AB3 will be divided into two
separate major defense acquisition programs—one
for remanufactured aircraft and one for new builds.
This division will permit visibility into the cost,
schedule, and performance of both programs. Even
after the program restructuring, risks remain in the
AB3 program. An analysis by DOD’s Program
Assessment and Root Cause Analyses office noted
that even though the AB3 contractor has performed
well on its development contract, increasing
software content, extensions of the development
schedule, and the ability of the contractor to provide
production aircraft at prices consistent with the
existing program baseline, all pose risks for the
current program.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the
Army provided technical comments, which were
incorporated where appropriate.
Production Maturity
In October 2010, AB3 received approval to enter
production. We did not assess production maturity
because the program has not started to collect
statistical process control data. However, the
Director, Defense Research and Engineering,
assessed the AB3 as ready for production in May
2010. The assessment used engineering
manufacturing readiness levels, a metric that
includes technology and design maturity and
production readiness, as the basis for reaching this
conclusion.
Other Program Issues
The AB3 program experienced a Nunn-McCurdy unit
cost breach of the critical threshold in June 2010 due
to the addition of new-build helicopters to the
upgrade program. The original AB3 program
Page 38
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: Army IAMD
Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (Army IAMD)
The Army’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense
(IAMD) program is being developed to network
sensors and weapons and a common battle
command system across a single integrated fire
control network to support the engagement of air
and missile threats. The IAMD Battle Command
System (IBCS) will provide control and management
for IAMD sensors and weapons, such as the Joint
Land-Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted
Sensor System and PATRIOT through an interface
module that supplies battle management data and
enables networked operations.
Source: Northrop Grumman.
Low-rate
decision
(12/14)
Initial
capability
(8/16)
Full-rate
decision
(5/17)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 39
Latest
12/2009
$1,571.4
$3,382.6
$4,954.0
$16.737
296
80
Percent
change
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
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dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
Design and
technology
192
maturity
fk
IAMD entered development in December 2009
with its four critical technologies nearing maturity.
However, according to program officials, the
technologies will not be fully mature until after the
design review in August 2011. As a result, the
program will not have demonstrated that the
proposed design meets requirements until after
the design review, which puts it at risk for late
design changes. The platform the IBCS was
originally planned to be fielded on will not be
available when production begins in 2014, but
according to program officials, an alternative has
been selected. The cost and schedule of the IAMD
program may also be affected by an Army
proposal to substitute the IBCS for the current
battle management system under development for
the Medium Extended Air Defense System
(MEADS). If this option is selected for any of the
MEADS partners, the development schedule for
IAMD will need to be synchronized with MEADS.
As of
12/2009
$1,571.4
$3,382.6
$4,954.0
$16.737
296
80
lo
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman
Space & Mission Systems Corp
Program office: Huntsville, AL
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,177.4 million
Procurement: $3,382.6 million
Total funding: $4,560.0 million
Procurement quantity: 285
Design
review
(8/11)
le
ve
Program Essentials
GAO
review
(11/10)
d
Development
start
(12/09)
Production
si
re
Technology
development
(2/06)
System development
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
Not
assessed
0
Development GAO DOD
start
review design
(12/09)
(11/10) review
(8/11)
Not
assessed
Production
decision
(12/14)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: Army IAMD
Army IAMD Program
Technology Maturity
IAMD entered development in December 2009 with
its four critical technologies—integrated battle
command, integrated defense design, integrated fire
control network, and distributed track
management—nearing maturity. In August 2009, the
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Research and Technology approved a technology
readiness assessment that stated that all of the
critical technologies were tested in a relevant
environment using digital simulations. In addition,
the integrated fire control network and the
distributed track management technologies were
demonstrated through hardware tests, and the
integrated defense design was demonstrated
through a prototype. Program officials estimate that
the technologies will be mature by the IAMD
production decision in 2014, but not by its planned
August 2011 design review.
Design Maturity
The IAMD program is preparing for its August 2011
design review; however, the risk of late and
potentially costly design changes will persist
because the program will not have demonstrated
that the program’s critical technologies are fully
mature or the proposed design meets requirements
by then. The Army completed a partial preliminary
design review prior to development start for the
IAMD and its components. The IBCS preliminary
design review is complete, and the reviews for
IAMD, the interface modules, and the overall
integration of the components were expected to be
complete in November 2010. Officials stated that the
Army expects to modify the IBCS design because the
platform it was planned to be fielded on—the High
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle—will not be
available when it enters production in 2014. The
Army and the contractor evaluated alternatives and
selected a chassis from the Family of Medium
Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) as a replacement. The
program is now working on integrating the FMTV
chassis into the design for the IBCS.
program. According to Army officials, a number of
issues would need to be resolved before the
proposal could be adopted. These issues include a
decision between the IBCS and BMC4I contractors
about whether the substitution is feasible and a
decision about whether to adopt it for any or all of
the MEADS partners. If any of the MEADS partners
agree to the substitution, the development schedule
for IAMD will need to be synchronized with MEADS.
Specifically, IBCS would be needed for integration
testing prior to the MEADS low-rate initial
production decision, currently planned for
November 2012.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the
Army stated that the IAMD program entered the
engineering and manufacturing development (EMD)
phase in December 2009 after a competitive
prototyping phase lasting 15 months. During this
phase, the competitors (Raytheon and Northrop)
developed IBCS prototypes which were
demonstrated to the government prior to the
selection of one contractor (Northrop). Both
contractors were assessed at technology readiness
levels necessary for entry into the EMD phase.
Subsequently, Northrop’s design was reassessed in
December 2010, and all critical technologies were at
the level needed for the current phase of the
program. The program is on track to conduct the
critical design review in August 2011. With regards
to the insertion of the IBCS into the MEADS
program, the Army and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense agreed to withdraw the proposal based on
cost and schedule considerations. Any use of the
IBCS with the MEADS components will be after
fiscal year 2016. The Army also provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
Other Program Issues
The cost and schedule of the IAMD program could
be affected by an Army proposal to substitute the
IBCS for the Battle Management Command, Control,
Communications, Computer, and Intelligence
(BMC4I) system under development for the MEADS
Page 40
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: B-2 EHF SATCOM Increment 1
B-2 Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability, Increment 1
The Air Force’s B-2 EHF satellite communications
upgrade is being developed in three increments.
Increment 1 upgrades the computing system speed
and storage capacity of the current avionics
infrastructure to facilitate future B-2 upgrades.
Increment 2 will provide connectivity through lowobservable antennas and radomes, and includes
nonintegrated Family of Advanced Beyond Line-ofSight Terminals and related hardware. Increment 3
will enable connectivity with the Global Information
Grid and net-ready capability. We assessed
Increment 1.
Source: U.S. Air Force.
Design
review
(10/08)
Full-rate
decision
(7/12)
Required
assets available
(3/14)
Last
procurement
(2014)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 41
Latest
07/2010
$501.9
$116.7
$618.6
$30.929
20
85
Percent
change
-13.1
-4.1
-11.6
-7.1
-4.8
0.0
Attainment of Product Knowledge
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w
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Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
Design and
technology
192
maturity
fk
According to the program office, the B-2 EHF
SATCOM Increment 1 will have mature critical
technologies and a stable design by its planned
July 2011 low-rate initial production decision. The
program office also plans to demonstrate critical
manufacturing processes using a pilot production
line and high levels of manufacturing readiness for
two key technologies prior to the production
decision. The program expects an operational
assessment to be completed by the Air Force
Operational Test and Evaluation Center in early
2011 to support the production decision. The B-2
EHF SATCOM Increment 1 program completed
software certification in April 2010 and flight
testing began in September 2010, after a 5-month
delay. According to the program office, this delay
has added pressure to the test schedule and the
program’s plan to begin initial operational test and
evaluation in fiscal year 2012.
As of
05/2007
$577.7
$121.7
$699.4
$33.303
21
85
lo
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB,
OH
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $119.7 million
Procurement: $116.7 million
Total funding: $236.4 million
Procurement quantity: 16
Low-rate
decision
(7/11)
le
ve
Program Essentials
GAO
review
(11/10)
d
Development
start
(2/07)
Production
si
re
Program
start
(3/02)
System development
De
Concept
Projection
Technology
maturity 96
0
Development
start
(2/07)
DOD GAO Production
design review decision
review (11/10) (7/11)
(10/08)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: B-2 EHF SATCOM Increment 1
B-2 EHF SATCOM Increment 1
Program
Technology and Design Maturity
The B-2 EHF SATCOM Increment 1 program entered
system development in February 2007 with all six of
its critical technologies nearing maturity. The
program office expects all critical technologies to be
mature and flight-qualified by the program’s planned
July 2011 production decision. The B-2 EHF
Increment 1 design also appears stable. According to
the program office, all of the expected drawings
were releasable at the October 2008 design review
and the number of design drawings has not grown.
The development and successful integration of new
disk drive units and integrated processing units is a
primary objective for Increment 1. The Air Force has
completed disk drive unit qualification and design
verification without discovering any significant
issues, and integrated processing unit durability and
airworthiness testing was also completed.
recovering from early software development issues
that delayed the start of developmental test and
evaluation by 9 months. Flight testing began in
September 2010 after a 5-month delay. The delay has
added pressure to the current test schedule and
increased the schedule risk for the start of initial
operational test and evaluation in fiscal year 2012.
According to the program office, the delay was a
result of installation issues, test aircraft concerns,
and higher B-2 testing priorities. The program office
has taken steps to address the installation issues and
the health of the test aircraft.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the B-2
program office noted that despite the delays in
software development and in the start of flight test,
the B-2 EHF Increment 1 schedule remains a year
ahead of the July 2012 threshold date for its low-rate
initial production decision, and 7 months ahead of
the September 2012 threshold date for completion of
initial operational test and evaluation. The Air Force
also provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.
Production Maturity
Although we did not fully assess production
maturity because the program does not have
statistical process control data, we did assess
aspects of production maturity. According to the
program office, the B-2 EHF SATCOM Increment 1 is
based on commercial-off-the-shelf technology with
proven manufacturing processes. The program is
implementing other practices that will also help
demonstrate production maturity. For example,
according to the program office, system-level
development testing of a fully configured,
production-representative prototype in its intended
environment began in July 2010, and critical
manufacturing processes will be demonstrated on a
pilot production line using productionrepresentative articles prior to the July 2011
production decision. In addition, the program plans
to complete a manufacturing readiness level
assessment to support a production readiness
review in April 2011 and demonstrate a high level of
manufacturing readiness for the disk drive units and
integrated processing units.
Other Program Issues
B-2 EHF SATCOM Increment 1 testing is
progressing; however, earlier delays have added
schedule risk to the test program. The program
completed software certification in April 2010, after
Page 42
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: BMDS: GMD
BMDS: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
MDA’s GMD is being fielded to defend against
limited long-range ballistic missile attacks during
their midcourse phase. GMD consists of an
interceptor with a 3-stage booster and kill vehicle,
and a fire control system that formulates battle plans
and directs components integrated with BMDS
radars. We assessed the maturity of all GMD critical
technologies, as well as the design of the Capability
Enhancement II (CE-II) configuration of the
Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV), which began
emplacements in fiscal year 2009.
Source: Missile Defense Agency.
Technology/system development
Program
start
Directive to field
initial capability
(2/96)
(12/02)
Initial capability
1st emplaced
CE-I
interceptor
(7/04)
Program Essentials
Prime contractor: Boeing
Program office: Redstone Arsenal, AL
Funding FY11-FY15:
R&D: $5,512.2 million
Procurement: $0.0 million
Total funding: $5,553.6 million
Procurement quantity: 0
Initial
capability
(10/04)
1st CE-I
successful
intercept
(9/06)
1st emplaced
CE-II
interceptor
(10/08)
Failed CE-II
intercept test
GAO
review
(1/10)
(11/10)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Latest
02/2010
$37,844.0
$0.0
$38,082.4
NA
NA
NA
As of
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Percent
change
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Columns include costs from program inception through fiscal year 2015. Totals do not include the
future cost of the European component.
Page 43
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
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design, and
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Design and
technology
192
maturity
De
MDA continues to put the GMD program at risk
for further cost growth and delays as it buys and
emplaces CE-II interceptors before all the critical
technologies have been demonstrated in a realistic
environment. After a 1-year delay, MDA tested the
CE-II EKV in January 2010, but it failed to achieve
an intercept. GMD reconducted the test in
December 2010 and although the booster and EKV
were successfully launched, it again failed to
achieve an intercept. Almost all of the CE-II kill
vehicles currently under contract will have been
delivered before the test is successfully
conducted. Moreover, developmental testing is
expected to continue until fiscal year 2021, well
after the last planned EKV deliveries. Due to the
concurrent testing and production of the CE-II
EKV, the program could experience costly late
design changes and retrofits if problems are
discovered during flight testing.
Technology
maturity 96
Not
assessed
0
Development
start
(NA)
DOD GAO Production
design review decision
review (11/10) (TBD)
(5/06)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: BMDS: GMD
BMDS: GMD Program
Technology Maturity
All nine technologies in the GMD operational
configuration are mature, but two technologies
developed for the CE-II interceptor—an upgraded
infrared seeker and onboard discrimination—are
nearing maturity. Although the program delivered
and fielded more upgraded interceptors in fiscal
year 2010, its full capability has yet to be verified
through flight tests.
Design Maturity
The design of the enhanced interceptor appears
stable with all of its expected drawings released to
manufacturing. However, the design could still
change because two technologies are still being
developed and have not had their capability verified
through flight testing.
Production Maturity
We did not assess the maturity of the production
processes for the GMD interceptors. The program is
buying interceptors for operational use, but officials
do not plan to make an official production decision
or collect statistical control data because the
planned quantities are small. However, according to
GMD officials, the program does track defects per
unit for each major interceptor component. In
addition, GMD employs a manufacturing capability
assessment process in which all critical
manufacturing indicators are assessed on a monthly
basis.
program is at risk for costly late design changes and
retrofits if problems are discovered during flight
testing.
In fiscal year 2010, GMD conducted a nonintercept
flight test of its two stage GBI, which was originally
designed for a European site. Although all flight test
objectives were achieved, an EKV anomaly was
experienced that might affect system performance.
MDA is currently developing plans to sustain the
GMD element through 2032; however, key unknowns
and a lack of analysis have hindered these efforts. In
fiscal year 2010, GMD continued to develop its fleet
rotation strategy and aging and surveillance test plan
and completed its stockpile reliability plan. GAO has
been unable to fully assess these efforts because
they lack key analysis. For example, the sufficiency
of the planned inventory of operational GBIs is
based on various assumptions, including the
reliability of the interceptor. However,
developmental testing is expected to continue until
at least 2021 and the reliability of the interceptor is
not fully known.
Program Office Comments
The program office provided technical comments,
which were incorporated as appropriate.
Other Program Issues
GMD continues to concurrently develop,
manufacture, and field the CE-II EKVs putting it at
risk for further cost growth, schedule delays, and
performance shortfalls in delivered capability. After
experiencing over a 1-year delay, GMD conducted an
intercept flight test to assess the capability of the
CE-II EKV in January 2010; however, it did not
intercept the target because of a failure in the EKV.
GMD reconducted this test in December 2010.
Although the booster was successfully launched and
deployed the EKV, it failed to intercept the target.
The next flight test will be determined after
identification of the cause of the failure. Although
the emplaced CE-II ground-based interceptors (GBI)
have not been declared operational, the production
of the CE-II is nearly complete. Consequently, the
Page 44
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: BMDS: THAAD
BMDS: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
MDA’s THAAD is being developed as a rapidlydeployable, ground-based missile defense system
with the capability to defend against short- and
medium-range ballistic missiles during their late
midcourse and terminal phases. A THAAD battery
includes interceptor missiles, three to six launchers,
an X-band radar, and a fire control and
communications system. MDA is scheduled to
deliver the first two of nine planned THAAD
batteries to the Army in fiscal years 2011 and 2012
for initial operational use.
Source: Missile Defense Agency.
Technology/system development
Program
start
Transition
to MDA
(1/92)
(10/01)
Initial capability
Contract award
for Batteries
1 and 2
(12/06)
Program Essentials
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin
Program office: Huntsville, AL
Funding FY11-FY15:
R&D: $1,892.4 million
Procurement: $3,881.9 million
Total funding: $6,544.9 million
Procurement quantity: NA
Contract award
for Battery 3
interceptors
(9/10)
GAO
review
Materiel
release
to Army
(3/11)
(11/10)
Battery 1
initial capability
delivery
(9/11)
Battery 2
initial capability
delivery
(3/12)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Latest
02/2010
$15,973.3
$4,412.3
$21,156.2
NA
NA
NA
As of
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Percent
change
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Columns include costs from the program’s inception through fiscal year 2015.
Page 45
Attainment of Product Knowledge
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technology
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si
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Design and
technology
192
maturity
De
THAAD has mature technologies and has had a
production contract since 2006, but the program is
still experiencing design and production issues.
Problems with a safety switch have caused
interceptor production issues, design changes,
and schedule delays. Deliveries of Batteries 1 and
2 have been delayed at least 1 year; the number of
design drawings has increased by more than 20
percent since production began due to the switch
redesign and other related changes; and the
Army’s acceptance of THAAD batteries has been
delayed 6 months until testing on the switch is
complete. Most THAAD ground component
deliveries for Batteries 1 and 2 are complete, but
there will be a production gap of more than a year
for future battery ground and missile components,
which could increase costs. In fiscal year 2010,
THAAD successfully proved out its objective
software in flight testing.
Technology
maturity 96
Not
assessed
0
Development
start
(6/00)
DOD
design
review
(12/03)
Production GAO
start
review
(12/06) (11/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: BMDS: THAAD
BMDS: THAAD Program
Technology and Design Maturity
The THAAD program’s major components—the fire
control and communications system, interceptor,
launcher, and radar—are mature. According to the
program office, the prime contractor has released
100 percent of the expected design drawings.
However, the number of design drawings has
increased by more than 20 percent since production
started in December 2006, due primarily to fire
control risk reduction efforts, design changes for a
safety system called an optical block that prevents
inadvertent launches, and associated changes to the
flight sequencing assembly, which houses the optical
block. Additional drawings or design work could
still be required based on the results of remaining
ground and flight testing.
Production Maturity
MDA awarded a contract for its first two initial
operational batteries in December 2006 before
completing developmental testing on all the system’s
critical components and has experienced production
delays as a result. While we did not assess THAAD’s
overall production maturity because the program
has not collected statistical process control data on
its critical manufacturing processes, the program’s
production readiness assessments highlighted a
number of risks including design producibility and
qualification of critical components. The delivery of
the first two batteries has been delayed by at least a
year after these risks materialized in parts of the
THAAD interceptor. A qualified optical block design
failed during integration qualification testing in early
fiscal year 2010 due to contamination during
manufacturing. The program changed to cleaner
manufacturing processes and subsequently
completed this qualification testing in September
2010. According to program officials, the program
plans to develop a more producible design of the
optical block for use on future THAAD battery
interceptors. All of the ground components
necessary for Batteries 1 and 2 have been delivered
except for the launchers which are experiencing a 2
year delay in completing the government acceptance
process because of production issues as well as
delays to the qualification process due to design
changes. In addition, discoveries during a recent
ground test have led to further design changes. The
Page 46
launchers are expected to complete the government
acceptance process by the end of the third quarter of
fiscal year 2011.
Other Program Issues
The THAAD program delayed its conditional release
of batteries to the Army from September 2010 until
March 2011 because of ongoing safety issues with
interceptor components. For the release to occur,
the Army must certify that the batteries are safe,
suitable, and logistically supported. According to
program officials, the results from optical block
safety testing in February 2011 are needed before
the release board can make its decision.
The THAAD program is facing a production gap that
poses cost and schedule risks. Product qualification
issues delayed contract award for Battery 3
interceptors by approximately 6 months to the end
of fiscal year 2010, and there will be as much as a 1year production gap for some interceptor
components. The program did not plan to award the
contract for THAAD ground components and
Battery 4 interceptors until the first quarter of fiscal
year 2011, which means there will be a production
gap of up to 3 years for some ground components.
As a result of these gaps, the program will have to
retrain workers and recertify and requalify parts.
The effect of these gaps on cost is not yet known.
Despite test delays due to target issues, the program
was able to conduct one flight test in June 2010 to
successfully demonstrate the complete objective
software for the THAAD battery.
Program Office Comments
Program officials stated that the THAAD program is
significantly more mature than indicated in the
“Attainment of Product Knowledge” graph and
associated language. At production start all
production design was completed except for two
items associated with the fire control and
interceptor. At the time of this review, none of the
interceptors for the THAAD batteries were
delivered, but all THAAD system and component
qualifications were completed except for two
interceptor-related tests. All but one of the
subassemblies for each of the 50 interceptors was
delivered. Other technical comments were
incorporated as appropriate.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: BAMS UAS
Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)
The Navy’s Broad Area Maritime Surveillance
Unmanned Aircraft System (BAMS UAS) is intended
to provide a persistent maritime intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability.
BAMS UAS will be part of a family of maritime patrol
and reconnaissance systems that recapitalizes the
Navy’s airborne ISR assets. Increments 2 and 3 of the
program will upgrade the system’s communication
relay and add a signals intelligence capability. We
assessed Increment 1.
Source: U.S. Navy.
System development
Design
review
(1/11)
GAO
review
(11/10)
Full
capability
(2019)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 47
Latest
12/2009
$3,150.0
$9,501.8
$13,031.5
$186.165
70
92
Percent
change
1.8
3.4
3.0
3.0
0.0
0.0
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
lo
The BAMS UAS program began development in
2008 with all technologies nearing maturity and
plans to demonstrate its design is stable by its
critical design review in January 2011. The
program office continues to monitor six watch-list
items that were identified in a 2007 independent
technology readiness assessment that could affect
the program’s cost, schedule, and performance.
The BAMS UAS program plans to enter production
in May 2013. According to program officials, the
BAMS air vehicle is based on the RQ-4B Global
Hawk and uses sensor components or entire
subsystems from other existing platforms. There
are some structural changes to the airframe, but
none of these require significant changes to
manufacturing processes. The program expects to
purchase two developmental aircraft and begin
testing prior to production.
As of
02/2009
$3,094.5
$9,185.3
$12,656.7
$180.811
70
92
le
ve
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman
Systems Corporation
Program office: Patuxent River, MD
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $2,106.5 million
Procurement: $9,501.8 million
Total funding: $11,988.1 million
Procurement quantity: 65
Initial
capability
(12/15)
d
Program Essentials
Low-rate
decision
(5/13)
si
re
Program/
development start
(4/08)
Production
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
Not
assessed
0
Development GAO DOD
start
review design
(4/08)
(11/10) review
(1/11)
Production
decision
(5/13)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: BAMS UAS
BAMS UAS Program
Technology Maturity
DOD and the Navy certified that all BAMS UAS
technologies were nearing maturity and had been
demonstrated in a relevant environment before the
start of system development. The program is
monitoring six watch-list items that were identified
in a 2007 independent technology readiness
assessment, which could cause cost, schedule, or
performance issues during development. According
to the program, the Navy conducted an additional
independent technology readiness assessment after
the program’s February 2010 preliminary design
review. DOD was reviewing the results at the time of
our assessment.
Design Maturity
The BAMS UAS program expects the air vehicle’s
design to be stable by its January 2011 critical design
review. However, the program will be at risk for
design changes until it integrates all of its key
subsystems and components and tests them through
an integration laboratory or an early system
prototype demonstration. This will not occur until
January 2012. According to the program office,
about 79 percent of the BAMS UAS air vehicle’s
expected drawings are releasable to manufacturing
and 8 of the 11 subsystem critical design reviews
have been successfully completed.
Production Maturity
The BAMS aircraft is based on the Global Hawk 
RQ-4B currently in production, and, according to
program officials, uses sensor components or entire
subsystems from other existing platforms. There are
some significant changes to the airframe, such as
deicing and structural reinforcements for the wings,
but none of these require significant manufacturing
process changes. The program expects to purchase
two developmental aircraft and begin testing them
prior to production.
Other Program Issues
In 2010, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
directed the Navy and Air Force to seek efficiencies
in the Global Hawk and BAMS UAS programs.
According to BAMS UAS program officials, the Air
Force and Navy programs are investigating
commonality opportunities in areas such as senseand-avoid capabilities, a common ground control
station architecture, a consolidated maintenance
Page 48
hub, and basing options for both UASs. According to
program staff, thus far, only minor changes to the
configuration of the BAMS UAS are anticipated.
The BAMS UAS program is also continuing to
leverage knowledge from the BAMS demonstrator
program. The demonstrator consists of two Block 10
Global Hawk UASs. It is used to support BAMS UAS
design activity, test ground station capabilities, and
develop concepts of operations. For example, a
BAMS UAS official noted the demonstrator has been
successful using mission operating bases, which
conduct data analysis and operate flight controls,
located in the continental United States. As a result,
the program office plans to update its concept of
operations to reflect this lesson learned. According
to the program, forward operating bases,
responsible for launch and recovery of the aircraft,
will remain in theater as planned.
The BAMS UAS program poses a significant
software development challenge. The program will
utilize more than 6 million lines of code, including
more than 1 million lines of new code. Total lines of
code have increased by about 13 percent since
development start, which according to the program,
were the result of selecting a different sense-andavoid radar subsystem, and shifting from reused
code to new software for the synthetic aperture
radar. The program is closely monitoring the
software effort and software is being developed in
three blocks of capability to decrease risks.
Program Office Comments
According to the Navy, the program continues to
meet its cost, schedule, and performance
requirements. In support of the engineering and
manufacturing development decision, the Navy
stated that the Office of the Secretary of Defense
assessed the technology and determined BAMS had
been demonstrated in a relevant environment, since
the program leverages existing DOD investment in
its airframe, engine, avionics, payloads, and
software. The Navy also stated that the program is
capturing and applying lessons learned from the
programs it is leveraging in order to maximize its
effectiveness and efficiency. Furthermore, the Navy
stated that the BAMS UAS and Air Force Global
Hawk programs continue to work closely together to
seek synergistic opportunities in all phases of the
programs. The Navy also provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: C-5 RERP
C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP)
The Air Force’s C-5 RERP is one of two major
upgrades for the C-5. The RERP is designed to
enhance the reliability, maintainability, and
availability of the C-5 by replacing the propulsion
system; modifying the mechanical, hydraulic,
avionics, fuel, and landing gear systems; and making
required structural modifications. Together with the
C-5 Avionics Modernization Program, these
upgrades are intended to improve C-5 mission
capability rates and reduce total ownership costs.
Source: Lockheed Martin.
System development
Production
Program
start
Development
start
Design
review
Low-rate
decision
(2/00)
(11/01)
(4/04)
(3/08)
Last
procurement
(11/10)
(2014)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 49
Latest
03/2010
$1,760.6
$5,582.9
$7,348.8
$141.323
52
135
Percent
change
2.0
-38.1
-31.6
65.7
-58.7
35.0
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
lo
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
d
The C-5 RERP entered production in March 2008
with mature technologies and a design that was
nearing completion. We did not assess production
maturity because the program office does not
require process control data to be collected. To
determine the program’s readiness to enter fullrate production, the program completed a
manufacturing readiness assessment, which
concluded its manufacturing processes were
capable, in control, and affordable. The
assessment was performed on the first low-rate
initial production aircraft and may not reflect all
manufacturing risks. A production aircraft was
not used for initial operational testing. The Air
Force test organization found the system to be
effective, suitable, and mission capable; however,
it noted that incomplete development and testing
of the aircraft’s defensive systems and thrust
reversers increased the risk of operating in certain
environments.
As of
11/2001
$1,726.6
$9,013.3
$10,743.7
$85.267
126
100
si
re
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB,
OH
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $49.0 million
Procurement: $4,409.2 million
Total funding: $4,458.2 million
Procurement quantity: 40
GAO
review
De
Program Essentials
Full-rate
decision
B-model
(10/10)
le
ve
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
0
Development
start
(11/01)
DOD
design
review
(4/04)
Production GAO
decision review
(3/08) (11/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: C-5 RERP
C-5 RERP Program
Technology and Design Maturity
According to an independent technology readiness
assessment conducted in October 2001, the C-5
RERP’s technologies are mature. In addition, the C-5
RERP design is stable.
Production Maturity
The C-5 RERP program entered production in March
2008. We did not assess production maturity because
the program office does not require process control
data to be collected as part of the production
contract. In order to determine the program’s
readiness to enter full-rate production, the Air Force
and the prime contractor, Lockheed Martin,
performed a manufacturing readiness assessment in
early 2010. According to the final report, a
manufacturing readiness assessment is normally
conducted near the end of low-rate initial
production. However, the assessment was
performed on the first low-rate initial production
aircraft while it was in production and may not
reflect all the manufacturing risks. Program officials
stated that conducting the assessment at the
beginning of low-rate initial production was driven
by full-rate production decision requirements
established in an acquisition decision memorandum
and the expected date of the decision. The Air Force
accepted delivery of the first production aircraft in
October 2010.
The C-5 RERP program’s manufacturing assessment
concluded that the manufacturing risk was
understood and that the manufacturing processes
for the system were capable, in control, and
affordable. The assessment identified what program
officials believe to be two minor issues with the
aircraft engine’s thrust reverser, which will not
affect production, and an air exit door that could
affect production. According to program officials,
design changes are being made to the thrust reverser
to prevent freezing and will be ready for testing in
April 2011. The thrust reverser modifications will be
installed on all modernized C-5 aircraft, including
those that have already been upgraded. The
malfunctioning air exit door will be addressed
through a change to production processes and will
not require additional flight testing. The program
expects all aircraft in the modernized C-5 fleet to
eventually receive modified air exit doors.
Page 50
Other Program Issues
The Commander, Air Force Operational Test and
Evaluation Center, found the C-5 RERP to be
effective, suitable, and mission-capable during
operational testing conducted from October 2009 to
January 2010. The Air Force did not provide a lowrate initial production aircraft for operational testing
as recommended by the Director, Operational Test
and Evaluation, because one was not available.
However, according to program officials, a
production-representative aircraft was used in
operational testing. According to the test report, the
modified development aircraft increased the C-5
maximum operating weight, significantly surpassed
its reliability requirement, and performed its
required mission better than the C-5 legacy fleet.
However, the Air Force test organization also noted
that incomplete development and testing of the
aircraft’s defensive systems and thrust reversers
increased the risk of operating in certain
environments.
In February 2010, DOD released the Mobility
Capabilities Requirements Study–2016, which
concluded that the Air Force has excess strategic
airlift capacity. As a result, the Air Force is
requesting approval to retire 22 C-5A aircraft. This
would reduce the number of aircraft in the C-5
Avionics Modernization Program, but it would not
affect the number of aircraft in the C-5 RERP
program.
Program Office Comments
The Air Force provided technical comments to a
draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: C-130 AMP
C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP)
The Air Force’s C-130 AMP will standardize the
cockpit and avionics for three combat
configurations of the C-130 fleet. The program is
intended to ensure the C-130 global access and
deployability by satisfying navigation and safety
requirements, installing upgrades to the cockpit
systems, and replacing many systems no longer
supportable due to diminishing manufacturing
resources. It is also expected to increase the
reliability, maintainability, and sustainability of the
upgraded aircraft.
Source: C-130 Avionics Modernization Program.
System development
GAO
review
(11/10)
Full-rate
decision
(2/13)
Last
procurement
(2018)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 51
Latest
04/2010
$1,895.6
$4,100.0
$5,995.6
$27.129
221
NA
Percent
change
148.1
24.0
47.3
245.8
-57.4
NA
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
lo
The C-130 AMP program entered production in
June 2010 with mature technologies and a stable
design. The program reported that it
demonstrated critical manufacturing processes
prior to production; however, it did not assess
manufacturing readiness levels at key suppliers
and installation facilities. The first two aircraft to
receive the AMP upgrade have begun the
modification process. During low-rate production,
the program plans to qualify a second contractor
to compete for the full-rate production contract.
In February 2010 the program reported a NunnMcCurdy unit cost breach of the significant cost
growth threshold, which it attributed to factors
such as the omission of training devices and
adequate spares from initial estimates, and delays
in the production decision. The program has been
restructured and planned dates for key events
have been pushed back by more than 1 year.
As of
07/2001
$764.0
$3,307.2
$4,071.2
$7.844
519
NA
le
ve
Prime contractor: Boeing
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB,
OH
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $55.9 million
Procurement: $3,942.8 million
Total funding: $3,998.7 million
Procurement quantity: 214
Low-rate
decision
(6/10)
d
Program Essentials
Design
review
(8/05)
si
re
Development
start
(7/01)
Production
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
0
Development
start
(7/01)
DOD
design
review
(8/05)
Production GAO
decision review
(6/10) (11/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: C-130 AMP
C-130 AMP Program
Technology and Design Maturity
The C-130 AMP program’s three current critical
technologies—global air traffic management,
defensive systems, and combat delivery navigator
removal—are mature. After a Nunn-McCurdy unit
cost breach of the critical cost growth threshold in
2007, the program was restructured and the number
of critical technologies was cut from six to three.
The removed technologies were intended for Special
Mission C-130 aircraft configurations, which were
eliminated from the program. The design of the 
C-130 AMP combat delivery configuration is stable,
with all of the expected drawings releasable to
manufacturing.
Production Maturity
The C-130 AMP program reported that it
demonstrated critical manufacturing processes
using production-representative articles prior to
entering production, but it did not assess
manufacturing readiness levels at key suppliers and
installation facilities. Program officials reported that
they will perform these assessments during low-rate
production and develop manufacturing maturity
plans as needed in order to demonstrate its
readiness to begin full-rate production. We did not
assess the overall production maturity of the
program because it does not collect statistical
process control data on its critical manufacturing
processes. However, the program does track quality
metrics related to the numbers of nonconformance
and corrective action reports, as well as the
percentage of inspection points passed.
Other Program Issues
After 2 years of delays and the threat of program
cancellation, the C-130 AMP received approval to
enter production in June 2010. The first two aircraft
scheduled for AMP kit installation began the
modification process in August and October 2010,
respectively. During low-rate production, the
program will conduct a full and open competition to
select a second contractor. The program will qualify
the second contractor by providing installation and
maintenance training, and the second contractor
will perform up to five low-rate production kit
installations. This contractor will compete with the
current contractor for the full-rate production
contract, which includes the procurement of 198 kits
and up to 141 kit installations. The competition and
Page 52
planned contract award for the second source have
been delayed by about 4 months to early 2011 and
early 2012, respectively, because the program has
changed the acquisition approach for this effort.
These delays could affect the program’s planned
entry into full-rate production in early 2013.
The C-130 AMP program has completed
developmental testing, which identified key
deficiencies in the areas of crew workload and
avionics. Specifically, testing found that the core
avionics were not well adapted to the C-130 tactical
missions, and identified the need to reduce crew
workload during airdrop, low-level, and certain
formation operations. The program plans to develop
additional software builds to correct these issues.
However, the program has reported a delay in
awarding the contract for one of these software
builds, which could affect its ability to begin
operational testing in fiscal year 2012 as planned.
In February 2010, the C-130 AMP program reported a
Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the significant
cost growth threshold after the average
procurement unit cost increased by almost 18
percent over its existing baseline. According to the
program office, the cost breach was due to the
omission of training devices and adequate spares in
initial program estimates, inflation, delays in the
program’s production decision, and a change in the
kit installation strategy. The program has been
restructured, and the completion of operational
testing and low-rate production kit installation, as
well as the full-rate production decision, are now
scheduled to occur more than 1 year later than
previously planned.
Program Office Comments
The program office concurred with this assessment.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: CH-53K
CH-53K - Heavy Lift Replacement
The Marine Corps’ CH-53K helicopter will perform
heavy-lift assault transport of armored vehicles,
equipment, and personnel to support operations
deep inland from a sea-based center of operations.
The CH-53K program is expected to replace the
legacy CH-53E helicopter and improve range and
payload, survivability and force protection,
reliability and maintainability, and coordination with
other assets, while reducing total ownership cost.
Source: © 2008 Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation.
Low-rate
decision
(9/14)
Initial
capability
(9/18)
Full-rate
decision
(3/19)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 53
Latest
07/2010
$5,915.4
$15,986.9
$21,902.3
$109.512
200
153
Percent
change
37.1
33.2
34.3
4.7
28.2
28.6
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
Design and
technology
192
maturity
fk
According to program officials, both CH-53K
current critical technologies are nearing maturity
and are expected to be fully mature by its
production decision in 2014. A third technology,
the viscoelastic lag damper, has been replaced
with a modified version of an existing technology
to reduce cost and weight. The program
completed its design review in July 2010—16
months later than planned—with over 90 percent
of its total expected design drawings released.
Developmental testing and initial operational
capability have been delayed, and the overall cost
of development has increased by $1.7 billion. The
program is revising its acquisition strategy to
move the start of production up by 1 year to align
with its production decision. The program will
also update its schedule and cost estimate. As it
stands now, delivery of the capability will occur
more than 2 years later than planned.
As of
12/2005
$4,313.6
$11,997.9
$16,311.5
$104.561
156
119
lo
Prime contractor: Sikorsky Aircraft
Corporation
Program office: Patuxent River NAS,
MD
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $3,703.2 million
Procurement: $15,986.9 million
Total funding: $19,690.1 million
Procurement quantity: 196
GAO
review
(11/10)
le
ve
Program Essentials
Design
review
(7/10)
d
Development
start
(12/05)
Production
si
re
Program
start
(11/03)
System development
Projection
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
0
Development
start
(12/05)
DOD GAO Production
design review
decision
review (11/10)
(9/14)
(7/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: CH-53K
CH-53K Program
Technology Maturity
The CH-53K program began development in 2005
with three critical technologies, all of which were
immature. One of these technologies, the
viscoelastic lag damper, was replaced by a modified
version of an existing technology to reduce cost and
weight. According to the program office, the 
CH-53K’s two remaining critical technologies—the
main rotor blade and the main gearbox—were
nearing maturity when the program’s design review
was held in July 2010. The program office plans for
these technologies to be fully mature and
demonstrated in a realistic environment prior to its
production decision in 2014.
Design Maturity
The CH-53K design appears stable. In July 2010, the
program office completed its critical design review
with over 90 percent of total expected design
drawings released. However, the continuing
maturation of critical technologies could result in
design changes as testing progresses.
Other Program Issues
CH-53K developmental testing and initial
operational capability have been delayed, and the
overall cost of development has increased by 
$1.7 billion. To avoid further cost and schedule
problems, the program has taken several steps,
including allowing more time to review the design
and deferring certain requirements. For example,
the program delayed its critical design review to
ensure that all subsystems had completed their
design reviews before moving forward. In addition,
the program has received approval to defer three net
ready capabilities—variable message format (VMF),
mode 5, and link 16—to later in production to
reduce development costs. According to the
program office, deferring these capabilities would
save approximately $103.5 million in the near term.
However, it will also decrease the initial capability
that is delivered to the warfighter. The program is
currently revising its acquisition strategy to move
the start of production up by 1 year to align with its
production decision. Currently, there is a 1-year gap
between the production decision date and the
scheduled start of production. According to the
program office, it is also updating its schedule and
cost estimates.
Page 54
Delays in the CH-53K program may result in the
extended use of and increased costs for legacy
systems, such as the CH-53E and CH-53D helicopter.
Currently deployed CH-53E aircraft are flying at
almost three times the planned utilization rate. This
operational pace is expected to result in higher
airframe and component repair costs, as the Marine
Corps seeks to minimize CH-53E inventory
reductions until CH-53K deliveries reach meaningful
levels. According to program officials, all available
decommissioned CH-53E and CH-53D helicopters
have been reclaimed and all available parts have
been salvaged to keep the current inventory of
aircraft in service. However, as a cost-saving
measure, the Marine Corps now plans to begin
retiring the entire CH-53D fleet earlier than
anticipated.
In 2008, the program office was directed to increase
the number of planned CH-53K aircraft from 156 to
200 to accommodate an increase in Marine troop
levels from 174,000 to 202,000. The quantity increase
added $5 billion in procurement cost to the program.
Program Office Comments
In its comments on a draft of this assessment, the
Navy stated that, during 2010, the CH-53K program
completed the critical design review and began
assembly of the engineering development model test
articles. Critical technologies are maturing as
planned in the approved technology maturation
plan. In August 2010, the Director, Defense Research
and Engineering, certified that both critical
technology elements had achieved technology
readiness level 6, which is the appropriate level of
maturity for this stage of program development. The
President’s 2011 budget fully funded the program to
achieve a fiscal year 2018 initial operational
capability. The Navy also provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: CVN 21
CVN 21 Future Aircraft Carrier
The Navy’s CVN 21 program is developing a new
class of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. The
carriers will include advanced propulsion, aircraft
launch and recovery, and survivability technologies
designed to improve operational efficiency, enable
higher sortie rates, and reduce manpower. The Navy
awarded a contract for detail design and
construction of the lead ship, CVN 78, in September
2008 and expects delivery of the ship by September
2015. The Navy plans to award a construction
contract for the second ship, CVN 79, in December
2012.
Source: U.S. Navy.
GAO
review
Construction contract
award—second ship
(7/07)
(9/08)
(11/10)
(12/12)
First ship
Initial
delivery capability
(9/15)
(9/16)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 55
Percent
change
-3.1
-2.4
-2.5
-2.5
0.0
8.8
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
Design and
technology
192
maturity
fk
CVN 78 began construction in September 2008.
However, 7 of the program’s 13 critical
technologies are still not fully mature because
they have not been demonstrated in a realistic, atsea environment. Of these technologies, the
electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS),
advanced arresting gear, and dual band radar
present the greatest cost and schedule risk. The
ship’s three-dimensional product model was
completed in November 2009, but the contractor
is making design changes and could experience
more as EMALS and other systems complete
testing. Seventy-two percent of the ship’s
structural units are complete, accounting for
about 19 percent of the total production hours. A
number of units are behind schedule due to late
materials. The program’s shift from a 4- to 5-year
build cycle could increase costs if it results in the
type of inefficiencies predicted by the shipbuilder.
As of
Latest
04/2004
06/2010
$4,732.3
$4,588.0
$30,316.2
$29,597.8
$35,048.5
$34,185.7
$11,682.827 $11,395.246
3
3
137
149
lo
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman
Shipbuilding-Newport News
Program office: Washington, DC
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $991.2 million
Procurement: $19,047.6 million
Total funding: $20,038.8 million
Procurement quantity: 2
Lead-ship
fabrication start
le
ve
Program Essentials
Production
decision
d
(6/00)
Constructionpreparation
contract award
(5/04)
Production
si
re
Program
start
System development
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
0
Contract
award
(5/04)
Lead ship
fabrication
(9/08)
GAO
review
(11/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: CVN 21
CVN 21 Program
Technology Maturity
Seven of the CVN 21 program’s 13 current critical
technologies have not been demonstrated in a
realistic, at-sea environment. Of these technologies,
EMALS, the advanced arresting gear, and dual band
radar present the greatest risk to the ship’s cost and
schedule. Program officials stated that EMALS
development has been one of the primary drivers of
CVN 78 cost increases. Problems have occurred in
EMALS testing which could result in more design
changes later in the program. Testing uncovered a
crack in the motor, which has already resulted in
several design changes; and in January 2010, a motor
controller software error caused damage to the
EMALS hardware. Both fixes have successfully been
retested. The program completed the first four 
F/A-18E launches in December 2010. The advanced
arresting gear is nearing maturity and has completed
extended reliability testing. However, delays in landbased testing with simulated and live aircraft could
lead to late delivery. The Navy finalized a fixed-price
production contract for EMALS and the advanced
arresting gear in June 2010. Although the Navy
continues to pay design and testing costs, any
EMALS changes identified during development will
be incorporated into the production units at no cost
to the government. The dual band radar, which
includes the volume search and multifunction
radars, is being developed by the DDG 1000
destroyer program and is also nearing maturity.
However, as a part of a program restructuring, the
DDG 1000 eliminated the volume search radar from
the program. According to Navy officials, radar
development has not been affected, but CVN 78 will
now be the first ship to operate with this radar.
Radar equipment will be delivered for installation
and testing beginning September 2011 for the
multifunction radar and in January 2012 for the
volume search radar.
Design Maturity
In September 2008, CVN 78 began production with
only 76 percent of its three-dimensional product
model complete. The three-dimensional product
model was completed by November 2009, but the
contractor is currently making design changes to
prevent electrical cable routing from interfering with
other design features. As EMALS and other systems
complete testing, additional design changes may be
necessary.
Page 56
Production Maturity
The Navy awarded the CVN 78 construction contract
in September 2008. Construction of approximately
65 percent of the ship’s structural units is complete.
These units account for about 19 percent of the
ship’s total production hours. As of July 2010,
construction of the hull in dry dock was behind
schedule because of late material deliveries from
suppliers.
Other Program Issues
In 2010, the CVN 21 program shifted from a 4- to 5year build cycle, which could increase program
costs. According to program officials, the
shipbuilder projects that this change will increase
costs by 9 to 15 percent due to the loss of learning
and effect on the supplier base, among other
inefficiencies. The Navy disagrees with this
assessment and reported to Congress that the shift
will have minimal negative consequences. The dual
band radar also presents cost risks for the program.
Program officials are considering buying the radar
for both CVN 79 and CVN 80 at the same time, in
order to reduce the risks associated with the
production line being idle for up to 5 years.
However, this strategy could lead to increased costs
if changes identified during at-sea testing on CVN 78
need to be incorporated into the already-procured
systems for the two follow-on ships.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the
Navy generally concurred with this assessment.
Officials stated the program is addressing the
technology and construction challenges for a
successful September 2015 delivery, and that CVN 79
is on track to award a construction contract by the
first quarter fiscal year 2013. The Navy stated that
while the change from a 4- to 5-year build cycle will
increase the unit cost of the CVN 78 class carrier, it
facilitates a reduced average yearly funding
requirement over a longer period of time. The Navy
also provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: DDG 1000
DDG 1000 Destroyer
The Navy’s DDG 1000 destroyer is a multimission
surface ship designed to provide advanced landattack capability in support of forces ashore and
littoral operations. Construction has begun on the
first and second ships, and the Navy anticipates
awarding a construction contract for the third ship
in the second quarter of fiscal year 2011. Bath Iron
Works will build all three ships in this class with key
segments built by Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding
Gulf Coast.
Source: U.S. Navy.
System development
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
As of
01/1998
$2,240.4
$32,043.5
$34,283.9
$1,071.372
32
128
Latest
01/2011
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
221
Percent
change
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
72.7
Latest cost data resulting from the June 2010 Nunn-McCurdy restructuring were not available at the
time of this assessment.
Page 57
Attainment of Product Knowledge
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
le
The second ship in the DDG 1000 class began
construction in March 2010 with a complete
design. While all 12 of the program’s critical
technologies are now nearing maturity or are fully
mature, 8 of these technologies will not be
demonstrated in a realistic environment until after
installation on the first ship. Software
development for the total ship computing
environment also continues to be a challenge. In
fiscal year 2008, the Navy truncated the DDG 1000
program to three ships, triggering a critical NunnMcCurdy cost breach and a restructure of the
program. DOD removed the volume search radar
from the baseline design and will modify software
for the remaining multifunction radar to meet
volume search requirements. The restructured
program delayed initial operational capability by 1
year to allow additional time for the program to
retire remaining software and production risks.
no
w
Prime contractor: BAE Systems, Bath
Iron Works, Northrop Grumman
Shipbuilding, Raytheon
Program office: Washington, DC
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD
Procurement: TBD
Total funding: TBD
Procurement quantity: TBD
(6/16)
Design and
technology
192
maturity
fk
Program Essentials
Initial
capability
lo
(3/04)
Lead ship Second ship GAO
construction construction review
start
start
(2/09)
(3/10)
(11/10)
le
ve
(1/98)
Production Contract award—
decision
construction
detail design
(11/05)
(8/06)
d
Development
start
si
re
Program
start
Production
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
0
Contract
award
(8/06)
Lead ship
fabrication
(2/09)
GAO
review
(11/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: DDG 1000
DDG 1000 Program
Technology Maturity
Three of DDG 1000’s 12 critical technologies are
mature, and the remaining 9 have been
demonstrated in a relevant environment. The Navy
plans to fully demonstrate the integrated deckhouse
before installation on the ship, but the remaining 8
technologies will not be demonstrated in a realistic
environment until after ship installation. The design
review for one of the technologies—the ship’s longrange land-attack projectile—was delayed from 2010
to 2011 to allow time to correct issues found during
rocket motor testing, but program officials noted
that the projectile has performed well and met
accuracy and range requirements in flight tests
completed to date. The total ship computing
environment (phased over six releases and one
spiral) is now nearing maturity, and, according to
program officials, the integration and testing of
software release 5 is complete. However, software
development challenges remain. According to the
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA),
there has been significant cost growth due to testing
delays for release 5, and several unresolved
problems have been deferred to release 6. DCMA
has reported that these deferred requirements,
coupled with software requirements changes for
release 6, could create significant cost and schedule
challenges.
Design Maturity
The DDG 1000 design appears stable. The design
was 88 percent complete at the start of lead ship
construction and 100 percent complete shortly
thereafter.
Production Maturity
The first DDG 1000 began construction in February
2009 and the Navy estimates that approximately 30
percent of the ship is complete. Fabrication of the
second ship began in March 2010, and 38 percent of
the units that make up the ship are now in various
stages of production. The Navy reported that it
contractually requires the shipbuilders to specify
detailed structural attributes to be monitored during
unit fabrication and integration in order to reduce
the risk of rework. While the shipbuilders are not
currently meeting some of the production metrics,
program officials reported that these issues have
been addressed in part by retraining personnel.
Page 58
Other Program Issues
In fiscal year 2008, the Navy truncated the DDG 1000
program to three ships, triggering a Nunn-McCurdy
unit cost breach of the critical threshold and a
restructure of the program. To reduce program
costs, DOD removed the volume search radar from
the design, leaving only the multifunction radar on
the ship. According to program officials, removing
the volume search radar will save the program $300
million and will not preclude DDG 1000 from
meeting its key performance parameters. However,
the software for the multifunction radar will have to
be modified to provide a volume search capability
that meets all planned threat scenarios. The program
office has not yet estimated the cost of these
multifunction radar modifications; it does not
expect them to affect the program’s schedule.
According to program officials, the ship could
accept the volume search radar in the future
because space and weight will be reserved, but there
are currently no plans to include it. The program
restructure also delayed initial operational
capability by 1 year to the third quarter of fiscal year
2016 to allow additional time for the program to
retire remaining software and production risks. The
program expects all three ships to be operational by
2018.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the
Navy stated that the program received milestone B
approval, after the critical Nunn-McCurdy breach, in
October 2010 and is closely monitoring and
managing risk through comprehensive program
metrics, program reviews, and an earned value
management system. At the time of the review, all
critical technologies had been at the appropriate
level of maturity for the program phase. Earned
value assessments of both shipbuilders and an
independent logistics assessment are to be
completed in fiscal year 2011. All 26 major mission
systems equipment are in production and on track
for on-time delivery to the shipyard. Software
release 6 is on track to support land-based testing
for the propulsion system and light off of the main
engine. The first advanced gun system magazine was
delivered on time and the first gun has been shipped
for testing. A successful test mission readiness
review and associated tests for the multifunction
radar were completed in September 2010. The Navy
also provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: E-2D AHE
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE)
The Navy’s E-2D AHE is an all-weather, twin-engine,
carrier-based aircraft designed to extend early
warning surveillance capabilities. It is the next in a
series of upgrades the Navy has made to the E-2C
Hawkeye platform since its first flight in 1971. The
key objectives of the E-2D AHE are to improve
target detection and situational awareness,
especially in the littorals; support theater air and
missile defense operations; and provide improved
operational availability for the radar system.
Source: U.S. Navy.
System development
Design
review
(10/05)
Full-rate
decision
(12/12)
Initial
capability
(10/14)
Last
procurement
(2019)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 59
Latest
06/2010
$4,230.8
$13,556.9
$17,830.7
$237.743
75
136
Percent
change
11.8
26.1
22.7
22.7
0.0
43.2
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
lo
The E-2D AHE was approved for entry into
production in May 2009 with all its critical
technologies mature and its design stable. We did
not assess production maturity; however,
according to E-2D program and Defense Contract
Management Agency officials, the contractor is
performing well on a variety of production metrics
and inspections have not identified any significant
concerns. The program must complete a second
operational assessment and improve radar
reliability before it can award its next production
contract. According to program officials, the Navy
completed a second operational assessment in
November 2010. However, the program’s test plan
for improving the reliability of the radar system
remains aggressive. The program also
experienced delays in development testing and the
delivery of pilot production aircraft related to a
now-resolved problem with the engine mount
design.
As of
06/2003
$3,784.3
$10,750.2
$14,534.5
$193.794
75
95
le
ve
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman
Corp.
Program office: Patuxent River, MD
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $276.5 million
Procurement: $12,237.2 million
Total funding: $12,528.7 million
Procurement quantity: 65
GAO
review
(11/10)
d
Program Essentials
Low-rate
decision
(5/09)
si
re
Program/
development start
(6/03)
Production
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
0
Development
start
(6/03)
DOD
design
review
(10/05)
Production GAO
decision review
(5/09) (11/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: E-2D AHE
E-2D AHE Program
Technology Maturity
According to the Navy, all five of the E-2D AHE’s
critical technologies are mature. The Navy
completed a technology readiness assessment in
2009 to support the program’s low-rate initial
production decision, and DOD concurred with that
assessment. The assessment included one new
critical technology—the high-power UHF circulator.
In the assessment, DOD raised concerns about the
UHF transmitter’s durability and its potential effect
on life-cycle costs and operational availability.
According to program officials, the durability of the
parts has improved as a result of increased quality
control efforts.
Design Maturity
The E-2D AHE design is stable. Program officials
said that all current design drawings are releasable,
but some design changes will be necessary to
incorporate recent modifications to the aircraft,
including those related to an engine heat shield
puncture issue discovered during carrier suitability
testing.
Production Maturity
We did not assess production maturity; however,
according to E-2D program and Defense Contract
Management Agency officials, the contractor is
performing well on a variety of postproduction
metrics, and inspections have not identified any
significant concerns. The contractor reports
monthly to the Defense Contract Management
Agency and the program office on a series of
production metrics, such as scrap and rework rates,
and the program office reported that the contractor
is meeting its rework goal. The program did not
identify any critical manufacturing processes
associated with the E-2D AHE, nor does the program
require the contractor’s major assembly site to use
statistical process controls to ensure its critical
processes are producing high-quality and reliable
products because components are assembled using
manual processes that do not lend themselves to
such measures.
March 2011 Defense Acquisition Board review of the
program’s progress. According to program officials,
the Navy completed a second operational
assessment in November 2010. However, the
program’s test plan for improving the reliability of
the radar system remains aggressive. The radar must
demonstrate a reliability rate greater than or equal to
65 hours. As of November 2010, the program
reported a radar reliability rate of 46.7 hours.
Program officials expect that the radar will exceed
the 65-hour threshold by the March review because
some corrective actions have already been
implemented, several fixes for identified root causes
are waiting to be implemented, and few new types of
errors are occurring. According to program officials,
forthcoming software updates should address a
number of existing failures and improve reliability.
The program also experienced delays in
development testing and the delivery of pilot
production aircraft related to a now-resolved
problem with the engine mount design discovered
during carrier suitability testing. Specifically, engine
movement led to a temperature sensor puncturing a
heat shield and making contact with a bulkhead
during simulated aircraft carrier landings. In
response, certain carrier landing tests were stopped
and other flight tests reduced from October 2009
through July 2010 while the program implemented a
new engine mount design to address the problem.
The program office decided to adopt this design
modification and others on the program’s three pilot
production aircraft, which resulted in a 3- to 4month delay in the delivery of each aircraft.
According to program officials, the third pilot
production aircraft was delivered in November 2010.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the
program office provided technical comments, which
were incorporated as appropriate.
Other Program Issues
The E-2D AHE program must complete a second
operational assessment and improve radar reliability
before it can award its next production contract.
The program plans to award this contract after a
Page 60
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: Excalibur
Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile
The Army’s Excalibur is a family of global
positioning system–based, fire-and-forget, 155 mm
cannon artillery precision munitions intended to
provide improved range and accuracy. The nearvertical angle of fall is expected to reduce collateral
damage, making it more effective in urban
environments. The Army plans to develop the
unitary warhead version in three increments—Ia-1,
Ia-2, and Ib. We assessed increments Ia-1 and Ia-2
and made observations on increment Ib.
Source: U.S. Army.
System development
Design
review
(11/10)
Initial
capability—
increment Ia-2
(6/11)
Last
procurement
(2016)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 61
Latest
11/2010
$975.1
$695.8
$1,670.9
$.237
7,050
171
Percent
change
29.3
-82.4
-64.5
286.2
-90.8
25.7
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
lo
Excalibur increments Ia-1 and Ia-2 are in
production. According to program officials, their
critical technologies are mature and designs are
stable. The program received approval to begin
production of increment Ia-1 in May 2005 to
support an urgent requirement in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Increment Ia-2 entered production in
July 2007 and completed initial operational test in
February 2010. After a design and prototype
demonstration phase, the Army began engineering
and manufacturing development for increment Ib
in August 2010. The two critical technologies for
this increment are mature. In May 2010, the Army
reduced overall program quantities from 30,000 to
6,264 based on a review of precision munition
needs. The resulting unit cost increase led to a
Nunn-McCurdy breach of the critical threshold.
The program expects to be certified to continue in
early 2011.
As of
02/2003
$754.2
$3,951.7
$4,705.9
$.061
76,677
136
le
ve
Prime contractor: Raytheon
Program office: Picatinny Arsenal, NJ
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $67.2 million
Procurement: $285.6 million
Total funding: $352.8 million
Procurement quantity: 3,930
(5/05)
GAO
review
d
Program Essentials
Low-rate
decision—
increment Ia-2
(7/07)
si
re
Program/
development
start
(5/97)
Production
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
0
Development
start
(5/97)
DOD
design
review
(5/05)
Production GAO
decision review
(7/07) (11/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: Excalibur
Excalibur Program
Technology Maturity
The Excalibur’s three critical technologies for
increments Ia-1 and Ia-2—the airframe, guidance
system, and warhead—are mature. According to the
program office, the technologies were demonstrated
in a realistic environment at the time of their
respective design reviews in May 2005 and March
2007. After an 18-month prototype design and
demonstration phase, the Army began engineering
and manufacturing development for increment Ib in
August 2010. According to program officials, the two
critical technologies for this increment—the
guidance systems and safe-and-arm fuze—are
mature. The contractor for increment Ib plans to
leverage existing technology from the increment Ia
program.
Design Maturity
The Excalibur increment Ia-1 and Ia-2 designs are
stable. According to the program office, more than
90 percent of each increment’s expected design
drawings were releasable at the time of their design
reviews. The number of design drawings increased
by almost 20 percent between increment Ia-1 and 
Ia-2. According to a program official, the increase
was due to parts changes on increment Ia-1, as well
as upgrades and changes for increment Ia-2.
Production Maturity
The Excalibur program appears to have overcome a
series of quality lapses that increased program costs,
halted deliveries, and delayed the qualification of the
Ia-2. As a result of those problems, the program
manager asked the contractor to review acceptance
procedures and implement processes to control
product quality. The program also qualified a new
supplier for the inertial measurement unit—a part of
the projectile’s guidance system—which has
improved program reliability. While we could not
assess Excalibur’s overall production maturity
because statistical process controls have not been
implemented at the system level, the program is
taking steps to utilize these controls at the assembly
plants and subcontractors. The contractor has
started to compile these data and, as production
continues and quantities increase, plans to look for
key areas at the subcontractor level to place under
control.
Page 62
Other Program Issues
The Excalibur program is following an incremental
acquisition strategy. Increment Ia-1 Excalibur was
fielded in Iraq and first used in combat in 2007. The
program office reported that over 85 percent of the
rounds expended in combat operations have
functioned as expected. The program plans to
complete production of increment Ia-1 in fiscal years
2010 and 2011. Increment Ia-2 is currently in
production and completed initial operational test
and evaluation in February 2010. During operational
tests, it demonstrated an overall reliability rate of 73
percent by successfully completing 35 of 48 shots.
The increment Ib projectile, which is planned to
increase reliability and lower unit costs, is
scheduled to begin production in fiscal year 2012.
In May 2010, the Army reduced overall program
quantities from 30,000 to 6,264 based on a review of
precision munition needs. The resulting unit cost
increase—from $47,000 to $99,000 per projectile—
led to a Nunn-McCurdy breach of the critical
threshold. Congress was notified of the breach in
August 2010. The program expects to be
restructured and certified by the Secretary of
Defense to continue in January 2011. As a result of
the Nunn-McCurdy breach, the program projects the
full-rate production decision for increment Ia-2 will
move from August 2010 to February 2011. The
effects of the program restructure on increment Ib
are still being determined by the program office.
Program Office Comments
The program office provided technical comments on
a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated
as appropriate.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: EFV
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV)
The Marine Corps’ EFV is designed to transport
troops from ships offshore to inland locales at
higher speeds and from longer distances than its
predecessor, the Assault Amphibious Vehicle 7A1
(AAV 7A1). The EFV will have two variants—a troop
carrier for 17 combat-equipped Marines and 3 crew
members and a command vehicle to manage combat
operations. Since the program started, DOD has also
awarded contracts to redesign key subsystems to
improve reliability and to develop an armor kit to
protect EFVs from improvised explosive devices.
Source: U.S. Marine Corps.
System development
Program
start
Nunn-McCurdy
breach
Development
start
GAO
review
(12/00)
(2/07)
(7/08)
(11/10)
Operational
testing
Low-rate
decision
Initial
capability
(7/11)
(1/12)
(8/16)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Percent
change
130.1
39.8
55.7
169.2
-42.1
86.2
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
lo
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
Technology
maturity 96
0
Page 63
Latest
11/2010
$3,740.2
$10,208.4
$14,043.7
$23.682
593
257
le
ve
The EFV’s critical technologies are mature, but its
design is still evolving. In 2007, DOD extended
system development, and the program revised its
approach to meeting its reliability requirements.
In addition to reliability, the program is monitoring
risks related to its schedule, the vehicle’s weight,
and the potential for increased unit costs. Seven
new prototypes, which incorporate significant
design changes, are now undergoing development
and reliability growth testing, and the program
plans to demonstrate the prototypes’ initial
reliability in January 2011. The Secretary of
Defense has proposed canceling the program. If it
is not cancelled, the program will determine
whether schedule or quantity changes—such as
delaying its production decision or reducing initial
quantities—are warranted.
As of
12/2000
$1,625.2
$7,299.8
$9,018.7
$8.799
1,025
138
d
Prime contractor: General Dynamics
Program office: Woodbridge, VA
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $575.7 million
Procurement: $9,993.4 million
Total funding: $10,637.8 million
Procurement quantity: 573
KP-2: Initial
demonstrated
reliability
(1/11)
si
re
Program Essentials
Production
De
Concept
Development
start
(12/00)
DOD GAO Production
design review decision
review (11/10) (1/12)
(12/08)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: EFV
EFV Program
Technology Maturity
According to the program office, all four EFV critical
technologies—high-pressure jet, high-speed planing,
lightweight armor, and power diesel—are mature.
Design Maturity
The EFV’s design is still evolving. In 2007, DOD
extended system development, and the program
revised its approach to meeting its reliability
requirements. One part of this approach involved a
restructured development effort to test redesigned
components on existing prototypes. Another part
involved building seven new prototypes, which
incorporate 180 significant subsystem design
changes to improve the EFV’s ability to move, shoot,
communicate, and carry and protect troops. The
initial reliability goal of the design changes is to
increase system reliability from the 4.5 hours mean
time between operational mission failures measured
in the program’s 2006 operational assessment to 16.4
hours prior to the next operational assessment,
which is planned for July 2011. The prototypes are
now undergoing development and reliability growth
testing, and the program plans to demonstrate this
16.4 hour goal in January 2011. The eventual goal is
for low-rate initial production vehicles to
demonstrate 43.5 hours of reliability during initial
operational test and evaluation, which is scheduled
to begin in July 2015. These operational test results
will support the program’s full-rate production
decision in September 2016.
Production Maturity
According to the EFV program, it is too early to
determine the maturity of the EFV production
processes. While the seven developmental prototype
vehicles were built using tooling and processes that
were representative of those used in production, the
program does not intend to collect data on key
manufacturing processes or use statistical process
controls until low-rate production begins. EFV
suppliers are performing inspections of the
program’s key product characteristics and recording
the data in preparation for future statistical process
control analysis.
this program, stating that the EFV would be an
enormously capable vehicle if completed, but that
the mounting costs of acquiring it needed to be
weighed against other priorities.
The program is currently monitoring four risk areas
that could affect the ultimate success of the
program. Reliability growth has been identified as a
risk because there is a chance that the design
changes the program has made may not be
significant enough to provide the needed
improvement in reliability. The program has also
identified vehicle weight as a risk. Program officials
expect aggressive weight management throughout
the current development effort and low-rate initial
production to mitigate this risk. While the program’s
current weight assessment shows that the prototype
design will not accommodate the required weight
growth for future upgrades and increased loads, the
program currently projects that the low-rate initial
production design will meet the weight growth
margin in the EFV’s requirement document for
production. The program’s schedule leading up to
the program’s production decision also faces risks.
Specifically, technical and software issues could
delay key events, such as developmental testing and
the start of the program’s July 2011 operational
assessment. Finally, there is a risk that redesign of
the EFV could increase unit costs as well as
operations and support costs for the program. If the
program continues, it will determine whether
schedule or quantity changes—such as delaying its
production decision or reducing initial quantities—
are warranted to address these risks and its overall
affordability.
Program Office Comments
DOD provided technical comments on a draft of this
assessment, which we incorporated as appropriate.
Other Program Issues
The EFV program is entering a period that could
determine whether or not it continues. In January
2011, the Secretary of Defense proposed canceling
Page 64
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: JSF
F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter)
DOD’s JSF program is developing a family of
stealthy, strike fighter aircraft for the Navy, Air
Force, Marine Corps, and U.S. allies, with the goal of
maximizing commonality to minimize life-cycle
costs. The carrier-suitable variant will complement
the Navy F/A-18E/F. The Air Force variant will
primarily be an air-to-ground replacement for the F16 and the A-10, and will complement the F-22. The
short take-off and vertical landing variant will
replace the Marine Corps F/A-18 and AV-8B aircraft.
Source: 2010 Lockheed Martin.
Concept
System development
Production
Program
start
Development
start
Design
review
Production
decision
GAO
review
(11/96)
(10/01)
(2/06 & 6/07)
(6/07)
(11/10)
Program Essentials
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin
Program office: Arlington, VA
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $8,359.6 million
Procurement: $215,146.0 million
Total funding: $223,815.5 million
Procurement quantity: 2,385
Initial
capability—
USMC
(12/12)
Last
procurement
Initial
capability—
USAF & USN
(4/16)
(2035)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
As of
10/2001
$38,402.1
$170,372.1
$210,557.6
$73.467
2,866
116
Latest
08/2010
$53,663.1
$229,467.6
$283,674.5
$115.456
2,457
174
Percent
change
39.7
34.7
34.7
57.2
-14.3
50.0
Latest cost data do not fully account for cost and schedule changes resulting from the program’s
critical Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach.
Page 65
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
si
re
d
le
ve
lo
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
De
The JSF is in production but three critical
technologies are not mature, manufacturing
processes are not proven, and testing is not
complete. Continuing manufacturing
inefficiencies, parts problems, and technical
changes indicate that the aircraft’s design and
production processes may lack the maturity
needed to efficiently produce aircraft at planned
rates. With most of developmental and operational
flight testing still ahead, the risk of future design
changes is significant. DOD restructured the JSF
program in February 2010 to address development
challenges. The projected cost growth triggered a
Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical
threshold. According to program officials, the JSF
is tracking well against its new, less aggressive test
schedule despite late deliveries of test aircraft and
lower than expected availability rates for short
take-off/vertical landing test aircraft.
Technology
maturity 96
0
Development
start
(10/01)
DOD
design
review
(2/06 and 6/07)
Production GAO
start
review
(6/07) (11/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: JSF
JSF Program
Technology Maturity
The JSF program entered system development in
2001 with none of its eight critical technologies fully
mature. According to the program office, five of
these technologies are now mature and three
technologies—mission systems integration,
prognostics and health management, and radar—are
nearing maturity. However, significant development
risks remain as the program integrates and tests
these technologies.
Design Maturity
The JSF program did not have a stable design at its
critical design reviews. The program has now
released over 99 percent of its total expected
drawings; however, the program continues to
experience numerous design changes. With most of
developmental and operational flight testing still
ahead, the risk of future design changes and their
potential effect on the program are significant.
Production Maturity
Despite beginning production in 2006 and procuring
58 aircraft to date, the JSF program’s manufacturing
processes are still not mature and only 12 percent of
its critical processes are in statistical control. DOD
has reduced near-term production quantities.
However, continuing manufacturing inefficiencies,
parts problems, and technical changes indicate that
the aircraft’s design and production processes may
lack the maturity needed to efficiently produce
aircraft at planned rates. Managing an extensive,
still-maturing global network of suppliers adds
another layer of complexity to producing aircraft
efficiently and on-time. The prime contractor is
implementing manufacturing process
improvements. However, due to the extensive
amount of testing still to be completed, the program
could be required to make alterations to its
production processes, changes to its supplier base,
and costly retrofits to produced and fielded aircraft,
if problems are discovered.
Other Program Issues
After an extensive programwide review, DOD
restructured the JSF program in February 2010 to
address development challenges. The restructure
increased time and funding for system development,
added more aircraft to support flight testing,
reduced near-term procurement quantities, and
Page 66
incorporated additional software resources. The
projected cost growth—including almost $104
billion since 2007—triggered a Nunn-McCurdy unit
cost breach of the critical threshold. A milestone
review was scheduled for November 2010 to update
cost and schedule estimates.
According to program officials, the JSF is making
progress when measured against its new, less
aggressive test schedule and all three variants have
had their first flights. However, several issues could
affect testing. The program had only delivered eight
aircraft to test sites as of December 2010, and short
take-off/vertical landing test aircraft have
experienced lower than expected availability rates.
The program also continues to experience
challenges in developing and integrating the very
large and complex software requirements needed to
achieve JSF capabilities. Further delays in either
flight testing or software development could
jeopardize the Marine Corps’ planned initial
operating capability date. Finally, the uncertain
fidelity of test results is a risk because the program
relies on an unaccredited network of test
laboratories and simulation models to evaluate
system performance.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the
program office noted that JSF is undergoing a
technical baseline review of requirements to
complete the development effort as part of the
consideration for recertification of the development
milestone. Eight aircraft of the 10 anticipated in 2010
have been delivered to the test sites. An additional 4
are projected to be delivered by June 2011. The test
program has slightly exceeded the overall test flight
and test point metrics planned for 2010; testing of
the Marine Corps variant is behind plan while testing
of the Air Force variant has exceeded plans. Mission
systems testing is underway with Block 1.0 on both
Air Force and Marine Corps mission systems test
aircraft. Over half of the projected airborne system
software is in testing including the foundational
sensor fusion architecture. Survivability testing has
begun (live fire testing and radar cross section
signature ground testing) and results thus far are
matching predictions. The first airborne dynamic
signature test with aircraft AF-3 will begin
December 2010.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: FAB-T
Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T)
The Air Force’s FAB-T will provide a family of
satellite communications terminals for airborne and
ground-based users. FAB-T will address current and
future communications capabilities and
technologies, replacing many program-unique
terminals. FAB-T is being developed incrementally.
The first increment will provide voice and data
military satellite communications for nuclear and
conventional forces as well as airborne and ground
command posts, including the B-2, B-52, RC-135, E-6,
and E-4 aircraft. We assessed this increment.
Source: Boeing.
Concept
System development
Development
start
(9/02)
Program Essentials
Prime contractor: Boeing
Program office: Hanscom AFB, MA
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $220.2 million
Procurement: $2,081.8 million
Total funding: $2,302.0 million
Procurement quantity: 209
Production
Critical
design review
(1/09)
GAO
review
(11/10)
Low-rate
decision
(TBD)
Full-rate
production
(TBD)
Last
procurement
(TBD)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
As of
12/2006
$1,514.4
$1,627.0
$3,141.5
$14.544
216
129
Latest
12/2009
$1,735.2
$2,194.6
$3,929.9
$16.172
243
NA
Percent
change
14.6
34.9
25.1
11.2
12.5
NA
The program did not provide an updated cost position or future funding stream because of ongoing
changes related to the rebaseline.
Page 67
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
si
re
d
le
ve
lo
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
De
The FAB-T program expected to enter production
in February 2010 with its critical technologies
mature and its design stable; however, the
program now plans to significantly extend its
development phase to more fully develop the highdata-rate variant and reduce the concurrency in
testing and production. A new low-rate production
decision date has not yet been approved, but is
tentatively scheduled for the first quarter of fiscal
year 2013. Two critical technologies have not yet
demonstrated their maturity as planned, and the
FAB-T program office continues to monitor
certification of the system’s cryptography by the
National Security Agency. The FAB-T design also
does not appear to be stable; however, we were
unable to specifically assess it because the
program has not provided updated information on
its design relating to its restructure and rebaseline
efforts.
Technology
maturity 96
Not
assessed
0
Development
start
(9/02)
DOD GAO Production
design review decision
review (11/10) (TBD)
(1/09)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: FAB-T
FAB-T Program
Technology Maturity
The FAB-T program expected to enter production in
February 2010 with all six critical technologies
mature and demonstrated in a realistic environment.
However, according to program officials, two critical
technologies—the continuous transverse stub
antenna and the high-data-rate software
configuration architecture—have not yet
demonstrated their maturity as planned. The
program has decided to extend the development
phase, in large part to more fully develop the highdata-rate software variant. FAB-T’s critical
technologies were not assessed at development start
in 2002 because it was not yet a major defense
acquisition program.
Design Maturity
The FAB-T design does not appear to be stable. Even
though the program office reported a high
percentage of releasable design drawings last year,
there have been changes to the program since then
that could affect the design. Specifically, as a result
of hardware qualification problems and testing
failures, the program decided to extend
development and delay production. Resolving these
issues could require design changes. According to
program officials, the program also anticipates that
two engineering changes—one related to secure
transmissions and another related to environmental
specifications—will require additional design work.
We were unable to specifically assess the design as a
whole because the program has not provided
updated information on its design relating to its
restructure and rebaseline efforts.
office, hardware qualification problems and testing
failures made this level of concurrency an
unacceptable risk. The new low-rate production
decision date is tentatively scheduled for November
2012. In addition, in response to cost and schedule
growth on the FAB-T program, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense directed the establishment of
four integrated product teams to perform reviews
similar to those required for a Nunn-McCurdy
breach on management, technical, and cost issues,
and to examine potential alternative sources and
changes to requirements.
FAB-T certification by the National Security Agency
(NSA) is another key step in the program. FAB-T
needs to properly protect information at various
classification levels and NSA will provide a
certification of the cryptography in certain
equipment. In June 2009, NSA completed a review of
the low-data-rate version of system software and
approved limited use of the FAB-T cryptographic
element in program testing. Program officials
expected to be authorized to test the extended-datarate version of system software around the end of
2010. The NSA is currently scheduled to complete
final certification of this version in March 2013.
However, delays in the maturation of the high-datarate software configuration architecture technology
could affect the certification schedule.
Program Office Comments
The Air Force provided technical comments, which
were incorporated as appropriate.
Other Program Issues
The FAB-T program has recently been restructured
and rebaselined to more fully develop the high-datarate variant and reduce concurrency between testing
and production. The program delayed its scheduled
February 2010 production decision and plans to
extend its development phase. In January 2009, the
contractor delivered the first FAB-T engineering
model. According to program officials, FAB-T
completed all the objectives for developmental flight
testing of the hardware for the low-data-rate system
in August 2009. At that time, program officials
expected the extended or high-data-rate system to
undergo most of its testing concurrently with lowrate production. However, according to the program
Page 68
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: Global Hawk
Global Hawk (RQ-4A/B)
The Air Force’s Global Hawk is a high-altitude, longendurance unmanned aircraft with integrated
sensors and ground stations providing intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. The
Global Hawk will replace the U-2. After a successful
technology demonstration, the system entered
development and limited production in March 2001.
The program includes RQ-4A aircraft similar to the
original demonstrators, as well as larger and more
capable RQ-4Bs. We assessed the RQ-4B, which is
being procured in three blocks.
Source: Northrop Grumman.
System development
Development start /
low-rate decision
(3/01)
Demonstration
program start
(2/94)
Last
procurement
(2018)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 69
Latest
07/2010
$3,948.7
$9,481.6
$13,575.7
$176.307
77
TBD
Percent
change
284.8
122.8
155.5
109.1
22.2
NA
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
lo
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
le
ve
The Global Hawk RQ-4B has mature critical
technologies, a stable design, and proven
production processes, but it remains at risk for
late design changes and costly retrofits. The
completion of operational tests for the aircraft
that make up the largest part of the program has
been delayed nearly 4 years by testing discoveries,
concurrent testing, resource constraints, and
weather problems. The program will have
procured more than half of those aircraft by the
time testing is complete in December 2010. The
program also plans to procure more than half the
aircraft with advanced radar before it completes
operational testing in 2013. The Air Force is taking
steps to address some of the testing delays. In
fiscal year 2010, the Air Force increased the total
number of aircraft to be procured from 54 to 77
and extended planned production through 2018.
As of
03/2001
$1,026.3
$4,255.0
$5,312.4
$84.323
63
55
d
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB,
OH
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,067.5 million
Procurement: $5,339.1 million
Total funding: $6,406.6 million
Procurement quantity: 39
GAO
review
(11/10)
si
re
Program Essentials
Production
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
0
Development
start
(NA)
DOD
design
review
(NA)
Development GAO
start/production review
decision (11/10)
(3/01)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: Global Hawk
Global Hawk Program
Technology Maturity
The critical technologies for the RQ-4B are mature.
However, the program must still successfully test
two key capabilities—the advanced signals
intelligence payload and multiple platform radar—to
ensure they perform as expected. The first flight of
an RQ-4B equipped with the signals intelligence
payload occurred in September 2008 and operational
testing is scheduled to be completed in December
2010. After delays in its development, the first flight
of an RQ-4B equipped with the multiple platform
radar is expected to occur in April 2011.
Development testing is underway.
Design Maturity
The RQ-4B basic airframe design is stable with all of
its expected design drawings released; however, the
program remains at risk for late design changes and
costly retrofits if problems are discovered in testing.
During the first year of production, frequent
substantive engineering changes increased
development and airframe costs and delayed
deliveries and testing. Substantial commonality
between the RQ-4A and RQ-4B had been expected,
but as the designs were finalized and production
geared up, the design differences were much more
extensive and complex than anticipated.
Production Maturity
The manufacturing processes for the RQ-4B
airframe are mature and in statistical control. In
addition, the program reports that it is meeting its
quality goal on the number of nonconforming parts.
The RQ-4B aircraft is being produced in three
configurations. Block 20 aircraft are equipped with
an enhanced imagery intelligence payload; block 30
aircraft have both imagery and signals intelligence
payloads; and block 40 aircraft will have an
advanced radar surveillance capability. All six block
20 aircraft have been produced. Production
continues on block 30 and block 40 aircraft. The first
block 30 aircraft was delivered in November 2007
and the first block 40 aircraft was delivered without
the sensor in November 2009.
found in operational testing, it could result in costly
retrofits for large numbers of aircraft. The Global
Hawk program has continued to experience delays
in developmental and operational testing. The
completion of operational tests for the block 20 and
30 aircraft has been delayed nearly 4 years to
December 2010. The start of operational testing for
block 40 aircraft has been delayed by more than 3
years to March 2013. According to the Global Hawk’s
December 2009 Selected Acquisition Report, several
factors contributed to the most recent schedule
slips, including developmental test discoveries;
concurrent development and production testing;
testing resource constraints; and weather problems.
According to program officials, a shift in focus and
resources required to address a Joint Urgent
Operational Need, using two block 20 aircraft, has
also contributed to block 40 operational test delays.
The Air Force is taking steps to address some of the
testing delays. For example, the program is now
conducting aircraft acceptance tests at Beale Air
Force Base in order to free up resources for
operational testing at Edwards Air Force Base.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air
Force emphasized that the Global Hawk program
has improved program execution while reducing
program risk. The Air Force noted that older RQ-4A
Global Hawk aircraft—which we did not assess—
have been successfully used by the warfighters and
other government agencies to carry out various
missions. The service also noted that each of the
variants of its larger RQ-4B aircraft is now either in
operations or testing. Flight operations of deployed
aircraft and flight testing of the advanced radar
payload are expected to begin in 2011. The Air Force
noted that current challenges facing the program
include initial system deployments and
normalization of operations and sustainment. In
addition to commenting on this assessment, the Air
Force provided technical comments, which we
incorporated where appropriate.
Other Program Issues
The Global Hawk program expects to have procured
all of its block 20 aircarft, and more than half of its
block 30 and block 40 aircraft before operational
testing is complete. As a result, if problems are
Page 70
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: GPS-IIIA
Global Positioning System (GPS) IIIA
The Air Force’s Global Positioning System (GPS) III
program will develop and field a new generation of
satellites to supplement and eventually replace GPS
satellites currently in use. It consists of three
increments: IIIA, IIIB, and IIIC. Other programs will
develop the ground control system and user
equipment. We assessed GPS IIIA, which intends to
provide capabilities such as a stronger military
navigation signal to improve jamming resistance and
a new civilian signal that will be interoperable with
foreign satellite navigation systems.
Source: Lockheed Martin.
Concept
System development
Production
Development
start
(5/08)
Program Essentials
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin
Program office: El Segundo, CA
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,238.6 million
Procurement: $1,409.6 million
Total funding: $2,648.2 million
Total quantity: 8
Design
review
(8/10)
GAO Production
review decision
(11/10) (12/10)
First satellite
available for launch
(5/14)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
As of
05/2008
$2,486.9
$1,396.3
$3,883.1
$485.392
8
NA
Latest
07/2010
$2,615.2
$1,409.6
$4,024.8
$503.099
8
NA
Percent
change
5.2
1.0
3.6
3.6
0.0
NA
We could not calculate acquisition cycle times for GPS IIIA because initial operational capability will
not occur until GPS IIIC satellites are fielded.
Page 71
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
si
re
d
le
ve
lo
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
De
The GPS IIIA program completed its critical
design review in August 2010 with its critical
technologies mature and design stable. The
program plans to prove its production processes
by building and testing a prototype spacecraft
prior to its December 2010 production decision.
This prototype will include almost all satellite
parts excluding redundant units, but will not be
flight-worthy. A complete GPS IIIA satellite will
not be available for testing prior to the production
decision. The GPS IIIA program is using a “backto-basics” approach, which emphasizes best
practices such as maintaining stable requirements
and using mature technologies. The program still
faces risks to delivering and launching satellites as
planned, due to its compressed schedule and
dependence on a separately developed ground
control system being fully functional.
Technology
maturity 96
0
Development
start
(5/08)
DOD
GAO Production
design review decision
review (11/10) (12/10)
(8/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: GPS-IIIA
GPS-IIIA Program
Technology and Design Maturity
The GPS IIIA program’s critical technologies are
mature and its design is stable. The critical
technologies have changed for the GPS IIIA program
as it has developed its design. Prior to contract
award, the program’s five critical technologies were
based on a notional government architecture for the
satellite. According to the program office, the
Lockheed Martin satellite design differs significantly
from this architecture. A postpreliminary design
review technology readiness assessment in 2009
identified seven critical technologies. However, the
number of critical technologies was revised to eight
when the results of that assessment were finalized in
2010. All eight have been demonstrated in a relevant
environment. According to the program office, the
number of critical technologies has been stable as of
the postpreliminary design review assessment. In
addition, the design for GPS IIIA is stable with 98
percent of design drawings releasable at its August
2010 critical design review.
Production Maturity
The GPS IIIA program plans to reduce risk and
prove out its production processes by building and
testing a prototype spacecraft prior to its December
2010 production decision. However, this prototype
will not be production-representative. It will include
almost all satellite parts, excluding redundant units.
According to the program office, it will not be flightworthy because its parts will not go through the
flight screening process. A complete GPS IIIA
satellite will not be available for testing prior to the
production decision. We did not assess production
maturity because the program office does not collect
statistical process control data for its critical
manufacturing processes, but rather uses other
process and technology maturity metrics.
While this approach should enable the GPS III
program to deliver satellites more quickly than the
predecessor GPS program, its schedule is still
aggressive considering the complexities associated
with the integration phase. The Air Force plans to
launch the first GPS IIIA satellite in 2014. This would
require the program to go from contract award to
first launch 3.5 years faster than the GPS IIF.
In addition, the GPS IIIA program could be affected
by the development schedule for the next-generation
GPS ground control system, the OCX, which is being
managed as a separate major defense acquisition
program. Though the GPS IIIA satellites can provide
positioning and timing services without OCX, it is
needed to control other features of the satellites,
such as the enhanced military signal and additional
civil signals. Until OCX is operational, these
additional signals cannot be operated on the GPS
IIIA satellite, and the Air Force is reluctant to launch
the second IIIA satellite before the first one is fully
tested. The Air Force currently plans to deliver GPS
OCX Block I in August 2015—15 months after the
first planned GPS IIIA satellite launch.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, GPS
program officials acknowledged that there is
currently a disconnect between the OCX delivery
schedule and the GPS IIIA launch schedule. As a
result, the program office recently awarded a
contract to the OCX and GPS IIIA contractors to
study possible technical solutions to provide
preliminary ground control capabilities to support
the first GPS IIIA launch. The program expects this
interim system to be delivered in the third quarter of
2013. The program officials believe that this system
will provide the capability to launch and check out
the GPS IIIA vehicle ahead of OCX completion.
Program officials also provided technical comments,
which were incorporated as appropriate.
Other Program Issues
The GPS IIIA program has adopted an acquisition
approach that should increase its chances of
meeting its cost and schedule goals; however, the
program still faces risks that could affect the on-time
delivery and launch of GPS satellites. GPS IIIA is
being managed using a “back-to-basics” approach,
which is designed to maintain stable requirements,
implement an incremental development strategy, use
mature technologies, and provide more oversight
than under the previous GPS satellite program.
Page 72
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: GPS OCX
GPS III OCX Ground Control Segment
The Air Force’s next generation GPS control
segment (OCX) will provide command, control, and
mission support for the GPS Block II and III
satellites. OCX is expected to assure reliable and
secure delivery of position and timing signals to
serve the evolving needs of GPS military and civilian
users. The Air Force plans to develop OCX in four
blocks to deliver upgrades as they become available.
We assessed the first block, which will support the
operations of GPS Block II and Block III satellites.
Source: U.S. Air Force.
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
Design and
technology
192
maturity
Technology
maturity 96
0
Page 73
Percent
change
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
fk
The GPS OCX program is scheduled to enter
development in June 2011 with its 14 critical
technologies nearing maturity. In February 2010,
the Air Force awarded a cost-reimbursement
contract to Raytheon for Blocks I and II of the
OCX program. The GPS OCX program built
prototypes and plans to hold a preliminary design
review in April 2011 prior to entry into engineering
and manufacturing development, as required by
DOD acquisition policy and statute. The GPS OCX
will not be fielded in time for the May 2014 launch
of the first GPS IIIA satellite. As a result, the GPS
Directorate is considering funding a parallel effort
that accelerates existing launch and checkout
requirements to develop a command and control
capability for the first GPS IIIA satellites.
Latest
07/2010
$2,693.1
$22.6
$2,891.3
$1,445.642
2
NA
As of
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
lo
Prime contractor: Raytheon
Program office: El Segundo, CA
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,675.5 million
Procurement: $22.5 million
Total funding: $1,873.6 million
Procurement quantity: 0
Production
decision
(4/15)
Development
start
(6/11)
le
ve
Program Essentials
Preliminary
design review
(4/11)
d
GAO
review
(11/10)
Production
si
re
Program
start
(2/07)
System development
De
Concept
GAO Development
review
start
(11/10)
(6/11)
Not
assessed
Not
assessed
DOD
design
review
(TBD)
Production
decision
(4/15)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: GPS OCX
GPS OCX Program
Technology Maturity
According to program officials, when the GPS OCX
enters development in June 2011, its 14 critical
technologies will be nearing maturity. As part of its
risk-reduction activities, the program selected two
contractors, through a competitive process, to
develop system-level prototypes. It also plans to
hold a preliminary design review in April 2011 prior
to entry into engineering and manufacturing
development, as required by DOD acquisition policy
and statute. In an October 2010 memorandum, the
Director, Defense Research and Engineering, stated
that an independent assessment of the program
found that all but one critical technology had been
demonstrated in a relevant environment. The
technology that had not been demonstrated in a
relevant environment has been deferred to future
OCX blocks. The assessment also found that GPS
OCX will eventually require larger bandwidths, and
questioned whether the backup command and
control site will have the capability to take control of
all the functions managed by the primary site.
Furthermore, the assessment found that the
program did not have a security architecture that
meets all information assurance requirements, and
that the OCX system may not be able to handle large
data sets required to service external users. The
Director recommended that the Air Force conduct a
technology readiness assessment on future OCX
blocks to explain how these and any new
requirements are fully addressed by mature
technologies.
program understood the risks associated with the
development effort before moving forward to the
next phase of the program.
The Air Force plans to deliver GPS OCX Block I in
August 2015—15 months after the first planned GPS
IIIA satellite launch. To address this issue, the GPS
Directorate is considering funding a parallel effort
that accelerates existing launch and checkout
requirements to develop a command and control
capability for the first GPS IIIA satellites. However,
GPS Directorate officials indicated that the effort
would not enable new capabilities offered by GPS
IIIA satellites, including a military signal designed to
enable resistance to jamming and three civil signals.
The program expects to release a request for
proposal for the parallel effort during the first
quarter of fiscal year 2011 and receive the Air
Force’s authority to proceed during the third quarter
of fiscal year 2011.
Program Office Comments
The GPS Directorate provided written technical
comments that were incorporated as appropriate.
Other Program Issues
In February 2010, the Air Force awarded a costreimbursement contract to Raytheon for Block I and
II of the GPS OCX program. According to program
officials, a cost-reimbursement contract was used
because of the high level of risk associated with
developing complex software programs for GPS
OCX.
The GPS OCX program plans to enter engineering
and manufacturing development in June 2011—over
2 years later than initially planned. According to
program officials, this delay was due, in part, to the
need to hold a preliminary design review and report
on its results before the milestone review. In
addition, the GPS Directorate and GPS OCX
program manager wanted to make sure that the
Page 74
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: Gray Eagle
Gray Eagle
The Army’s Gray Eagle, formerly known as ER/MP,
will perform reconnaissance, surveillance, target
acquisition, and attack missions. It will operate
either alone or with other platforms such as the
Longbow Apache helicopter. Each system includes
12 aircraft as well as ground control stations, ground
and air data terminals, automatic takeoff and
landing systems, and ground support equipment.
The program consists of Block 1 systems and two
less-capable Quick Reaction Capability systems. We
assessed the Block 1 configuration.
Source: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc.
Concept
System development
Program/development
start
(4/05)
Program Essentials
Prime contractor: General Atomics
Program office: Huntsville, AL
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $246.0 million
Procurement: $2,285.1 million
Total funding: $3,374.3 million
Procurement quantity: 10
Production
Design
review
(11/06)
Low-rate
decision
(2/10)
GAO
review
(11/10)
Initial
Full
capability capability
(7/12)
(8/12)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
As of
04/2005
$339.8
$660.5
$1,000.2
$200.046
5
50
Latest
09/2010
$875.3
$2,965.8
$4,844.0
$372.613
13
87
Percent
change
157.6
349.0
384.3
86.3
160.0
74.0
As of December 2010, DOD had not yet approved a new cost and schedule baseline for the program.
Page 75
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
si
re
d
le
ve
lo
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
De
The Gray Eagle entered production in February
2010 without having all of its critical technologies
mature. The program office reported that the
system’s design is stable and its production
processes are proven, but the program remains at
risk for late and costly design and manufacturing
changes during production until its critical
technologies have been fully integrated and
tested. A January 2010 risk review board identified
risks related to areas including software, engine
availability, and supplier capacity. The Army has
identified operational availability and reliability as
a risk after limited user testing showed that the
system could not meet its key performance
parameter for that area. The Army has plans in
place to mitigate these risks and will undertake
various risk-reduction activities leading up to the
system’s entry into initial operational test and
evaluation in 2011.
Technology
maturity 96
0
Development
start
(4/05)
DOD
design
review
(11/06)
Production GAO
decision review
(2/10)
(11/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: Gray Eagle
Gray Eagle Program
Technology Maturity
The Gray Eagle entered production in February 2010
without all its critical technologies mature, as
recommended in DOD’s Technology Readiness
Assessment Deskbook. Two technologies—the
heavy fuel engine and deicing—have been assessed
as mature. The other three technologies—the
automatic takeoff and landing system, tactical
common data link, and manned-unmanned
teaming—are nearing maturity.
Prior to 2010, the program office had reported that
all its critical technologies would be mature at
production. However, an independent technology
readiness assessment by the Office of the Director,
Defense Research and Engineering, reached a
different conclusion on both the identification and
maturity level of the program’s critical technologies.
This assessment resulted in the Army dropping one
critical technology, adding two newly identified
technologies, and downgrading the maturity level of
three technologies. According to the program office,
the maturity levels were downgraded because the
program office had previously assessed the
technologies alone, whereas the independent
assessment considered their maturity when
integrated with Gray Eagle. For example, the
program office had assessed the automatic takeoff
and landing system as mature because the same
technology is used on the already-fielded Shadow
unmanned aircraft system, but the independent
assessors rated it as nearing maturity because the
system had not yet been fully integrated into the
Gray Eagle and tested in an operational
environment.
Design Maturity
While the program office indicated that the Gray
Eagle design is stable, the program remains at risk
for late and costly design and manufacturing
changes during production until its critical
technologies have been fully integrated and tested.
Despite this risk, the Army plans to proceed with
production. In 2009, the Army’s Aviation and Missile
Research, Development, and Engineering Center
independently assessed the program’s production
readiness and concluded that the design of the
system was mature and stable enough such that
potential design changes would not present a
significant risk to the program during low-rate initial
production.
Page 76
Production Maturity
According to an independent Army assessment of
the program’s production readiness, for critical or
major suppliers, its manufacturing process maturity
was satisfactory and manufacturing infrastructure
met or exceeded requirements for low-rate initial
production. However, in January 2010, an Army
review board noted production risks associated with
the tactical common data link subcontractor’s
capacity to produce, provide spares for, and repair
that component as needed to meet program
schedule. In addition, it identified issues with
software development and engine availability
resulting from issues with financial stability of the
engine supplier. According to the program office, the
data link production capacity issue has been largely
mitigated and the prime contractor has qualified a
second engine supplier.
Other Program Issues
In October 2010, the Army identified operational
availability and reliability as a risk after limited user
testing showed that the system could not meet its
key performance parameter for that area. The Army
plans to undertake risk-reduction activities leading
up to the system’s initial operational test and
evaluation in 2011.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of the assessment, the
program office indicated that the DOD Technology
Readiness Assessment Deskbook discourages the
practice of evaluating technology readiness based
on degree of integration. The program also believes
that our product knowledge graph did not accurately
capture the Gray Eagle’s production maturity
because there are more methods to assess maturity
than the critical processes assessment we used. The
program did not detail the methods it believed
applicable. Finally, the program stated that all riskmitigation plans were on schedule as of January
2011. The program also provided technical
corrections, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
GAO Response
According to the DOD deskbook, technologies
should be at technology readiness level (TRL) 7 or
higher at production start. To achieve TRL 7, a
program should demonstrate a system prototype in
an operational environment, which would require
them to be integrated in the system.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: Increment 1 E-IBCT
Increment 1 Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT)
The Army’s E-IBCT program will augment brigadelevel capabilities through an incremental, expedited
fielding of systems to current forces. The first
increment, scheduled for fielding in late 2011,
includes unattended sensors, unmanned ground and
air vehicles, and new radios and battle command
software. Increment 1 evolved from Army efforts to
quickly equip current forces with the more mature
capabilities from the now terminated Future Combat
System program. The Army anticipates at least one
follow-on increment.
Source: U.S. Army.
System development
Low-rate
decision
(10/09)
(12/09)
Limited GAO
user
review
test
(9/10) (11/10)
Initial
Full-rate
Last
capability production procurement
(9/11)
(12/11)
(08/13)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 77
Latest
08/2010
$595.9
$2,661.7
$3,257.6
$361.956
9
27
Percent
change
1.0
2.6
2.3
2.3
0.0
0.0
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
lo
E-IBCT Increment 1 was approved for production
in December 2009, even though an independent
review team later found that none of its critical
technologies were mature, and the program was
still making design changes to address reliability
issues identified in testing. Since that time, the
Army has worked to improve performance and
reliability of the E-IBCT systems. According to the
Army, all current Increment 1 critical technologies
are mature and its systems’ designs are stable. The
results of an updated independent technology
assessment were not available at the time of our
review. In addition, the Army was unable to
provide production data from the contractor. The
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics was scheduled to review
the program in December 2010 to determine
whether to proceed with the production of the
next two sets of systems.
As of
02/2010
$590.0
$2,594.2
$3,184.2
$353.801
9
27
le
ve
Prime contractor: Boeing
Program office: Warren, MI
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $112.9 million
Procurement: $2,182.6 million
Total funding: $2,295.5 million
Procurement quantity: 8
Design
review
d
Program Essentials
Limited
user
test
(9/09)
si
re
Program /
development
start
(7/04)
Production
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
0
Development
start
(NA)
DOD
design
review
(10/09)
Production GAO
decision review
(12/09) (11/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: Increment 1 E-IBCT
Increment 1 E-IBCT Program
Technology Maturity
According to the Army, all current E-IBCT Increment
1 critical technologies are mature, although
independent reviewers disagree. Prior to the
December 2009 production decision, the Army
reported that 9 out of 10 critical technologies were
mature. However, a March 2010 independent
assessment reported that none of the critical
technologies were mature and only two technologies
were nearing maturity. The assessment found that
the Army had not demonstrated two key radio
technologies under the expected operational
conditions or at the required range. It also found that
other technologies displayed erratic performance,
experienced excessive reboots, or were relatively
primitive with regard to efficiency and robustness.
According to Army officials, a September 2010
limited user test planned to demonstrate the
improved maturity of these technologies. To support
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics’ December 2010 review of
the program, the Director, Defense Research and
Engineering, planned to complete an updated
independent technology assessment. The results of
that assessment were not available at the time of our
review.
Design Maturity
According to the Army, the designs of the E-ICBT
Increment 1 systems are stable with 93 percent of
the total expected design drawings releasable to
manufacturing. These designs were not stable when
the program received approval to enter production
in December 2009. The program has made 86 design
changes since then to address performance and
reliability issues. These design changes were
incorporated into the equipment that was used in a
September 2010 limited user test and into the
systems’ production configuration.
Production Maturity
We did not assess production maturity because the
Army was unable to provide statistical process
control data on critical manufacturing processes.
However, Army documents indicate that the systems
have achieved an engineering manufacturing
readiness level of 3, which demonstrates readiness
for low-rate production.
Page 78
Other Program Issues
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics was scheduled to review
the program in December 2010 to consider the
systems’ readiness for further testing and fielding,
whether to proceed with additional production, and
the direction for the remainder of the program. The
review was to be based on the Army’s progress
improving the systems’ reliability and network
performance during the September 2010 limited user
test.
During tests leading up to the September 2010
limited user test, the Army reported that only one
system failed to meet its reliability requirement for
entrance into the limited user test. However, an
Army assessment of the 2010 limited user test
reported that only three of the five systems met or
exceeded reliability requirements. Although
reliability did improve since the 2009 limited user
test, the systems were collectively assessed as not
providing force effectiveness at the system of
systems level and, with the exception of the small
unmanned ground vehicle, provided minimal
military utility.
Program Office Comments
According to the program office, in 2009, significant
concerns were raised regarding the reliability of
Increment 1 systems and network maturity. Testing
conducted in 2010 demonstrated significant
reliability improvements with all systems (less the
unmanned aerial system) greatly exceeding their
reliability requirements. Testing also proved
network maturity for the E-IBCT configuration and
the Network Integration Kit was determined to be a
key command and control enabler. The Training and
Doctrine Command identified two key issues with
the Network Integration Kit, and the program
manager has already implemented and
demonstrated fixes. The Training and Doctrine
Command has voiced strong support for the
Network Integration Kit and Small Unmanned
Ground Vehicle. On the basis of a December 2010
Army Configuration Steering Board and a pending
Defense Acquisition Board, a descoping of systems
and quantities is expected. Cost and quantity
information for the anticipated changes are
predecisional and were not made available for this
report. The Army provided additional technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: Scorpion
Intelligent Munitions System-Scorpion
The Army’s Intelligent Munitions System-Scorpion is
a remotely controlled, antivehicular landmine
alternative system. The Scorpion includes an
integrated system of lethal and nonlethal munitions,
sensors, software, and communications that detects,
tracks, classifies, reports, engages, and kills light
wheeled through heavy tracked vehicles. As part of
the Army’s capability portfolio review, it was
determined that the Scorpion is no longer
affordable. Program closeout was approved by a
configuration steering board in October 2010.
Source: U.S. Army.
System development
Low-rate
decision
(12/11)
Initial operational
capability
(9/13)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 79
Percent
change
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
lo
The Scorpion program’s critical technologies are
mature and its design is stable. The program
initially planned to use the Joint Tactical Radio
System, but has switched to the more mature
Spider radio. While the Scorpion’s design was not
stable at its April 2009 design review, over 90
percent of its design drawings are now releasable
and its critical software functionality has been
tested. The program will conduct a series of
production readiness reviews as it prepares for its
December 2011 production decision. In addition,
the program is already producing test hardware on
the production floor using production processes,
personnel, and tooling. Originally part of the
Future Combat System, the program was
established as a stand-alone program in January
2007. The separation caused cost growth which
led to the program being designated a major
defense acquisition program in February 2010.
Latest
11/2010
$487.3
$870.5
$1,685.2
$.642
2,624
89
As of
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
le
ve
Prime contractor: Textron Defense
Systems
Program office: Picatinny Arsenal, NJ
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $78.7 million
Procurement: $870.0 million
Total funding: $1,275.9 million
Procurement quantity: 2,624
GAO
review
(11/10)
d
Program Essentials
Critical
design review
(4/09)
si
re
Development
start
(5/06)
Production
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
0
Development
start
(5/06)
DOD GAO Production
design review decision
review (11/10) (12/11)
(4/09)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: Scorpion
Scorpion Program
Technology Maturity
All four of the Scorpion’s critical technologies—the
control station computing unit, situational
awareness, antivehicle effects, and communications
through Spider radio—are mature. When the
program began development in 2006, its critical
technologies included the Joint Tactical Radio
System (JTRS) Cluster 5 radio and the JTRS
Network Enterprise Domain soldier radio waveform.
As a result of differences between the Scorpion and
JTRS development schedules, the program switched
to the mature Spider radio.
Design Maturity
The Scorpion’s design has stabilized since its April
2009 design review when only 61 percent of its total
expected drawings were releasable. Over 90 percent
of its design drawings are now releasable and its
safety-critical and major software functionality has
been tested. While risk-reduction tests completed in
November 2009 have demonstrated the capability of
the system’s design utilizing productionrepresentative hardware, the system’s poor
performance against heavy tracked vehicles and
another required target is a design concern.
According to the program’s January 2010 post–
critical design review assessment, the Army needs to
make a decision on the importance of this
requirement because the program is utilizing
resources to try to meet it and it could affect the
system’s overall performance. In addition, the
assessment identified system reliability and an
aggressive program schedule as challenges.
Production Maturity
We could not assess production maturity because
the program does not collect statistical process
control data on its critical manufacturing processes;
however, the program has taken a number of steps
to prepare for its planned December 2011
production decision. The program has identified its
critical manufacturing processes and key product
characteristics and uses yield and defect data and
defect management to track them. According to the
program office, the contractor began identifying and
developing custom tooling and test equipment that
would be required for production shortly after
development start. Production processes and tooling
were refined during this period and utilized in the
next phase wherein operations personnel built
Page 80
hardware with engineering oversight. All Scorpion
hardware delivered for qualification testing has been
produced on the production floor, using production
processes, personnel, tooling, and special test
equipment. The program will also conduct a series
of production readiness reviews to support the
transition to production.
Other Program Issues
The Scorpion began development as part of the
Future Combat System (FCS) program in 2006. It
supports the National Landmine Policy announced
in February 2004, which stated the United States
would no longer use non-self-destructing antivehicle
and antipersonnel landmines after December 31,
2010. In January 2007, the Army separated the
Scorpion program from the FCS. In February 2010,
due to development cost growth, which was
attributed to negative effects from the separation
and technical issues during development, the
Scorpion program was designated as a major
defense acquisition program.
As part of the Army’s capability portfolio reviews, it
was determined that the Scorpion is no longer
affordable and that the Army is willing to accept the
operational risk of not fielding this capability.
However, some of this technology will roll into the
Spider program. The decision to conduct an orderly
closeout was approved by a configuration steering
board in October 2010 and the official acquisition
decision memorandum is pending.
Program Office Comments
The Scorpion program was developed to avoid a
capability gap associated with the National
Landmine Policy and field a capability prior to
December 31, 2010. Due to this pressure, the
program was initially schedule driven. Following the
critical design review, the program plan was updated
to reflect an event driven schedule. Following the
risk-reduction testing in November 2009, design
changes and modifications to the requirement
improved performance against the heavy tracked
vehicles, and changes to the tactics, techniques, and
procedures by the engineer school resulted in
improved performance against lightwheeled
vehicles. These enhancements were demonstrated
during conduct of development and live fire testing
in September 2010. Program officials also provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: JAGM
Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM)
The Joint Air-to-Ground Missile is a joint Army/Navy
program with Marine Corps participation. The
missile will be air-launched from helicopters and
fixed-wing aircraft and designed to target tanks;
light armored vehicles; missile launchers; command,
control, and communications vehicles; bunkers; and
buildings. It is to provide line-of-sight and beyond
line-of sight capabilities and can be employed in a
fire-and-forget mode or a precision attack mode. The
missile will replace Hellfire, Maverick, and airlaunched TOW.
Source: Department of Defense.
Concept
Production
start
(TBD)
Critical
design review
(TBD)
Initial operational
capability
(TBD)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 81
Percent
change
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
lo
According to the program office, the three JAGM
critical technologies are expected to be nearing
maturity and demonstrated in a relevant
environment before a decision is made to enter
development. However, an independent
technology readiness assessment identified five
critical technologies, at least one of which has not
reached this level of maturity. The program office
has incorporated a provision in the draft request
for proposal for the development contract that
may mitigate some of the technology risk by
requiring both contractors to submit two rocket
motor designs. According to program officials, the
release of the request for proposal has been
delayed until the third quarter of fiscal year 2011
because the program’s acquisition strategy and
requirements needed to be updated to reflect the
cancellation of the Armed Reconnaissance
Helicopter and new guidance on affordability.
Latest
07/2010
$1,650.8
$5,202.1
$6,852.9
$.202
33,853
69
As of
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
le
ve
Prime contractor: TBD
Program office: Warren, MI
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,206.9 million
Procurement: $5,202.1 million
Total funding: $6,409.0 million
Procurement quantity: 33,853
GAO Development
start
review
(TBD)
(11/10)
d
Program Essentials
Prototype
missile tests
(9/10)
si
re
Preliminary
design review
(6/10)
Production
De
Technology
development start
(9/08)
System development
Technology
maturity 96
0
GAO Development
review
start
(11/10)
(TBD)
Not
assessed
Not
assessed
DOD
design
review
(TBD)
Production
decision
(TBD)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: JAGM
JAGM Program
Technology Maturity
According to the program office, the three JAGM
critical technologies are expected to be nearing
maturity and demonstrated in a relevant
environment before a decision is made to start
system development. The critical technologies
include a multimode seeker for increased
countermeasure resistance, boost-sustain
propulsion for increased standoff range, and a
multipurpose warhead for increased lethality.
However, an independent technology readiness
assessment identified five critical technologies, at
least one of which has not reached this level of
maturity. The program office has incorporated a
provision in the draft request for proposal for the
engineering and manufacturing development
contract that may mitigate some of the technology
risk by requiring both contractors to submit two
rocket motor designs.
engineering and manufacturing development
contract between the two technology development
contractors.
The Army and the Navy will continue to rely on
Hellfire and Maverick missiles until JAGM is fielded.
The Army will continue to extend the fielding of
Hellfire to meet the needs of the warfighter, while
the Navy will rely on both Maverick and Hellfire
until JAGM becomes available.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the
program office stated that due to the delay in the
signing of the JAGM acquisition strategy, key dates
in the development phase have the potential to be
delayed.
Other Program Issues
In September 2008, the Army awarded two fixedprice incentive contracts to Raytheon and Lockheed
Martin for a 27-month JAGM technology
development phase. During technology
development, each contractor completed three tests
using prototype missiles in order for the program to
assess the technical risks of proceeding to the next
phase of development. In addition to testing
prototypes, each contractor completed a preliminary
design review. According to program officials, a
post–preliminary design review assessment should
be complete by December 2010.
The JAGM program planned to receive approval to
enter system development in November 2010 and
award an engineering and manufacturing
development contract in December 2010. However,
the release of the request for proposal for this
contract has been delayed because the program’s
acquisition strategy and requirements needed to be
updated to reflect the cancellation of the Armed
Reconnaissance Helicopter, the addition of the 
OH-58 Kiowa as a replacement platform, and new
guidance on affordability. According to program
officials, contract award is now expected no earlier
than the third quarter of fiscal year 2011. The JAGM
program office has requested a justification and
approval for a limited competition for the
Page 82
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: JASSM
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM)
The Air Force’s JASSM program is intended to field a
next-generation air-to-ground cruise missile capable
of stealthy flight and reliable performance at
affordable costs. It is designed to destroy enemy
targets from outside the range of air defenses. The
Air Force is currently producing a baseline JASSM
and is developing an extended range version—
JASSM-ER—that will more than double the range of
the baseline version. The two variants are 70 percent
common in hardware and 95 percent common in
software. We assessed the JASSM-ER variant.
Source: U.S. Air Force.
Concept
Program
start
(6/96)
System development
JASSM
development
start
(11/98)
Program Essentials
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin
Program office: Eglin AFB, FL
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $84.4 million
Procurement: $4,736.2 million
Total funding: $4,820.7 million
Procurement quantity: 3,747
ER
development
start
(6/03)
Production
ER
low-rate
decision
(11/10) (12/10)
GAO
review
ER
ER
full-rate
initial
decision capability
(6/13)
(TBD)
ER last
procurement
(2025)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
As of
11/1998
$1,004.7
$1,252.9
$2,281.6
$.924
2,469
75
Latest
06/2010
$1,462.3
$5,738.7
$7,201.0
$1.435
5,018
87
Percent
change
45.5
358.0
215.6
55.3
103.2
16.0
Latest costs include funding for both JASSM and JASSM-ER. According to program officials, JASSMER does not have an approved program baseline separating its costs from the baseline program, but
is completing one for the upcoming production decision.
Page 83
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
si
re
d
le
ve
lo
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
De
According to the program office, the JASSM-ER
plans to enter production in December 2010 with
all of its critical technologies and manufacturing
processes mature. We did not assess the design
stability of the JASSM-ER because the program
office does not collect design drawing data.
However, the JASSM-ER design has been
demonstrated to perform as intended. It has been
successful in 10 out of 11 flight tests. The program
plans to perform additional tests in order to
demonstrate that it meets its reliability
requirement. As part of the upcoming production
decision, the program has assessed its
manufacturing readiness and proven out
manufacturing and quality processes in a pilot-line
environment. The cost of the JASSM-ER could be
higher than predicted because prior cost estimates
were overly optimistic and flight tests will be
needed to achieve its reliability requirement.
Technology
maturity 96
0
Development
start
(6/03)
DOD
GAO Production
design review decision
review (11/10) (12/10)
(10/05)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: JASSM
JASSM Program
Technology Maturity
An independent review panel recently assessed all
five JASSM-ER critical technologies as mature. The
five technologies are the engine system, engine lube
system, fuse, low-observable features, and global
positioning system. This assessment was conducted
to support the upcoming JASSM-ER production
decision.
Design Maturity
According to the program office, the JASSM-ER
design is stable. The design has been demonstrated
to perform as intended and the missile has been
successful in 10 out of 11 flight tests. However, we
did not specifically assess design stability because
the JASSM-ER program office does not track the
number of design drawings. According to the
program office, under the total system performance
responsibility arrangement that was in place when
the program was initiated, all design drawings were
developed and managed by the contractor. The Air
Force has since sought more control over the design
of the missile. It now has approval authority over
major configuration changes, as well as approval
authority over configuration changes that that may
increase cost, require retrofit, or affect safety for
missiles currently in production.
Production Maturity
According to a program official, the JASSM-ER plans
to enter production in December 2010 with all of its
manufacturing processes mature. The Air Force
recently assessed JASSM-ER at a manufacturing
readiness level 8, meaning, among other things, that
its technologies are mature, manufacturing and
quality processes and procedures have been proven
in a pilot-line environment, and it is ready to enter
into low-rate production. In addition, the JASSM-ER
missiles are being produced on the same production
line as the JASSM baseline, and the two missiles are
70 percent common in hardware and 95 percent
common in software.
(combined JASSM and JASSM-ER production rate),
which has not been achieved since 2005. Not
producing at the expected rate has led to a less
efficient production process and a longer production
period, both of which increase costs. Further,
Lockheed Martin officials stated that low production
rates could cause skilled labor to look elsewhere for
work and JASSM reliability could be adversely
affected. In addition, according to the Air Force, as
many as 20 flight tests may be needed to fully
demonstrate JASSM-ER’s reliability goal of 85
percent. These flight tests could cost as much as 
$70 million.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the
JASSM program office noted the reliability concerns
have been alleviated by successful tests of JASSMER (10 of 11, completed November 2010) and Lot 7
JASSM baseline (15 of 16, completed October 2009).
Additional flight tests beyond the budgeted
operational test and reliability assessment programs
are not required to achieve the reliability
requirement of 85 percent following JASSM-ER Lot
4. In fact, JASSM-ER is currently at 87 percent at the
conclusion of developmental tests. The risk for
higher JASSM-ER costs stems from unforeseen
budget cuts that reduce production quantities and
drive up unit price. Additionally, the JASSM-ER
design is stable as evidenced by the last five flight
tests flown with the current production
configuration, and the program’s successful
completion of a production readiness review. The
JASSM program also provided technical comments,
which were incorporated where appropriate.
Other Program Issues
The cost of the JASSM-ER program could be higher
than predicted. First, lower than projected annual
procurement levels could increase production costs.
The Air Force’s current cost estimate for the JASSM
program may be overly optimistic since it is based
on a production rate of 280 missiles per year
Page 84
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: JHSV
Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV)
The JHSV is a joint Army and Navy program to
acquire a high-speed, shallow-draft vessel for rapid
intratheater transport of combat-ready units. The
ship will be capable of operating without reliance on
shore based infrastructure. The program intends to
produce a total of 18 ships, 13 for the Navy, and 5 for
the Army. DOD authorized construction of the lead
ship in December 2009. It is expected to be delivered
in November 2011.
Source: Austal USA.
Initial
Second ship
capability
delivery
(12/12)
(1/13)
Last ship
delivery
(1/17)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 85
Latest
07/2010
$125.7
$3,543.4
$3,669.1
$203.836
18
50
Percent
change
-0.7
2.5
2.4
2.4
0.0
4.2
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
Design and
technology
192
maturity
fk
The JHSV program entered production in
December 2009 with its critical technologies
mature, but without a complete three dimensional
design. Nine of the ship’s 46 design zones were
complete in the three-dimensional model when
construction began. According to the Navy’s own
measure of design maturity—which takes into
account other design metrics such as
completeness of two-dimensional design drawings
and engineering reviews, as well as the threedimensional model—the design was at least 85
percent complete. Program officials state that the
three-dimensional model was completed in
September 2010. As of October 2010, 33 modules
were in production utilizing instructions derived
from the model. Prior to starting production, DOD
agreed to reduce the JHSV’s required transit
speed, in order to avoid the need for a significant
redesign that could have affected the program’s
cost and schedule.
As of
02/2009
$126.5
$3,456.0
$3,582.5
$199.028
18
48
lo
Prime contractor: Austal, USA
Program office: Washington, DC
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $18.8 million
Procurement: $2,593.2 million
Total funding: $2,612.0 million
Procurement quantity: 13
Lead-ship
delivery
(11/11)
le
ve
Program Essentials
Lead-ship
GAO
fabrication start review
(12/09)
(11/10)
d
Contract
award
(11/08)
si
re
Program
start
(4/06)
System development Production
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
0
Contract
award
(11/08)
Lead ship
fabrication
(12/09)
GAO
review
(11/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: JHSV
JHSV Program
Technology and Design Maturity
The JHSV program awarded its detailed design and
construction contract in November 2008 with 17 of
its 18 critical technologies mature and demonstrated
in a realistic environment. Before production began
in December 2009, the program was required to
demonstrate that all technologies were mature.
In December 2009, DOD authorized the Navy to
begin construction of the lead ship without a
complete three-dimensional design. According to
program officials, 9 of the ship’s 46 threedimensional design zones were complete at the start
of construction. An additional 14 design zones were
nearing completion. According to program officials,
construction start was delayed 34 days to complete
product modeling for the JHSV’s most complex
areas, such as the ship’s machinery rooms. This level
of design maturity falls short of GAO’s
recommended shipbuilding best practices, which
call for achieving a complete and stable threedimensional product model before construction
begins. The program office believes that the
completion of the model prior to construction start
was less critical for JHSV because it is not as
complex as other Navy ships, such as the DDG 1000.
According to the Navy’s own measure of design
maturity—which includes the completion of twodimensional design drawings and engineering
reviews as well as the three-dimensional model—the
design was at least 85 percent complete. According
to program officials, the three-dimensional model
was completed in September 2010.
Production Maturity
Prior to the start of production, the JHSV program
was required to demonstrate that its manufacturing
processes were in control. The program conducted
two pilot production phases and built a pilot module
in the shipbuilder’s new module manufacturing
facility. According to program officials, production
will be monitored through the use of earned value
management data to track the cost of the work
performed, and through reviews and inspections
performed by the American Bureau of Shipbuilding
and the Navy’s Supervisor of Shipbuilding. As of
October 2010, the program office reported that 33 of
the ship’s modules were in production.
Page 86
Other Program Issues
DOD chose the JHSV to participate in the capital
budget account pilot program, which was created to
control cost growth by providing stable funding.
Under this initiative, the program office must gain
approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics, and the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) for
changes in funding or requirements. Program
officials stated that this is useful as it allows them to
stabilize their requirements and the flow of work to
the shipyard. Funding for 10 of the program’s 18
ships is currently guaranteed.
Prior to starting production, DOD agreed to reduce
the JHSV’s required transit speed, to avoid design
changes that could have affected the program’s cost
and schedule. Previously JHSV had been required to
have a transit range of 4,700 nautical miles traveling
at a speed of 25 knots. According to program
officials, transiting at this speed requires additional
amounts of fuel that would have triggered the need
for a significant redesign, cost increases, and
schedule delays. As a part of a configuration steering
board meeting, officials from the JHSV Navy
requirements office, Joint Staff, and DOD agreed
that the speed could be reduced to 23 knots to
preserve the current design and schedule with
minimal effect on meeting mission needs.
Program Office Comments
The program office did not concur with our findings
related to design maturity. As certified by Navy and
Defense Department officials, per Public Law 110181, greater than 85 percent of the design was
completed prior to construction start by the Navy’s
measure of design maturity. In addition, the threedimensional model was completed prior to the start
of fabrication of the future USS Vigilant, the first
JHSV, on September 13, 2010. Significant production
and financial risk has been avoided by using proven
commercial production design and technology,
ensuring stable requirements, minimizing change,
and through the ruthless pursuit of cost reduction
and efficiency.
GAO Response
Our findings on the design maturity of the JHSV are
based on metrics determined by previous audits of
Navy shipbuilding programs and commercial best
practices.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: JLENS
Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS)
The Army’s JLENS will provide over-the-horizon
detection and tracking of land-attack cruise missiles
and other targets. The Army is developing JLENS in
two spirals. Spiral 1 is complete and served as a test
bed to demonstrate the concept. Spiral 2 will utilize
two aerostats with advanced sensors for
surveillance and tracking, as well as mobile mooring
stations, communication payloads, and processing
stations. JLENS will provide surveillance and
engagement support to other systems, such as 
PAC-3, SM-6, and MEADS. We assessed Spiral 2.
Source: U.S. Army.
System development
Low-rate
decision
(3/12)
Initial
capability
(9/13)
Full-rate
decision
(11/14)
Last
procurement
(2020)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 87
Latest
12/2009
$2,154.7
$5,041.9
$7,378.0
$461.122
16
97
Percent
change
9.1
11.5
12.4
12.4
0.0
0.0
Attainment of Product Knowledge
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
no
w
le
dg
e
Projection
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
lo
According to program officials, JLENS will enter
production with mature technologies, a stable
design, and proven production processes. The
program began development in 2005 with only one
of its five critical technologies mature, and only
two of the four current critical technologies are
mature. The design appears stable, but the
potential for design changes remains until the
maturity of JLENS components have been
demonstrated. In September 2010, an aerostat
accident resulted in the loss of one of the JLENS
platforms. This accident and other system
integration challenges are expected to delay
several key program events, including the
production decision. Twelve of the program’s 15
critical manufacturing processes are currently in
control. The JLENS program has also completed a
number of key production planning activities,
such as assessing supplier capabilities and risks.
As of
08/2005
$1,975.5
$4,520.7
$6,566.9
$410.432
16
97
le
ve
Prime contractor: Raytheon
Program office: Redstone Arsenal, AL
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $649.1 million
Procurement: $5,041.9 million
Total funding: $5,852.8 million
Procurement quantity: 14
GAO
review
(11/10)
d
Program Essentials
Design
review
(12/08)
si
re
Development
start
(8/05)
Production
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
0
Development
start
(8/05)
DOD GAO Production
design review decision
review (11/10) (3/12)
(12/08)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: JLENS
JLENS Program
Technology Maturity
JLENS entered system development in August 2005
with only one of its five critical technologies mature.
The program subsequently combined two of the
critical technologies—the communications payload
and the processing group—into the communications
processing group. The communications processing
group and platform are currently mature. The
program expects to demonstrate the fire control
radar and surveillance radar in a realistic
environment before the program enters production.
Many of the JLENS radar technologies have legacy
components. However, sensor software items
related to signal processing, timing, and control, as
well as element measurement, are not yet mature.
The program office has successfully conducted tests
of the fire control radar antenna, but the integration
of both the fire control radar and surveillance radar
components in the program’s system integration
laboratory has yet to occur.
Design Maturity
The JLENS design appears stable, but the potential
for design changes will remain until key JLENS
components have been integrated and tested. For
example, a first flight demonstration of the aerostat
was successfully conducted in August 2009, but the
program must still complete a series of tests
integrating the JLENS mobile mooring station with
the aerostat. In September 2010, the program
experienced the loss of a platform following an
aerostat accident. The program is analyzing the
cause of the accident, as well as other system
integration issues. The JLENS program has received
approval to transport the mobile mooring station
without armor, which mitigates a risk the program
office has identified in the past.
Production Maturity
The JLENS program projects that it will enter
production with all 15 of its critical manufacturing
processes mature and stable. According to the
program office, 12 of the program’s critical
manufacturing processes are currently in control.
The JLENS program has also completed a number of
key activities that are essential to effective
production management, including updating its
manufacturing plan and addressing areas such as
supplier capabilities and risks, cost, quality control,
materials, producibility, and workforce skills.
Page 88
Other Program Issues
The JLENS program is working to address several
risks that could affect the program’s cost, schedule,
and performance. First, the program received $32
million less than the amount requested in the
President’s fiscal year 2010 budget. If additional
funding is not provided in fiscal year 2012, the
program reports it will not be able to procure the
equipment to field an initial operational capability by
the end of fiscal year 2013. Second, due to the
September 2010 aerostat accident and subsequent
loss of a platform, the program expects several key
events, including the start of production, to be
delayed. Third, if problems occur during systems
integration and verification tests, the program
expects that cost and schedule would be affected.
Fourth, if test site preparations are not complete by
April 2011, then the production timeline could be
jeopardized. Finally, the program could also be
affected by alignment with the Army’s Integrated Air
and Missile Defense program. As part of the
integrated strategy, the Army extended the system
development and demonstration phase by 12
months. The JLENS program is waiting approval of a
new acquisition program baseline with updated cost
and schedule estimates that reflect this change.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the
program stated that the Army is planning to request
funds in its fiscal year 2012 budget to offset the fiscal
year 2010 reduction. The program also reported
experiencing development challenges that have
caused system integration delays, and schedule
challenges due to a September 2010 aerostat
accident. The program office continues to work on a
new acquisition program baseline. A new cost
estimate was presented to the Army Cost Review
Board in July 2009. The estimate will be updated
based on the results of an Army review and
submission of the President’s fiscal year 2012
budget. A revised baseline is expected to be
approved in the third quarter of fiscal year 2011. The
Army provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: JPALS
Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS)
JPALS is a joint Army, Navy, and Air Force program
that will replace the obsolete radar-based SPN-46
and SPN-35 systems. It is a Global Positioning
System/Inertial Navigation System-based system
that will provide a rapidly deployable, adverse
weather, adverse terrain, day-night precision
approach and landing capability for all DOD ground
and airborne systems. Increment 1A is a Navy-led
sea-based ship system, and increment 1B will
integrate JPALS with sea-based aircraft. We assessed
increment 1A.
Source: Department of Defense.
System development
Production
decision
Initial
capability
Full-rate
decision
(2/13)
(12/14)
(6/15)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 89
Latest
07/2010
$750.3
$219.0
$976.2
$26.384
37
77
Percent
change
-3.8
4.2
-2.1
-2.1
0.0
2.7
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
Design and
technology
192
maturity
fk
JPALS began system development in July 2008
with both of its critical technologies nearing
maturity. JPALS is primarily a software
development effort but also includes commercial
hardware components. The hardware design is
stable and program officials accepted the system’s
drawings in preparation for the December 2010
critical design review. However, design stability
has been affected by requirements changes. As of
January 2011, there were 387 requirements in the
system performance specification—an increase of
33 since the start of development. Officials also
report ship integration challenges on CVN 78 may
require changing the antenna placement to
accommodate performance and maintenance
requirements. The program plans to enter
production in 2013. Increment 1B will begin
development in 2012 and integrate the system with
the avionics of the F/A-18E/F, EA-18G, and 
MH-60R/S.
As of
07/2008
$780.2
$210.1
$997.1
$26.950
37
75
lo
Prime contractor: Raytheon
Program office: Lexington Park, MD
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $305.2 million
Procurement: $219.2 million
Total funding: $524.4 million
Procurement quantity: 26
(11/10)
Critical
design
review
(12/10)
le
ve
Program Essentials
GAO
review
d
(7/08)
Preliminary
design
review
(12/09)
si
re
Development
start
Production
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
Projection
Not
assessed
0
Development GAO DOD
start
review design
(7/08)
(11/10) review
(12/10)
Production
decision
(2/13)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: JPALS
JPALS Program
Technology Maturity
The JPALS program began development in July 2008
with two critical technologies—the geometry extra
redundant almost fixed solution and the vertical
protection level / lateral protection level—nearing
maturity. Program officials expect both critical
technologies to be mature and demonstrated in a
realistic environment by the JPALS production
decision in 2013. While JPALS utilizes existing
commercial components for most of its hardware,
its functionality will be enabled by over 700,000 lines
of software code. The program plans to rely heavily
on reused code with 77 percent of the program’s
total lines of code expected to be reused. If less
software is reused than originally estimated, the
potential consequences are longer development time
and greater cost.
Design Maturity
JPALS is primarily a software development effort,
but also includes commercial hardware
components. The hardware design is stable with 96
percent of the total expected design drawings
released to manufacturing. The drawings cover the
JPALS ship system-radio, antenna, receiver, racks,
and console. The program also tracks requirement
changes to monitor design stability. As of January
2011, there were 387 requirements in the system
performance specification—an increase of 33 since
the start of development. These changes are due to
system design gaps uncovered for L-class ships, the
Joint Strike Fighter, and legacy landing systems and
updated maintenance requirements. According to
program officials, detailed software requirements
are stable and proceeding according to schedule to
support software development. The first of seven
software blocks is complete and blocks 2 and 3 are
on schedule.
Production Maturity
Program officials plan to employ various techniques
to assess production maturity, including tool design,
fabrication metrics, and quarterly production
readiness reviews. The program will build eight
engineering development models to be installed on
aircraft carriers and sent to test facilities to
demonstrate system performance. These models are
expected to be delivered in fiscal years 2011 through
2012. The program plans to enter production in
February 2013.
Page 90
Other Program Issues
According to program officials, several ship
integration challenges are being addressed.
Specifically, the current JPALS antenna location for
the JPALS system on CVN 78 affects the program’s
ability to meet performance and maintenance
requirements. Trade studies are investigating several
potential antenna location changes to determine the
optimal position for it. The cost effect of moving the
antenna will not be known until the studies are
complete. Program officials also continue to monitor
the system’s maintainability to ensure JPALS
requires no manpower increase compared to legacy
systems—a key performance parameter. JPALS has
completed a detailed maintenance analysis, the
results of which indicate that the estimated
workload meets this manpower requirement. JPALS
is also at risk of exceeding its weight limit for 
CVN 78. It currently exceeds the requirement by 500
pounds. The program office reported that CVN 78
has updated the ship design to account for the
increased weight.
The JPALS acquisition strategy separates the
program into seven increments. Increment 1 is
separated into two phases, A and B. Increment 1B—
aircraft integration—will begin development in 2012
and integrate the system with the avionics of the
F/A-18E/F, EA-18G, and MH-60R/S. Increment 2—
land-based—will be led and funded by the Air Force
and was expected to begin development during
2011.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the
Navy generally concurred with this assessment.
Officials stated that the JPALS increment 1A
program is on track for system integration with
acceptable risk, that cost and schedule performance
are within the baseline plan, and that the system
requirements and acquisition strategy continue to be
accurate, supportable, and executable. The Navy
also provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: AMF JTRS
Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System (AMF JTRS)
DOD’s JTRS program is developing software-defined
radios that will interoperate with existing radios and
increase communications and networking
capabilities. A joint program executive office
provides a central acquisition authority that cuts
across the military services. Program and product
offices develop hardware and software for users
with similar requirements. The AMF program will
develop radios and associated equipment for
integration into nearly 160 different types of aircraft,
ships, and fixed stations.
AMF JTRS Small Airborne
AMF JTRS Maritime – Fixed Station
Source: Department of Defense.
Technology/system development
Program
start
(3/08)
Design
review
(11/09)
GAO
review
(11/10)
Program Essentials
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin
Program office: San Diego, CA
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $950.4 million
Procurement: $6,213.7 million
Total funding: $7,164.1 million
Procurement quantity: 26,878
Initial capability
SA production
decision
(11/11)
M/F production
decision
(6/12)
Initial
capability
(8/14)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
As of
10/2008
$1,915.8
$6,117.1
$8,032.9
$.296
27,102
80
Latest
07/2010
$1,998.1
$6,213.7
$8,211.8
$.303
27,102
77
Percent
change
4.3
1.6
2.2
2.2
0.0
-3.8
The program office reported quantities in terms of channels rather than radios. The program is
developing a 2-channel small airborne (SA) radio and a 4-channel maritime/fixed station (M/F) radio
based on a single common architecture.
Attainment of Product Knowledge
dg
le
no
w
si
re
d
le
ve
lo
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
Technology
maturity 96
Not
assessed
0
Page 91
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
De
The AMF JTRS program completed its design
review in November 2009 with its five critical
technologies nearing maturity and its design
stable. There will be an independent technology
readiness assessment before the small airborne
variant production decision, currently planned for
November 2011. AMF JTRS production processes
are also approaching maturity with manufacturing
sites having demonstrated a capability to produce
components or subsystems in a productionrelevant environment. Each of the AMF variants
will undergo initial operational test and evaluation
after the program’s initial production decision.
AMF JTRS quantities could increase depending on
whether the Navy and Marine Corps decide to
acquire AMF JTRS small airborne radios for their
networking capabilities.
Development
start
(3/08)
DOD GAO Production
design review decision
review (11/10) (11/11)
(11/09)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: AMF JTRS
AMF JTRS Program
Technology Maturity
DOD certified the AMF JTRS program for entry into
system development in March 2008 with all five of its
critical technologies nearing maturity and
demonstrated in a relevant environment. Prior to the
start of system development, the AMF JTRS program
took steps to develop key product knowledge. In
2004, the program awarded competitive system
design contracts to two industry teams led by
Boeing and Lockheed Martin to help mitigate
technical risks and address key integration
challenges. According to program officials, an
independent technology readiness assessment will
be performed in preparation for the small airborne
variant production decision, which is scheduled for
November 2011.
Design Maturity
The AMF JTRS design appears stable. The program
reported that all of its expected design drawings
were releasable when it completed its design review
in November 2009. AMF JTRS’ ability to
demonstrate that the system meets its performance
requirements is dependent on waveforms and
network management services from the JTRS
Network Enterprise Domain program. Of the two
open items remaining from the design review,
program officials consider the ability to route and
retransmit between radio channels to be high risk.
More specifically, the program is concerned that a
needed waveform may not be available in time to
allow operational testers to complete testing before
the program’s small airborne variant production
decision in November 2011. Program officials
assessed the other open item—security certification
from the National Security Agency—as a medium
risk. Both the program office and National Security
Agency agree that there are currently no
certification issues with the design. Once the
National Security Agency certifies AMF JTRS, any
changes will require an additional certification.
Certification requirements may impact the system
verification testing schedule.
process controls—at each manufacturing site.
Consistent with best practices, the sites are
expected to demonstrate the ability to produce
production-representative units on pilot lines before
beginning low-rate production. Several
manufacturing sites have already demonstrated a
capability to produce prototype components or
subsystems in a production-relevant environment.
Other Program Issues
AMF JTRS quantities could change depending on the
Navy and Marine Corps’ strategy for acquiring
networking capabilities. While all of the services are
planning to buy maritime/fixed station radios, the
Army and Air Force are currently the only services
planning to purchase the small airborne AMF JTRS
radios. A March 2008 acquisition decision
memorandum removed this requirement for the
Navy and the Marine Corps and indicated that they
plan to rely on the less capable ARC-210 radios for
their airborne communications needs. While the
ARC-210 radio is being upgraded, it will not have the
waveforms for air-to-air and air-to-ground data
networking. In August 2008, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
directed the JTRS joint program executive office,
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Networks and Information Integration (NII), along
with the Joint Staff and military services, to assess
issues and options related to replacing currently
fielded ARC-210 radios with AMF JTRS capabilities.
According to an NII official, this assessment has still
not been initiated.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the
Joint Program Executive Office JTRS provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
Production Maturity
The AMF JTRS program expects to have mature
production processes before beginning production.
A joint government-contractor assessment team has
conducted manufacturing readiness level
assessments—which include assessing statistical
Page 92
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: JTRS GMR
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Ground Mobile Radios (GMR)
DOD’s JTRS program is developing software-defined
radios that will interoperate with selected radios and
increase communications and networking
capabilities. The JTRS GMR program is developing
radios for ground vehicles. JTRS GMR depends on
waveforms being developed by the JTRS Network
Enterprise Domain program, and shares
interdependencies with the JTRS Handheld,
Manpack, Small Form Fit program as well as the
JTRS Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station program.
Source: Department of Defense.
Program rebaseline
directed
(9/08)
GAO
review
(11/10)
Production
decision
(10/11)
Initial
capability
(01/13)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 93
Latest
01/2011
$1,697.3
$14,170.4
$15,867.7
$.182
87,079
127
Percent
change
68.9
-12.3
-7.6
15.1
-19.7
130.9
Attainment of Product Knowledge
Projection
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
Design and
technology
192
maturity
fk
The JTRS GMR program expects to have its
critical technologies mature, design stable, and
most of its production processes in control by its
planned October 2011 production decision.
However, the JTRS GMR limited user test and
production decision may be delayed to allow the
program to test the GMR radio with its final
software build and better assess the maturity of
the wideband networking waveform. Even if the
JTRS GMR limited user test and production
decision are delayed, the Army’s Early Infantry
Brigade Combat Team program still plans to
request approval to procure the radios for its next
two brigades. The JTRS GMR program has yet to
fully test key networking capabilities and receive
its final National Security Agency certification.
The program expects the Office of the Director,
Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation, to
complete a new independent cost estimate in
January 2011.
As of
06/2002
$1,004.8
$16,159.9
$17,164.7
$.158
108,388
55
lo
Prime contractor: Boeing
Program office: San Diego, CA
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $128.3 million
Procurement: $14,170.4 million
Total funding: $14,298.7 million
Procurement quantity: 86,948
New acquisition
baseline
(1/08)
le
ve
Program Essentials
Design
review
(12/07)
d
Development
start
(6/02)
Production
si
re
Program
start
(9/97)
System development
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
0
Development
start
(6/02)
DOD GAO Production
design review decision
review (11/10) (10/11)
(12/07)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: JTRS GMR
JTRS GMR Program
Technology Maturity
The JTRS GMR program started system
development in 2002 with none of its 20 critical
technologies mature and demonstrated in a realistic
environment. The JTRS GMR program expects to
have its critical technologies mature by its planned
October 2011 production decision. According to the
program office, 11 of the 19 current critical
technologies are now mature, 7 are nearing maturity,
and 1 is still immature. The immature critical
technology—bridging/retransmission software—is
to be tested as part of GMR’s multiservice
operational test and evaluation, which is scheduled
to begin in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2012.
JTRS GMR relies on the wideband networking
waveform—among other waveforms—to meet the
requirements of key users, most notably the Early
Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT) program.
While program officials reported the wideband
networking waveform to be approaching maturity,
the Office of the Director, Defense Research and
Engineering (DDR&E), assessed the waveform’s
maturity to be substantially lower in a March 2010
technology readiness assessment for the E-IBCT
program. According to the program office, there
have been discussions between the JTRS program
executive office and the Army about delaying GMR’s
limited user test—which was scheduled for
completion in December 2010—until later in fiscal
year 2011. The delay would allow the program to test
the GMR radio with its final software build and
collect more data for DDR&E to better assess the
maturity of the wideband networking waveform.
Testing the radio with its final software build could
reduce the risk of late, costly design changes in
production.
Design Maturity
The design of the JTRS GMR appears stable with
over 90 percent of the total expected design
releasable to manufacturing. However, until all its
technologies are mature, key waveforms have been
fully integrated and tested, and the program’s final
security certification is received, the potential for
design changes remains.
Production Maturity
The JTRS GMR program has reported that 27 of its
35 critical manufacturing processes will be in
statistical control by the program’s planned October
2011 production decision. By not having all these
processes in statistical control at production start,
there is a greater risk that the radio will not be
produced within cost, schedule, and quality targets.
However, prior to its production decision, the
program will demonstrate its critical manufacturing
processes on a pilot production line. In addition, the
program has delivered 91 engineering development
model sets for use in developmental and operational
testing.
Other Program Issues
Until a complete and comprehensive cost estimate is
developed, JTRS GMR program costs will remain
uncertain. In August 2008, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
directed the JTRS GMR program to update its cost
estimate and revise its acquisition program baseline.
Program officials expect the Office of the Director,
Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation, to complete
an independent cost estimate by August 2011.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the
JTRS Joint Program Executive Office provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
According to program officials, the most significant
technical challenge remaining for GMR is meeting
security requirements. The program’s security
verification test was scheduled for the fourth quarter
of fiscal year 2010. The program expects to receive
its final security certification from the National
Security Agency in the third quarter of fiscal year
2011.
Page 94
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: JTRS HMS
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit (HMS)
DOD’s JTRS program is developing software-defined
radios that will interoperate with existing radios and
increase communications and networking
capabilities. The JTRS HMS program has two
concurrent phases of development. Phase 1 includes
the Rifleman radio and two small form fit radios.
Phase 2 consists of the manpack radio and two
additional small form fit radios, all of which are for
use in a classified security domain. We assessed
phase 1 and made observations on phase 2.
Source: © 2009-2010 General Dynamics.
System development
Production
Program/
development start
Design review
phase I
Design review
phase II
GAO
review
(4/04)
(3/08)
(9/09)
(11/10)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Percent
change
67.0
-58.4
-51.6
-26.3
-34.3
22.4
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
lo
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
Technology
maturity 96
0
Page 95
Latest
07/2010
$896.2
$3,889.9
$4,786.2
$.022
215,961
104
le
ve
The Rifleman radio’s production decision has been
delayed from August 2010 to approximately April
2011, and the manpack radio’s production
decision is also at risk. In addition, since August
2009, the program’s estimated procurement cost
increased from $2.5 billion to $3.9 billion, as
engineering design models were produced and the
program learned more about actual costs. While
this amount is less than half the program’s original
estimate, it is planning to buy far fewer radios—in
particular the more expensive handheld and
manpack radios—than initially planned.
As of
05/2004
$536.6
$9,352.6
$9,889.2
$.030
328,674
85
d
Prime contractor: General Dynamics
C4 Systems, Inc.
Program office: San Diego, CA
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $79.3 million
Procurement: $3,889.9 million
Total funding: $3,969.2 million
Procurement quantity: 215,551
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
si
re
Program Essentials
Low-rate
Low-rate
decision—
decision—
Manpack Rifleman radio
(4/11)
(2/11)
De
Concept
Development
start
(4/04)
DOD GAO Production
design review decision
review (11/10) (4/11)
(3/08)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: JTRS HMS
JTRS HMS Program
Technology Maturity
According to the JTRS HMS program, its phase 1
critical technologies—logical partitioning and
software power management—are nearing maturity.
In October 2010, the Army assessed the Early
Infantry Brigade Combat Team and concluded that
one of the JTRS HMS small form fit radios was
mature, and in January 2011, the Director, Defense
Research and Engineering, concurred with this
assessment. Additionally, the program office
reported that it will demonstrate the Rifleman radio
is fully mature during operational testing in January
2011.
The Army has not assessed the maturity of any of the
program’s four phase 2 technologies, but the
program office reported that it will demonstrate that
the manpack radio is fully mature during operational
testing in February 2011. The program office has
also reported that the manpack radio is currently
meeting its size, weight, and power requirements.
Design Maturity
According to the JTRS HMS program office, the
phase 1 design is now stable. The phase 1 Rifleman
radio has been reconfigured to address issues
identified in its 2009 limited user test. The program
office reported that the radio now has fewer parts;
meets size, weight, and battery requirements; and
provides increased reliability and range. The phase 2
design continues to change. JTRS HMS and the Nett
Warrior program, which will use the phase 2 small
form fit B radio, are investigating alternatives to
better accommodate Nett Warrior’s updated
requirements, but the program office does not
expect this redesign to be a challenge because it will
not involve new technology.
Other Program Issues
The production decision for the Rifleman radio has
been further delayed from August 2010 to
approximately April 2011, and the manpack radio’s
planned February 2011 production decision is also at
risk. The waveforms targeted for the radio’s limited
user test are being operationally tested in February
2011; the National Security Agency is not scheduled
to complete certification of the manpack radio until
after successful verification testing in May 2011; and
the MUOS waveform that the manpack radio is
required to use is not scheduled to be operationally
tested until 2012.
Since August 2009, the program’s estimated
procurement cost has increased from $2.5 billion to
$3.9 billion, as engineering design models were
produced and the program learned more about
actual costs. While this amount is less than half the
program’s original estimate, it is planning to buy far
fewer radios—in particular the more expensive
handheld and manpack radios—than initially
planned.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the
JTRS Joint Program Executive Office provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
Production Maturity
According to the JTRS HMS program, its production
processes are mature. In 2010, the program
identified one critical manufacturing process and
reported it was in control. In 2009, the program
identified 24 critical manufacturing processes, but it
no longer considers any of these processes critical
because their maturity has increased.
Page 96
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: LCS
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
The Navy’s LCS is designed to perform mine
countermeasures, antisubmarine warfare, and
surface warfare missions. It consists of the ship
itself, or seaframe, and the mission package it
deploys. The Navy is procuring the first four
seaframes in two unique designs. The first seaframe
(LCS 1) was delivered in September 2008. The
second seaframe (LCS 2) followed in December
2009. We assessed both seaframes. See pages 99-100
for an assessment of LCS mission packages.
Sources: Lockheed Martin (left); General Dynamics (right).
System development Production
GAO
review
Initial
capability
(11/10)
(7/12)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
As of
05/2004
$873.9
$464.6
$1,338.5
$334.622
4
41
Percent
change
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
139.0
Latest
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
98
Baseline estimates above are for seaframe-related costs only. Research and development funding
includes detail design and construction of two ships.
Page 97
Attainment of Product Knowledge
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
le
The Navy is building the third and fourth LCS
seaframes without having matured all the critical
technologies or having achieved a stable design.
Three of 19 seaframe critical technologies are still
only nearing maturity and the Navy reported last
year that LCS 3 and LCS 4 began fabrication with
only 69 percent and 57 percent of basic and
functional drawings complete, respectively. In
addition, the Navy’s efforts to resolve technical
issues affecting the lead ships have led to design
changes to LCS 3 and LCS 4 during construction,
several of which remain in progress. Following
failed contract negotiations in 2009 for fiscal year
2010–funded ships, the Navy twice restructured
the program’s acquisition strategy. This process
culminated in December 2010 when the Navy
awarded contracts for 10 ships of each design
between fiscal years 2010 and 2015.
no
w
Prime contractor: General Dynamics,
Lockheed Martin
Program office: Washington, DC
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD
Procurement: TBD
Total funding: TBD
Procurement quantity: TBD
Second
ship
delivery
(12/09)
Design and
technology
192
maturity
fk
Program Essentials
First
ship
delivery
(9/08)
lo
(6/04)
Production
decision—
2nd design
(10/05)
le
ve
(9/02)
Production
decision—
1st design
(12/04)
d
Development
start
si
re
Program
start
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
0
Contract
award
(12/04)
Lead ship
fabrication
(2/05)
GAO
review
(11/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: LCS
LCS Program
Technology Maturity
Sixteen of 19 critical technologies for both LCS
designs are mature. Three technologies—LCS 1’s
overhead launch and retrieval system and LCS 2’s
trimaran hull and aluminum structure—are nearing
maturity. Further, launch, handling, and recovery
systems, which are essential to the LCS
antisubmarine warfare and mine countermeasures
missions, are still being refined for both designs. For
LCS 1, Navy simulations have identified risks in
safely launching and recovering mission systems
that experience pendulous motion during
handling—such as the remote multimission vehicle
and unmanned surface vehicle systems. These
operations may be complicated by unacceptably
high water levels intruding into the ship’s launch bay
during high sea states. On LCS 2, the twin boom
extensible crane system—designed to launch,
handle, and recover watercraft—contains unproven
elements. The Navy reports recent progress on these
systems including (1) successful operation and
movement of an embarked 11-meter rigid-hull
inflatable boat onboard LCS 1 in March 2010, 
(2) synthetic lift lines on LCS 2 successfully
completing a 200 percent lift test, and (3) routine
usage of a straddle carrier to move an 11-meter rigidhull inflatable boat (with stowage cradle) and
berthing modules around the LCS 2 mission bay.
Navy officials also report that testing of LCS 2’s twinboom extensible crane is progressing.
Design and Production Maturity
The Navy provided historical data on design
completeness that was inconsistent with data it
provided to GAO last year, but officials did not
respond to requests for clarification. The data
provided by the Navy last year indicated that the
LCS 3 and LCS 4 began fabrication with only 69
percent and 57 percent of basic and functional
drawings complete, respectively. The Navy also
could not provide this data for the LCS 1 and LCS 2.
GAO’s work on shipbuilding best practices has
found that leading commercial firms assess a ship
design as stable when 100 percent of these drawings
are complete. By delaying construction start until
basic and functional design is completed and a
stable design is achieved, shipbuilders minimize the
risk of design changes and the subsequent costly
rework and out-of-sequence work these changes can
drive.
Page 98
The Navy used a concurrent design-build strategy
for LCS 1 and LCS 2 seaframes, which proved
unsuccessful. Implementation of new design
guidelines, delays in major equipment deliveries, and
strong focus on achieving schedule and performance
goals resulted in increased construction costs. The
Navy’s ongoing efforts to resolve technical issues
affecting LCS 1 and LCS 2, implement cost reduction
measures, and increase mission capability have led
to design changes for LCS 3 and LCS 4. These
changes are significant and have affected the
configuration of several major ship systems
including propulsion, communications, electrical,
and navigation.
Other Program Issues
After unsuccessful contract negotiations for fiscal
year 2010–funded seaframes, the Navy outlined a
new acquisition strategy for the LCS program in
September 2009 aimed at improving affordability by
selecting one seaframe design for the fiscal year
2010 ships and beyond. In November 2010, the Navy
amended this strategy and proposed contracting for
10 ships of each seaframe design through fiscal year
2015. In December 2010, Congress approved this
revised strategy, and the Navy subsequently awarded
fixed-price incentive contracts for up to 10 ships
each to Lockheed Martin and Austal USA.
Program Office Comments
According to the Navy, two industry teams (1) have
each designed, built, and delivered to the Navy a
lead ship meeting the LCS performance
requirements and (2) are currently building their
second ships, with lessons learned from the lead
ships incorporated into the designs. The Navy states
that both designs are stable, with LCS 3 and LCS 4
having experienced minimal design changes to-date,
and cites impressive learning and investment by
both shipbuilders as well as significant improvement
in cost and schedule performance. According to the
Navy, LCS 3 launched on December 4, 2010, at over
80 percent complete. This level of completeness at
launch, and the improvement in cost and schedule
performance by both shipbuilders, provides the
Navy confidence that risk of design change and outof-sequence work is minimal. The Navy also
provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: LCS Modules
Littoral Combat Ship-Mission Modules
The Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) will perform
mine countermeasures (MCM), surface warfare
(SUW), and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) missions
using modular mission packages. Packages include
weapons and sensors that operate from MH-60
helicopters or unmanned underwater, aerial, or
surface vehicles. Initial packages include
engineering development models and productionrepresentative systems of some, but not all, systems
planned. Mission capability improves with each
package delivered until it reaches a baseline
capability.
Source: © Northrop Grumman Corporation.
Milestone
B–LCS
(11/10)
(2QFY11)
Initial
Initial
capability capability
MCM
SUW
(2013)
(2013)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 99
Percent
change
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Latest
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
NA
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
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Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
Design and
technology
192
maturity
fk
The Navy has accepted delivery of five partially
capable mission packages. At full baseline
capability, packages require a total of 21 critical
technologies, including 11 sensors, 6 vehicles, and
4 weapons for their operation. Most of these
technologies are mature; however, some mission
systems have experienced test failures and have
not demonstrated the promised capability.
Individual systems in the mine countermeasures
packages do not meet reliability requirements, and
the Navy is currently evaluating alternatives to
replace the cancelled Non-Line-of-Sight Launch
System (NLOS-LS) and missiles. The Navy is also
reexamining the content of the ASW package. Due
to developmental delays with key mission
systems, the Navy risks acquiring significant
numbers of seaframes and mission packages
before the mission packages are proven.
As of
08/2007
$484.5
$3,211.0
$3,695.6
$57.743
64
NA
lo
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman
Corporation, Integrated Systems
Program office: Washington, DC
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD
Procurement: TBD
Total funding: TBD
Procurement quantity: TBD
GAO
review
le
ve
Program Essentials
First
First
ASW
SUW
delivery delivery
(9/08)
(7/08)
d
First
MCM
delivery
(9/07)
si
re
LCS
program
start
(5/04)
System development
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
0
Not
assessed
Not
assessed
Development
start
(NA)
DOD
design
review
(NA)
Not
assessed
Production GAO
start
review
(NA)
(11/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: LCS Modules
LCS Modules Program
Technology Maturity
At its full baseline capability, operation of the MCM,
SUW, and ASW packages on LCS requires a total of
21 critical technologies, including 11 sensors, 6
vehicles, and 4 weapons. Of these technologies, 18
are mature and have been demonstrated in a
realistic environment.
The Navy has accepted delivery of two partially
capable MCM mission packages. According to
program officials, in 2010 the MCM mission package
completed end-to-end testing, and two MCM
systems—the AN/AQS-20A sonar and Airborne Laser
Mine Detection System—have completed
developmental testing in separate test events. Two
other systems—the Unmanned Surface Vehicle
(USV) and Unmanned Surface Sweep System—have
not yet been demonstrated in a realistic
environment, and a third—the Remote Minehunting
System (RMS)—has been delayed because of poor
reliability. Program officials report that the Navy is
assessing alternative USV designs because the
current system does not meet power output
requirements necessary to support the towed
surface sweep system. The RMS, which is its own
major defense acquisition program, experienced a
Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical
threshold in December 2009, due to cost increases
resulting from a 51 percent reduction in quantity and
efforts to improve reliability. In June 2010, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense completed its review and
certified RMS for continuation. According to
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, officials,
RMS reliability has improved from 7.9 hours to
nearly 45 hours between failures. According to
program officials, the Navy plans to recommence
RMS production in fiscal year 2015. Further,
program officials report that the Rapid Airborne
Mine Clearance System has been removed from the
package while the Navy evaluates more costeffective alternatives for meeting desired capability
delivery time frames.
The Navy has accepted delivery of two partially
capable SUW mission packages and expects to
accept delivery of a third mission package in fiscal
year 2011. The Navy will resume procuring SUW
packages in fiscal year 2012. The 30 millimeter gun
was test-fired from LCS 1 in September 2009 and
according to program officials, integrated with the
Page 100
LCS 1 combat system and demonstrated at sea in
April 2010. In May 2010, DOD cancelled the NonLine-of-Sight Launch System due to cost and
technical challenges. Officials note the Navy is
evaluating other alternatives and expects to
complete evaluation by the second quarter of fiscal
year 2011.
The Navy accepted delivery of one partially capable
ASW mission package in September 2008. However,
program officials stated that the Navy plans to
introduce new mission systems and classified
capabilities before procuring additional ASW
packages. Program officials report that the Navy has
completed development and testing of the first ASW
mission package to evaluate operational concepts
and refine requirements.
Other Program Issues
The Navy plans to purchase 18 ships and 13 mission
packages between fiscal years 2011 and 2015, but
developmental delays in key mission package
systems mean the Navy will acquire significant
numbers of seaframes before mission packages are
proven. GAO has reported since 2007 on challenges
developing systems constituting LCS mission
packages and integrating them with their host
platforms. These challenges have delayed the
planned delivery of baseline capability by several
years. Until mission package performance is proven,
the Navy risks investing in a fleet of ships that does
not deliver its promised capability and is largely
constrained to self-defense as opposed to missionrelated tasks.
Program Office Comments
The Navy stated that recent testing has been
comprehensive, operationally relevant, and
successful. According to the Navy, the SUW mission
package supported early deployment of LCS 1,
providing a counter–illicit trafficking capability.
Further, the Navy stated that from program
inception, the acquisition strategy for mission
package has employed an incremental approach and
remained stable, fielding systems as they achieve the
required level of maturity. According to the Navy,
those few systems experiencing issues (NLOS-LS
and RMS) are either being replaced with alternative
systems or are targets of increased focus and
attention. According to the Navy, the results have
been positive in all cases. In addition, the Navy
provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: LHA 6
LHA Replacement Amphibious Assault Ship
The Navy’s LHA 6 will replace the LHA 1 Tarawaclass amphibious assault ships. The LHA 6 is a
modified variant of the fielded LHD 8 amphibious
assault ship and will feature enhanced aviation
capabilities and is designed to support all Marine
aviation assets in the Expeditionary Strike Group.
LHA 6 construction began in December 2008. It is
currently scheduled to be delivered in April 2013.
The LHA 6 ship class includes three ships. We
assessed LHA 6 and made observations on LHA 7
and LHA 8.
Source: U.S. Navy.
Construction
start
(12/08)
Contract
award
(6/07)
Initial
capability
(10/14)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
As of
01/2006
$217.6
$2,915.4
$3,133.0
$3,133.034
1
146
Latest
12/2009
$286.0
$6,100.0
$6,387.3
$3,193.635
2
159
Percent
change
31.4
109.2
103.9
1.9
100.0
8.9
Research and development costs include the LHA 6, LHA 7, and LHA 8. Procurement costs only
include the LHA 6 and LHA 7.
Attainment of Product Knowledge
dg
le
no
w
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
Technology
maturity 96
0
Page 101
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
lo
The LHA 6 began construction in December 2008
with mature technologies, but a design that was
only 65 percent complete. Almost all detailed
design drawings have now been released. In July
2009, the Secretary of the Navy certified that the
LHA 6 program was ready to commence full
shipbuilding construction activities. As of
September 2010, the program office reported it
had conducted unit readiness reviews for all of the
ship’s 216 assembly units, and the shipbuilder had
started fabrication on 215 units. The LHA 6
program may incur cost growth due to the need
for postdelivery rework of the ship’s deck to cope
with the intense, hot downwash from the Joint
Strike Fighter.
le
ve
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman
Shipbuilding
Program office: Washington, DC
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $48.8 million
Procurement: $2,866.3 million
Total funding: $2,916.2 million
Procurement quantity: 1
Ship
delivery
(4/13)
GAO
review
(11/10)
d
Program Essentials
Production
si
re
Program
start
(7/01)
System development
De
Concept
Contract
award
(6/07)
Lead ship
fabrication
(12/08)
GAO
review
(11/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: LHA 6
LHA 6 Program
Technology Maturity
All LHA critical technologies were mature by the
time the program awarded its construction contract
in June 2007. DOD and the Navy concluded in 2005
that all LHA 6 components and technologies were
fully mature and will have been installed on other
ships prior to LHA 6 delivery. Although not
considered critical technologies, the program has
identified six key subsystems needed to achieve the
LHA 6’s full capabilities. Five of these are mature,
installed on numerous Navy ships, and do not
require modification for the LHA 6. The sixth, the
Joint Precision Approach and Landing System, a
Global Positioning System-based aircraft landing
system, is still in development. While this system is
necessary to realize the LHA 6’s full capabilities, it is
not required to meet its operational requirements.
The program office has also previously identified the
machinery control system as a potential risk. The
shipbuilder expected to commence integrated
testing of the machinery control system for LHA 6 in
January 2011 in the land based test equipment.
conducted unit-level readiness reviews for all of the
ship’s 216 assembly units and the shipbuilder had
started fabrication on 215 units.
Other Program Issues
The LHA 6 is likely to experience further cost
growth. Costly postdelivery rework of the ship’s
deck may be necessary to cope with the downwash
from the Joint Strike Fighter. The heat from these
aircraft could warp the LHA 6 deck or damage deck
equipment. The Navy will conduct at-sea testing on
USS WASP to determine if and how the LHA 6 and
other Joint Strike Fighter–capable ships will need to
modify their flight decks. The program office does
not expect the Navy to finalize a solution to this
issue prior to LHA 6 ship delivery.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the
Navy stated that the program manager is continually
monitoring shipyard performance and is working
closely with the shipbuilder to identify mitigation
strategies. The Navy also provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
Design Stability
The LHA 6 began construction in December 2008
with only 65 percent of its design complete. Almost
all detailed design drawings have now been
released. The LHA 7 design will be very close to the
LHA 6. Design changes will be limited. These
changes include a new firefighting system and radar
and command, control, communications,
computers, and intelligence updates. Design
changes may be more significant on the LHA 8 if the
Navy includes a well deck on the ship. All LHA ships
except LHA 6 and LHA 7 have a well deck. Officials
report that reintroducing the well deck would affect
aviation capabilities such as fuel storage space. The
Navy will determine the final configuration,
capabilities, and cost for the LHA 8 after trade
studies are completed in fiscal year 2011. Program
officials reported that decisions on the LHA 8 design
and the potential increase in funding needed to
execute them have not yet been determined.
Production Maturity
In July 2009, the Secretary of the Navy certified that
the LHA 6 program was ready to commence full
shipbuilding construction activities. As of
September 2010, the program office reported it had
Page 102
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: MPF(F)/MLP
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) / Mobile Landing Platform
The Navy’s Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) is one of
four classes of ships in the Maritime Propositioning
Force (Future)—MPF(F)—squadron that supports
seabasing. The MLP is designed to facilitate at-sea
vehicle and cargo transfer in low-threat
environments to support operations ashore. In 2010,
the Navy restructured the MPF(F) program, which
includes a lower-cost variant of the MLP based
largely on a commercial oil tanker. The Navy plans
to award the construction contract for the first of
three MLP vessels in early 2011.
Source: Computer Sciences Corp.
Lead-ship
fabrication
start
(7/11)
GAO
review
Design/
construction
approval
(3/11)
(11/10)
(9/13)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 103
Percent
change
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
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dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
Design and
technology
192
maturity
fk
The MLP program will award its detailed design
and construction contract with three of its four
current critical technologies mature. The
remaining technology, operations with MLP and
its supporting vessels, is nearing maturity. It is not
expected to be mature before construction begins
because it requires a complete or near complete
MLP to be tested at-sea. The program is currently
testing the technology using small-scale models.
As part of the MPF(F) restructuring, the MLP
program replaced most of its critical technologies.
The redesigned MLP is largely based on a
commercial oil tanker. The new design offers less
capability, but reduces the program’s cost and
schedule. According to program officials,
leveraging the design of a commercial oil tanker
will allow them to have a higher level of design
maturity and a lower level of technological risk
prior to the start of construction.
Latest
07/2010
$93.7
$1,426.1
$1,519.9
$506.622
3
81
As of
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
lo
Prime contractor: General
Dynamics/NASSCO
Program office: Washington, DC
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $24.2 million
Procurement: $1,307.0 million
Total funding: $1,331.2 million
Procurement quantity: 3
Initial
operating
capability
(3/15)
le
ve
Program Essentials
Lead-ship
delivery
d
(6/08)
Production
si
re
Program
start
System development
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
Not
assessed
0
GAO
review
(11/10)
Contract
award
(3/11)
Lead ship
fabrication
(7/11)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: MPF(F)/MLP
MPF(F)/MLP Program
Technology Maturity
The MLP program will award its detailed design and
construction contract with three of its current
critical technologies mature and one nearing
maturity. As a result of the MPF(F) restructure, the
MLP adopted a new design and lowered the number
of critical technologies from five to four, reducing
MLP capabilities as well as costs. The technologies
are designed to assist in the transfer of cargo
between the MLP and other ships. The three
technologies that have reached maturity—skin-toskin vehicle transfer with the Large, Medium Speed
Roll-on/Roll-off vessel, vehicle transfer with the
Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV), and the Landing
Craft Air Cushion interface—were tested at-sea
using surrogate platforms. Program officials
reported that the vehicle transfer technologies—
which use ramps to connect MLP to the large cargo
vessel or the JHSV at-sea while in motion—were
tested as recently as March 2010. Vehicle transfers
with the JHSV are currently limited to operations in
calm waters. The landing craft interface was tested
at sea in March 2010 by loading landing craft at
different speeds and approaches in varying sea
states onto a surrogate MLP. While on the MLP,
landing craft may receive cargo, undergo limited
maintenance, and refuel. The last technology—
landing craft operations with MLP and larger cargo
vessel connected—requires the simultaneous
interaction of two of the other technologies.
Program officials do not expect this technology to
reach maturity before construction as it requires a
complete or near complete MLP for at-sea testing.
Program officials said it is currently being tested
using small scale models.
Design Maturity
The MLP has undergone significant design changes
due to the MPF(F) program restructure and budget
reductions. The new MLP design will offer less
cargo, personnel, and aviation capacity, but at a
lower cost. The design is based on the Alaska-class
crude oil carrier with modifications that allow the
MLP to raise and lower itself into the water so that
landing craft can float on and off. Program officials
reported that the MLP will leverage approximately
60 percent of the commercial design. They also
reported 81 percent of preliminary design drawings
are complete and the three-dimensional design is
underway. The largest changes will be to the central
Page 104
portion of the ship, which will be modified to store
supplies and vehicles, as well as the equipment
needed for the landing craft interface. In the future,
the MLP may be able to accommodate float-on
modules to provide additional capabilities.
Other Program Issues
Due to resource constraints, the Navy has
restructured MPF squadrons by deferring the
construction of new Large, Medium Speed Rollon/Roll-off vessels, redesignating two classes of
ships out of the MPF(F), and reducing the
capabilities and costs of the MLP. Additionally, the
MPF(F) concept of operations has changed from
assembling cargo on-board the MLP to assembling it
onshore.
Program Office Comments
According to the MLP program, it is working with
the Office of Naval Research and the Technology
Readiness Assessment office to reassess MLP
critical technologies. The program anticipates that
this assessment will state that MLP has no critical
technologies. The program has also identified a
series of production-readiness criteria in the request
for proposal for the construction contract, including
having certain American Bureau of Shipbuilding
drawings 100 percent complete, the three
dimensional model by zone 90 percent complete, the
model by block 65 percent complete, and work
package kits 5 percent complete. According to the
program, these criteria and the program’s detailed
plan for completing all design artifacts to support
production will ensure the design is sufficiently
mature for construction. The Joint Requirements
Oversight Council has also validated all changes in
MLP capabilities. The program office also provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: MUOS
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS)
The Navy’s MUOS, a satellite communication
system, is expected to provide a worldwide,
multiservice population of mobile and fixed-site
terminal users with an increase in narrowband
communications capacity and improved availability
for small terminals. MUOS will replace the Ultra
High Frequency (UHF) Follow-On (UFO) satellite
system currently in operation and provide
interoperability with legacy terminals. MUOS
consists of a network of satellites and an integrated
ground network. We assessed both the space and
ground segments.
Source: © 2008 Lockheed Martin.
Production
Development
start
(9/04)
GAO
review
(11/10)
On-orbit
capability
(3/12)
Full
capability
(9/15)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
As of
09/2004
$3,593.8
$2,990.2
$6,622.0
$1,103.658
6
90
Latest
06/2010
$4,151.8
$2,613.3
$6,830.2
$1,138.361
6
112
Percent
change
15.5
-12.6
3.1
3.1
0.0
24.4
The latest cost data do not reflect the current cost of the program, and a new acquisition program
baseline has not yet been approved.
Page 105
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
lo
All MUOS critical technologies are mature and all
design drawings have been released; however,
design flaws discovered late in production
continue to pose cost and schedule risks for the
program. After a 2009 review of the program
found that the MUOS schedule was optimistic and
its budget was inadequate, the program developed
more realistic cost and schedule baselines. The
new cost baseline has not yet been approved. The
current estimate for the first satellite to begin onorbit operations is March 2012—24 months later
than planned when the program began
development. The delivery of MUOS capabilities is
time-critical due to the operational failures of two
UFO satellites. The MUOS program has taken
several steps to address any potential capability
gap that could occur prior to the first MUOS
satellite beginning on-orbit operations.
le
ve
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin
Space Systems
Program office: San Diego, CA
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $875.2 million
Procurement: $1,561.2 million
Total funding: $2,436.5 million
Procurement quantity: 2
Production
decision
(2/08)
d
Program Essentials
Design
review
(3/07)
si
re
Program
start
(9/02)
System development
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
0
Development
start
(9/04)
DOD
design
review
(3/07)
Production GAO
decision review
(2/08) (11/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: MUOS
MUOS Program
Technology Maturity
According to the program office, all eight MUOS
critical technologies are mature and have been
demonstrated in at least a realistic environment.
Design Maturity
According to the program office, the MUOS design is
stable and the design flaws discovered late in
production have largely been resolved. However,
design issues with UHF reflectors continue to pose
cost and schedule risks for the program. Specifically,
the UHF reflectors have been redesigned to mitigate
signal interference and structural hardware bonding
issues. According to the program, the late delivery of
the UHF reflectors—which are on the program
critical path for the first MUOS satellite launch—is
the program’s top challenge. The hinges that connect
the solar panels and booms in the solar array wing
assembly are also causing unwanted signal
interference.
According to the program, it has mitigated the
schedule effects of these design issues by
proceeding in September 2010 with system-level
vibration testing, which approximates the level of
vibration experienced during launch, prior to
incorporating all of the planned designed
modifications for the reflectors and solar panels.
According to DOD, system-level vibration testing has
been completed and the risk associated with the
nonflight compnents are being mitigated by
conducting component-level vibration testing on
these parts prior to their reinstallation on the
spacecraft. According to the program, the reflectors
and solar panels are going through rework and test
in parallel with system-level thermal vacuum testing
and are to be available for reinstallation on the
spacecraft after system-level testing.
the program, the number of defects has decreased
slightly over time as the maturity of the
manufacturing process has increased.
Other Program Issues
The importance of the first MUOS launch increased
due to the unexpected failures of two UFO satellites.
Based on the current health of on-orbit satellites,
UHF communication capabilities are currently
predicted to provide the required availability level
until the first MUOS satellite begins on-orbit
operations—currently planned for March 2012.
However, the MUOS program is addressing the
potential for a capability gap by activating dual
digital receiver unit operations on a UFO satellite,
examining the potential of purchasing or leasing
UHF satellite communications services on a
commercial satellite, and exploring the feasibility of
expanded digital receiver unit operations on the
legacy payloads of the MUOS satellites.
In 2009, a Navy-initiated review of the MUOS
program found that while it was technically sound,
its schedule was optimistic and its budget was
inadequate. As a result, the program developed new
cost and schedule baselines. The acquisition
program baseline has been under revision since
December 2009, but has not yet been approved. The
prime contract cost baseline for the MUOS program
was renegotiated in February 2010. According to the
program, the prime contract cost baseline, which
includes $162 million in engineering change
proposals, has increased about 61 percent since
contract award in September 2004.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the
Navy provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.
Production Maturity
According to the program office, the production
maturity of the first MUOS satellite is high. We could
not assess production maturity because the program
does not collect statistical process control data on
its critical manufacturing processes. According to
the program office, the space segment does collect,
track, and analyze data on manufacturing process
defects. While manufacturing defects have
contributed to cost growth and schedule delays on
Page 106
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: NMT
Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT)
The Navy’s NMT is the next-generation maritime
military satellite communications terminal. It will be
installed in existing ships, submarines, and shore
sites. NMT is designed to work with the Air Force’s
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
Satellite system to enhance protected and survivable
satellite communications to naval forces. Its
multiband capabilities will also enable
communications over existing military satellite
communication systems, such as Milstar, Wideband
Global SATCOM, and the Defense Satellite
Communications System.
Source: © 2008 Raytheon Company.
System development
GAO Full-rate
Initial
review decision capability
(11/10) (1/12)
(9/12)
Full
capability
(9/15)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 107
Latest
10/2010
$660.9
$1,143.7
$1,804.7
$5.936
304
107
Percent
change
-3.8
-28.5
-21.1
-13.6
-8.7
0.0
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
lo
The NMT program entered production in July 2010
with mature critical technologies and a stable
design, but without demonstrating its critical
manufacturing processes are in statistical
control—a key step for ensuring these processes
are repeatable, sustainable, and capable of
consistently producing quality parts. The NMT
program began to produce productionrepresentative engineering development models in
May 2008. According to the NMT program, it used
these models to mature and baseline its
manufacturing processes. The program also plans
to complete a manufacturing readiness
assessment during fiscal year 2011 to support a
full-rate production decision in fiscal year 2012.
The NMT program is dependent on AEHF
satellites to test its full range of capabilities. The
first AEHF satellite was launched in August 2010,
but a propulsion issue has delayed it from
reaching its planned orbit.
As of
12/2006
$687.0
$1,599.8
$2,286.8
$6.867
333
107
le
ve
Prime contractor: Raytheon
Program office: San Diego, CA
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $57.2 million
Procurement: $1,081.3 million
Total funding: $1,138.5 million
Procurement quantity: 254
Low-rate
decision
(7/10)
d
Program Essentials
Design
review
(5/08)
si
re
Development
start
(10/03)
Production
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
0
Development
start
(10/03)
DOD
design
review
(5/08)
Production GAO
decision review
(7/10) (11/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: NMT
NMT Program
Technology Maturity
The NMT program’s two critical technologies—a
multiband antenna feed and monolithic microwave
integrated circuit power amplifiers for Q-band and
Ka-band communication frequencies—are mature.
Both of these technologies have been demonstrated
in fully capable, production-representative
engineering development models.
Design Maturity
The NMT’s design is stable. The program has
released all of its expected design drawings and
placed the design under configuration control. At its
May 2008 design review, program officials reported
that about 70 percent of the expected drawings were
releasable to manufacturing.
Production Maturity
The NMT program office entered production in July
2010 without demonstrating that its manufacturing
processes were in statistical control—a key step for
ensuring these processes are repeatable,
sustainable, and capable of consistently producing
high-quality parts. During a June 2008 technology
readiness assessment, the program identified three
critical manufacturing processes related to the Qband and Ka-band monolithic microwave integrated
circuits and the Q/Ka radome. The NMT program
began to produce production-representative
engineering development models in May 2008.
According to the NMT program, it used its
production run of 33 engineering development
models to mature and baseline its manufacturing
processes. This will allow the program to begin
tracking statistical process control data. A
manufacturing readiness level assessment is
scheduled to occur during fiscal year 2011 to
support a full-rate production decision review in
fiscal year 2012.
data rate can be tested with one AEHF satellite,
should the Air Force configure it in that fashion.
Additional AEHF satellites provide more coverage
and program officials noted that initial operational
capability can be achieved with two installed
systems that have successfully completed system
operational verification test. In addition, the NMT
program can provide value to the fleet when it is
fielded by accessing existing satellite
communication systems such as the Defense
Satellite Communications System, Milstar, Wideband
Global SATCOM, Interim Polar, and UFO satellite
constellations.
The NMT program’s software lines of code have
significantly increased since development start to
accommodate software communications
architecture requirements. Currently, software
integration testing is over 80 percent complete with
over 95 percent of the defects resolved. According to
NMT program officials, the NMT program is
containing most of the defects that it finds within
phase, which is a good indicator because it is more
efficient to correct problems within the phase in
which they occur.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the
Navy stated that the NMT program has successfully
entered the production phase and continues to
successfully progress to provide deployed naval
commanders with assured access to secure,
protected, command and control and
communication capabilities to support the exchange
of warfighter-critical information. It will support the
Navy’s net-centric FORCEnet architecture and act as
an enabler for transforming operational capability
available to the warfighter. The Navy also provided
technical comments, which we incorporated as
appropriate.
Other Program Issues
The NMT program is dependent on AEHF satellites
to test its full range of capabilities. The first AEHF
satellite was launched in August 2010; however, a
faulty satellite propulsion system will delay the
satellite from reaching its planned orbit by about 7
to 9 months. Delays with AEHF capability directly
affect the ability of the NMT program to test the new
higher data rate communications capability.
However, NMT officials stated that the new higher
Page 108
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: P-8A
P-8A Poseidon
The Navy’s P-8A Poseidon is a Boeing 737
commercial derivative that will replace the P-3C
Orion. Its primary roles are antisubmarine warfare;
antisurface warfare; and intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance. The P-8A is a part of a family of
systems that share the integrated maritime patrol
mission and support the Navy’s maritime warfighting
capability. The program plans to field capabilities in
three increments. We assessed increment one.
Source: U.S. Navy.
Design
review
(6/07)
Development
start
(5/04)
Full-rate
decision
(4/13)
Initial
capability
(7/13)
Last
procurement
(2019)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 109
Latest
11/2010
$7,795.0
$23,738.8
$32,352.6
$265.186
122
160
Percent
change
5.1
3.1
5.8
-0.3
6.1
0.0
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
lo
The P-8A entered production in August 2010 with
mature technologies and a stable design. The
program completed a production readiness review
in January 2010 and demonstrated its airframe
manufacturing processes on a commercial line
prior to the production decision. However, several
parts of the P-8A, including the sonobouy
launcher, auxiliary fuel tanks, and a new fuel tank
safety system, have manufacturing readiness
levels that are lower than recommended for the
start of production. The airframe on the P-8A
program has been designated as a commercial
item. The Defense Contract Audit Agency has
expressed concern about the designation because
of the extent of the modifications being made to
the aircraft. In addition, according to the program
office, the Defense Contract Management Agency
has cited limited access to commercial production
facilities as a concern.
As of
05/2004
$7,420.2
$23,020.1
$30,575.9
$265.877
115
160
le
ve
Prime contractor: Boeing
Program office: Patuxent River, MD
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,857.7 million
Procurement: $21,751.5 million
Total funding: $24,327.4 million
Procurement quantity: 111
Low-rate GAO
decision review
(8/10)
(11/10)
d
Program Essentials
Production
si
re
Program
start
(3/00)
System development
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
0
Development
start
(5/04)
DOD
design
review
(6/07)
Production GAO
decision review
(8/10) (11/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: P-8A
P-8A Program
Technology and Design Maturity
The P-8A entered production in August 2010 with
mature technologies and a stable design. An
independent technology readiness assessment of the
program was conducted in December 2009 to
support the production decision. The assessment
identified one current critical technology, the hydrocarbon sensor, and rated it mature. The sensor has
been tested in ground-based applications, but has
not been demonstrated in an aircraft. While the ESM
digital receiver was considered a critical technology
during development, program officials stated that
this technology was no longer identified as such
because it is mature and has been demonstrated on
the E/A-18G. However, no formal ESM flight testing
has been conducted on the P-8A. According to the
program office, another formerly identified critical
technology, the sonobouy launcher, is scheduled to
begin testing in a realistic environment in fiscal year
2011.
Production Maturity
The critical manufacturing processes for the P-8A
airframe are proven, but manufacturing readiness
levels are lower than recommended for the start of
production. The P-8A program completed a
production readiness review in January 2010 and
demonstrated its critical airframe manufacturing
processes on a commercial line prior to its August
2010 production decision. The airframe is being
procured as a commercial item and has stable
production processes that support production rates
in excess of 32 airframes per month. However,
several parts of the P-8A, including the sonobouy
launcher, auxiliary fuel tanks, and new fuel tank
safety system are currently assessed at
manufacturing readiness levels that are lower than
those recommended for the start of production.
Other Program Issues
The P-8A airframe has been designated as a
commercial item. As a result, the contractor is not
required to submit cost or pricing data to the
government. According to the Navy, it weighed the
assumed cost and benefits before making the
commercial item designation. The Defense Contract
Audit Agency has expressed concern about the
designation because of the extent of the
modifications being made to the aircraft, which
include an estimated $460 million in nonrecurring
Page 110
engineering. In addition, according to the program
office, both the Office of the Secretary of Defense
and the Defense Contract Management Agency
(DCMA) have expressed concerns about the limited
access to production facilities and limited
surveillance of aircraft parts afforded by the
commercial item designation.
Prior to entering production, an operational
assessment of the P-8A found that the system
demonstrated the expected level of maturity or
exceeded all test thresholds. The assessment was
conducted in the program’s Weapon System
Integration Laboratory (WSIL) and not with an
operationally representative aircraft. The Navy
operational testers stated that conducting the
operational assessment in the WSIL proved to be
useful in determining and evaluating the preliminary
risks in the development of the P-8A system, but that
characterizing system risks based on this data alone
represented a major limitation. According to the
Navy testers, subsequent flight tests conducted in
June 2010 have been successful with only minor
issues observed. Initial operational test and
evaluation will begin in 2012.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the
Navy stated that since the P-8A was competitively
awarded and more than one offer was received, it
did not ask for certified cost or pricing data for the
system development and demonstration contract
with Boeing Defense, Space and Security (BDS).
The Navy further explained that as the airframe is
purchased as an interdivisional commercial item,
DCMA does not have independent access to inspect
it in Boeing Commercial Airplanes’ (BCA) facilities.
However, the DCMA and the Navy may accompany
BDS during BCA selected quality reviews. These
events are typical and customary for any customer
of BCA. Inspections apply to the aircraft once it
reaches the BDS facilities where DCMA can inspect
any part of the end product. The Navy also provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: PATRIOT/MEADS CAP Fire Unit
PATRIOT/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit
The Army’s PATRIOT/Medium Extended Air Defense
System (MEADS) program transitions the PATRIOT
missile system to MEADS. MEADS is intended to
provide low-to-medium-altitude air and missile
defense to counter, defeat, or destroy tactical
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or other airbreathing threats. MEADS is being developed by the
United States, Germany, and Italy. We assessed the
MEADS fire unit, which includes launchers, radars, a
battle management component, and reloaders. We
did not assess the PATRIOT missile.
Source: U.S. Army.
Concept
System development
Program/
development start
(8/04)
Program Essentials
Prime contractor: MEADS International
Program office: Huntsville, AL
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $2,820.2 million
Procurement: $13,693.0 million
Total funding: $16,513.2 million
Procurement quantity: 48
Production
Full-rate
decision
(11/12)
Critical
GAO
design review review
(8/10)
(11/10)
Initial
capability
(9/17)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
As of
08/2004
$5,229.5
$13,847.8
$19,077.3
$397.444
48
157
Latest
12/2009
$4,820.3
$13,693.0
$18,513.3
$385.694
48
157
Percent
change
-7.8
-1.1
-3.0
-3.0
0.0
0.0
The cost, schedule, quantity, and funding data are for the MEADS fire unit.
Page 111
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
si
re
d
le
ve
lo
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
De
The MEADS program completed a system-level
critical design review in August 2010 with its
technologies mature and design stable. The
MEADS member nations held a program review in
October 2010, according to officials, to decide
whether or not to continue with the program and
whether or not to modify the system to use a
unified battle management control system being
developed by the Army’s Integrated Air and
Missile Defense program. If the Army and member
nations decide to use the new unified battle
management control system, the MEADS program
will require increased time and funding to
develop, field, and integrate this system into the
existing fire unit software and hardware. The
MEADS program is expected to be rebaselined
following the program review if the decision is
made to continue it.
Technology
maturity 96
0
Development
start
(8/04)
DOD
GAO Production
design review decision
review (11/10) (11/12)
(8/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: PATRIOT/MEADS CAP Fire Unit
PATRIOT/MEADS CAP Fire Unit
Program
Technology Maturity
All five of the MEADS critical technologies—
launcher electronics, multifunction fire control
radar exciter, multifunction fire control radar
transmit/receive module, slip ring, and spray cooling
system—are mature.
Design Maturity
The MEADS program completed its system-level
critical design review in August 2010 and its design
is stable. At critical design review the program had
released 93 percent of the total expected design
drawings across the five major end items. The
MEADS battle management, command, control,
communications, computer, and intelligence
(BMC4I) software and hardware was the only major
end item with less than 90 percent of its drawings
released. Only 76 percent of BMC4I drawings were
releasable by the design review because, according
to program officials, one of the international
partners came in with a late request to change the
collapsible roof design to a fixed roof. As of
December 2010, the program has released 98
percent of the expected drawings for the BMC4I and
98 percent across the five major end items.
Other Program Issues
The MEADS member nations held a program review
in October 2010, according to officials, to decide
whether or not to continue with the program and if
so, which battle management system to use—the
current MEADS BMC4I tactical operations center or
the Army’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle
Command System (IBCS). This program decision
was postponed until December 2010. The Army
plans to use IBCS to control and manage sensors
and weapons, such as PATRIOT and the Joint LandAttack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted
Sensor System, and support the engagement of air
and missile threats. However, the MEADS BMC4I is
further along in its development than the IBCS,
which entered system development in December
2009. As a result, the MEADS program would require
increased time and funding to develop, field, and
integrate the IBCS into the existing fire unit software
and hardware, if the decision is made to use it.
Page 112
The MEADS program is expected to be rebaselined
following the program review. MEADS officials
expect the program’s design and development phase
to be extended by 18 months due in part to issues
with BMC4I and sensor requirements and an
underestimation of the sensor development effort
that delayed the program’s critical design review.
Program officials stated that the increased cost
associated with the schedule extension is expected
to be shared among the three member nations.
Details regarding the schedule extension and its
effect on the program were not available as
negotiations had not begun among the member
nations. According to the program’s Selected
Acquisition Report, the MEADS contract was
expected to be amended in the first quarter of fiscal
year 2011 to incorporate any programmatic changes.
The MEADS program is at risk of not meeting
several technical performance measures, including
assembly, disassembly, and emplacement times,
especially in extreme temperatures. According to
officials, the Army has approved a request for relief
for several system performance specifications
related to the transportability of various
components on C-130 aircraft as well as CH-47 and
CH-53 helicopters. The MEADS program faces other
transportability challenges as well because the
vehicles used to move the system do not meet all
NATO road requirements.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment,
program officials noted that the MEADS program is
over 6 years into development, that fabrication is
well underway, and that initial major end-item
deliveries would begin in December 2010. They
stated that integration and testing activities are
planned to start during calendar year 2011. While the
United States is still planning to use the IBCS, the
international partners are not, and a program
decision is still anticipated by the end of December
2010. Program officials concluded that requirements
satisfaction, software maturity, and cost growth
continue to be concerns. The program also provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: Reaper
Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System
The Air Force’s MQ-9 Reaper is a multirole, mediumto-high-altitude endurance unmanned aerial vehicle
system capable of flying at higher speeds and higher
altitudes than its predecessor, the MQ-1 Predator A.
The Reaper is designed to provide a ground-attack
capability to find, fix, track, target, engage, and
assess small ground mobile or fixed targets. Each
system consists of four aircraft, a ground control
station, and a satellite communications suite. We
assessed increment 1, which consists of two
configurations, Block 1 and Block 5.
Source: U.S. Air Force.
System development
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
As of
02/2008
$413.9
$2,080.2
$2,597.9
$24.742
105
79
Latest
06/2010
$806.2
$10,171.9
$11,131.8
$28.470
391
82
Percent
change
94.8
389.0
328.5
15.1
272.4
3.8
These costs are for Increment 1 of the Reaper program.
Page 113
Attainment of Product Knowledge
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
le
The Block 1 Reaper is in production with critical
technologies that are mature and a design that is
stable. We did not assess its production maturity.
The MQ-9 program plans to make numerous
enhancements in Block 5, including system power
increases, modernized crew stations, and
improvements to the primary data link. The
program office judged these improvements to be
technologically mature, but they still must be
integrated and tested on the MQ-9 system. Total
aircraft quantities have increased more than 500
percent since fiscal year 2007 and the program is
incorporating several urgent operational needs
from the warfighter. Although the Reaper’s initial
operational testing was completed in August 2008,
full-up testing of two key performance parameters
was delayed to November 2012 during Block 5
testing. The Air Force plans to begin development
of Increment 2 in late fiscal year 2012.
no
w
Prime contractor: General Atomics
Aeronautical Systems, Inc
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB,
OH
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $448.2 million
Procurement: $7,980.0 million
Total funding: $8,534.7 million
Procurement quantity: 288
Block 5
full-rate
production decision
(3/13)
Design and
technology
192
maturity
fk
Program Essentials
Initial Block 5
capability low-rate
decision
(3/11)
(3/11)
lo
(2/04)
GAO Required
assets
review
available
(11/10) (12/10)
le
ve
(1/02)
Block 1
low-rate
decision
(2/08)
d
Development
start
si
re
Program
start
Production
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
0
Development
start
(2/04)
DOD
design
review
(2/09)
Production GAO
decision review
(2/08)
(11/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: Reaper
Reaper Program
Technology Maturity
The Reaper’s Block 1 critical technologies are
mature. The Air Force has identified numerous
technology enhancements for Block 5 that are
expected to improve the capability of existing
onboard subsystems and ground control stations.
These enhancements include power increases, radar
and ground control station upgrades, a secure data
link, and heavyweight landing gear. The program
office judged these improvements to be
technologically mature, but they still must be
successfully integrated and tested on the MQ-9
system. For example, the encryption of the data
using the primary data link increases the time to
transmit data. These transmission delays could
result in hard landings, which may damage the
aircraft. The program office is currently evaluating a
range of hardware and software solutions to this
problem and plans to test them operationally in
November 2012. The program plans to undergo a
Block 5 technology readiness assessment in support
of its low-rate production decision by March 2011.
Design Maturity
According to the program office, the Block 1 Reaper
design is stable and all engineering drawings have
been released. The MQ-9 program plans to conduct a
formal critical design review on the Block 5
configuration in December 2010. At that time, it
expects to know the number of additional drawings
needed for this configuration.
Production Maturity
We did not assess production maturity because the
MQ-9 program does not use statistical process
controls. The program uses other quality control
measures such as scrap, rework, and repair to track
product quality. The program is in production and
contracted for 103 aircraft. The contractor has a
continuous improvement program that includes
manufacturing process goals, which are updated as
they are met. The Air Force has also conducted
several manufacturing reviews of the contractor’s
facilities and determined that the production
capacity is sufficient to meet the expected demand.
aircraft quantities have increased by over 500
percent since fiscal year 2007 and the system’s
performance requirements have continued to
change. In addition to the Block 5 capability
upgrade, the program is also incorporating several
urgent operational requirements from the
warfighter, such as data link encryption, wide area /
high resolution surveillance, and a capability to
detect dismounted soldiers. Meeting these demands
has put a stress on the program’s resources. A recent
systems engineering review noted that the
contractor’s resources have been overburdened by
the need to balance software development, support
ongoing operations, and enhance system capability.
It also found that the Reaper program lacks
sufficient software metrics to allow proper
developmental resource and schedule planning.
The Block 1 Reaper completed initial operational
testing in August 2008. Testers found that it was
effective in the killer role, but problems associated
with radar and the network prevented them from
evaluating the hunter and net-ready capability. To
enable testers to fully evaluate the hunter capability,
the Air Force is upgrading the radar’s ground moving
target indicator and target recognition/classification
capability, and integrating the radar into the crew
station. Full-up testing of these capabilities was
delayed and will be completed during the Block 5
initial operational testing, scheduled for November
2012.
The Air Force plans to begin development of
increment 2 of the MQ-9 Reaper in late fiscal year
2012. This increment will include the small diameter
bomb, an automatic take-off and landing capability,
a deicing system, and national airspace certification.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air
Force provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.
Other Program Issues
Since its inception, the MQ-9 program has followed a
concurrent development and production strategy in
order to respond to urgent operational needs. Total
Page 114
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: SSC
Ship to Shore Connector (SSC)
The Navy’s Ship to Shore Connector is expected to
provide transport of personnel, weapon systems,
equipment, and cargo from ships to the shore. SSC is
the replacement for the Landing Craft, Air Cushion
(LCAC), which is facing the end of its service life.
The SSC will deploy in existing and planned Navy
well deck amphibious ships and will be used for
assault and nonassault operations. It is expected to
operate independent of tides, water depth,
underwater obstacles, ice, mud, or beach conditions.
Source: U.S. Navy.
Preliminary Development
GAO
review design review
start
(3/11)
(11/10)
(3Q/FY11)
Lead ship
fabrication start
(TBD)
Initial
capability
(TBD)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
Technology
maturity 96
Projection
0
Page 115
Percent
change
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
lo
The SSC program plans to award the detail design
and construction contract for the lead ship in
fiscal year 2011 with all five potential critical
technologies nearing maturity or mature.
According to the program office, the SSC will be
the first government-led Navy ship design in 14
years. Aligned with goals from Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics’ efficiency initiative, the Navy is
focused on balancing costs with capabilities
during the technology development phase in order
to formulate requirements that are technically
achievable within known fiscal constraints. The
Under Secretary has also emphasized affordability
and encouraged programs to make tradeoffs in
order to stay within the established costs for the
program.
Latest
08/2010
$435.7
$3,885.8
$4,343.7
$59.503
73
TBD
As of
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
le
ve
Prime contractor: TBD
Program office: Washington, DC
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD
Procurement: TBD
Total funding: TBD
Procurement quantity: TBD
Contract award—
design/construction
(TBD)
d
Program Essentials
Production
si
re
Program
start
(5/09)
System development
De
Concept
GAO
review
(11/10)
Contract
award
(TBD)
Not
assessed
Lead ship
fabrication
(TBD)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: SSC
SSC Program
Technology Maturity
The SSC program expects all five potential critical
technologies to be mature or nearing maturity by the
time the detail design and construction contract for
the lead ship is awarded. The program has identified
five critical technologies—the aluminum buoyancy
box, gas turbines, fire suppression system,
composite shaft, and composite lift fan. According
to the program office, some components of these
technologies are already in use in the Navy fleet. For
instance, several potential SSC candidate engines
are used in the aircraft industry today. According to
program officials, there are risks associated with
readying them for ships. The aluminum chosen is the
same alloy that is in use on the second Littoral
Combat Ship, and composites are used throughout
the Navy fleet, including on the LCACs. The Navy
plans to release the request for proposal for the
detail design and construction of the SSC in the first
quarter of 2011.
development phase. The Navy noted that the
program is considered low risk, technically sound,
and is postured for events leading up to
development start, program initiation, and release of
a request for proposal for detail design and
construction and entry into the engineering and
manufacturing development phase. The Navy also
provided technical comments that were
incorporated as appropriate.
Other Program Issues
According to Navy officials, the SSC is the first
government-led Navy ship design in 14 years. The
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics has emphasized
affordability and encouraged programs in the
technology development phase to make tradeoffs in
order to stay within the established costs for the
program. Accordingly, the Navy is focusing on
producing a design that reduces maintenance costs
and balances performance requirements against lifecycle costs. The SSC is expected to have greater lift,
a lower fuel consumption rate, and less expected
maintenance than the LCAC. The Navy plans to
achieve this through a series of design changes,
including the extensive use of composite materials,
a simpler and more efficient drive train, and more
powerful, fuel-efficient engines. In validating the
SSC’s key performance parameters in June 2010, the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
required the program to return to the JROC if costs
exceed 10 percent of the approved program
baseline.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the
Navy stated that the JROC validated the SSC
requirements that have defined the SSC technical
design parameters within the technology
Page 116
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: SDB II
Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), Increment II
The Air Force’s Small Diameter Bomb (SDB)
Increment II is planned to provide attack capability
to moving or stationary mobile targets in adverse
weather from standoff range. It combines radar,
infrared, and semi-active laser sensors in a multimode seeker to acquire, track, and engage targets. It
uses a weapons data link from host aircraft as well
as GPS and an inertial navigation system to achieve
accuracy. SDB II will integrate with the F-15E and
the Navy and Marine Corps Joint Strike Fighter, and
with other aircraft, such as the F-22A.
Source: © 2010 Raytheon Company.
System development
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 117
Latest
10/2010
$1,618.8
$3,009.1
$4,627.9
$.270
17,163
72
Percent
change
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Attainment of Product Knowledge
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
e
The SDB II program entered system development
in July 2010 with all four of its critical
technologies nearing maturity. In an April 2010
technology readiness assessment, each
technology was found to need additional
development to demonstrate the required level of
maturity for operational use. While some of the
SDB II technologies are being utilized in other
systems, they are being applied in new ways on
this program. In addition, the integration of those
technologies into the constrained SDB II design is
a risk for the current development schedule.
Further, the program already faces funding
shortfalls. When the program was approved to
enter development, it was granted a waiver from
the requirement to provide full funding. The
funding shortfall was estimated to be about 22
percent of the required funding over the life of the
program.
As of
10/2010
$1,618.8
$3,009.1
$4,627.9
$.270
17,163
72
dg
Prime contractor: Raytheon
Program office: Eglin AFB, FL
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,071.0 million
Procurement: $3,009.1 million
Total funding: $4,080.1 million
Procurement quantity: 17,000
(9/23)
le
Program Essentials
(1/13)
Last
procurement
no
w
(11/10)
Initial
capability
F-35B/C
(6/18)
Design and
technology
192
maturity
fk
(7/10)
Initial
capability
F-15E
(7/16)
Low-rate
decision
lo
(5/06)
Critical
design
review
(1/11)
le
ve
GAO
review
d
Development
start
si
re
Program
start
Production
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
Not
assessed
0
DOD
Development GAO
start
review design
(7/10)
(11/10) review
(1/11)
Not
assessed
Production
decision
(1/13)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: SDB II
SDB II Program
Technology Maturity
The SDB II program entered system development in
July 2010 with all four of its critical technologies
nearing maturity. In April 2010, an independent
technology readiness assessment found that the
SDB II data link, payload (warhead), seeker, and
target classifier had been demonstrated in a relevant
environment. The assessment team based their
conclusions on modeling and simulation, as well as
captive flight, static and dynamic warhead, and
other testing methods. Each technology was found
to need additional development to demonstrate the
required level of maturity for operational use. In
addition, while each of these technologies has been
fielded in one or more weapon systems, they are
being applied in new ways on this program and must
be integrated into the constrained SDB II design.
The data link is a new application of an existing
technology and will require a tremendous leap
forward in packaging. The payload (warhead) will
be used in a way on SDB II that is beyond its current
demonstrated capability, and fuze development has
been and continues to be a problem. The seeker
combines proven sensor technologies, but in a
smaller design. The target classifier is a new
technology in a weapon system context. Finally,
Joint Strike Fighter integration issues represent a
substantial risk for the program and the Navy
because the aircraft may not be available for
environmental and integration testing until after the
SDB II has completed its initial development. The
environments of the Joint Strike Fighter may cause a
re-design of a portion of the weapon or limitations in
the weapon’s employment.
Other Program Issues
In July 2010, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logisitcs approved the
SDB II to enter engineering and manufacturing
development. The program will use a fixed-price
incentive contract for this phase of the program. The
Under Secretary also approved an aggressive
procurement schedule in an effort to promote
affordability and productivity. However, the
acquisition decision memo that outlined these
decisions stated that it will be a challenge to execute
this strategy because of DOD’s track record of
procuring weapons at less than economically
beneficial rates due to budget pressures. In addition,
the program already faces funding shortfalls. When
the program was approved to enter development, it
was granted a waiver from the requirement to
provide full funding. The program is not currently
funded to the Air Force’s cost estimate or its current
acquisition program baseline. The shortfall was
estimated to be about 22 percent of the required
funding over the life of the program.
Program Office Comments
The program office offered technical comments,
which were incorporated as appropriate.
Design Maturity
The SDB II program held its critical design review in
January 2011. We could not assess SDB II design
maturity because data on design drawings were not
available. As an entrance criteria for holding the
design review, the program had planned to
determine if 95 percent of the system’s drawings
were completed and under configuration control.
Program officials stated that it appeared the design
as presented is capable of achieving the desired
requirements for the system. If the program’s post–
critical design review assessment is successful, the
contractor will be cleared to start building hardware
for the SDB II program.
Page 118
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: SBIRS High
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High Program
The Air Force’s SBIRS High satellite system is being
developed to replace the Defense Support Program
and perform a range of missile warning, missile
defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace
awareness missions. SBIRS High consists of four
satellites in geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) plus
two replenishment satellites, two sensors on host
satellites in highly elliptical orbit (HEO) plus two
replenishment sensors, and fixed and mobile ground
stations. We assessed the space segment and made
observations about the ground segment.
Source: © 2007 Lockheed Martin Corporation.
System development
Production
Program
start
Development
start
Design review /
production decision
(2/95)
(10/96)
(8/01)
GAO
review
First
satellite
launch
(4/11)
(11/10)
Second
satellite
launch
(4/12)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
As of
10/1996
$4,304.5
$0.0
$4,520.6
$904.111
5
86
Latest
12/2009
$10,626.7
$5,065.3
$15,938.5
$2,656.409
6
TBD
Percent
change
146.9
NA
252.6
193.8
20.0
NA
The 1996 data show no procurement cost as the Air Force planned to use research and development
funds to buy all five satellites. The cost of the HEO replenishment sensors is not included in either
column.
Attainment of Product Knowledge
dg
le
no
w
lo
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
Technology
maturity 96
0
Page 119
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
le
ve
According to the program office, SBIRS High
critical technologies are mature, its design is
stable, and its manufacturing processes have been
proven; however, continued difficulties with flight
software development could add to the program’s
cost overruns and schedule delays. According to
the program office, significant progress has been
made on flight software testing. However, various
subsystem- and system-level qualification testing
remains and the Defense Contract Management
Agency (DCMA) has reported that the effort
required to finalize the flight software is likely to
further delay the launch date of the first GEO
satellite. The program office’s best-case estimate
is that the first GEO satellite will launch in April
2011—4 months later than previously estimated
and roughly 9 years later than originally planned.
d
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin
Corporation
Program office: El Segundo, CA
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,844.4 million
Procurement: $3,085.6 million
Total funding: $4,954.3 million
Procurement quantity: 3
Second
sensor
delivery
(9/05)
si
re
Program Essentials
First
sensor
delivery
(8/04)
De
Concept
Development
start
(10/96)
DOD
design
review
(NA)
Design review/ GAO
production review
decision
(11/10)
(8/01)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: SBIRS High
SBIRS High Program
Technology Maturity
According to the SBIRS High program office, all
three critical technologies—thermal management,
onboard processing, and the infrared sensor—are
mature.
Design Maturity
The SBIRS High hardware design appears stable.
According to the program office, over 99 percent of
the total expected design drawings are releasable.
Functional testing of the first GEO spacecraft in
2009 revealed solder fractures on some hardware
components, which contributed to satellite delivery
delays. The program disassembled and tested these
components and determined that redesign was
unnecessary and they were suitable for use as-is.
Hosted HEO sensors are currently on-orbit, and
program officials report that they are operational.
The program plans to buy replenishment sensors
that will differ only slightly in design. According to
the program office, the design changes will address
parts obsolescence and electromagnetic
interference issues that affected the original sensors.
Those interference issues led the program to issue
waivers to accept the original sensors for
operational use, even though they did not meet all
the program’s specifications. Replenishment sensors
are scheduled for delivery to the host for integration
in fiscal years 2012 and 2015.
Production Maturity
According to the program office, the manufacturing
processes for SBIRS High are proven since the first
and second GEO satellites and the first two HEO
sensors have been built.
Other Program Issues
The estimated cost of the program continues to
grow, and its schedule is at risk for further delays.
DCMA projects nearly $600 million in cost overruns
at contract completion, more than twice the amount
reported last year. Additional contract cost increases
and schedule delays are expected due in part to the
continued underestimation of the effort required to
finalize and test the flight software. The program
office is working to rebaseline the SBIRS High
contract cost and schedule estimates for the sixth
time; it will then revise its acquisition program
baseline to more realistic cost and schedule goals.
Page 120
Developing the complex flight software subsystem
designed to monitor the health and status of the
spacecraft has already caused multiple delays, and
DCMA has reported that the remaining software
effort will likely further delay the launch date of the
first GEO satellite. According to the program office,
significant progress has been made on flight
software testing, but various subsystem- and systemlevel qualification testing remains. For example, the
fault management system, which has caused delays
in the past, was scheduled to undergo testing in late
2010 to determine whether the system will perform
as expected. According to DCMA, these tests had to
be completed by the end of 2010 for the program to
have a realistic chance of launching the first GEO
satellite in April 2011—the program office’s bestcase estimate.
According to program officials, the development of
the SBIRS High ground system is on track, and the
system will be available to process the data
generated from the first GEO satellite when it
reaches its orbit. If the first GEO satellite launches
in April 2011, program officials expect that satellite
data will be certified for use in missile warning
operations by November 2012.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the
program office stated that the first GEO satellite
successfully completed all integration testing. In
mid-December 2010, the final system-level test was
completed, and installation began of components,
such as solar array wing assemblies and a
deployable light shade. Flight software run-forrecord activities for the first GEO satellite are
expected to be completed in February, supporting
the start of launch processing in March. Independent
review teams verified that an April 2011 launch is
achievable. Ground software required for launch has
been verified. The follow-on production contract
procures the third and fourth GEO satellites
completing the original SBIRS constellation, plus
two HEO replenishment payloads; it was definitized
in June 2010, and values roughly $3 billion. The
program office also provided technical comments,
which were incorporated as appropriate.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: SM-6
Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) Extended Range Active Missile (ERAM)
The Navy’s Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) is a surface-toair missile launched from Aegis destroyers and
cruisers to provide ship self-defense, fleet area
defense, and theater air defense. Combining legacy
Standard Missile (SM) and Advanced Medium-Range
Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) hardware and
technology, SM-6 will allow for over-the-horizon
engagement, improved capability at extended
ranges, and capability to receive in-flight updates
from Aegis ships. SM-6 Block 1 is in production.
Follow-on blocks will be developed to meet future
threats.
Source: Raytheon Missile Systems.
Design
review
(3/06)
GAO
review
(11/10)
Initial
capability
(9/11)
Full-rate
decision
(12/11)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 121
Latest
07/2010
$972.0
$5,160.9
$6,132.8
$5.111
1,200
87
Percent
change
-8.1
13.2
9.2
9.2
0.0
16.0
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
lo
The SM-6 program’s concurrent testing and
production strategy puts the program at increased
risk of cost growth and schedule delays. The
program is in low-rate production with 30 missiles
under contract and deliveries expected to begin in
March 2011. However, the program has not
completed developmental testing to prove that the
design meets performance and reliability
requirements, and the risk of design changes
remains. Recent test failures have increased the
risk that unexpected design changes could result
in costly rework for the 30 missiles already under
contract and schedule delays. To receive approval
to enter full-rate production, the program must
successfully complete flight testing, demonstrate
reliability, and achieve production maturity. Full
testing of SM-6 capabilities will not occur until
after full-rate production is well underway.
As of
07/2004
$1,057.9
$4,558.1
$5,616.0
$4.680
1,200
75
le
ve
Prime contractor: Raytheon Missile
Systems
Program office: Arlington, VA
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $72.4 million
Procurement: $4,940.0 million
Total funding: $5,012.3 million
Procurement quantity: 1,170
Low-rate
decision
(8/09)
d
Program Essentials
Production
si
re
Program
start
(6/04)
System development
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
0
Development
start
(6/04)
DOD
design
review
(3/06)
Production GAO
decision review
(8/09) (11/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: SM-6
SM-6 Program
Technology and Design Maturity
According to the program office, all SM-6 critical
technologies were mature and its design was stable
by its August 2009 production decision; however, the
program has not completed developmental testing to
prove that the design will meet performance and
reliability requirements. Until developmental testing
is completed, the risk of design changes remains.
Land-based developmental testing was successfully
completed in 2009. However, sea-based
developmental testing was suspended in May 2010
after two test failures. According to program
officials, the failures did not result in hardware
design changes and developmental testing is
scheduled to resume in January 2011. According to
an official from DOD’s Office of the Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation, the program’s
limited number of developmental test flights leaves
little margin for error.
Production Maturity
The SM-6 is in low-rate production with 30 missiles
under contract and deliveries expected in March
2011. We could not assess production maturity
because the program did not provide statistical
process control data. However, prior to production
start, the program demonstrated a maturity level
sufficient to proceed with low-rate production. To
obtain approval to begin full-rate production, the
program must achieve production maturity,
successfully conclude at-sea developmental and
operational flight testing, and demonstrate
reliability. However, the program and DOD’s
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation have
not yet agreed to the flight reliability metrics and
failure definitions that will be used to assess the
program.
Other Program Issues
The SM-6 program’s concurrent testing and
production strategy puts the program at increased
risk of cost growth and schedule delays if
unexpected design changes are required as a result
of testing. In 2009, the program obtained approval
from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics to begin low-rate initial
production of up to 19 missiles before completing
developmental testing. To minimize the risks
inherent in this approach, the Under Secretary
required the program to complete developmental
Page 122
testing and obtain approval prior to awarding
subsequent contracts. Despite the test failures that
led to the suspension of at-sea developmental testing
in May 2010, the Under Secretary approved low-rate
production of an additional 11 missiles and the
procurement of long-lead materials for the
remaining 59 low-rate missiles.
SM-6 capabilities will not be fully tested until after
full-rate production is well underway. SM-6 is a key
pillar of the Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter
Air System—a system of systems designed to extend
the battle space over the horizon. A developmental
version of the integrated fire control capability was
demonstrated in 2009; however, it is not scheduled
to be demonstrated at-sea until fiscal year 2014. The
program plans to have three of four full-rate
production lots under contract by that time.
According to the program office, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense decided the SM-6 should be
fielded in advance of the Naval Integrated Fire
Control-Counter Air System to address the Navy’s
critical shortage of extended range missiles.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the 
SM-6 program office disagreed with the GAO
assertions that the program’s concurrent testing and
production strategy puts the program at risk of cost
growth and schedule delays; that the program has
not completed testing to prove that the design meets
performance requirements; and that recent test
failures increase the risk of design changes.
According to the program office, the program
successfully completed reliability demonstration
testing and has begun high-accelerated-life testing.
In addition, the SM-6 hardware is very mature, and
the risk of design changes is minimal. Officials
added that full testing of SM-6 using the legacy
interface will be completed prior to the full-rate
production decision and that flight testing using the
integrated fire control interface will take place prior
to delivery of the first full-rate production missiles.
GAO Response
Our reviews of DOD weapon systems confirm that
fully configured, integrated, productionrepresentative prototypes should be tested before
committing to production. The benefits of testing
are maximized when the developmental tests are
completed prior to a production decision because
making design changes after production begins can
be both costly and inefficient.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: VTUAV
Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV)
The Navy’s VTUAV will provide real-time imagery
and data to support intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance requirements. A VTUAV system is
composed of up to three air vehicles with associated
sensors, two ground control stations, one recovery
system, and spares and support equipment. The air
vehicle launches and recovers vertically, and
operates from ships and land. The VTUAV is being
designed as a modular, reconfigurable system that
supports various operations, including surface,
antisubmarine, and mine warfare.
Source: © 2006 Northrop-Grumman Corporation.
System development
GAO
review
(11/10)
Operational
Initial
test
capability
(9/11)
(9/11)
Full-rate
decision
(2/12)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 123
Latest
07/2010
$664.8
$1,881.3
$2,547.2
$14.555
175
141
Percent
change
12.8
13.5
-1.1
0.0
-1.1
35.6
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
lo
The VTUAV is in production, but the program may
be at risk for further cost increases and schedule
delays as a result of concurrent testing and
production. The VTUAV program delayed the start
of operational test and evaluation by 2 years to
September 2011, due to system reliability and
software maturity issues that were discovered
during developmental flight testing. During an
August 2010 flight test, the operator lost contact
with the aircraft, resulting in it entering restricted
air space. As a result, the program made changes
to the software. In order to keep suppliers
producing at a minimum rate until operational test
and evaluation is complete, the program increased
its low-rate production quantities from 9 to 15.
The program plans to achieve initial operational
capability in September 2011 and full-rate
production in February 2012—almost 2 years later
than previously planned.
As of
12/2006
$589.1
$1,657.7
$2,576.3
$14.555
177
104
le
ve
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman
Program office: Patuxent River, MD
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $19.1 million
Procurement: $1,660.2 million
Total funding: $1,680.3 million
Procurement quantity: 156
Low-rate
decision
(5/07)
d
Program Essentials
Design
review
(11/05)
si
re
Program
start
(1/00)
Production
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
0
Development
start
(1/00)
DOD
design
review
(11/05)
Production GAO
decision review
(5/07) (11/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: VTUAV
VTUAV Program
Technology Maturity
The VTUAV relies on common, mature technologies.
Design Maturity
The VTUAV design is still changing as a result of
ongoing testing. The program had released all its
expected drawings by its May 2007 production
decision, but it subsequently made design changes
and added drawings to address problems discovered
during developmental testing. As of January 2011,
100 percent of the program’s total expected design
drawings have been released. However, the program
is still making changes to the design as a result of
concurrent testing and production. The program
anticipates 20 changes in the aircraft’s design,
requiring 60 additional design drawings. The formal
evaluation of the system’s operational suitability and
effectiveness was not completed as anticipated until
April 2010. During an assessment of the system on
the USS McInerney and subsequent developmental
flight tests, the program discovered system
reliability and software maturity issues, including a
weak communications link and false alarms related
to the unmanned system’s status. More specifically,
during an August 2010 developmental flight test, the
operator lost contact with the aircraft, causing it to
enter restricted air space. An investigation
determined the root cause to be a software design
flaw and the program has since made changes to the
software. The VTUAV program also delayed the start
of operational test and evaluation by 2 years to
September 2011. The program now plans to achieve
initial operational capability in September 2011 and
full-rate production in February 2012—almost 2
years later than previously planned.
Production Maturity
The VTUAV was originally designed as a modified
commercial off-the-shelf item. We could not assess
production maturity because the program did not
require the prime contractor or its supplier base to
identify key product characteristics—the first step
to implementing production process controls. The
program reports that one VTUAV supplier uses
statistical process controls to measure elements of
blade manufacturing. In addition, the program plans
to develop production metrics based on critical
safety items and safety of flight inspection criteria to
support the full-rate production decision. The
program increased its low-rate production quantities
Page 124
from 9 to 15, in order to keep suppliers producing at
a minimum rate until operational test and evaluation
is complete.
Other Program Issues
The VTUAV program is currently considering a
variety of future capabilities that could be added to
the system, including a surface search radar, a
signals intelligence package, an enhanced data and
communications relay, and weapons. The program
office had funding in place in fiscal year 2010 to
integrate a surface search radar, but that funding
was used to sustain the program when it
experienced cost overruns resulting from software
issues discovered during developmental testing.
Other planned capabilities are currently unfunded.
Work on these capabilities will be implemented as
subprograms.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on the draft of this assessment, the
Navy stated that the VTUAV program has made
significant progress in the last year. VTUAV
conducted integration testing on the USS Freedom
in November 2010, is deployed on the USS
Halyburton, is being deployed to Afghanistan as part
of the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
Task Force, and has been selected by Office of the
Secretary of Defense as the interim solution for a
classified, maritime-based, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance urgent need requirement.
VTUAV experienced a delay in the start of
operational evaluation and continues to make
incremental strides to satisfy the full capability
production document requirements. Software
changes to correct problems discovered during
developmental testing have accounted for the
majority of this schedule delay as any newly
discovered software anomaly will delay flight testing
until a new software build is released. The
operational evaluation completion date is driven by
ship availability, and the USS Halyburton is not
available until late summer 2011. The Navy also
provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: SSN 774
Virginia Class Submarine (SSN 774)
The Navy’s Virginia class attack submarine is
designed to combat enemy submarines and ships,
fire cruise missiles, and provide improved
surveillance and special operations support to
enhance littoral warfare. The Navy awarded a Block
III construction contract in 2008 and has begun
construction on the first two hulls. In total, 7 ships
have been delivered and 11 more are under contract.
The Navy is introducing one new technology to
improve system performance. We assessed this
technology and made observations on design and
production issues.
Source: U.S. Navy.
System development
Development
start—
AESR
(12/08)
(11/10)
2 per year
production
begins
(2011)
Block IV
contract
awarded
(2013)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 125
Latest
09/2010
$7,076.9
$76,492.6
$83,569.4
$2,785.648
30
151
Percent
change
59.5
38.8
40.3
40.3
0.0
12.7
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
lo
The Virginia class submarine program was
approved to enter full-rate production in
September 2010. Construction of the first two
Block III submarines has begun, and production of
the first hull featuring several affordability-based
design changes is underway. The Navy is also
working to address quality control and reliability
concerns. The Navy will begin buying two
submarines per year in fiscal year 2011. It expects
to realize its goal of reducing costs to $2.0 billion
(in fiscal year 2005 dollars) per ship by fiscal year
2012 ship procurement and hopes to further
decrease the time required to build each ship. The
Navy has decided not to pursue two planned
technology insertions for the Virginia class, but it
is still developing advanced electromagnetic
signature reduction (AESR) technology that will
be introduced onto existing and new submarines.
AESR will begin testing in 2011.
As of
06/1995
$4,436.5
$55,113.7
$59,550.2
$1,985.005
30
134
le
ve
Prime contractor: General Dynamics,
Electric Boat Corporation
Program office: Washington, DC
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $709.7 million
Procurement: $40,375.8 million
Total funding: $41,085.5 million
Procurement quantity: 18
Production
decision—
AESR
(3/11)
GAO
review
d
Program Essentials
Full rate
production
decision
(9/10)
si
re
Development
start–
SSN 774
(6/95)
Production
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
0
Development
start
(NA)
DOD
design
review
(NA)
Production GAO
decision review
(NA)
(11/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: SSN 774
SSN 774 Program
Technology Maturity
The Navy has decided not to pursue two planned
technology insertions for the Virginia class, but it is
still developing advanced electromagnetic signature
reduction (AESR) technology that will be introduced
onto existing and new submarines. The Navy plans
to install AESR—software that monitors and
optimizes the submarine’s signature—on ships
starting with SSN 782. The software will be installed
on earlier ships over time. According to the Navy,
AESR prototype testing slipped by more than a year
due to non-AESR-related schedule delays, and is
scheduled to begin on SSN 778 in September 2011.
The Navy decided not to incorporate a conformal
acoustic velocity sensor wide aperture array on the
ship after it found it would significantly increase, not
decrease, life-cycle costs and complicate
maintenance. The Navy is still evaluating more
affordable sail designs, but according to officials, the
larger, flexible payload sail is no longer being
considered because the communications
requirements that drove the need for more space
have been eliminated.
Prior to the program’s full-rate production decision,
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved
a change to three Virginia class key performance
parameters. According to the Navy, they determined
that the original requirements were unrealistic and
would not be worth the cost needed to achieve
them. The change will not affect operations.
Design and Production Maturity
The program was approved to enter full-rate
production in September 2010. The Navy will begin
buying two ships per year in fiscal year 2011. The
Navy expects to achieve its goal of reducing costs to
$2.0 billion (in fiscal year 2005 dollars) per ship by
fiscal year 2012 ship procurement and hopes to
reduce the time required to build each ship to about
60 months. Navy officials said construction of SSN
784—the first hull incorporating significant costreducing design changes—has been underway for
approximately 2 years and is progressing well. The
Navy expects the first few hulls with this new design
to take longer to build, but expects to get back on
schedule by the middle of Block III.
Page 126
Other Program Issues
The Navy is working to address quality control and
reliability concerns. In November 2009, the Director,
Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E),
highlighted several design and reliability-related
deficiencies the program needed to address, but
concluded they did not preclude the program from
moving forward into full-rate production. These
deficiencies, which included multiple subsystem
failures, multiple “fail to sail” issues, and test aborts,
were also cited by the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, as examples of the pervasive reliability
problems that affect DOD systems. DDR&E also
noted that the program did not have a reliability
measurement or growth program—a best practice.
Navy officials told us that plans are in place to
mitigate each of these issues. For example,
according to the Navy, subsystem problems are
being addressed with the vendors and shipyards
through changes to installation techniques,
engineering changes or redesigns, and evaluations of
alternative technologies. Navy officials also told us
fail to sail events are not unexpected early in a
program and that the Virginia class submarine has
not experienced any fail to sail events while
deployed. According to Navy and DDR&E officials,
problems with a special hull treatment separating
from the hull have also been mitigated by changing
surface preparation techniques and redesigning
coating molds. Delivered hulls will have the coating
restored as needed, and more significant restoration
can occur during scheduled dry-dockings. According
to Navy officials, this issue is not unique to the
Virginia class and has not resulted in any operational
deficiencies. Navy officials said the shipbuilder has
also addressed the torpedo-room manufacturing
quality issues that were identified in 2009.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the
program office provided technical comments, which
were incorporated as appropriate.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: WIN-T Increment 2
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 2
WIN-T is the Army’s high-speed and high-capacity
backbone communications network. WIN-T
connects Army units with higher levels of command
and provides the Army’s tactical portion of the
Global Information Grid. WIN-T was restructured
following a March 2007 Nunn-McCurdy unit cost
breach of the critical threshold, and will be fielded in
four increments. The second increment will provide
the Army with an initial networking on-the-move
capability.
WIN-T Increment 2 – Initial Networking On The Move
WIN-T Inc 2 Tactical
Communications
Communic
Communic
Co
ommunications
ca
ations
ation
s Node
No
ode
od
d
de
e
(While
Mobile)
W
While
M
Mobil
obile
obil
obile)
ob
o
b
bile)
bil
bile
iile
le)
e
WIN-T
WIN
W
N-T
T Inc
Inc 2 Point
Poin
oin
in
nt of
of
Presence
Presence
sence
ence
ce
e
Ruggedized
MPM-1000 Modem
WIN-T
WINWI
WINWIN
IN-T
IIN
N-T
N
-T
T Inc
In
Inc 2 Tactical
Tac
Tac
Tact
cttic
ic
ical
ica
cal
ca
al
a
Communications
Commun
Commun
Communic
om
mmu
un ations
t ns
s Node
No
ode
d
(While
h Stationary)
Stationar
Stationar
tati
ationary)
a
ationa
y)
Highband Networking Waveform
Line of Sight Radio
Highband
Networking
Waveform Line
of Sight
Antenna
On-The-Move
SATCOM
Antenna
WIN-T
WIN
IN-T
IN
N-T
T Inc
In
I c 2 Soldier
Sold
So die
iier
er
e
Network
Extension
N
Extensio
e on
Initial Network
Operations
Source: U.S. Army.
System development
Design
review
(2/08)
Full-rate
decision
(8/12)
Initial
capability
(5/13)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 127
Latest
12/2009
$268.5
$4,469.9
$4,738.4
$2.138
2,216
65
Percent
change
14.3
30.8
29.7
10.8
17.1
30.0
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
lo
WIN-T Increment 2 entered production in
February 2010 with all 15 of its critical
technologies mature. However, the program is
currently addressing significant performance and
reliability shortfalls that were revealed in a March
2009 limited user test. The test results showed that
WIN-T Increment 2 did not meet its operational
reliability requirements. DOD’s Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation, recommended
that the Army improve performance and training
to address these deficiencies and ensure success
during initial operational test, which is scheduled
for early fiscal year 2012. We could not assess
production maturity. According to the Army, 
WIN-T is primarily an information technology
integration effort that relies on commercially
available products. Performance is measured
through a series of test events to demonstrate
performance at increasing levels of system
integration.
As of
10/2007
$235.0
$3,418.3
$3,653.3
$1.930
1,893
50
le
ve
Prime contractor: General Dynamics
C4 Systems Corp.
Program office: Ft. Monmouth, NJ
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $39.4 million
Procurement: $3,868.6 million
Total funding: $3,908.0 million
Procurement quantity: 1,856
GAO
review
(11/10)
d
Program Essentials
Low-rate
decision
(2/10)
si
re
Program/development
start
(6/07)
Production
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
Not
assessed
0
Development
start
(6/07)
DOD
design
review
(2/08)
Production GAO
decision review
(2/10) (11/10)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: WIN-T Increment 2
WIN-T Increment 2 Program
Technology Maturity
All 15 WIN-T Increment 2 critical technologies were
mature by its February 2010 production decision. In
September 2009, the Army completed a technology
readiness assessment to support a low-rate initial
production decision. An independent review team
reviewed this technology readiness assessment and
the body of evidence used to support it and
concluded that all 15 critical technologies were
mature. In November 2009, the Director, Defense
Research and Engineering, concurred with the
independent review team’s assessment, noting that
tests conducted by the Army show that each of 
WIN-T Increment 2’s critical technologies have been
demonstrated in a realistic environment.
Design Maturity
We could not assess the design maturity of WIN-T
Increment 2 because the program office does not
track the number of releasable drawings. According
to the program office, WIN-T is primarily an
information technology integration effort that relies
on commercially available products. Performance is
measured through a series of component,
subsystem, configuration item, and network level
test events designed to demonstrate performance at
increasing levels of system integration. Design
stability is measured through a problem tracking
report system. Problem tracking report trends are
reported and tracked on a weekly basis by the
program office.
Production Maturity
We could not assess the production maturity of the
WIN-T Increment 2. According to the program office,
WIN-T is primarily an information technology
integration effort that relies on commercially
available products.
Other Program Issues
During a March 2009 limited user test, WIN-T
Increment 2 failed to demonstrate the ability to
support mobile operations as well as the required
capabilities in forested terrain. WIN-T Increment 2
operational effectiveness was degraded because the
program’s concept of operations, organizational
structure, and manning were not adequate to
operate and troubleshoot the network. Further, the
test concluded that the WIN-T Increment 2 did not
meet its operational reliability requirements because
Page 128
three critical components demonstrated poor
reliability. In a January 2010 operational assessment
of this limited user test, DOD’s Director, Operational
Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), recommended that
the Army take certain actions to address these
deficiencies to ensure success at the WIN-T
Increment 2 initial operational test scheduled for the
first quarter of fiscal year 2012. DOT&E
recommended that the Army improve the
performance of the Increment 2 waveforms, provide
greater training to soldiers, refine its tactics and
manning levels for Increment 2, and aggressively
pursue a reliability growth program for WIN-T
Increment 2 components. According to the program
office, it is working to address these concerns and
respond to these recommendations before the start
of the program’s operational test.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the
Army addressed (1) the development of a failure
mode closure plan, (2) risk reduction events, and 
(3) production qualification testing for WIN-T
Increment 2. With regard to the failure mode closure
plan, the Army noted that, as directed by the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the program
office has identified, provided corrections for,
tested, and resolved all 37 of WIN-T Increment 2’s
identified failure modes identified from the limited
user test. The Army also noted that a series of OSDwitnessed closure events and formal reports have
been completed. With regard to risk reduction, the
Army explained that, as directed by OSD, the
program office designed, executed, and performed
analysis illustrating successful support for seven
critical technical performance parameters, including
mobile throughput and scalability. With regard to
production qualification testing, the Army noted that
the program office has two production qualification
test events scheduled in fiscal year 2012 to further
validate system readiness prior to the initial
operational test. The Army also provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: WIN-T Increment 3
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 3
WIN-T is the Army’s high-speed and high-capacity
backbone communications network. WIN-T
connects Army units with higher levels of command
and provides the Army’s tactical portion of the
Global Information Grid. WIN-T was restructured
following a March 2007 Nunn-McCurdy unit cost
breach of the critical threshold, and will be fielded in
four increments. The third increment will provide
the Army a full networking on-the-move capability.
WIN-T Increment 3
Full Networking On The Move
Antenna
(High Band Radio Frequency Unit)
2 ch & 4 ch
JC4ISR
Air & Ground
Ground Only
HRFU-MT
Air Only
HRFU-EK
Addition of
Airborne Tier
Ground Only
BCT
Single chassis JC4ISR
Radio that provides
4x network capacity
as the LOS Inc 2
radio
WIN-T
WINWIN
W
ININ-T
IIN
N-T
N
--T
T Inc
In
nc 3 Soldier
nc
S
Solldierr
So
Sold
Network
Net
Netwo
Netw
N
etw
e
etttwork
etwo
work
w
wo
ork
k Extension
Extensio
t sio
ion
DIV
• Adds an airborne communications node as a third tier of tactical
networked communications.
• Provides a fully mobile and flexible network to a dispersed force of
noncontiguous terrain.
• Aerial tier increases throughput and reduces reliance on SATCOM.
WIN-T
WIN
WINW
IN
N-T
N
-T
T Inc
In
Inc 3 Tactical
T ct
Tact
ctic
ical
ica
ical
ca
c
al
Communications
Communi
Communic
Co
Comm
Com
C
om
ommun
o
ommu
ommunic
mmunic
mm
muni
munic
m
u
unic
nii a
n
ations
ons Node
Node
de
d
e
(While
(While
hile
ile
e Mobile)
Mobil
obile)
obi
obile
obile)
bile
ile)
il
le
e))
Full Network Operations
Fully automated network operations - no pause in operations
Source: U.S. Army.
System development
Full-rate
decision
(7/18)
Initial
capability
(2/19)
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions)
Research and development cost
Procurement cost
Total program cost
Program unit cost
Total quantities
Acquisition cycle time (months)
Page 129
Latest
10/2010
$2,189.2
$11,476.8
$13,666.0
$4.261
3,207
187
Percent
change
-17.3
-14.8
-15.3
-8.0
-7.9
13.3
Attainment of Product Knowledge
no
w
le
dg
e
Production,
288
design, and
technology
maturity
fk
Design and
technology
192
maturity
lo
The WIN-T Increment 3 program will not fully
mature its critical technologies until its planned
March 2015 production decision. Three of the
program’s 20 critical technologies are currently
mature and 15 are nearing maturity. Of the two
remaining technologies, one was rated as nearing
maturity by an independent review team; but, the
Director, Defense Research and Engineering,
concluded that the technology’s ambiguous
requirements made it difficult to state whether it
had been adequately demonstrated. The other
technology—a cryptographic device whose
development is being managed by the National
Security Agency—has not been formally rated.
The Army recently developed a revised WIN-T
Increment 3 acquisition program baseline to
account for changes due to the cancellation of the
Future Combat System program.
As of
05/2009
$2,647.4
$13,477.9
$16,125.3
$4.631
3,482
165
le
ve
Prime contractor: General Dynamics
C4 Systems Corp.
Program office: Ft. Monmouth, NJ
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,046.9 million
Procurement: $11,476.8 million
Total funding: $12,523.7 million
Procurement quantity: 3,168
Low-rate
decision
(3/15)
d
Program Essentials
Design
review
(4/13)
GAO
review
(11/10)
si
re
Program/development
start
(7/03)
Production
De
Concept
Technology
maturity 96
Projection
Not
assessed
0
Development GAO DOD
start
review design
(7/03)
(11/10) review
(4/13)
Not
assessed
Production
decision
(3/15)
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: WIN-T Increment 3
WIN-T Increment 3 Program
Technology Maturity
The WIN-T Increment 3 program will not fully
mature its critical technologies until its planned
March 2015 production decision. An April 2009
review of the Army’s technology readiness
assessment for WIN-T Increment 3 by the Director,
Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E),
concluded that, of the program’s 20 critical
technologies, 3 were mature and 15 were nearing
maturity.
Of the two remaining technologies, the Quality of
Service Edge Device (QED) was rated as nearing
maturity in the Army’s assessment; however,
DDR&E concluded that this technology had
ambiguous requirements that made it difficult to
state whether it had been adequately demonstrated.
DDR&E noted that while the Army had
demonstrated that the QED technology met
requirements under most conditions, in one
stressing scenario, it did not. DDR&E
representatives believe that it is unlikely that any
network can meet this requirement in all
environments. Since the QED technology was
shown to be robust and capable of meeting its
requirement in most scenarios, DDR&E
recommended that the Army clarify the user’s
requirements for this technology by the next design
review. According to a program office official, the
Army’s Training and Doctrine Command has
revisited user requirements for this critical
technology; however, a new rating for this
technology will not be formalized until the program’s
design review, currently scheduled for February
2014.
The other remaining technology—High Assurance
Internet Protocol Encryptor (HAIPE) version 3.X—
was not available to be rated at the time of DDR&E’s
review in April 2009. HAIPE is a device that encrypts
and encapsulates Internet protocol packets so that
they can be securely transported over a network of a
different security classification. Version 1.3.5 of
HAIPE is mature; however, according to the WIN-T
program office, its use in WIN-T Increment 3 would
result in a less efficient network design. DDR&E has
notified the Army that the maturity of the HAIPE
version 3.X technology should be established to
DDR&E’s satisfaction before it is transitioned into
WIN-T Increment 3. The National Security Agency
Page 130
(NSA) manages the HAIPE program, and is
responsible for certifying that vendors’ HAIPE
products comply with the HAIPE interoperability
specification. According to an NSA representative,
NSA has informally assessed HAIPE 3.X and
believes it is mature. However, NSA has not been
tasked by the Army or DDR&E with providing a
formal assessment of HAIPE 3.X’s technology
maturity. As a result, our assessment and
presentation of WIN-T’s Increment 3’s technology
maturity excludes this critical technology.
Design Maturity
We could not assess the design stability of the WIN-T
Increment 3 because the program office does not
track the number of releasable drawings. According
to the program office, this metric is not meaningful
because WIN-T is not a manufacturing effort, but
rather an integration effort. Performance is
measured through a series of component,
subsystem, configuration item, and network level
test events designed to demonstrate performance at
increasing levels of system integration. Design
stability is measured through a problem tracking
report system. Problem track report trends are
reported and tracked on a weekly basis by the
program office.
Other Program Issues
In May 2009, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics approved a
revised acquisition program baseline for the WIN-T
Increment 3 program. However, this new baseline
was developed prior to the Secretary of Defense’s
recommended cancellation of the Future Combat
System (FCS) program, which was closely related to
WIN-T Increment 3. As a result, the Under Secretary
restricted the Army from obligating or expending
WIN-T Increment 3 funds associated directly with
FCS and directed that a new cost estimate and
acquisition program baseline be completed and
approved. In October 2010, the Under Secretary
approved a revised acquisition program baseline for
WIN-T Increment 3, based on an independent cost
estimate prepared by the Director, Cost Assessment
and Program Evaluation (CAPE), that reflects the
restructured program.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the
Army provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: AMDR
Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR)
The Navy’s Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR)
will be a next-generation radar system designed to
provide ballistic missile defense, air defense, and
surface warfare capabilities. AMDR will consist of
an S-band radar for ballistic missile defense and air
defense, X-band radar for horizon search, and a
radar suite controller that controls and integrates
the two radars. AMDR will initially support DDG 51
Flight III. The Navy expects AMDR to provide the
foundation for a scalable radar architecture to
defeat advanced threats.
Source: U.S. Navy.
Current Status
The AMDR program entered technology development in September 2010 and is one of the first programs to
incorporate affordability cost targets as part of the acquisition strategy. In addition, in September 2010, the
Navy awarded three fixed-price incentive fee contracts to Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and
Raytheon for S-band radar and radar suite controller technology development. The contractors will build and
test prototypes to demonstrate the critical technologies during a 2-year technology development period. The
Navy then plans to conduct a limited competition among the technology development contractors for
engineering and manufacturing development. According to the program’s technology development strategy,
the X-band radar technology is mature and the Navy plans to acquire it through full and open competition.
The Navy will provide it as government-furnished equipment to the S-band and radar suite controller
contractor to manage the integration during engineering and manufacturing development. Additional
software development will be required to integrate the two radars.
To support the decision to enter technology development, the Navy conducted an early evaluation of
technology maturity and identified six candidate critical technologies—four hardware-related and two
software-related. According to program officials, digital beamforming—necessary for AMDR’s simultaneous
air defense and ballistic missile defense mission—will likely take the longest time in development to mature.
Program officials stated that while this technology is currently in use on existing radars, it has not been
demonstrated on a large-aperture radar. The Navy is coordinating with the Air Force’s Space Fence program
on the S-band radar’s technology development. The Navy estimates that AMDR will be available for delivery
to a shipyard in fiscal year 2019.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $15,668.8 million 
Research and development: $2,257.6 million 
Procurement: $13,382.9 million 
Quantities: 24
Next Major Program Event: Preliminary design review, July 2012
Program Office Comments: The AMDR program office concurred with this assessment and provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
Page 131
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: B-2 DMS
B-2 Defensive Management System (DMS) Modernization
The Air Force’s B-2 DMS modernization is expected
to upgrade the 1980s-era analog defensive
management system to a digital capability. The
modernization effort is intended to improve the
frequency coverage and sensitivity of the electronic
warfare suite, as well as update pilot displays and
inflight replanning capability for avoiding
unanticipated air defense threats. It is also expected
to improve reliability and maintainability for the
system. According to program officials, the current
DMS is a major readiness driver for the aircraft.
Source: U.S. Air Force.
Current Status
In June 2010, the B-2 DMS program received its material development decision and entered the material
solution analysis phase. As part of this phase, the program will conduct an analysis of alternatives. According
to program officials, the analysis of alternatives will consider three options: (1) a minimum upgrade (only
critical electronic parts of current DMS); (2) a fully modernized DMS; and (3) an incremental DMS upgrade.
Upon completion of the analysis of alternatives, the program anticipates entering the technology
development phase in March 2011. The program tentatively plans to enter engineering and manufacturing
development in 2013 after it completes its preliminary design review, and projects an initial operational
capability for the B-2 DMS around fiscal year 2020.
A primary focus for the B-2 DMS program in technology development will be the low-observable antennas for
the B-2’s leading edges. Overall, the program office has identified six critical technologies. According to the
program office, five of the critical technologies are nearing maturity or are mature and have been
demonstrated in a relevant or realistic environment. The low-observable antennas for the B-2 leading edges
are the least mature. The primary risk with the technology’s development will be achieving the desired
performance while still meeting the low-observable requirements of the aircraft. During the technology
development phase, the program does not plan to develop prototypes of the full B-2 DMS, but instead plans to
develop prototype antenna subsystems, which is the area it believes contains the most technological risk.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $1,505.8 million
Research and development: $937.1 million
Procurement: $568.7 million
Quantities: 20
Note: This is an initial draft cost estimate developed by the program office. A formal baseline cost estimate is
expected for the milestone A decision scheduled for March 2011.
Next Major Program Event: Technology development start (milestone A), March 2011
Program Office Comments: The program was provided a draft of this assessment and had no comments.
Page 132
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: B-2 EHF SATCOM Increment 2
B-2 Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability, Increment 2
The Air Force’s B-2 EHF SATCOM is a satellite
communication system designed to upgrade the
aircraft’s ultra high frequency system to ensure
continued secure, survivable communication. The
system has three increments, with each expected to
be its own program. Increment 2 is designed to
provide connectivity by adding low-observable
antennas and radomes to the aircraft. It also
includes separate, nonintegrated Family of
Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T)
and related hardware.
Source: U.S. Air Force.
Current Status
The B-2 EHF Increment 2 program is in technology development. In March 2008, the program began a
component advanced development effort that includes systems engineering, requirements analysis,
technology maturation, and preliminary design activities. The program plans to enter engineering and
manufacturing development in fiscal year 2013—3 years later than originally planned.
The B-2 EHF Increment 2 program has attempted to make decisions that balance requirements with technical
solutions; however, antenna technology maturation and FAB-T availability still pose risks. For example, as a
result of a recent trade study, the program’s key performance parameters were revised to reflect what is
achievable and technically feasible. In addition, the Air Force changed the antenna location and technology
to an active electronically scanned array (AESA) to lower risk. These decisions are expected to mitigate
integration risks, but technology maturation risks still exist. The program expects its critical technologies to
be nearing maturity by development start, but current technology readiness levels for AESA are relatively low
and the program does not have a fallback antenna technology option should the AESA technology not mature
as expected. An Air Force review also raised concerns that the decision to pursue AESA technologies
exclusively may have precluded the use of lower risk, more affordable and mature technologies. In addition
to these challenges, the availability of FAB-T hardware, which enables voice and data satellite
communication, has significantly delayed the program. Due in part to the FAB-T delays, the B-2 EHF
Increment 2 will not begin production by the current U.S. Strategic Command need date in fiscal year 2016.
The program’s initial operational capability is expected in March 2020.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $1,796.7 million
Research and development: $1,331.2 million
Procurement: $464.5 million
Quantities: 20
Next Major Program Event: Engineering and manufacturing development start, March 2013
Program Office Comments: In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office noted that a
2008 trade study validated program risk areas related to the antenna’s technology and planned location on the
B-2. This study concluded that changing the antenna’s technology to an electrical antenna would
considerably reduce risk, allowing relocation and, as a result, precluded negative effects on the B-2’s
structure and radar cross section. The Air Force also provided technical comments, which were incorporated
as appropriate.
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Common Name: BMDS: ALTB
BMDS: Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB)
MDA’s ALTB, formerly the Airborne Laser program,
is being developed as an advanced platform for the
Department of Defense’s directed energy research
program. The ALTB platform includes two solid
state lasers and a high-energy laser housed aboard a
modified Boeing 747-aircraft. The ALTB will
transition to a national test platform over the next 4
years.
Source: Missile Defense Agency.
Current Status
Until recently, MDA’s Airborne Laser program was developing a prototype system to negate enemy missiles
during the boost phase of flight. However, after spending more than $5 billion on its development, DOD
designated it as a test bed to demonstrate the potential of using directed energy as a viable technology against
ballistic missiles. In February 2010, MDA demonstrated that the ALTB could successfully destroy a shortrange threat-representative ballistic missile during the boost phase. According to the Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), the demonstration utilized a realistic target and was the most operationally
relevant test of the Airborne Laser to-date. However, DOT&E also noted that despite the realism of the target
missile, the test was not operationally realistic because a key component of the ALTB’s detection and
tracking system was removed because it exhibited technical issues during earlier ground and flight testing.
MDA conducted its second major flight test of the ALTB in early September 2010 against a short-range
ballistic missile in the boost phase, but failed to destroy the target. The ATLB successfully detected and
tracked the target, but corrupted beam control software steered the high-energy laser slightly off center. The
ALTB safety system detected this shift and shut down the high-energy laser. MDA conducted a third flight test
in October 2010 against a solid-fuel missile. However, while the system seems to have successfully acquired
and tracked the plume or rocket exhaust of the target, it never transitioned to active tracking. As a result, the
laser was not fired. The laser incorrectly reported that it was not ready and the safety default aborted the
engagement.
Total Program Funding: NA
Next Major Program Event: NA
Program Office Comments: In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the ALTB program acknowledged
DOT&E’s comments but noted that the test bed is focused on scientific learning rather than proof of
operational capability. According to the program, MDA is collaborating with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to establish experiments that maximize benefits for DOD directed-energy programs. In fiscal year
2010, the ALTB conducted 40 flight experiments, including engagements of eight boosted targets. The ALTB
also destroyed a solid-fuel metal-body target missile prior to its first major flight test. In May 2010, ALTB
successfully engaged a diagnostic target missile at twice the range of the February experiments—a key riskreduction event for future experiments. MDA continues to support directed energy as a hedge against the
ever-changing threat environment.
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GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: BMDS: FTF
BMDS: Flexible Target Family (FTF)
MDA’s Flexible Target Family was designed to be a
family of short-, medium-, and long-range targets
with common components for ground-, air-, and sealaunch capabilities. MDA is currently producing a
groundlaunched, intermediate-range target, the LV-2,
for BMDS flight tests. It is also developing a second
target in this family, the 52-inch extended medium
range ballistic missile target (eMRBM).
Source: Missile Defense Agency.
Current Status
The LV-2 has been successfully tested and is in production. MDA flew the first LV-2 target vehicle in January
2010. During this test, the program was able to demonstrate all the critical technologies necessary for the 
LV-2 in the current BMDS test plan. These technologies had not been flight tested in the necessary form, fit,
and function before production began. There are currently five additional LV-2 target missiles in various
stages of production, all in the same configuration. In order to assess production risks, the contractor is
collecting data on labor hours and scrap, rework, and defect rates and has reported that these measures are
tracking as expected. MDA had originally planned to produce at least one alternative configuration of the 
LV-2 that used a shrouded reentry vehicle, but the mission requiring this technology was dropped from the
agency’s test plan. MDA officials said they could purchase additional LV-2 targets, but no additional ones are
currently under contract. The second LV-2 flight test was scheduled for the first quarter of fiscal year 2011.
MDA is not planning to conduct a risk-reduction flight for the second Flexible Target Family vehicle, the 52inch eMRBM, because of budget constraints. This target uses more than 90 percent of the same ground and
flight software, and 72 percent of the same components as the LV-2. However, these components must be
incorporated into a new, smaller structure, which could pose an integration risk. MDA plans to use the first
two eMRBMs in a BMDS operational test in 2012. In April 2010, MDA began acquiring the first three eMRBMs,
and in September 2010 increased the quantity from three to five. MDA expects to complete negotiations and
definitize the contract in July 2011.
Total Funding for LV-2 (Fiscal years 2005 to 2013): Research and development $622.2 million
Quantities: 6
Next Major Program Event: Third LV-2 flight test, third quarter fiscal year 2011
Program Office Comments: In commenting on a draft of this assessment, MDA provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
Page 135
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: C-27J JCA
C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA)
The Air Force’s C-27J is a commercially available,
multifunctional small-to-medium-size cargo aircraft.
It is designed to help meet time-sensitive and
mission critical transport requirements, and to
augment the Air Force’s intratheater lift inventory.
Its mission also includes casualty evacuation,
airdrop, troop transport, aerial sustainment, and
homeland security. The aircraft is capable of
carrying up-armored High Mobility Multipurpose
Wheeled Vehicles and heavy, dense loads such as
aircraft engines and ammunition.
Source: L-3 Communications.
Current Status
The C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft program has been in production since June 2007. The sixth aircraft was
delivered in November 2010. The program completed the transition from an Army-led joint program to an Air
Force program in October 2010. Current plans are to procure 38 aircraft and assign them to Air National
Guard bases. The Air Force Air Mobility Command and the National Guard Bureau have identified the first
six locations to receive C-27J aircraft as Mansfield, Ohio; Baltimore, Maryland; Meridian, Mississippi; Battle
Creek, Michigan; Fargo, North Dakota; and Bradley, Connecticut. The C-27J program office has established a
foreign military sales section which has received requests for information about pricing and availability from
a number of countries. However, as of July 2010, no foreign military sales cases had been initiated.
The C-27J program was to achieve initial operational capability in August 2010, but due to delays in multiservice operational test and evaluation, as well as delays in receiving certification from the Federal Aviation
Administration, initial capability is now anticipated for January 2011. In June 2010 the Air Force received
authorization from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to expand the
low-rate initial production procurement (LRIP) by up to 8 aircraft, to a total of 21. This does not affect the
total quantities. Program officials explained that the firm fixed-price contract for the C-27J is based on prices
established according to the number of aircraft purchased in a given period. By expanding the maximum
number of LRIP aircraft, the program was able to order 8 aircraft in the latest ordering period at the currently
agreed upon price rather than waiting for the next ordering period. According to program officials, this
helped save an estimated $19 million and avoid a significant break in production.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $1,966.3 million
Research and development: $118.3 million
Procurement: $1,773.2 million
Quantities: 38
Next Major Program Event: Full-rate production decision, February 2011
Program Office Comments: The program office was provided a draft of this assessment and did not offer
any comments.
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GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: DDG 51
DDG 51 Destroyer
The Navy’s DDG 51 destroyer is a multimission
surface ship designed to operate against air, surface,
and subsurface threats. The Navy started buying
DDG 51 destroyers in 1985 and expects to have 62
destroyers in service by 2012. In 2008, the Navy
announced it would continue the program and plans
to buy nine more ships over the next 5 years. The
Navy then expects to start buying a new version of
the ship—Flight III—in fiscal year 2016. Initial plans
for Flight III include an increased emphasis on
ballistic missile defense.
Source: U.S. Navy.
Current Status
In 2008, the Navy announced its plan to restart the DDG 51 Flight IIA production line. The Navy anticipates
that construction of DDG 113—the first ship in the restart program—will begin in fiscal year 2012 after an
approximate 4-year gap in new DDG 51 starts. While program officials do not currently anticipate utilizing
any new technologies or changing the Flight IIA design, the Navy could decide to use a hybrid electric drive
designed to reduce fuel consumption on both new and existing DDG 51 destroyers, as well as in future
designs, if it proves to be successful. The system is currently a prototype. The Navy is also working to address
any industrial base issues that result from the production gap. For example, officials stated that before the
Navy decided to restart DDG 51 production, the existing contractor for DDG 51 main reduction gears sold its
production line. The Navy conducted a full and open competition and will now provide the gears as
government-furnished equipment.
According to the program officials, a new air and missile defense radar will be the major technology effort for
Flight III. The radar is being developed through a separate program office. According to the DDG 51 program,
improving power generation on Flight III will be important to accommodate the expected increase in power
and cooling requirements for this radar. The radar could also pose a risk for Flight III construction. The Navy
estimates that it will not be available for delivery to a shipyard until fiscal year 2019—2 years prior to ship
delivery according to the Navy. Officials stated that a decision has not been made to determine where the
DDG 51 program will start in DOD’s milestone review process for the development and acquisition of the
Flight III changes.
Estimated Total Program Cost (fiscal years 2010-2015): $16,926.5 million
Research and development: $140.8 million
Procurement: $16,785.7 million
Quantities: 9
Next Major Program Event: DDG 113 construction start, fiscal year 2012
Program Office Comments: The program office provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
Page 137
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: DWSS
Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS)
DOD’s Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS) is
a next-generation polar-orbiting environmental
satellite system with primary coverage in the early
morning orbit. The system will incorporate data
from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) / National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) Joint Polar Satellite
System (JPSS) in the afternoon and from the
European Meteorological Operational (MetOp)
satellite in mid-morning.
Source: Northrop Grumman.
Current Status
In February 2010, the Executive Office of the President announced that the National Polar-orbiting
Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program was being restructured because of longstanding cost, schedule, and performance issues and management deficiencies. DOD and NOAA/NASA were
directed to proceed with separately-managed acquisitions—DWSS for DOD and JPSS for NOAA/NASA.
Currently, DOD obtains weather data through Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) satellites.
The Air Force launched a DMSP satellite in 2009 and has two remaining satellites, which it plans to launch as
needed. To ensure continued coverage, the Air Force plans to have DWSS satellites available for launch in
2018 and 2021.
To reduce developmental risks and lower acquisition costs, the Air Force expects to leverage to the
maximum extent the technology and investments made in the NPOESS program. The DWSS satellite bus is a
modified NPOESS bus, but reduced in size and weight to meet DOD mission requirements. DWSS plans to use
the visible infrared imager radiometer suite (VIIRS) sensor planned for NPOESS, as well as the ground
control system based on the NPOESS design. The Air Force is evaluating microwave sensor alternatives,
focusing on affordability while still providing DMSP-comparable microwave capability.
Estimated Total Program Cost: TBD
Research and development: TBD
Procurement: NA
Quantities: 2
Next Major Program Event: Materiel development decision, February 2011
Program Office Comments: Program officials stated they are working on restructuring the NPOESS prime
contract to facilitate transition of civil NOAA/NASA work while focusing on DOD mission needs. Also, DOD
and NOAA/NASA are working to complete a memorandum of agreement on sharing common elements at the
VIIRS contractor and DOD plans to acquire duplicate test sets and ground support equipment to minimize
single supplier issues.
Page 138
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: EPS
Enhanced Polar System (EPS)
The Air Force’s Enhanced Polar System (EPS) will
provide next-generation protected extremely high
frequency (EHF) satellite communications in the
polar region above 65 degrees northern latitude. EPS
will replace the current Interim Polar System and
serve as a polar adjunct to the Advanced EHF
(AEHF) system. EPS consists of two EHF payloads
hosted on classified satellites. A gateway will
connect modified AEHF communications terminals
to other communication systems utilizing an
extension of the AEHF mission control segment.
Source: LinQuest Corporation.
Current Status
The EPS program is preparing to enter system development. It was initiated in fiscal year 2006 to fill the gap
left by the cancellation of the Advanced Polar System. In December 2007, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics directed the program to bypass concept development and proceed to a
system development decision in order to synchronize the program’s schedule with the host satellite
production timeline. Since then, the Air Force has determined that the EPS program would require additional
payload engineering and changes to the gateway, and the program’s entry into system development has been
delayed from February 2010 to the third quarter of fiscal year 2011. In addition, the program’s projected cost
could significantly increase. According to program officials, the EPS program did not have an opportunity to
develop a complete and thorough cost estimate because it was directed to proceed directly to a system
development decision. The fiscal year 2011 President’s budget request included about $1 billion for the
program through fiscal year 2015; however, program officials stated that the new cost estimate might require
double this amount. Before the EPS program can enter system development, the milestone decision authority
will have to certify that this funding is available.
According to the program office, EPS critical technologies are mature. Although the program does not plan to
conduct prototyping prior to the start of development, program officials noted the EPS has conducted
prototyping in the payload, ground, gateway, and terminal segments as part of the technology development
phase of the program. According to DOD acquisition policy, the technology development strategy for each
major defense acquisition program shall provide for prototypes of the system or, if a system prototype is not
feasible, for prototypes of critical subsystems before it gets approval to enter the engineering and
manufacturing development phase.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $1,490.7 million
Research and development: $1,395.4 million
Procurement: $79.7 million
Quantities: 2
Next Major Program Event: System development decision, third quarter of fiscal year 2011
Program Office Comments: The EPS program office provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.
Page 139
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: F-22A Raptor
F-22A Raptor
The Air Force’s F-22A Raptor is the only fifthgeneration operational air-to-air and air-to-ground
fighter/attack aircraft. This aircraft integrates
stealth, supercruise, and advanced avionics,
maneuverability, and weapons in one platform. The
Air Force established the F-22A modernization and
improvement program in 2003 to add enhanced airto-ground, information warfare, reconnaissance, and
other capabilities and improve the reliability and
maintainability of the aircraft.
Source: U.S. Air Force.
Current Status
In April 2009, the Secretary of Defense announced that F-22A production would end at 187 aircraft, and as of
September 2010, the Air Force had accepted delivery of 160 aircraft. According to the Director, Operational
Test and Evaluation, the F-22A could have difficulty meeting operational suitability requirements relating to
low-observable maintainability when the system reaches full maturity. Air Force officials reported that the
low-observable materials are difficult to manage and maintain, requiring nearly twice the number of
maintenance personnel as anticipated.
The Air Force is upgrading the F-22A fleet in four increments. The first increment has been fielded. The
second increment—Increment 3.1—will begin follow-on operational test and evaluation in January 2011.
These increments add enhanced air-to-air and air-to-ground; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
and synthetic aperture radar capabilities. The third increment—Increment 3.2—has been divided into two
phases. The first will deliver electronic protection, combat identification, and Link 16 communication
upgrades beginning in 2014. The second phase will begin fielding AIM-9X and AIM-120D capabilities, and
additional electronic protection upgrades beginning in 2016. The multifunction advanced datalink, planned to
provide interoperability with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, was removed from Increment 3.2 after costs
increased significantly over initial estimates and the program was unable to secure fiscal year 2010 funding.
Increment 3.3 will enable compliance with air traffic management standards, but the additional content for
this increment has not yet been determined.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $77,392.8 million
Research and development: $39,171.7 million
Procurement: $37,560.5 million
Quantities: 188
Next Major Program Event: Final aircraft delivery, February 2012
Program Office Comments: The Air Force acknowledged challenges associated with maintaining a fifthgeneration low-observable system, and said there are currently more than 10 ongoing efforts under the
reliability and maintainability maturation program to increase maintainability and material durability. The Air
Force also stated that the majority of repairs to the low observable system resulted from having to perform
other maintenance activities, rather than to address problems with the low observable system itself.
According to the service, all operational units have reported mission capable rates for the low-observable
system of about 90 percent, since January 2009. The Air Force also provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.
Page 140
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: H-1 Upgrades
H-1 Upgrades (UH-1Y/AH-1Z)
The Navy’s H-1 Upgrades Program converts the 
AH-1W attack helicopter and the UH-1N utility
helicopter to the AH1-Z and UH-1Y configurations,
respectively. The mission of the AH-1Z attack
helicopter is to provide rotary-wing fire support and
reconnaissance capabilities in day/night and adverse
weather conditions. The mission of the UH-1Y utility
helicopter is to provide command, control, and
assault support under the same conditions.
Source: U.S. Navy.
Current Status
The UH-1Y and AH-1Z configurations are in production. DOD approved full-rate production for the UH-1Y in
September 2008. The program received approval to enter full-rate production for the AH-1Z in November
2010. The Navy completed operational testing and evaluation for the AH-1Z in June 2010. The evaluation
report, issued in September 2010, concluded that the AH-1Z is operationally effective and suitable, and
recommended the aircraft for introduction in the fleet. The report also highlighted concerns with logistics
supportability and recommended this deficiency be corrected prior to the first AH-1Z operational
deployment.
In July 2010, the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Aviation issued a directive changing the
composition of H-1 program procurements from 123 UH-1Ys and 226 AH-1Zs to 160 UH-1Ys and 189 AH-1Zs.
The Deputy Commandant cited increased demand for utility helicopters in support of combat operations and
the increase in combat power of the AH-1Z compared to the AH-1W as support for the directive. As of
November 2010, there were 98 H-1 upgrades under contract, and 46 aircraft—34 UH-1Ys and 12 AH-1Zs—had
been delivered to the fleet.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $11,866.5 million
Research and development: $1,855.3 million
Procurement: $10,011.2 million
Quantities: 4 (Research and Development), 349 (Procurement)
Next Major Program Event: Initial operational capability, AH-1Z, second quarter fiscal year 2011
Program Office Comments: The Navy provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
Page 141
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: JLTV
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
The Army and Marine Corps’ Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle is a family of vehicles focused on balancing
personnel protection, payload, and performance.
JLTV is expected to reduce life-cycle costs through
commonality at the subassembly and component
level. The JLTV is expected to provide defensive
measures for troops while in transport, increase
payload capability, improve the logistics footprint,
and reduce soldier workload associated with system
operation and field maintenance activities.
Source: Department of Defense.
Current Status
In December 2007, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics directed the
Army to begin a 27-month technology development phase for the JLTV program with the goal of reducing
risks prior to and shortening the length of system development. Prior to entering engineering and
manufacturing development, the JLTV program will develop prototypes, demonstrate critical technologies in
a relevant environment, and conduct a preliminary design review, as required by DOD policy. In October
2008, the Army awarded three technology development contracts. The three contractors delivered prototype
vehicles in May 2010. Testing on the prototypes has begun and is expected to last about a year. At the
conclusion of technology development, the Army plans to hold a full and open competition and award two
engineering and manufacturing development contracts. One of these two contractors will be selected for
production.
The JLTV’s acquisition costs have not been determined, but based on evolving user requirements the JLTV
average unit manufacturing cost is estimated at $356,000. This cost does not include contractor general and
administrative cost, contractor profit, or government-furnished equipment. The program has a demanding set
of projected requirements and tradeoffs may be necessary. Among the program’s key challenges is whether
the vehicle can provide the performance and reliability required within the weight limits for helicopter
transport.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $53,523.3 million
Research and development: $1,082.2 million
Procurement: $52,298.3
Quantities: 60,383
Next Major Program Event: Engineering and manufacturing development start, January 2012
Program Office Comments: In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated that
JLTV provides a design that supports mobility, reliability, and maintainability within weight limits to ensure
transportability to and from the battlefield. The program office also noted that JLTV uses scalable armor
solutions to meet requirements for added protection while maintaining load carrying capacity.
Page 142
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: KC-X
KC-X Program
The Air Force’s KC-X program is the first of three
phases in the recapitalization of the KC-135 aerial
refueling tanker fleet. The KC-X acquisition strategy
calls for the procurement of 179 commercial
derivative aircraft tankers at an expected cost of
around $35 billion. The KC-X is planned to provide
sustained aerial refueling capability to facilitate
global attack, air-bridge, deployment, sustainment,
employment, redeployment, homeland defense,
theater support, and specialized national defense
missions.
Source: U.S. Air Force.
Note: Photo is of the KC-135 Stratotanker, the aircraft the KC-X
will replace.
Current Status
The KC-135 recapitalization effort is the Air Force’s highest acquisition priority. It is expected to involve the
procurement of about 600 aircraft over a 40-year period with a cost that could exceed $100 billion. The first
phase of this recapitalization—the KC-X program—is in source selection. According to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Air Force plans to award a fixed-price incentive fee contract for the engineering
and manufacturing development phase of the KC-X program in early fiscal year 2011. The request for
proposal for this contract requires all critical technologies to be at a technology readiness level 6—
demonstrated in a relevant environment—or higher. According to its current acquisition strategy, the primary
technical risk for the KC-X program is the integration of military hardware and software on a commercial
platform. The Air Force plans to begin procurement of four aircraft for development and testing purposes in
fiscal year 2011.
The Air Force has experienced numerous delays in awarding a development contract. In February 2008, the
Air Force awarded a development contract to Northrop Grumman and the European Aeronautic Defense and
Space Company. However, the contract award was the subject of a bid protest that was sustained by GAO. As
a result, in October 2008, the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the Air Force to terminate the
contract and conduct a new competition.
Estimated Total Program Cost: TBD
Research and development: TBD
Procurement: TBD
Quantities: 179
Next Major Program Event: Engineering and manufacturing development start, early fiscal year 2011
Program Office Comments: The Office of the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy
provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate.
Page 143
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: NPOESS
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)
Until it was significantly restructured in February
2010, NPOESS was a triagency program with the
Department of Commerce (National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration), DOD (Air Force), and
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) designed to merge civil and defense weather
satellite programs to reduce costs, provide global
weather and climate coverage, and improve
capabilities above current fielded systems.
Source: Northrop Grumman.
Current Status
In February 2010, the Executive Office of the President announced that the NPOESS program was being
restructured because of long-standing cost, schedule, and performance issues and management deficiencies.
As part of the restructuring, DOD, NOAA, and NASA were directed to proceed with separately-managed
acquisitions—the Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS) and the civilian Joint Polar Satellite System
(JPSS). DOD, NOAA, and NASA will still be responsible for meeting NPOESS weather and climate
observational requirements in their assigned orbits. DOD will be responsible for collecting weather and
climate data during the early morning orbit. NOAA and NASA will be responsible for collecting weather and
climate data during the afternoon orbit. These agencies are expected to share data from a common ground
system to be managed by NOAA and NASA.
According to the Executive Office of the President, the JPSS will consist of platforms based on the NPOESS
Preparatory Project (NPP) satellite. NOAA is currently developing its plan for the JPSS and is considering
options such as developing a smaller satellite than the one planned for NPOESS and removing sensors that
were planned for the NPOESS satellites. NOAA will have to manage a series of challenges during the
transition from NPOESS to JPSS, including the resolution of existing contracts and intellectual property
issues and the loss of skilled workers. NOAA also has to address risks related to the readiness of ground
systems to support the planned October 2011 NPP satellite launch and the instrument readiness to support a
JPSS launch in 2014.
DOD is in the early stages of planning its approach for the DWSS program. See page 138 for more information
about the status of the program.
Estimated Total Program Cost: According to program officials, the estimated total program cost for
NPOESS was about $5.3 billion when last reported in fiscal year 2010.
Next Major Program Event: NA
Program Office Comments: We did not request comments on this assessment because the NPOESS
program office was disbanded before we completed our review.
Page 144
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Common Name: Navy UCAS-D
Navy Unmanned Combat Air System Aircraft Carrier Demonstration (UCAS-D)
The Navy’s UCAS-D program plans to demonstrate
and mature technologies that could be used on a
future unmanned, long-range, low-observable
carrier-based aircraft with an autonomous airrefueling capability, which would provide greater
standoff capability, expanded payload and launch
options, and increased naval reach and persistence.
Following completion of the demonstration and
technology maturation effort, the Navy will decide
whether to initiate a formal acquisition program.
Source: Northrop Grumman.
Current Status
The Navy UCAS-D program is a demonstration program. The program plans to demonstrate carrier
operations, including autonomous aerial refueling, of a low-observable unmanned combat air system and
mature both aircraft and other critical technologies needed to operate and integrate the aircraft with the ship.
These efforts are intended to support an acquisition decision for a potential Navy UCAS major defense
acquisition program, which could enter the acquisition process at either the technology demonstration or
engineering and manufacturing development phase. In August 2007, the Navy awarded a cost-plus incentive
fee contract to Northrop Grumman for the design, development, integration, test, and demonstration of two
unmanned combat air systems. The contractor has completed the first air vehicle and is currently building
the second air vehicle. First flight is scheduled for December 2010, and according to program officials, the
demonstration effort—excluding the autonomous aerial refueling capability—is scheduled to be completed
by 2013. The refueling capability is not scheduled to be demonstrated until summer 2014 and all technology
maturation and demonstration efforts are to be completed by 2015.
While the prime contractor’s estimated costs have grown by over $200 million to $813 million, according to
the program manager, there is sufficient funding in the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget request to
complete the demonstration program. The cost of the prime contract has grown, in part, because the
contractor originally proposed completing the demonstration sooner than 2013 and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense added an autonomous aerial refueling demonstration to the program in 2008. Although
the Navy officials initially agreed to the accelerated schedule, it was subsequently determined that the
technology involved was more complex than originally anticipated. After a 2010 review by the Navy, the
program’s cost and schedule estimates were revised to reflect the Navy’s original 2013 program completion
date as well as the addition of the autonomous aerial refueling capability.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $1,562.1 million
Quantities: 2
Next Major Program Event: First flight, December 2010
Program Office Comments: The Navy UCAS-D program office provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.
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Common Name: Nett Warrior
Nett Warrior Increment I
The Army’s Nett Warrior program is an integrated
ground soldier system designed to provide
embedded training and increased situational
awareness, lethality, mobility, survivability, and
sustainability during combat operations. There are
three increments planned. Increment I will focus on
developing the situational awareness system used
initially with Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. The
program is a descendant of the Land Warrior
program, which was terminated due to cost
concerns and funding constraints.
Source: U.S. Army.
Current Status
The Nett Warrior program was approved to enter technology development in February 2009 and plans to
proceed directly to production in fiscal year 2011. The Army has awarded cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts to
General Dynamics, Raytheon, and Rockwell Collins for prototypes, which include a hands-free display,
headset, computer, navigation equipment, antennas, and cables. These prototype designs have undergone
developmental testing and are currently being evaluated in a limited user test. The Army has identified five
critical technologies for Nett Warrior Increment I—energy/power management subsystem, antenna,
navigation, user controller, and voice intelligibility. These technologies are currently nearing maturity and,
pursuant to a program acquisition decision memorandum, they must be demonstrated in an operational
environment prior to exiting technology development. Based on the results of the limited user test,
conducted at Ft. Riley, Kansas, and a technology readiness assessment of the program by the Director,
Defense Research and Engineering, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
will make a decision on whether the program will proceed to engineering and manufacturing development or
directly to production and deployment as planned. While it is not designated as a critical technology, the fully
networked capability of the Nett Warrior Increment I will not be achieved until the Joint Tactical Radio
System is incorporated after full-rate production.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $1,669.4 million
Research and development: $179.8 million
Procurement: $1,489.6 million
Quantities: 20,430
Next Major Program Event: Low-rate initial production decision, fiscal year 2011
Program Office Comments: The program office provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
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Common Name: OR
Ohio-Class Replacement (OR) / Sea Based Strategic Deterrent
The Navy’s Ohio-class Replacement (OR) / Sea
Based Strategic Deterrent will replace the current
fleet of Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines
(SSBN) as they begin to retire in 2027. The Navy
began research and development in 2008, in order to
avoid a gap in sea-based nuclear deterrence between
the Ohio class’s retirement and the production of a
replacement. The Navy is working with the United
Kingdom to develop a Common Missile
Compartment (CMC) for use on the Ohio-class
replacement and the United Kingdom’s replacement
for the Vanguard SSBN.
Source: General Dynamics Electric Boat.
Current Status
The OR program was scheduled to enter technology development in December 2010. The Navy’s fiscal year
2011 long range shipbuilding plan includes 12 OR SSBNs and projects that the program will receive
authorization to begin construction on the lead ship in fiscal year 2019. The high expected cost of the OR has
been an early focus of the program. Both DOD and Navy officials have stated the cost of the program could
dominate Navy shipbuilding budgets in the 2020 to 2030 time frame. The size and number of missile tubes is
one of a number of cost drivers. The OR’s analysis of alternatives, which was approved by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense’s office of Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation in December 2009, discussed the size
and number of missile tubes; however, a final decision is still pending. According to the program office,
Northrop Grumman, Babcock Integrated Technologies, Electric Boat Corporation, and BAE Systems Marine
have been awarded contracts for assembly of prototype missile tubes.
The main focus of OR research and development to date has been the CMC. The United Kingdom has
provided $329 million for this effort since fiscal year 2008. During fiscal years 2009 and 2010, the Navy had
allocated about $183 million for the design and prototyping of the missile compartment. According to Navy
officials, the program’s other areas of emphasis include developing stealth technologies, ensuring a balanced
ship design and the production readiness of the missile tube manufacturing base, and strengthening
government system engineering personnel.
Overall, the Navy has received $510.3 million for the OR program over fiscal years 2009 and 2010. The
President’s budget request for fiscal year 2011 included an additional $672.3 million. These numbers include
funding for OR and propulsion plant development.
Estimated Total Program Cost: TBD
Next Major Program Event: Engineering and manufacturing development start, fiscal year 2015
Program Office Comments: The OR program generally concurred with this assessment. The program
stated that over the past year, it has focused on containing nonrecurring engineering and construction costs
by incorporating innovations to ship design and construction methodologies and practices as well as lessons
learned from the Virginia-class program’s design and construction. The program office also provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
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Common Name: Space Fence
Space Fence
The Air Force’s Space Fence will be a new system of
ground-based radars to replace the aging Air Force
Space Surveillance System. It will use higher radio
frequencies to detect and track smaller Earthorbiting objects. The system will consist of up to two
geographically dispersed radars (notionally located
in Australia, Ascension Island, or Kwajalein Atoll) to
help ensure effective space surveillance coverage.
The system’s enhanced capabilities are expected to
significantly increase the number of orbiting objects
detected and tracked.
Source: U.S. Air Force.
Current Status
The Space Fence program began technology development in March 2009. In June 2009, the Air Force awarded
three $30 million firm fixed-price contracts to Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon. The
Northrop Grumman contract was subsequently terminated after a reduction in program funding. The
program is currently focused on making cost, schedule, and performance tradeoffs to ensure its affordability.
The Air Force next plans to conduct a full and open competition and award up to two contracts for a
maximum of $214 million to continue technology development. The contracts will go through the preliminary
design review, which is planned for January 2012, followed by another full and open competition leading to a
single, final development and production contract in July 2012. The first Space Fence radar site is scheduled
to provide initial operational capability by the end of fiscal year 2015, with the final site providing full
capability by 2020.
The program office identified five critical technologies and expects them to be nearing maturity by the
preliminary design review. Mature backup technologies exist; however, all have potentially higher acquisition
or operating costs associated with them, or both. According to the program office, using these backups could
make the program unaffordable.
According to the program office, a separate program for the development of a new space command and
control system poses a risk for Space Fence. This new system, which will process Space Fence data, needs to
be available when the Space Fence is fielded because the amount of data it will generate exceeds existing
command and control system performance limits.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $2,717.6 million
Research and development: $1,682.2 million
Procurement: $1,035.4 million
Quantities: 1 (Research and Development), 1 (Procurement)
Next Major Program Event: Final development and production start, July 2012
Program Office Comments: The program office stated that changes to the acquisition strategy increase
competition, induce further contractor design and cost realism, and reduce program risk to deliver the first
system capability by September 2015. The preliminary design review is expected to occur 6 months prior to
the planned June 2012 milestone B, allowing for a more informed decision at final contract award. The
program office also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
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Common Name: SMOD
Stryker Modernization (SMOD)
The Army’s Stryker family of vehicles is a group of
deployable, wheeled, armored vehicles. The Stryker
upgrade program, commonly known as Stryker
Modernization, is a technological overhaul of
targeted components designed to improve the
vehicle’s survivability, mobility, lethality, and
networking capabilities. The system enhancements,
which will be applied to all 10 Stryker variants, will
enable the vehicles to remain in operation through
2050. The program will comprise two increments.
We made observations on increment one.
Source: U.S. Army.
Current Status
The Army is planning a materiel development decision (MDD) for the Stryker Modernization program, which
will determine where it will enter the acquisition process. The program is the outgrowth of a modernization
concept that was briefed at a Stryker configuration steering board meeting in August 2009. According to the
Stryker program, the modernization program is necessary to address space, weight, and power constraints
that could affect the vehicles’ ability to meet current and future warfighting needs. Before moving forward
with the program, the Army had to await the outcome of two events. In March 2010, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics directed the Army to provide a complete overview of
Stryker Modernization efforts, including an evaluation of how Stryker Modernization activities fit into the
Army strategy for meeting future ground combat vehicle requirements. In addition, the Army must complete
its combat vehicle portfolio review.
The first increment of the Stryker Modernization program will consist of two phases. According to program
officials, phase 1 will focus on the common characteristics of all 10 variants, such as the chassis and drive
train, spare parts, and test equipment. Phase 2 will focus on enhancing characteristics unique to each of the
variants, such as fire support and medical evacuation. The Army has identified three critical technologies for
phase 1—semiactive suspension, survivability improvements, and power generation. According to the
program, all three technologies will be demonstrated in a relevant or realistic environment before the
program enters engineering and manufacturing development. The program also plans to select, through
competition, three contractors to develop prototypes of key subsystems prior to this phase. Additional
critical technologies may be identified for phase 2. The Stryker Modernization strategy will be determined by
Army senior leaders and then that strategy will be recommended to the defense acquisition executive at the
program’s MDD for his approval.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $2,179.8 million
Research and development: $1,190.0 million
Procurement: $989.8 million
Quantities: 35 (Research and Development), 664 (Procurement)
Next Major Program Event: Materiel development decision, TBD
Program Office Comments: In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
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Common Name: 3DELRR
Three Dimensional Expeditionary Long Range Radar (3DELRR)
The Air Force’s 3DELRR will be the long-range,
ground-based sensor for detecting, identifying,
tracking, and reporting aircraft and missiles for the
Joint Forces Air Component Commander. It will
provide real-time data and support a range of
expeditionary operations in all types of weather and
terrain. It is being acquired to replace the Air Force’s
AN/TPS-75 radar systems. The Marine Corps is
considering 3DELRR as a potential replacement to
the AN/TPS-59 to support the Marine Air-Ground
Task Force Commander.
Source: U.S. Air Force.
Current Status
The 3DELRR program was approved to enter the technology development phase in May 2009. The Air Force
has awarded firm fixed-price contracts for the development of system-level prototypes. The program expects
to demonstrate the capability of each of the prototypes by the end of the first quarter of fiscal year 2011. The
program plans to conduct a full and open competition and award a single cost plus incentive fee contract for
program definition and risk reduction before seeking approval to enter engineering and manufacturing
development in the third quarter of fiscal year 2013. Initial operational capability for the radar is targeted for
approximately 2019.
The 3DELRR program is focused on reducing technical risk before beginning system development. The
program has identified six critical technologies. The program’s technology development strategy calls for
these technologies to be nearing maturity and demonstrated in a relevant environment by the start of system
development. The program also expects to complete a preliminary design review prior to development start
and a critical design review early in the engineering and manufacturing development phase.
According to the program office, the primary risks going forward are securing adequate funding and
accurately capturing the user’s requirements. Additional near-term funding is necessary to execute the
current acquisition strategy. In the event of a program budget shortfall, the program office would have to
examine alternatives including revising the acquisition strategy, conducting requirements tradeoffs, and
extending the delivery schedule. Further, if the program’s requirements document does not accurately
represent user requirements, then the system design could require changes late in the acquisition process.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $2,092.4 million
Research and development: $743.3 million
Procurement: $1,349.1 million (Air Force only)
Quantities: 35 (Air Force only)
Next Major Program Event: Program definition and risk reduction contract award, second quarter fiscal
year 2012
Program Office Comments: The program office concurred with the assessment and provided technical
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
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Common Name: V-22 Osprey
V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft (Osprey)
The V-22 Osprey is a tilt-rotor aircraft developed for
use by the Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy. The
Marine Corps and Air Force Special Operations
Command have completed multiple deployments of
the MV-22 and CV-22, respectively, in Iraq, Africa,
Afghanistan, South America, and in support of the
humanitarian efforts in Haiti. As of December 2010,
there were 125 V-22s in service. The program is
currently focused on improving readiness,
decreasing ownership cost, and preparing for a
second multi-year procurement contract.
Source: U.S. Marine Corps.
Current Status
The V-22 has been deployed and is supporting combat operations; however, the aircraft has experienced
reliability and readiness issues that have resulted in high maintenance and operating costs. Since 2009, the
program has undertaken several initiatives to understand and reduce operations and maintenance costs after
it became apparent the MV-22 was exceeding its budgeted cost per flight hour. The program developed a new
cost model to increase the quality and accuracy of cost per flight hour estimates and established a team to
identify cost savings opportunities. According to the Marine Corps, it is also working with industry to
increase the durability of key components that affect readiness and operating costs. One of the program’s top
priorities is the ice protection system. A June 2010 Air Force accident report on a March 2009 CV-22 engine
failure concluded that it was caused by a part from the central deice distributor (an ice protection system
component) shaking loose and falling into the engine. The report stated that this part had a history of
structural issues related in part to its design. The program office has addressed the risks identified in the
report by instituting an inspection of this component at the 35 hour interval and installing a more durable
version of the part on aircraft in production. According to the program office, all CV-22s and deployed MV-22s
have been retrofitted with the hardware fix and retrofit kits are available for the remaining fleet. In April
2010, a CV-22 crashed on an infiltration mission in support of ground forces in Afghanistan. In August 2010,
the Air Force Accident Investigation Board reported that there were 10 substantially contributing factors to
the accident and that they fell into four categories: mission execution, environmental conditions, human
factors, and aircraft performance. We were unable to follow-up on how these factors are being addressed
during our assessment. The V-22 program is in the fourth year of its first multiyear procurement contract. The
program will request authority to enter, and is planning and budgeting for, a second multiyear procurement
contract to begin in fiscal year 2013.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $56,061.1 million
Research and development: $13,114.7 million
Procurement: $42,829.3 million
Quantities: 458 aircraft
Program Office Comments: In its comments on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated that
the V-22 has met all operational tasking and the Marines and Air Force are exceptionally satisfied with the 
V-22’s “game changing” capabilities. It also emphasized the aircraft’s exceptional survivability and the
numerous improvements that have been made to it in the last decade. Eight Marine and two Air Force Osprey
squadrons are operational. The program projects reaching 100,000 flight hours in early 2011. Production is
fully mature with aircraft deliveries on or ahead of schedule. The program’s overall strategy is an effective
and affordable globally deployed Osprey fleet.
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Common Name: VXX
Presidential Helicopter (VXX)
The Navy’s VXX program is expected to develop and
field a replacement for the current fleet of VH-3D
and VH-60N helicopters that provide transportation
for the President, Vice President, heads of state, and
others as directed. The program was initiated after
the VH-71 presidential helicopter replacement
program was terminated in June 2009 due to
excessive cost growth and schedule delays. The
Navy is also taking steps to extend the service life of
its existing fleet of VH-3D and VH-60N helicopters
until a new helicopter can be fielded.
Source: U.S. Navy.
Current Status
In March 2010, the VXX program held a materiel development decision review. The Navy expects to complete
an analysis of alternatives by the second quarter of fiscal year 2011 and enter technology development by the
third quarter of fiscal year 2011. According to program officials, the new program will complete a four-phase
systems engineering and design review process before beginning system development.
In June 2009, DOD terminated the VH-71 program due to excessive cost growth, schedule delays, and
technical risk. From its inception, program officials had acknowledged that the program carried substantial
risk due to an aggressive schedule directed by the White House. Program officials further attribute the
program’s problems to a misunderstanding between the government and contractors over requirements—a
problem exacerbated by a highly compressed development schedule, a lack of sufficient predevelopment
systems engineering and design work, and the eventual reengineering of entire subsystems needed to
mitigate aircraft performance and weight issues. Prior to termination, five pilot production VH-71s were built
and delivered and 10 percent of the planned 1,460 flight hour test program was completed.
As a result of the VH-71 termination, the Navy has to extend the service life of its fleet of VH-3D and VH-60N
helicopters. Current projections indicate these helicopters can operate until 2017; however, the Navy is
studying whether the fleet’s life can be extended to 2023 or later until the VXX is fielded.
Estimated Total Program Cost: TBD
Quantities: TBD
Next Major Program Event: Technology development start, third quarter fiscal year 2011
Program Office Comments: The program office concurred with this assessment.
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Agency Comments and
Our Evaluation
DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. The
comments are reprinted in appendix VI. DOD also provided technical
comments, which we addressed in the report, as appropriate.
In its comments, DOD stated that it did not find GAO’s methods for
calculating cost growth useful for management purposes. Specifically, DOD
takes exception to the part of our analysis that aggregates data on the cost
growth that has accumulated from a program’s first full cost estimate,
which is typically tied to the start of development—milestone B—to the
current year. DOD considers our methodology to be flawed and the
resulting information to be misleading because it does not delineate cost
growth experienced in the past, cost growth associated with capability
upgrades, and cost growth associated with quantity increases. DOD
requested that those metrics be removed from the report. In addition, DOD
commented that the four different cost growth metrics presented in the
report make it difficult for readers to gain an understanding of program
performance.
Given the magnitude and complexity of major weapon system acquisitions,
we believe no single metric adequately captures all of the dynamics of cost
changes. Measuring cost increases from the formal start of a program to
the present is one of several important metrics because it conveys the
magnitude of the task at hand and provides a context for management.
Further, milestone B is recognized as a key point for establishing
accountability for weapon system programs, as evidenced by the
importance of milestone B cost estimates in reporting Nunn-McCurdy unit
cost breaches to Congress and the statutory certification requirements a
program must meet, which include developing a reasonable cost estimate,
to proceed beyond this point. Therefore, we retained this as one of several
metrics used to measure program performance in this report. With regard
to DOD’s comment about cost growth associated with capability upgrades,
we believe that a key tenet of a knowledge-based acquisition approach is to
set realistic capability requirements at the outset of a program and to avoid
changing them in order to achieve cost and schedule predictability.
We used several other metrics to make distinctions between older and
more recent cost increases and increases stemming from a lack of
knowledge or poor program management versus simple quantity increases.
For example, we designed our cost analysis to focus primarily on program
performance over the last 2 years, which allows us to evaluate DOD’s
management of its major defense acquisition programs since key
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acquisition reforms were put into place by Congress and DOD. To ensure
the focus remains on this 2-year analysis, we made changes to table 2 in the
final report in response to DOD’s comments. Our analysis also explicitly
accounts for cost increases associated with changes in weapon system
quantities including cases such as the DDG 51 and the MRAP. Similarly, we
present analysis of the often-overlooked and hard-to-quantify phenomenon
of reducing quantities or capabilities, or both, to offset cost increases.
DOD also commented on a set of program performance metrics that were
discussed by DOD, OMB, and GAO in 2008, as a mechanism for evaluating
DOD’s progress in addressing the issues discussed in GAO’s Weapon
Systems Acquisition High-Risk area. DOD believes that these metrics still
do not adequately capture cost growth that results solely from poor
estimating and poor execution as opposed to other sources including
changes in inventory goals and changes in requirements or capabilities. We
agree that these metrics do not quantify the cost growth attributable to
each of those factors; however, DOD specifically requested that we use
these metrics to assess the performance of its major defense acquisition
program portfolio and its policies in its comments on our 2009 and 2010
annual assessments of weapon programs. We will continue to work with
DOD to develop a set of metrics to better measure its progress in
addressing its long-standing weapon system acquisition issues. Finally,
DOD stated that it is undertaking a series of actions to obtain greater
efficiency and productivity in defense spending. We support DOD’s efforts
to get better value from defense spending and look forward to including the
results of these efforts in future reports.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget. In addition, the report will be made available
at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
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GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
of this report. Staff members making key contributions to this report are
listed in appendix VII.
Michael J. Sullivan
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management
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GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
List of Committees
The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
The Honorable John McCain
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Daniel Inouye
Chairman
The Honorable Thad Cochran
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon
Chairman
The Honorable Adam Smith
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
Chairman
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks 
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
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Appendix I
Scope and Methodology
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x
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e
x
Iis
This report contains observations on the performance of the Department of
Defense’s (DOD) fiscal year 2010 major defense acquisition program
portfolio. To develop these observations, we obtained and analyzed data
from Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) and other information in the
Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval Purview system,
referred to as DAMIR.1 We refer to programs with SARs dated December
2009 as the 2010 portfolio. We converted cost information to fiscal year
2011 dollars using conversion factors from the DOD Comptroller’s National
Defense Budget Estimates for Fiscal Year 2011 (table 5-9). Data for the total
planned investment of major defense acquisition programs were obtained
from DAMIR, which we aggregated for all programs using fiscal year 2011
dollars. However, the data do not include the full costs of acquiring Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) programs.
We also collected and analyzed data on the composition of DOD’s major
defense acquisition program portfolio. To determine changes in that
portfolio, we compared the programs that issued SARs in December 2009
with the list of programs that issued SARs in December 2007. To assess the
cost effect of changes to the major defense acquisition portfolio, we
calculated the estimated total acquisition cost for the 13 programs exiting
the portfolio and for the 15 programs entering the portfolio.
To compare the cost of major defense acquisition programs over 2 years, 5
years, and from baseline estimates, we collected data from December 2009,
December 2007, and December 2004 SARs; acquisition program baselines;
and program offices. We retrieved data that showed cost estimates for
research, development, test, and evaluation; procurement; and total
acquisition for 98 major defense acquisition programs in the 2010 portfolio.
We divided some SAR programs into smaller elements, because DOD
reports performance data on them separately. We analyzed the data to
determine the change in research and development, procurement, and total
acquisition costs from the first full estimate, generally development start,
with the current estimate. For a few programs that did not have a
development estimate, we compared the current estimate to the
production estimate. Also, for a few shipbuilding programs that had a full
planning estimate, we compared the current estimate to the planning
estimate. For programs that began as non–major defense acquisition
1
DAMIR Purview is an executive information system operated by the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics / Acquisition Resources and
Analysis.
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Appendix I
Scope and Methodology
programs, the first full estimate used by GAO as a baseline may be different
than the original baseline contained in DOD SARs. When comparable cost
and schedule data were not available for programs, we excluded them from
the analysis. To calculate cost growth incurred over the past 2 years, from
2008 to 2010, we calculated the difference between the December 2007 and
December 2009 SARs for programs older than 2 years. For programs less
than 2 years old, we calculated the difference between December 2009 and
first full estimates. We converted all dollar figures to fiscal year 2011
constant dollars. We took a similar approach for calculating cost growth
incurred from 2005 to 2010. We also obtained schedule information and
calculated the time since program start, or program age; cycle time from
program start to initial operational capability; delay in obtaining initial
operational capability; and the delay in initial capability as a percentage of
total cycle time. Finally, we extracted data on quantities and program
acquisition unit cost and compared the current unit cost to the baseline
unit cost to determine whether programs’ unit cost has increased or
decreased from the baseline estimate. For three software programs with no
quantities, we assigned each program a quantity of one. For two programs,
F-22 and DDG 51, we then calculated the effect on DOD’s buying power
from each program by multiplying the change in program acquisition unit
cost by the current planned quantities.
To calculate the amount of procurement cost growth attributable to
quantity increases, we isolated the change in procurement costs and the
change in procurement quantities for programs over the past 2 years. For
those programs with change in procurement quantities, we calculated the
amount attributable to quantity changes as the change in quantity
multiplied by the average procurement unit cost for the program 2 years
ago.
To evaluate program performance according to DOD, OMB, and GAO–
developed metrics, we calculated how many programs had less than a 4
percent increase in total acquisition cost over the past 2 years, less than a
10 percent increase over the past 5 years, and less than a 15 percent
increase from initial estimates using data from December 2009, December
2007, and December 2004 SARs; acquisition program baselines; and
program offices. For programs that began as non–major defense
acquisition programs, the first full estimate used by GAO as a baseline may
be different than the original baseline contained in DOD SARs. We also
identified 10 of the highest cost programs from the December 2009 SARs
and calculated changes in total costs and program acquisition unit cost
over the past 2 years. We excluded MDA’s Ballistic Missile Defense System
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Appendix I
Scope and Methodology
from this analysis, because the program does not report baseline estimates
or quantity information in its annual SAR.
To calculate the amount of cost growth incurred before and after
production start, we identified 56 programs with December 2009 SARs that
had production cost estimates. To determine the average age of these
programs, we calculated the time between program start and December
2009 for each program. To analyze the cost growth before and after
production, we compared development cost estimates, production cost
estimates, and December 2009 cost estimates for both research and
development and procurement costs and determined the difference
between each estimate for each program. We then calculated the percent
change between development and production estimates, and between
production and current estimates for both development and procurement
costs. Finally, we calculated the average percent change for each program
from development to production and from production to current estimates
to determine the average percent cost growth incurred before and after
production.
Through discussions with DOD officials responsible for the database and
confirming selected data with program offices, we determined that the SAR
data and the information retrieved from DAMIR were sufficiently reliable
for our purposes.
Analysis of Selected
DOD Programs Using
Knowledge-Based
Criteria
In total, this report presents information on 71 weapon programs. A table
listing these programs is found in appendix VII. Out of these programs, 49
are captured in a two-page format discussing technology, design, and
manufacturing knowledge obtained and other program issues. The
remaining 22 programs are described in a one-page format that describes
their current status. We chose these programs based on their estimated
cost, stage in the acquisition process, and congressional interest. To obtain
cost, schedule, technology, design, and manufacturing information, we
asked 49 programs to complete a data-collection instrument and received
responses from all these programs. In addition, to collect information from
major defense acquisition programs and components of these programs on
other program factors such as requirements changes, configuration
steering board activities, software development, and program office
staffing, we asked 44 programs to complete a second electronic
questionnaire and received responses from all these programs from June to
November 2010. To collect data from pre–major defense acquisition
programs including cost and schedule estimates, technology maturity, and
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Scope and Methodology
planned implementation of acquisition reforms, we distributed a separate
electronic questionnaire to 54 programs categorized as pre–major defense
acquisition programs as of July 2010. Both questionnaires were sent by email in an attached Microsoft Word form that respondents could return
electronically. We received responses from June to November 2010. During
the course of our review, we dropped 37 programs from this analysis,
including 19 that were no longer slated to become major defense
acquisition programs, 11 that had not yet begun the technology
development phase, and 7 that had become major defense acquisition
programs or were spinoffs of major defense acquisition programs. In
addition, three programs did not return the questionnaire. Therefore, our
assessment of planned major defense acquisition programs consists of 14
programs nearing system development start. To ensure the reliability of the
data collected through our questionnaires, we took a number of steps to
reduce measurement error, nonresponse error, and respondent bias. These
steps included conducting two pretests of each questionnaire by phone
prior to distribution to ensure that our questions were clear, unbiased, and
consistently interpreted; reviewing responses to identify obvious errors or
inconsistencies; conducting follow-up to clarify responses when needed;
and verifying the accuracy of a sample of keypunched questionnaires.
Our analysis of how well programs are adhering to a knowledge-based
acquisition approach focuses on a subset of 40 major defense acquisition
programs from DOD’s fiscal year 2010 portfolio that were in development
or the early stages of production as of June 2010. The 31 programs that are
not included in this analysis either do not have acquisition milestones that
line up with development start, critical design review, and production start
or lack key data on technology, design, and production necessary to assess
them against our knowledge-based acquisition criteria at this point in time.2
To assess the cost and schedule outcomes for the 40 programs to-date, we
identified programs with cost, schedule, and quantity data at the first full
estimate, generally milestone B—development start—and the estimate
from the December 2009 SAR. Of the programs in our assessment, 39 had
relevant data on research and development costs, 38 had relevant data on
procurement costs, and 34 had data on schedules for delivering initial
2
The 31 programs in our assessment that are not covered in this analysis include: 18 planned
major defense acquisition programs, 4 MDA elements, 4 programs that are well into
production, 1 component within a major defense acquisition program, 1 program that is
based on a commercially-derived aircraft, 2 programs that were canceled, and 1 technology
development program.
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Scope and Methodology
capabilities. The remaining programs, not included in this analysis, did not
have comparable data. We summed the first full estimate and the current
estimate of both research and development costs and procurement costs
for the programs and calculated the percentage change between the
estimates. The schedule assessment is calculated two ways—as the
average of the change in months between the first and current estimates for
the planned or actual delivery of initial operational capability and as the
average change in months divided by the first estimate of acquisition cycle
time.
To assess knowledge attainment of programs at critical decision points
(system development start, critical design review, and production start), we
collected data about their knowledge levels at each point. The data were
collected from 40 program offices as of November 2010. Additional
information on product knowledge is found in the product knowledge
assessment section of this appendix. We did not validate the data provided
by the program offices, but reviewed the data and performed various
checks to determine that they were reliable enough for our purposes.
Where we discovered discrepancies, we clarified the data accordingly.
Programs in our assessment were in various stages of the acquisition cycle,
and not all of the programs provided knowledge information for each point.
Programs were not included in our assessments if relevant decision or
knowledge point data were not available. In addition, because knowledge
points differ for shipbuilding programs, we exclude them from our
assessment of certain knowledge-based practices. In particular, we focused
on the 17 programs that entered these key acquisition points since 2009 and
evaluated their adherence to knowledge-based practices. For each decision
point, we summarized knowledge attainment for the number of programs
with data that achieved that knowledge point. Twenty-six nonship
programs provided data on technology maturity at development start, 1 of
which began development since 2009; 29 nonship programs provided data
on design stability at their critical design review, 9 of which held this
review since 2009; and 4 programs provided data on production processes
in control at production start, 1 of which began production since 2009. Our
analysis of knowledge attained at each key point also includes other factors
that we have previously identified as being key to a knowledge-based
acquisition approach, including holding system design reviews early in
development, planning for manufacturing, testing an integrated prototype
prior to the design review, using a reliability growth curve, and testing a
production-representative prototype prior to making a production
decision. See appendix IV for a list of these practices.
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Scope and Methodology
For our analysis of requirements changes, we obtained and analyzed
information from 39 programs about the number and effect of requirements
changes since development start. Using this information, we compared the
average percent change in research and development cost and delay in
delivery of an initial operational capability between programs that had an
added or enhanced key performance parameter; a reduced, deferred, or
deleted key performance parameter; or stable key performance
parameters. We also compared the age of programs that had stable or
unstable requirements.
For our analysis of software development, we obtained and analyzed
information from 25 programs related to the number of software lines of
code expected in the final system at development start and currently, and
from 21 programs that collect data on the percentages of software defects
contained in-phase and in subsequent phases. We also collected data from
40 programs on whether they collected earned value management data for
software development. We calculated whether the percentage growth in
total lines of code correlated with the percentage growth in research and
development costs, as well as whether the growth in software correlated
with percentage delay in achieving initial operational capabilities. We also
compared the total lines of code expected currently with whether
programs are collecting earned value management data for software
development. Finally we compared the percentage growth in software lines
of code with program age.
For our analysis of program staffing, we analyzed information related to
program office staffing from 44 programs, including 40 major defense
acquisition programs and 4 MDA elements, on the number of military
personnel, civilian government employees, support contractors, and
Federally Funded Research and Development Centers and universityaffiliated employees working in the following functions: program
management, business-related functions, contracting, engineering,
administrative support, and other functions. We compared this information
with data collected in prior years. We also collected information on
whether programs had been authorized all positions requested, whether
they had filled those positions, reasons for not filling positions, and
whether they were using support contractors to make up for shortfalls in
government personnel or capabilities.
To determine how DOD has begun to implement acquisition reforms, we
obtained and analyzed the revised DOD 5000.02 acquisition instruction, the
Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, and the Directive-Type
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Scope and Methodology
Memorandum 09-027 implementing the Act. We analyzed data from the
survey sent to planned major defense acquisition programs in our
assessment to determine how they were implementing requirements for
holding a preliminary design review; developing prototypes; maturing
critical technologies; and considering tradeoffs among cost, schedule, and
performance objectives before development start. We also collected
information on whether these programs are planning to incorporate
competition into their acquisition strategies.3 To determine how programs
were implementing the requirement to hold configuration steering boards,
we analyzed data from the survey sent to major defense acquisition
programs.
We relied on GAO’s body of work examining DOD acquisition issues over
the years. In recent years, we have issued reports that identified systemic
problems with major weapon systems acquisitions and we have made
recommendations to DOD on ways to improve how it acquires major
weapon systems. These reports cover contracting, program management,
acquisition policy, cost estimating, budgeting, and requirements
development. We have also issued many detailed reports evaluating
specific weapon systems, such as aircraft programs, ships, communication
systems, satellites, missile defense systems, and future combat systems. We
also used information from numerous GAO products that examine how
commercial best practices can improve outcomes for DOD programs. This
work has shown that valuable lessons can be learned from the commercial
sector and can be applied to the development of weapon systems.
System Profile Data on
Each Individual TwoPage Assessment
Over the past several years, DOD has revised policies governing weapon
system acquisitions and changed the terminology used for major
acquisition events. To make DOD’s acquisition terminology more consistent
across the 71 program assessments, we standardized the terminology for
3
The DOD and statutory requirement is that the acquisition strategy for each major defense
acquisition program include measures to ensure competition, or the option of competition,
throughout the life cycle of the program. Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-23, § 202; Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-027—Implementation of the Weapon Systems
Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, attachment 1, para. 2 (Dec. 4, 2009). The survey question
with respect to this requirement read “Does the acquisition strategy call for competition
post–Milestone B.” When programs answered “no” to the question, GAO interpreted that
answer to mean that the program is not planning to incorporate into the acquisition strategy
competition, or the option of competition, after development start.
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Scope and Methodology
key program events. For most individual programs in our assessment,
“development start” refers to the initiation of an acquisition program as
well as the start of engineering and manufacturing development. This
coincides with DOD’s milestone B. A few programs in our assessment
(mostly programs that began before 2001) have a separate “program start”
date, which begins a pre–system development phase for program definition
and risk-reduction activities. This “program start” date generally coincides
with DOD’s former terminology for milestone I, followed by a
“development start” date, either DOD’s former milestone II or current
milestone B depending on when the program began system development.
The “production decision” generally refers to the decision to enter the
production and deployment phase, typically with low-rate initial
production. The “initial capability” refers to the initial operational
capability—sometimes called first unit equipped of required asset
availability. For shipbuilding programs, the schedule of key program events
in relation to acquisition milestones varies for each program. Our work on
shipbuilding best practices has identified the detailed design and
construction contract award and the start of lead ship fabrication as the
points in the acquisition process roughly equivalent to development start
and design review for other programs. For MDA programs that do not
follow the standard DOD acquisition model but instead develop systems’
capabilities incrementally, we identify the key technology development
efforts that lead to an initial capability.
For each program we assessed in a two-page format, we present cost,
schedule, and quantity data at the program’s first full estimate, generally
milestone B, and an estimate from the program office reflecting 2010 data
where it was available. To assess the cost, schedule, and quantity changes
of each program, we reviewed DOD’s SARs or obtained data directly from
the program offices. In general, we compared the latest available SAR
information with a baseline for each program. For programs that have
started product development—those that are beyond milestone II or B—we
compared the latest available SAR to the development estimate from the
first SAR issued after the program was approved to enter development, or
for the planning estimate if we had a full estimate. For systems not
included in the SARs, we attempted to obtain comparable baseline and
current data from the individual program offices. For MDA systems, for
which a baseline was not available, we do not present a comparison. For
the other programs assessed in a one-page format, we present the latest
available estimate of cost and quantity from the program office.
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Scope and Methodology
For each program we assessed, all cost information is presented in fiscal
year 2011 dollars using Office of the Secretary of Defense–approved
deflators to eliminate the effects of inflation. We have depicted only the
program’s main elements of acquisition cost—research and development
and procurement. However, the total program cost also includes military
construction and acquisition operation and maintenance costs. Because of
rounding and these additional costs, in some situations, total cost may not
match the exact sum of the research and development and procurement
costs. The program unit costs are calculated by dividing the total program
cost by the total quantities planned. In some instances, the data were not
applicable, and we annotate this by using the term “not applicable (NA).”
The quantities listed refer to total quantities, including both procurement
and development quantities.
The schedule assessment for each program is based on acquisition cycle
time, defined as the number of months between program start and the
achievement of initial operational capability or an equivalent fielding date.
In some instances the data were not yet available, and we annotate this by
using the term “to be determinded (TBD)” or “NA.”
The information presented on the “funding needed to complete” is from
fiscal year 2011 through completion and, unless otherwise noted, draws on
information from SARs or on data from the program office. In some
instances, the data were not available, and we annotate this by the term
“TBD” or “NA.” The quantities listed refer only to procurement quantities.
Satellite programs, in particular, produce a large percentage of their total
operations units as development quantities, which are not included in the
quantity figure.
The intent of these comparisons is to provide an aggregate, or overall,
picture of a program’s history. These assessments represent the sum of the
federal government’s actions on a program, not just those of the program
manager and the contractor. DOD does a number of detailed analyses of
changes that attempt to link specific changes with triggering events or
causes. Our analysis does not attempt to make such detailed distinctions.
Product Knowledge
Data on Individual
Two-Page Assessments
In our past work examining weapon acquisition issues and best practices
for product development, we have found that leading commercial firms
pursue an acquisition approach that is anchored in knowledge, whereby
high levels of product knowledge are demonstrated by critical points in the
acquisition process. On the basis of this work, we have identified three key
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Scope and Methodology
knowledge points during the acquisition cycle—development start; design
review, which occurs during engineering and manufacturing development;
and production start—at which programs need to demonstrate critical
levels of knowledge to proceed. To assess the product development
knowledge of each program at these key points, we submitted a datacollection instrument to 49 program offices. We received responses from
all 49 programs; however, not every program had responses to each
element of the data-collection instrument. The results are graphically
depicted in each two-page assessment. We also reviewed pertinent
program documentation and discussed the information presented on the
data-collection instrument with program officials as necessary.
To assess technology maturity, we asked program officials to apply a tool,
referred to as Technology Readiness Levels (TRL), for our analysis. The
National Aeronautics and Space Administration originally developed TRLs,
and the Army and Air Force science and technology research organizations
use them to determine when technologies are ready to be handed off from
science and technology managers to product developers. TRLs are
measured on a scale from 1 to 9, beginning with paper studies of a
technology’s feasibility and culminating with a technology fully integrated
into a completed product. See appendix V for TRL definitions. Our best
practices work has shown that a technology readiness level of 7—
demonstration of a technology in a realistic environment—is the level of
technology maturity that constitutes a low risk for starting a product
development program.4 For shipbuilding programs, we have recommended
that this level of maturity be achieved by the contract award for detailed
design and construction.5 In our assessment, the technologies that have
reached TRL 7, a prototype demonstrated in a realistic environment, are
referred to as mature or fully mature. Those technologies that have reached
TRL 6, a prototype demonstrated in a relevant environment, are referred to
as approaching or nearing maturity and are assessed at attaining 50 percent
of the desired level of knowledge. Satellite technologies that have achieved
TRL 6 are assessed as fully mature due to the difficulty of demonstrating
maturity in a realistic environment—space.
4
GAO, Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve
Weapon System Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-99-162 (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 1999); Best
Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to Better Weapon System
Outcomes, GAO-01-288 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2001).
5
GAO, Best Practices: High Levels of Knowledge at Key Points Differentiate Commercial
Shipbuilding from Navy Shipbuilding, GAO-09-322 (Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2009).
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Scope and Methodology
In most cases, we did not validate the program offices’ selection of critical
technologies or the determination of the demonstrated level of maturity.
We sought to clarify the TRLs in those cases where information existed that
raised concerns. If we were to conduct a detailed review, we might adjust
the critical technologies assessed, their readiness levels demonstrated, or
both. It was not always possible to reconstruct the technological maturity
of a weapon system at key decision points after the passage of many years.
Where practicable, we compared technology assessments provided by the
program office to assessments conducted by officials from the Office of the
Director, Defense Research and Engineering.
To assess design stability, we asked program officials to provide the
percentage of engineering drawings completed or projected for completion
by the design review, the production decision, and as of our current
assessment.6 In most cases, we did not verify or validate the percentage of
engineering drawings provided by the program office. We clarified the
percentage of drawings completed in those cases where information that
raised concerns existed. Completed drawings were defined as the number
of drawings released or deemed releasable to manufacturing that can be
considered the “build to” drawings. For shipbuilding programs, we asked
program officials to provide the percentage of the 3D product model that
had been completed by the start of lead ship fabrication, and as of our
current assessment.7
To assess production maturity, we asked program officials to identify the
number of critical manufacturing processes and, where available, to
quantify the extent of statistical control achieved for those processes.8 In
most cases, we did not verify or validate the information provided by the
program office. We clarified the number of critical manufacturing
processes and the percentage of statistical process control where
information existed that raised concerns. We used a standard called the
Process Capability Index, a process performance measurement that
quantifies how closely a process is running to its specification limits. The
index can be translated into an expected product defect rate, and we have
found it to be a best practice. We sought other data, such as scrap and
6
GAO, Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early Improves
Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-02-701 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002).
7
GAO-09-322.
8
GAO-02-701.
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Appendix I
Scope and Methodology
rework trends in those cases where quantifiable statistical control data
were unavailable. We do not assess production maturity for shipbuilding
programs.
Although the knowledge points provide excellent indicators of potential
risks, by themselves they do not cover all elements of risk that a program
encounters during development, such as funding instability. Our detailed
reviews on individual systems normally provide a more comprehensive
assessment of risk elements.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2010 to March 2011, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
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Appendix II
Changes in DOD’s 2010 Portfolio of Major
Defense Acquisition Programs over Time
Appendx
Ii
Table 4 shows the change in research and development costs, procurement
costs, total acquisition cost, and average delay in delivering initial
operational capability for the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 2010
portfolio of major defense acquisition programs. The table presents
changes that have occurred on these programs in the last 2 years, the last 5
years, and since their first full cost and schedule estimates.
Table 4: Changes in DOD’s 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense Acquisition Programs over Time
Fiscal year 2011 dollars in billions
Last 2 years
(2008 to 2010)
Last 5 years
(2005 to 2010)
Since first full estimate
(Baseline to 2010)
$15
5 percent
$29
10 percent
$102
47 percent
$121
11 percent
$186
18 percent
$287
31 percent
Increase in total acquisition cost
$135
9 percent
$217
16 percent
$402
35 percent
Average delay in delivering initial capabilities
5 months
8 percent
9 months
13 percent
22 months
30 percent
Increase in total research and development cost
Increase in total procurement cost
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: Data were obtained from DOD’s Selected Acquisition Reports. In a few cases data were
obtained directly from program offices. Not all programs had comparable cost and schedule data and
these programs were excluded from the analysis where appropriate. Portfolio performance data do not
include costs of developing Missile Defense Agency elements. Total acquisition cost includes research
and development, procurement, acquisition operation and maintenance, and system-specific military
construction costs.
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Appendix III
Current and Baseline Cost Estimates for
DOD’s 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense
Acquisition Programs
Appendx
iI
Table 5 contains the current and baseline total acquisition cost estimates
(in fiscal year 2011 dollars) for each program or element in the Department
of Defense’s (DOD) 2010 major defense acquisition program portfolio. We
excluded elements of the Missile Defense Agency’s Ballistic Missile
Defense System because comparable current and baseline cost estimates
were not available. For each program we show the percent change in total
acquisition cost from the program baseline, as well as over the past 2 years
and 5 years.
Table 5: Current Cost Estimates and Baseline Cost Estimates for DOD’s 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense Acquisition Programs
Fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions
Change in Change in total Change in total
acquisition
acquisition
total
acquisition cost within the cost within the
cost from
past 2 years
past 5 years
baseline (%)
(%)
(%)
Current total
acquisition
cost
Baseline total
acquisition
cost
$12,920
$6,277
105.8
61.3
87.1
Advanced Threat Infrared
Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning
System (ATIRCM/CMWS)
4,701
3,362
39.8
-4.2
-1.6
AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided
Missile (AARGM)
1,825
1,577
15.7
8.7
11.2
AH-64D Longbow Apache
14,507
6,041
140.2
15.4
38.9
AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air
Missile (AMRAAM)
23,900
10,767
122.0
30.8
41.7
3,589
3,096
15.9
7.2
16.2
546
342
59.5
NA
NA
10,577
7,135
48.2
35.7
48.2
4,954
4,954
0.0
0.0
0.0
619
699
-11.6
-8.3
-11.6
Program
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
Satellite
AIM-9X/Air-to-Air Missile
Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload (ASIP)–
Baseline
Apache Block III (AB3)
Army Integrated Air & Missile Defense (Army
IAMD)
B-2 Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM
Capability, Increment 1
B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP)
1,305
1,319
-1.1
3.4
2.8
21,936
12,779
71.7
3.2
16.3
Block IV Tomahawk (Tactical Tomahawk)
6,845
2,085
228.3
49.2
50.9
Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems (BFVS) A3
Upgrade
9,670
4,119
134.8
-5.8
200.4
13,032
12,657
3.0
3.0
3.0
Black Hawk (UH-60M)
Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS)
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)
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Appendix III
Current and Baseline Cost Estimates for
DOD’s 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense
Acquisition Programs
(Continued From Previous Page)
Fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions
Change in Change in total Change in total
total
acquisition
acquisition
acquisition cost within the cost within the
cost from
past 2 years
past 5 years
baseline (%)
(%)
(%)
Current total
acquisition
cost
Baseline total
acquisition
cost
6,053
4,071
48.7
9.6
33.3
C-130J Hercules
15,327
935
1,539.3
22.2
117.4
C-17A Globemaster III
Program
C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130
AMP)
82,347
52,769
56.0
9.7
13.9
C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA)
1,966
3,854
-49.0
-49.0
-49.0
C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP)
1,320
1,087
21.5
-11.9
38.3
C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining
Program (C-5 RERP)
7,348
10,744
-31.6
-29.0
-30.4
CH-47F Improved Cargo Helicopter (CH-47F)
13,530
3,172
326.6
4.7
13.5
CH-53K—Heavy Lift Replacement
21,902
16,311
34.3
33.9
34.3
7,935
2,596
205.6
8.6
73.0
28,362
15,260
85.9
-4.7
0.1
1,797
1,607
11.8
5.0
12.4
Chemical Demilitarization–Assembled Chemical
Weapons Alternatives (Chem Demil-ACWA)
Chemical Demilitarization–Chemical Materials
Agency (Chem Demil-CMA)
Cobra Judy Replacement (CJR)
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)
5,063
2,897
74.8
1.2
-0.1
34,186
35,048
-2.5
12.0
2.9
6,873
5,948
15.6
-0.2
-3.5
DDG 1000 Destroyer
19,810
34,284
-42.2
-29.7
120.6
DDG 51 Destroyer
94,344
14,960
530.6
21.9
20.8
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE)
17,831
14,535
22.7
12.0
21.0
EA-18G Growler
11,601
8,843
31.2
32.6
32.3
EA-6B Improved Capability (ICAP) III
1,187
1,170
1.4
1.4
1.4
Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range
Artillery Projectile
2,437
4,706
-48.2
3.0
10.3
14,044
9,019
55.7
0.6
14.6
4,978
1,000
397.7
108.6
397.7
54,625
80,513
-32.2
3.4
7.7
CVN 21 Future Aircraft Carrier
CVN-68 Class / Carrier Replacement Program
(CVN 77)
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV)
Gray Eagle
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
F-22 Raptor
F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter)
Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight
Terminals (FAB-T)
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV)
Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below
(FBCB2)
Page 171
77,393
89,901
-13.9
2.9
6.8
283,674
210,558
34.7
13.6
23.9
3,930
3,141
25.1
11.6
25.1
21,301
10,292
107.0
0.8
19.6
4,113
2,785
47.7
13.8
102.3
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Appendix III
Current and Baseline Cost Estimates for
DOD’s 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense
Acquisition Programs
(Continued From Previous Page)
Fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions
Program
Change in Change in total Change in total
total
acquisition
acquisition
acquisition cost within the cost within the
cost from
past 2 years
past 5 years
baseline (%)
(%)
(%)
Current total
acquisition
cost
Baseline total
acquisition
cost
1,118
567
97.4
22.5
13,576
5,312
155.5
37.2
92.7
5,767
1,742
231.1
3.8
-53.8
Global Broadcast Service (GBS)
Global Hawk (RQ-4A/B)
Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS)
H-1 Upgrades (UH-1Y/AH-1Z)
28.0
11,866
3,572
232.2
37.4
47.3
High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS)
2,126
4,297
-50.5
0.5
-52.3
Increment 1 Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team
(E-IBCT)
3,077
3,184
-3.4
-3.4
-3.4
Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures
(IDECM) Block 4
692
684
1.2
1.2
1.2
Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures
(IDECM) Blocks 2/3
1,531
1,461
4.8
4.8
4.8
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM)
7,201
2,282
215.6
23.6
50.5
Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM)
6,377
3,367
89.4
8.1
3.0
Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV)
3,669
3,583
2.4
2.4
2.4
Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated
Netted Sensor System (JLENS)
7,378
6,567
12.4
7.9
12.4
36,375
22,792
59.6
59.6
59.6
Joint Precision Approach and Landing System
(JPALS)
971
997
-2.6
-2.6
-2.6
Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS)
5,815
3,670
58.4
-0.5
2.5
Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) Baseline
2,205
2,813
-21.6
0.2
-0.6
Joint Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)
Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) Unitary
3,125
5,015
-37.7
17.9
9.8
15,868
17,165
-7.6
-6.3
-11.8
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Handheld,
Manpack, and Small Form Fit (HMS)
4,786
9,889
-51.6
55.2
-51.6
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Network
Enterprise Domain (NED)
1,995
966
106.4
-3.8
43.1
Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station Joint Tactical
Radio System (AMF JTRS)
8,212
8,033
2.2
2.2
2.2
454
397
14.4
14.4
14.4
Lewis and Clark Class (T-AKE) Dry
Cargo/Ammunition Ship
6,586
5,205
26.5
16.8
35.7
LHA Replacement Amphibious Assault Ship
6,387
3,133
103.9
90.5
103.9
Light Utility Helicopter (LUH), UH-72A Lakota
1,969
1,784
10.4
-0.6
10.4
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Ground
Mobile Radios (GMR)
Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures
(LAIRCM)
Page 172
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Appendix III
Current and Baseline Cost Estimates for
DOD’s 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense
Acquisition Programs
(Continued From Previous Page)
Fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions
Current total
acquisition
cost
Baseline total
acquisition
cost
3,865
1,353
LPD 17 Amphibious Transport Dock
18,361
11,539
MH-60R Multi-Mission Helicopter
14,340
5,453
MH-60S Fleet Combat Support Helicopter
8,318
3,456
Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program
(PRP)
2,913
2,775
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS)
6,830
Multifunctional Information Distribution System
(MIDS)
Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion
Program (MP-RTIP)
Program
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
Change in Change in total Change in total
total
acquisition
acquisition
acquisition cost within the cost within the
cost from
past 2 years
past 5 years
baseline (%)
(%)
(%)
185.6
29.1
165.9
59.1
24.7
39.3
163.0
16.8
23.5
140.7
2.5
1.4
5.0
0.1
1.1
6,622
3.1
4.4
14.6
2,939
1,284
129.0
9.1
21.0
1,363
1,770
-23.0
0.1
-18.7
National Airspace System (NAS)
1,597
855
86.8
0.0
-1.2
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System (NPOESS)
6,309
6,584
-4.2
-43.3
-13.9
Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) IIIA
4,141
3,883
6.6
6.6
6.6
Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) Space &
Control
7,361
6,125
20.2
1.1
0.0
Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) User
Equipment
2,165
974
122.2
-1.0
49.6
Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT)
2,005
2,287
-12.3
0.6
-12.3
P-8A Poseidon
32,361
30,576
5.8
7.1
7.1
PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)
10,768
5,136
109.7
8.0
7.2
PATRIOT/Medium Extended Air Defense System
(MEADS) Combined Aggregate Program (CAP)
Fire Unit
18,513
19,077
-3.0
1.5
-0.4
PATRIOT/Medium Extended Air Defense System
(MEADS) Combined Aggregate Program (CAP)
Missile
7,677
7,179
6.9
10.4
9.2
Predator—Unmanned Aircraft System
3,581
3,579
0.1
0.1
0.1
Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System
11,132
2,598
328.5
328.5
328.5
Remote Minehunting System (RMS)
1,275
1,420
-10.2
-15.1
-10.2
Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile-UGM 133A Trident
II (D-5) Missile
51,410
50,942
0.9
1.6
4.4
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High
Program
15,938
4,521
252.6
27.9
48.6
922
859
7.3
7.3
7.3
Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) Block
10
Page 173
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Appendix III
Current and Baseline Cost Estimates for
DOD’s 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense
Acquisition Programs
(Continued From Previous Page)
Fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions
Change in Change in total Change in total
total
acquisition
acquisition
acquisition cost within the cost within the
cost from
past 2 years
past 5 years
baseline (%)
(%)
(%)
Current total
acquisition
cost
Baseline total
acquisition
cost
6,133
5,616
9.2
13.2
12.0
Stryker Family of Vehicles (Stryker)
16,153
7,914
104.1
-1.8
42.7
V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft
(Osprey)
56,061
39,501
41.9
-1.1
3.3
Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV)
2,469
2,576
-4.2
20.9
-4.2
Program
Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) Extended Range Active
Missile (ERAM)
Virginia Class Submarine (SSN 774)
82,193
59,550
38.0
-1.2
-7.8
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T)
Increment 2
4,738
3,653
29.7
29.7
29.7
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T)
Increment 3
13,552
16,125
-16.0
-16.0
-16.0
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T),
Increment I
4,006
4,027
-0.5
-0.5
-0.5
$3,561
$1,175
203.1
68.4
75.6
Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS)
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: Data were obtained from DOD’s SARs, acquisition program baselines, and, in some cases,
program offices. NA indicates data were not available to make the assessment.
Page 174
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Appendix IV
Knowledge-Based Acquisition Practices
Appendx
IiV
GAO’s prior work on best product development practices found that
successful programs take steps to gather knowledge that confirms that
their technologies are mature, their designs stable, and their production
processes are in control. Successful product developers ensure a high level
of knowledge is achieved at key junctures in development. We characterize
these junctures as knowledge points. The Related GAO Products section of
this report includes references to the body of work that helped us identify
these practices and apply them as criteria in weapon system reviews. The
following summarizes these knowledge points and associated key
practices.
Knowledge Point 1: Technologies, time, funding, and other resources match customer needs. Decision to invest in product
development
Demonstrate technologies to a high readiness level—technology readiness level 7—to ensure technologies will work in an operational
environment
Ensure that requirements for product increment are informed by preliminary design review using systems engineering process (such as
prototyping of preliminary design)
Establish cost and schedule estimates for product on the basis of knowledge from preliminary design using system engineering tools
(such as prototyping of preliminary design)
Constrain development phase (5 to 6 years or less) for incremental development
Ensure development phase fully funded (programmed in anticipation of milestone)
Align program manager tenure to complete development phase
Contract strategy that separates system integration and system demonstration activities
Conduct independent cost estimate
Conduct independent program assessment
Conduct major milestone decision review for development start
Knowledge Point 2: Design is stable and performs as expected. Decision to start building and testing productionrepresentative prototypes
Complete system critical design review
Complete 90 percent of engineering design drawing packages
Complete subsystem and system design reviews
Demonstrate with system-level integrated prototype that design meets requirements
Complete the failure modes and effects analysis
Identify key system characteristics
Identify critical manufacturing processes
Establish reliability targets and growth plan on the basis of demonstrated reliability rates of components and subsystems
Conduct independent cost estimate
Conduct independent program assessment
Conduct major milestone decision review to enter system demonstration
Page 175
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Appendix IV
Knowledge-Based Acquisition Practices
(Continued From Previous Page)
Knowledge Point 3: Production meets cost, schedule and quality targets. Decision to produce first units for customer
Demonstrate manufacturing processes
Build and test production-representative prototypes to demonstrate product in intended environment
Test production-representative prototypes to achieve reliability goal
Collect statistical process control data
Demonstrate that critical processes are capable and in statistical control
Conduct independent cost estimate
Conduct independent program assessment
Conduct major milestone decision review to begin production
Source: GAO.
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GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Appendix V
Technology Readiness Levels
Append
x
i
V
Technology readiness level
Description
Hardware/software
Demonstration environment
1.
Basic principles observed
and reported
Lowest level of technology
readiness. Scientific research
begins to be translated into
applied research and
development. Examples might
include paper studies of a
technology’s basic properties
None (paper studies and
analysis)
None
2.
Technology concept and/or
application formulated
Invention begins. Once basic
None (paper studies and
principles are observed,
analysis)
practical applications can be
invented. The application is
speculative and there is no proof
or detailed analysis to support
the assumption. Examples are
still limited to paper studies.
None
3.
Analytical and experimental
critical function and/or
characteristic proof of
concept
Active research and
development is initiated. This
includes analytical studies and
laboratory studies to physically
validate analytical predictions of
separate elements of the
technology. Examples include
components that are not yet
integrated or representative.
Analytical studies and
Lab
demonstration of nonscale
individual components (pieces of
subsystem)
4.
Component and/or
breadboard validation in
laboratory environment
Basic technological components
are integrated to establish that
the pieces will work together.
This is relatively “low fidelity”
compared to the eventual
system. Examples include
integration of “ad hoc” hardware
in a laboratory.
Low-fidelity breadboard.
Integration of nonscale
components to show pieces will
work together. Not fully
functional or form or fit but
representative of technically
feasible approach suitable for
flight articles.
Lab
5.
Component and/or
breadboard validation in
relevant environment
Fidelity of breadboard
technology increases
significantly. The basic
technological components are
integrated with reasonably
realistic supporting elements so
that the technology can be
tested in a simulated
environment. Examples include
“high fidelity” laboratory
integration of components.
High-fidelity breadboard.
Functionally equivalent but not
necessarily form and/or fit (size
weight, materials, etc). Should
be approaching appropriate
scale. May include integration of
several components with
reasonably realistic support
elements/subsystems to
demonstrate functionality.
Lab demonstrating functionality
but not form and fit. May include
flight demonstrating breadboard
in surrogate aircraft. Technology
ready for detailed design studies.
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GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Appendix V
Technology Readiness Levels
(Continued From Previous Page)
6.
System/subsystem model or Representative model or
prototype demonstration in prototype system, which is well
a relevant environment
beyond the breadboard tested
for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant
environment. Represents a
major step up in a technology’s
demonstrated readiness.
Examples include testing a
prototype in a high fidelity
laboratory environment or in
simulated realistic environment.
Prototype. Should be very close
to form, fit and function. Probably
includes the integration of many
new components and realistic
supporting
elements/subsystems if needed
to demonstrate full functionality
of the subsystem.
High-fidelity lab demonstration
or limited/restricted flight
demonstration for a relevant
environment. Integration of
technology is well defined.
7.
System prototype
demonstration in a realistic
environment
Prototype. Should be form, fit
and function integrated with
other key supporting
elements/subsystems to
demonstrate full functionality of
subsystem.
Flight demonstration in
representative realistic
environment such as flying test
bed or demonstrator aircraft.
Technology is well substantiated
with test data.
8.
Actual system completed
Technology has been proven to
and “flight qualified” through work in its final form and under
test and demonstration
expected conditions. In almost
all cases, this TRL represents
the end of true system
development. Examples include
developmental test and
evaluation of the system in its
intended weapon system to
determine if it meets design
specifications.
Flight-qualified hardware
Developmental Test and
Evaluation (DT&E) in the actual
system application.
9.
Actual system “flight proven” Actual application of the
through successful mission technology in its final form and
operations
under mission conditions, such
as those encountered in
operational test and evaluation.
In almost all cases, this is the
end of the last “bug fixing”
aspects of true system
development. Examples include
using the system under
operational mission conditions.
Actual system in final form
Operational Test and Evaluation
(OT&E) in operational mission
conditions.
Prototype near or at planned
operational system. Represents
a major step up from TRL 6,
requiring the demonstration of
an actual system prototype in a
realistic environment, such as in
an aircraft, vehicle or space.
Examples include testing the
prototype in a test bed aircraft.
Source: GAO and its analysis of National Aeronautics and Space Administration data.
Page 178
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Appendix VI
Comments from the Department of Defense
Page 179
Appendx
iI
V
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Appendix VI
Comments from the Department of Defense
Page 180
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Appendix VII
GAO Contact and Acknowledgments
Append
x
iI
V
GAO Contact
Michael J. Sullivan, (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov
Acknowledgments
Principal contributors to this report were Ronald E. Schwenn, Assistant
Director; Raj C. Chitikila; Deanna R. Laufer; Alan D. Rozzi; and Wendy P.
Smythe. Other key contributors included David B. Best, Maricela Cherveny,
Bruce D. Fairbairn, Arthur Gallegos, William R. Graveline, Kristine R.
Hassinger, Michael J. Hesse, Meredith A. Kimmett, C. James Madar,
Stephen P. Marchesani, Jean L. McSween, Kenneth E. Patton, Charles W.
Perdue, W. Kendal Roberts, Rae Ann H. Sapp, Roxanna T. Sun, Robert S.
Swierczek, Bruce H. Thomas, and Karen S. Zuckerstein.
The following were responsible for individual programs:
System
Primary staff
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellite
Bradley L. Terry
AGM-88 Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM)
Kathryn M. Edelman, Grant M. Sutton
Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR)
Molly W. Traci
Apache Block III (AB3)
Helena Brink
Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (Army IAMD)
Carol T. Mebane, Ryan D. Stott
B-2 Defensive Management System (DMS) Modernization
Matthew P. Lea, Sean D. Merrill
B-2 Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability,
Increment 1
Sean D. Merrill, Don M. Springman
B-2 Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability,
Increment 2
Don M. Springman, Sean D. Merrill
BMDS: Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB)
LaTonya D. Miller
BMDS: Flexible Target Family (FTF)
Ivy G. Hubler, Teague A. Lyons
BMDS: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
Steven B. Stern, Rebecca Guerrero
BMDS: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
Meredith A. Kimmett, Brian A. Tittle
Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Aircraft
System (UAS)
W. William Russell, Jodi G. Munson
C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP)
Lauren M. Heft, Kathy Hubbell
C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA)
Andrew H. Redd
C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP) Cheryl K. Andrew, Megan L. Hill
CH-53K - Heavy Lift Replacement
Marvin E. Bonner, Robert K. Miller
CVN 21 Future Aircraft Carrier
W. Kendal Roberts, Robert P. Bullock
DDG 1000 Destroyer
Deanna R. Laufer, W. Kendal Roberts
DDG 51 Destroyer
Molly W. Traci
Page 181
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Appendix VII
GAO Contact and Acknowledgments
(Continued From Previous Page)
System
Primary staff
Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS)
Maricela Cherveny
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE)
Jeffrey L. Hartnett, Teague A. Lyons
Enhanced Polar System (EPS)
Bradley L. Terry
Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile
Wendy P. Smythe
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV)
Jerry W. Clark, MacKenzie H. Cooper
F-22A Raptor
Andrew H. Redd, Michael W. Aiken
F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter)
Charlie Shivers, LeAnna Parkey
Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T)
Scott Purdy, Alexandra K. Dew
Global Hawk (RQ-4A/B)
Laura Jezewski, Travis J. Masters
Global Positioning System (GPS) IIIA
Laura T. Holliday, Laura Hook, Sigrid McGinty
GPS III OCX Ground Control Segment
Arturo Holguin, Jr.
Gray Eagle
Tana M. Davis
H-1 Upgrades (UH-1Y/AH-1Z)
Stephen V. Marchesani
Increment 1 Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT)
Marcus C. Ferguson, Tana M. Davis
Intelligent Munitions System–Scorpion
Wendy P. Smythe, John S. Warren
Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM)
Carrie W. Rogers
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM)
John W. Crawford, Michael J. Hesse
Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV)
J. Kristopher Keener, Erin E. Preston
Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor
System (JLENS)
John M. Ortiz
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
Danny G. Owens, Dayna L. Foster
Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS)
W. Kendal Roberts
Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System
(AMF JTRS)
Paul G. Williams
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Ground Mobile Radios (GMR)
Nathan A. Tranquilli, Ridge C. Bowman
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Handheld, Manpack, and Small Nathan A. Tranquilli, Ridge C. Bowman
Form Fit (HMS)
KC-X Program
Wendell K. Hudson, Mary Jo Lewnard
LHA Replacement Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA 6)
Celina F. Davidson
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
John P. Dell’Osso, Christopher R. Durbin
Littoral Combat Ship-Mission Modules
Gwyneth B. Woolwine, Jeremy Hawk, Christopher R. Durbin
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)/Mobile Landing Platform
Erin E. Preston, J. Kristopher Keener
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS)
Richard Y. Horiuchi
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environment Satellite System
(NPOESS)
Suzanne Sterling
Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT)
Lisa P. Gardner
Navy Unmanned Combat Air System Aircraft Carrier Demonstration Julie C. Hadley, Travis J. Masters
(UCAS-D)
Nett Warrior Increment 1
William C. Allbritton
Page 182
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Appendix VII
GAO Contact and Acknowledgments
(Continued From Previous Page)
System
Primary staff
Ohio-Class Replacement (OR)/Sea Based Strategic Deterrent
Alan D. Rozzi, C. James Madar
P-8A Poseidon
Heather L. Miller, Jacob L. Beier
PATRIOT/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS)
Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit
Ryan D. Stott, Carol T. Mebane
Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System
Rae Ann H. Sapp
Ship to Shore Connector (SSC)
Meghan Hardy, Kelly Bradley
Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), Increment II
Michael J. Hesse
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High Program
Claire Buck
Space Fence
Peter E. Zwanzig
Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) Extended Range Active Missile (ERAM) Angie Nichols-Friedman, Deanna R. Laufer
Stryker Modernization (SMOD)
Andrea M. Bivens, Wendy P. Smythe
Three Dimensional Expeditionary Long Range Radar (3DELRR)
Anne McDonough-Hughes, Amy Moran Lowe
V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft (Osprey)
Bonita P. Oden, Jerry W. Clark
Presidential Helicopter (VXX)
J. Andrew Walker, Michael W. Aiken
Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(VTUAV)
Leigh Ann Nally
Virginia Class Submarine (SSN 774)
C. James Madar, Alan D. Rozzi
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 2
James P. Tallon
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 3
James P. Tallon
Source: GAO.
Page 183
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Related GAO Products
Defense Acquisitions: Observations on Weapon Program Performance
and Acquisition Reforms. GAO-10-706T. Washington, D.C: May 19, 2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Strong Leadership Is Key to Planning and
Executing Stable Weapon Programs. GAO-10-522. Washington, D.C.: May 6,
2010.
Best Practices: DOD Can Achieve Better Outcomes by Standardizing the
Way Manufacturing Risks Are Managed. GAO-10-439. Washington, D.C:
April 22, 2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. GAO10-388SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Many Analyses of Alternatives Have Not Provided
a Robust Assessment of Weapon System Options. GAO-09-665.
Washington, D.C.: September 24, 2009.
Best Practices: High Levels of Knowledge at Key Points Differentiate
Commercial Shipbuilding from Navy Shipbuilding. GAO-09-322.
Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2009.
Defense Acquisitions: Charting a Course for Lasting Reform. GAO-09663T. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2009.
Defense Acquisitions: Measuring the Value of DOD’s Weapon Programs
Requires Starting with Realistic Baselines. GAO-09-543T. Washington,
D.C.: April 1, 2009.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD Must Balance Its Needs with Available
Resources and Follow an Incremental Approach to Acquiring Weapon
Systems. GAO-09-431T. Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2009.
GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for
Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs. GAO-09-3SP.
Washington, D.C.: March 2, 2009.
Defense Acquisitions: Perspectives on Potential Changes to Department
of Defense Acquisition Management Framework. GAO-09-295R.
Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2009.
Page 184
GAO-11-233SP Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
Related GAO Products
Defense Acquisitions: DOD’s Requirements Determination Process Has
Not Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities. GAO-08-1060.
Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: A Knowledge-Based Funding Approach Could
Improve Major Weapon System Program Outcomes. GAO-08-619.
Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2008.
Best Practices: Increased Focus on Requirements and Oversight Needed
to Improve DOD’s Acquisition Environment and Weapon System Quality.
GAO-08-294. Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2008.
Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon
System Investments Could Improve DOD’s Acquisition Outcomes. GAO07-388. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Major Weapon Systems Continue to Experience
Cost and Schedule Problems under DOD’s Revised Policy. GAO-06-368.
Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2006.
Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers
Needed to Improve Outcomes. GAO-06-110. Washington, D.C.: November
30, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Stronger Management Practices Are Needed to
Improve DOD’s Software-Intensive Weapon Acquisitions. GAO-04-393.
Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2004.
Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon
Systems’ Total Ownership Costs. GAO-03-57. Washington, D.C.: February
11, 2003.
Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early
Improves Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-02-701. Washington, D.C.: July 15,
2002.
Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to
Better Weapon System Outcomes. GAO-01-288. Washington, D.C.: March 8,
2001.
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Related GAO Products
Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better
Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-00-199. Washington, D.C.: July 31,
2000.
Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can
Improve Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-162. Washington, D.C.:
July 30, 1999.
Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires
Changes in DOD’s Environment. GAO/NSIAD-98-56. Washington, D.C.:
February 24, 1998.
Best Practices: Commercial Quality Assurance Practices Offer
Improvements for DOD. GAO/NSIAD-96-162. Washington, D.C.: August 26,
1996.
(120920)
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