United States General Accounting Office
GAO
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee
on Defense, Committee on
Appropriations, House of
Representatives
July 1999
DEFENSE
ACQUISITIONS
Reduced Threat Not
Reflected in Antiarmor
Weapon Acquisitions
GAO/NSIAD-99-105
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548
B-280327
National Security and
International Affairs Division
Letter
July 22, 1999
The Honorable Jerry Lewis
Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In its report on the Fiscal Year 1999 Defense Appropriations Bill, the House
Committee on Appropriations expressed concern with the Cold War
mindset of the services, which are continuing to develop and procure an
increasing number of tank-killing weapons. The Committee questioned
whether current antiarmor acquisition plans are appropriate at a time when
potential adversaries have smaller armored forces than during the Cold
War. Accordingly, the Committee directed the Secretary of Defense to
develop an antiarmor master plan to be submitted with the fiscal year 2000
budget. The plan is to identify the projected armored threat and the
quantity of all antiarmor weapons, with the purpose of eliminating excess
antiarmor weapon capabilities. The last master plan was prepared in
September 1990.
You requested that we independently review and comment on the master
plan. Specifically, you asked that we evaluate the plan’s findings and
conclusions, its underlying data and analyses, and its key assumptions, as
well as overall antiarmor funding trends. As of June 30, 1999, the Secretary
of Defense had not submitted the plan. As agreed with your office, we are
therefore providing information we have gathered that addresses the parts
of your request that we could complete without the Department of
Defense’s (DOD) plan. For this report, we (1) identified changes in armored
threats from 1990 to 1997, (2) compared the number and makeup of the
1990 antiarmor weapon inventory with those of the 1998 inventory, and
(3) identified the funding trends of past and future antiarmor
procurements. When the master plan is issued, we will review it and issue
our final report to you.
Results in Brief
Leter
The number of potential enemy armored targets U.S. forces expect to face
has decreased considerably since 1990. During the Cold War, the services
considered the greatest threat to be a massive land attack spearheaded by
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thousands of armored vehicles in Central Europe. Today’s conditions,
however, are significantly different, and military planners consider smaller
regional conflicts as the threat basis when developing war-fighting plans
and requirements. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency’s latest
biannual Outyear Threat Report, issued in 1997, the number of armored
targets is less than 20 percent of the number considered in 1990.
The overall size of DOD’s current antiarmor weapons inventory is
approximately the same as during the Cold War, and inventories of the
more sophisticated and lethal antiarmor weapons have actually increased.
Currently, there are 35 different types of antiarmor weapons in the
inventory and 10 other types in production. While today’s inventory
weapons have similar capabilities to those in the 1990 inventory, the 10 new
weapons are expected to provide improved targeting, lethality, and
survivability capabilities developed in response to the anticipated future
tank threat.
The services continue to invest in antiarmor weapons and are planning
funding increases. They estimate they will spend $11.1 billion in total
procurement funding to acquire the 10 antiarmor weapons currently in
production, which includes $4.2 billion for fiscal years 2000 through 2003.
In addition, DOD is developing nine new antiarmor weapons at an
estimated cost of $3.5 billion. The procurement costs for six of the nine
new programs have not yet been determined, but the remaining three have
an estimated procurement cost of about $4.7 billion. Plans to acquire large
quantities of new and improved antiarmor weapons do not appear
consistent with the reduced size of the armored threat and the existing
large and capable inventory of antiarmor weapons.
Background
Antiarmor weapons are capable of destroying targets such as tanks,
armored combat vehicles, and/or artillery. To determine weapon
requirements, the services use the Defense Intelligence Agency’s latest
biannual Outyear Threat Report estimates. The current report modeled a
scenario in which U.S. forces would fight two major regional conflicts.
In October 1998, the administration issued “A National Security Strategy
for a New Century,” which describes the new and different threats facing
the United States since the end of the Cold War. Similarly, the Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) testified in October
1998 that the military needs to change the way it fights, the weapons it uses,
and the way it acquires weapons to successfully meet the new anticipated
Leter
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threats. According to the Under Secretary, the most likely future combat
scenarios include information warfare, urban combat, chemical/biological
attack, terrorism, and nuclear attack. He noted that the dilemma the
military faces is how to fund competing demands to develop weapons to
achieve the goals of the early 21st century and meet current readiness
needs. The Under Secretary stressed that the military needs to shift away
from traditional weapons designed to counter a Cold War threat. He
specifically stated that one required action is to reduce the number of
traditional weapons now in acquisition to fund the required newer
weapons. This, he said, would enable the military to reallocate resources to
top-priority modernization programs for communications, sensors,
space-based reconnaissance, and computer systems.
DOD’s 1990 antiarmor master plan was a single integrated document
describing the development and acquisition of weapons capable of
defeating armored threats. Prior to 1990, antiarmor requirements were
primarily justified according to the potential threat of a Central European
conflict. A principle component of this threat was the very large Soviet and
Warsaw Pact inventories of armored vehicles. While the 1990 plan still
concluded that the Soviet Union would retain major conventional and
strategic forces and would remain the major concern of defense planning,
it recognized that the Warsaw Pact was no longer a credible military
alliance.
In 1993, we reported that DOD had not sufficiently reexamined its
antiarmor needs since the decline of the Warsaw Pact.1 DOD reported that
the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation had plans to conduct a
2-year study of the antiarmor mission. However, according to a Program
Analysis and Evaluation official, the Office terminated the study before it
was completed, and no reportable results were obtained.
Armored Threat
Substantially Reduced
DOD reports as well as testimony by top Defense officials show that the
armored threat facing the United States has dropped substantially since
1990. A comparison of the armored targets in the 1990 antiarmor master
plan with those in the 1997 Defense Intelligence Agency Outyear Threat
Report shows that the number of armored targets U.S. forces expect to face
has dropped significantly during the period. Figure 1 shows the number of
1
Antiarmor Weapons Acquisitions: Assessments Needed to Support Continued Need and Long-term
Affordability (GAO/NSIAD-93-49, Mar. 4, 1993).
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enemy tanks and armored combat vehicles in the 1997 Outyear Threat
Report is less than 20 percent of the number in 1990 antiarmor master plan.
Figure 1: Comparison of Enemy Tanks and Armored Combat Vehicles, 1990 Soviet
Union and 1997 Regional Conflict
Armored combat
vehicles
Tanks
0
20
40
60
80
100
1997 as a percent of 1990
1990 Soviet Union
1997 Regional conflict
This decline reflects the changes in threats since the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991. In 1987, we reported that the Soviet inventory totaled
approximately 52,000 tanks, including about 29,000 in Europe.2 About
26,000 of the tanks in the inventory were produced after 1978 (including the
T64B, T72M1, and T80). The technical sophistication and the sheer
numbers of these armored vehicles were far greater than the armored
threat associated with any other war-fighting contingency, either then or
now. However, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact significantly reduced the
likelihood that the United States would have to face an opponent with such
technically sophisticated armored weapons. Consequently, the armored
threat as projected in the 1997 Outyear Threat Report is not nearly as
capable as that of the former Soviet Union in terms of quantity and quality.
In January 1998, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency reported
to Congress that threats had diminished substantially, that the United
States was unlikely to face a global military threat similar to the former
Soviet Union for at least two decades, and that ground forces throughout
the world were being reduced. Further, he said many developing nations
2
Antitank Weapons: Current and Future Capabilities (GAO/PEMD-87-22, Sept. 17, 1987).
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had outdated equipment that was either not operational or in serious
disrepair. Developed countries were in various stages of modernization,
but ground forces were a low priority.
The Defense Intelligence Agency’s 1997 Outyear Threat Report used two
regional conflict scenarios as the threat estimate for determining
requirements. Iraq and North Korea are currently the most likely opponents
the United States would face. The number of armored vehicles currently
maintained by Iraq and North Korea represents only a small fraction of the
Cold War threat. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency Director
testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in January
1998 that the United Nations sanctions and arms embargo implemented
after the Persian Gulf War limit Iraq’s opportunity to procure additional
weapons and have had a devastating effect on its economy. Further, North
Korea’s overall military readiness continues to erode along with its
worsening economic situation.
Antiarmor Weapon
Inventory Remains at
Cold War Levels While
New and Improved
Weapons Are Added
The overall size of the antiarmor weapon inventory has remained fairly
constant since 1990. At the same time, weapons have become more
sophisticated, lethal, and effective. These more highly sophisticated
weapons, some of which are capable of killing multiple targets, were
developed to defeat the anticipated future Soviet tank threat.
The 1990 antiarmor master plan divided the inventory and procurement of
antiarmor weapons into five different categories: infantry/helicopter,
indirect fire support, fixed-wing, tank rounds, and mines. Figure 2
compares the number of all types of antiarmor weapons in 1990 and 1998
within these five categories. There are various types of antiarmor weapons
within each category. The various types of antiarmor weapons are
described in appendix I.
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Figure 2: Comparison of Antiarmor Munitions, 1990 and 1998
1998 as a percent of 1990
140
128
119
120
100
96.6
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
80
80
67.7
60
40
20
0
Infantry
/helicopters
Indirect
fire
Fixedwing
Tank
rounds
Mines
Total
1990
1998
The 1998 inventory of infantry/helicopter antiarmor weapons is slightly
smaller than in 1990, but it contains inventories of three additional
weapons with improved capabilities—the Javelin, the Hellfire II missile,
and the Longbow Hellfire missile. The 1998 inventory of indirect fire
weapons increased from 1990 levels. The biggest contributors were the
higher number of Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) rockets and the
recently produced Sense and Destroy Armor (SADARM) submunition. The
1998 inventory of fixed-wing antiarmor weapons also grew over the 1990
level. It included two additional weapons capable of killing multiple
armored targets—the Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW) and the Sensor
Fused Weapon. The 1998 inventory of tank rounds shrank significantly.
However, the drop was in the number of tank rounds for the older M60 and
M61 tanks. Rounds for the M-1 Abrams main battle tank currently in use
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increased by 425 percent. These rounds are more lethal against modern
armored targets. The 1998 inventory of mines also shrank from 1990, but
quantities of two new mines that provide increased performance and
lethality were added. Detailed comparisons of the 1990 and 1998
inventories are in appendix II.
U.S. antiarmor weapons proved very capable during Operation Desert
Storm. The United States and its allies destroyed or forced abandonment of
2,633 tanks during the air and ground assault against Iraqi ground forces.
According to a 1992 House Committee on Armed Services report,
technology gave U.S. forces the edge, and the equipment performed above
the most optimistic expectations.3
DOD Continues to
Invest in Antiarmor
Weapon Capability
In 1998, the services had 35 different types of weapons in inventory capable
of performing today’s antiarmor mission and had spent a total of
$20.2 billion (in then-year dollars) to acquire these weapons.4 They had also
spent a total of $3.6 billion through fiscal year 1998 to procure
10 additional antiarmor weapons and estimated they would spend another
$7.4 billion to complete procurement of these new weapons. The
procurement funding requests for the 10 antiarmor weapons in production
are in appendix III.
In addition, the services are currently developing nine new weapons with
varying levels of antiarmor capability for a total estimated development
cost of almost $3.5 billion, $2.6 billion of which has already been spent.
Some of the weapons such as the Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition and the
Line-of-Sight Antitank (LOSAT) are primary antitank weapons. Others such
as the Multipurpose Individual Munition (MPIM) engage a variety of
targets, including buildings, bunkers, and light armor. The guided MLRS
can engage personnel, light armor, or heavy armor, depending on the
payload selected. At this time, only three of the weapons are approaching a
procurement decision. Their estimated future procurement funding is
about $4.7 billion. Table 1 shows the development and projected
procurement costs for the nine weapons.
3
Defense for a New Era, Lessons of the Persian Gulf War, House Committee on Armed Services (1992).
4
Inventory quantities and costs are defined as what was on contract through fiscal year 1998, not
necessarily what was on–hand at the end of the fiscal year. For some older Army munitions, inventory
was based on on-hand data because original procurement data was unavailable.
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Table 1: Antiarmor Development Weapons
Then-year dollars in millions
Total Development
Estimated
development
cost to procurement
cost
complete
cost
Brilliant antiarmor submunitiona
$1,020
$ 34
$1,864
Improved brilliant antiarmor submunitiona
334
206 Undetermined
Line-of-sight antitank
387
220 Undetermined
61
42 Undetermined
Multipurpose individual munition
Improved sense and destroy armor
988
36 Undetermined
96
78 Undetermined
Tank round M829E3
255
193 Undetermined
Joint stand-off weapon BLU-108
245
Guided multiple launch rocket system
Predator
Total
47
2,369
139
25
492
$3,525
$881
$4,725
a
Does not include the cost to develop and procure the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) needed
to deliver the submunition to the target area.
Source: President’s Fiscal Year 1999 Budget.
In addition, the Army has spent almost $178 million to develop the
Enhanced Fiber Optics Guided Missile antiarmor weapon. The future of
this weapon is uncertain. No funding was requested in the President’s
Fiscal Year 2000 Budget, and procurement funds for fiscal years 1998 and
1999 were rescinded and eliminated. Table 2 shows the projected yearly
procurement funding requests through fiscal year 2003 for the 10 weapons
in production and the 3 nearing production.
Table 2: Antiarmor Procurement Funding Requests
Then-year dollars in millions
Fiscal year
Weapons
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
To complete
In production
$784
$964
$1,154
$1,087
$1,121
$814
$1,975
122
267
478
448
480
2,930
$1,086
$1,421
$1,565
$1,569
$1,294
$4,905
Nearing
production
Total
$784
Source: President’s Fiscal Year 1999 Budget.
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Procurement funding for antiarmor weapons fell steadily between 1986 and
1996. According to the Institute for Defense Analysis, antiarmor funding fell
from $2.5 billion in 1986 to $770 million in 1996.5 However, future funding
demands for the 10 weapons in production and the 3 in development show
a reverse in this trend. Fiscal year 1999 was the first year to exceed
$1 billion in antiarmor funding since fiscal year 1994. Funding for these
weapons is expected to increase each year through fiscal year 2002.
Conclusions
DOD has maintained the overall size of its antiarmor weapon inventory at
the same level as in 1990 while significantly increasing its effectiveness.
The lethality and accuracy of the weapons in the current inventory are
superior to those available in 1990. At the same time, however, the threat of
a massive heavily armored attack by potential enemies has greatly
diminished, and war-fighting strategies have been modified to reflect global
changes in threats and priorities. Nevertheless, DOD plans to increase its
procurement of antiarmor weapons. Plans to acquire large quantities of
new and improved antiarmor weapons do not appear consistent with the
reduced size of the armored threat and the existing large and capable
inventory of antiarmor weapons.
Agency Comments and
Our Evaluation
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred. DOD
offered comments that were generally directed at explaining and justifying
the findings of this report. For example, DOD noted that the report did not
discuss or account for the fact that many of the antiarmor weapons
quantities are leftover stockpile levels from the Cold War and the
technology in those weapons did not provide the levels of precision,
lethality, and survivability available today.
As discussed in our report, we plan to assess DOD’s forthcoming antiarmor
master plan. The plan is expected to provide an updated assessment of the
current armored threat, current antiarmor capabilities, and antiarmor
weapons requirements. We plan to assess the plan’s findings and
conclusions, its underlying data and analyses, and its key assumptions.
5
Trends and Funding for Acquisition of Antiarmor Munitions, 1986-2001, Institute for Defense Analysis
(Jan. 1997).
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Scope and
Methodology
To determine the change in threat from 1990 to 1997, we compared the
threat contained in the 1990 antiarmor master plan with the threat
contained in the Defense Intelligence Agency’s 1997 Outyear Threat Report.
We discussed threat information with representatives from the Defense
Intelligence Agency, Bolling Air Force Base, Maryland; the U.S. Central
Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida; and the Commander of U.S.
Forces Korea.
To determine the change in number and types of antiarmor weapons
between 1990 and 1998, we compared the inventory contained in the 1990
antiarmor master plan with data the individual services provided on their
1998 antiarmor inventory. We discussed antiarmor weapon inventories with
representatives from the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and
Plans, Washington, D.C.; the Army’s Concepts Analysis Agency, Bethesda,
Maryland; the Air Force’s Director for Operational Requirements, Crystal
City, Virginia; the Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland;
and the Marine Corps’ Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia.
We identified past and future funding trends by obtaining data from the
1997 Institute for Defense Analysis report on Trends and Funding for
Acquisition of Antiarmor Munitions, 1986-2001 and from fiscal year 1999
and 2000 budgetary documents.
We conducted our review from June 1998 to May 1999 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable William S. Cohen,
Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army;
the Honorable F. Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary of the Air Force; the
Honorable Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; General James L. Jones,
Commandant of the Marine Corps; Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of
Management and Budget; and other interested parties. We will also make
copies available to others upon request.
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Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or William Graveline at (256) 650-1400,
if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. The major
contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Sincerely yours,
,
James F. Wiggins
Associate Director
Defense Acquisitions Issues
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Contents
Letter
1
Appendix I
U.S. Antiarmor
Weapons
14
Appendix II
Comparison of
Antiarmor Weapons in
Inventory, 1990-98
19
Appendix III
Current Production
Weapon Funding
Requests
21
Appendix IV
Comments From the
Department of Defense
22
Appendix V
Major Contributors to
This Report
25
Tables
Table 1: Antiarmor Development Weapons
Table 2: Antiarmor Procurement Funding Requests
8
8
Figures
Figure 1: Comparison of Enemy Tanks and Armored Combat
Vehicles, 1990 Soviet Union and 1997 Regional Conflict
Figure 2: Comparison of Antiarmor Munitions, 1990 and 1998
4
6
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Contents
Abbreviations
ATACMS
BAT
CEM
DOD
HEAA
JSOW
LOSAT
MLRS
MOPMS
MPIM
SADARM
SFW
SLAP
SMAW
TOW
WAM
WCMD
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Army Tactical Missile System
Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition
Combined Effects Munition
Department of Defense
High Explosive Antiarmor
Joint Stand-Off Weapon
Line-of-Sight Antitank
Multiple Launch Rocket System
Modular Pack Mine System
Multipurpose Individual Munition
Sense and Destroy Armor
Sensor Fused Weapon
Saboted Light Armor Penetrator
Shoulder-launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon
Tube-launched, Optically Tracked, Wire Command–link Guided
Wide Area Munition
Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser
GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix I
U.S. Antiarmor Weapons
Appenx
Idi
Infantry/Helicoper
Weapons
Dragon
The Dragon completed production in 1980. It is a shoulder-fired,
lightweight, short-range antitank guided missile that only needs one soldier
to fire. The missile uses semiautomatic command line-of-sight guidance
with an infrared tracker. The Dragon has limited antiarmor capability due
to its 1,000-meter range and lack of fire-and-forget technology (allowing
personnel to fire the weapon and take cover rather than remaining exposed
while guiding the weapon to its target).
Hellfire
The Hellfire air-to-ground missile is the primary antitank armament of the
Army’s Apache, Kiowa Warrior, and special operations helicopters; the
Marine Corps’ Super Cobra helicopter; and the Navy’s Sea Hawk helicopter.
The Hellfire uses semi-active laser terminal guidance. Beginning in 1990,
the missile was reconfigured with an interim warhead to improve lethality
against near-term threat reactive armor. Hellfire II includes improvements
to defeat all known electro-optical countermeasures and advanced reactive
armors.
High Explosive Antiarmor
The High Explosive Antiarmor (HEAA) rocket is an antitank weapon
designed to defeat targets at ranges up to 500 meters. It is effective against
current tanks without additional armor. The rocket is launched from the
shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapon (SMAW). When the HEAA
completed development in 1988, it transformed the SMAW into a
multipurpose weapon suitable for close-in antiarmor urban fighting.
Javelin
The Javelin is a portable antitank weapon used by the Army and the Marine
Corps. The weapon weighs 48.5 pounds and has a maximum range of
2,500 meters. It provides high lethality against conventional and reactive
armor and will replace the Dragon. The weapon has a high kill rate against
all known armored threats at extended ranges under day/night, adverse
weather, and battlefield obscurants. Its key feature is fire-and-forget
technology. The Javelin is hardened against countermeasures and does not
require extensive training for effective employment.
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Appendix I
U.S. Antiarmor Weapons
Line-of-Sight Antitank
The Line-of-Sight Antitank (LOSAT) weapon consists of a kinetic energy
missile and launcher mounted on a High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled
Vehicle (HMMWV). LOSAT is being developed as a mobile, direct fire,
antitank weapon that provides lethality at long ranges.
Longbow Hellfire
The Longbow Hellfire air-to-ground missile is designed to defeat individual
armored targets and enhance the survivability of the Longbow Apache
Helicopter. Longbow uses radio frequency guidance. It can be used both
day and night, in adverse weather, and with battlefield obscurants.
Longbow Hellfire complements the semi-active Laser Hellfire II with
fire-and-forget capability, maximizing the ability of the Apache.
Predator Multipurpose
Individual Munition
Predator is designed to be a lightweight shoulder-fired weapon capable of
defeating reactive armor. The weapon is designed with a modular warhead.
The Marine Corps uses a warhead that can defeat tanks with reactive
armor. The Army has modified the Predator with an alternative warhead,
the Multipurpose Individual Munition (MPIM). The MPIM provides infantry
with a fire-and-forget weapon capable of defeating enemy forces in
buildings, bunkers, and lightly armored vehicles.
Saboted Light Armor
Penetrator
Saboted Light Armor Penetrator (SLAP) is a 50-caliber ammunition
effective against light armor with a maximum effective range of
approximately 1,500 meters. It is a reduced caliber munition wrapped in
plastic. The lighter weight allows the velocity to be significantly and safely
increased in an unmodified machine gun.
Tube-launched, Optically
Tracked, Wire
Command-link Guided
The Tube-launched, Optically Tracked, Wire Command-link Guided (TOW)
missile is an antitank weapon designed to fulfill the heavy assault
requirement for close combat maneuver forces. The TOW can be fired from
a ground tripod or from specifically adapted vehicles such as Bradleys and
HMMWVs or from Cobra helicopters. The weapon includes a thermal sight
for operations at night, in reduced visibility, and in countermeasures.
Several upgraded variants of the missile are in inventory, including ones
that can counter reactive armor. However, the TOW is not a fire-and-forget
weapon.
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Appendix I
U.S. Antiarmor Weapons
Indirect Fire Weapons
Brilliant Antiarmor
Submunition
The Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition (BAT) is a guided submunition that
searches and destroys moving armored targets using acoustic and infrared
seekers. The Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Block II can carry
the BAT to ranges beyond 100 kilometers. The preplanned product
improvement (P3I) BAT uses millimeter wave, infrared, and acoustic
seekers to also attack cold stationary or dug-in targets like
Surface-to-Surface Missile Transporter-Erector Launchers and Heavy
Multiple Rocket Launchers. The ATACMS Block IIA missile will carry the
P3I BAT to ranges of 300 kilometers.
Copperhead
The Copperhead is a laser-guided projectile fired from standard
155-millimeter howitzers. Its production was completed in the 1980s. The
projectile's semi-active laser seeker searches for a target illuminated by a
forward ground- or aircraft-based observer using a laser. The minimum
range of the Copperhead is 3 kilometers and its maximum range is
15.5 kilometers. The warhead can penetrate every tank now in service. The
Copperhead has been modified with a time-delay fuse, which permits the
warhead to penetrate reactive armor without detonating it.
Multiple Launch Rocket
System
The Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) has been in production since
the 1980s. The MLRS basic rocket is a free-flight unguided tactical rocket
with a warhead containing 644 Dual Purpose Improved Conventional
Munition (DPICM) submunitions. The DPICM can penetrate light armor.
The Extended Range MLRS (ER-MLRS) began production in fiscal year
1996. The new rocket added enhanced capability through improvements in
range, accuracy, effectiveness, and maneuver force safety. The extended
range rocket has a range of 45 kilometers and contains 518 DPICM
submunitions. Starting in fiscal year 2002, the guided MLRS will integrate a
guidance control package into the ER-MLRS resulting in reduced mission
time and increased survivability.
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Appendix I
U.S. Antiarmor Weapons
Sense and Destroy Armor
The Sense and Destroy Armor (SADARM) is a fire-and-forget sensor-fused
submunition delivered by 155-millimeter artillery projectiles or by the
MLRS. It is designed to detect and destroy light armored vehicles, primarily
self-propelled artillery. Once dispensed over the target area, it detects
individual targets using millimeter wave and infrared sensors and fires an
explosively formed penetrator through the top of the target. The
155-millimeter projectile carries two SADARMs per round and has a range
of 22.5 kilometers. The MLRS carries six SADARMS per rocket and has a
range of 30 kilometers. According to the Department of Defense (DOD), the
Army’s MLRS-delivered SADARM program is currently not funded.
Fixed-Wing Weapons
Combined Effects Munition
The Combined Effects Munition (CEM) is a multipurpose cluster bomb for
ground support and is used against light armor, personnel, and artillery. The
CEM weighs approximately 950 pounds and dispenses 202 bomb units. The
CEM entered production in 1985. Because of its inaccuracy when dropped
from higher altitudes, the Air Force is fitting CEM with a wind corrected
munitions dispenser (WCMD) kit. The kit will provide inertial navigation to
correct for the effects of the wind.
Joint Stand-Off Weapon
The Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW) is a Navy-led joint program with the
Air Force. JSOW is an air-to-ground weapon capable of attacking a variety
of targets from outside enemy point defenses during day/night and adverse
weather conditions. There are currently three configurations of the JSOW:
JSOW baseline for soft and area targets, JSOW BLU-108 for massed land
combat vehicles, and JSOW Unitary for harder/point targets and increased
kill effectiveness.
Maverick
The Maverick is a rocket propelled, air-to-surface, precision guided tactical
missile with fire-and-forget capability designed for use against tanks and a
variety of hardened targets. The pilot has to visually acquire a target. When
the missile is engaged, a video picture instantly appears on the cockpit
display. The pilot then lines up the target with the gunsight. When the
missile is released, it finds the target automatically.
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GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix I
U.S. Antiarmor Weapons
Rockeye
The Rockeye is an air-launched dispenser weapon. It is one of the older,
best known, and most widely used dispensers. The bomblet is designed
primarily as an antiarmor weapon for use against tanks, armored carriers,
and gun emplacements. The Rockeye II carries 247 dual-purpose antiarmor
bomblets and has a nose-mounted fuse to control the opening of the
dispenser at predetermined altitudes.
Sensor Fused Weapon
The Sensor Fused Weapon (SFW) is a cluster weapon designed for use
against land combat vehicles. It consists of a tactical weapon dispenser
containing 10 submunitions. Each submunition contains four warheads.
The warheads are released in a horizontal trajectory and are activated
through a small infrared sensor contained in the warhead. This weapon
provides multiple kills per pass capability. The Air Force is fitting SFW with
the WCMD kit, which will provide inertial navigation to correct for the
effects of the wind.
Tank Rounds
The 120-millimeter tank round is fired from the M1A1 and M1A2 tanks.
There are four basic cartridge types: (1) Kinetic Energy; (2) Armor
Piercing, Fin Stabilized, and Discarding Sabot-Tracer; (3) Chemical Energy
High Explosive; and (4) training rounds for each of the tactical cartridges.
The Armaments Enhancement Initiative program provides upgrades to the
120-millimeter round capability to defeat Soviet-built armored vehicles of
the 1990s and later.
Antiarmor Mines
Antiarmor mines in inventory include several non-self-destructing and
self-destructing mines. The inventory includes the M15, M19, and M21
non-self-destructing mine and a family of mixed munitions that includes the
Modular Pack Mine System (MOPMS), Volcano, and Gator. MOPMS
contains 21 individual antitank and antipersonnel mines. It is used as a
protective minefield, for obstacle enhancement, or to close gaps in other
larger minefields. Volcano contains six antitank mines and is designed for
quick emplacement. The Gator system has a total of 94 mines (72 antitank
and 22 antipersonnel) and was developed to place mine fields on the
ground using high-speed tactical aircraft. DOD has one mine in production,
the Wide Area Munition (WAM). The WAM is a first-generation smart
weapon. It recognizes armor and autonomously aims and launches its
submunition against the target. It offers increased performance and
lethality over current mines in inventory.
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GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II
Comparison of Antiarmor Weapons in
Inventory, 1990-98
AppenIx
di
The 1990 antiarmor master plan contained a total of 34 antiarmor weapons
in inventory or procurement. Comparisons of the weapons by category
shows that more sophisticated lethal weapons have been added since
then.1
In the infantry/helicopter weapon category, the 1998 inventory stood at
97 percent of the 1990 inventory. The 1990 inventory contained five
weapons: the Dragon, the Light Assault Weapon, the Lightweight
Multipurpose Weapon (AT-4), the TOW missile, and the Hellfire. The 1998
inventory included these five weapons and three additional ones with
improved capabilities: the shoulder-fired Javelin, the Hellfire II missile, and
the Longbow Hellfire missile.
In the infantry/helicopter category, the inventory quantities of
shoulder-fired weapons were 95 percent of 1990 levels. The 1998 inventory
included the Javelin, which provides fire-and-forget technology and
enhanced lethality over the Dragon. The 1998 inventory of TOW missiles
was about 81 percent of the 1990 inventory. Although the number of TOW
missiles has declined, the 1998 inventory contained more modern variants,
which provide more lethality and longer range. The 1998 inventory of
helicopter air-to-ground missiles was well above its 1990 level and included
over 20,000 Hellfire II and Longbow Hellfire missiles, which provide
improved lethality and survivability over the basic Hellfire missile.
The 1998 inventory for the indirect fire support weapons category was
128 percent of the 1990 inventory. This category is composed of artillery
shells and rockets. The biggest contributors to the larger 1998 inventory
were the increased numbers of the MLRS rocket and the inclusion of some
recently produced SADARM submunitions. The SADARM was developed to
improve the ability of the artillery projectile to accurately locate targets.
The 1998 inventory in the fixed-wing category of antiarmor weapons was
119 percent of the 1990 inventory. The fixed-wing 1990 inventory contained
the Maverick air-to-ground missile and the Rockeye and CEM cluster
weapons. In the 1998 inventory, the Maverick was 104 percent, the Rockeye
107 percent, and the CEM 164 percent of the 1990 inventory. The 1998
inventory included two additional antiarmor area weapons capable of
1
We did not include four weapons (25-millimeter and 30-millimeter munitions) in the comparison
because their quantities were extremely large compared with the other weapons in the same categories.
Page 19
GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II
Comparison of Antiarmor Weapons in
Inventory, 1990-98
killing multiple armored targets: the JSOW air-to-ground missile and the
SFW.
In the tank rounds category, the 1998 inventory stood at 68 percent of the
1990 inventory. This category contained 105-millimeter and 120-millimeter
tank rounds. While the 1998 inventory of tank rounds was significantly
smaller than the total 1990 inventory, most of the rounds in 1990 were
105-millimeter M60 or M61 tank rounds. However, the main battle tank
currently in use is the M-1 Abrams, which uses the 120-millimeter round
shell. A comparison of the 120-millimeter inventory shows that the 1998
inventory was 425 percent of the 1990 inventory. The 120-millimeter tank
rounds have increased lethality against modern armored weapons. Some of
the newer kinetic energy rounds were designed to defeat the newer
Soviet-built tanks.
In the mines inventory category, the 1998 inventory was 80 percent of the
1990 inventory. The 1998 inventory contained two newer mines, the
Volcano and the WAM. Both provide increased performance and lethality
over the mines contained in the 1990 inventory.
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GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix III
Current Production Weapon Funding
Requests
AppeInIx
di
Then-year dollars in millions
Weapon
Service
WCMD on CEM
Air Force
WCMD on Gator
Air Force
Javelin
Army
Javelin
Marine Corps
Longbow Hellfire
Army
MLRS-extended range
Army
SADARM
Army
Total quantity to be
procured
Total cost
30,000
$500
Cost through fiscal Cost fiscal year 1999
year 1998
to completion
$112
$388
5,000
82
19
63
24,403
3,012
945
2,067
2,553
287
96
191
12,905
2,092
704
1,388
6,102
245
109
136
50,000
1,978
235
1,743
SFW
Air Force
5,000
2,066
912
1,154
Tank round M829A2
Army
144,000
614
470
144
WAM
Army
3,165
214
40
174
$11,090
$3,642
$7,448
Total
Source: Service budgetary data.
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GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix IV
Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 22
AppenV
Ix
di
GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix IV
Comments From the Department of Defense
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GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix IV
Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 24
GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix V
Major Contributors to This Report
National Security and
International Affairs
Division, Washington,
D.C.
William Gillies
Roy Karadbil
Atlanta Field Office
Laura Durland
Beverly Breen
(707356)
Page 25
Lert
AppenV
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GAO/NSIAD-99-105 Defense Acquisitions
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