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PREFACE
With its Report on Programme Manipulation, the Committee publishes eight statistical tables on
oil and humanitarian transactions under the Programme. Tables 1 through 5 focus on the oil
transactions during the Programme and contain the following information: (1) general data on
contracts executed by oil purchasers, such as total value of executed oil contracts and quantity of
lifted barrels; (2) information on Iraqi oil allocation recipients and oil contracts used for execution
of allocations; (3) data on known underlying financiers for purchases of Iraqi oil under the
Programme; and (4) information on surcharge payments associated with certain contracts under
the Programme.
Tables 6 through 8 focus on humanitarian goods purchases (including transactions involving oil
spare parts). These tables contain the following information: (1) general data on humanitarian
contracts executed by the Government of Iraq, such as the value of executed contracts and
description of purchased goods; and (2) information on illicit payments made in connection with
humanitarian contracts, including payments made in the form of after-sales-service fees and
inland transportation fees.
I.
NOTICE TO COMPANIES
A. OIL PURCHASERS
Based upon its review of SOMO records, the Committee identified 139 companies whose
purchases of oil were associated with a surcharge paid to the Government of Iraq during the
Programme. The Committee sent notice letters to 127 companies stating that they would be
represented on a table showing that unauthorized payments were made in connection with their
contracts under the Programme. The companies were invited to respond and submit any evidence
corroborating or refuting the information. The Committee received 26 responses.848
B. HUMANITARIAN GOODS SUPPLIERS
Prior to the publication of this Report, the Committee sent notifications to 2,253 suppliers who
had contracts for which the Committee had evidence of actual or projected illicit payments. The
letters advised each company that it would appear in a table accompanying the Committee’s
report. The companies were invited to respond and submit any evidence corroborating or refuting
the information. Some companies responded to the Committee’s notification, but many did not.
The Committee made every effort to obtain the most current mailing and contact information for
the identified companies, using information from United Nations contract and Treasury files as
well as from other documents obtained during the investigation. Where necessary, publicly
848
Due to an administrative error, twelve companies were not sent notifications.
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available database systems were searched for contact information. In those cases where mail was
returned to the Committee as “undeliverable,” the Committee conducted additional searches for
the contact information. For a small number of companies, the Committee was unable to
successfully mail notices where current information was unavailable or the company was
apparently no longer in existence.
As a result of its mailings, the Committee received 293 responses from companies.
C. SUMMARY OF RESPONSES
The table below summarizes the responses received by the Committee from the oil and
humanitarian companies based on the following categories:
Category Definitions:
A: Company admits that it knowingly made illicit payments to the Government of Iraq or its agents.
B: Company denies that it made payments to the Government of Iraq or its agents in violation of the
Programme.
C: Company acknowledges payments were made or may have been made but denies knowing at the
time that its agents or employees made illicit payments.
D: Company acknowledges that payments were made or may have been made, but contends that
payments were made with the belief that they were authorized under the Programme or for actual
services performed by legitimate private contractors.
E: Company acknowledges receipt of the Committee’s letter and takes no position or has expressly
requested that its response not be disclosed.
F: Company did not respond.
G: Company was not noticed by the Committee or subsequent information was identified and it was
no longer appropriate to list the company.
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Table A – Categories of Responses to Mailings
Oil Entities
Number of
Entities
Category
Humanitarian Entities
% of Total
Number of
Entities
% of Total
A – Admits payment
1
0.7%
26
1.2%
B – Denies payment
18
12.9%
152
6.7%
C – Admits payments but
denies knowledge at the time
–
0.0%
10
0.4%
D – Admits payments but
believed authorized at the
time
2
1.4%
41
1.8%
E – Takes no position
5
3.6%
64
2.8%
Subtotal of responses
26
18.6%
293
12.9%
F – Does not respond to IIC
101
72.7%
1,785
G – Company not noticed
Total
79.2%
849
12
8.6%
175
7.8%
139
100.0%
2,253
100.0%
The majority of the oil and humanitarian companies noticed did not respond to the Committee.
Responses received by the Committee are indicated in Tables 1 and 7. Although the majority of
companies that did respond denied that illicit payments had been made, more than 75 admitted to
payments, albeit with certain caveats as described in the table above.850
II.
OIL TABLES
The Committee presents its information concerning the oil purchases under the Programme in
five tables:
Table 1—“Oil Allocations and Sales Summary by Contracting Company”—presents a
list of oil allocations and oil sales by contracting company for oil sold under the
Programme.
849
Of the 175 companies, documentation for 27 led to the conclusion that they should not be included in
the table. For the remaining 148, there was insufficient time to notify them before the publication of the
Report.
850
Table 1 lists all 139 oil entities, including those that did not receive a notice from the Committee. This
is due to the fact that the evidence of surcharges paid was based on SOMO records that were largely
corroborated by bank account documentation and embassy receipt records. Table 7, however, does not list
the 175 humanitarian companies that the Committee was unable to notice because some number of the
companies’ illicit payments were solely based on projections.
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Table 2—“Oil Sales Summary by Contracting Company and Contract”—presents a list
by contracting company for oil sold under the Programme.
Table 3—“Summary of Oil Sales by Non-Contractual Beneficiary”—details Iraq’s oil
allocations to individuals and entities other than the named contracting party.
Table 4—“Known Underlying Financiers”—provides a list of the underlying financiers
that the Committee identified during its investigation.
Table 5—“Surcharge Payments Associated with a Contracting Company”—provides a
list by company of the surcharges that were paid in connection with certain contracts.
A. SOURCES OF EVIDENCE
The information in these tables is broadly based on four sources:
•
Databases and records maintained by the United Nations, specifically, the Office of Iraq
Programme (“OIP”) and the United Nations Treasury department and hereinafter is
collectively referred to as “United Nations OFFP records.”
•
Records of the Government of Iraq, primarily from the Ministry of Oil and the State Oil
Marketing Organization (“SOMO”). These records include ledgers of oil surcharge
payments, lists of allocations for each phase, letters from the executive director of SOMO
to the Minister of Oil seeking approval for allocations with handwritten approvals by the
Minister of Oil, and records from Iraq’s embassies in Austria, Greece, Egypt, Italy,
Malaysia, Russia, Syria, Switzerland (Permanent Mission to the U.N. in Geneva),
Turkey, Vietnam, and Yemen.
•
Records from various financial institutions involved in the financing aspects of the oil
transactions, as well as financial institutions that received deposits of oil surcharges.
•
Records provided by certain entities involved in the purchase of oil from Iraq.
B. DESCRIPTION OF TABLES AND METHODOLOGIES
1. Table 1: Oil Allocation and Sales Summary by Contracting
Company
Table 1 (hereinafter referred to as the “Committee oil summary table”) presents an alphabetical
list of the companies that were allocated oil; and, to the extent the oil was lifted, it provides
details of the amount lifted and the amount paid. This list provides summary information from
Iraq’s Ministry of Oil regarding the total oil allocated to the contracting company, the names of
non-contractual beneficiaries associated with the one or more contracts executed by the
contracting party, and surcharges associated with the contracts executed by the contracting
company. It should be emphasized that the fact that a company is listed on this table does not
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mean that company—as opposed to another third party with a financial interest in the transaction--paid the surcharges associated with its contracts.
2. Table 2: Oil Sales Summary by Contracting Company and Contract
Table 2 (hereinafter referred to as the “Committee oil company table”) presents a second
alphabetic list of the contracting companies purchasing oil, this time providing details by contract
of the barrels lifted, the value of contracts, and surcharges associated with certain contracts. This
list updates the information on companies purchasing oil, published by the Committee in October
2004, and also provides summary information from Iraq’s Ministry of Oil regarding surcharges
levied, paid and outstanding.
3. Table 3: Summary of Oil Sales by Non-Contractual Beneficiary
As described in Chapter 2 of the Report, the Government of Iraq distributed oil allocations to
particular countries, and in the names of particular individuals and entities. A number of these
beneficiaries were not the parties that executed contracts for the purchase of oil, which are listed
in Tables 1 and 2. Rather, they are beneficiaries who usually sell their rights to the oil. Table 3
(hereinafter referred to as the “Committee oil beneficiary table”) is based on Ministry of Oil
records and presents an alphabetic list of oil allocations made in the names of individuals and
entities other than the named contracting party, or “non-contractual beneficiary”. This table
contains the name of the non-contractual beneficiary, the country under which the allocation was
granted, the name of the contracting party, and details of oil allocated and lifted by contract
number. In instances when no contract was executed, the contracting company is listed as “no
contracting company per SOMO.”
4. Table 4: Known Underlying Oil Financiers
Many of the letters of credit executed under the Programme were financed by companies that did
not appear on the SOMO contracts or the documentation made available to the United Nations.
The Committee has focused on identifying the underlying financiers of the oil purchases during
the surcharge period. Based on the various records obtained, the Committee has identified the
underlying financiers for approximately seventy-five percent of the letters of credit issued to
purchase oil during the surcharge period. Table 4 (hereinafter referred to as “Committee oil
financier table”) provides a listing of the underlying financiers that the Committee was able to
identify.851 The table provides each underlying purchaser, the letter of credit, the name of the
contracting party, the barrels lifted, and the value of the oil financed. Much of this information
was provided by banks in Switzerland, which included letter of credit customer files and bank
account statements. Additional information was provided by company financial records regarding
their oil purchases.
851
In selected instances, the table lists the financing company even where it is also the also the contracting
company. Committee oil financier table, Bayoil.
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5. Table 5: Surcharge Payments Associated with a Contracting
Company
Table 5 (hereinafter referred to as “Committee oil surcharge table”) provides a listing of the
contracting company and contract associated with surcharge payments. This table lists
information from internal SOMO documents that record levied and collected surcharges (“SOMO
surcharge records”); (2) transaction histories of bank accounts used by SOMO to receive
surcharge payments; and (3) Iraqi records of receipts for cash deposits made at various Iraqi
embassies in cities worldwide. The SOMO surcharge records comprehensively identify the
amounts of surcharges levied and paid and the oil contracts for which surcharges were paid. The
Committee has corroborated more than ninety-eight percent of these listed transactions by crossreference to further bank account documentation and embassy receipt records. It should be
emphasized that the fact that a company is listed on this table does not mean that company paid
the surcharges associated with its contracts.852
III.
HUMANITARIAN TABLES
Tables 6, 7, and 8 provide information on humanitarian goods transactions. When reviewing the
information presented in these tables, it is important to note that the Committee has not been able
to obtain a complete set of records of kickback levy and payment data from all Iraqi ministries
that were involved in the purchase of humanitarian goods under the Programme. Accordingly,
these tables reflect a distinction between “projected” kickback figures and “actual” kickback
figures. A “projected” kickback figure indicates that the evidentiary basis for the conclusion that
there was a kickback paid is Iraq’s uniform policy of requiring the payment of kickbacks during
certain time periods until July 2003 when the Coalition Provisional Authority reduced all
contracts to eliminate estimated kickback amounts. An “actual” amount reflects the fact that the
Committee has acquired contract-specific payment data from the relevant ministry, from a
banking institution, or from the supplier itself or its collection/shipping agent.
A. SOURCE OF EVIDENCE
As discussed at length in the Report on Programme Manipulation, the Committee’s findings as
they relate to the imposition and collection of illicit kickbacks and fees are based on the collection
and analysis of an extensive body of evidence. Much of the evidence comes from
contemporaneous documentation and data provided by the various Iraqi contracting ministries,
including financial ledgers, internal correspondence, and database records. Other evidence is in
852
SOMO levied more in surcharges than it was eventually paid. Surcharges valued at $263 million were
levied on 169 companies that contracted for the purchase of oil. Of these 169 companies, 138 ultimately
made payments in connection with 309 contracts. The remaining thirty-one companies succeeded in lifting
oil without remitting funds to Iraq. Ninety of the companies that lifted oil paid surcharges only in part
rather than the full amount levied. A few companies paid surcharges totaling $588,800 on contracts that
were never executed. These companies are not listed in Table 5.
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the form of bank records and deposits, as well as information provided by the suppliers that
participated in the transactions, their agents and shipping companies.
In many instances, this body of evidence not only demonstrates that a kickback was levied with
respect to a contract, but also provides confirmation of the amount of the solicitation and its
payment. Moreover, the information supplied by one source is often corroborated by other
information and evidence. For example, ministry financial ledgers are supported by internal
ministry correspondence. In addition, bank statements of paying suppliers as well as those of the
Government of Iraq reflect transfers in and out of bank accounts consistent with the kickback
schemes. In other instances, the corroboration is provided through company responses to the
Committee’s notification of adverse findings as well shipping and agent records.
The specific sources of information presented in the table are:
1. Side agreement with the Government of Iraq – document outlining a bilateral contractual
relationship with a supplier for the payment of kickbacks.
2. Ministry correspondence/documents – letters, memos, facsimiles, unilateral promises to
pay, and invoices/receipts from Iraqi Ministries.
3. Company correspondence/documents – letters, memos, facsimiles, and invoices/receipts
on company letterhead.
4. Other documents – letters, memos, facsimiles, and invoices/receipts from other parties,
such as agents or shipping companies.
5. Ministry financial data – Iraqi Ministry spreadsheets and accounting records and ledgers.
6. Banking Records – account statements, receipts, and advices relating to the following:
a. Housing Bank for Trade and Finance (Jordan), Central Bank of Iraq accounts
b. Jordan National Bank (Jordan), Alia Company for Transport and General Trade
accounts
c. Al-Rafidain Bank (Jordan), Central Bank of Iraq accounts
d. Fransabank SAL (Lebanon), Central Bank of Iraq accounts
e. Jordan National Bank (Jordan), Arrow Trans Shipping Company accounts
The Committee’s evidence confirmed the existence of the policy requiring the payment of
kickbacks. Where the Committee did not have access to certain Ministry and banking
information, the amount of illicit kickbacks and fees paid for many of the suppliers was projected
based on Government of Iraq directives, other available evidence, and historical trends. The basis
for and components of the projections are more fully described in the notes to Table 8.
B. EVIDENCE AND QUANTIFICATION OF ILLICIT AFTER-SALESSERVICE AND TRANSPORTATION FEES
In its Programme Management Report, issued in September 2005, the Committee presented
estimates of total after-sales-service fees and inland transportation fees collected by the former
regime. The estimated amounts then reported were $1.056 billion in after-sales-service fees and
$527 million in transportation fees and were largely based on projected data. Since the release of
that Report, the Committee has obtained additional information and data from the Government of
Iraq and various banks providing levied and actual payments of after-sales-service fees and
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transportation fees. As a result of this new information, the Committee revises the following: (1)
the estimate of after-sales-service fees and transportation fees levied and paid for particular
suppliers where the amounts for that supplier had been previously estimated; (2) the assessment
and recovery rates used by the Committee for after-sales-service fees levied and paid in
projecting amounts where no actual data was available; and (3) the estimate of total after-salesservice fees levied and paid for all suppliers to $1.024 billion. The new information did not cause
a revision to the Committee’s estimate of total transportation fees collected.853
Some of the evidence obtained by the Committee details the distribution of illicit payments
between after-sales-service fees and inland transportation fees, an example of which is provided
in Chapter 3, Section IV.B. In other instances, the Committee had evidence of illicit payments
but no clear indication as to the exact proportion attributable to after-sales-service fees versus
inland transportation fees. In such cases, ten percent of the uninflated disbursement amount was
assumed to be associated with after-sales-service fees; and the balance was apportioned to inland
transportation fees. This approach was based on the review of evidence discussed in Section
III.A.
1. Quantification of Illicit Payments of After-Sales-Service Fees
The imposition of after-sales-service fees began in Phase VIII and was to be applied by each
contracting ministry to each and every humanitarian contract entered into from that point forward.
The rate to be imposed was generally ten percent of the contract’s value. As discussed in the
Report on Programme Manipulation and previous Reports, the Committee found compelling
evidence indicating that the order was strictly enforced, even on Iraqi insiders and front
companies. Therefore, even in the absence of direct evidence of participation—such as a signed
side agreement—the Committee finds sufficient evidence that, from Phase VIII on, all suppliers
were required to pay a kickback in order to obtain or execute a humanitarian contract under the
Programme.
As described in Tables 7 and 8, evidence of an illicit payment of after-sales-service fees is both
actual and projected. From Phase VIII onward, a total of 3,554 contracts, or slightly over half of
the total contracts, had actual data available pertaining to the after-sales-service fees amounts
levied and paid, the latter of which totaled $495 million. After-sales-service fees levied and paid
for the remaining 3,204 contracts were projected by the Committee based on historical data trends
and Iraqi policy records. The amounts paid totaled $588 million. Based on a comparison of
actual levied to actual paid data, the historical trends show that the regime did not collect about
ten percent of the after-sales-service fees levied. Accordingly, the Committee reduces its
estimate of projected after-sales-service fees collected by ten percent to arrive at total after-salesservice fees collected.
853
“Programme Management Report,” vol. I, p.103
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Table B– Estimation of ASSF Paid/Collected (in USD millions)
# of
Contracts
ASSF Paid
Where Amounts Are:
Actual
3,554
$494,558,040
Projected
3,204
$587,885,415
Total
6,758
$1,082,443,455
Less Estimate of 10% Shortfall on
Projected Amounts
Adjusted Total
$(58,788,542)
$1,023,654,913
2. Quantification of Illicit Payments of Inland Transportation
The imposition of inland transportation fees began in 1999 during Phase VI, and was to apply to
each and every humanitarian contract with goods delivered through Umm Qasr. The rate to be
imposed was determined by a rate table and was based on the weight, number of containers or
other characteristic of the shipment. It was not based on a flat percentage of the contract’s
value.854
Although there is evidence corroborating the imposition of inland transportation fees, there is
little or no data readily available allowing for the estimation of the fee amount. Since the fees
imposed were not based on a flat percentage of the contract’s value, but instead varied due to
multiple factors such as container size and product packaging specifications, it was not always
possible to determine the applicable rate. For example, a contract for vegetable ghee specified in
metric tons might have inland transportation fees imposed based on the number of 20-foot and
40-foot containers needed to ship the goods, whereas a contract for sheets of wood could have
fees levied based on numbers of crates, without an indication as to how many sheets constitute a
crate. The lack of specific shipping information foreclosed conducting a computation or good
854
As noted in the Report on Programme Manipulation, there is evidence indicating the imposition of
inland transportation fees on some shipments delivered through land border crossings. However, there is
no compelling evidence to indicate that the imposition was wide-scale or formalized, as was the imposition
of fees for goods delivered through Umm Qasr; therefore, the Committee has not included any
quantification of them.
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faith estimate of inland transportation fees for many contracts. The Committee notes such cases
in Tables 7 and 8 by indicating that a fee was assessed, but without specifying a dollar amount.855
As the Committee noted in its Report on Programme Management, the total amount of inland
transportation fees estimated to have been collected by the Iraqi regime is $527 million, of which
$225 million represented actual data. No new information has been obtained since the release of
that report to cause the Committee to amend its estimate of total inland transportation fees
collected by the Government of Iraq.
C. DESCRIPTION OF TABLES AND METHODOLOGIES
1. Table 6: Humanitarian Goods Purchased by the Government of Iraq
by Supplier
Table 6—“Humanitarian Goods Purchased by the Government of Iraq by Supplier”—presents an
alphabetical list of all suppliers of humanitarian goods under the Programme for contracts for
which goods were delivered and paid for as of May 31, 2005. This list largely reflects the
information published in tables by the Committee on October 21, 2004, but has been updated to
reflect revised information where applicable pertaining to the supplier’s name and other
descriptive information. Under the column heading “Evidence of Illicit Payments,” the table
identifies those suppliers who had Programme contracts on which illicit payments were made to
the Government of Iraq. The Committee emphasizes that the identification of a particular
company’s contract as having been the subject of an illicit payment does not demonstrate that the
company had knowledge at the time that it was making an illicit payment or that it, as opposed to
an agent or secondary purchaser with a financial interest in the transaction, made or authorized
the payment. The table distinguishes the evidence of participation by indicating whether it is
based at least in part on actual, contract-specific payment data (“A”) or was entirely based on
projections (“P”) derived from Iraq’s uniform policy of requiring all contractors to make
payments during certain contracting time periods.856
855
While projections of inland transportation fees by individual contracts were generally not possible given
the peculiar nature of how the fees were assessed, and the lack of specific detailed information on which to
base the estimate, based on actual data available, it is known that inland transportation fees ranged from
0.01% to 20.82% of a contract’s value.
856
Because the Government of Iraq sometimes required that illicit payments be made upon the execution of
a contract, some companies paid the kickback upfront on contracts that were ultimately cancelled without
the goods being delivered. The Committee has identified twelve entities which have been found to have
paid illicit kickbacks, but did not have any deliveries of contracted goods and, thus, did not receive any
payments from the Escrow Account under the contract. Because Table 6 only lists suppliers with contracts
delivered, the twelve entities are not listed in this table; rather, they are listed as part of Tables 7 and 8.
Additionally, these tables reflect contracts procured by the Government of Iraq primarily for the Central
and Southern Governorates. Although these items include some bulk commodities and oil spare parts a
portion of which was allocated to the Northern Governorates, the tables do not include any contracts
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2. Table 7: Actual and Projected Illicit Payments on Contracts for
Humanitarian Goods Summary by Supplier
Table 7 presents only those suppliers that had contracts for which there is evidence of collection
of illicit after-sales-service fees and/or inland transportation fees by the former Government of
Iraq. For each supplier, the table presents a summary total of only the contracts executed by the
supplier for which direct or indirect evidence of participation was found. The table also
quantifies, where possible, the aggregate dollar amount of the solicitation and payment. The table
also provides the nature of any response from each company to the Committee’s letter of
notice.857
3. Table 8: Actual and Projected Illicit Payments on Contracts for
Humanitarian Goods Summary by Supplier and Contract
Table 8 expands on the information provided in Table 7, listing by supplier each individual
contract for which a kickback payment was made and providing an estimate of the amounts
imposed and paid. The amounts are based on either actual or projected data. The table identifies
the type of evidence relied upon and indicates whether the amounts are based on actual data or
were projected by the Committee. Although a printed version of Table 8 is not included in the
report due to its length, it can be found on the Committee’s official website.858
procured for the North by any of the UN-related Agencies. Finally, the term “supplier” is used to represent
the company which directly contracted with the Government of Iraq for the supply and delivery of
humanitarian goods. This company may have been an agent, middleman, trading company or Iraqi front
company, and may not have been the ultimate supplier of the goods contracted.
857
This includes twelve companies not listed as part of Table 6—Capex Spain, Core Health Care Limited,
Eastman Kodak S.A, Emtamitas Energy and Construction Inc., Energopromstroy 1, Four Stars Energy Srl,
Grunenthal Pharma Ag, International Conversion Foundation, Isd Intur-Deka Trade Limited Company,
Newbridges, Rego Gollwitzer Gmbh & Co. Kg, and Rhodia Silicones—who paid fees, but did not have
their goods delivered.
858
Independent Inquiry Committee, http://www.iic-offp.org/documents.htm
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APPENDIX B
CONSIDERATION OF RESPONSE FROM JOSEPH STEPHANIDES
CONSIDERATION OF RESPONSE FROM JOSEPH
STEPHANIDES
In its First Interim Report, the Committee concluded that Joseph Stephanides, while employed as
the Director of the Security Council Affairs Division in the United Nations Department of
Political Affairs (“DPA”) violated the procurement rules that required Mr. Stephanides to act with
“absolute impartiality” towards all bidders and that he not disclose outside the United Nations
organization information relating to the acceptance or rejection of a bid. The basis for this
conclusion was Mr. Stephanides’s approach to the United Kingdom Mission, in early August
1996, in an effort to have the United Kingdom arrange for Lloyd’s Register Inspection Ltd.
(“Lloyd’s”) to lower its bid to furnish inspection services under the Programme. Specifically,
Mr. Stephanides told a diplomat of the United Kingdom that “it looked like a tender from a
competitor would be approved” because of “what the diplomat called a ‘whopping’ difference in
price between the higher bid of Lloyd’s and the lower bid of its competitor. Mr. Stephanides and
the diplomat spoke about having Lloyd’s submit a lower bid, and Mr. Stephanides told the
diplomat how much lower the bid need to be in order for Lloyd’s to be awarded the contract.”859
At a meeting with the Committee, Mr. Stephanides, through his counsel, admitted that he had
contacted the United Kingdom delegation to engage its assistance in having Lloyd’s bid lowered,
and that this may be viewed as a “technical violation” of the procurement rules. The First Interim
Report made a finding that “the regular competitive bidding process was tainted by Mr.
Stephanides’s contacts with a member state mission and preempted for political reasons dictated
by the Iraq Steering Committee.”860
Since the First Interim Report, Mr. Stephanides, through counsel, has provided three submissions
to the Committee in which he disputes the Committee’s findings regarding his conduct during the
1996 selection process for the humanitarian inspection contract under the Programme. Mr.
Stephanides maintains that when he approached the United Kingdom Mission regarding Lloyd’s
he acted “pursuant to directions he received from the Chairman of the Steering Committee
reflecting an understanding reached between the members of the Steering Committee and
members of the Security Council, in furtherance of the political requirements set by the Security
Council.” Second, Mr. Stephanides asserts that once it became clear that the humanitarian
inspection contract could not be awarded to Bureau Veritas due to its nationality, Lloyd’s was the
only viable choice, and there no longer was an ongoing competitive bid process when he reached
out to the United Kingdom Mission. Finally, he describes the process of selecting Lloyd’s as
859
“First Interim Report,” pp. 99, 107-11. In 1996, the procurement rules were in a notebook volume
entitled “Purchase and Transportation Service Procurement Manual” (Procurement Manual), and were
revised as of April 13, 1988. Procurement Manual, Version 01, secs. 9.002, 9.005 (Apr. 13, 1988); see
Kiyohiro Mitsui interview (Feb. 1, 2005).
860
Committee meeting with Joseph Stephanides (Feb. 2, 2005); “First Interim Report,” pp. 107-08, 110.
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highly politicized, and this characterization is indeed supported by several of the statements
accompanying his submissions.861
In his letter to the Committee dated August 2, 2005, Mr. Stephanides advised that his actions
were taken under the authority of and with the full knowledge of Chinmaya Gharekhan, the
Chairman of the Steering Committee and relevant members of the Security Council, and that his
action resulted in substantial savings to the United Nations. At no time prior to the publication of
the First Interim Report did Mr. Stephanides ever inform the Committee that he was acting
pursuant to the authority and direction of Mr. Gharekhan. Mr. Gharekhan has been interviewed
on two occasions, the second time to discuss the points raised by Mr. Stephanides subsequent to
the First Interim Report’s publication. Mr. Gharekhan had no recollection of having directed or
authorized Mr. Stephanides to approach the United Kingdom delegation, and he denied having
specifically requested that Mr. Stephanides advise the United Kingdom Mission that Lloyd’s
would need to lower its price in order to be awarded the contract.862
Edward W. Gnehm, Jr., the former United States Deputy Permanent Representative (1994-97) has
offered his support for Mr. Stephanides, stating that the position of the United States and several
other members of the Security Council that the inspection contract could not be awarded to
Bureau Veritas, a French company, was conveyed clearly to the Steering Committee and made
known to Mr. Stephanides. He further stated that he did not know what actions Mr. Stephanides
took but that “we [the United States] told Stephanides to negotiate down the price [with
Lloyd’s].” Mr. Gnehm, however, did not sit on the Steering Committee, nor did he supervise Mr.
Stephanides. Moreover, the information recently provided by Mr. Gnehm had not been previously
disclosed by United States officials questioned about Mr. Stephanides role in the selection of
Lloyd’s.863
The Committee is not aware of information indicating that Mr. Stephanides was authorized by
any superior to share competitive bidding information with the United Kingdom Mission in
violation of United Nations procurement rules.
861
George Irving letters to the Committee (July 8 and Oct. 7, 2005) (including statements from a number of
persons knowledgeable about Mr. Stephanides); George Irving letter to the Committee (Aug. 2, 2005)
(including a letter from Edward W. Gnehm, Jr.). Mr. Gnehm, Jr. was the Deputy Permanent Representative
of the United States to the United Nations from May 1994 to August 1997.
862
George Irving letter to the Committee (August 2, 2005); Joseph Stephanides interviews (Sept. 27, 2004
and Jan. 17, 2005); Committee meeting with Joseph Stephanides (Feb. 2, 2005); “First Interim Report,” pp.
107-08; Chinmaya Gharekhan interviews (Nov. 30, 2004 and Aug. 23, 2005) (stating that selection of the
Programme contractors was done in accordance with those United Nations procedures governing the
selection process and acknowledging that political factors would be considered and that one country would
not get two contracts under the Programme).
863
George Irving letter to the Committee (Oct. 7, 2005); George Irving letter to the Committee (Aug. 2,
2005) (including statement of Edward W. Gnehm, Jr.).
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To the extent that Mr. Stephanides’s preference for Lloyd’s was supported by the Steering
Committee and members of the Security Council for various political reasons, this background
information is already set forth at length in the First Interim Report. But the basis for the
Committee’s adverse finding against Mr. Stephanides is not the political nature of the selection
process, the fact that Mr. Stephanides personally preferred one contractor over another, or that he
expressed his preference to others within the United Nations as he was allowed to do under the
United Nations procurement rules. To the contrary, the basis for the Committee’s adverse finding
against Mr. Stephanides was the acknowledged violation of the procurement rules in the manner
in which he decided to share bidding information with the United Kingdom Mission in an effort
to have Lloyd’s Register chosen over another company that submitted a lower bid.864
While the Committee acknowledges that there were political considerations at play during this
selection, the procurement rules existed for the purpose of bringing transparency to the process.
Contrary to Mr. Stephanides’s assertion that at the time of his approach to the United Kingdom
Mission, the bid process was at an end, the August 8 letter from the United Kingdom Mission and
the Steering Committee minutes of August 9, 12, and 13 make clear that no decision had yet been
made to terminate the process. More explicitly, the procurement rules specifically provide for
waiving certain technical requirements if the “interests of the Organization” so justify, with the
proviso that a waiver be accompanied by a full explanation of the reasons thereof. No such
explanation has been forthcoming from those involved in this decision or from Mr.
Stephanides.865
The balance between political considerations and the adherence to established standards should
not tip in a manner that undermines transparency. The Committee has considered carefully the
information provided by Mr. Stephanides and other witnesses, and it maintains its earlier finding
that he violated the procurement rules by the manner in which he sought an advantage for
Lloyd’s, and more broadly, by not providing a contemporaneous explanation of the political basis
for his actions.
864
“First Interim Report,” pp. 98-99, 101-03, 110, 113-19.
865
Ibid., p. 108; Committee meeting with Joseph Stephanides (Feb. 2, 2005); “Financial Regulations and
Rules of the United Nations (Series 100),” ST/SGB/Financial Rules/1/Rev.3, Rule 110.21 (1985).
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RESPONSE OF JOSEPH STEPHANIDES
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APPRENDIX C
RESPONSES TO PRIOR COMMITTEE REPORTS
RESPONSES TO PRIOR COMMITTEE REPORTS
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RESPONSES TO PRIOR COMMITTEE REPORTS
RESPONSE OF S. IQBAL RIZA
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APPENDIX C
RESPONSES TO PRIOR COMMITTEE REPORTS
RESPONSE OF THE UN BOARD OF AUDITORS
On October 20, 2005, the United Nations Board of Auditors (“BOA”) provided the Committee
with its detailed review of the Committee’s BOA-specific findings included in the Committee’s
Programme Management Report.866 The Committee is unable to consider this document given
the timing of its submission. In addition, BOA submitted a letter to the Chairman of the
Committee, which is reproduced below at BOA’s request.
866
Sabiniano Cabatuan letter to the Committee (Oct. 20, 2005) (attaching a schedule of BOA comments on
the Committee’s findings).
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RESPONSES TO PRIOR COMMITTEE REPORTS
RESPONSE OF DIANA MILLS-ARYEE
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RESPONSES TO PRIOR COMMITTEE REPORTS
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RESPONSES TO PRIOR COMMITTEE REPORTS
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RESPONSES TO PRIOR COMMITTEE REPORTS
RESPONSE OF NORA DIAS
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APPENDIX D
ERRATA
ERRATA SHEET
The Committee makes the following factual corrections to its Programme Management Report:
Volume Two, Chapter 7, page 207:
Text:
“Ms. Dias was an acquaintance of Kojo Annan, and she served as secretary to Sanjay Bahel, the
supervisor of the procurement department, and Alexander Yakovlev, the main procurement
officer involved with the bidding process for the Programme’s 1998 inspection contract.”
Corrected Text:
Ms. Dias was an acquaintance of Kojo Annan, and she served as secretary to Sanjay Bahel, the
supervisor of the procurement department.
Explanation:
Additional information made available to the Committee, subsequent to the Report, demonstrates
that Ms. Dias was not assigned as secretary to Mr. Yakovlev during the bidding process for the
Programme’s 1998 inspection contract.867
Volume Two, Chapter 7, pages 206-07:
Text:
“Kojo Annan confirmed to the Committee that the reference to “his copy” was to the copy sent to
the Secretary-General and the reference to “our friend” was most likely to Wagaye Assebe. Kojo
Annan acknowledged that he received inside information from Ms. Assebe regarding the “pet
project.”
Corrected Text:
Kojo Annan confirmed to the Committee that the reference to “his copy” was to the copy sent to
the Secretary-General and the reference to “our friend” most likely was to Wagaye Assebe.
867
Procurement Division organizational chart (June 26, 1998); Nora Dias letter to Chairman Paul Volcker
(Sept. 15, 2005).
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ERRATA
Explanation:
When interviewed on July 2, 2005, Kojo Annan discussed a number of occasions on which he
contacted Ms. Assebe, the Secretary-General’s personal assistant, for some general information
about the Programme that was publicly available.868 Upon additional review of the notes of that
interview, it has been determined that the reference to Ms. Wagaye providing inside information
on the “pet project” was an error.
868
“Programme Management Report,” vol. III, pp. 203-04.
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APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
INDIVIDUALS
Name
Description
Talal Hussein Abu-Reyaleh
Agent for Glencore International AG; Associated with Al-Khaled
Engineering
Othman Al-Absi
General Manager, Alia for Transportation and General Trade
Hikmat Al-Azzawi
Former Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister, Iraq
Burhan Mohammed AlChalabi
Iraqi businessman based in the United Kingdom; Recipient of oil
allocation to benefit the Mariam Appeal and George Galloway
Adel Al-Dzhilaui
President, A.V.M. Air
Mohammad Al-Farraj
General Manager, M/S International Engineering Group (“IEG”)
Abd-al Tawab Abdullah
Al-Mullah Al-Huwaysh
Former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Military
Industrialization, Iraq
Isam Rashid Al-Huwaysh
Former Governor of Iraq’s Central Bank
Shakir Al-Khafaji
Iraqi-American facilitating in the granting of oil allocations
Ahmed Mortada Ahmed
Al-Khalil
Former Minister of Transportation and Communication, Iraq
Hussain Al-Khawam
Iraqi businessman and co-founder (with Iraqi Ministry of
Transportation) of Alia for Transportation and General Trade
Riyadh Al-Khawam
Founder and Chairman, Al-Hoda International Trading Co.
Ahmed Hussein AlSamarrai
Former Head of the Presidential Diwan, Iraq
Luis Alvarez
Trader for Iraqi crude oil, Glencore International AG
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APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
INDIVIDUALS
Name
Description
Win Aung
Chairman, Dagon Timber Limited
Jaber Khalef Awad
Iraqi businessman associated with European Oil and Trading
Company (“E.O.T.C.”)
Tariq Aziz
Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, 1991 - 2003
Josef Bauer
Chief Executive Officer, Bauer AG
Ahmed Saif Belhasa
Founder and Chairman, Belhasa Group; Chairman, Belhasa
International Company LLC
Father Jean-Marie
Benjamin
Founder, Benjamin Committee for Iraq, 1999; Assistant to the
Vatican State Secretary, 1991 - 1994
Amr Abdul Sattar Bibi
Director and beneficial owner, Alcon Petroleum Ltd.; formerly trader
at Taurus Petroleum Ltd.; Delta Petroleum representative dealing
with Glencore International AG
Alain Bionda
Swiss attorney, businessman and oil trader; Owner, Zyrya
Management Services
Suzanne Bishopric
United Nations Treasurer
Serge Boidevaix
President, Franco-Arab Chamber of Commerce; Former French
diplomat; Consultant to Vitol S.A.; Titled as President of Vitol,
France
Peter Boks
Managing Director, Saybolt Eastern Hemisphere BV; formerly a
consultant for Petroplus International Ltd.
Aernout Boot
Executive for Middle East business development, Petroplus
International Ltd.
Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary-General of the United Nations, 1992 - 1996
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APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
INDIVIDUALS
Name
Description
Leia Boutros-Ghali
Spouse of former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali; sister to
Efraim (Fred) Nadler
Raouf Boutros-Ghali
Brother of former United Nations Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali
Andrea Catanese
Managing Director, Costieri Genovese Petrolferi (“CO.GE.P”)
David Chalmers
American oilman, President of Bayoil
Robin D’Alessandro
Trader for Iraqi crude oil, Vitol S.A.
Wolfgang Denk
Area Sales Manager, Overseas Department, DaimlerChrysler AG
Marco Mazarino de Petro
Long time associate of Roberto Formigoni; Consultant to the office
of the President of the Lombardy Region, Italy
Lyudmil Dionissiev
Bayoil employee
Roland Favre
Financial director, Vitol S.A.
Elias Firzli
Recipient of oil allocation; Acted as intermediary between other
allocation recipients and oil traders
Roberto Formigoni
President, Lombardy Region, Italy
George Galloway
Member of Parliament, United Kingdom; Founder, Mariam Appeal
Augusto Giangrandi
Trader for Bayoil and Italtech; business associate of David Chalmers
Wilfried Grunewald
Sales Manager, Osram Middle East FZE
Bernard Guillet
Former diplomatic advisor to Charles Pasqua, Ministry of the
Interior, France
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APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
INDIVIDUALS
Name
Description
Saddam Zibn Hassan
Executive Director of Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Organization
(SOMO), 1994 - 2001; Deputy Minister of Oil, 2001 - 2003
Sergei Issakov
Chairman of the Board of Directors, Russian Engineering Company
(“REC”)
Igor Ivanov
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Russia
Hikmat Jergi
Iraqi citizen listed as co-owner of Al Wasel & Babel General Trading
LLC, on behalf of the former Government of Iraq
Felicity Johnston
Chief Customs Expert, United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme
Victor Kalyuzhny
Minister of Fuel and Energy, Russia
Claude Kaspereit
General Manager, European Oil and Trading Company (“E.O.T.C.”)
Alexandre Kramar
Oil Overseer for the Programme, Russia, 1996 - 2003
Musbah Ladki
Beneficial owner, Fenar Petroleum Ltd.; Signatory to the accounts of
Jabal Petroleum and Petrocorp AVV First National Bank in Lebanon
Murtaza Lakhani
Agent for Glencore International AG; Owner of Continental Oil, Ltd.
Igor Lebedev
Son of Vladimir Zhirinovsky; one of the leaders of the Liberal
Democratic Party of the Russian Federation (“LDPR”)
Michael Long
General Manager for International Sales and Marketing, AWB Ltd.
Ibrahim Lootah
Co-owner, Al Wasel & Babel General Trading LLC
Paolo Lucarno
Official at Costieri Genovese Petrolferi (“CO.GE.P”)
Rune Lundberg
President, Volvo Construction Equipment
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GLOSSARY
INDIVIDUALS
Name
Description
Andrew Macleod
Weir employee
Noor Asiah Mahmood
Co-owner of Mastek Sdn Bhd; Business partner of Faek Ahmad
Shareef; sister-in-law of Malaysian Prime Minister Badawi
Sandi Majali
Advisor to the African National Congress (“ANC”); Chairperson,
South Africa-Iraq Friendship Association (“SAIFA”) and South
African Business Council for Economic Transformation
(“SABCETT”)
A. Hamid Majid
Consultant to Maloney Industries Inc.
Riad Marei
Jordanian agent for Bukkehave A/S
Kho Hui Meng
President, Vitol Asia
Jean-Bernard Mérimée
Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, 1991 1995; Former Special Advisor on European Affairs to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations
Jean-Loup Michel
Managing Director, Aredio Petroleum
Catalina Miguel
Held power of attorney for Nafta Petroleum and Mednafta Trading
Co.; Beneficial owner, Mednafta Trading Co. account at BNP Paribas
(Suisse) SA
Nicholas Moriarty
Executive and expert in crude oil, Petroplus International Ltd.
Kgalema Motlanthe
Secretary-General, African National Congress (“ANC”)
Gilles Munier
Secretary-General, Amitiés Franco-Irakiennes (French-Iraqi
Friendship Association) (“AFI”)
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APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
INDIVIDUALS
Name
Description
Tun Myat
Humanitarian Coordinator, United Nations Office of the
Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, 2000 - 2002; United Nations
Security Coordinator, 2002 - 2004
Hamida Na’ana
Syrian journalist; Recipient of oil allocation
Efraim (Fred) Nadler
Friend of Benon Sevan and Fakhry Abdelnour; former Corporate
Officer (Treasurer) and Director of African Middle East Petroleum
Co. Ltd. Inc. (AMEP)
Hakan Nirstedt
Marketing Director, Volvo Construction Equipment
Armando Carlos Oliveira
Supervising inspector, Saybolt Eastern Hemisphere BV
Aziz Pahad
Deputy Foreign Minister, South Africa
Charles Pasqua
Senator, France; Former Minister of the Interior and Administration,
France, 1986 - 1988 and 1993 - 1995
Ben Pollner
Director, Taurus Group; Founder, Taurus Petroleum Nassau and
Taurus Petroleum Nevis; formerly Senior Vice President, Bayoil
(USA)
Peter Post
Area Export Manager for Iraq, Bukkehave A/S
Mo’tasset Fawzy Qatishat
Jordanian businessman and part owner of Alia for Transportation and
General Trade
Ali Hassan Rajab
Former Senior Official, State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO),
Iraq
Taha Yassin Ramadan
Former Vice President of Iraq
Amer Muhammad Rashid
Former Minister of Oil, Iraq
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GLOSSARY
INDIVIDUALS
Name
Description
Mohammed Saidji
Held power of attorney for Mednafta Trading Co.
Mohammed Mehdi Saleh
Former Minister of Trade, Iraq
Antoine Santiago
Representative of Atlas Copco Compressor International N.V.
(“ACCI”)
Martin Schenker
Director of Finance and Administration, Taurus Group; Co-owner,
Aredio Petroleum; associate of Ben Pollner
Benon Sevan
Under-Secretary-General and Executive Director of the United
Nations Office of the Iraq Programme, 1997 - 2004
Assef Shaleesh
General Manager, SES International Corp.
Faek Ahmad Shareef
Recipient of Iraq oil allocations; Iraqi-born businessman and coowner of Mastek Sdn Bhd
Victor Shevtsov
Chairman, Board of Directors of Infobank
Jaya Sudhir
Co-owner of Mastek Sdn Bhd; Business partner of Faek Ahmad
Shareef
Abdallah Suedi
Consultant to Cotecna Inspection S.A.
Khamis Suedi
Director, Office of Strategic Planning & Policy Development, World
Intellectual Property Organization
Niels Troost
Senior employee, Taurus Petroleum Services Limited; for a time,
held power of attorney to sign contracts on behalf of Fenar Petroleum
Ltd.
Sazhi Umalatova
Chairperson, Party of Peace and Unity, Russia (“PPU”)
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APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
INDIVIDUALS
Name
Description
Marcel van Poecke
Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer, Petroplus
International Ltd.
Arthur Ventham
Former inspector, Cotecna Inspection S.A.
Samir Vincent
Iraqi-born American businessman; President, Phoenix International
L.L.C.; former Consultant for Coastal Corporation
Alexander Voloshin
Former Chief of Staff, Administration of the Russian President;
Chairman of the Board of Directors, Unified Energy Systems of
Russia (“UES”)
Hans von Sponeck
Humanitarian Coordinator, United Nations Office of the
Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, October 1998 - March 2000
Andrew Walker
General Manager of crude and products trade, Taurus Group
Michael Wilson
Vice President for Marketing Operations in Africa, Cotecna
Inspection S.A.
Oscar Wyatt
Chairman, Coastal Corporation
Vladimir Zair-Bek
President, Council for Trade and Economic Cooperation with Middle
East and North Africa Countries (“ACTEC”)
Amineh Naji Daoud Abu
Zayyad
Spouse of George Galloway
Vladimir Zhavrid
Director, Belmetalenergo
Vladimir Zhirinovsky
Head of the Liberal Democratic Party of the Russian Federation
(“LDPR”)
Fawaz Abdullah Zureikat
President, Middle East Advanced Semiconductor; associate of
George Galloway
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APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
INDIVIDUALS
Name
Description
Gennady Zyuganov
Head of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (“KPRF”)
ORGANIZATIONS
Term
Description
ACCI
Atlas Copco Compressor International N.V., a subsidiary of Atlas
Copco Airpower N.V.
ACTEC
Council for Trade and Economic Cooperation with Middle East and
North Africa Countries
AFI
Amitiés Franco-Irakiennes (French-Iraqi Friendship Association)
AFICE
Franco-Iraqi Economic Cooperation Association
African Petroleum
African Petroleum (pty) Limited
Al Wasel & Babel
Al Wasel & Babel General Trading LLC
Alcon
Alcon Petroleum Ltd.
Al-Hoda
Al-Hoda International Trading Co.
Alia
Alia for Transportation and General Trade
Al-Rowa’a
Al-Rowa’a General Trading Company LLC
ANC
African National Congress
Aredio
Aredio Petroleum SARL
Atlas
Atlas Copco Airpower N.V.
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APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
ORGANIZATIONS
Term
Description
AVM
A.V.M. Air
AWB
AWB Ltd.; formerly the Australian Wheat Board
Bayoil
Bayoil Supply & Trading Limited and Bayoil (USA) Inc.
Belhasa Group
Belhasa Group of Companies
Belhasa International
Belhasa International Company LLC
Belhasa Motors
Belhasa Motors Company LLC
BNP
BNP Paribas S.A.
Bukkehave
Bukkehave A/S
Bulf
Bulf Drilling and Oil Servicii, SRL
Caisor Services
Caisor Services Inc.; name of account at Union Bancaire Privée
(UBP), Geneva, having Fred Nadler as beneficial owner
Candonly
Collective name given to various entities controlled by Marco de
Petro
CBI
Central Bank of Iraq
Chaiyaporn
Chaiyaporn Rice Company Limited
CO.GE.P
Costieri Genovese Petrolferi
Command Council
Iraqi regime leaders who made decisions on allocations of oil; also
referred to as the “Supreme Command Council”
Cotecna
Cotecna Inspection S.A.
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GLOSSARY
ORGANIZATIONS
Term
Description
CPA
Coalition Provisional Authority
Dagon Timber
Dagon Timber Limited
Delta Petroleum
Delta Petroleum Products Trading Company
Devon Petroleum
Devon Petroleum Ltd. S.A.
DFA
Department of Foreign Affairs, South Africa
DFAT
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia
E.O.T.C.
European Oil and Trading Company
EBK
Swiss Federal Banking Commission (Eidgenössischen
Bankenkommission)
Fenar
Fenar Petroleum Ltd.
Fortum
Fortum Oil and Gas OY
Genmar
Genmar Resources GmbH, Switzerland
Ginza
Ginza Company for Construction and Real Estate Development
Glencore
Glencore International AG
Glencore France
Glencore France S.A.
Holding Company
Holding Company for Food Industries
IEG
M/S International Engineering Group
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APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
ORGANIZATIONS
Term
Description
IGB
Iraqi Grain Board
IGI
International Group for Investments
Imvume
Imvume Management (Pty) Ltd.
ISCWT
Iraq State Company for Water Transport
Italtech
Italtech SRL
Jawala
Jawala Corporation SDN. BHD.
KPRF
Communist Party of the Russian Federation
Land Transport
Iraq State Company for Land Transportation
LDPR
Liberal Democratic Party of the Russian Federation
Lloyd’s
Lloyd’s Register Inspection Ltd.
Lukoil Asia Pacific
Lukoil Asia Pacific PTE Ltd.
Maloney
Maloney Industries Inc., now known as Hanover Canada Corporation
Marc Rich + Co.
Marc Rich + Co. Investment AG
Mariam Appeal
United Kingdom-based organization established to provide medical
aid to Iraq; George Galloway was its first chairman
Mastek
Mastek Sdn Bhd
Middle East Advanced
Semiconductor
ASI Middle East Advanced Semiconductor Inc.
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APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
ORGANIZATIONS
Term
Description
Ministry of Energy
Ministry of Industry and Energy, formerly Ministry of Fuel and
Energy, Russia
Ministry of Transportation
Ministry of Transportation and Communication, Iraq
Montega Trading
Montega Trading (Pty) Limited
Mukhabarat
Iraqi Intelligence Services
OPEC
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
Osram-Middle East
Osram Middle East FZE
Petroline
Petroline FZC
Petroplus
Petroplus International Ltd.
Phoenix
Phoenix Investment International
Plasco
Plasco Shipping Co. Ltd.
PPU
Party of Peace and Unity, Russia
Presidential Diwan
Administrative bureau of the Presidential Office created to research
specific issues requested by former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein
or his Council of Ministers
PTSC
Petroleum Technical Services Co.
REC
Russian Engineering Company
SABCETT
South African Business Council for Economic Transformation
SAIFA
South Africa-Iraq Friendship Association
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GLOSSARY
ORGANIZATIONS
Term
Description
Saybolt
Saybolt Eastern Hemisphere BV
Scandinavian
Scandinavian T. Limited
SECO
State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, Switzerland
SES
SES International Corp., Syria
Siemens-France
Siemens S.A.S.
Siemens-Turkey
Siemens Sanaye ve Ticaret A.S., also known as Simko Ticaret ve
Sanayi Yakacik
Sinochem
Sinochem Corporation; formerly China Import Company
SOMO
Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Organization
SWIFT
Standardized messaging service for financial institutions provided by
the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
Taurus
Taurus Petroleum Ltd.
Texaco
Texaco, Inc.
The Committee
Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food
Programme
TNK
TNK-BP, formerly Tyumen Oil Company
Total
TOTSA Total Oil Trading SA
UAE
United Arab Emirates
UES
Unified Energy Systems of Russia
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APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
ORGANIZATIONS
Term
Description
Union Trading
Union Trading Company LLC
Vinafood
Vietnam Northern Food Corporation
Vinamilk
Vietnam Dairy Joint Stock Company
Volvo CE
Volvo Construction Equipment
Weir
Weir Group PLC
WEMCO
Envirotech Pump Systems (France), a subsidiary of Weir Group PLC
WESCO
Weir Engineering Services Co. (UAE), a subsidiary of Weir Group
PLC
UNITED NATIONS ABBREVIATIONS
Term
Description
661 Committee
A sanctions oversight committee created under Security Council
Resolution 661 (1990), composed of representatives from each of the
fifteen members of the Security Council
OIOS
United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services
OIP
United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme, established October
15, 1997 to administer the Oil-for-Food Programme
OLA
United Nations Office of Legal Affairs
Secretariat
One of the six principal organs of the United Nations, comprising the
Secretary-General and such staff as the Organization may require
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GLOSSARY
UNITED NATIONS ABBREVIATIONS
Term
Description
Security Council
United Nations Security Council, composed of representatives of
fifteen Member States, of which five have permanent seats; primary
responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security
The Programme
United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme
Treasury
United Nations Treasury
UNCC
United Nations Compensation Commission, established by Security
Council Resolution 687 (1991), to compensate victims of Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait
UNMOVIC
United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
UNOHCI
United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq
UN-related Agencies, or
the Agencies
These nine agencies had significant roles in the Programme on the
ground in Iraq, especially in the largely Kurdish northern region:
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (“FAO”),
International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”), United Nations
Development Programme (“UNDP”), United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”), United Nations
Human Settlements Programme (“UN-Habitat”), United Nations
Children’s Fund (“UNICEF”), United Nations Office for Project
Services (“UNOPS”), World Food Programme (“WFP”), and World
Health Organization (“WHO”). For ease of reference, this Report
refers to this group of agencies as “UN-related Agencies” in
recognition that they have varying legal relationships to the United
Nations.
WIPO
World Intellectual Property Organization
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
Resolution
Description
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GLOSSARY
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
Resolution
Description
Resolution 661 (1990)
Following invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, this resolution
prohibited most forms of trade and financial transactions with Iraq
Resolution 986 (1995)
This resolution ultimately established the Oil-for-Food Programme
OTHER TERMS
Term
Description
After-Sales-Service Fee or
Commission (“ASSF”)
Term used to disguise the humanitarian contract kickback paid on
Programme contracts as required by the Iraqi regime
Banking Agreement
Agreement for Banking Services Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 986 (1995), between the United Nations and BNP
Chron Files
Chronological Files
CIF
Combination of cost, insurance, and freight fees
Demurrage
Costs incurred by a cargo ship for delay beyond its contractually
agreed time of departure
DM
German Deutsche Mark
Escrow Account
Usually, the ESB Account, held at Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP)
Humanitarian Kickbacks
Scheme related to humanitarian goods contracts in which suppliers of
goods were required to pay a certain amount, usually ten percent, to
the relevant ministry after a contract was executed
Inland Transportation Fee
Scheme related to humanitarian goods contracts in which the Iraqi
regime required payment of transportation fees in order to deliver
goods internally within Iraq; also known as “internal transportation
fee”
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APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
OTHER TERMS
Term
Description
Iraq-UN MOU
Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretariat of the
United Nations and the Government of Iraq on the implementation of
Security Council Resolution 986 (1995), S/1996/356 (May 20, 1996)
L/C
Letter of Credit
MLA
Money Laundering Act of 1997, Switzerland
NAM
Non-Aligned Movement
No Objection Procedure
Procedure by which a humanitarian goods contract is deemed
approved if no member of the 661 Committee lodged an objection
within a prescribed time period
Oil Spare Parts
Parts and equipment for the maintenance and repair of Iraq’s oil
production infrastructure
Oil Surcharges
Scheme relating to oil lifting contracts, in which buyers of Iraqi oil
agreed to pay back to the Iraqi regime a certain amount per barrel,
outside of the Programme payments
PMT
Per metric ton
Port Fees
Fees charged on vessels at the port of loading, also called “port
charges”
Programme Management
Report
Report on the Management of the United Nations Oil-for-Food
Programme, issued by the Independent Inquiry Committee on
September 7, 2005
Report
Report on Programme Manipulation, issued by the Independent
Inquiry Committee on October 27, 2005
SOE
State Owned Enterprise (Iraq)
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APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
OTHER TERMS
Term
Description
TaR
Transactions and Relationships System, an analytical database
maintained by the Independent Inquiry Committee that contains
information gathered in the course of its investigation
Third Interim Report
Report issued by the Independent Inquiry Committee on August 8,
2005
Third-Party Purchaser
Company that financed a purchase of oil by the contracting party, and
ultimately received the oil from the original purchaser
USD
United States dollar
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APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
This page is intentionally left blank
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APPENDIX F
STAFF LIST
The Committee
Paul A. Volcker
Richard J. Goldstone
Mark Pieth
Chairman
Member
Member
Senior Management
Reid Morden
Mark G. Califano
Michael T. Cornacchia
Frank E. Hydoski
Susan M. Ringler
Executive Director
Chief Legal Counsel
Chief Investigative Counsel
Chief of Forensics
Counsel to the Committee
Staff
Pauline Agumba
Gemma Aiolfi
Robert M. Allyn
Robert M. Appleton
Zainab Aziz
Hagop A. Baboujian
Maria A. Barton
Manisha Bharti
Philip A. Binder
Emily S. Bolton
Nada Teresa Bouari
Bwalya Chilufya
Carla J. Clark
Kevin Curtis
John J. Durham
Chris Eaton
Mary E. Eaton
Janet L. Engel
Jocelene D. Fouassier
Harald Friedl
John K. Gauthier
Beth I. Goldman
Alistair Graham
Jeremy Griffiths
Daniel E. Guerrini
Peter D. Hackshaw
Philippe Heinrichs
Barry A. Hogan
Nadim Houry
Larry D. Kaiser
Andrew G. Kalashnik
Laurent Kasper-Ansermet
Patrick J. Kelkar
W. Michael Kramer
REPORT ON PROGRAMME MANIPULATION–OCTOBER 27, 2005
Administrative Assistant
Special Assistant to Mark Pieth
Administrative Assistant
Special Counsel
Research Assistant
Investigator/Analyst
Senior Counsel
Senior Investigator
Administrative Assistant
Investigator/Analyst
Investigator/Analyst
Finance Associate
Special Counsel
Team Leader
Deputy Counsel
Senior Investigator
Data Management Coordinator
Senior Investigator
Administrative Assistant, Paris Office
Analyst
Senior Investigator
Research Analyst
Senior Investigator
Forensic Accountant
Senior Investigator
Senior Investigator
IT Manager
Senior Investigator
Deputy Counsel
Senior Investigator
Investigator/Analyst
Head of Paris Office
Senior Analyst
Senior Investigator
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APPENDIX F
STAFF LIST
Staff
Gabriele Lechenauer
Zora Ledergerber
Andrew M. Levine
Alasdair Macleod
Marc Maisto
M. Shervin Majlessi
Dean P. Manning
Bernard C. Marino
Michelle R. Meredith
Jeffrey A. Meyer
Brian J. Mich
Richard P. Mika
Tshikaji Muleba-Sabwa
Karen H. Naimer
Eugenia Nalbatian
Momar Lissa Ndiaye
Genevieve Noundja-Noubissi
Hellen M. Nyabera
Bernard P. O'Donnell
Simeon Obidairo
Nadine Okla
Monika Ora
Leanard Philip
Sandra A. Rutkowski
Shirin Sabri
Debbie L. Santalesa
Bridget M. Santiago
Alan C. Schick
Wolf-Dieter Schlechthaupt
Gerard Sexton
Alan C. Schick
Aleksandr N. Shapovalov
Gregory A. Shultz
Brett G. Simpson
Brian E. Spears
Thomas H. Steenvoorden
Jonathan M. Struggles
Trevor C. Sutton
Philip Trewhitt
Todd Trivett
Lodewijk A.P. Gualtherie van Weezel
Stephen S. Zimmermann
continued
Investigator/Analyst
Special Assistant to Mark Pieth
Deputy Counsel
Analyst
Senior Investigator
Deputy Counsel
Senior Investigator
Senior Investigator
Research Assistant
Senior Counsel
Senior Counsel
Senior Investigator
Finance Associate
Deputy Counsel
Senior Analyst
Senior Analyst
Controller
Data Management Officer
Senior Investigator
Senior Analyst
Administrative Assistant
Investigator/Analyst
Data Management Associate
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Investigator/Analyst
Senior Analyst
Administrative Assistant
Senior Investigator
Senior Banking Expert, Europe
Senior Investigator
Senior Investigator
Deputy Counsel
Investigator/Analyst
Team Leader
Special Counsel
Senior Investigator
Deputy Counsel
Investigator/Analyst
Head of Baghdad Office
Team Leader
Investigator/Analyst
Interim Chief-of-Staff
United Nations Staff on Loan
Dara Lysaght
Constance Samuel
Kagure Karanu
REPORT ON PROGRAMME MANIPULATION–OCTOBER 27, 2005
Administrative Management Officer
Associate Administrative Officer
Administrative Assistant
PAGE 622 OF 623
INDEPENDENT INQUIRY COMMITTEE INTO THE UNITED NATIONS OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAMME
REPORT ON PROGRAMME MANIPULATION
APPENDIX F
STAFF LIST
Advisors to Committee
John M. Hennessey
Walter McCormack
Richard W. Murphy
Special Advisor
Special Advisor
Special Advisor
Secondment from the Federal Reserve Bank of NY
Sean M. O'Malley
Senior Investigative Officer
Interns
Ross Banon
Lauren E. Baer
Patrick J. Dooley
Jane Okpala
Ari Simon
Alisa Valderama
Consultants
Deloitte Financial Advisory Services LLP
Mary Jane Schirber
Samir Hans
Anthony DeSantis
Michael Wudke
Eric Baca
Michael Rossen
Justin Gallagher
Todd Swint
Bob Dillen
Tae S. Choe
Jared Crafton
Mahdi Bseiso
Partner
Senior Manager
Manager
Manager
Manager
Manager
Senior Consultant
Senior Consultant
Senior Consultant
Senior Consultant
Senior Consultant
Associate Consultant
Dispute Analytics LLC
Jean-Michel Ferat
Todd Nelson
Natalie Taplin-Hall
Emily Kim
Marni Wills
Senior Manager
Senior Manager
Manager
Senior Associate
Associate
Glasgow Forensic Group LLC
David Wolfe
Deidra DenDanto
Meena Marwaha
Viren Patel
REPORT ON PROGRAMME MANIPULATION–OCTOBER 27, 2005
Managing Director
Director
Senior Consultant
Senior Consultant
PAGE 623 OF 623