Policies, Practices, and Procedures: A Study of Indiana School Safety
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate School
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree
Doctor of Education
By
David W. Pillar
Dissertation Advisor: Dr. Joseph McKinney
Ball State University
Muncie, Indiana
May 2016
Policies, Practices, and Procedures: A Study of Indiana School Safety
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate School
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree
Doctor of Education
By
David W. Pillar
Dissertation Advisor: Dr. Joseph McKinney
Ball State University
Muncie, Indiana
May 2016
Approved By:
_________________________
Dr. Joseph McKinney-Committee Chairperson
_______________
Date
_________________________
Dr. Lori Boyland-Committee Member
_______________
Date
_________________________
Dr. Serena Salloum-Committee Member
_______________
Date
_________________________
Dr. Kevin Gatzlaff-Committee Member
_______________
Date
__________________________
Dr. Robert Morris-Dean of Graduate School
_______________
Date
ii
Ball State University
Muncie, Indiana
May 2016
Copyright 2016 by David W. Pillar
All Rights Reserved
iii
Abstract
Dissertation: Policies, Practices, and Procedures: A Study of Indiana School Safety
Student: David Pillar, Ed.S.
Degree: Doctor of Education
College: Teachers College
Date: May 2016
Pages: 112
This policy study was designed to discover and analyze current school safety policies,
practices, and procedures of Indiana public school districts and Indiana public charter schools.
The impetus for this study was the increased media coverage of violence in schools, most
notably the tragic events at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut in
December 2012.
This quantitative, survey-based research sought to explore in a scholarly manner what
policies, practices, and procedures Indiana public and public charter schools have implemented
to promote safety in a post-Sandy Hook society, and whether those steps are working. A survey
was sent to those responsible for safety in Indiana’s public school districts and public charter
schools to discover school safety realities taking place in schools around the state.
Data were collected from 183 respondents, 67.8% (n=124) of whom cited that they were
the person responsible for safety at their public school district or at the public charter school. Of
the 124 respondents, 113 identified themselves as being from traditional public school districts,
while 11 identified themselves as being from Indiana public charter schools. Respondents also
identified their gender, position within the school district or charter school, the location of the
school district or charter school, and the enrollment of the school district or charter school.
iv
Responses to the survey were primarily discussed within six main categories regarding school
safety: policy issues, communication plans, law enforcement, security hardware, changes postSandy Hook, and obstacles to change.
Of the 124 respondents who identified themselves as the person responsible for safety in
their traditional public district or public charter school, 50.8% (n=63) and 45.2% (n=52) believed
their schools or school were safe or mostly safe, respectively.
Survey results showed that traditional public school districts are largely implementing
safety measures at a higher rate than public charter schools. Single building entry points, mass
communication systems, additional paid security at extra-curricular events, interior surveillance
cameras, and buzzer entry systems were the most popular and most used strategies to support
school safety. Districts and schools focused on the installation of buzzer entry systems, interior
surveillance cameras, and training for faculty and staff as major changes post-Sandy Hook.
Finally, 80.5% of respondents cited financial limitations as the top obstacle to implementing
safety measures in their districts or schools.
v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to acknowledge and thank my dissertation chairperson, Dr. Joseph
McKinney, and the members of my committee, Dr. Serena Salloum, Dr. Lori Boyland, and Dr.
Kevin Gatzlaff for their support and dedication with this project. Thanks also go to the many
teachers and professors who have been of assistance in this process, including Dr. Kianre
Eouanzoui and Dr. Delbert Jarman.
My sincere thanks is expressed to Dr. Judith DeMuth for her motivation and support and
Dr. Sandi Cole, Mrs. Jan Bergeson, Dr. Carol Gardiner, Mrs. Peggy Chambers, Mr. Brian
Flaherty, and Mrs. Pat Wilson for their motivation during the most challenging of times. This
journey started with three wonderful colleagues from Bloomington-Dr. Debra Prenkert, Dr.
Cameron Rains, and Mr. Jeff Henderson-and I would never have made it without them. Their
guidance, friendship, and humor gave encouragement when most needed. Also, during the many
meetings and classes for this endeavor, I always knew my wonderful school, Jackson Creek
Middle School, was in good hands with Mr. Greg Weimer, Mrs. Jessica Willis, and Mrs. Kristin
Poage leading during my absence. I want to thank them and all of my teachers and staff for their
support.
I would like to express gratitude to Dr. J.T. Coopman of the Indiana Association for
Public School Superintendents for his support and feedback, Mr. John Matthews from the
Community Safety Institute for his direction and feedback, and Mr. David Woodward and Mr.
Ryan Stewart at the Indiana Department of Education. These two gentlemen work tirelessly to
equip Indiana educators and law enforcement personnel with the tools needed to keep our
students, teachers, and schools safe. Their assistance in this project was invaluable.
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So many other people have been supportive and helpful of this endeavor both personally
and professionally. Although they may not all be recognized by name, they all know who they
are and they all know how valued they are to me.
I would like to give love and thanks to my wonderful wife, Kellie, for her support,
patience, and amazing editing skills. She has been nothing short of fantastic during this journey.
And finally, I would like to thank my parents, Janet and Bill Pillar. From the moment I went to
preschool to the time I walk across the stage to be hooded, they have been and always will be my
biggest fans and have relentlessly supported my education since day one, and I thank them.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iv
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ vi
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
A Brief History of School Violence ............................................................................................... 2
It Can Happen Anywhere: Columbine and Beyond ....................................................................... 3
The Safety Challenges Facing American Schools .......................................................................... 6
Purpose of the Study ....................................................................................................................... 7
Research Questions ......................................................................................................................... 8
Definition of Terms ...................................................................................................................... 10
Chapter 2: Review of Literature ................................................................................................... 11
The Need for the Perception of Safety within Schools ................................................................. 11
Collecting School Safety Data ...................................................................................................... 13
Policies on School Safety ............................................................................................................. 14
School Safety Laws, Codes, and Legislation ................................................................................ 21
School Safety Communication ..................................................................................................... 26
Law Enforcement in the School Setting ....................................................................................... 27
Safety Hardware in the School Setting ......................................................................................... 31
Chapter 3: Methods ....................................................................................................................... 35
Research Questions ....................................................................................................................... 36
Research Design ........................................................................................................................... 36
Survey Sample .............................................................................................................................. 37
Instrument ..................................................................................................................................... 38
Data Collection ............................................................................................................................. 40
Data Analysis ................................................................................................................................ 41
Limitations of the Study ............................................................................................................... 43
Chapter 4: Results and Findings ................................................................................................... 45
Research Question 1 ..................................................................................................................... 47
Research Question 2 ..................................................................................................................... 49
School Safety Plans ...................................................................................................................... 49
viii
Funding and Training.................................................................................................................... 50
Policy Issues ................................................................................................................................. 50
Research Question 3 ..................................................................................................................... 51
Communication ............................................................................................................................. 51
Law Enforcement .......................................................................................................................... 53
Research Question 4 ..................................................................................................................... 54
Security Hardware ........................................................................................................................ 54
Research Question 5 ..................................................................................................................... 56
Research Question 6 ..................................................................................................................... 63
Research Question 7 ..................................................................................................................... 66
Chapter 5: Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 69
Discussion of Findings.................................................................................................................. 69
Research Questions ....................................................................................................................... 70
Summary of Methods.................................................................................................................... 70
Analysis of Research Questions ................................................................................................... 71
Research Question 1 ..................................................................................................................... 72
Research Question 2 ..................................................................................................................... 72
Research Question 3 ..................................................................................................................... 73
Research Question 4 ..................................................................................................................... 74
Research Question 5 ..................................................................................................................... 75
Research Question 6 ..................................................................................................................... 78
Research Question 7 ..................................................................................................................... 81
Findings Related to the Literature ................................................................................................ 82
Conclusions ................................................................................................................................... 84
Implications for Practice ............................................................................................................... 84
Future Research ............................................................................................................................ 86
References ..................................................................................................................................... 87
Appendix A ................................................................................................................................... 92
Appendix B ................................................................................................................................. 100
Appendix C ................................................................................................................................. 103
Appendix D ................................................................................................................................. 108
ix
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Saint Augustine said, “This awful catastrophe is not the end but the beginning. History
does not end so. It is the way its chapters open.” On December 14, 2012, 20-year-old Adam
Lanza killed his mother, took guns that she purchased for him from their house, and drove to
Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut. There he massacred six teachers and
20 children, 12 girls and eight boys, all between the ages of 6 and 7. Lanza was diagnosed with a
mental illness in elementary school and lived a life in a dark basement surrounded by violent
video games and research on mass killings (Lysiak, 2013). This tragedy now stands as the
second deadliest mass school shooting in United States history. The most deadly college campus
shooting took place in 2007 when college senior, Seung-Hui Cho, shot and killed 32 students on
the campus of Virginia Tech University. Recent to this writing, Chris Harper-Mercer shot a
teacher and eight students before killing himself at Umpqua Community College in Roseburg,
Oregon on October 1, 2015. The Huffington Post, using data compiled by Everytown for Gun
Safety Action Club from December 2012 to February 2014, has documented at least 74
shootings on a K-12 or university campus since the Sandy Hook shooting, The Huffington Post
used the following criteria and disclaimer:
Incidents were classified as school shootings when a firearm was discharged inside a
school building or on school or campus grounds, as documented in publicly reported
news accounts. This includes assaults, homicides, suicides, and accidental shootings.
Incidents in which guns were brought into schools but not fired there, or were fired off
school grounds after having been possessed in schools, were not included. This list
includes incidents meeting the above criteria that were brought to our attention after our
School Shootings Analysis was issued on February 10, 2014. Incidents were identified
1
through media reports, so this is likely an undercount of the true total. (Hall & Diehm,
2014)
The number continues to grow, as evidenced by the events in Oregon. Each time, a national
conversation about not only gun control and mental illness, but also ways to improve school
safety, is reignited, and a further discussion is initiated.
School safety and security has evolved. Incidents that were once unimaginable are now at
the forefront of the minds of educational leaders. Although not a new phenomenon, across the
nation, violence and school safety has become a primary issue for parents, students, teachers, and
school administrators (Landen, 1992; Sautter, 1995). School leaders look to past incidents of
school violence in order to learn about the causes and to develop safety policies, practices, and
procedures in an effort to combat the horror of school violence.
A Brief History of School Violence
Adam Lanza, the Sandy Hook Elementary shooter, was by no means a trailblazer or an
innovator in the realm of school violence. School violence is not so much a new problem as a
recurrent one that has not been adequately recognized for its persistence and pervasiveness
throughout the history of education (Cornell & Mayer, 2010). School violence has been around
for centuries. The first known episode of school violence in America resulting in death occurred
on July 26, 1764, when four Delaware Indian warriors attacked a schoolhouse in what is today
Greencastle, Pennsylvania. In this attack, the schoolmaster, Enoch Brown, along with nine
school children, were shot and killed (Middleton, 2007). Since then, other events of school
violence have gained public attention because of location, heinousness, or the number of
casualties. Bath Township, Michigan was the site of the deadliest school attack in history. On
2
May 18, 1927, 55-year-old Andrew Kehoe, the school board treasurer, killed his wife, blew up
his farm, and then detonated explosives that killed 38 children and six adults in the North wing
of the Bath Consolidated School. He then shot himself and blew up his truck, killing the 33-yearold superintendent of schools, the post master, and another second grade student. Kehoe, who
was known to be a very angry person in general, was distraught over losing a recent township
election and vowed revenge on the community (“School Dynamiter,” 1927).
Despite a history of school shootings in America, the first news media reference using the
term “school violence” appeared in a Los Angeles Times op-ed published in April 1968, which
criticized Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley for his reaction to riots sparked by the assassination
of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Chicago’s “west side ghetto” which was predominately
African American. It was then that Mayor Daley said school violence was “rising dangerously.”
In March 1969, The New York Times debuted the term “school violence” in an article on Mayor
John Lindsay’s reactions to escalating “school disorders” at public schools around the city
(Fuentes, 2011). Today, the terms, and many others that have spawned from it, are common
vernacular in American education, media, and social culture.
It Can Happen Anywhere: Columbine and Beyond
A teacher, with her keys hanging from a lanyard around her neck, stood outside of
Columbine High School on April 20, 1999, and cried out over and over, “How could this happen
here?” Although many school shootings and violent events have occurred throughout United
States history, the tragedy at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, is often the first to
come to mind when the topic of school safety or violence is considered. Although other tragic
events have occurred in schools, this shooting took place in a predominantly Evangelical
3
Christian city of 60,000 residents and garnered the attention of the nation. The Columbine
shooting was the most covered news story in 1999 and throughout the entire decade of the
1990’s, only the O.J. Simpson trial received more national media coverage (Muschert, 2002).
There were many possible reasons the nation paid so much attention to this particular event.
Possibly because there were surveillance videos of the killers roaming the halls with assault
rifles, which brought the tragic events to life for people. It could have been the heroic story of the
teacher, Mr. Dave Sanders, who was shot and later died while helping usher students to safety.
Or maybe it was the images of hundreds of high school students evacuating the building in tears,
with their hands on their heads and visibly terrified, that caught national attention.
On that day at Columbine, students Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris killed twelve
classmates and Mr. Sanders before killing themselves after 49 minutes of horror they
orchestrated at their school, forever etching themselves into the nation’s consciousness. The
Columbine tragedy once again put school safety in the headlines and made it imperative that real
changes in school violence prevention had to be made. Solutions were suggested, such as
improved identification of students at risk of dropping out, and mental health interventions with
those students deemed “at risk” (Arman, 2000). Shortly after the Columbine shootings, a Gallup
poll found that two thirds of Americans believed that a similar incident was “very likely” or
“somewhat likely” to happen in their community (Saad, 1999) and over one third of high school
students said there were students at their school potentially violent enough to cause a situation
like the one that occurred at Columbine (Gallup, 1999). Even one year later, another poll found
that 71% of parents felt that the Columbine shooting had changed their view of how safe their
children were at school (Borum, Cornell, Modzeleski, & Jimerson, 2010).
4
Although preparedness is a priority, there are regular reminders that violent events in
schools can and do happen anywhere. The March 21, 2005, deadly events in Red Lakes,
Minnesota and the October 2, 2006, violent tragedy at Nickel Mines, Pennsylvania are sad
reminders. In Red Lakes, Jeffrey Weise, a 16-year-old Ojibwe Indian tribe member murdered his
grandfather, a tribal police officer, and his grandfather’s girlfriend. He then took two police
issued firearms, and drove his grandfather’s police car to Red Lake Senior High School. Once
there, Weise killed an unarmed security guard, a teacher, and five high school-aged students.
Weise was involved in a shoot-out with police and ended up killing himself at the school. The
events at this northwest Minnesota reservation, where only tribe members can live and own land,
were a shock to many. Weise suffered from depression caused by the suicide of his father and the
near-fatal injuries his mother suffered in a car accident, as well as a general dissatisfaction of
living on the reservation. The Red Lake shooting brought to light issues such as depression and
mental illness and how they can contribute to the occurrence of school violence.
In Nickel Mines, Pennsylvania, Charles Roberts went to a one-room Amish schoolhouse
and claimed the lives of five girls between the ages of 6 and 13 by shooting them. Roberts was a
milk deliveryman who was married and had children of his own. He went into the schoolhouse
and gathered the male students. He forced them to help carry in lumber and weapons and then
released them. Roberts then barricaded the school door shut and shot ten girls execution style,
killing five, before killing himself. School safety expert Kenneth Trump said this event was
proof that “we are still, seven years post-Columbine, suffering from Mayberry syndrome. If it
can happen in a one-room Amish schoolhouse in rural Pennsylvania, it can happen anywhere”
(Fuentes, 2011, p. 136). This event drew attention because of the violent nature of the crime
against this historically peaceful group of people. While the response from those outside of the
5
Nickel Mine Amish community included a renewed call to arm teachers in the classroom
(USAToday.com, 2006), inside the community, the Nickel Mines Amish remained peaceful even
after the tragic events. Their forgiveness and peacefulness in those trying times spawned a
movie, “Amish Grace” (Kraybill & Nolt, 2007).
The Safety Challenges Facing American Schools
School officials have a duty to provide for the safety of students and school personnel in
all of the school district’s schools (McKinney, 2012). Although the chances of a homicide
happening at school are rare, safety and security is still a concern for schools and for students,
parents, and school personnel. But why is that? In a study published in 2014, The Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention found in its “School-Associated Violent Death Study” that
deaths in schools dropped steadily from the 2006-2007 school year to the 2009-2010 school year.
In this study, a school death case was defined as a fatal injury (e.g., homicide, suicide, or legal
intervention) that occurred on school property, on the way to/from school, or during or on the
way to/from a school-sponsored event. The study found that student deaths were most likely to
occur at the beginning of the semester, during a transitional period (i.e. before or after school or
around lunch), and when firearms were used. These firearms were often brought by the
perpetrator from home or taken from the home of a friend (The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2014). There were 17 reported homicides in schools in 2009-2010, down from 32 in
2006-2007 which continued the trend of an average of 21 student deaths at school from 1996 to
2006 (Mayer & Furlong, 2010). It should be noted that Blad (2013) of Education Week actually
cites 63 student deaths, including nine suicides during the 2006-2007 year according to U.S.
6
Department of Justice and Education reports. This highlights the fact that there is no
standardized method of tracking violent behavior in schools.
Although still unimaginable, these school homicides, which receive a great deal of public
attention, are still incredibly rare. A school-based homicide at a typical school would occur
approximately once every 6,000 years (Mayer & Furlong, 2010) and the average number of
homicides per year at school, 21, although still painful, accounts for less than 1% of the average
homicides of children ages 5-18 in the United States (Modzeleski et al., 2008). Homicides aside,
it is clear that school violence is not a single problem amenable to a simple solution, but a variety
of problems and challenges that range on a continuum from playful misbehavior to disrespectful,
hostile, and progressively more violent transgressions (Cornell & Mayer, 2010).
These statistics aside, the public still cares. In the 2014 PDK/Gallup Poll of the Public’s
Attitudes Toward the Public Schools, nine percent of respondents cited “lack of discipline/use of
drugs/fighting & gangs” as the second biggest problem that public schools face. Inadequate
funding was the only topic outranking safety. Whether the statistics support the need for concern,
there is still concern regarding safety within our public schools.
Purpose of the Study
Currently there are no standardized methods of collecting and reporting school-based
crime incidents nationally, and most data come from anonymous self-report surveys that do not
allow tracking specific respondents over time (Mayer & Furlong, 2010). That lack of data
complicates the challenges that school leaders face when trying to convince students, parents,
and communities that overall, schools are safe, and in reality, one of the safest places students
can be (Modzeleski et al., 2008).
7
To fill this gap, in this dissertation, I present the current literature on school safety and
conduct an analysis of the perceptions and practices of school safety specialists in Indiana’s
traditional public schools and public charter schools. More specifically, I investigate to better
understand how safety measures in Indiana schools are currently being implemented, whether
those responsible for enacting safety policy think it is working, and how they are going about
determining appropriate safety measures in order to better prevent school violence. Over 20
years ago, Goal 7 of the Federal Goals 2000, Educate America Act, said that “by the year 2000,
every school in America will be free of drugs and violence and the unauthorized presence of
firearms and alcohol, and will offer a disciplined environment conducive to learning” (Goals
2000: Educate America Act, 1994). Although we as a society are far from that goal, we must
continue to strive to make it a reality.
Research Questions
Through my research, I addressed the following questions:
1. What is the demographic profile of the person who holds the position of school
safety specialist in Indiana public school districts and the person responsible for
school safety in Indiana public charter schools?
2. How do school safety specialists in Indiana public school districts and those
responsible for school safety in Indiana public charter schools perceive the
effectiveness of local policies and state statute related to school safety?
3. What do school safety specialists in Indiana public school districts and those
responsible for school safety in Indiana public charter schools perceive to be
effective law enforcement and communication practices with regard to ensuring
school safety?
4. Which safety products or devices do school safety specialists perceive to be most
effective?
5. How does the size or location of a district affect its level of school safety
measures?
6. What differences are present between school safety measures in traditional public
schools versus public charter schools?
8
7. What policies, practices, and procedures have Indiana public and public charter
schools implemented to promote safety since the Sandy Hook tragedy in
December 2012?
9
Definition of Terms
Active Shooter/Killer: a type of mass murder marked by rapidity, scale, randomness, and suicide.
ALICE: A safety response protocol and an acronym for the Alert, Lockdown, Inform, Counter,
Evacuate model which is a technique used in some public settings such as schools, universities,
and workplaces.
School Resource Officer (SRO): Law enforcement officers who are responsible for providing
security and crime prevention in school settings.
School Safety Specialist: A position required in Indiana by IC 5-2-10.1-9 to oversee school
safety measures in each of Indiana’s public school districts.
Tabletop Exercise: An activity involving key personnel discussing simulated scenarios in an
informal setting that is generally designed to test a group’s theoretical ability to respond to a
situation.
Threat Assessment: A study of a facility or organization centered upon an analysis of the facts
and evidence of behavior in a given situation or as a response to a prior situation conducted to
prevent targeted violence.
10
CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Education reformer Alan E. Beck said, “In teaching, you can’t do the Bloom stuff until
you have taken care of the Maslow stuff” (Mead, 2015). If students and staff do not feel safe, it
is substantially more difficult to effectively teach and learn. Although public policy and state
statute provide parameters in which people operate, individual schools have turned to a variety of
methods and resources to help maintain a safe environment based on their own unique needs and
resources. Common strategies for most school safety policies, practices, and procedures fall into
the categories of: policy, communication, law enforcement, and hardware. Everything from
state- mandated safety plans and mass contact systems to district police units and door buzz-in
equipment has been discussed or implemented in an effort to increase levels of school safety.
Each discussion has been centered on how to make schools safer or at the very least, improve the
perception of safety among constituents.
The Need for the Perception of Safety within Schools
Abraham Maslow, a well-known American psychologist, advanced the idea that needs
are organized in a hierarchy such that lower-level needs have to be satisfied before higher-level
needs become motivating (Dawis & Fruehling, 1996). Maslow states that after biological needs,
such as food, drink, warmth, and sex are met, safety needs are next.
Emotional safety in schools is often destroyed by threats whether they are real or
imagined (Surface, 2011). Regardless of the environment, if people do not feel safe, it is difficult
for them to focus on any task. Schools are no different. If a school is not safe or orderly, all other
activities suffer (Marzano, 2013). If students and faculty do not have a safe and orderly
environment in which to work, little if any substantive work can be accomplished. When
11
challenges already exist in maintaining the attention of young learners, issues of safety and order
must be placated to avoid further distraction. However, after highly-publicized shootings in
America’s public schools, administrators and educators have no choice but to prioritize safety
and focus on ways to make schools safer places. School leaders have historically understood the
importance of providing students and staff with a safe learning environment to ensure that
learning can effectively take place, and this need for safety in schools remains a primary concern
for all public school stakeholders (Trump, 1998). School security is essential to learning, and
students must be confident that they need not worry about their physical safety while at school
(Fritz & Radka, 2010).
Marzano (2013) identifies the safe and orderly environment in a variety of ways, but it is
crucial that students, faculty, and staff perceive the school environment as safe and orderly. The
leading factors that improve that perception are:

When asked, faculty and staff generally describe the school as a safe place.

When asked, faculty and staff generally describe the school as an orderly place.

Clear and specific rules and procedures are in place for the running of the school.

Faculty and staff know the emergency management procedures and how to
implement them for specific incidents.

Evidence of practicing emergency management procedures for specific incidents
is available.

Evidence of updates to emergency management plans is available.
A focus on safety and order in school is by no means a new concept for educators and
researchers. Dr. Ronald Edmonds (1981) cited an “orderly, safe environment conducive to
teaching and learning” as one of his five key correlates for effective schools in his earlier work.
12
In their newest book What Effective Schools Do: Re-envisioning the Correlates, Lezotte and
Snyder (2011), expand Lezotte’s own five original correlates from his 1979 study to seven
correlates and a “safe and orderly environment” remains as one of the main factors that lead to a
school being deemed effective. Although school violence has evolved since these works were
published, the need for a safe and orderly school environment remains crucial to fostering
productive teaching and learning in schools.
Collecting School Safety Data
As stated earlier, there are no standardized methods for collecting and reporting schoolbased crime incidents nationally, and most data come from anonymous self-report surveys that
do not allow tracking specific respondents over time (Mayer & Furlong, 2010). The task of
establishing reliable nationwide data points of current school crime and safety incidents, which
could be anything from the number of homicides to the documented instances of bullying, and
regularly updating and monitoring these indicators are important in ensuring the safety of our
nation’s students. This is the aim of Indicators of School Crime and Safety (Robers, Kemp,
Rathbun, & Morgan, 2014). The National Center for Education Statistics conducts the School
Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS) in the spring of even-numbered years. This survey is
administered to public primary, middle, high, and combined school principals across the United
States. The survey questions are developed based on indicators from a variety of independent
data sources, including national surveys of students, teachers, principals, and post-secondary
institutions. The questions also utilize universal data collections from federal departments and
agencies including The Bureaus of Justice Statistics, NCES, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Office of Postsecondary Education. The
13
NCES then uses the indicators to create the survey that is sent out to school principals. The
SSOCS is designed to provide estimates of school crime, discipline, disorder, programs and
policies.
The findings, published in 2014, found that from July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2011, there
were 31 school associated violent deaths which were defined as: a homicide, suicide, or legal
intervention (involving a law enforcement officer), in which the fatal injury occurred on the
campus of a functioning elementary or secondary school in the United States, while the victim
was on the way to or from regular sessions at school or while the victim was attending or
traveling to or from an official school-sponsored event. Victims of school-associated violent
deaths included students, staff members, and others who were not students. This number is down
from the peak of 63 school deaths nationwide during the 2006-2007 school year (Blad, 2013).
During the 2011-2012 school year, SSOCS showed that 88% of respondents controlled
access to school buildings by locking or monitoring doors during schools hours and 64% of
respondents used security cameras to monitor the schools. During the 2009-2010 school year,
43% of public schools reported the presence of one or more security staff at their school at least
once a week during the school year (Robers, Kemp, Rathbun, & Morgan, 2014).
Policies on School Safety
After the Sandy Hook shootings in Newtown, Connecticut, lawmakers across the United
States took action to prevent a similar tragedy with hundreds of strategies to promote school
safety. According to Shah and Ujifusa (2013), almost one year after the Sandy Hook Elementary
School shootings, as of December 6, 2013, there were 644 proposed pieces of federal legislation
14
in statehouses around the country regarding school safety and gun control. Those pieces of
legislation were directly connected to:

178-School Emergency Planning

101-Police in Schools

84-Arming School Employees

81-School Climate and Student Support

76-Building Safety Upgrades

73-Easing School Gun Restrictions

51-Gun Control
And as of December 6, 2013, a total of 97 of those bills were signed into law in states all over
the country. While the new laws were put in place to promote school safety, schools have taken
additional measures to create safe and orderly environments. Many schools, for example, have
taken steps, often at considerable expense, to make it more difficult to bring weapons into school
(Fritz & Radka, 2010).
In Indiana, the course of action for school safety is outlined within policy manuals at each
district within the state. Items ranging from visitor policies to punishment for having weapons on
school grounds are typical subjects within these policy manuals. Furthermore, Indiana state
statute requires the following events be reported to local law enforcement: violations involving
alcohol or controlled substances on or within 1,000 feet of school property, suspected child
abuse, threats or harassment, or unwanted contact that results in bodily injury (McKinney, 2012).
The section on safety in statute continues to grow as boards, superintendents, and building-level
administrators continue to adjust to new challenges standing in the way of school safety.
15
Over the years, the response protocols to a school-shooting scenario have evolved as well. The
1999 attack on Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, impacted schools and law
enforcement and caused a philosophical and practical shift in responding to violent events. The
long-standing tactics from the 1960’s conducted by Special Weapons and Tactics Teams
(SWAT) were abandoned. During that time, SWAT officials would enter into negotiations with
offenders who entered buildings and took hostages. Now, schools follow an “active
shooter/killer” response whereby information is gathered and officers are substantially more
likely to engage a violent intruder within a school.
The federal government also responded to Columbine with federal grant programs such
as Emergency Response and Crisis Management (ERCM) and Readiness and Emergency
Management for Schools (REMS), to put new focus on training and preparation for educators
and administrators to act and react when a threat surfaces against the safe and orderly
environment for which schools strive. ERCM is a program that highlights the importance of
emergency preparedness to various situations that may cause harm. These situations, ranging
from weather related disasters to man-made incidents, are not always preventable, but a
calculated and calm response by all involved can often lead to safer outcomes. ERCM
encourages schools to have a plan in place to help avoid students and staff from getting lost,
disoriented, confused, or being unprepared. ERCM cites that acts of violence in schools are
uniquely disturbing because the intent is usually to hurt children.
Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS) was another federal act that
was intended to help prepare and withstand instances of danger, but in this case, the efforts have
been geared specifically toward schools. The federal Department of Education along with the
Department of Justice, in response to the Columbine attacks, created this program that annually
16
funneled $20 to $30 million per year to schools to offer trainings, purchase supplies, and hire
personnel to manage school safety. However, the grants section of this program was cut under
the federal budget for 2012 fiscal year. Ken Trump, considered by many as the nation’s foremost
expert on school security, called the cuts to eliminate the already “embarrassingly pithy amount
of $30 million in REMS grant awards to local school districts, reckless, negligent, and
inexcusable” (Trump, 2011). However, the REMS program still exists and continues to provide
resources for schools and school leaders about how to construct, carry out, and evaluate safe
schools planning and measures.
With all of this well-intentioned and potentially helpful programming in place in the
years after Columbine, in December of 2012, the paradigm on school safety shifted again as 26
lives were taken by Adam Lanza at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut.
Ken Trump said, “Nothing was more powerful than seeing firsthand the shell-shocked faces of
Newtown’s residents and the images of a picture-perfect American community that will be
forever changed” (Trump, 2013). The event spawned a national debate over gun laws and mental
health issues, but it also caused school leaders to yet again consider what to do to maintain a safe
and orderly school environment (Matthews, 2013). Trump considered some ideas irrational, such
as: arming teachers and staff, equipping students with bulletproof backpacks and teachers with
bulletproof vests, and teaching students to throw items at armed gunmen and attack them
(Trump, 2013). Since Columbine, plans had been in place and drills were practiced, but after
Sandy Hook, the question remained, “What can school leaders do to keep its students, faculty
and staff safe?”
For a safe and orderly school climate to become a reality, administrators, faculty, staff,
students, and lawmakers must make a commitment that safety measures become not just a
17
priority, but the priority. There is a new mission in addition to what schools are doing to
maintain a safe and orderly environment, and that is to devise ways to prevent another Newtown.
More than 450 bills related to school safety filed around the country in the one year after
Newtown as legislators proposed solutions including arming teachers, adding guards or police
officers, and shoring up building security in a variety of different ways (Shah & Ujifusa, 2013).
In reality, comprehensive violence prevention will require a range of strategies and interventions
in addition to threat assessment (Borum, Cornell, Modzeleski, & Jimerson, 2010).
There is no shortage of ideas about how to create a safe school environment. The
National Conference of State Legislators reports that by August 1, 2016, eight states (up from
two in 2011), will allow concealed weapons to be carried on their college campuses: Colorado,
Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, Oregon, Texas, Utah and Wisconsin. In 2012, two states allowed it
and sixteen additional states attempted legislation to do the same. All sixteen attempts failed.
Three states, Kansas, South Dakota, and Tennessee, all passed laws prior to the Newtown
shootings formally allowing school employees to carry weapons. Following Newtown, 62
additional proposals were filed all around the country to arm school employees in some fashion.
As of July 1, 2013, in Indiana, according to IC 35-47-9-1, schools are gun-free zones. Yet
anyone employed or authorized by a school "to act as a security guard, perform or participate in
a school function, or participate in any other activity authorized by a school" is exempt. This
technically allows Indiana schools to designate any employee they wish as a security officer,
including teachers, and allows them to carry a gun.
Further legislation, Senate Bill 1, in Indiana in the 2012-2013 session required at least
one teacher, principal, or other school staff member to carry a gun in every public or charter
school. That bill was ultimately voted down which is consistent with the new comprehensive
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emergency guidelines for school districts released by the White House in collaboration with the
U.S. Departments of Education, Homeland Security, Justice, and Health and Human Services, as
well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
The guidelines, which were promised after the Newtown shooting, advocate confronting an
active shooter (as a last resort).This change in policy was made with consideration that 16 of 41
recent active-shooter events were stopped by potential victims. The guidelines go on to say, “The
possibility of an active shooter situation is not justification for the presence of firearms on
campus in the hands of any personnel other than law enforcement officers” (Zubrzycki, 2013).
Additionally, the following legislation (Indiana Code) addresses matters of school safety
in the state of Indiana:

IC 5-2-10.1-9-outlines the duties for school safety specialists

IC 5-2-10.1-10-outlines the duties and membership for county school safety
commissions

IC 5-2-10.1-11-creates and describes the school safety specialist training and
certification program

IC 5-2-10.1-12-defines the purpose and processes for safe school committees and
school safety plans

IC 6.11-2-2.5-requires all school corporations to develop a written emergency
plan for natural as well as manmade disasters

IC 20-26-16-overviews school corporation police departments

20-30-5.5-1-requires internet safety guidelines for all students grades three and
above

IC 20-33-8-requires school boards to adopt a rule prohibiting bullying at school
that includes provisions for education, parental involvement, reporting,
investigating and intervention

IC 20-34-3-20-requires each school to conduct one tornado preparedness drill
and one manmade occurrence disaster drill during each semester. The governing
19
body of a school corporation shall require each principal to file a certified
statement that all drills have been conducted as required

Additionally, legislation exists on topics ranging from suspension and expulsion
guidelines, to weapons, compulsory school attendance mandates, and gang
activity
Despite the laws mentioned above that support efforts of school safety, Indiana Governor
Mike Pence, a Second Amendment advocate, signed into law Indiana Code 35-47-9 which
allows guns on school property in locked cars. A statement from the Governor’s Office said,
“this is a common sense reform of the law that accomplishes the goal of keeping parents and
law-abiding citizens from being charged with a felony when they pick their kids up at school or
go to cheer on the local basketball team.” Indiana Association of Public School Superintendent’s
Director Dr. John T. Coopman and Indianapolis Public Schools Superintendent Dr. Lewis
Ferebee were among many state educational leaders speaking out against the bill with Dr.
Ferebee stating, "Young people, schools, guns and all of that is a mix for something
inappropriate” (Wang, 2014).
In October of 2015, Governor Pence added $3.5 million to Indiana’s school safety grant
program for the purpose of increasing resources that schools could use for safety initiatives. That
additional funding makes for a total of $9 million available for Indiana schools to spend on
school resource officers, threat assessments, and safety and security equipment such as security
cameras. Pence’s comments on the topic highlight the politicized nature of school safety as he
said, “Providing resources to create and maintain protected school campuses for Indiana’s
students is critical to the well-being of our state and its citizens. We have no higher priority than
to ensure the security of our children and faculty at our schools” (Keck, 2015).
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School Safety Laws, Codes, and Legislation
Indiana has consistently been involved in the conversation centered around school safety
and security. Former Indiana Senator Birch Bayh concluded in a 1975 report that homicide, rape,
robbery, and assault in schools were increasing dramatically (Bayh, 1975). Indiana takes a
proactive approach to implementing school safety initiatives by teaching those who attend the
Indiana School Safety Specialist Academy or ISSSA. The Indiana School Safety Specialist
Academy provides ongoing, certified training and information on national and state best
practices, as well as exemplary resources for school safety, security, intervention/prevention, and
emergency preparedness planning. According to the Indiana Department of Education website,
school safety specialists are trained to lead the development and implementation of school safety
practices in order to provide safe educational environments for all students in Indiana.
Each Indiana school is required to have a School Safety Plan on file that is reviewed at
the beginning of every school year by a school-based committee. The plan identifies members of
the school safety team, which includes administrators, teachers, staff, even students, and outlines
plans and topics such as evacuation procedures, emergency contacts, and reunification plans.
Schools also use drug testing as a way to create a safer and drug-free environment. In
1995, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that schools could randomly drug test student athletes and
other involved in extra-curricular activities by way of Veronica School District 47J v. Acton.
Additionally, bus drivers, or others who have access to driving a school vehicle transporting
students or student-athletes are themselves also subjected to a random drug screening. These
efforts to prevent drug activities on school campuses and by students are a critical step in
deterring criminal activity at school.
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Students should not expect the same privacy rights granted by the Constitution under the
Fourth Amendment when at school. Locker searches, which have been deemed legal due to the
fact the locker is property of the school, are a common practice used to investigate student
possession of contraband. Administrators have more latitude in searching the person or property
of students than law enforcement officers because administrators must only have “reason to
believe” or “reasonable suspicion” in order to conduct a search at school. The Supreme Court
found in New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) that a school administrator’s need to maintain order in a
school was a “special need” and that searches based on a reasonable suspicion were
constitutional.
Canine searches have also been used in Indiana schools and around the nation to identify
possible possession of narcotics. In these searches, trained handlers lead specially trained canines
around schools locker bays or parking lots. When the dogs “hit” on a target, the school
administrators have more than the necessary cause to search the targeted property and evidence
discovered can be used in the school discipline or the criminal conviction of the perpetrators. The
case Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District ultimately stated that cars and lockers
could be searched using canines, but without “individualized suspicion,” students themselves
could not be searched by dogs. This is also a big industry in the school safety world. For $40,000
to $60,000, a person can open a canine investigation franchise, with Interquest being the most
popular franchise option, and owner/operators can charge $300 to $600 a day for sniffing dogs to
visit a school (Fuentes, 2011).
Schools generally strive to promote safe and welcoming environments. With that
welcoming environment comes the practice of regulating visitors and volunteers. Volunteers who
work in a supervised or unsupervised role within nearly all Indiana schools have either a limited
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or a comprehensive criminal history background check completed by the Indiana State Police or
other law enforcement agency. This process allows for an additional layer of protection for the
students and staff who will be working with these volunteers. Visitors who come to many
schools also have procedures and protocols to follow prior to being allowed access to areas
where students and staff may be. These procedures range from signing in and wearing a name
badge to providing a driver’s license or completing a limited background check. Raptor
Technologies, a company founded by former Enron consultant Allan Measom, created a program
called V-Soft in 2001 that runs a visitor’s identification against the state and national sex
offender database. By 2005, the company was earning $2.5 million a year (Fuentes, 2011). All of
these policies and procedures work to help maintain a higher level of safety and security for
those present in the building.
It is not uncommon for faculty members to be required to wear identification. Name tags,
name badges, identification cards on lanyards or clips are all common forms of identification
used by adult staff members to assist in students and visitors being able to easily identify faculty
and staff.
School uniforms have been historically used in private parochial schools as a sign of
respect, accountability, and a way to maintain discipline. Some public schools have moved
toward requiring uniforms. The National Center for Education Statistics study showed that
between 2003-2004 and 2011-2012, the number of public schools nationwide who turned to
uniforms rose from 13 to 19 percent. The data also showed that more city schools than suburban
and rural schools require uniforms, as well as more high-poverty than low-poverty schools (47
percent to 6 percent) are dictating that clothing choice for students (Burtka, 2015).
Administrators in districts that have a mandated clothing policy believe that wearing a uniform
23
allows students to model a more positive behavior (Gullatt, 1999). President Clinton went so far
as alluding to the issue in his January 23, 1996, State of the Union address where he said:
I challenge all our schools to teach character education: to teach good
values and good citizenship. And if it means that teenagers will stop
killing each other over designer jackets, then our public schools should be
able to require the students to wear school uniforms (Clinton, 1996).
At times, the clothing students wear or do not wear can result in bullying, harassment,
and violence. In some school districts, colors students wear can incite violent behavior because
of what the colors are represent. Brand names shoes and clothing can also lead to higher rates of
theft or violence. Some districts implement strict dress codes or uniform policies to assist in
alleviating the issues that arise from the clothing students wear. School administrators and
parents who support school uniform policies believe when uniforms are worn, students lose their
gang or high fashion identity and become less violent, thus improving the school environment
(White & Beal, 1999). One study found that on average, students wearing a school-identified
type of dress reported significantly more positive perceptions of belonging in their school
community than reported by students in the standard dress group (Fosseen, 2002). When students
have a strong perception of belonging, they are less likely to engage in violent behavior which
leads to a safer learning environment.
Schools exist in all kinds of districts; some are where the effects of gang activity, access
to guns, and neighborhood violence can intrude on schools (Mayer & Furlong, 2010). Gang
management plans are tools typically used in large urban settings or other places where
documented gang activity is more likely to occur. In a November 2010 study, The National Gang
Center Bulletin (NGCB), published by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, said 45% of high school
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aged students and 35% of middle school aged students say there are gangs or students who
identify themselves as being part of a gang in their school. The NGCB also notes that gang
members do not leave their conflicts, attitudes, and behaviors outside the school doors. Some of
the most dangerous gang activities in any community may take place in and around local
schools. Gang members encounter each other at school during class changes, in the lunchroom,
in common areas, and during assemblies and school events. Because of the risk of violent
behavior, schools and local law enforcement collaborate to counteract the potential violence that
gangs can bring to schools and school events.
Although acts of violence such as shootings, stabbings, or bomb threats are the most
likely to draw national headlines with regard to school safety, natural and manmade disasters
account for additional dangers in public schools. Evacuation drills and natural disaster drills are
required in Indiana. Historically, all schools were to have a fire or evacuation drill once per
month for every month school is in session, one tornado drill each semester, and a man-made
disaster lock down or “shelter in place” drill each semester. That law was changed on July 1,
2015, with Indiana Code 20-34-3-20 so that a tornado drill or man-made disaster drill may be
conducted in place of a fire drill perhaps as a response to the fact that it has been over 50 years
since a student was killed in a fire at school (Timm & Romer, 2015). Many Indiana schools also
participate in the Great American Shakeout, a national earthquake awareness drill done each
year. According to the Southern California Earthquake Center, over 518,000 kindergarten to
twelfth grade school students in Indiana are registered to participate in the 2015 drill. Indiana’s
total registration of over 668,000 participants is the largest of any state of the fourteen in the
central U.S. region (Central U.S. Participation Totals, 2015).
25
These policies, and so many more, ranging from traffic drop off patterns to managing nocontact orders (Mayes, 2008) exist with the common goal of keeping students, faculty, and staff
safe while in school. However, as disruptive events happen, proper communication is imperative
for assisting in maintaining a safe and orderly environment.
School Safety Communication
Schoolreach, Blackboard, Canvas, and School Messenger are just a few of the many
systems available in today’s school settings that allow communication to many different people
at one time and are used for a variety of reasons. Although these systems can and are used for
communicating information about school functions, report cards, or dismissal times, the systems
can be used in the time of an emergency to efficiently and effectively communicate with a
school’s constituency about plans and procedures. It is possible to use the same systems to call
parents about rumors of threats or the like in schools (Surface, 2011). In the time of a school
tragedy or an event out of the ordinary, schools may be besieged with calls or contacts from
parents wanting information or incorrect information being shared. Mass communication
systems, when used properly, can alleviate those challenges and be a major asset in the carrying
out of safety plans during or after an emergency situation.
Another critical communication tool to help support school safety is the anonymous “tip”
hotline. By setting up anonymous hotlines, schools or school districts can provide an outlet for
parents, community members, and most importantly, students, to relay information in a safe and
confidential way. Oftentimes, students are hesitant to report behaviors and events such as
bullying because they do not want to receive backlash from those they report. Many school
districts instituted anonymous tip lines after the 1999 Columbine massacre and while it is not
26
clear how many incidents these lines have averted, authorities believe they have definitely helped
(Finley, 2015). With an anonymous hotline, they are able to report in a safe way and schools, in
turn, benefit because they receive more and better information. Specifically, the “Text-A-Tip”
program creatively advocates for anonymous text messaging to authorities as a safe way to report
dangerous activites (Fritz & Radka, 2010).
Students are the eyes and ears of the building. A new term, “The Columbine Effect,” was
derived from the shootings at Columbine High School. This refers to the increased willingness of
students to inform authorities when they hear of an act of violence about to be committed by
their peers (Larkin, 2007). They are at the critical ground level for school safety. In today’s
climate of instantaneous information exchange through Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and every
other new platform, attention to and monitoring of social media is critical. The school tradition
of “passing notes” is now done electronically rather than in the back of the classroom. Fights,
threats, and bullying are now documented through “posts,” “tweets,” and “snaps” and by staying
aware and educated on these platforms, educators can use social media as a tool to support safety
initiatives and deter undesirable behavior.
Law Enforcement in the School Setting
In some school districts, law enforcement units intended solely for policing schools and
school property within the district are used to provide services to their students and staff.
Although school police forces are often either a luxury or a necessity, they are valuable tools in
providing timely responses and their presence can serve as a deterrent to violent behavior. A
regular police presence in the building enhances the school security and allows for a rapid
professional response. Additionally, an officer who is comfortable and enthusiastic on the job
27
can develop trusting relationships with students and serve as a confidante for students who have
safety concerns (Fritz & Radka, 2010).
A common issue discussed regarding school safety is whether schools should have armed
or unarmed security personnel in the buildings. Many communities are content to have unarmed
officers in buildings as the presence alone is enough of a deterrent as described previously. These
officers are often off-duty or retired law enforcement or are hired security guards. However,
many families have concerns about the presence of firearms in a school setting for a variety of
reasons, including the possibility of an accidental discharge or overuse of weapons. Others
support the idea of having armed security at schools. Those individuals feel a great sense of
security with trained officers ready and able to use firearms in a safe and effective manner should
the need arise. In addition, armed security officers can serve as a deterrent to anyone who may
want to engage in school violence. As discussed earlier, many states have entertained the idea of
arming teachers, administrators, or others within the school. According to armedcampuses.org,
college campuses in eight states (Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, Oregon, Utah,
Wisconsin, and on July 1, 2016, Texas) allow concealed firearms on campus. No Indiana college
or university allows this, however, Indiana State Representative Jim Lucas has twice introduced
legislation, most recently in January of 2016 with House Bill 1055, to “prohibit a state agency,
including a state supported college or university, from regulating the possession or transportation
of firearms, ammunition, or firearm accessories” (Carlton, 2016).
School resource officers (SROs) have been at the center of debate recently as the school
safety movement has grown. The job of the SRO is typically described as a “triad model”
because it consists of the three distinct responsibilities. This is such because they are police
officers with arrest powers, counselors for law related issues, and help to guide stakeholders to
28
appropriate services (Lavarello & Trump, 2001). The SRO program is reported to have begun in
Flint, Michigan, in 1953 but did not take hold in America’s public schools until the 1990’s in
response to school shootings (Mulqueen, 1999). School resource officers often provide security,
mentoring, and support for school and school-related activities and functions. But it must be
stressed that an SRO is a police officer first (Umphrey, 2009). Those in favor of the SRO
position support their presence as a deterrent for crime and undesirable behavior, with school law
enforcement expert Curt Lavarello saying, “that if administered properly, an SRO program can
have incredible value to schools” (Toppo, 2015, para. 14). In addition, they can assist school
personnel in investigations with fewer restrictions than the local police department. Additionally,
as the SRO develops trust with students, certain students will report violations of the law in their
personal lives and in school settings (Marazono, 2001). In general, the program provides school
administrators with the “additional resources” to promote a safe learning environment (Weiler &
Cray, 2011). Those against the position of SRO often cite the fact that their mere presence
creates a negative climate in the school and that the rise of the SRO program has coincided with
a rise in the number of children arrested or referred to court for school discipline (Kim &
Geronimo, 2010). It is also of concern that some police departments perceive the job of the SRO
to be considered “babysitting” and in general, an undesirable position (Bond, 2001). The state of
Indiana has made available grant money to partially fund SRO positions in Indiana public
schools and public charter schools through the funding provided by the Indiana Department of
Homeland Security.
In addition to district police forces, armed or unarmed security, and student resource
officers, many school districts hire security for extra-curricular activities. Events such as athletic
contests, dances, or concerts often draw large crowds of people who may not be familiar with the
29
protocols and procedures of the school or the site. Having additional security staff present to
police and monitor these areas can be a worthwhile investment for a school district or school
athletic department and a good opportunity for police to be a positive presence (Brunner &
Lewis, 2005).
After the Columbine High School shootings in Littleton, Colorado, the way in which law
enforcement responds to calls of on-campus violence changed. Active shooter or active killer
drills have become the response technique favored, in part because collaborative drills from local
police agencies have shown to be beneficial for helping those in law enforcement process the
challenges of responding to an active on-campus threat. In these drill scenarios, local law
enforcement units, along with fire and rescue, emergency responders, school personnel, and
community leaders stage an area where an “active shooter” is currently on campus. All aspects of
a real shooting event are covered. Those individuals involved fulfill their responsibilities as
though an actual shooter is on campus. This includes everything from accessing entry points to
providing immediate first aid. It is understood that no two scenarios will be the same and there
will always be variables in these situations, but this practice helps to identify strengths and areas
for improvement which are critical to planning for a violent event on campus.
If a school cannot or does not have an active shooter drill, tabletop exercises are a
common alternative. In tabletop exercises, hypothetical scenarios are created and shared and a
team or group then tests their ability to respond to the scenario posed. These scenarios provide
opportunities for discussion and practice on a smaller scale and can often lead to valuable
learning experiences that motivate positive change.
30
Safety Hardware in the School Setting
School safety and security companies and consultancy groups have spawned from the
additional attention and implementation of tools to combat school violence. Linda Yelton, a
researcher from Security International Association said, “My impression is that schools are way
behind the curve. They don’t understand the risks involved in having a thousand kids on campus.
Yes, they are scrambling to catch up but they aren’t there yet” (Fuentes, 2011, p. 131). Andrews
International, one of countless school security firms, has developed an education and safety
toolkit that has five key components:

Gain control of your environment

Educate yourself on hostile behavior

Minimize potential danger by taking action in an emergency

Continue your education

Build a culture of safety
Andrews International endorses having a properly trained security force that is an invaluable
resource, but encourages people to actively participate in their own safety, as security is
inevitably heighted (www.asse.org, 2007). Andrews and similar companies are a rapidly growing
line of education and defense for schools that are more inclined to prioritize school safety and
have the means to use these companies.
In the six months after the Newtown shooting, at least 62 of over 400 school safety bills
proposed by legislators around the country directly concerned building safety upgrades, which
can include school surveillance cameras (Morones, 2013). While security cameras have long
been common in department stores, car lots, and banks, having first been installed in response to
school violence in the 1980’s, surveillance cameras are now common in schools. These cameras
31
can detect motion or temperature change, and have the ability to provide sharp images that are
easy to access, view, and share. The cameras can generally provide an extra layer of monitoring
over the school environment as they are often placed in high traffic areas like entries and exits,
highly populated areas like hallways, cafeterias, or gymnasiums, and in locations where valuable
equipment may be housed, such as the library or the computer lab. Some argue that cameras are
ineffective for preventing crimes or misbehavior because schools rarely have a person to monitor
the cameras in real time (Green, Travis, & Downs, 1999). However, surveillance cameras can be
helpful in identifying the perpetrator of a crime or parties involved in violence. Cameras can also
provide an accurate depiction of violent events which are helpful to share with law enforcement
and other school personnel should the need arise.
Another piece of hardware that is often at the center of any discussion on safety and
school climate is the metal detector. Metal detectors are appealing because they are viewed as a
quick and visible solution to preventing school violence, however, they are not always cost
effective (Hankin, Hertz, & Simon, 2011). Metal detectors are often located by entry points
where students or visitors must be scanned prior to entering the building. An alternative to the
permanent or walk-through metal detector is the hand-held metal detector, or a wand, that can be
used on an individual and is easily transported. Although the Cleveland Public School System
spent an estimated $3.7 million to incorporate walk-through metal detectors and x-ray scanners
in in each of 111 public schools, Garcia (2003), found that only 32% of school safety
administrators thought metal detectors were effective in minimizing or preventing crime.
Regardless of the perception of how effective metal detectors are, Fisher Labs, a metal detector
manufacturer, reports that 28% of its business is from schools (Fuentes, 2011).
32
Visitor management systems are also common. This system allows a school employee to
scan a driver’s license and then an immediate background check is conducted and a personalized
visitor pass is created. Orange County Schools in Orlando, Florida invested $579,350 in initial
equipment and technology costs to implement the Raptor Technologies system in their schools
all with the hopes of being “relentless about who is going in and out of our schools” (Martin,
2015). When working with issues of school safety, mitigating damage is often one of the highest
priorities. Limiting access to the building and the process of determining who is entering the
building can often buy time, which can be critically important. A final tool that is less invasive,
but often used, is the “buzz in” system. This is a door system where a visitor may have to hit a
cue that allows someone to see the visitor or speak to them prior to allowing them access to the
building.
It is hard to prevent murder when killers do not care if they live or die. It is like trying to
stop a suicide bomber (Langman, 2009). A school can spend millions of dollars on hardware,
communication devices, and have appropriate law enforcement in place, but sadly, when
someone sick or evil makes the determination that they are going to harm students or teachers in
a school setting or in any other setting for that matter, there are limits to what can be done to
prevent this. The day after the Columbine High School shooting, Colorado Governor Bill Owens
said, “Our innocence is lost today” (Obmascik, 1999). We have to painfully acknowledge that in
spite of our best efforts some tragedies will not be prevented. We simply have to effectively
manage those crises that cannot be prevented (Trump, 2013). An unattributed quote at the
Columbine monument says, “It brought the nation to its knees but now that we’ve gotten back up
how have things changed; what have we learned?” (Fuentes, 2011). The hope is that school
33
leaders, law enforcement, and law makers have learned and we will continue learning every day
we go to school.
34
CHAPTER 3: METHODS
In this study, I surveyed those statutorily designated as responsible for school safety in
traditional public and charter public schools throughout Indiana to explore what programs,
policies, and practices are in place to promote school safety in this post-Sandy Hook climate.
Public school law requires school safety specialists for each public school district; however, the
position is not required for public charter schools. Indiana is the only state to require a school
safety specialist in each public school district (Woodward, 2016).
At the time of this writing, according to the Indiana Department of Education, there are
289 public school districts/corporations in the state of Indiana. Indiana Code 5-2-10.1-9 outlines
the duties of school safety specialists in each school corporation. The referenced Indiana Code
states:
(a) Each school corporation shall designate an individual to serve as the school
safety specialist for the school corporation.
(b) The school safety specialist shall be chosen by the superintendent of the
school corporation with the approval of the governing body.
(c) The school safety specialist shall perform the following duties:
(1) Serve on the county school safety commission, if a county school safety
commission is established under section 10 of this chapter.
(2) Participate each year in a number of days of school safety training that the
council determines.
(3) With the assistance of the county school safety commission, if a county school
safety commission is established under section 10 of this chapter, develop a safety
plan for each school in the school corporation.
35
(4) Coordinate the safety plans of each school in the school corporation as
required under rules adopted by the Indiana State Board of Education.
(5) Act as a resource for other individuals in the school corporation on issues
related to school discipline, safety, and security.
Research Questions
1. What is the demographic profile of the person who holds the position of school
safety specialist in Indiana public school districts and the person responsible for
school safety in Indiana public charter schools?
2. How do school safety specialists in Indiana public school districts and those
responsible for school safety in Indiana public charter schools perceive the
effectiveness of local policies and state statute related to school safety?
3. What do school safety specialists in Indiana public school districts and those
responsible for school safety in Indiana public charter schools perceive to be
effective law enforcement and communication practices with regard to ensuring
school safety?
4. Which safety products or devices do school safety specialists perceive to be most
effective?
5. How does the size or location of a district affect its level of school safety
measures?
6. What differences are present between school safety measures in traditional public
schools versus public charter schools?
7. What policies, practices, and procedures have Indiana public and public charter
schools implemented to promote safety since the Sandy Hook tragedy in
December 2012?
Research Design
I conducted a quantitative research study using a survey I developed largely based on
relevant literature. The survey enabled me to collect the demographics of the schools and the
school personnel. Questions were asked that also allowed me to collect information regarding the
realities of school safety practices within traditional public school districts and public charter
schools. The topics addressed in the survey were chosen based on their prevalence in current
research and discussion in the area of school safety. The questions in the survey were designed to
36
elicit demographic data and information from the following categories: safety climate, safety
policy, safety communication, law enforcement, and security hardware. The questions in each
category were answered using a 1-4 Likert style scale with 1 meaning “no/strongly disagree/not
effective,” 2 meaning “disagree/somewhat effective,” 3 meaning “agree/mostly effective,” and 4
meaning “yes/strongly agree/strongly effective.” There were also questions with the response,
“Yes” or “No” or “Do Not Know” in each category. The survey was hosted on the Qualtrics
web-based survey host site. The access to Qualtrics was provided by Ball State University.
Survey Sample
A link to this survey was sent to the superintendent of each public school district via the
Indiana Association of Public School Superintendents email listserv with the request that it be
directed to the person designated as the school safety specialist. The email was also sent to the
person listed on the Indiana Department of Education website or the specific school website as
director/principal of each public charter school in the state of Indiana with a request to pass the
survey on to each of the individuals who are primarily responsible for school safety within their
organization. Further, the link to the survey was posted on the Indiana Department of Education
School Safety Specialist Learning Connection group with a request that school safety specialists
respond. The School Safety Specialist Learning Connection group had approximately 896
members at the time the survey was sent; however, it should be noted that not all of those group
members are the designated district school safety specialist for a given district. The first
demographic question was intended to filter respondents so that the primary school safety
decision maker responded to the survey. A follow-up email was sent weekly after the original
email to all public school superintendents via the IAPSS listserv, to all members of the School
37
Safety Specialist Learning Connection group, and directly to representatives of the charter
schools as a reminder to complete the survey.
Each respondent was informed of the anonymity of his or her responses in the invitation
to participate. The procedures for administering this survey were received and reviewed by the
Ball State University Institutional Review Board (IRB) prior to its distribution. The IRB
determined there were minimal risks in participation and the design of the survey maintained
confidentiality. No compensation was provided by the researcher or the University for
participation and the results of the survey will be made available to any interested participant.
Instrument
The rapid proliferation of the Internet has resulted in one of the most dramatic changes in
survey research in recent years (Umbach, 2004). And while the need to know something that is
unknown drives the decision to conduct most surveys, the uses of survey results are as diverse as
those who sponsor them. Data from surveys are regularly used by individuals and businesses
throughout the United States to make investment, hiring, and policy decisions (Dillman, Smyth,
Christian, 2010). This quantitative, survey-based research sought to explore in a scholarly
manner what policies, practices, and procedures Indiana public and public charter schools have
implemented to promote safety in a post-Sandy Hook society. Survey-based research was chosen
for several reasons. The review of literature and conversations with several experts in this field
indicated there was a lack of quantitative information regarding the current status of these issues
within the state of Indiana. As school safety is a vast and an ever-changing topic, compiling
current and relevant research and information is a valuable resource for discussion and planning
now, and for the future, as school safety continues to evolve.
38
I developed this original survey (see Appendix A) by reviewing recent literature and
federal and state legislation regarding school safety to determine which topics related to school
safety are predominant and recurring in Indiana and across the country. I chose to develop the
survey rather than using one that had already been created in order to focus on the areas of:
safety climate, safety policy, safety communication, law enforcement, and security hardware
which were predominantly discussed in the literature. The demographic portion of the survey
allowed me to specifically address research questions one, five, and six. The question asking the
respondent to describe the district as urban, town, suburban, rural, or Metropolitan School
District (MSD) and the question asking the respondent to list the enrollment assisted in
answering research questions two through four and specifically, question five.
Although surveys of this type could be substantially longer and investigate each of the
categories further, I considered the number of questions and the format appropriate, as well as
the amount of time to answer the survey, to meet the general needs of the study. I did not want to
deter potential respondents from participating by including too many questions. It was estimated
that this survey would take 10 to 15 minutes to complete and a majority of respondents
completed it between six and nine minutes.
This survey was anonymous. Respondents were not asked to share their name at any
time. It was a web-based survey that was hosted on Qualtrics, and although there is no absolute
guaranteed anonymity, there was no collection of any participants’ IP addresses or any attempt to
identify the names of the participants.
In addition to my committee Chair, Dr. Joseph R. McKinney, an expert panel reviewed
the survey and feedback was collected from the following safety, law, and research experts:

Dr. Serena J. Salloum, Committee Member
39

Mr. David Woodward, Director of the Indiana School Safety Academy

Dr. Anne-Maree Ruddy, Director, Education Policy and Senior Research
Associate Center for Evaluation & Education Policy (CEEP) Indiana University
School of Education

Dr. Russ Skiba, Director, Equity Project at Indiana University

Mr. John Matthews, Executive Director, Community Safety Institute (CSI)

Mr. John Carter, Director of Planning, Monroe County Community School
Corporation
Data Collection
A web-based survey was used as the instrument to collect responses from those
designated as the school safety specialist in each of Indiana’s public school districts and those
responsible for school safety initiatives in Indiana’s charter school districts. An email to all
Indiana public school superintendents and public charter directors was sent requesting
participation by their district’s school safety specialist. The survey was also placed on the
Indiana Schools Safety Specialists’ Learning Connection page and the listserv for the Indiana
Association of Public School Superintendents. I sent an electronic letter of informed consent
prior to sending the survey link. The informed consent letter included information about the
purpose of the study and directions about how to access the online survey via Qualtrics. The
informed consent letter also explained the procedures that are in place to maintain anonymity.
Participants were informed that continued participation in the survey could be halted at any time
and they were able to participate in as much or as little as they wish. The survey was distributed
in June of 2015 and the window for the survey closed four weeks later in July 2015.
40
The survey asked school safety specialists in Indiana’s public schools and public charter
schools about their perceptions of school safety. More specifically, the level to which their
school corporation participates with fidelity in matters related to policy, what communication
systems the schools employ, what level of law enforcement is present, and what safety hardware
is present. Participants had four weeks to participate in the survey which I anticipated would take
10 to 15 minutes to complete. I sent weekly reminder emails after the original invitation to
complete it with the hope that the reminder may help get the data collected within my selfimposed four-week window. During this survey window, a participation request was sent out and
upon the closing of the participation window, access to the survey was unavailable and all survey
responses were statistically analyzed.
Data Analysis
To carry out the analysis of the data collected in this survey, I used bivariate analysis and
descriptive review. Bivariate analysis is the simultaneous analysis of two variables (attributes). It
explores the relationship between two variables, whether there exists an association and the
strength of this association, or whether there are differences between two variables and the
significance of these differences. Descriptive review is the observation of a subject, or in this
case, data, without influencing the subject. The analysis allows for a familiarization of the data
by analyzing frequency distributions and tendencies (Long, Convey, & Chwalek, 1985).
The first research question asked, “What is the demographic profile of the person who
holds the position of school safety specialists in Indiana public school districts and the person
responsible for school safety in Indiana public charter schools?” Each survey respondent
answered questions that inquired as to their gender and to what other, if any, position they hold
41
within the school district. In larger school districts, it is reasonable to believe that a person’s sole
responsibility may be school safety. In smaller districts, the responsibility may be one of several
duties that person undertakes. The responses to this question were analyzed through descriptive
review.
The second research question asked, “How do school safety specialists in Indiana public
school districts and those responsible for school safety in Indiana public charter schools perceive
the effectiveness of local policies and state statute related to school safety?” There are 20
questions that helped frame what policies are enacted in a given respondent’s district and what
the respondent’s perception of the effectiveness of those measures is. The questions were
analyzed by bivariate analysis as determined how different demographics affect perceptions of
effectiveness.
The third research question asked, “What do Indiana school safety specialists perceive to
be effective law enforcement and communication practices with regard to ensuring school
safety?” There are a total of 14 yes/no/don’t know questions regarding what practices of law
enforcement and emergency communication are currently enacted in Indiana. There were
opportunities for respondents to rate the effectiveness of those practices. The questions were
analyzed by bivariate analysis as I looked at how different demographics affect perceptions of
effectiveness.
The fourth research question asked, “Which safety products or devices do school safety
specialists perceive to be the most effective?” There are seven yes/no/don’t know questions that
allowed me to use descriptive review to investigate what safety products are currently being used
in Indiana schools and what the perception is of their effectiveness according to the respondents.
42
The fifth research question asked, “How does the size or location of a district affect its
level of school safety measures?” A bivariate analysis allowed me to compare the prominence of
school safety measures that have been implemented via yes/no/don’t know responses compared
to the size of the school district the respondents chose on the demographic questions.
The sixth research question asked, “What differences are present between school safety
measures in traditional public schools versus public charter schools?” A bivariate analysis again
allowed me to compare the results of the two different school settings.
The seventh and final research question asked, “What policies, practices, and procedures
have Indiana public and public charter schools implemented to promote safety since the Sandy
Hook tragedy in December 2012?” A descriptive review of the two final questions on the survey
allowed for discovering this information and what, if any, limitations may have restricted
implementation of any change.
Limitations of the Study
As with any survey, there were concerns about the response rate. Timing of the survey
release and occupational turnover within my intended response group were of particular concern
to me. It was my intention to provide the survey to each of the 289 public school districts and 67
public charter schools in the state of Indiana and I believe that was accomplished via the
superintendent listserv and direct emails. From there, I depended on the superintendents to pass it
on to the correct person, the superintendent to forward the link from the Indiana Association of
Public School Superintendents, or the district school safety specialist to be on the Indiana
Department of Education School Safety Specialists Learning Connection listserv which provided
43
access to the survey. Although the Indiana Department of Education has a list of those who hold
the positions, that list is not made available to researchers or vendors.
Additional challenges to completing the survey may have resulted from position turnover
and/or the shifting of responsibilities as restructuring occurred. This may have limited who
received or who had access to the survey. Those who chose to view the survey may have also
ultimately declined to respond for any reason. It is possible, although unintended, that
respondents may have found questions overly suggestive. A focus on certain actions meant or
legally prescribed to improve school safety may have potentially intimidated a respondent.
Respondents may also have been concerned with perceived harsh language such as “as required
by statute, code, or law.” This language, combined with a concern for lack of confidentiality may
have deterred some respondents from fully participating if the respondent thought their answers
may expose inefficiencies in the way school safety is approached in that particular district or
school. Participants may have also been deterred by the amount of time necessary to complete
the survey.
Lastly, representation of school districts is a limitation to be considered. Based on data
provided by the Indiana Department of Education, there are 36 public metropolitan school
districts, 159 public rural school district, 61 suburban school districts, and 33 town school
districts. Respondents to the survey were 10 of the 36 metropolitan/urban districts (27.7%), 69 of
the 159 rural districts (43.7%), 17 of the 61 suburban districts (27.8%), and 16 of the 33 town
districts (48.5%). Although there is a healthy representation from each category, school district
personnel may have misrepresented their district due to the lack of a formal definition of each
category.
44
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND FINDINGS
As stated in Chapter 1, this study examined the policies, practices, and procedures of
Indiana school safety strategies, and the perceptions of school safety issues by those responsible
for implementation of the strategies in Indiana’s public and public charter schools. This chapter
is organized by presenting the research questions and subsequent findings which include tables
and summaries. The research questions are as follows:
1. What is the demographic profile of the person who holds the position of school
safety specialist in Indiana public school districts and the person responsible for
school safety in Indiana public charter schools?
2. How do school safety specialists in Indiana public school districts and those
responsible for school safety in Indiana public charter schools perceive the
effectiveness of local policies and state statute related to school safety?
3. What do school safety specialists in Indiana public school districts and those
responsible for school safety in Indiana public charter schools perceive to be
effective law enforcement and communication practices with regard to ensuring
school safety?
4. Which safety products or devices do school safety specialists perceive to be most
effective?
5. How does the size or location of a district affect its level of school safety
measures?
6. What differences are present between school safety measures in traditional public
schools versus public charter schools?
7. What policies, practices, and procedures have Indiana public and public charter
schools implemented to promote safety since the Sandy Hook tragedy in
December 2012?
For analyses in this chapter, responses from those who identified themselves as the
person responsible for safety in their traditional public district or their public charter schools
were used for the “use” column while responses from all survey respondents are shared for
perception of effectiveness. Every survey respondent did not answer each question which caused
response totals to fluctuate from 179 to 183. Based on the procedures used to invite potential
respondents to participate, I can assume that each respondent was qualified to give their
45
perception on the effectiveness of a certain policy, practice, procedure, or piece of equipment.
These perceptions of qualified respondents were something I deemed valuable and chose to
include. However, it should be noted that in Appendix B (prevalence of each policy, practice,
and procedure in public vs. charter schools), Appendix C (prevalence of each policy, practice,
and procedure sorted by school location), and Appendix D (prevalence of each policy, practice,
and procedure sorted by school/district enrollment size), only the responses of those respondents
who identified themselves as the specialist or person responsible for making decisions regarding
safety for their district or public charter school were included. I made this decision in an effort
have the most accurate analysis regarding what is currently happening in schools based on the
school public/charter status, location, and size. Multiple responses from the same school or
school district could have potentially altered the data within those various subgroups by allowing
data for a single district or school to be repeated or counted multiple times.
In an effort to provide this survey to all members of the intended audience, the link for
this survey was sent to the Indiana Department of Education’s Indiana School Safety Specialist
Academy listserv, the Indiana Association of Public School Superintendents via their listserv,
and directly to the identified principal/director/leader of public charter schools in the state of
Indiana via the information available on the Indiana Department of Education website and on the
websites of the public charter schools. It is reasonable to believe that through these avenues, the
link reached a representative of each of Indiana’s 289 public school districts and corporations
and a total of 67 public charter schools, with an overall total of 34.8% responding.
46
1. What is the demographic profile of the person who holds the position of school
safety specialist in Indiana public school districts and the person responsible for
school safety in Indiana public charter schools?
Figure 4.1
Sex of person responsible for school safety in Indiana public school districts and
Indiana public charter schools.
Sex of Person Responsible for School Safety
15%
Male
Female
85%
Note. n=123
Of the 123 respondents who identified themselves as the person responsible for school
safety in Indiana public school districts and Indiana’s public charter schools, 14.6% (18)
identified themselves as female and 85.4% (105) identified themselves as male.
47
Figure 4.2
Position of the person responsible for school safety in Indiana public school districts
and Indiana public charter schools.
Position of person responsible for school
safety
Superintendent
15%
5%
4%
2%
17%
Assistant Superintendent
Building Level Administrator
16%
Teacher
School Safety Specialist
School Resource Officer
41%
Other
Note. n=121
Of the 121 respondents, 41.3% (50) identified themselves as a building level
administration, 17.4% (21) identified themselves as superintendent, 15.7% (19) identified
themselves as assistant superintendent, 14.9% (18) identified their position as one not listed, 5%
(6) identified themselves as the School Resource Officer, 4.1% (5) identified themselves as
School Safety Specialist (or like title), and 1.7% (2) identified themselves as a teacher.
Information regarding the location and enrollment of the respondent’s public school district or
public charter school is discussed in depth later in this chapter on pages 52-59 and in Appendices
C and D.
48
2. How do school safety specialists in Indiana public school districts and those
responsible for school safety in Indiana public charter schools perceive the
effectiveness of local policies and state statute related to school safety?
School Safety Plans
Of those responsible for safety at their Indiana traditional public school district or public
charter school, 96.8% (n=120) said that their schools/districts have a school safety plan for each
building that is annually reviewed. Of those plans, 83.8% (n=104) have photographs of the
building layouts, 35.4% (n=44) have photos of emergency shutdown devices for gas, water, and
ventilation, 89.5% (n=111) have specific information regarding students with specific special
needs, and 98.9% of these plans were locally developed. Based on the responses (Table 4.1),
building level administrators and district level administrators were the most likely to participate
in the plan’s development. In 80.6% (n=100) percent of the plans, local emergency responders
(i.e. police officers, firefighters, paramedics) participated. Students were also participants in
planning at a rate of 20.9% (n=26).
Table 4.1
Participants in the development of local school improvement plans
Position within
school/community
Districts in which a person
with the position from the
first column participated in
the development of the
safety plan
Percent of
schools/districts in which
a person with the position
participated
District level administrators
Building level administrators
Teachers
Non-Certified Staff
Parents
Students
First Responders
Local business owners
Community members
107
122
95
69
52
26
100
18
35
80.6%
98.3%
76.6%
55.6%
41.9%
20.9%
80.6%
14.5%
28.2%
49
Funding and Training
As resources and training continue to be sought after by schools and districts, it was
reported by respondents that 74% of responding districts/schools received funding from the 2014
Secured School Safety Grant Program Funding Opportunity offered by the Indiana Department
of Homeland Security. Funding, which is available to traditional public districts and to public
charter schools (but not private schools), from this grant could be used to pay half the salary for a
school resource officer (SRO) or funds could be used to conduct threat assessments.
Policy Issues
Respondents were asked if their district or public charter schools implemented particular
policies (see Table 4.2). Respondents were then asked whether they felt the policies were
effective. Single entry points for visitors were used by 98.3% (n=118) of districts and school
responding and 66.4% of total respondents found that to be a “very effective” policy. Volunteer
criminal history checks were used by 91.7% (n=110) of the respondents’ schools and 55.8%
found that to be a “very effective” tool. Only 5.8% (n=7) of schools responding have their
students wear uniforms and correspondingly, only 13.2% of respondents found student uniforms
to be a policy they would describe as “very effective.” The comprehensive results are as follows:
50
Table 4.2
Use of specific safety policies and practices by responding districts and schools and perceived
effectiveness of all respondents
A
Topic
B
Use
C
Not Effective
D
Effective
Random drug testing
of secondary
students
76
63.9%
18
12.9%
Random locker
searches
80
66.7%
Canine searches
Single entry point
for visitors
Staff ID Badges
Student uniforms
Volunteer criminal
history screening
16
11.5%
E
Somewhat
Effective
60
43.2%
F
Very
Effective
45
32.4%
13
9.5%
17
12.4%
57
41.6%
50
36.5%
106
88.3%
118
98.3%
4
2.7%
3
2.0%
11
7.4%
7
4.6%
63
42.3%
41
27.0%
71
47.7%
101
66.4%
86
71.7%
7
5.8%
110
91.7%
13
9.2%
45
42.5%
4
2.7%
24
16.9%
20
18.9%
7
4.8%
47
33.1%
27
25.5%
54
36.7%
58
40.8%
14
13.2%
82
55.8%
Gang management
41
17
31
38
34
plan
34.2%
14.2%
25.8%
31.7%
28.3%
Note. Column A, n=124, Columns B-E n=varies based on total respondents making it greater
than the total number of respondents in Column A. Not all respondents answered each question.
3. What do school safety specialists in Indiana public school districts and those
responsible for school safety in Indiana public charter schools perceive to be
effective law enforcement and communication practices with regard to ensuring
school safety?
Communication
Respondents were asked if their district or public charter schools implemented the
following methods of communication. Respondents were then asked whether they felt the
51
methods were effective (see Table 4.3). Mass communication systems are used by 95% (n=114)
of the respondents’ schools and 71.1% (n=108) find the systems to be “very effective.” Using the
systems for late start and early dismissal is carried out by 95% (n=113) of the respondent’s
schools and 73.7% (n=112) find it to be “very effective.” Only 55% (n=66) of respondents are in
a district which uses an anonymous schools safety hotline and only 26% (n=34) find it to be
“very effective” with 16% (n=21) of respondents reporting it is not effective. The comprehensive
results are as follows:
Table 4.3
Use of specific safety communication practices by responding districts and schools and
perceived effectiveness of all respondents
A
Topic
B
Use
D
Effective
114
95.0%
C
Not
Effective
1
.7%
3
2.0%
E
Somewhat
Effective
40
26.3%
F
Very
Effective
108
71.1%
Has a mass
communication
system
Uses system for
weather alerts
97
80.8%
3
2.1%
9
6.2%
39
26.7%
95
65.1%
Uses system for
nearby police
emergencies
83
69.2%
6
4.3%
19
13.5%
45
31.9%
71
50.4%
Uses system for late
113
start or early dismissal 95.0%
2
1.3%
4
2.6%
34
22.4%
112
73.7%
21
16.0%
26
19.8%
50
38.2%
34
26.0%
Has an anonymous
school safety hotline
66
55.0%
Uses social media to
79
12
26
47
53
communicate about
65.8%
8.7%
18.8%
34.1%
38.4%
dangers
Note. Column A, n=124, Columns B-E n=varies based on total respondents making it greater
than the total number of respondents in Column A. Not all respondents answered each question.
52
Law Enforcement
Respondents were asked if their district or public charter schools implemented the
following law enforcement practices. Respondents were then asked whether they felt the
practices were effective. The responses (see Table 4.4) show that 75.8% (n=91) of districts use
extra security at extra-curricular events and that 59.7% (83) find it “very effective.” Having law
enforcement during the day is also common as 58.3% (n=70) of districts say they have a school
resource officer (SRO). SRO’s were said to be very effective 57.8% of the time. Training is also
occurring as 72.5% (n=87) of districts responding say they have had an active shooter drill. The
comprehensive results are as follows:
53
Table 4.4
Use of specific law enforcement safety practices by responding districts and schools and
perceived effectiveness of all respondents
A
Topic
B
Use
C
Not Effective
D
Effective
19
18.1%
E
Somewhat
Effect
29
27.6%
F
Very
Effective
34
32.4%
Has exclusive police
force
17
14.2%
23
21.9%
Has at least one
armed officer
64
53.3%
14
11%
14
11%
26
20.5%
73
57.5%
Has unarmed officers
8
6.7%
70
58.3%
91
75.8%
28
29.8%
13
10.2%
7
5%
21
22.3%
10
7.8%
7
5%
24
25.5%
31
24.2%
42
30.2%
21
22.3%
74
57.8%
83
59.7%
Has conducted at
least one active
shooter drill
87
72.5%
13
9.5%
12
8.8%
48
35%
64
46.7%
Trains staff/students
on ALICE model
40
33.3%
24
20.5%
18
15.4%
45
38.5%
30
25.6%
Has an SRO
Has paid security at
extra- curricular
events
Conducts table top
72
11
24
52
42
activities
60.5%
8.5%
18.6%
40.3%
32.6%
Note. Column A, n=124, Columns B-E n=varies based on total respondents making it greater
than the total number of respondents in Column A. Not all respondents answered each question.
4. Which safety products or devices do school safety specialists perceive to be most
effective?
Security Hardware
Respondents were asked if their district or public charter schools used specific security
hardware (see Table 4.5). Respondents were then asked whether they felt the hardware was
effective. Interior security cameras are very common as 94.1% (n=112) of respondents use them
in their districts. Main entrance buzzer systems are used in 95.8% (n=114) of respondents’
54
schools and 93.2% (n=109) use exterior security cameras. Respondents say that main entrance
buzzer systems are the most effective of the hardware options provided as 62.4% (n=93) rate
them as “very effective.” Only 2.5% (n=3) of respondents have main entrance metal detectors in
their schools and only 10.5% (n=10) rate them as “very effective.” The comprehensive results
are as follows:
Table 4.5
Use of specific safety hardware by responding districts and schools and perceived effectiveness
of all respondents
A
Topic
B
Use
C
Not Effective
D
Effective
10
6.7%
E
Somewhat
Effect
54
36%
F
Very
Effective
83
55.3%
Interior Security
Camera
112
94.1%
3
2%
Exterior Security
Camera
109
93.2%
5
3.4%
11
7.4%
53
35.8%
79
53.4%
Main Entrance
Buzzer System
114
95.8%
3
2%
6
4%
47
31.5%
93
62.4%
Visitor ID
Management System
53
44.5%
15
12.3%
22
18%
35
28.7%
50
41%
Main Entrance Metal
Detectors
3
2.5%
32
33.7%
23
24.2%
30
31.6%
10
10.5%
Uses Hand-Held
Metal Detectors
14
12%
27
28.1%
28
29.2%
29
30.2%
12
12.5%
Front Entry Vehicle
27
30
24
32
20
Barriers
22.7%
28.3%
22.6%
30.2%
18.9%
Note. Column A, n=124, Columns B-E n=varies based on total respondents making it greater
than the total number of respondents in Column A. Not all respondents answered each question.
55
5. How does the size or location of a district affect its level of school safety measures?
Size
Figure 4.3
Enrollment of the District or Public Charter of the Respondent n=124
Enrollment of the District or School of the
Respondent
28
15
13
5
14
11
7
7
2
5
7
8
2
A cross tabulation of the survey results also allowed for a comparison of respondents
based on the size of the school or school district. Respondents categorized their district or public
charter school based on enrollment parameters set forth in the survey. There were a total of 13
possible size categories ranging in public charter schools and traditional public school districts
from 0-500 students to those traditional public districts over 10,000 students enrolled (see Figure
4.3). Specific results for school districts and schools based on their size as it relates to the topics
on the survey can be found in Appendix D.
One hundred twenty-two specialists responded to their districts attention to school safety
plans. Public charter schools or districts with enrollments of 751-1,000 students (n=7) and those
56
with an enrollment of 4,001-5,000 (n=2) reported 100% having photographs of the building
layouts within the plan. The two school districts at 4,001-5,000 both reported having photos of
emergency shutdowns in their plans. None of the seven public charter schools or traditional
public districts with 751-1,000 students reported having pictures of the emergency shutdowns in
their plans. Six enrollment categories, all with at least 2,001 students, showed 100% proficiency
in including evacuation information for specific students.
One hundred twenty specialists responded on their school or district’s policies and
practices regarding school safety. Eleven of the 13 enrollment categories reported that 100% of
their public charter schools or traditional public school districts have a single entry point for
visitors. Eight of 13 groups reported 100% of them use canines in searches at least once a year.
Two groups of traditional public schools, those with enrollments of 5,001-6,500 (n=5) and those
with 6,501-7,500 (n=2), reported 100% use the following: random locker searchers, canine
searches, single entry points for visitors, staff ID badges, and volunteer criminal history
screening.
One hundred twenty specialists responded on their school or district’s safety and security
communication efforts. All but six of the schools or districts responded that they have a mass
communication system in place for students and families. And all but six responded saying they
use a communication system for late/delayed start and early dismissal. Safe school hotlines were
the rarest communication technique used by responding schools. No school or district category
with an enrollment of 1,500 or less had any greater than 50% of its respondents having an
anonymous safe schools hotline to report concerns.
One hundred twenty specialists responded on their school or district’s law enforcement
realities. The three largest size categories, districts with 6,501 students or more, all reported that
57
100% of the respondents, total n=16, have at least one armed officer on site, have an SRO, and
pay for additional security at extra-curricular events. No group trains staff and students on
ALICE at more than 54.5%. The smallest enrollment group, 0-500 students, is also the least
likely to have an armed officer, 13.3% n=2, and has the lowest percentage, 46.6%, of having
conducted an active shooter drill.
One hundred twenty specialists responded on safety and security hardware in their
traditional public school districts or public charter schools. Only six respondents cited not having
an interior security camera. Four of those six respondents are at public charter schools or
traditional public school districts with 500 or less students. The seven largest enrollment
categories, those with 2,501 students or more, were all 100% using interior security cameras,
exterior security cameras, and main entrance buzzer systems. Only three respondents, one each at
public charter schools or traditional public districts with enrollments of 0-500, 1,501-2,000, and
2,501-3,000, cited having main entrance permanent metal detectors.
The final section of the survey asked questions about changes in safety and security
policies, practices, or procedures since the Sandy Hook shooting in December of 2012 and what
obstacles were encountered. A total of 119 traditional public school districts and public charter
schools responded. The two largest enrollment categories combined added SROs at 50%, n=7,
and buzzer/secured entry systems at 85.7%, n=12. Since Sandy Hook, security cameras were
added second most frequently. The rate was 100%, n=4 in schools or districts with 501-750, and
n=2 in district 4,001-5,000. Twenty percent, n=3, cited no changes in public charter schools or
traditional public districts with 500 or less students.
Financial limitations were the top obstacle to change. One hundred percent cited this in
schools or districts with an enrollment 501-750, n=4 and enrollment group 4,001-5,000, n=2.
58
Financial limitations were cited in each group with a minimum of 76.9%, although the
enrollment group with 6,501-7,500, n=2, did not cite financial limitations as an obstacle.
School Location
Figure 4.4
Location of the District or Public Charter of the Respondent n=121
Location of the District or School of
Respondent
73
16
Rural
Town
19
Suburban
15
Urban
1
MSD
A cross tabulation of the survey results also allowed for a comparison of respondents
based on the location of the school. Respondents self-identified their district or public charter
school as rural, town, suburban, urban, or MSD (Metropolitan School District). Specific results
for school districts and schools based on their location as it relates to the topics on the survey can
be found in Appendix C.
One hundred twenty-one specialists responded to their districts attention to school safety
plans. Rural schools reported that 90.4% (n=66) have photographs of the building layouts in their
59
district plans. Yet only 38.4% (n=28) have photographs of emergency shutoffs in the buildings.
In town schools 75% (n=12) have the building photographs in their plans and 75% also have
specific formal reunification plans after an evacuation. One hundred percent of plans in town
districts have a plan to evacuate students with specific needs. Out of 19 suburban school district
specialist responses, 94.7% (n=18) have specific student evacuation plans while only 31.6%
(n=6) have photographs of emergency shutdown devices. Twelve urban district specialists
responded. One hundred percent (n=12) have specific student evacuation information in their
plans. Again, photographs of emergency shutdown devices were present in only 33.3% (n=4) of
the plans.
One hundred twenty specialists responded to their district’s policy practices. Of the 72
rural school district specialists who responded, 97.2% (n=70) have single entry points for visitors
to enter schools. Other popular policy practices at rural schools were volunteer criminal history
screening at 91.6% (n=66) and canine searches which occur at 90.2% (n=65) of the responding
districts. Students wear uniforms at only 2.7% (n=2) of rural districts. In the town school
districts, all 16 have single entry points for visitors, and 93.7% (n=15) have volunteer criminal
history screening and use canine searches. No town schools reported to have their students wear
uniforms. In the 19 suburban schools, all of the use a single entry point for visitors and 94.7%
(n=18) do criminal history screenings for volunteers. One suburban school has student uniforms.
Out of 12 urban district responses, all 12 have a single entry point for visitors, while only 25%
(n=3) randomly drug test secondary students. The one MSD school district specialist who
responded, cited their district searches lockers, has canine searches, has a single visitor entry
point, has their staff wear ID badges, and conducts criminal history checks on volunteers, but
60
does not randomly drug test students, make them wear uniforms, or have a gang management
plan.
One hundred twenty specialists responded to their district’s safety and security
communications capabilities. The 72 rural school districts reported that 97.2% (n=70) have a
mass communication system. This high percentage was mimicked by 87.5% (n=14) of town
schools, 94.7% (n=18) of suburban schools, 91.6% (n=11) or urban schools, and the one MSD
school also report to having a mass communication system. Using this system for alerts
regarding late/delayed school starts and early dismissal was the most common use of the system
as it was confirmed by 94.4% (n=68) of rural districts, 87.5% (n=14) of town school districts, all
19 suburban school districts, 91.6% (n=11) of urban schools districts, and the one MSD district.
One hundred twenty specialists and public charter school leaders responded to their
district’s law enforcement realities. All school locations reported a high percentage of schools or
school districts that pay for additional security at extra-curricular activities. Rural schools
reported this trend at 72.2% (n=52), town school districts at 81.2% (n=13), suburban schools at
84.2% (n=16), urban at 75% (n=9), and MSD’s one respondent confirmed their participation in
this practice. Rural and town schools and districts showed a high likelihood of having conducted
an active shooter drill 73.6% (n=53) and 87.5% (n=14), respectively, while suburban, 84.2%
(n=16) and urban schools 66.6% (n=8) were highly likely to have a school resource officer
(SRO). Only eight of the 120 respondents have an unarmed officer in their buildings, while 43%
(n=31) rural schools, 68.7% (n=11) of town schools, 78.9% (n=15), 50% (n=6), and the one
MSD school district reported having at least one armed officer in at least one of their schools.
One hundred twenty specialists responded to questions regarding their district’s safety
and security hardware. Security surveillance cameras and front entry buzzer systems were
61
reported to be the most common pieces of hardware that the respondent’s schools used in efforts
to maintain safety and security. Interior security cameras were cited as being used by 93%
(n=67) of rural schools, 100% (n=16) of town schools, 84.2% (n=16), 100% of urban schools
(n=12), and the one MSD respondent. Exterior security cameras had similarly high numbers.
Main entry buzzer systems were also cited as being commonly used as 94.4% (n=68) of rural
school districts, 93.7% (n=15) of town school districts, 100% (n=19) suburban school districts,
91.6% (n=11) of urban school districts, and the one MSD school confirmed their presence.
The final section of the survey asked questions about changes in safety and security
policies, practices, or procedures since the Sandy Hook shooting in December of 2012 and what
obstacles were encountered. A total of 120 traditional public school districts and public charter
schools responded. Rural schools and districts were most likely to have added security cameras
as cited by 56.9% (n=41) of respondents. Town schools and districts were most likely to add
buzzer/secured entry systems at 62.5 % with n=10. Suburban schools and districts also added
buzzer/secured entry systems at 63.1% with n=12. Urban schools added security cameras at the
highest rate with 58.3% and n=7. Urban schools, at 41.6% (n=5) added SROs at the highest rate.
The MSD district who responded added the buzzer/secured entry system and increased staff
training. No changes at all occurred at 13 of the 120 schools and districts who responded.
Financial obligations were seen as the top obstacle to change when attempting to
implement safety and security measures. This was cited as the case at 81.9% (n=59) of rural
schools and districts, 81.2% (n=13) at town schools and districts, 78.9% (n=15) at suburban
schools and districts, 75% (n=9) of urban schools and districts, and at the one MSD school.
Eighteen respondents cited no obstacles to implementing change.
62
6. What differences are present between school safety measures in traditional public
schools versus public charter schools?
Figure 4.5
Type of district or school of the respondent n=124
District/School Description of Respondent
9%
Traditional Public District
Public Charter School
91%
A cross tabulation of the survey results allowed for a comparison of respondents
identified as specialists from traditional public schools and respondents from public charter
schools. Data from each area of the survey was run to compare results between traditional public
and public charter schools. Specific results for traditional public schools compared to public
charter schools as it relates to the topics on the survey can be found in Appendix B.
With regard to school safety plans, public schools and public charter schools do have
photographs of the school layout within the plan (85% to 72.7%), do have photographs of
emergency shutdown devices (36.3% to 27.3%), and having specific information regarding the
evacuation of students with special or medical needs (90.3% to 81.8%), while public charter
63
schools were more likely to have information (90.9% to 76.8%) regarding a formal reunification
plan for families.
With regard to policy issues, 110 respondents identified themselves as the specialist or
decision maker at a public school district. Nine respondents identifying as a public charter school
specialist responded to this set of questions on the survey. For the public school districts, the
safety and security policy issues most common were a single entry point at schools for visitors
(n=109 or 99%), volunteer criminal history screening (n=103 or 93.6%), and canine searches (n102 or 92.7%). Only five districts responding have students wear uniforms and only 37
respondents work at a district with a gang management plan.
The most common public charter school policy responses amongst respondents were also
single entry point for visitors (n=9 at 100%) and volunteer criminal history screening (n=7 or
77.7%). Only one public charter respondent said that their school conducts random drug tests of
students and only two public charter schools require their students to wear uniforms.
With regard to safety communication procedures, 111 respondents identified themselves
as the specialist or decision maker at a traditional public school district. Nine respondents
identifying as a public charter school specialist responded to this set of questions regarding
safety communication on the survey. For the public school districts, 106, or 95.4%, have a mass
communication system and use the system for late/delayed start or early dismissal. Only 64, or
57.6%, have an anonymous school safety hotline.
The public charter school communication procedure most common was the use of a mass
communication system (n=8). Only two public charter schools reported having an anonymous
school safety hotline.
64
With regard to law enforcement, 111 respondents identified themselves as the specialist
or decision maker at a traditional public school district. Nine respondents identifying as a public
charter school specialist respondent to this set of survey questions. Eighty-eight traditional public
school respondents said their district pays for additional security at extra-curricular activities.
Eight-three respondents, or 74.7%, said their district has conducted at least one active shooter
drill. Only sixteen, or 14.4%, have an exclusive police force for the schools, yet 62 districts, or
55.8%, have an armed officer and 67, or 60.4%, traditional public districts have a school
resource officer (SRO). Seven, or 6.3%, have unarmed officers at their districts.
The most common public charter school law enforcement responses amongst respondents
were conducting active shooter drills (n=4). Two public charters have armed officers and three
have an SRO.
With regard to security hardware, 110 respondents identified themselves as the specialist
or decision maker at a traditional public school district. Nine respondents identifying as a public
charter school specialist respondent to this set of survey questions. Interior security cameras and
main entry buzzer systems were found in the districts of 107 respondents, or 97.2%. Exterior
security cameras were found in 103 districts, while only two districts, 1.8% of responders, cited
having main entrance metal detectors.
The most common public charter school security hardware responses amongst the nine
respondents were main entry buzzer systems (n=7) and exterior security cameras (n=6). Only
one public charter school who responded had main entrance metal detectors or hand-held metal
detectors.
The final section of the survey asked questions about changes in safety and security
policies, practices, or procedures since the Sandy Hook shooting in December of 2012 and what
65
obstacles were encountered. A total of 113 traditional public school district specialists, and 11
public charter school specialists responded to these questions.
For the traditional public schools, the most common changes post Sandy Hook were the
installation of buzzer/secured entry systems (82.3%), staff training (72.5%), and security
cameras (67.2%). Only one traditional public district who responded added an unarmed security
officer and main entry metal detectors. For public charter schools, the most common change was
staff training. This was cited by six schools. No public charter school added an armed or
unarmed security officer or metal detectors.
Lastly, with regard to obstacles to implementing changes with safety and security polices,
practices, and procedures, traditional public schools cited financial limitations in 80.5%, or 91
responses. Fifteen districts, or 13.2%, cited no obstacles to change. Public charter schools also
cited financial limitations in six responses.
7. What policies, practices, and procedures have Indiana public and public charter
schools implemented to promote safety since the Sandy Hook tragedy in December
2012?
Changes Post-Sandy Hook
Respondents were asked if their district or public charter schools implemented any
changes since the Sandy Hook tragedy in December of 2012. Respondents were permitted to
select all that may apply. Buzzer/Secured entry systems were added in 51.6% (n=64) of districts
post-Sandy Hook. Staff training occurred in 54% (n=67) of the districts and security cameras
were added in 48.8% (n=60) of districts. In 10.5% (n=13) of districts responding, no changes had
occurred between the time of the Sandy Hook School shooting which took place in December of
66
2012 and the response window of this survey in June/July 2015. The comprehensive results are
as follows:
Table 4.6
Changes implemented post-Sandy Hook by the districts/schools of the respondents who
identified themselves as the person responsible for school safety initiatives
A
Possible Changes Implemented
B
Number of districts/schools
making the specified change
School Resource Officer
39
C
Percent of district/schools
making the specified
change
31.5%
Armed Security Officer
16
12.9%
Unarmed Security Officer
1
.8%
Metal Detectors
1
.8%
Security Cameras
60
48.4%
Increased Exterior Lighting
23
18.5%
Buzzer/Secured Entry System
64
51.6%
Staff Training
67
54%
Other
20
16.1%
No changes have occurred since
13
10.5%
that time
Note. Column B, n=124. Respondents were able to select all choices that applied.
Obstacles to Implementation
Respondents were asked what obstacles their district or public charter schools
encountered when implementing policies related to safety. They were permitted to choose more
67
than one response. Financial limitations were selected by 78.2% (n=97) of all respondents. The
comprehensive results are as follows:
Table 4.7
Potential obstacles to changes in school safety policies, practices, or procedures as cited by the
respondents who identified themselves has the person responsible for school safety initiatives
A
Potential Obstacle
B
Number of districts/schools
identifying obstacle as
implementation to change
Financial Limitations
97
C
Percent of
districts/schools
identifying obstacle as
implementation to change
78.2%
Lack of qualified candidates to
fill positions
6
4.8%
Lack of training
11
8.9%
Lack of administrative/Board
support
4
3.2%
Lack of parental support
2
1.6%
Lack of community support
4
3.2%
Potential legal implications
9
7.3%
Other obstacles
11
8.9%
No obstacles
18
14.5%
Note. Column B, n=124. Respondents were able to select all choices that applied.
As noted earlier, complete data tables with all responses can be found in Appendices B-D
on pages 95-107 of this document. A summary and conclusions drawn from all data from the
survey reported in this chapter will be discussed in Chapter 5.
68
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS
This was a policy study designed to discover and analyze current policies, practices, and
procedures of Indiana public school districts and Indiana public charter schools. Those
responsible for safety in Indiana’s public school districts and public charter schools were
surveyed to discover realities taking place in schools around the state.
This chapter presents a summary of the study and important and interesting conclusions
drawn from the data presented in Chapter 4. This chapter provides a discussion of the
implications of the research for actions and recommendations for additional studies.
Discussion of Findings
School leaders have historically understood the importance of providing students and
staff with a safe environment to ensure that learning can effectively take place, and this need for
safety in schools remains a primary concern for all public school stakeholders (Trump, 1998).
School security is essential to learning, and students must be confident that they need not worry
about their physical safety while at school (Fritz & Radka, 2010).
The impetus for this study was the increased media coverage of violence in schools
(Muschert, 2002), but most notably the renewed discussion on school safety after the tragic
events at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut, in December of 2012. My
goal was to investigate the realities of what school safety policies, practices, and procedures were
in place in Indiana traditional public school districts and public charter schools. Quantitative
research methods were utilized to answer seven research questions posed by this study
69
Research Questions
In order to investigate this topic, I developed seven research questions. These questions
provided direction and structure for my literature review and data analysis. The research
questions are as follows:
1. What is the demographic profile of the person who holds the position of school
safety specialist in Indiana public school districts and the person responsible for
school safety in Indiana public charter schools?
2. How do school safety specialists in Indiana public school districts and those
responsible for school safety in Indiana public charter schools perceive the
effectiveness of local policies and state statutes related to school safety?
3. What do school safety specialists in Indiana public school districts and those
responsible for school safety in Indiana public charter schools perceive to be
effective law enforcement and communication practices with regard to ensuring
school safety?
4. Which safety products or devices do school safety specialists perceive to be most
effective?
5. How does the size or location of a district affect its level of school safety
measures?
6. What differences are present between school safety measures in traditional public
schools versus public charter schools?
7. What policies, practices, and procedures have Indiana public and public charter
schools implemented to promote safety since the Sandy Hook tragedy in
December 2012?
Summary of Methods
A survey hosted on Qualtrics was distributed to the superintendents of the 289 public
school districts in Indiana via the Indiana Association of Public School Superintendent listserv.
In addition, the survey was directly emailed to the contact person listed for each Indiana public
charter school on the Indiana Department of Education website as of June 2015 and to the 896
members of the Indiana School Safety Specialist Academy listserv who were members as of June
2015. Data were collected from each respondent and sorted by whether or not the respondent was
the person responsible for safety at the traditional public school district or at the public charter
70
school. Those answering affirmatively were the primary target respondent for this survey. The
data was also disaggregated by public/private school status, district/school location, and
district/school enrollment.
Survey results were collected from a total of 183 respondents. These results were sorted
by respondents who identified themselves as the person responsible for school safety in their
Indiana traditional public school district or their Indiana public charter school, and 124
respondents identified themselves in this targeted category. Of the 124, 113 identified themselves
as coming from traditional public school districts while 11 identified themselves as
representatives of Indiana public charter schools. Respondents also identified their gender,
position within the school district or charter school, the location of the school district or charter
school, and the enrollment of the school district or charter school. Based on data provided by the
Indiana Department of Education, there are 36 public metropolitan school districts, 159 public
rural school district, 61 suburban school districts, and 33 town school districts. Respondents to
the survey were 10 of the 36 metropolitan/urban districts (27.7%), 69 of the 159 rural districts
(43.7%), 17 of the 61 suburban districts (27.8%), and 16 of the 33 town districts (48.5%).
Responses to the survey were divided into six main sections regarding school safety: policy
issues, communication plans, law enforcement, security hardware, changes post-Sandy Hook,
and obstacles to change.
Analysis of Research Questions
The following analysis for each of the seven research questions is based on the data
collected and linked with relevant literature for this study.
71
1. What is the demographic profile of the person who holds the position of school
safety specialist in Indiana public school districts and the person responsible for
school safety in Indiana public charter schools?
The large majority of the 123 respondents who answered this survey question and
identified themselves as a target respondent, 85.4% (n=105) were men. Perhaps more interesting,
and somewhat alarming, was the fact that 41.3% (n=50) of the 121 respondents who answered
this question said they were a building level administrator-a position already designated with so
many responsibilities. A total of 33.1% (n=40) identified themselves as central office
administrators (superintendent or assistant superintendent), but only 9.1% (n=11) identified his
or her position as School Resource Officer or School Safety Specialist (or a similar title).
School officials have a duty to provide for the safety of students and school personnel in
all of the school district’s schools (McKinney, 2012). This indicates that the responsibility of
school safety is still falling on those who otherwise already have extensive duties. Building
principals who are responsible for district safety initiatives, especially in smaller districts, are
likely out of their own building more frequently. When they are needed for safety consultation at
other buildings within the district, additional challenges may be present. In addition to being
away from their primary responsibilities, lack of familiarity with other buildings may be an issue.
It is likely that the principal responsible for safety may not be as knowledgeable with the
logistics or the community at other buildings. The hope would be that eventually, districts and
schools would be able to allow safety duties to be the large majority of one’s responsibilities
rather than just one of many responsibilities.
2. How do school safety specialists in Indiana public school districts and those
responsible for school safety in Indiana public charter schools perceive the
effectiveness of local policies and state statute related to school safety?
72
Of the 124 target respondents, 50.8% (n=63) and 45.2% (n=52), believed their schools or
school were safe or mostly safe, respectively. They also believed that students, 71.5% (n=88), as
well as parents and community stakeholders, 59.7% (n=74), feel that their schools are safe.
Respondents said that 96.8% (n=120) of their schools have safety plans. Even though it is
somewhat alarming that 3.2% do not, it is reassuring that these plans, crafted in large part by
committees with building level administrators, central office administrators, emergency
responders, and teachers, exist and are reviewed at least annually in accordance with state
statute.
Overall, schools appear to be using single entry points for visitors as a policy/logistical
tactic to improve safety measures as 98.3% (n=118) of respondents said that practice was used in
their district. Interestingly, considering the cost, $400 to $600 in some instances for a single day
of dog searching (Fuentes, 2011), canine searches were used in 88.3% (n=106) of the
respondents schools. Random student drug testing programs are prevalent in Indiana schools
with 63.9% (n=76) of respondents reporting the district uses random student drug testing.
Further, random locker searches, 66.7% (n=80), surrounded in generally supportive case law, are
also popular practices. Not surprisingly, only 5.8% of respondents (n=7) said their schools
required students to wear uniforms, and 42.5% (n=45) of total respondents to this question said
uniforms are “not effective” as a safety policy.
3. What do school safety specialists in Indiana public school districts and those
responsible for school safety in Indiana public charter schools perceive to be
effective law enforcement and communication practices with regard to ensuring
school safety?
Mass communication systems are used in Indiana schools. A total of 114 respondents,
(95%), say their district or school uses the communication systems for some purpose. Not
surprisingly, 95% (n=113), use the systems for reporting late/delayed start or early dismissal to
73
parents and families. According to Finley (2015), many school districts instituted anonymous tip
lines after the 1999 Columbine massacre because authorities believe they have definitely helped
in efforts to provide a safe school environment. Only 55% (n=66) of Indiana public schools and
districts are currently using the anonymous tip lines.
Because of the issues surrounding guns in school settings, the use and presence of law
enforcement in public schools is generally a debated topic. According to the 2013 PDK/Gallup
Poll on Public Education, Americans do not want guns in schools, yet the results of my study
show that at 53.3% (n=64), a majority of respondents’ districts, have an armed officer in at least
one school. This shows Indiana to be ahead of national results from a study where during the
2009-2010 school year, 43% of public schools reported the presence of one or more security staff
at their school at least once a week during the school year (Robers, Kemp, Rathbun, & Morgan,
2014). At 58.3% (n=70) of responding schools and districts, SROs are a popular law
enforcement option for public schools likely because an SRO develops trust with students and
often leads to students being more willing and likely to report violations of the law in their
personal lives and in school settings (Marazono, 2001). In general, the SRO program is popular
because it provides school administrators with additional resources to promote a safe learning
environment (Weiler & Cray, 2011). Personnel aside, it is encouraging that training is occurring
as 72.5% (n=87) of the respondents said their school or district has conducted an active shooter
drill and 60.5% (n=72) have conducted tabletop training exercises.
4. Which safety products or devices do school safety specialists perceive to be most
effective?
Although they can be cost prohibitive, security surveillance cameras (94.1% n=112) and
main entrance buzzer systems (95.8% n=114) are the most popular pieces of hardware among
respondents’ schools and districts. Some argue that cameras are ineffective for preventing crimes
74
or misbehavior because schools rarely have a person to monitor the cameras in real time (Green,
Travis, & Downs, 1999). However, the assistance video surveillance footage can provide in
investigating a crime or behavior issues is often invaluable. The perceived value of buzzer
systems is demonstrated by the fact that the expenditure of almost $600,000 was not enough to
prevent Orlando, Florida schools from installing main entrance buzzer systems as they continue
their efforts to be “relentless about knowing who is going in and out of our schools” (Martin,
2015).
Metal detectors, either main entry (2.5% n=3) or handheld (12% n=14), on the other
hand, are not popular options with schools as a safety hardware measure. Even still, the
Cleveland (OH) Public School System spent an estimated $3.7 million to incorporate walkthrough metal detectors and x-ray scanners in in each of 111 public schools, while Garcia (2003),
found that only 32% of school safety administrators thought metal detectors were effective in
minimizing or preventing crime which speaks to why only 2.5% of respondents to my survey use
them in their district or public charter school.
5. How does the size or location of a district affect its level of school safety measures?
There are several factors that must be considered with the discussion of the location of a
district and how it affects the safety measures of a district or school. Five location choices were
provided to respondents: rural, town, suburban, urban, and MSD (Metropolitan School District).
Of the 124 respondents who identified themselves as the person responsible for safety initiatives
in their traditional public school or public charter school, 121 answered the question about the
location of the school district. Of the 121, 60.3% (n=73) identified their district or school as
rural, 15.7% (n=19) said their district was suburban, 13.2% (n=16) identified their district or
school as town, 9.9% (n=12) identified their district or school as urban, and .8% (n=1) identified
their district as MSD. Taking that into consideration, there were many instances where rural
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schools had the largest n, and also many instances where the MSD district that responded
implemented a policy, practice, or procedure at 100% (n=1). Keeping those factors in mind, the
MSD district implemented 26 of the 33 total safety policies, practices, or procedures listed on the
survey. From there, the rural schools had the highest n in 29 of the 33 total safety policies,
practices, and procedures listed on the survey.
Rural schools were the least likely at 86.3% (n=63) to have specific student evacuation
plans in place for students with disabilities or special needs. Arguably, this may be because of
the lesser volume of students with special needs rural schools may have. Surprisingly, two rural
schools require students to wear uniforms, but not surprisingly, rural schools at 23.6% (n=17)
were least likely to have a gang management plan. Rural schools were one of the least likely at
69.4% (n=50) to have staff wear ID badges. The assumption that it is more likely that staff are
better known and recognized in a smaller school seems to be justification. Town schools had the
highest percentage of schools to randomly drug test secondary students (75% n=12), conduct
canine searches (93.7% n=15), and require staff to wear ID badges (81.2% n=13). Suburban
schools conducted volunteer criminal history checks (94.7% n=18) at a higher level than any
other school location, perhaps due to intact family structure in suburban areas. Urban schools,
not surprisingly, are most likely (33.3% n=4) to require their students to wear uniforms and were
the most likely to have gang management plans (66.6% n=8).
Districts and schools in all locations utilize mass communication systems with little
discernible difference in how they are used. Suburban schools are most likely to use their mass
communication system for weather alerts (84.2% n=16) among others, while unsurprisingly,
urban schools are most likely to use their systems to alert staff, parents, and students of nearby
police emergencies (91.6% n=11).
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Suburban schools have the highest percentages of responding districts or schools in
several of the law enforcement categories. They were most likely to have an exclusive district
police force (26.3% n=5), most likely to have at least one armed officer (78.9% n=15), most
likely to have an SRO (84.2% n=16), and most likely to have additional paid security at extracurricular events (84.2% n=16). Each of these safety initiatives cost money, and it could easily
be argued that suburban schools are more likely to have financial support for their district or
school safety plans. Districts or schools identifying as town were the most likely to support
training. Respondents said 87.5% (n=14) of them have conducted at least one active
shooter/killer drill and 75% (n=12) have conducted tabletop training activities.
Districts and schools in all locations had a similar amount of their schools with security
cameras and all locations are using main entry buzzer systems at a high level. Suburban locations
are most likely (52.6% n=10) to have a visitor ID management system and surprisingly, two rural
respondents identified as having main entrance metal detectors while five responded saying they
use hand held metal detectors in their district.
When discussing changes post-Sandy Hook, urban schools had the highest percentage of
respondents acknowledging enhanced security measures. It is unknown whether Sandy Hook
was the main or only cause, but urban schools added SRO’s, armed security officers, security
cameras, and trained their staff at rates higher than any other location. Frustratingly, town
schools at 18.7% (n=3) were the most likely to not have made any changes since Sandy Hook.
Across the board, all locations cited financial limitations as the primary obstacle to change.
With regard to enrollment size, there were 13 possible choices for survey respondents to
select. The smallest category was for districts or schools with 500 or less students. The largest
category was for districts with 10,001 or more students. Twenty-six respondents said they were
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the person responsible for school safety initiatives in traditional public school districts or public
charter schools with a total enrollment of 1,001-1,500 students, which was the largest group of
respondents. The smallest groups of respondents were two respondents each at districts or
schools with enrollments of 4,001-5,000 and 6,501-7,500 students, respectively. The group of
respondents with 1,001-1,500 had the most affirmative responses to 28 of the 33 total safety
policies, practices, and procedures on the survey.
Overall, districts or schools with enrollments of 4,001-5,000 students are more likely to
have security-related policies or items in place. Those “items” range from specific student
evacuation information and staff ID badges, to security at events and security cameras. This is
highly likely due to the finances available to these larger districts and schools based on per pupil
expenditure in the state. Conversely, and for the exact same reason (per pupil expenditure), the
smaller the district or school, the more likely they were to not have or be able to do something
related to school safety and security. Districts and schools with smaller enrollments were much
less likely to have extra security, surveillance cameras, and even school resource officers.
However, when considering changes and obstacles to those changes, the most growth in number
of districts or schools came from those in the middle of this survey distribution. Districts and
schools in the five categories with enrollments ranging from 1,000 to 4,000 showed the highest
numbers and some of the highest percentages making school safety enhancements. Districts and
schools of all sizes, save those with an enrollment of 6,501-7,500, cited financial limitations as
the greatest obstacle to change.
6. What differences are present between school safety measures in traditional public
schools versus public charter schools?
Contact persons for 67 Indiana public charter schools were directly emailed the link to
the survey based on contact information listed on the Indiana Department of Education’s
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directory of public charter schools. A total of 19 respondents, 11 of them identified as the person
responsible for safety within their school, replied to the survey. Not all 19 responded to each
question on the survey. The possible reason for this is the lack of knowledge regarding questions
asked.
When comparing traditional public schools with public charter schools, public schools
are generally implementing policies, practices, and procedures related to school safety at a
greater rate. The survey results for this study are consistent with national trends as the safety
practices of charter schools in Arizona, for example, were questioned after the Sandy Hook
shootings. Just as in Indiana, the schools in the public charter school network in Arizona are not
required to have an emergency response plan. Arizona police shared specific concerns such as
locations of public charter schools in places such as strip malls or stand-along facilities that are
less likely to have a designated perimeter, the lack of strict sign-in/sign-out procedures, and the
absence of security and surveillance cameras as major issues (Fehr-Snyder, 2013).
However, according to the National Charter School Research Project (NCSRP), many
parents say they chose charter schools because of the climate they offer. The report found that
when surveyed, one in seven charter school teachers reported being threatened by a student while
one in five public school teachers reported a threat by a student. The report goes on to say that
while public schools (violence prevention programs) and charter schools (uniforms and dress
codes) have different priorities, they do not do anything vastly different. Charter schools being
smaller in most situations could be a benefit (Lake, Hill, & Christensen, 2007).
According to survey respondents who identified themselves as the person responsible for
safety at their traditional public school district or their public charter school, the only policy and
practice areas where public charter schools have implemented measures at a higher percentage
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than traditional public are student uniforms (22.2% vs. 4.5%) and gang management plans
(44.4% n=4 vs. 33.6% n=37). Interestingly, those two areas were ranked by all respondents as
the least effective measures for safety policies. Public charters also had a 100% implementation
rate (n=9) while the traditional public districts had an implementation rate of 99% (n=109) in the
area of single entry points for visitors.
The comparison of traditional public school districts with public charter schools with
regard to communication was reasonably even. Traditional public districts were implementing
communication strategies related to safety at a slightly higher rate. Only 22.2% (n=2) of public
charters had an anonymous safety hotline.
In 2014, the Justice Department said 43% of public schools nationwide reported the
presence of one or more security guards, security personnel, school resource officers (SROs) or
sworn law enforcement officers during the 2009-10 school year (Toppo, 2015). Respondents
indicated that public charter schools have lagged behind their traditional public schools peers
with regard to law enforcement implementation. According to the respondents who are
responsible for the safety measures in public districts and public charters, traditional public
schools are substantially more likely to have an armed officer (55.8% (n=62) vs. 22.2% (n=2)),
have a school resource officer (60.3% (n=67) vs. 33.3% (n=3)) and have additional security at
extra-curricular events (79.2% (n=88) vs. 33.3% (n=3)) than their public charter school peers.
Traditional public school districts are also much more likely to conduct trainings. Traditional
public schools conduct active shooter drills (74.7% vs. 44.4%), train students and staff in the
ALICE defense model (34.2% vs. 22.2%), and conduct tabletop trainings (62.1% vs. 33.3%) at a
noticeably higher percentage.
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Within the topic of security hardware, traditional public school districts are outfitting
their schools at a much greater pace than the public charter schools. Over 93% of traditional
public districts are equipping their schools with interior and exterior surveillance cameras and
main entry buzzer systems. Public charter specialists who responded did report that seven of nine
schools (77.7%) had a main entry buzzer system.
Financial limitations were cited as the greatest obstacle to implementing change with
safety and security policies, practices, and procedures as it was reported to be main challenge by
80.5% (n=91) of traditional public school districts and 54.5% (n=6) of public charter schools.
However, changes to safety policies, practices, and procedures have been reported by each
group. Traditional public districts made sizable changes in spite of the financial limitations. The
most common changes were 82.3% (n=93) installed buzzer/secured entry systems, 72.5% (n=82)
had targeted staff training, 67.2% (n=76) installed surveillance cameras, and 49.5% (n=56)
added school resource officers. The public charter schools also made changes with 54.5% (n=6)
prioritizing staff training, while 36.3% (n=4) added surveillance cameras, exterior lighting, and
the buzzer/secured entry systems. It is rather evident through the survey results that the financial
limitations placed a burden on public charter schools to be able to make changes at the same rate
as the traditional public school districts. Proactive safety or security measures taken by schools,
regardless of the priority, can likely only help to keep students safe.
7. What policies, practices, and procedures have Indiana public and public charter
schools implemented to promote safety since the Sandy Hook tragedy in December
2012?
Indiana’s traditional public school districts and public charter schools need funding to
help implement school safety and security measures. A total of 78.2% (n=97) of school safety
decision makers cited financial limitations as the main obstacle to implementing safety changes.
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While Indiana Governor Mike Pence added $3.5 million in October of 2015 to the school safety
initiatives budget in the state, the funds were still less than what was needed and less than what
was once available for safety. These funding cuts for school safety initiatives over time have
been harshly criticized by school safety expert Ken Trump who called cuts of federal school
safety grants “reckless, negligent, and inexcusable” (Trump, 2011). Indiana’s public school
districts and public charter schools have stressed budgets, and sadly, school safety initiatives can
become secondary matters of concern when prioritizing expenditures.
Obstacles aside, schools and school districts in Indiana have made changes to their safety
policies, practices, and procedures in the time since the shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary
School in Newtown, Connecticut in December of 2012. An emphasis on staff training at 54%
(n=67), perhaps the most cost efficient of all potential changes, followed by the installation of
buzzer/secured entry systems (51.6% n=64) have been the most popular post-Sandy Hook
changes. And likely thanks to a state grant program in Indiana, School Resource Officers
(SROs), have been added at the districts or schools of 31.5% (n=39) of the respondents. Most
alarmingly, however, is that respondents from a total of 13 traditional public school districts or
public charter schools, 10.5%, reported no changes have occurred since the Sandy Hook
shootings. I can only hope this lack of action is because extensive safety measures were already
in place, but that is most likely, and sadly, not the case.
Findings Related to the Literature
The overarching theme is that there is currently no system to track incidents of school
violence. There are no standardized methods of collecting and reporting school-based crime
incidents nationally, and most data come from anonymous self-report surveys that do not allow
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tracking specific respondents over time (Mayer & Furlong, 2010). Without this information, the
general public can only make assumptions about the safety of schools based on what is portrayed
in the media and anecdotal data from their own experiences or those of their family, friends, and
acquaintances. The disparity between what the media portrays and the realities of school
homicides is alarming and surprising. Safe Havens International’s Michael Dorn says that
statistical realities may not calm the fear of anxious parents after tragic events that are widely
covered by national media (Blad, 2013). We live in a world where shock media, violence, and
promoting misfortunes of others gains viewers or website clicks, therefore, those stories get
reported. Even one death at school is too many, but the reality is a school-based homicide at a
school would be mathematically likely to occur approximately once every 6,000 years (Mayer &
Furlong, 2010) and the average number of homicides per year at school, 21, although still
painful, accounts for less than 1% of the average homicides of children ages 5-18 in the United
States (Modzeleski et al., 2008). You would never imagine that to be the case by following the
news in today’s world.
How will school safety evolve? According to the 2013 PDK/Gallup Poll on Public
Education, Americans do not want guns in schools. By a margin of almost two-to-one,
Americans support increasing mental health services rather than hiring more security guards to
promote school safety. Most Americans reject arming teachers and administrators, but they do
support screening procedures for visitors to elementary, middle, and high schools, similar to
those used in government buildings. Limiting violence and weapons in schools, providing mental
health services, and supporting opportunities for all stakeholders in an increasingly diverse
school system environment will continue to be the challenges facing legislators, law enforcement
personnel, the medical community, and school leaders as we look ahead into the future.
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Conclusions
Schools are generally safe. That in no way infers crimes do not occur, bullying does not
take place, and occasional violent events do not happen. It means schools are a safe place for a
large majority of children. Traditional public school districts are largely implementing safety
policies, practices, and procedures at a higher rate than public charter schools. Single building
entry points, mass communication systems, additional paid security at extra-curricular events,
interior surveillance cameras, and buzzer entry systems are the most popular and used strategies
to support school safety. Districts and schools focused on the installation of buzzer entry
systems, interior surveillance cameras, and training for faculty and staff as the major changes
post-Sandy Hook. Lastly, 80.5% of respondents cited financial limitations as the top obstacle to
implementing safety measures in their schools.
Of the 124 respondents who identified themselves as the person responsible for safety in
their traditional public district or public charter school, 50.8% (n=63) and 45.2% (n=52),
believed their schools or school were safe or mostly safe, respectively. We can only hope their
beliefs hold true.
Implications for Practice
This information may be interesting to educators, policy makers, and law enforcement
from the state level to the building level as it is a snapshot of what Indiana traditional public
school districts and public charter schools are doing to promote safety in our schools. Although
the survey respondents maintained anonymity, the results of this survey should allow those
responsible for school safety initiatives to compare their practices with what those of other
schools of the same type, location, and enrollment are doing. My hope is the information derived
from this survey will invite conversation on how to improve school safety practices. Part of this
84
conversation may include higher education and teacher and administrator preparation programs
as the issue of school safety should be a greater part of the curriculum for both programs. Those
responsible for training must face the reality that equipping teachers and leaders with the
knowledge and strategies to keep their students and schools safe is now as much a part of the
preparation conversation as curriculum and assessment. As those conversations start, the Indiana
School Safety Specialist Academy should be involved as a valuable resource for those interested
in, or responsible for, school safety.
Indiana School Safety Specialists Academy
The Indiana School Safety Specialist Academy (ISSSA) is an exemplary resource for
educators or law enforcement responsible for school safety in Indiana and is a model when
considering state-sponsored school safety organizations around the nation. At least eight other
states over the last three years have contacted the ISSSA to learn more about the program.
However, most all cited funding as an obstacle to being able to implement a similar model
(Woodward, 2016). The ISSSA is specifically valuable with regard to interpreting policy and
statute, supporting training initiatives, and obtaining information for new potential practices. The
ISSSA began in 1999 with a graduating class of 237 and since then, has certified 3,578 adults as
School Safety Specialists in the state of Indiana (Stewart, 2015). Of the 124 target respondents to
the survey, 94.2% (n=113) confirmed that someone from their district or charter school has
completed the Indiana School Safety Specialists Academy certification. School Safety Expert
and Safe Havens International President Michael Dorn said, “The Indiana School Safety
Specialists Academy goes to considerable lengths to select excellent presenters not only
85
nationally, but within the state of Indiana. It was truly a pleasure to once again have the
opportunity to present for this impressive program” (Dorn, 2013).
Future Research
There will never be a lack of interest in school safety because, sadly, it seems as if there
is a report of a violent event within a school with every passing week. Surveys on the policies,
practices, and procedures of safety measures in our schools should be an annual occurrence.
Efforts should be made to see what schools across the state, and across the nation, are doing to
ensure the safety of our faculty, staff, visitors, and our most valuable asset and our future, our
children. Every child should be safe while at school and we should constantly be investigating
how we can make safe schools for all students a true reality.
86
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strengthen a school safety program. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.
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-eliminates-emergency-planning-grants-for-local-schools/
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Woodward, D. (2016, January 20). [E-mail interview].
91
APPENDIX A
Survey Instrument
Directions:
Please respond to the following:
1. With regard to school safety:
I am the School Safety Specialist and am primarily responsible for school safety initiatives
within my school district/corporation
I am not the School Safety Specialist and am not the person primarily responsible for school
safety initiatives within my school district/corporation
2. Our school district would best be described as:
Public School
Public Charter School
3. Our school district would best be described as:
Rural
Town
Suburban
Urban
MSD
92
4. The total number of K-12 students in our district or charter school is:
0-500
2,001-2,500
6,501-7,500
501-750
2,501-3,000
7,501-10,000
751-1,000
3,001-4,000
10,001 or more
1,001-1,500
4,001-5,000
1,501-2,000
5,001-6,500
5. The person who holds the state mandated position of school safety specialist in our
district or the person responsible for school safety in our charter school is:
-Female
-Male
6. The person who holds the state mandated position of school safety specialist in our
district holds the position of:
-Superintendent
-Assistant Superintendent
-Building Level Administrator
-Teacher
-School Safety Specialist (or like title) is the only position this person holds
-School Resource Officer
-Other _____________________
93
Please respond to each statement below using the following scale:
1-No/Strongly Disagree/Not Effective
2-Somewhat/Disagree/Somewhat Effective
3-Mostly/Agree/Mostly Effective
4-Yes/Strongly Agree/Very Effective
Perception of Climate
7
Because of the policies, practices, and procedures in place, I believe the schools in
our district are safe.
1. I believe students that attend our schools feel safe.
2. I believe the parents whose children attend our schools feel that our schools are
safe.
3. I believe that key stakeholders (community member, business owner, visitors) feel
that our schools are safe.
Yes/No/Do Not Know
4. Our district conducts surveys (of students, parents, or key stakeholders) on the
perception of the safety of our schools at least once per school year.
5. Our district has had a violent event (shooting, stabbing, altercation resulting in
death or severe injury, etc.) in the last year.
Policy
Yes/No/Do Not Know
6. We have a school safety plan specific to each of the buildings in our district that is
reviewed annually.
7. Our School Safety Plans include (Yes/No/Do Not Know):



Photographs of the buildings or the building layout.
Photographs of emergency shutdown devices (gas, water, ventilation)
Specific information about evacuating students with special needs based on
their disability (i.e. chair lift, wheel chairs, medically fragile, etc.).
94

Formal reunification plans for families to meet their children in the case of an
evacuation.
8. The school safety plans in our buildings were created locally by district personnel
and local stakeholders
9. The following participate in the creation and review of our school safety plans
(Yes/No/Do Not Know):









District Central Administrators
Building Level Administrators
Teachers
Non-Certified Staff
Parents
Students
First responders
Local Business Owners
Community members otherwise not affiliated with the school
Yes/No/Do Not Know
10. Our district has a County Safety Committee as discussed in I.C.5-2-10.1.
11. Our district applied for and received funds for the 2014 Secured School Safety
Grant Program Funding Opportunity offered by the Indiana Department of
Homeland Security.
12. At least one school in our district has faced a severe weather, ecological,
chemical, or other event that caused an off-site evacuation of students and staff.
13. Students and teachers in our district’s schools know our formal off-campus
evacuation sites.
21. Practices
Our District:
Yes or No or
Don Not Know
21-1
Has at least one staff member
that is an Indiana Department
of Education (IDOE) School
Safety Specialist having
attended and completed the
IDOE School Safety Specialist
95
Level of Effectiveness:
1
2
3
4
Academy.
21-2
Has conducted threat
assessments for each of our
buildings.
21-3
Randomly drug tests students
in the secondary schools.
21-4
Conducts random locker
searches at least once during
the school year with students
present.
21-5
Uses dogs in searches.
21-6
Requests that all visitors enter
through a single entry point at
schools in our district.
21-7
Requires faculty and staff
members wear ID badges to
identify themselves at all
times.
21-8
Requires students in our
district to wear uniforms on a
daily basis.
21-9
Has a volunteer screening
program that filters candidates
with criminal histories.
21-10
Has a gang management plan
that prevents gang activity in
our schools
96
22. Communication
Our District:
Yes or No or
Do Not Know
Level of Effectiveness:
1
2
3
4
Yes or No or
Do Not Know
Level of Effectiveness:
1
2
3
4
22-1
Has a mass communication
system (i.e. School
Messenger, etc.)
22-2
Uses a mass communication
system for weather alerts.
22-3
Uses a mass communication
system for nearby police
emergencies (i.e. bank
robberies, escaped prison
inmates, etc.).
22-4
Uses a mass communication
system for late start/early
release.
22-5
Has an anonymous hotline for
people to report security
dangers.
22-6
Uses social media (Facebook,
Twitter, Instagram, etc.) to
communicate with students
and staff about impending
danger.
23. Law Enforcement
Our District:
23-1
Has an exclusive police force
23-2
Has at least one armed officer
in at least one building
97
23-3
Has unarmed officers in our
buildings
23-4
Has a School Resource Officer
(SRO)
23-5
Has paid security at extracurricular events
23-6
Conducted at least one active
shooter drill
23-7
Trains students and staff the
ALICE (Alert, Lockdown,
Inform, Counter, Evacuate)
Model.
23-8
Conducts table top safety
exercises
24. Security Hardware
Schools in Our District:
Yes or No or
Do Not Know
24-1
Have at least one interior
security camera.
24-2
Have at least one exterior
security camera.
24-3
Have an access control
(buzzer) system at the main
entrance.
24-4
Use a visitor management
system (i.e. Raptor, Hall Pass
ID, School Gate Guardian)
24-5
Have metal detectors at our
entry points;
24-6
98
Level of Effectiveness:
1
2
3
4
Use hand-held metal detectors
on students.
24-7
Have effective vehicle barriers
at the front of our schools to
prevent cars from being able
to drive through the front
entry.
25. What changes, if any, has your district or charter school implemented since the Sandy Hook
tragedy in December of 2012? Please select all that apply.










School Resource Officer
Armed Security
Unarmed Security
Metal Detectors
Security Cameras
Increased Outside Lighting
Buzzer/Secured Entry System
Staff Training
Other
No changes have occurred since that time
26. What obstacles have you encountered in the implementation of school safety policies,
practices, and procedures in your district or charter school? Please select all that apply.









Financial Limitations
Lack of adequate candidates to fill positions
Lack of available training
Lack of administrative/board support
Lack of parent support
Lack of public support
Legal implications
Other
We have not encountered obstacles in the implementation of our school safety measures
99
APPENDIX B
Data tables related to Traditional Public School Districts/Corporations compared to Public
Charter Schools as responded to by those that identified themselves as the person responsible for
school safety for the district/corporation or at the public charter school.
School Safety Plans
Topic
Photographs of Building
Layout
Photographs of Emergency
Shutdowns
Specific Student Evacuation
Information
Formal Reunification Plans
Traditional Public (113)
96
85%
41
36.3%
102
90.3%
96
76.8%
Public Charter (11)
8
72.7%
3
27.3
9
81.8%
10
90.9%
Policy Issues
Topic
Random drug testing of
secondary students
Random locker searches
Canine searches
Single entry point for visitors
Staff ID Badges
Student uniforms
Volunteer criminal history
screening
Gang management plan
Traditional Public (110)
75
68.1%
77
70%
102
92.7%
109
99%
82
74.5%
5
4.5%
103
93.6%
37
33.6%
Public Charter (9)
1
11.1%
3
33.3%
4
44.4%
9
100%
4
44.4%
2
22.2%
7
77.7%
4
44.4%
Communication
Topic
Has a mass communication
system
Traditional Public (111)
106
95.4%
100
Public Charter (9)
8
88.8%
Uses system for weather
alerts
Uses system for nearby police
emergencies
Uses system for late start or
early dismissal
Has an anonymous school
safety hotline
Uses social medial to
communicate about dangers
90
81%
77
69.3%
106
95.4%
64
57.6%
72
64.8%
7
77.7%
6
66.6%
7
77.7%
2
22.2%
7
77.7%
Law Enforcement
Topic
District/school has exclusive
police force
District/school has at least
one armed officer
District/school has unarmed
officers
District/school has an SRO
District/school has paid
security at extra- curricular
events
District/school has conducted
at least one active shooter
drill
District/school trains
staff/students on ALICE
model
District/school conducts table
top activities
Traditional Public (111)
16
14.4%
62
55.8%
7
6.3%
67
60.3%
88
79.2%
Public Charter (9)
1
11.1%
2
22.2%
1
11.1%
3
33.3%
3
33.3%
83
74.7%
4
44.4%
38
34.2%
2
22.2%
69
62.1%
3
33.3%
Security Hardware
Topic
Interior Security Camera
Exterior Security Camera
Main Entrance Buzzer
System
Visitor ID Management
Traditional Public (110)
107
97.2%
103
93.6%
107
97.2%
49
101
Public Charter (9)
5
55.5%
6
66.6%
7
77.7%
4
System
Main Entrance Metal
Detectors
Uses Hand-held Metal
Detectors
Front Entry Vehicle Barriers
44.5%
2
1.8%
13
11.8%
25
22.7%
44.4%
1
11.1%
1
11.1%
2
22.2%
Changes Post-Sandy Hook
Topic
School Resource Officer
Armed Security Officer
Unarmed Security Officer
Metal Detectors
Security Cameras
Increased Exterior Lighting
Buzzer/Secured Entry System
Staff Training
Other
No changes have occurred
since that time
Traditional Public
(113 responses)
56
49.5%
23
20.3%
1
.8%
1
.8%
76
67.2%
30
26.5%
93
82.3%
82
72.5%
23
20.3%
17
15%
Public Charter
(11 responses)
1
9%
0
0
0
4
36.3%
4
36.3%
4
36.3%
6
54.5%
2
18.1%
2
18.1%
Obstacles to Change
Topic
Financial Limitations
Lack of qualified candidates
Traditional Public
(113 responses)
91
80.5%
6
102
Public Charter
(11 responses)
6
54.5%
0
to fill positions
Lack of training
5.3%
10
8.8%
3
2.6%
2
1.7%
4
3.5%
9
7.9%
10
8.8%
15
13.2%
Lack of administrative
support
Lack of parental support
Lack of community support
Potential legal implications
Other obstacles
No obstacles
1
9%
1
9%
0
0
0
1
9%
3
27.2%
APPENDIX C
Data tables related to Location (Rural, Town, Suburban, Urban, MSD (Metropolitan School
District) of Traditional Public Districts and Public Charter Schools as responded to by those that
identified themselves as the person responsible for school safety for the district/corporation or at
the public charter school.
School Safety Plans
Topic
Rural (73)
Town (16)
Urban (12)
MSD (1)
12
75%
4
25%
Suburban
(19)
16
84.2%
6
31.6%
Photographs of
Building Layout
Photographs of
Emergency
Shutdowns
Specific Student
Evacuation
Information
Formal
Reunification Plans
66
90.4%
28
38.4%
6
50%
4
33.3%
1
100%
1
100%
63
86.3%
16
100%
18
94.7%
12
100%
1
100%
57
79.2%
12
75%
15
78.9%
11
91.6%
1
100%
Policy Issues
Topic
Rural (72)
Town (16)
Random drug
50
12
Suburban
(19)
11
103
Urban (12)
MSD (1)
3
0
testing of
secondary
students
Random
locker
searches
Canine
searches
Single entry
point for
visitors
Staff ID
Badges
Student
uniforms
Volunteer
criminal
history
screening
Gang
management
plan
69.4%
75%
57.8%
25%
47
65.2%
11
68.7%
14
73.6%
7
58.3%
1
100%
65
90.2%
70
97.2%
15
93.7%
16
100%
17
89.4%
19
100%
8
66.6%
12
100%
1
100%
1
100%
50
69.4%
2
2.7%
66
91.6%
13
81.2%
0
9
75%
4
33.3%
10
83.3%
1
100%
0
15
93.7%
13
68.4%
1
5.2%
18
94.7%
17
23.6%
6
37.5%
10
52.6%
8
66.6%
0
Urban (12)
MSD (1)
11
91.6%
1
100%
1
100%
Communication
Topic
Rural (72)
Town (16)
Has a mass
communication
system
Uses system
for weather
alerts
Uses system
for nearby
police
emergencies
Uses system
for late start or
early dismissal
Has an
anonymous
school safety
hotline
Uses social
70
97.2%
14
87.5%
Suburban
(19)
18
94.7%
60
83.3%
10
62.5%
16
84.2%
10
83.3%
1
100%
48
66.6%
11
68.7%
12
63.1%
11
91.6%
1
100%
68
94.4%
14
87.5%
19
100%
11
91.6%
1
100%
40
55.5%
10
62.5%
11
57.8%
4
33.3%
1
100%
48
10
11
9
1
104
medial to
communicate
about dangers
66.6%
62.5%
57.8%
75%
100%
Urban (12)
MSD (1)
2
16.6%
1
100%
Law Enforcement
Topic
Rural (72)
Town (16)
District/school
has exclusive
police force
District/school
has at least
one armed
officer
District/school
has unarmed
officers
District/school
has an SRO
District/school
has paid
security at
extracurricular
events
District/school
has conducted
at least one
active shooter
drill
District/school
trains
staff/students
on ALICE
model
District/school
conducts table
top activities
5
6.9%
4
25%
Suburban
(19)
5
26.3%
31
43%
11
68.7%
15
78.9%
6
50%
1
100%
6
8.3%
1
6.2%
0
1
8.3%
0
34
47.2%
52
72.2%
11
68.7%
13
81.2%
16
84.2%
16
84.2%
8
66.6%
9
75%
1
100%
1
100%
53
73.6%
14
87.5%
13
68.4%
6
50%
1
100%
26
36.1%
4
25%
4
21%
6
50%
0
38
52.7%
12
75%
14
73.6%
7
58.3%
1
100%
Security Hardware
Topic
Rural (72)
Town (16)
Suburban
105
Urban (12)
MSD (1)
Interior
Security
Camera
Exterior
Security
Camera
Main
Entrance
Buzzer
System
Visitor ID
Management
System
Main
Entrance
Metal
Detectors
Uses Handheld Metal
Detectors
Front Entry
Vehicle
Barriers
67
93%
16
100%
(19)
16
84.2%
65
90.2%
15
93.7%
16
84.2%
12
100%
1
100%
68
94.4%
15
93.7%
19
100%
11
91.6%
1
100%
31
43%
7
43.7%
10
52.6%
4
33.3%
1
100%
2
2.7%
1
6.2%
0
0
0
5
6.9%
4
25%
3
15.7%
2
16.6%
0
14
19.4%
2
12.5%
6
31.5%
4
33.3%
1
100%
Urban (12)
MSD (1)
5
41.6%
0
12
100%
1
100%
Changes Post-Sandy Hook
Topic
Rural (72)
Town (16)
School
Resource
Officer
Armed
Security
Officer
Unarmed
Security
Officer
Metal
Detectors
Security
Cameras
Increased
Exterior
Lighting
23
31.9%
5
31.2%
Suburban
(19)
6
37.5%
9
12.5%
1
6.2%
2
10.5%
4
33.3%
0
1
1.3%
0
0
0
0
0
1
6.2%
7
43.7%
2
12.5%
0
0
0
5
26.3%
3
15.7%
7
58.3%
2
16.6%
0
41
56.9%
16
22.2%
106
0
Buzzer/Secured
Entry System
Staff Training
Other
No changes
have occurred
since that time
35
48.6%
42
58.3%
13
18%
6
8.3%
10
62.5%
8
50%
3
18.7%
3
18.7%
12
63.1%
9
47.3%
2
10.5%
2
10.5%
6
50%
7
58.3%
3
25%
2
16.6%
1
100%
1
100%
1
100%
0
Suburban
(19)
15
78.9%
1
6.6%
Urban (12)
MSD (1)
9
75%
1
8.3%
1
100%
0
0
Obstacles to Change
Topic
Rural (72)
Town (16)
Financial
Limitations
Lack of
qualified
candidates to
fill positions
Lack of
training
Lack of
administrative
support
Lack of
parental
support
Lack of
community
support
Potential
legal
implications
Other
obstacles
No obstacles
59
81.9%
3
4.1%
13
81.2%
1
6.2%
8
11.1%
4
5.5%
2
12.5%
0
0
0
1
8.3%
0
1
1.3%
1
6.2%
0
0
0
2
2.7%
2
12.5%
0
0
0
6
8.3%
1
6.2%
1
6.6%
1
8.3%
0
8
11.1%
8
11.1%
1
6.2%
2
12.5%
1
6.6%
5
26.3%
1
8.3%
3
25%
0
107
0
0
APPENDIX D
Data tables related to Enrollment Size of Traditional Public Districts and Public Charter Schools
as responded to by those that identified themselves as the person responsible for school safety for
the district/corporation or at the public charter school.
A=0-500
E=1,501-2,000
I=4,001=5,000
B=501-750
F=2,001-2,500
J=5,001-6,500
C=751-1,000
G=2,501-3,000
K=6,501-7,500
D=1,001-1,500
H=3,001-4,000
L-7,501-10,000
M=10,001 or more
School Safety Plans
Topic
A-15
B5
C-7
D-26
E-13
F-14
G-7
H-11
I-2
J-5
K-2
L-7
M-8
Photographs
of Building
Layout
Photographs
of
Emergency
Shutdowns
Specific
Student
Evacuation
Information
Formal
13
86.7%
4
80
%
7
100%
24
85.7%
12
92.3%
(10/13)
71.4%
6
85.7%
8
72.7%
2
100%
4
80%
1
50%
6
85.7%
7
87.5%
8
53.3%
1
20
%
0
8
28.6%
7
53.8%
(4/13)
28.6%
2
28.6%
3
27.3%
2
100%
2
40%
1
50%
5
57.1%
2
25%
13
86.7%
4
80
%
5
71.4%
23
82.1%
12
92.3%
14
100%
6
85.7%
11
100%
2
100%
5
100%
2
100%
7
100%
7
87.5%
13
86.7%
2
40
%
5
71.4%
20
71.4%
11
84.6%
(12/13)
92.3%
7
100%
7
63.6%
2
100%
3
60%
2
100%
6
85.7%
6
75%
Reunification
Plans
Policy Issues
Topic
Random
drug testing
of
secondary
students
Random
A-15
B-4
C-7
D-27
E-13
F-13
G-7
H-11
I-2
J-5
K-2
L-7
M-7
3
20%
3
75%
4
57.1%
19
70.3%
10
76.9%
9
69.2%
6
85.7%
10
90.9%
2
100%
1
20%
2
100%
5
71.4%
2
28.5%
8
53.3%
1
25%
4
57.1%
16
59.2%
11
84.6%
8
61.5%
5
71.4
9
81.8%
1
50%
5
100%
2
100%
6
85.7
4
57.1%
108
locker
searches
Canine
searches
Single entry
point for
visitors
Staff ID
Badges
Student
uniforms
Volunteer
criminal
history
screening
Gang
management
plan
7
46.6%
4
100%
7
100%
24
88.8%
13
100%
12
92.3%
7
100%
10
90.9%
2
100%
5
100%
2
100%
7
100%
6
85.7%
15
100%
4
100%
7
100%
27
100%
13
100%
12
92.3%
7
100%
10
90.9%
2
100%
5
100%
2
100%
7
100%
7
100%
8
53.3%
1
25%
3
42.8%
21
77.7%
11
84.6%
9
69.2%
5
71.4%
6
54.5%
2
100%
5
100%
2
100%
6
85.7%
7
100%
2
13.3%
0%
1
14.2%
1
3.7%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
3
42.8%
12
80%
3
75%
7
100%
26
96.2%
12
92.3%
12
92.3%
7
100%
10
90.9%
1
50%
5
100%
2
100%
6
85.7%
7
100%
6
40%
0%
0%
8
29.6%
5
38.4%
4
30.7%
3
42.8%
3
27.2%
1
50%
3
60%
2
100%
3
42.8%
3
42.8%
Communication
A-15
Topic
13
Has a mass
86.6%
communication
system
12
Uses system
80%
for weather
alerts
10
Uses system
66.6%
for nearby
police
emergencies
12
Uses system
80%
for late start or
early dismissal
4
Has an
26.6%
anonymous
school safety
hotline
10
Uses social
66.6%
medial to
communicate
about dangers
B-4
C-7
D-27
E-13
F-13
G-7
H-11
I-2
J-5
K-2
L-7
M-7
4
100%
6
85.7%
27
100%
13
100%
13
100%
6
85.7%
10
90.9%
2
100%
5
100%
2
100%
7
100%
6
85.7%
1
25%
6
85.7%
23
85.1%
11
84.6%
12
92.3%
4
57.1%
9
81.8%
2
100%
4
80%
2
100%
7
100%
4
57.1%
1
25%
3
42.8%
18
66.6%
11
84.6%
11
84.6%
4
57.1%
7
63.6%
2
100%
3
60%
2
100%
5
71.4%
6
85.7%
4
100%
6
85.7%
27
100%
13
100%
12
100%
6
85.7%
10
90.9%
2
100%
5
100%
2
100%
7
100%
7
100%
2
50%
1
14.2%
13
48.1%
9
69.2%
7
53.8%
4
57.1%
8
72.7%
1
50%
4
80%
2
100%
5
71.4%
6
85.7%
1
25%
4
57.1%
18
66.6%
12
92.3%
7
53.8%
4
57.1%
6
54.5%
2
100%
3
60%
1
50%
5
71.4%
6
85.7%
109
Law Enforcement
Topic
A-15
B-4
C-7
D-27
E-13
F-13
G-7
H-11
I-2
J-5
K-2
L-7
M-7
District/school
has exclusive
police force
District/school
has at least
one armed
officer
District/school
has unarmed
officers
District/school
has an SRO
District/school
has paid
security at
extracurricular
events
District/school
has conducted
at least one
active shooter
drill
District/school
trains
staff/students
on ALICE
model
District/school
conducts table
top activities
2
13.3%
0%
1
14.2%
0%
2
15.3%
1
7.6%
1
14.2%
1
9%
1
50%
0%
0%
3
42.8%
5
71.4%
2
13.3%
1
25%
2
28.5%
8
29.6%
6
46.1%
10
76.9%
5
71.4%
9
81.8%
1
50%
4
80%
2
100%
7
100%
7
100%
1
6.6%
0%
1
14.2%
1
3.7%
0%
0%
0%
1
9%
1
50%
1
20%
1
50%
1
14.2%
0%
5
33.3%
1
25%
3
42.8%
10
37%
6
46.1%
9
69.2%
6
85.7%
10
90.9%
0%
4
80%
2
100%
7
100%
7
100%
6
40%
2
50%
3
42.8%
21
77.7%
13
100%
9
69.2%
5
71.4%
9
81.8%
2
100%
5
100%
2
100%
7
100%
7
100%
7
46.6%
3
75%
4
57.1%
20
74%
12
92.3%
9
69.2%
5
71.4%
7
63.6%
2
100%
4
80%
2
100%
6
85.7%
6
85.7%
5
33%
1
25%
2
28.5%
11
37%
5
38.4%
2
15.3%
3
42.8%
6
54.5%
0%
0%
1
50%
2
28.5%
2
28.5%
7
46.6%
1
25%
2
33.3%
16
59.2%
8
61.5%
10
76.9%
4
57.1%
5
45.4%
2
100%
4
80%
2
100%
5
71.4%
6
85.7%
Security Hardware
Topic
A-15
B-4
C-7
D-26
E-13
F-13
G-7
H-11
I-2
J-5
K-2
L-7
M-7
Interior
Security
Camera
Exterior
Security
Camera
Main
Entrance
Buzzer
System
Visitor ID
Manageme
nt System
Main
Entrance
11
73.3%
4
100
%
7
100%
26
100%
12
92.3
%
12
92.3
%
7
100%
10
90.9
%
2
100
%
5
100
%
2
100
%
7
100%
7
100%
12
80%
4
100
%
6
85.7
%
25
96.1
%
12
92.3
%
12
92.3
%
7
100%
10
90.9
%
2
100
%
5
100
%
2
100
%
7
100%
7
100%
13
86.6%
4
100
%
7
100%
25
96.1
%
11
84.6
%
13
100%
7
100%
11
100%
2
100
%
5
100
%
2
100
%
7
100%
7
100%
7
46.6%
%
2
50%
3
42.8
%
11
42.3
%
4
30.7
%
5
38.4
%
2
28.5
%
5
45.4
%
2
100
%
1
20%
1
50%
4
57.1
%
6
85.71
%
1
6.6%
0%
0%
0%
1
7.6%
0%
1
14.2
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
110
Metal
Detectors
Uses Handheld Metal
Detectors
Front Entry
Vehicle
Barriers
%
2
13.3%
0%
0%
3
11.5
%
1
7.6%
1
7.6%
1
14.2
%
2
18.1
%
1
50%
2
40%
0%
0%
1
14.2%
3
20%
2
50%
1
14.1
%
3
11.5
%
5
38.4
%
3
23%
1
14.2
%
2
18.1
%
0%
0%
1
50%
2
28.5
%
4
57.1%
Changes Post-Sandy Hook
Topic
A-15
B-4
C-7
D-26
E-13
F-13
G-7
H-11
I-2
J-5
K-2
L-7
M-7
School Resource
Officer
Armed Security
Officer
3
20%
1
25%
2
28.5%
8
30.7%
4
30.7%
3
23%
3
42.8%
5
45.4%
1
50%
2
40%
0
5
71.4%
2
28.5%
1
6.6%
0
1
14.2%
4
15.3%
0
3
23%
1
14.2%
1
9%
0
2
40%
0
1
14.2%
2
28.5%
Unarmed
Security Officer
Metal Detectors
0
1
25%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Security
Cameras
Increased
Exterior Lighting
Buzzer/Secured
Entry System
Staff Training
6
40%
4
100%
4
57.1%
13
50%
6
46.1%
8
61.5%
5
71.4%
1
9%
3
27.2%
2
100%
3
60%
1
50%
3
42.8%
2
28.5%
4
26.6%
2
50%
0
7
26.9%
3
23%
1
7.6%
2
28.5%
0
1
50%
0
1
50%
0
2
28.5%
6
40%
1
25%
4
57.1%
15
57.6%
5
38.4%
6
46.1%
4
57.1%
6
54.5%
1
50%
3
60%
1
50%
6
85.7%
6
85.7%
8
53.3%
3
20%
3
20%
4
100%
1
25%
0
3
42.8%
0
15
57.6%
6
23%
2
7.6%
7
53.8%
1
7.6%
1
7.6%
7
53.8%
1
7.6%
0
3
42.8%
2
28.5%
0
7
63.6%
2
18.1%
1
9%
1
50%
0
3
60%
0
1
50%
0
0
1
20%
1
50%
3
42.8%
1
14.2%
1
14.2%
5
71.4%
3
42.8%
1
14.2%
Other
No changes have
occurred since
that time
2
28.5%
Obstacles to Change
Topic
Financial
Limitations
A-15
B-4
C-7
D-26
E-13
F-13
G-7
H-11
I-2
J-5
K-2
L-7
M-7
10
66.6%
4
100%
6
85.7%
23
88.4%
10
76.9%
11
84.6%
6
85.7%
9
81.8%
2
100%
4
80%
0
6
85.7%
6
85.7%
Lack of
qualified
candidates to fill
positions
Lack of training
0
1
25%
0
2
7.6%
0
1
7.6%
0
0
0
1
20%
0
0
1
14.2%
1
6.6%
1
6.6%
0
0
1
7.6%
1
7.6%
3
27.2%
1
9%
0
0
0
0
1
7.6%
0
0
0
2
7.6%
1
3.8%
0
0
0
2
28.5%
0
1
14.2%
0
0
0
0
1
3.8%
0
0
1
14.2%
0
0
0
0
0
0
Lack of
administrative
support
Lack of parental
111
0
support
Lack of
community
support
Potential legal
implications
Other obstacles
No obstacles
0
1
25%
0
1
3.8%
0
0
1
14.2%
1
9%
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
25%
1
14.2%
1
3.8%
2
15.3%
1
7.6%
1
14.2%
0
0
0
0
0
2
28.5%
1
6.6%
1
25%
1
14.2%
2
7.6%
3
23%
1
7.6%
1
14.2%
0
0
0
0
0
1
14.2%
5
40%
0
1
14.2%
0
0
2
15.3%
1
14.2%
2
18.1%
0
1
20%
2
100%
2
28.5%
2
28.5%
112