Nazmul Sultan/Volume 1 (2013)
The Challenge of Multiculturalism: Beyond Liberalism and
Communitarianism
Nazmul Sultan
Department of Philosophy and Department of Political Science, Hunter College, CUNY
Abstract
Centralizing a relational understanding of socio-cultural groups, this paper argues that both liberalism and
communitarianism fail to address the profound questions that are being posed by multiculturalism. For
both liberalism and communitarianism, socio-cultural groups are something sociologically given, and it is
also presupposed that groups exist by virtue of their positive identity. The normative visions of liberalism
and communitarianism are conditioned by this rather essentialized idea of groups. If groups are not seen
as something self-constituted, but rather as entities that are formed through their relational differences and
contests, the limits of liberal and communitarian theories become quite apparent.The primacy of negative
group-rights in liberalism ends up reproducing the existing inequality among socio-cultural groups.
Communitarianism, on the other, positivizes each (cultural) group in a pre-political manner, while it is
also incapable of addressing the inter-group relationality among hegemonic and non-hegemonic groups.
Against the negative rights oriented liberalism, I argue that what is needed is the space of a positive
political participation that does not begin with an imposition of majoritarian or hegemonic culture. The
positive space of interaction should not however be reduced to the institutional level. The political
dialogue and contest among groups, whose only condition is the presupposition of equality of all
participants (including their cultures), should complement institutional assertion of equality.
Over the last couple of decades, normative political theory in the West has extensively grappled with the
challenge of multiculturalism. Owing to the growing dissolution of monocultural political imaginary and
the proliferation of immigrant groups in the western countries, the question of multiculturalism has been
catapulted to the forefront of political horizon. The effects of the multiculturalization of society have
resulted into two-folded political directions: on the one hand, the liberal discourses have extended their
otherwise individualistic mode of politics to allow group rights of marginal cultures, while the
conservative discourses, in various ways, have sought to assert the majoritarian culture as the norm to be
adapted by others. More constructive theoretical responses to multiculturalism have been dominated by
liberalism and communitarianism, while neoconservatism has led the reaction against multiculturalism. In
this paper, I will primarily engage with the former two responses, leaving aside the conservative argument
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against multiculturalism. Considering liberal and communitarian responses to the problematic of
multiculturalism, I will argue that both of these approaches provide inadequate solution to the profound
questions that are being posed by multicultural phenomenon. Problematizing liberal approach to
multiculturalism, I maintain that the strict individualistic liberalism that does not consider group identities
as a subject of concern (owing to the professed equality of individuals, regardless of their cultures) is
mistaken, precisely because oppression in contemporary capitalist societies takes place around group
identities. That is, groups are at the forefront of constitutively unjust social organization, and thus it
requires a more robust politicization than that is allowed by the framework of liberalism. Considering a
liberal conception of group rights, I argue that the policy of catering certain special rights to “vulnerable”
groups does not address the core problem of inter-group inequality. Although I endorse group-rights to an
extent, I think group-rights are not capable enough to address the political questions that multiculturalism
poses.1 Opposing communitarian ontologization of “community” as a pre-politically decided “essence”
of politics, I will argue that communitarianism is incapable of addressing inter-group inequality, an
inequality which marks the central crisis of contemporary multiculturalism. The question of socio-cultural
groups2 and their specific rights should address the relational inequality vis-a-vis hegemonic groups. This
position does not necessitate me to oppose-- rather it incentivizes -- the possibility of formulating a new
political culture in multicultural political communities. The liberal version of multiculturalism
perpetuates existing relations of inequality among groups by delimiting groups to their own spaces, thus
not positively enabling them to become empowered and equal. The crisis of liberal multiculturalism
requires it to be supplemented with a positive space of equal interaction among cultures. However, the
positive interaction should not be formulated according to a paternalistic positive relations, whereby
hegemonic groups accommodate minority groups with the aim of eventually assimilating them. To put it
briefly, criticizing both liberal and communitarian approaches to multiculturalism, I show that the
political response towards multiculturalism requires more than the policy of introducing group-rights; in
1
I agree with Habermas’ statement that “collective rights, hedging collective identities, may become dangerous or
even illegitimate as they violate basic individual rights.” See Jürgen Habermas, "Address: multiculturalism and the
liberal state,” Stanford Law Review 47 (1995): 850. Since I posit that group rights matter vis-a-vis hegemonic group,
it does not contradict my position when I maintain that an individual must have the legal right to disidentify with
groups, even as it is true that whether a person can disidentify with a social group does not primarily depend on her
will.
2
Throughout this paper, I will use the term “socio-cultural group” rather than “cultural group” (except in regard to
communitarianism) in order to denote the concept of group that multiculturalism brings to the fore. Although the
question of group is formulated according to their cultural differences, it is inherently a socio-cultural issue. In order
to stress this social nature of marginalization that cultural-minority group suffers, I choose the term “socio-cultural
group” over “cultural group.”
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so doing, I argue that the question of socio-cultural groups should be politicized in such a way as to
address the relational inequality3 between hegemonic and non-hegemonic groups.
Addressing the political problematic that has been foregrounded by the advent of multiculturalism,
Jurgen Habermas formulates the question posed by multiculturalism in this manner: “Should citizens'
identities as members of ethnic, cultural, or religious groups publicly matter, and if so, how can collective
identities make a difference within the frame of a constitutional democracy?”4 During the early period of
multicultural politics, as Kymlicka notes, liberalism was generally considered to be against
multiculturalism, while communitarianism appeared to accommodate it.5 This, however, has been a false
dichotomy, for it has become established that liberalism is capable in its own way to accommodate grouprights. Of course, the process in which liberalism justifies group rights as a necessary component for
enabling individual autonomy presupposes the primacy of individual rights over group rights. As argued
by some liberals, “the autonomy of individuals their ability to make good choices amongst good lives is
intimately tied up with access to their culture, with the prosperity and flourishing of their culture, and
with the respect accorded their culture by others.”6 In other words, group rights pertain to liberalism
insofar as it is necessary for enabling individual rights of those individuals belonging to minority groups.
Habermas thinks that liberalism, owing to the centrality of culture in the formation of individual, is
normatively necessitated to grant equal coexistence of all cultures. This position entails that the state not
only should remain neutral vis-a-vis both minority and majority cultures (in principle), but also should
intervene to safeguard a culture when it is violated or endangered (but, as Habermas specifies, liberalism
cannot save a culture in the way one saves an endangered species; only when a group of citizens deem a
culture worth safeguarding, liberalism can conceive the possibility of allowing special rights to that
group). This approach to multiculturalism, by and large, remains confined within the framework of
negative rights. The non-hegemonic minority cultures are allowed certain rights only insofar as it
considered to be essential to the reproduction of that culture. Even the policy of affirmative action -- the
policy by which liberal democratic states supposedly seek to address the problem of under-representation
of minority groups -- is only concerned with a balanced representation of the minority group in the
3
Later on the paper, I will show (following Iris Young) why groups are essentially relational entity, and thus the
inequality among them needs to be seen as a relational one i.e. the inequality does not primarily follow from the
internal constitution of groups. This idea of relational inequality presupposes the structural form of oppression,
while maintaining that structural oppression is most acutely manifested in the relational aspects of society.
4
Jürgen Habermas, "Address: multiculturalism and the liberal state," 849.
5
Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 326.
6
Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy 339. This is originally a point made by Joseph Raz that
Kymlicka paraphrases.
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institutions. As for some of the special rights given to the minority groups, these rights are justified on the
basis of their essential place within particular groups. Without those rights, it is argued, the specific
groups will be unable to reproduce themselves. In this conjuncture, the critics of group rights argue that
liberal policy of allowing special rights to certain groups ends up bolstering the practice of violating
individual rights within those groups. Susan Okin, for example, argues that liberal multiculturalism aids
misogyny of certain immigrant groups that are “culturally misogynist” i.e. women do not experience
equal rights within those groups.7 Such an approach to the problematic of multiculturalism fails to realize
the deeper root of the problem. To begin with, Okin’s argument reduces the complex formation of sociocultural groups to a defect particular to specific group. The cultural exclusion of the immigrants -perpetuated by liberal multiculturalism (which Okin fails to recognize) -- generates inwardness and
conservatism within immigrant community. Group rights merely seek to alleviate the problem that
resides in the structural formation of multicultural society. The argument that recognizes certain “minority
culture” as the force responsible for the violation of individual rights (within those groups) only manifests
its own failure to see structural roots of violence and inequality.
The centrality of negative group-rights in liberal approach to multiculturalism ends up
reproducing existing inequality among groups. The value of Slavoj Zizek’s critique of liberalism lies in
his discerning of this larger effect of liberal multiculturalism. Zizek attacks the negative separation of
each “cultural group” from another, as if liberal multiculturalism allows differences only insofar as they
do not challenge the existing state of unequal hierarchy of socio-cultural groups: “ [M]ulticultural
tolerance and respect of differences share with those who oppose immigration the need to keep others at a
proper distance. "The others are OK, I respect them," the liberals say, "but they must not intrude too much
on my own space. What is increasingly emerging as the central human right in late-capitalist societies is
the right not to be harassed, which is the right to be kept at a safe distance from others.”8 Extending
Zizek’s argument, one could say that liberalism’s preoccupation with walling out one cultural group from
another not only reproduces existing hierarchies, but also makes it difficult for minority communities to
go through a process of positive development. Likewise, the hegemonic culture evades encounter with
non-hegemonic ones, thus failing to reconsider its deeply embedded biases. The biases of hegemonic
culture do not remain confined within its private sphere, since its political principles and actions (which,
7
Susan Okin, Is multiculturalism bad for women? (Princeton University Press, 1999).
Slavoj Zizek, "Liberal multiculturalism masks an old barbarism with a human face," The Guardian, October 3
2010.
8
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in turn, largely influence political institutions and practices) are conditioned by putative “private” beliefs
and biases.
If liberal multiculturalism remains caught up within an ideal of negative group rights, then the
communitarian approaches positivize groups almost pre-politically.9 This ontologization of cultural
groups as only meaningful site and condition of political practice leaves communitarian approaches
unable to address contemporary crisis of multiculturalism. Since justice is imbricated with the “common
good” that every society internally possesses, the politics of communitarianism is primarily concerned
with safeguarding the autonomy of each community from externalities. In other words, communitarianism
argues in favor of positive rights of each groups. However, when it comes to inter-group relationship, it
defends positive dissociation between groups in order to safeguard their internally coherent positivity. In
addition, the claim that the state should advance “common good” poses a particular problem: if the state is
to advance “common good” of all cultures, what should be its own culture (since communitarianism does
not admit the possibility of a group-independent “political culture”)? If the state adopts a particular
common good, it necessarily ends up in a hierarchical order of state-sponsored and state-abandoned
cultures.
For both liberalism and communitarianism, socio-cultural groups are something sociologically
given, while it is also presupposed that groups exist by virtue of their positive identity. The normative
visions of liberalism and communitarianism are conditioned by this rather essentialized idea of social
groups. If, however, we see groups as relational and mutually reproducing entities, the political approach
to multiculturalism takes a different turn. The methodologically individualist notion of groups
conceptualizes socio-cultural groups either in terms of common attributes of a certain group of people (e.g.
an ethnic group) or in terms of the contracts by agreeing with which a certain group of people come to
form a social group. The social ontology that underpins methodologically individualist conception of
groups puts individuals as “ontologically prior to the social.”10. Iris Marion Young, one of the foremost
theorists of groups, contests individualist conception of socio-cultural groups, arguing that groups are
formative of the self, and one cannot understand it according to exit-entry policy. However, her account
9
“Pre-political” in the sense that communitarianism ascribes political meaningfulness to each cultural groups prior
to their any political contestations and decisions. Of course, communitarians argue that only through political
association “encumbered selves” can realize themselves. In the words of Michael Sandel: “It is only as participants
in political association that we can realize our nature and fulfill our highest ends.” Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's
discontent: America in search of a public philosophy (Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1998), 7. But, I would argue
that such a notion of politics is still “pre-political” in the sense that the possibility of meaningful political existence
is already embedded within community, and thus the location of the political is prior to any political contestation.
10
Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 45.
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of groups are significantly different from the communitarian approach, since she opposes the claim that
groups exist by themselves and are internally positive. Rather groups are essentially relational: “A
person’s group identities may be for the most part only a background or horizon to his or her life,
becoming salient only in specific interactive contexts.”11 Women, for example, are defined and oppressed
as women in relation to men.12 Group-based oppression is relational at its core, and hence politics of
equality must be concerned with the relational aspects of inter-group relations. Since the structural nature
of oppression is manifested in social relationality, the emphasis on the latter does not overlook the
structural basis of group-oppression. The implication of such an understanding of social group is rather
profound. Merely affirming the difference is not enough, for differences among groups are molded
precisely by the hierarchy of groups. While it is important that minority groups have rights that enable
them to exist, it must be complemented by the simultaneous politics that addresses the relational sphere
between two groups. Could that be done institutionally? I am not persuaded by the argument that
representative equality in institutions eventually results into an inclusive society, since the political
culture that institutions embody is not necessarily challenged by the physical inclusion of the nonhegemonic minority group members. Indeed, as Jurgen Habermas points out, it is essential to decouple
“the majority culture from the political culture with which it was originally fused, and in most instances
still is”13 The institutional articulation of inter-group equality is structurally incapable of overcoming such
an extra-institutional sources of inequality. The hierarchical political culture should thus be challenged
even at the extra-institutional level.
Insofar as the challenge of multiculturalism denotes not only an institutional problem but also a
problem embedded in social organization and in political culture, we need to look beyond rights-oriented
approach to the problematic of multiculturalism. The rights-oriented approaches merely concern
themselves with the juridical moment of politics, while leaving aside the cultural (and even social)
production of inequality. My discussion so far has asserted that neither the negative-rights oriented liberal
multiculturalism nor the ontologically positivized communitarianism provides adequate solution to the
problem. My disagreement with these approaches lies in the relationality-based understanding of sociocultural groups. Owing to a relational understanding of groups, I approach the problematic of
11
Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 46.
The term “relationality” of group-oppression does not denote that for every oppressed group there is a correlate
oppressing group, since oppression is structural, there need not always be a dyadic relationship between two groups.
Young rather means that “for every oppressed group there is a group that is privileged in relation to that group” (42)
-- this is a form of relationality that recognizes hierarchy of groups, while keeping in mind the structural nature of
exploitation.
13
Jürgen Habermas, "Address: multiculturalism and the liberal state," Stanford Law Review 47 (1995): 852.
12
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multiculturalism slightly, if not radically, differently from Jurgen Habermas, who is equally concerned
with moving beyond the constraints of liberal and communitarian approaches. I share Habermas’ position
that we neither should presuppose ethical unity of a preexisting community nor should we solely remain
concerned with formal institutions. The proceduralist approach of Habermas does nt depend on “a
collectively acting citizenry but on the institutionalization of the corresponding procedures and conditions
of communication.”14 Habermas’ Goldilocks solution retains the intersubjective kernel of
communitarianism, while negating its principle of ethical unity, and yet aspires to institutionalize the
“conditions of communication.” However, how the “conditions of communication” are to be decided?
Habermas himself acknowledges the necessity to extricate political culture from hegemonic culture. Prior
to the institutionalization of conditions of communication, it is necessary to lay the ground for
unconditional ground of communicative interaction (which either can be dialogue-oriented
communication or more agonistic contestation) among groups. The sole condition of inter-group
communication should be an unconditional presupposition of equality.15 That is necessary for
counteracting the relational inequality that lies among groups. The presupposition of equality need not
efface the differences -- only through political interaction and contest among groups can we democratize
the formation of the conditions of communication, not to mention institutions.16 The practice of equality
needs to encompass both institutional and extra-institutional moments of political life. But the terms of
political communication and contest should not solely be decided by institutions, since that would
foreclose the possibility of contesting over the conditions of communication. While political institutions
must reflect the outcomes of equality-presupposed interactions, the political culture of equality must not
be codified and rendered into a rigid set of practices if we want to keep it open to continual possibility of
equality in political interactions.
Centralizing a relational conceptulization of socio-cultural groups, I have argued that liberal and
communitarian approaches to multiculturalism fail to address the crux of the problem. The primacy of
negative group-rights in liberalism, despite its limited efficacy, ends up reproducing the existing
inequality among groups. Communitarianism, on the other, positivizes each (cultural) group in a pre14
Jürgen Habermas, "Three normative models of democracy," Constellations 1 (1997): 7.
“Equality-as-Presupposition” is a concept that has been theorized by Jacques Ranciere. For Ranciere, equality
should not merely be posited as an end of institutional process , nor should we understand it as an end of political
procedures (as in Rawlsian theory of redistributive justice). Equality is rather axiomatic -- that is, instead of taking
equality as an end, political actions and procedures must start with the presupposition of equality.
16
What should be the site of contesting political communication among groups though? The public sphere seems to
be the proper site of such interaction. However, given the historical and culturally loaded formation of public
spheres, the spaces themselves should be distinguished from their cultural and political particularity.
15
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political manner, while it is also incapable of addressing the inter-group relationality among hegemonic
and non-hegemonic groups. Against the negative rights oriented liberalism, I argued what is crucial for
the political challenge that multiculturalism poses is the assertion of a positive political participation that
does not begin with an imposition of majoritarian or hegemonic culture, while I also maintain that
institution-oriented approach is not enough. The political dialogue and contest among socio-cultural
groups, whose only condition is the presupposition of equality of all participants (including their cultures),
should complement institutional assertion of equality.
17