Biological Weapons
Presented by
Dr. Kenneth Alibek
to the USAF Air War College
November 1, 1999
HADRON, INC.
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Chemical
Biological
Nuclear
TACTICAL
STRATEGIC
Factors in BW Effectiveness
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Choice of agent
Deployment method
Formulation
Manufacturing process
Meteorological and terrain conditions
Types of BW Threat
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Bacterial weapons
Viral weapons
Rickettsial weapons
Fungal weapons
Toxin weapons
Peptide weapons (a variant of toxin
weapons)
Partial Listing of Known Biological Weapons
Agents
20% - 90% Kill
in 1-10 Days
Anthrax**
Bolivian hemor. fever
Ebola infection
Glanders
Lassa infection
Marburg infection
Melioidosis
Plague**
Smallpox**
Yellow fever**
20% - 100% Kill
in 5-20 Days
50% - 100%
Incapacity for 2 Weeks
Brucellosis
Brill-Zinsser disease
Blastomycosis
Dengue fever
Congo-Crim. hem. fever Eastern equine enceph.**
Monkey herpes B
Epidemic typhus
Korean hemor. fever
Legionellosis
Japanese enceph.
Murine typhus
Monkeypox infection
Q fever
Omsk hemor. fever
Rift Valley fever**
Russian S/S enceph.
Salmonellosis
Tularemia**
Scrub typhus
*Untreated; days are number of days after symptoms appear
**Vaccine available (if agent not genetically altered)
BW Deployment Methods
• Vector
• Contamination of food
and water sources
• Aerosol (the most effective
deployment method)
Soviet Biological Weapons
Developed and Approved for Use
Tularemia
Glanders
VEE
Smallpox
Plague
Anthrax
Q Fever (<1990)
Marburg (>1990)
STRATEGIC
OPERATIONAL
Biological Weapons Being
Developed--Late ‘80s/Early ‘90s
NATURAL STRAINS
• Ebola
• Bolivian hemorrhagic
fever
• Argentinian
hemorrhagic fever
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Melioidosis
Lassa fever
Japanese encephalitis
Russian springsummer encephalitis
Biological Weapons Being
Developed--Late ‘80s/Early ‘90s
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED STRAINS
• Antibiotic-resistant
(AR) plague
• AR tularemia
• AR anthrax
• Antibiotic- and
sulfonamide-resistant
glanders
• Immune systemovercoming (IO)
plague
• IO tularemia
• IO anthrax
• Smallpox with VEE
genes inserted
Types of Biological Weapons
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DRY
Tularemia
Anthrax
Brucellosis
Marburg
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LIQUID
Smallpox
Plague
Anthrax
VEE
BW Manufacturing Capacities
Ministry of Defense
• Sverdlovsk facility--anthrax
 100+
tons stockpiled
 Production capacity > 1000 tons annually
• Kirov facility--plague
 20
tons stockpiled
 Production capacity ~ 200 tons annually
• Zagorsk facility--smallpox
 20
tons stockpiled
 Production capacity ~ 100 tons annually
• Strizhi (new facility)
BW Manufacturing Capacities
Biopreparat
• Berdsk facility--plague, tularemia, glanders
 Production
capacity > 1000 tons annually
• Stepnogorsk facility--anthrax, tularemia,
glanders
 Production
capacity > 1000 tons annually
• Omutninsk facility--plague, tularemia,
glanders
 Production
capacity > 1000 tons annually
BW Manufacturing Capacities
Biopreparat (cont.)
 Kurgan
facility--anthrax
 Production
 Penza
capacity > 1000 tons annually
facility--anthrax
 Production
 Koltsovo
 Exact
capacity > 1000 tons annually
facility--Marburg, smallpox
production capacity unknown; dozens of
tons annually
BW Manufacturing Capacities
Ministry of Agriculture
 Pokrov
facility--smallpox, VEE
 Production
capacity > 200 tons annually
Munitions, Submunitions,
Delivery Means
Aviation
bombs with “biological” bomblets
for strategic and medium bombers
Spray tanks installed on medium bombers
Multiwarhead
ballistic missiles with
bomblet warheads
Cruise missiles with special disseminating
devices (under development)
Epidemiological Pattern of
Smallpox Weapon
New foci of
secondary infection
Contaminated zone
Infected zone
Zone of initial
explosion
Epidemiological Pattern of
Tularemia Weapon
Contaminated zone
Infected zone
Zone of initial
explosion
Epidemiological Pattern of
Plague Weapon
New foci of
secondary infection
Zone of initial
explosion
Contaminated zone
Infected zone
Epidemiological Pattern of
Anthrax Weapon
Contaminated zone
Zone of initial
explosion
Infected zone
Modes of Infection
PRIMARY AEROSOL
• Caused by aerosols that form immediately after dissemination
• Affect “target objects” before sedimentation
SECONDARY AEROSOL
• Caused by aerosols which have already sedimented, but have
aerosolized again due to wind or activity (building ventilation,
vehicular activity, street cleaning, maintenance, etc.)
Modes of Infection (cont.)
SECONDARY DROPLET
• Caused by droplet aerosols secreted by people who were
infected by primary or secondary aerosols
• Seen only with agents contagious by respiratory droplet
infection
SECONDARY NON-AEROSOL
• Transmitted by infected animals (rodents, insect parasites)
directly or via objects, food or water, OR
• Transmitted by contaminated objects (without involving
aerosolization)
Effectiveness of the USSR’s BW
• Specific expenditure value (Q50) = amount
of BW required to affect 50% of the
population evenly distributed over one
square kilometer (open area)
• Smallpox, anthrax, tularemia, plague, VEE,
glanders: Q50 ~ 3-5 kg/km2
• Marburg, dry form (and theoretically dry
Ebola): Q50 ~ 1 kg/km2
Current Defenses Against
Biological Weapons
Physical:
• Early Detection
 Limited Capability
• Protective Gear
 Inadequate
 Unrealistic
Current Defenses Against
Biological Weapons
Medical:
• Vaccines
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Available for < 10% of known agents
Genetic engineering can render ineffective
Weeks / months to become effective
Supplies inadequate
Not cost effective
• Pre-treatment
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Depends on luck
• Treatment
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Marginal success
Medical Research Targets
• Treating and preventing a broad spectrum of
infections by modulating the immune
system
• Treating and preventing specific infections
caused by biological weapons
Dr. Kenneth Alibek
HADRON, INC.
7611 Little River Turnpike
Suite 404W
Annandale, VA 22003
(703) 642-9404
kalibek@hadron.com