Characteristics of Joint Participants in the Wisconsin Medicaid Buy-in and SSDI
Benefit Offset Pilot: A Comparison with the Population of SSDI Beneficiaries
Enrolled in the Wisconsin Medicaid Buy-in
Barry S. Delin and Ellie C. Hartman
Stout Vocational Rehabilitation Institute
University of Wisconsin – Stout
2010 MIG/DMIE Employment Summit
Pittsburgh PA
April 19, 2010
The authors thank the managers and staff at Pathways to Independence, housed
at the Office of Independence and Employment, Wisconsin Department of Health
Services, for their cooperation and support. The authors also thank staff at
Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. for providing data and technical assistance
without which this paper could not have been written. This work was supported by
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicaid Infrastructure Grant –
CFDA No. 93.768 and Social Security Administration Contract No. SS00-05-60008
The descriptions and interpretations in this paper are solely those of the authors
1
Slightly over half the participants in the Wisconsin SSDI Employment Pilot (SSDIEP) also were enrolled in the Wisconsin Medicaid Buy-in for some period during the time
they participated in the pilot. 1 The SSDI-EP involved a test of a benefit offset feature for
the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program which would incent earnings
above the Substantial Gainful Activity level. This paper presents information about how
similar the joint SSDI-EP and Buy-in participants were to other Buy-in participants,
especially those who appear to meet pilot eligibility requirements, on a range of selected
characteristics. These characteristics include a range of “static” demographic, disability,
and public participation variables and employment rates and earnings over a roughly two
year period.
BACKGROUND
Those enrolled in a Medicaid Buy-in program (for workers with a disability) will
often be participating in one or more other public programs providing income support,
health care, and/or other long term supports. In particular, a large proportion of those
enrolled in a Medicaid Buy-in also participate in the Social Security Disability Insurance
(SSDI) program. In 2006, about 71% of those enrolled (nationally) in a Medicaid Buy-in
were also SSDI beneficiaries. Approximately 95% of these individuals were “SSDI only;”
the remaining 5% also had concurrent participation in the Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) program. 2
Medicaid Buy-ins are intended as work incentive programs. However, there is
some variation in eligibility criteria and program features across states, due to both the
specific federal statute used to authorize a state’s program and states’ own choices. 3
Nonetheless, participation in a Medicaid Buy-in allows persons with serious disabilities to
maintain access to Medicaid benefits while having earnings above the monthly
Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA) level. 4 Additionally, Medicaid Buy-ins are intended to
support employment over a protracted time period, at least technically independent of
whether an individual maintains attachment to other public programs such as SSDI.
1
The Wisconsin Buy-in is officially known as the Wisconsin Medical Assistance Purchase Plan
(MAPP).
2
Gimm, Gilbert, Davis, Sarah K., Andrews, Kristin L., Ireys, Henry T. Liu, Su. 2008. “The Three
E’s: Enrollment, Employment, and Earnings in the Medicaid Buy-in Program, 2006.” Washington
DC: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. (Report Reference #6170-330, April 11, 2008) pp. 23-24.
3
Authority to establish Medicaid Buy-ins for disabled workers comes from two federal statutes:
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act
of 1999. Though the general purpose and structure of both types of Medicaid Buy-in are similar,
the authorizing statutes provide for different eligibility standards, program features and ranges of
allowable variation in how states operate their Buy-ins.
4
For Medicaid Buy-ins, disability is generally defined by the same standards as for eligibility for
Social Security disability programs. The main difference is that Buy-in participants do not need to
have earnings below the SGA level to establish or maintain eligibility. In point of fact, there are
ways in which persons in Social Security disability programs can earn above the SGA level and
retain program eligibility. However the conditions for doing so differ substantially between the SSI
and SSDI programs, with the latter program’s conditions being far more restrictive and time
constrained.
The 2010 SGA level is $1,000 per month ($1640 for those who are categorized as blind).
2
Wisconsin was one of four states where the Social Security Administration (SSA)
tested a benefit offset feature for the SSDI program; the effort was known as the
Wisconsin SSDI Employment Pilot (SSDI-EP). Under current law, a SSDI beneficiary
cannot receive a cash benefit for months when the beneficiary has earnings above the
SGA level, except during a time limited Trial Work Period (TWP). After a TWP has been
completed, earning above the SGA level in any month results in the complete loss of the
SSDI cash benefit for that month. This is the so called “cash cliff” and constitutes a major
disincentive to work effort unless an individual is able to earn enough above SGA to
completely replace the lost benefit and to justify the time spent in doing so. Moreover,
after the thirty-six month Extended Period of Eligibility (EPE) that follows a completed
TWP, having SGA earnings generally results in losing eligibility to the program and,
ultimately, to Medicare as well.
The benefit offset feature tested in Wisconsin and the other pilot states was
intended to insure that additional earnings over SGA would leave the beneficiary better
off. Beneficiaries using the offset would lose only $1 of their SSDI cash benefit for every
$2 of earnings over the SGA level during the pilot. Though all of these beneficiaries
would eventually be returned to regular program rules, SSA agreed not to have any
period of above SGA earnings during the pilot used to disqualify these participants from
continued attachment to the SSDI program.
Although all of the offset pilots utilized random assignment, this did not mean that
the characteristics of pilot participants necessarily approximated those of working age
SSDI beneficiaries in each pilot state. SSA excluded beneficiaries who also participated
in SSI and those who had not qualified for their SSDI benefits under their own earnings
records. Participants were also volunteers. It is quite likely that some of the SSA
mandated program requirements affected who actually enrolled in a pilot, as did the
differing recruitment strategies each pilot used. 5 Therefore, one must consider the
possibility that the participant outcomes observed from the pilot might not reflect what
would have been observed if participants were truly representative of the state’s
beneficiary population. Unfortunately, there were few characteristics and even fewer
outcomes on which SSDI-EP participants could be directly compared to Wisconsin’s
population of adult SSDI beneficiaries.
The SSDI-EP was a relatively small project with a total enrollment of 496
participants. 50.8% (252) of these individuals were enrolled in the Wisconsin Medicaid
Buy-in for some period between the calendar quarter in which they enrolled in the pilot
and the end of the eighth calendar quarter subsequent to the enrollment quarter (i.e.,
5
Eligibility was limited to beneficiaries no more than seventy-two months past their TWP
completion. If enrolled and assigned to the treatment group, a participant could only use the offset
until the seventy-second month following TWP, no matter how soon that occurred after enrolling
in the pilot.
The SSDI-EP delivered the program through approximately twenty community based agencies.
Through the enrollment period (August 2005 through October 2006) these agencies conducted
recruitment activities, most often targeted toward persons with some current or prior involvement
with an agency. Approximately midway during the enrollment period, the state project office
arranged to have recruitment letters sent to selected individuals who were either current
consumers of the state’s Vocational Rehabilitation agency or enrolled in the Medicaid Buy-in.
3
“Q0-Q8”). 6 The proportion in the treatment group (53.0%) enrolled in the Buy-in was
4.7% higher than in the control group (48.3%). 7 Roughly three-quarters of SSDI-EP
participants in the Buy-in had entered that program by the time they entered the pilot.
Just as it would be useful to know how closely SSDI-EP participants match the
characteristics of those who would have access to a benefit offset provision should it
become law, so too would it be useful to know how similar those who jointly participated
in the SSDI-EP and the Wisconsin Buy-in were to those in the overall Wisconsin Buy-in
population who might have access to an SSDI offset feature in the future. Unlike for
SSDI-EP participants as a whole, it has been possible to directly investigate this issue
for the sub-group that was also enrolled in the Buy-in.
This opportunity was the result of two factors. The first was the availability
through the Wisconsin Medicaid Infrastructure Grant (MIG) of longitudinal employment
and earnings data for a large random sample of working age Buy-in participants. The
second factor was the potential availability of data about Buy-in participants from the
Integrated Data Set maintained for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) by Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. (MPR). 8 These data would support
identifying those in the Buy-in samples also in SSDI and, among those, the individuals
highly likely to meet pilot eligibility requirements. The MPR maintained data would also
provide a common source of demographic, disability, and public program participation
data that would support comparisons across all three types of Buy-in subgroups. Finally,
using data from Wisconsin unemployment insurance (UI) records, it would also be
possible to compare employment rates and average earnings for the subgroups over
time.
METHOD
This paper compares information about three subgroups of Wisconsin Buy-in
participants: (1) offset pilot participants who were also enrolled in the Buy-in, (2) Buy-in
participants that appear to have met pilot eligibility requirements, and (3) Buy-in
6
This Q0-Q8 period was the primary one used to compare the employment outcomes of those in
the SSDI-EP intervention group to the outcomes of those assigned to the treatment group. All
participants who did not withdraw or die completed this nine quarter period before SSA returned
intervention group members who had not completed their TWPs back to regular SSDI program
rules in January 2009.
As by the start of 2009 many participants had been in the project for some period beyond Q8, it
was possible for participants to have some period of Buy-in participation that is not captured in
the Q0-Q8 data. We will return to this issue later in the paper.
7
Though a slightly higher proportion of treatment group members were in the Buy-in immediately
prior to entering the SSDI-EP, it appears that most of the observed, albeit marginal, difference
between the treatment and control groups’ Buy-in participation was a result of choices made after
participants joined the pilot.
8
This data set includes Medicaid, Medicare, SSA, and Ticket to Work data. CMS provides MIG
grantees with potential access to the Integrated Data Set through MIG-RATS, the technical
assistance network CMS established to promote state based evaluation of MIG sponsored
activities. MIG grantees and those designated to perform research on their behalf can apply for
access to aggregated data on a semi-annual basis. This paper uses data generated as a result of
a spring 2009 proposal.
4
participants who were SSDI beneficiaries and would have had access to an offset
provision had one had been statutorily incorporated into the Social Security Act.
The information presented in this paper was obtained from three separate data
sets. The first data set is that for the SSDI-EP evaluation. The second data set is the
“Touched by MIG Outcome Tracking System” that is maintained on behalf of Pathways
to Independence, i.e. the Wisconsin MIG. The third data set is the Integrated Data Set of
Medicaid Buy-in participants maintained by MPR. While all three data sets contain
individual level data, it was only possible to get aggregated data from MPR. Thus, this
paper is limited to univariate descriptive analyses.
The first subgroup, that of joint SSDI-EP and Medicaid Buy-in participants, is
defined somewhat differently than it is for the SSDI-EP evaluation. Instead of defining
the subgroup based on participation in the Buy-in during the primary Q0-Q8 period,
inclusion is based on any Wisconsin Medicaid Buy-in participation between January 1,
2005 and December 31, 2008. As a consequence, both the number and proportion of
SSDI-EP participants included in the subgroup for this analysis is slightly higher than
observed for the Q0-Q8 period (269 instead of 252 and 54% instead of 51%). 9
The members of other subgroups were identified by MPR from its Integrated
Data Set using cases provided from the Wisconsin “Touched by MIG Outcomes
Tracking System.” Every January since 2005, researchers working for the Wisconsin
MIG (Pathways) take random samples of Buy-in participants and other Medicaid
participants for reason of disability between ages twenty-one and sixty-four. 10 UI
employment outcomes for the members of these cohorts are then followed over a nine
calendar quarter period. We provided MPR with the identifiers for the Buy-in samples for
both 2005 and 2006 as those roughly corresponded with the SSDI-EP’s enrollment
period. MPR then identified the cases from each of these samples that were SSDI
beneficiaries, and, from that group, the smaller number of cases that appeared to meet
the offset pilot eligibility criteria. The sample sizes for the joint Buy-in/SSDI groups are
3,546 for 2005 and 4,236 for 2006. The sample sizes for the pilot eligible subgroups
9
The subgroup thus includes a small number of individuals who either left the Buy-in by the start
of the Q0-Q8 period or entered it after Q8 (though while still in the SSDI-EP). While it is quite
likely that the seventeen additional cases, especially any where there was no Buy-in participation
after SSDI-EP enrollment, decreased the absolute accuracy of the subgroup characteristics
reported here, there is no reason to think they greatly altered the level or distribution of
characteristics relative to the other subgroups (SSDI beneficiaries in the Buy-in and those in the
Buy-in who putatively met SSDI-EP eligibility requirements).
The reason that we defined the joint Buy-in and pilot participation group as we did was to
expedite MPR’s ability to perform our requested data draws and analyses. Recall that that the
Q0-Q8 period for each individual is relative to that individual’s enrollment date. SSDI participants
enrolled over a fifteen month period beginning in August 2005; the final enrollees did not finish
their Q8 until the end of 2008. However, the Integrated Data Base is structured on an annual
basis. The 2005-08 data period was the most tightly defined way to encompass every SSDI-EP
participant’s full Q0-Q8 period.
10
The Buy-in samples are 50% of “working age” participants in the month of the data draw. The
21-64 age range was chosen to match that defining “working age” in the Cornell University
summaries of disability data from the American Community Survey.
5
were smaller, 2,026 for 2005 and 2,508 for 2006 (respectively 57% and 59% of the SSDI
groups).
Following identification of the relevant cases for each of the sub-groups, MPR
queried its records for the desired “static baseline” variables that would be provided to
the authors in aggregate form. 11 MPR also generated nine quarter long series of
employment rates and earnings for each of the SSDI and putative offset pilot eligible
groups based on the UI data we provided for the cases in the January 2005 and 2006
samples of Buy-in participants. We generated the nine quarter time series for the joint
SSDI-EP and Buy-in subgroup based upon each individual’s calendar quarter of pilot
enrollment and restricted the cases to the 239 pilot participants who both completed the
full Q0-Q8 period and were enrolled in the Buy-in for some part of that period. All
monetary values, whether for static variables or for the earnings time series, were
deflated using the August 2005 value of the Consumer Price Index. 12
Finally, it is important to observe that the data draws required resolution of a
number of technical issues. This was particularly true for deciding how to identify those
individuals putatively eligible to participate in the offset pilot. We thank MPR staff, both
known and unknown, for their efforts. 13 Indeed, we think it important to point out that a
key aspect of the process MIG-RATS developed for allowing MIG grantees access to
data from the Integrated Data Set is the iterative consultation between the state based
researchers and MPR staff that takes place after a proposal has been approved.
FINDINGS
In this section we present information about both the “baseline” characteristics of
our subgroups and the nine quarters of employment and earnings outcomes data. Our
comparisons focus on the similarities and differences between the SSDI-EP participants
and the other sub-groups.
Though there are three types of subgroups, data are provided for an actual total
of five subgroups. While there is only one subgroup of pilot participants, there are two
subgroups for Medicaid Buy-in participants in SSDI and those MPR identified as meeting
offset pilot eligibility requirements. Recall that we provided samples of working age
Medicaid Buy-in participants for both January 2005 and 2006. 14 Baseline characteristics
11
The values for the joint SSDI-EP and Buy-in subgroup differ slightly from those produced by the
SSDI-EP evaluation records. These differences reflected (a) the somewhat different time points at
which such data was collected (at SSDI-EP enrollment for the SSDI-EP evaluation rather than the
annualized basis for the Integrated Data Set) and (b) the slightly different compositions of the joint
pilot participant/Buy-in groups already identified.
12
Specifically this was the 1982-84=100 version of the CPI-U adjusted so that the August 2005 is
“100.” This formulation was used for the SSDI-EP evaluation and was adopted for the MPR
analysis to insure comparability.
13
In particular, we note with appreciation the efforts of Kristin Andrews who coordinated the
technical assistance process at MPR.
14
There is a substantial probability (nearing 50%) that an individual in one of these Buy-in
participant samples will also be in the one for the other year. Additionally, it is almost certain that
some of SSDI-EP participants are included in these subgroups, but as the likely proportion in the
6
reflect data for these two time points. The Q0s of the employment outcome data are
those for the first calendar quarters containing the relevant sampling month. 15
Baseline characteristics for the SSDI-EP participant group are drawn from
January 2006 data rather, than in the SSDI-EP evaluation, fixed to the actual enrollment
date. The January 2006 date was roughly a third of the way through the pilot’s
enrollment period and served as a useful compromise given the structure of the
Integrated Data Set.
It is also critical to point out that SSDI-EP participation did not necessarily mean
an individual actually used the offset feature. In point of fact, only a relatively small
proportion did. Roughly half the participants were assigned to the control group and had
no access whatsoever. Those in the treatment group had to complete their TWP and
then had to earn above SGA in at least one month thereafter in order to actually use the
offset. By mid-2009, only about 11% of those who entered the SSDI-EP had at least one
month of offset use.
Finally, readers are reminded that the descriptions that follow apply only to
persons enrolled in the Wisconsin Medicaid Buy-in. When we provide information about
or make comparisons between SSDI-EP participants, those who appear to have been
eligible for SSDI-EP participation, and all working age SSDI, we always mean Medicaid
Buy-in participants who are included in those categories.
Subgroup Baseline Characteristics
Age is widely identified as a factor that affects the probability of successful return
to work. Younger individuals have a higher probability of a successful return to work,
while older persons are more likely to remain on disability benefits. Table 1 exhibits
mean and median age for our subgroups. It also exhibits distributions across four age
categories.
The SSDI-EP participants are substantially younger than the members of the four
other sub-groups; these differences are found to be statistically significant at p-values of
.05 or less. 16 For example, the median age of SSDI-EP participants is between three
and five years lower than for the other subgroups. These differences are also reflected in
the age distributions. In particular, the proportion of SSDI-EP participants in the “55 and
older” segment of the age distribution (13%) is less than one half that observed in the
distributions for the other subgroups (a minimum of 28%).
other sub-groups would be modest (e.g. about 3% for the SSDI groups, perhaps 6% of the
putative eligible groups). We judged that the distorting effects of their chance inclusion would not
significantly affect our ability to discern major differences across the subgroups.
15
Thus an individual included in both the 2005 and 2006 samples would have different time
spans of employment outcomes data included in the aggregate statistics for each of those
samples. For the 2005 subgroups the relevant period starts with the first quarter of 2005 and
ends with the first quarter of 2007. For the 2006 subgroups the relevant period is first quarter
2006 through first quarter 2008.
16
Significance test results were provided by MPR as only they had access to the individual level
data from the Integrated Data Set.
7
Table 1: Age at Subgroup Entry Date by Pilot Participant Group, Pilot Eligible
Groups, and All SSDI Groups
Mean
Median
Under 35
35 - 44
45 - 54
55 or
Age
Age
Older
Pilot
44
45
20.8%
27.9%
38.3%
13.0%
Participants
Pilot
Eligible 2005
Pilot
Eligible 2006
48
49
13.4%
21.7%
34.7%
30.3%
48
50
11.5%
20.0%
36.9%
31.7%
All SSDI 47
48
14.7%
24.1%
33.3%
27.7%
2005
All SSDI 48
49
12.8%
22.1%
35.8%
29.2%
2006
Source: MPR Integrated Data Set
Note: There are 0.2% missing cases from both the 2005 and 2006 “All SSDI” subgroups.
Table 2 provides information about the gender distribution and racial/ethnic
composition of all five subgroups. The SSDI-EP participant group is more heavily male
than the other subgroups. The proportion of males in the subgroup is almost 6.5% higher
than for females. By contrast, the differences seen within the other subgroups are never
more than 2%. This suggests that there was something about the SSDI-EP recruitment
and enrollment dynamics that resulted in a somewhat unrepresentative distribution
relative to the potential population of Buy-in users that might have entered the pilot or
the population of Buy-in users who might be qualified for a statutory offset. Nonetheless,
the differences are not found to be statistically significant.
By contrast, the measured racial and ethnic characteristics of the offset pilot
participants in the Buy-in appear to reasonably match those of the other subgroups. It
appears that the proportion of black individuals in the SSDI-EP participant group is a bit
larger than the others (perhaps reflecting the greater number of pilot sites in urban
areas), but again the results are not statistically significant at the .05 level.
8
Table 2: Gender and Race/Ethnicity by Pilot Participant Group, Pilot Eligible
Groups, and All SSDI Groups
Female
Male
White
Black
Hispanic
All
(non(nonOthers
Hispanic) Hispanic)
Pilot
46.8%
53.2%
86.3%
7.4%
2.6%
1.5%
Participants
Pilot
Eligible 2005
Pilot
Eligible 2006
50.6%
49.4%
88.8%
5.5%
2.6%
1.3%
51.0%
49.0%
89.4%
5.4%
2.2%
1.2%
All SSDI 49.6%
50.2%
89.6%
4.7%
2.3%
1.0%
2005
All SSDI 49.6%
50.2%
89.6%
5.0%
1.9%
1.2%
2006
Source: MPR Integrated Data Set
Note: “Hispanic” is included in the “Race and Hispanic Status” categories.
Note: For “Sex”, there are 0.2% missing cases from both the 2005 and 2006 “All SSDI”
subgroups. There are missing data for all five subgroups for “Race and Hispanic Status.”
The percentage of missing data ranged from 1.8% to 2.5%
Our next table displays information about educational attainment. In the general
population, greater educational attainment is strongly associated with higher earnings
and career development. Readers are alerted that the proportion of missing cases range
from two-thirds to three quarters of cases in each subgroup.
Table 3: Educational Attainment by Pilot Participant Group, Pilot Eligible Groups,
and All SSDI Groups
Mean
Median
13 to 15
16 Years
Missing
Years
Years
Years
or more
Data
Pilot
12.7
12.0
5.6%
5.6%
69.1%
Participants
Pilot
Eligible 2005
Pilot
Eligible 2006
12.1
12.0
5.0%
2.7%
66.0%
12.1
12.0
4.7%
2.9%
69.9%
All SSDI 11.9
12.0
2005
All SSDI 12.0
12.0
2006
Source: MPR Integrated Data Set
3.5%
1.8%
74.6%
3.7%
2.0%
74.8%
9
Nonetheless, we think the data in table 3 can provide useful insight into how the
pilot participants in the Buy-in differ from those in the other subgroups. While median
years of educational attainment are identical across the five subgroups, the mean score
for the SSDI-EP subgroup is a minimum of 0.6 years higher than for any of the other
subgroups. Moreover, the largest difference between any of the Pilot Eligible and All
SSDI subgroups is only 0.2 years. The (apparently) greater educational attainment of
those in the pilot is most evident in the proportion with sixteen or more years of
education. Roughly twice as high a proportion of offset participants are in this category
than in any of the other subgroups.
Table 4 displays data about the distribution of primary disabling conditions for the
five sub-groups. MPR defined these categories by grouping similar SSA primary
disability codes (DIGs) and has used these categories for some Buy-in related
analyses. 17 While inclusion in any one of these categories may have little or no import as
to the capacity to work, the service and support needs associated with different types of
disabling conditions can vary greatly. Crucially, so too can the availability of the
resources needed to meet service and support needs, especially across states and
localities.
Table 4: Distribution of Primary Disabling Conditions and Proportion Having
Permanent SSA Disability by Pilot Participant Group, Pilot Eligible Groups, and All
SSDI Groups
Mental
Mental
Musculoskeletal Sensory Other
Have
Illness
Retardation
or
Permanent
and
Missing
SSA
Other
Disability
Mental
Disorders
Pilot
50.9%
5.9%
11.9%
3.7%
27.5%
30.9%
Participants
Pilot
Eligible 2005
Pilot
Eligible 2006
41.1%
6.0%
16.9%
2.2%
33.8%
39.4%
40.7%
6.0%
17.3%
2.0%
34.1%
38.8%
All SSDI 35.5%
14.5%
12.0%
2.3%
35.7%
40.0%
2005
All SSDI 35.9%
13.8%
12.8%
2.2%
35.3%
38.6%
2006
Source: MPR Integrated Data Set
Note: There is substantial missing data for the “All SSDI” subgroups for the “Permanent
SSA Disability” variable, 10.2% for the 2005 sample and 9.8% for the 2006 sample. The
percentage of cases with missing data for all other subgroups ranges from 2.2% to
2.9%.
17
Additionally, SSA asked that these categories (slightly recoded) be used by those evaluating
each of the benefit offset pilots for describing participant characteristics and to specify disability
subgroup models that were run for all four evaluations.
10
There are notable differences between SSDI-EP participants who were enrolled
in the Buy-in and the other sub-groups. The difference between the distribution of SSDIEP participants and that for any of the other subgroups is always statistically significant.
Most notably, the proportion of pilot participants in the “mental illness and other mental
disorders” category is about ten percentage points higher than for the pilot eligible
subgroups and about fifteen percentage points higher than for all working age SSDI
beneficiaries in the Buy-in. Restated, the relative prevalence of affective disabilities (at
least as a primary disabling condition) appears to be much higher among offset pilot
participants than among the other subgroups.
Other observed differences were largely between the SSDI-EP participant group
and either, but not both, of the other types of subgroups. Pilot participants in the Buy-in
were less than half as likely as the overall SSDI beneficiary group to have primary
disabilities categorized as “mental retardation.” By contrast, the proportions included in
the “mental retardation” category were about the same for the pilot and the subgroups
who met pilot eligibility standards. This pattern is reversed for the “musculoskeletal”
category. SSDI-EP participants and the general beneficiary subgroups have similar
proportions of individuals with a primary disability classified as “musculoskeletal.” This
time it is the subgroups that are putatively eligible for the pilot who differ. About 17% of
the members of these subgroups have a primary disability that is “musculoskeletal” as
compared to about 12% for the pilot participants.
Though our discussion stresses comparisons between pilot participants in the
Buy-in and the other subgroups, the distributions of the pilot eligible and all SSDI
subgroups are also significantly different from each other. While differences between the
pilot participant and pilot eligible groups probably reflect differences in both project
recruitment efforts and individual preferences, differences between the pilot eligible and
all SSDI subgroups are rooted in SSA’s choices about offset pilot eligibility requirements.
In particular, the exclusion of both Disabled Adult Children (DACs) and concurrent
beneficiaries almost certainly lowered the proportion of participants with certain kinds of
cognitive impairments (“mental retardation”).
The last column (to the right) in table 4 exhibits the proportion in each subgroup
that SSA considers as having a permanent disability. Such conditions are understood as
those for which no medical improvement is expected and, thus, where there is very little
expectation at SSA (or at the Disability Determination Service which adjudicated the
beneficiary’s case) that the beneficiary will leave the SSDI program prior to full
retirement age. About 31% of those in SSDI-EP subgroup are so classified. This is eight
or more percentage points lower than for all the other subgroups. These differences are
statistically significant at the .05 level and suggest that the offset pilot participants might
be viewed as a less severely impacted group, a finding that would seem consistent with
a willingness to enter a return to work program with the explicit goal of increasing
earnings above the SGA level.
Table 5 displays a number of SSDI program related characteristics. The
proportion with Medicare “A” eligibility, which requires twenty-four months of SSDI
eligibility), is meant to indicate the relative level of newer beneficiaries in the subgroups.
The TWP and EPE elements are measures of work incentive usage and are aimed at
11
indicating serious involvement in return-to-work efforts. 18 Finally, as the Primary
Insurance Amount (PIA) reflects prior earnings, differences in the average and median
values across subgroups provides a relative indicator of labor market outcomes prior to
entering SSDI.
It is important to note certain limitations in using these data, particularly the TWP
and EPE elements, to indicate baseline conditions for the SSDI-EP subgroup. The data
in table 5 for SSDI-EP participants are from January 2006. Recall that this is about a
third of the way through the enrollment period. We know that participating in the pilot
increased the number who started or completed a TWP. As a consequence, the “TWP
started” and “in EPE” data for pre-2006 SSDI-EP enrollees may be somewhat higher
than the true baseline values. 19
Table 5: Selected SSDI Program Characteristics by Pilot Participant Group, Pilot
Eligible Groups, and All SSDI Groups
Eligible
TWP
In EPE
Mean
Median
for
Started
Monthly
Monthly
Medicare
but Not
Primary
Primary
A
Completed
Insurance Insurance
Amount
Amount
Pilot
82.5%
24.9%
17.5%
$917
$891
Participants
Pilot
Eligible 2005
Pilot
Eligible 2006
79.5%
10.6%
7.6%
$918
$895
83.1%
8.7%
5.9%
$926
$905
All SSDI 70.9%
7.7%
2005
All SSDI 75.5%
6.9%
2006
Source: MPR Integrated Data Set
5.1%
$915
$890
4.2%
$920
$894
The vast majority of those in all five subgroups had at least twenty-four months of
SSDI eligibility at the nominal baseline date for each subgroup. The data in table 5
indicate that the proportion of relatively new beneficiaries is higher in the all SSDI
subgroups, but the differences with the offset pilot and pilot eligible subgroups are
modest (yet generally statistically significant).
18
As participation in a Medicaid Buy-in requires employment (or, as in the case of the Wisconsin
Buy-in, participation in a program expected to result in employment in a limited time period) one
could argue that Buy-in participation demonstrates a similarly high level of involvement as TWP
or EPE participation. This may be true in other states, but participation in the Wisconsin Buy-in
does not require any earnings, let alone the level associated with expenditure of a TWP month
(roughly 70% of SGA).
19
24% of pilot participants enrolled before January 2006.
12
Those in the pilot participant subgroup are far more likely than those in any of the
other subgroups to have either started or completed a TWP by the nominal baseline
date. Both the start and completion rates (the later indicated by the percentage “in EPE”)
are far higher for the pilot subgroup. Proportions are, at minimum, 2.3 times higher than
the nearest of the other subgroups. Needless to say, the differences are statistically
significant. Though the differences are not as stark, those in the pilot eligible subgroups
are also more likely to have started or completed a TWP than those in the all SSDI
subgroups. Though these results are also generally significant, all of these subgroups
resembled each other more than they did the SSDI-EP participant subgroup.
Finally, there are no significant differences between any pair of subgroups on the
PIA measures. Indeed, the means and medians are surprisingly alike, suggesting little
difference in pre-disability earnings. While this result is not unexpected for the pilot
eligible subgroups, it is for the all SSDI subgroups which contain both DACs and
persons with poor enough earnings histories to qualify for SSI. While we cannot fully
explain the observed similarity, MPR has informed us that the PIAs for DACs in the all
SSDI subgroups had been removed from the calculations due to uncertainty about
whether their PIA values reflected their own earnings histories on those of a parent. 20
This exclusion should have increased mean and mean PIA values relative to
those for pilot participants and for the pilot eligible sub-groups. However, it remains likely
that the inclusion of PIA values for concurrent beneficiaries should still have resulted in
lower means and medians for the all SSDI subgroups relative to those for all the other
subgroups. A MPR staffer hypothesized that the “equalizing factor” might have been the
larger proportion of older beneficiaries in the all SSDI subgroups compared to that for
SSDI-EP participants (see table 1). All things being equal, those in the workforce longest
should have the highest PIAs. 21 Unfortunately, this explanation is not completely
satisfying. If it were, the mean and median values for the pilot eligible subgroups (which
have about the same age distributions as the all SSDI subgroups, but include no DACs)
should be higher than those for any of the other subgroups. 22
Subgroup Employment and Earnings Outcomes, Q0-Q8
We turn now to the employment and earnings trends data for our five subgroups
of Wisconsin Medicaid Buy-in users. These data are from the baseline calendar quarter
for each group through the eighth subsequent calendar quarter. For one pair of pilot
eligible and all SSDI subgroups, the initial quarter (Q0) is the first calendar quarter of
2005. For the other pilot eligible and all SSDI subgroups, the initial quarter is the first
three months of 2006. While everyone in these subgroups was a Buy-in participant
during the month they entered the subgroup sample (i.e., January 2005 or January
20
We lack information about whether values for widows and widowers receiving benefits based
on their deceased spouses’ earnings records were also excluded.
21
For this to be true, it would also be necessary that the older beneficiaries actually had longer
work histories rather than being in the SSDI program for longer periods. The data in the “Eligible
for Medicare A” column of table 5 is consistent with meeting this condition.
22
Another consideration is that The Wisconsin Buy-in has a premium structure that treats
unearned income far more disadvantageously than earnings and treats SSDI payments as
unearned income. Thus, if anything, beneficiaries with high PIAs are likely to face a disincentive
for participating in the Buy-in.
13
2006), continued Buy-in participation through Q8 varied. The vast majority either
remained in the Buy-in for all or most all of the Q0-Q8 period.
The Q0-Q8 periods for those in the pilot (SSDI-EP) subgroup begin in the
calendar quarter of enrollment. For example, if a participant enrolled in April 2006, Q0
would be the second calendar quarter of 2006. Additionally, the Q0-Q8 trend lines reflect
data for SSDI-EP participants who were enrolled in the Buy-in at some point in that
period. Thus, unlike the other subgroups, one can’t assume that all of these individuals
were in the Buy-in in the first month of entering the pilot (though three-quarters were).
Additionally, as already discussed, these cases are marginally different from the set
MPR identified to generate the baseline characteristics presented above.
The employment and earnings data presented are from Wisconsin
Unemployment records. 23 There is high compliance with UI reporting requirements;
however, there are jobs that do not need to be reported to the system. Important
exclusions include self-employment, employment at firms located outside the state, and
employment at very small or religious not-for-profit entities. Additionally, as the data are
quarterly, it is not possible to determine whether an individual was employed throughout
the three month period or how much was earned in any given month. 24
The five charts that follow compare the SSDI-EP subgroup to the pilot eligible
subgroups, the all SSDI subgroups, or both. As the trend lines for the SSDI-EP
participants combine data for individuals assigned to the treatment group and to the
control group, it is important to know how large the differences in employment outcomes
between these study assignment groups are. If the differences are large, it could be
argued that differences between the offset pilot subgroup and the others result largely
from the behavior of the treatment group.
In point of fact, there are not large differences between the Q0-Q8 employment
and earnings trends for those assigned to the intervention group and those not. Though
Buy-in participants in the intervention group had slightly higher employment rates and
mean earnings than those assigned to control in the final quarters of the Q0-Q8 period,
the overall trends for the period are not significantly different. 25 These results mirrored
those for the overall SSDI-EP participant group (i.e. both those in the Buy-in and those
23
Cases where there was no data in the UI records for any or all relevant quarters were imputed
not to have UI employment or UI earnings for those time periods.
24
Thus it is impossible to determine from UI data whether an individual had monthly earnings that
were equal or greater than either SGA or the TWP trigger amount.
25
See the data table in the appendix to this paper for more detailed information.
14
who did not use the Buy-in). 26 Consequently, we would not attribute much of the
observed differences in employment related differences to pilot intervention effects. 27
Figure 1 displays the Q0-Q8 employment rate trends for the SSDI-EP
participants and the two subgroups of those who are pilot eligible. It is interesting to note
that the UI employment rates for all these subgroups are much lower than would be
expected given that all Wisconsin Buy-in participants, save those in an approved
employment preparation program or temporarily exempted from employment due to
illness, will be employed. The difference between actual and expected employment rates
mainly reflects differences in what counts as reportable employment for UI and the
Wisconsin Medicaid Buy-in. 28
Throughout the Q0-Q8 period the employment rate for those in the SSDI-EP
subgroup is always far higher than for the subgroups of those who appear to meet pilot
eligibility requirements. UI Employment rates for the SSDI-EP subgroup hover around
50%, generally 20 percentage points higher than those of the pilot eligible subgroups. By
contrast the UI employment rates for the pilot eligible subgroups are only modestly
different from each other (always within five percentage points). 29
26
It is of course possible that differences in the trends will become significant over longer periods.
Though we intend to continue following both UI data and Buy-in participation until the end of
2011, two factors will make the analysis more challenging. First, the treatment group members
who did not complete a TWP by the end of 2008 were immediately returned to regular SSDI
program rules. Second, those in the treatment group who completed their TWPs will lose access
to the offset feature after the seventy-second month following TWP completion.
27
Barely a fifth of SSDI-EP treatment group members had used the offset provision by mid-2009.
Unfortunately, we do not have good information about the timing of the first month of usage. First
usage could not occur until after the three month grace period that followed the TWP completion
month, however the first use might occur later in some cases and some TWP completers may
never use the offset before reaching the end of the seventy-second month following TWP
completion. Moreover, whatever the actual rate of offset use in the Q0-Q8 period, it must be
somewhat lower than the TWP completion rate as of 12/31/2008 when non-completers in the
treatment group were returned to regular SSDI program rules.
28
We have already noted that Wisconsin UI records exclude certain kinds of employment.
Additionally, the employment of those receiving only in-kind compensation (allowable under
Wisconsin Buy-in rules) would not be included in UI records.
29
We did not provide MPR with individual level employment and earnings data for the SSDI-EP
subgroup. This was an unfortunate omission as it did not allow MPR to perform significance tests
of the differences between the SSDI-EP subgroup and the other subgroups on our behalf.
Nonetheless, the scale of the differences observed in figures 1 through 5 is large and it is
inconceivable that they are not statistically significant at the .05 level.
15
Figure 1: UI Employment Rates Q0-Q8 for SSDI-EP Participants and Pilot Eligible
Subgroups
UI Employment Rates, SSDI-EP Participants and Eligible Non-Participants
60%
50%
40%
SSDI-EP
Eligible 05
Eligible 06
30%
20%
10%
0%
Q0
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
Q6
Q7
Q8
Relative Quarter
Source: Wisconsin UI records
Figure 2 allows comparison between the UI employment rates for the SSDI-EP
subgroup and the two subgroups reflecting outcomes for all working age SSDI
beneficiaries. Though the “all beneficiary” subgroups include persons that might be
expected to be somewhat less likely than the pilot eligible subgroups to have UI reported
employment, the subgroups’ employment rates are marginally higher than for the pilot
eligible subgroups. 30 Nonetheless, the all SSDI subgroups have UI employment rates
that hover about the 30% level, and stand in about the same relation to the pilot
participant subgroup as those for the pilot eligible subgroups.
30
For example, one of the most salient differences between the all SSDI and pilot eligible
subgroups is the much higher proportion of those with a primary disability classified as “mental
retardation” in the former. The data in table 4 show the proportion to be more than twice as high
as for those in the pilot eligible subgroups or, for that matter, the SSDI-EP participant subgroup.
Though we lack data, we would have expected a relatively high proportion of those classified as
having “mental retardation” to be employed in sheltered workshops or similar enclaves. Such
employment is not reported to the Wisconsin UI system.
16
Figure 2: UI Employment Rates Q0-Q8 for SSDI-EP Participants and All SSDI
Subgroups
UI Employment Rates, SSDI-EP Participants and All SSDI
60%
50%
40%
SSDI-EP
All SSDI 05
All SSDI 06
30%
20%
10%
0%
Q0
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
Q6
Q7
Q8
Relative Quarter
Source: Wisconsin UI records
It is notable that despite some significant differences in their baseline
characteristics the pilot eligible and all SSDI subgroups exhibit very similar employment
rate trends over Q0-Q8. Indeed all of these subgroups posted declines in employment
rates over the analysis period of 3-4%. Though hardly a desirable result, the
employment rate for the SSDI-EP subgroup was essentially the same in Q8 as it was in
Q0.
Figure 3 and figure 4 display the mean quarterly UI earnings trends for the five
subgroups. Again, we emphasize comparisons between the SSDI-EP subgroup and the
respective pairs of subgroups for those who are pilot eligible and for all beneficiaries.
As displayed in figure 3, SSDI-EP participants in the Buy-in modestly increased
their earnings over the Q0-Q8 period. The increase was from $931 to $1067, a gain of
14.6%. By contrast, mean earnings for the two pilot eligible subgroups were typically
$500 or more lower. Further, the 2006 sample witnessed no earnings growth over the
Q0-Q8 period while the 2005 subgroup experienced a 6.5% decline. Clearly, those in the
SSDI-EP subgroup faired much better, but mainly because they started from a better
position at Q0. Once again, the differences between the two pilot eligible subgroups are
modest relative to the differences with the pilot participant subgroup.
17
Figure 3: Mean UI Quarterly Earnings Q0-Q8 for SSDI-EP Participants and Pilot
Eligible Subgroups
UI Mean Earnings per Quarter, SSDI-EP Participants and
Eligible Non-Participants
$1,200
$1,000
$800
SSDI-EP
Eligible 05
Eligible 06
$600
$400
$200
$0
Q0
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
Q6
Q7
Q8
Relative Quarter
Source: Wisconsin UI records
Quarterly mean earnings are a bit higher for those in the all SSDI beneficiary
subgroups than for the pilot eligible subgroups, though still far behind those for the
SSDI-EP subgroup. Yet over the Q0-Q8 period these subgroups tend to lose ground to
all the other subgroups. For example, Q0 mean earnings for the 2006 all SSDI subgroup
were $110 higher than for the 2006 pilot eligible subgroup and almost $475 less than the
SSDI-EP subgroup. By Q8, the advantage over the 2006 pilot eligible subgroup had
decreased to $75, whilst the deficit relative to the SSDI-EP group had grown to $645.
Moreover, both of the all SSDI groups suffered comparable declines in average earnings
over their Q0-Q8 periods; -8.0% for the 2005 cohort, -7.7% for the 2006.
18
Figure 4: Mean UI Quarterly Earnings Q0-Q8 for SSDI-EP Participants and All SSDI
Subgroups
UI Mean Earnings per Quarter, SSDI-EP Participants and All SSDI
$1,200
$1,000
$800
SSDI-EP
All SSDI 05
All SSDI 06
$600
$400
$200
$0
Q0
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
Q6
Q7
Q8
Relative Qurater
Source: Wisconsin UI records
Of course average earnings reflect differences in employment rates. Given the
roughly 20% difference in the employment rate trend lines between the SSDI-EP
subgroup and the other four, it is reasonable to ask whether the observed differences
are present for those who have UI employment in any given calendar quarter. The
answer is that the differences in mean earnings that are exhibited in figures 3 and 4
persist, though the differences are somewhat narrowed.
Figure 5 displays earnings trends for those employed in any calendar quarter for
all five of our subgroups. Again, those in the SSDI-EP subgroup display the best
performance. Mean earnings are $1953 per quarter at Q0 and $2257 at Q8. This
represents a gain of $305 or 15.6%. It is also notable that mean quarterly earnings are
approaching the three month equivalent of the SGA level, ending the Q0-Q8 period at
91% of that benchmark. 31
A look at figure 5 also confirms that the earnings trends for those who have UI
reported employment are very similar across all of the other subgroups. Differences
between any pair of these four subgroups pale in comparison to the difference between
any of them and the SSDI-EP subgroup. For instance, in Q8 the 2005 all SSDI subgroup
posted the highest level of mean earnings except for the SSDI-EP subgroup. Still, the
mean value for the 2005 all SSDI subgroup was only 75% of that for those in the SSDI31
The quarterly equivalent of the SGA level is $2490 in August 2005 constant dollars.
19
EP subgroup with non-zero earnings in that quarter. Though this represents a
considerable narrowing of the earnings differential (the mean earnings across the full
2005 all SSDI subgroup at Q8 was only 45% of those of the pilot participants), it
indicates that an appreciable part of the disparity was caused by some factor or factors
other than differences in the employment rate. 32
Figure 5: Mean UI Quarterly Earnings Q0-Q8 for Those with UI Reported
Employment, All Subgroups
UI Mean Earnings per Quarter for Those Employed, All Groups
$2,500
$2,000
$1,500
SSDI-EP
Eligible 05
Eligible 06
All SSDI 05
All SSDI 06
$1,000
$500
$0
Q0
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
Q6
Q7
Q8
Relative Quarter
Source: Wisconsin UI records
Note: Calculated by dividing mean quarterly earnings by the employment rate for that
quarter
Conclusion
When we submitted our proposal to MIG-RATS to obtain data from the MPR
Integrated Data Set one of our main goals was to learn how closely those jointly
participating in the Wisconsin Medicaid Buy-in and the Wisconsin SSDI-EP Employment
Pilot resembled other Buy-in participants, specifically (1) those who were eligible to
participate in the SSDI benefit offset pilot but did not do so and (2) those who would be
eligible for an offset should one ever be added to the law. We conceptualized this
second group as working age SSDI beneficiaries participating in the Buy-in. 33 An
32
Differences in mean earnings can also reflect variation in hours worked and/or hourly wage
rates. Unfortunately, Wisconsin UI data does not include these kinds of information.
33
It is our understanding that the Benefit Offset National Demonstration, scheduled to begin in
2011, will utilize primary study groups that include all adult beneficiaries. It is also our
20
underlying question was how typical SSDI-EP participants were to those who might be
eligible to use a SSDI benefit offset or might seriously consider using it.
Our primary concern in this paper has been on differences between the SSDI-EP
participants in the Buy-in and those who appear to have been eligible, but for the most
part did not enroll. We found a number of salient differences in baseline characteristics.
Actual participants tend to be younger, have somewhat higher educational attainment,
and appear to be somewhat more likely to have a primary disability that might be
characterized as having a mental illness. It is possible that one or more of these factors
will affect the “take-up rate” for any statutory offset provision. However, the most salient
difference by far is in the proportion of persons who had either started or completed a
Trial Work Period. 34
Though the demographic differences observed between the SSDI-EP and pilot
eligible subgroups are real, they are modest compared to the observed differences in
employment rates and earnings. Though outcome levels further diverge during the Q0Q8 period to the advantage of the SSDI-EP subgroup, most of the observed differences
between the pilot participants and others are present at Q0. Though we lack adequate
data for the pilot eligible or, for that matter, the all SSDI subgroups to explore the issue,
it appears that those actually participating in the offset pilot are typically, to borrow Gina
Livermore’s phrase, more work oriented than those in the other subgroups. 35 This is
important in that there is some reason to think SSDI beneficiaries who enter a Medicaid
Buy-in are themselves more work-oriented than the general beneficiary population.
However, it is also reasonable to conjecture that the power of this factor is mitigated by
the Wisconsin Buy-in’s modest employment requirement and the absence of any
minimum earnings requirement. It suggests, though does not confirm, that the SSDI-EP
largely enrolled participants who would be more likely than average to consider and
perhaps to use a SSDI benefit offset.
We also observed some ways in which the all SSDI subgroups are different from
the SSDI-EP subgroup and, in some cases, the pilot eligible subgroups. Like the pilot
eligible subgroups, those in the all SSDI subgroups tend to be older than the SSDI-EP
subgroup, to have less educational attainment, and to be even less likely that the pilot
eligible subgroup to make use of the TWP. The all SSDI subgroup was, however, distinct
in the far larger proportion of members with a primary disability categorized as “mental
retardation.”
understanding that there will be some restrictions to eligibility for the smaller study groups that will
examine the impact of support services such as work incentive benefits counseling, though we do
not know the degree to which these will replicate the eligibility restrictions that were placed on
participation in the four offset pilots.
34
As noted earlier in the paper, it is possible that these differences in TWP use and completion
may be somewhat exaggerated because of how data was compiled for the SSDI-EP subgroup.
About a quarter of these individuals had spent some time in the pilot by the time of the January
2006 reference point used by MPR to draw the data.
35
See Livermore, Gina A. 2008, “Disability Policy Research Brief Number 08-01: Earnings and
Work Expectations of Social Security Disability Beneficiaries.” Washington, DC: Center for
Studying Disability Policy, Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.
21
Nonetheless, what is most striking about the all SSDI subgroups is how similar
their outcome trends, whether for employment, mean earnings, or mean earnings for
those employed, are to the smaller cohorts of those meeting pilot eligibility requirements.
Again, it is the SSDI-EP participants who have far better outcome trends and, again,
most of the performance differential is present at the start of the analysis period.
Additional gains (actual for earnings but only relative to the other subgroups for
employment) are, at best, modest.
Finally, by identifying the very high magnitude of “baseline” differences in
employment outcomes as the primary explanation for differences in employment related
outcomes observed over the full Q0-Q8 period, we do not want to imply that we think
that program effects, whether of the Wisconsin Medicaid Buy-in or associated with
participating in the SSDI-EP, were trivial. We have already noted that SSDI payments
are treated as unearned income and, that above an adjusted income threshold, the Buyin premium “taxes” unearned income at 100%. 36 We have no doubt that this premium
structure has a negative effect on mean earnings for all five of our subgroups.
Unfortunately, the data available for this paper does not allow us to examine this issue. 37
It is also possible that there are aspects of the pilot itself that motivated higher
gains for the SSDI-EP subgroup over the Q0-Q8 period. These might include access to
services such as work incentive benefits counseling, ongoing contact with project staff,
and, for the treatment group, possibly the opportunity to access the offset provision. 38
While it has been possible to examine these effects within the SSDI-EP participant group
based on differences in service receipt and assignment to either the treatment or control
group (for example, benefits counseling seems strongly associated with earnings growth
after Q0), the data used in this paper do not support an examination of the relative
impact of these factors across the five subgroups.
36
Premiums apply to Wisconsin Buy-in participants with gross individual incomes greater than
150% of the federal poverty level (FPL) for their family size. There is no premium when income is
less than 150% FPL. Premiums, for those who must pay them, reflect the total of unearned
income (minus a living allowance and some exemptions) plus 3% of earnings.
37
We were able to examine this issue indirectly in the context of the SSDI-EP alone. Briefly, Buyin participants had lower earnings than participants not enrolled in the Buy-in though the
difference is not statistically significant. However, Buy-in participation also negatively impacted
the proportion of those who had quarterly earnings equal to or higher than three times the SGA
level. This finding is statistically significant.
38
Though there is no significant difference between the earnings trends based on study group
assignment, those in the treatment group are significantly more likely to complete a TWP
following entry to the project.
22
Appendix: Q0-Q8 Employment Outcome Trend Data
Aggregate UI Employment and Mean Earnings
Q0
UI Employ % - Pilot Participants
48%
UI Employ % - Pilot Eligible 2005
30%
UI Employ % - Pilot Eligible 2006
25%
UI Employ % - All SSDI 2005
33%
UI Employ % - All SSDI 2006
29%
Q1
52%
30%
24%
33%
29%
Q2
52%
29%
25%
32%
29%
Q3
52%
29%
24%
32%
29%
Q4
51%
27%
23%
31%
27%
Q5
49%
27%
23%
31%
28%
Q6
47%
28%
23%
31%
27%
Q7
49%
27%
23%
31%
27%
Q8
47%
26%
22%
29%
26%
CHG Q0-Q8 % CHG Q0_Q8
0%
-4%
-3%
-4%
-3%
Q0
931
446
347
527
457
Q1
1054
495
358
563
462
Q2
1081
488
369
563
468
Q3
1113
485
386
582
485
Q4
1124
434
341
511
432
Q5
1094
459
352
526
442
Q6
1114
457
357
533
439
Q7
1055
480
379
563
461
Q8
1067
417
347
485
422
CHG Q0-Q8 % CHG Q0_Q8
136
14.6%
-29
-6.5%
0
0.0%
-42
-8.0%
-35
-7.7%
Q0
47.7%
48.2%
47.0%
Q1
52.3%
49.6%
56.0%
Q2
52.3%
52.5%
52.0%
Q3
52.3%
56.1%
47.0%
Q4
50.6%
51.8%
49.0%
Q5
49.4%
51.1%
47.0%
Q6
47.3%
51.1%
42.0%
Q7
48.5%
51.1%
45.0%
Q8
47.3%
48.9%
45.0%
CHG Q0-Q8 % CHG Q0_Q8
0%
1%
-2%
UI Mean $ - Pilot Participants
UI Mean $ - Pilot Participants T
UI Mean $ - Pilot Participants C
931
949
907
1054
991
1142
1081
1024
1160
1113
1154
1056
1124
1134
1111
1094
1124
1052
1114
1173
1032
1055
1115
971
1067
1179
912
UI Mean $ - Emp. Pilot Participants
UI Mean $ - Emp. Pilot Eligible 2005
UI Mean $ - Emp Pilot Eligible 2006
UI Mean $ - Emp. All SSDI 2005
UI Mean $ - Emp. All SSDI 2006
Q0
1953
1487
1388
1597
1576
Q1
2015
1650
1492
1706
1593
Q2
2068
1683
1476
1759
1614
Q3
2128
1672
1608
1819
1672
Q4
2221
1607
1483
1648
1600
Q5
2215
1700
1530
1697
1579
Q6
2356
1632
1552
1719
1626
Q7
2173
1778
1648
1816
1707
Q8
2257
1604
1577
1672
1623
UI Mean $ - Pilot Participants
UI Mean $ - Pilot Eligible 2005
UI Mean $ - Pilot Eligible 2006
UI Mean $ - All SSDI 2005
UI Mean $ - All SSDI 2006
UI Employ % - Pilot Participants
UI Employ % - Pilot Participants T
UI Employ % - Pilot Participants C
136
230
5
14.6%
24.2%
0.5%
CHG Q0-Q8 % CHG Q0_Q8
305
15.6%
117
7.9%
189
13.6%
75
4.7%
47
3.0%