Thunder without Lightning
The High Costs and Limited Benefits of the F-35 Program
August 2015
Thunder without Lightning
The High Costs and Limited Benefits of the F-35
Program
By Bill French with Daniel Edgren
August 2015
Bill French is a policy analyst at the National Security Network (NSN). Daniel Edgren is a
former researcher at NSN.
The authors would like to thank Chris Strong and Graham Clark for their numerous research
and editorial contributions. Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton (Ret.) provided important guidance in
conceptualizing of the project early on. John Bradhsaw’s patience and input was greatly
appreciated. We would especially like to thank David Axe, Winslow Wheeler, Mandy
Smithberger, Pierre Sprey, Larry Korb, Kate Blakeley, and Bill Hartung for reviewing drafts of
the paper and providing valuable feedback that immensely benefited this work. Of course, the
final product is the sole responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views
of those who were kind enough to supply their assistance.
The National Security Network is dedicated to developing and advancing national security solutions
that are both pragmatic and principled. Learn more about NSN at www.nsnetwork.org
PHOTO CREDIT: Lockheed Martin, 2013.
Introduction and Executive
Summary
In June of this year, Gen. Joseph Dunford testified that the Department of Defense
(DOD) is reviewing the total number of F-35s it will purchase.1 Under current plans,
DOD intends to purchase and operate nearly 2,500 aircraft at an expense of roughly $1.4
trillion to replace most of the 4th-generation fighter and attack aircraft in the inventories
of the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy, including the F-16, F/A-18C/D, AV-8B, and
A-10. If this procurement plan or something close to it is maintained, the F-35 will form
the backbone of American airpower for the first half of the 21st century.
The ongoing review provides an opportunity to refocus attention on the F-35 program,
especially for Congress, which is charged with its funding and oversight. Past attention
given to the F-35 in Congress has focused primarily on the program’s cost overruns and
expensive development shortcomings. In light of the review, this focus should be
expanded to a broader cost-benefit assessment of the program that considers the extent
to which the F-35’s capabilities, or lack thereof, advance U.S. national security.
In this paper, we assess the capabilities of the F-35 and show how the aircraft is
mismatched to meet emerging threats. Considered alongside the exorbitant cost of the
program, this capability mismatch entails that it would be unsound to maintain a fullscale commitment to the F-35 program and that alternatives to the full program should
be studied and, ultimately, selected.
Evaluating the benefits provided by the F-35 program depends on the kinds of
contingencies in which it is assumed the aircraft might operate. Our analysis focuses on
the F-35’s ability to perform against advanced foreign militaries that are near-peer
competitors. This method was used for two reasons. First, this assumption is operative
for DOD, which is conducting its review while holding to the belief that the F-35 is wellsuited for competing with near-peer competitors. In announcing the review, Gen.
Dunford emphasized the aircraft’s “critical” significance for countering “near-peer
competitors.” 2 Second, if we instead assume the F-35 is also needed to counter lowergrade military powers or non-state actors, then there is little to no justification for the F35 to begin with. The United States already enjoys massive conventional overmatch
compared to less-capable states, and there is no need for an exorbitantly expensive 5thgeneration aircraft for counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operations against
organizations such as the Islamic State or the Taliban.
1
Contrary to Gen. Dunford’s comments and DOD’s beliefs, our analysis concludes that
the F-35 does not have the capabilities to be effective against near-peer adversaries. It
would be an error for DOD’s review to sustain a large-scale commitment to the F-35
based on the aircraft’s supposed utility against near-peer competitors. To perform
against near-peer adversaries, the F-35 will have to be capable of executing a range of
missions, from defeating enemy aircraft to penetrating enemy air defenses to strike
surface targets. But the F-35 will struggle to effectively perform these missions due to
shortcomings in its design and program requirements, despite costing between three
and nine times more than the 4th-generation aircraft it is designed to replace.
Drawing on detailed comparisons to other aircraft (see Appendix A), we identify four
crucial areas where the F-35’s capability is mismatched against near-peer competitors:
1. The F-35 is less maneuverable than many of the 4th-generation fighter aircraft it is
intended to replace or those it would likely face in combat, making it unlikely to
be effective in within-visual-range (WVR) air-to-air engagements.
2. The F-35’s small internal payload capacity will significantly limit its effectiveness
in beyond-visual-range (BVR) air-to-air engagements, and, to a lesser extent,
strike missions against surface targets. The F-35 will also likely have difficulty
generating high rates of sorties to deliver payloads to targets over time.
3. The F-35’s short range means that it will be of limited use in geographically
expansive theaters like the Asia-Pacific or against so-called anti-access threats
whereby adversaries can target forward airbases.
4. The F-35’s survivability depends on stealth technology that is at risk for
obsolescence and will become increasingly ineffective over the 56-year lifetime of
the program.
Thus, the F-35 will find itself outmaneuvered, outgunned, out of range, and visible to
enemy sensors. Going forward, full investment in the F-35 would be to place a bad
trillion-dollar bet on the future of airpower based on flawed assumptions and an
underperforming aircraft. To avoid such a catastrophic outcome, Congress and DOD
should begin the process of considering alternatives to a large-scale commitment to the
F-35. Staying the present course may needlessly gamble away a sizable margin of
American airpower at great expense and unnecessary risk to American lives.
2
F-35 Capability Mismatch
The F-35 was developed to sustain America’s global advantage in airpower by serving
as a multi-service, multi-role fighter capable of a host of missions, especially defeating
enemy aircraft, penetrating enemy air defenses to strike surface targets, and close air
support. While the F-35’s design emphasizes strike roles over air superiority, the Air
Force believes it will be necessary for the F-35 to perform air-to-air missions in the early
stages of high-end conflict.3 In the following section, we assess key capabilities of the F35 relevant to its performance, focusing on the aircraft’s maneuverability, payload,
range, and stealth features. There are significant problems with each. Far from
representing an effective next-generation fighter, the F-35 is more likely to find itself
outmaneuvered, outgunned, out of range, and visible to enemy sensors in contingencies
against near-pear militaries.
The F-35 program’s shortcomings are not just a matter of spending resources
inefficiently or buying too many of an underperforming weapon system. Because the F35 is currently slated to make up the vast majority of the U.S. fighter fleet, its
inadequacy puts American airpower at greater risk vis-à-vis near-peer adversaries.
With an inferior fighter fleet, American airpower will be handicapped in supporting top
functions assigned to the U.S. military, including deterring, denying, and defeating
capable state adversaries.4 As a result, a continued full-commitment to the F-35 program
is likely to pose a liability that American pilots and commanders will have to overcome
to execute their missions against advanced foreign militaries.
1. Kinematic Performance
To succeed in air-to-air roles, The F-35 will very likely have to defeat enemy aircraft in
within-visual-range (WVR) engagements, i.e. dogfighting. However, the F-35 will be
severely handicapped in close quarters with enemy aircraft. Dogfighting requires agility
and maneuverability. But the F-35 lacks these characteristics and in testing has
demonstrated maneuverability inferior to that of the 4th-generation fighter aircraft it will
replace. The available data indicate the F-35 will be less maneuverable than advanced
foreign fighters as well. While the F-35 was designed with a preference for beyondvisual-range (BVR) combat, in which maneuverability is supposedly less significant,
history shows dogfighting is a persistent feature of air-to-air combat.5 Despite the F-35’s
designers’ preference for long-range combat, avoiding dogfights may prove difficult.
3
Figure 1: F-35 Performance Compared to 4th-Generation Fighters It Will
Replace or May Face in Air Engagements
Navy (F-35C replaces
F-18)
F-35C
F/A-18C/D
Marine Corps (F-35B
replaces AV-8B)
F-35B
AV-8B
MiG-29
Su-27
Acceleration
USAF (F-35A replaces
F-16)
F-35A
F-16C Block
50/52
63 sec
28 sec
108 sec
42 sec
81 sec
n/a
31 sec
27 sec
Wing loading
86.62 lb/ft2
68.07 lb/ft2
78.44 lb/ft2
89.75
84.33
69.32 lb/ft2
75.35 lb/ft2
lb/ft2
lb/ft2
0.63 (0.92
1.16
0.71 (1.17
Aft. Burn)
0.67 (1.31
Aft. Burn)
17,000 lb
9,921 lb
17,637 lb
594-627
459-702
nm
840 nm
Thrust-to-weight
84.39 lb/ft2
0.63 (1.00
Aft. Burn)
0.70
(1.15
Aft. Burn)
0.53 (0.85
Aft. Burn)
0.69 (1.13
Aft. Burn)
18,000 lb
(4,788
internal)
19,522
18,000 lb
(4,788
internal)
15,500 lb
613 nm
200-845 nm
610 nm
290-600 nm
Aft.
Foreign Fighters
Burn)
Max payload
Combat radius
15,000 lb
(2,69
internal)
456 nm
nm
NOTE: see Appendix A for additional comparisons and more information, including relevant assumptions.
Pilots’ attempts to avoid WVR engagements will be hindered by the aircraft’s
comparatively small missile payload and slow speed, which will complicate
successfully killing enemy aircraft at BVR distances (we detail this problem in a later
section) or running from close-in engagements altogether.
1. 1 Performance vs. U.S. 4th-Generation Fighters
As Figure 1 and Appendix A show, the F-35 compares unfavorably to already deployed
4th-generation fighters in key capability areas relevant to maneuverability. The F-35 is
inferior in terms of its thrust-to-weight values and time to accelerate, the latter being
more than twice as slow as that of comparable fighters. These performance factors are
critical to building up speed and gaining or retaining energy that enables the aircraft to
maneuver and gain advantages in firing position against other aircraft or defeating
incoming missiles. F-35A and B models also score worse on wing loading* than their
counterparts, a value that is significant for turning maneuvers. The F-35C scores better
on wing loading, but this does not seem to have significantly ameliorated its poor
maneuverability. Inferiority in these areas has been shown to negatively affect F-35
performance. In 2012, testing downgraded the F-35’s ability to sustain turns (i.e., the
ability of the aircraft to continue to turn without losing speed): The F-35A was
downgraded from 5.3g to 4.6g sustained turns; the F-35C was downgraded from 5.1g to
*
Wing loading is an aircraft’s weight divided by its wing area. Wing loading is an important measure for comparing
aircrafts’ ability to turn and maneuver, though wing shape and control surface areas are also important.
4
5g sustained turns; and the F-35B was downgraded from 5g to 4.5g sustained turns.6
This places the ability of the F-35 to sustain turns in the class of 3rd-generation fighter
aircraft like the F-4 Phantom, which was capable of 5.5g sustained turns and entered
service with the Navy in 1960.7
One comparison that has attracted considerable attention is to what extent the F-35A
can match the maneuverability of the F-16. There is a double significance to this
comparison. First, matching the maneuverability of the F-16 was a “threshold” design
requirement of the program, meaning it was a minimally acceptable parameter
(matching the more maneuverable F/A-18C/D was a key program objective).8 Second,
the F-35A will be by far the most widely produced variant, with 1,763 aircraft planned
for the U.S. Air Force. Compared to the F-35A, the F-16 enjoys superior wing-loading
(84 lb/ft2 vs. 87 lb/ft2), as well as significant advantages in transonic acceleration (28
seconds vs. 63 seconds) and thrust-to-weight (0.77 and 1.15 with afterburners vs. 0.63
and 1.0 with afterburners).
In response, F-35 advocates have insisted that comparisons with 4th-generation aircraft
should account for factors that decrease their performance, such as the drag and weight
added by external fuel tanks or externally stored weapons. They claim the F-35 was
designed to carry larger amounts of fuel without the use of external tanks and can carry
weapons in internal bays, thereby minimizing drag. But this rationale is misleading.
First, the F-16 performance data cited by F-35 critics compares the acceleration of an F16 with four externally mounted air-to-air missiles9 to an F-35 after its onboard weapons
have already been expended.10 (The same is true of the data that compare the F/A-18 to
the F-35C).11 Second, while it is certainly true both that external fuel tanks confer
performance penalties and that F-16s, like all other fighters, often use external fuel tanks
to extend their range, external fuel tanks are dropped prior to air-to-air engagements.
Finally, even F-35 advocates admit that the comparison of F-35s to 4th-generation aircraft
penalized with greater external loads does not yield a strong – or any – performance
advantage to the F-35, but instead results in “very comparable” performance to aircraft
that were designed and produced in the 1970s.12
Any debate over the F-35’s maneuverability compared to the F-16 was put to rest with a
report leaked in July 2015. The report described air-to-air combat testing conducted in
January of the F-35 against an F-16 focusing on “Basic Fighter Maneuvers in offensive,
defensive and neutral setups at altitudes ranging from 10,000 to 30,000 feet.” The
report, written by the F-35 test pilot, described a sluggish aircraft outperformed by the
F-16D Block 40, a twin-seat model with a less powerful engine and more drag than the
current single-seat Block 50/52 model.13 Perhaps the most damning specific finding
was that “the F-35A remained at a distinct energy disadvantage for every
5
engagement,” meaning the aircraft was unable to effectively maneuver against its
mock adversary either defensively or offensively. The pilot concluded that F-35
performance was “substantially inferior” to 4 th-generation legacy fighters. Notably,
the F-35 was outperformed despite flying in a clean configuration without the weight
of armament while the F-16 was handicapped with two large external drop tanks.14
In response, Lockheed Martin did not contest the report that the Air Force test pilot
had written. Instead, the company asserted that the exercise did not take into account
the aircraft’s ability to engage aircraft from beyond visual range (BVR) or its stealth
characteristics. 15 However, as we will detail later, neither of these aspects is likely to
provide a significant net advantage for the F-35 against a near-peer opponent.
1.2 Performance vs. Foreign Fighters
As Figure 1 and Appendix A show, the F-35’s performance characteristics also compare
unfavorably to already deployed foreign 4th-generation fighters such as the Russiandesigned MiG-29 Fulcrum and Su-27 Flanker (also produced by China) in service with
air forces around the world. These are the kinds of aircraft the F-35 would most likely
face in air-to-air engagements against a high-end opponent. Compared to both the Su27 and MiG-29, the F-35 is grossly inferior in terms of wing loading (except for the F35C), transonic acceleration, and thrust-to-weight. All F-35 variants also have
significantly lower maximum speeds, Mach 1.6 for the F-35 compared to Mach 2.2 for
the Su-27 and Mach 2.3 for the MiG-29.
Air-to-air simulations paint an even grimmer picture. In 2009, U.S. Air Force and
Lockheed Martin analysts indicated that the F-35 could be expected to achieve only a 3to-1 kill ratio against the decades-old MiG-29 and Su-27 despite its advantages in stealth
and avionics.16 The results of other simulations have been far worse. In one simulation
subcontracted by the RAND Corporation, the F-35 incurred a loss exchange ratio of 2.4to-1 against Chinese Su-35s.17 That is, more than two F-35s were lost for each Su-35 shot
down.18 While these simulations take into account a host of other factors and include
assumptions about the context in which the engagements take place, they nevertheless
underscore the need for skepticism regarding the F-35’s air-to-air capabilities.19
Unfortunately, there are insufficient data on foreign 5th-generation fighters to allow for
meaningful comparisons. Three such fighters are known to be under development: the
Russian PAK FA and the Chinese J-20 and J-31.
6
Can the F-35 Replace the A-10?
Airpower analysts and members of Congress have extensively debated the merits of
whether the F-35 can suitably replace the A-10 for performing close air support
(CAS). The CAS mission has been critical in the past decade of conflict in Iraq and
Afghanistan and remains relevant to deterring or fighting contingencies against
near-peer competitors, as demonstrated by Russian aggression in Ukraine. Despite
costing roughly nine times as much as the A-10, the F-35 is much less capable in this
mission area. One F-35 pilot explains, “An A-10 is always going to be better at CAS
than an F-35 is. That’s because the A-10 was designed specifically for that
mission.”A
While the maximum external payload that the F-35 is capable of carrying is
comparable to A-10, the F-35 comes up short in most other areas.B Only the F-35A is
fitted with an internal cannon, and, while the A-10 is armed with 1,150 rounds of
30mm ammunition for its tank-killing GAU-8 Avenger cannon, the F-35A is limited
to 180 rounds for its less powerful 25mm cannon, effective only against lightarmored vehicles.C The F-35B and C variants removed the gun to save weight and
rely instead upon a “semi-stealthy” and “missionized” ventral gun pod that carries
slightly more ammunition.D But gun pods have not performed well historically,
most notably in the case of the F-4 Phantom.E A 30mm pod was tested on the F-16 as
an earlier proposed A-10 replacement, but the experiment was plagued by severe
inaccuracy and abandoned.F
Worse, the F-35 will enter service with inferior sensors for close air support. The F35 is equipped with a nose-mounted Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS) to
provide the pilot enhanced images for use against ground targets. But the F-35’s
EOTS is a less advanced version of what aircraft like the A-10 and F-16 use today,
featuring less resolution, less range, and an inability to share feeds with friendly
ground forces or mark targets with an infrared beam prior to weapons employment
to ensure the right targets are struck.G
The A-10 also possesses more efficient engines, heavy armor, and survivable,
redundant flight control systems. Taken together, these attributes allow the A-10 to
loiter over the battlefield longer and take greater risks, even being able to survive
direct hits from armor-piercing fire.H As a result, A-10s can fly lower and slower for
longer in order to more precisely acquire targets near friendlies and safely deliver
ordinance.
7
2. Payload Capacity and Sortie Generation
In addition to lacking maneuverability, the F-35 is hampered by limited space for
storing weapons in its internal bays. A deficient weapons capacity has significant
consequences for the aircraft’s ability to conduct missions against air and surface
targets. In air-to-air engagements, the F-35 will be outgunned by foreign fighters that
can carry greater numbers of missiles and cannon rounds. Nor can the aircraft carry
enough long-range missiles to ensure it can fight effectively and reliably in beyondvisual-range (BVR) engagements. In engagements against surface targets, the F-35’s
small internal payload means it will be able to destroy fewer targets per sortie if
maintaining a stealthy configuration. This problem will be exacerbated by the F-35’s
limited ability to generate sorties, i.e., fly missions, to repeatedly deliver its weapons to
targets over the duration of a campaign.
2.1 Air-to-Air Implications
The F-35’s small weapons capacity puts the aircraft at a sizable air-to-air disadvantage
against its competitors. If limited to its internal bays, the F-35 carries a standard load of
only two long-range air-to-air missiles, although four missiles can be carried if no other
munitions are on board.20 Major Richard Koch, chief of the U.S. Air Force Air Combat
Command advanced air dominance branch, said, “I wake up in a cold sweat at the
thought of the F-35 going in with only two air-dominance weapons.”21 But the aircraft is
still sizably outgunned even when carrying the maximum four missiles. Top-tier
foreign 4th-generation fighters like the Su-27 have 10 external hard points to carry air-toair missiles or other ordinance. Some models derived from the Su-27, like the Su-35,
have 12 external hard points.22
The F-35’s limited payload will handicap the fighter in beyond-visual-range (BVR)
combat in particular, which is characterized by low probabilities of kill per missile
expended. As a result, a small payload will offer even less combat power in BVR
engagements. This is especially problematic for an aircraft designed to favor BVR
combat. During the Cold War, radar-guided missiles achieved a 6.6% probability of kill
in BVR engagements. Of the conflicts featuring BVR engagements, the highest
probability of kill was achieved by Israel in the 1982 Lebanon War, yielding a 20% kill
rate. In the post-Cold War era, the effectiveness of BVR missiles improved.23 Through
2008, the United States achieved a 46% probability of kill with the AIM-120 AMRAAM
(the mainstay of the U.S. BVR missile inventory), though these results are based on a
tiny sample size of 6 engagements.24
8
However, the above gains in missile effectiveness should not be expected to apply to
conflict against near-peer competitors. According to analysis by RAND, the U.S. AIM120 record is weighted heavily by circumstances that favor the shooter: None of the kills
was achieved against adversaries that themselves had similar BVR missiles; the downed
pilots did not employ electronic countermeasures, in some cases were fleeing, nonmaneuvering, or lacked radar; and one case (out of a total of six) was an instance of
friendly fire. U.S. aircraft also enjoyed quantitative parity or superiority in all cases.25
These circumstances should not be expected to characterize BVR engagements between
the United States and an advanced adversary. For example, the presence of electronic
countermeasures alone would probably result in a drastically lower probability of kill
as Russian and Chinese fighter aircraft presently employ electronic countermeasures
that use digital radio frequency memory (DRFM) jamming reported to significantly
hinder radar-guided missile effectiveness.26
2.2 Air-to-Ground Implications
The F-35 has an internal payload capacity of just over 2,500 lbs. for the F-35B and just
under 5,000 lbs. for the F-35A and F-35C. These payloads are less than one-third that of
4th-generation fighter and attack aircraft. As a result, the F-35 will carry only two Joint
Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) or other heavy munitions to engage more robust
ground targets, or a larger number of Small Diameter Bombs (SDBs) to strike lighter
targets,27 except for the F-35B which cannot fit SDBs in its internal bays – an issue not
scheduled to be resolved before 2022. 28
Advocates of the F-35 correctly point out that today’s precision munitions require fewer
strikes to destroy targets than would have been needed a generation ago, but this is
nonetheless an unimpressive payload for strike missions.29 Payload capacity may prove
particularly important in contingencies against near-peer foreign militaries.
Sophisticated, dense air defenses significantly increase the risk of strike missions. This
also increases the value of greater payload because more munitions can mean fewer
missions and, therefore, less risk.
If the F-35 carries weapons externally, the aircraft’s payload capacity increases to
between 15,000-18,000 lbs., about the same as or superior to the aircraft it is replacing.
However, storing weapons externally would forgo the expensive stealth properties
upon which the F-35’s survivability depends and incur further aerodynamic penalties
on what is already a sluggish aircraft. And delivering these weapons in practice would
still face significant challenges on account of sortie generation and range, discussed
below.
9
2.3 Sortie Generation
While payload is a measure of the ordinance and destructive potential of an aircraft per
sortie, during a campaign the effectiveness of an aircraft depends on delivering
ordinance to targets over time in the course of multiple missions. The number and
duration of missions an aircraft can fly in a given time is therefore a key variable in its
ability to actualize its combat power, something referred to as an aircraft’s “sortie
generation rate.” It is doubtful the F-35 will be able to sustain high rates of sorties due
to heavy maintenance necessitated by the complexity of the aircraft. As of October 2014,
the F-35 was only able to achieve 61% of planned sorties (51% for the F-35C, 55% for the
F-35A, and 72% for the F-35B) due to maintenance issues. Each variant of the aircraft is
also behind its reliability and maintenance targets set for the current stage of
development,30 and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has characterized
engine reliability as “very poor.”31
While the F-35 has not accumulated enough flight hours to be considered mature, key
elements of the program’s approach to satisfying its sortie generation requirements are
proving unsound. Efficient maintenance on the aircraft depends on the Automated
Logistics Information System (ALIS), an information network created specifically for
the F-35 to diagnose maintenance issues and facilitate supporting logistics and supply
chains. Unless ALIS functions properly, the F-35 will not meet its sortie generation
requirements. The GAO reports that the system “has failed to meet basic requirements,
including having the ability to identify faults and failures in the aircraft,” despite being
on a development timeline that is already seven years behind schedule.32
3. Range
Beyond being outmaneuvered and outgunned, the F-35 will also have difficulty
operating over the kinds of distances that high-end contingencies will likely require
based on prevailing defense planning and doctrine.† While the F-35’s range is greater
than some of the aircraft it will replace, the aircraft is nonetheless a continuation of
DOD’s slanted investment in short-ranged manned tactical fighters.33 From the
†
Defense planners are increasingly concerned about so-called anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities that use
precision strike, counter-space, and cyber weapons to increase the risk of U.S. power projection, including
increasing the vulnerability of forward bases. The line of thinking to counter these threats – Air-Sea Battle (since
renamed), for example – emphasizes long-range strike systems to decrease dependence on forward airbasing. This
kind of strategic and operational thought would shape the demands put on the F-35 during a conflict, including
many that the aircraft would be unable to satisfy, as we explain. How well-founded these assessments and
responses are is another subject, but the point is that this line of thinking and the F-35’s capabilities are in tension.
10
perspective of prevailing doctrine, this emphasis is becoming increasingly untenable on
account of geography and the proliferation of so-called anti-access capabilities that hold
U.S. forward airbases at risk. These two factors are most severe in the Asia-Pacific,
where they combine to challenge the ability of the United States to project power.
3.1 Geographic Challenges
Today’s defense planners are increasingly focusing on the geographically expansive
Asia-Pacific region, where 60% of American airpower will be deployed by 2020.34
Compared to Europe, the Asia-Pacific offers limited basing options and poses different
challenges to gaining and maintaining operational access. The geographic size of the
Asia-Pacific inherently limits the operational utility of short-ranged tactical fighters like
the F-35. While the F-35’s combat radius of 600nm is greater than some of the aircraft it
will replace, it is over 200nm less than that of the Su-27 and similar models employed
by the Russian and People’s Liberation Army Air Forces. China also enjoys the
advantage of considerable strategic depth that allows it to mass fighter aircraft in areas
of interest to project power into nearby spaces. Moreover, this depth is well developed.
For example, China operates 41 military and dual-use airfields within unrefueled
combat radius of the Taiwan Strait.35
3.2 Anti-Access Challenges
Defense planners increasingly characterize near-peer adversaries in terms of posing
anti-access challenges to U.S. power projection.36 Anti-access threats hinder the ability to
project power into a given theater, including disrupting the ability to use regional
basing infrastructure. From this point of view, a force structure heavily made up of
short-range fighters like the F-35 exacerbates the implications of anti-access threats by
deepening dependence on at-risk regional basing. Anti-access challenges are most
severe in the Western Pacific where Chinese conventionally-armed ballistic and airlaunched cruise missiles hold U.S. and allied forces at risk for 1,000-1,200 miles beyond
the Chinese mainland.37 As a result, U.S. access to airbases in the Western Pacific is
likely to be contested during a conflict or crisis, forcing reliance on distant basing. The
only U.S. airbase in the region outside of the range of most Chinese long-range strike
systems is Anderson Air Force Base, located 1,600 miles from Taiwan, 1,600 miles from
the East China Sea, and 2,000 miles from the South China Sea. At these distances, sortie
rates would be reduced to a trickle beyond the 1,000-1,500-mile maximum range
stipulated by airpower analysts for effective fighter operations.38 China is also
developing and deploying anti-access systems capable of holding at risk U.S. aircraft
11
carrier strike groups, especially anti-ship ballistic missiles, advanced anti-ship cruise
missiles, and quiet diesel-electric submarines.
To mitigate anti-access challenges, planners are experimenting with dispersing air
forces to many locations and operating from austere, less-predictable locations to
complicate enemy targeting.39 However, it is not clear that the F-35 will be able to
operate effectively from austere locations given its delicate design and reliance on
maintenance-intensive features like radar absorbent coatings. Moreover, dispersal is a
method to reduce high levels of risk incurred by dependence on short-ranged tactical
fighters and vulnerable basing, not an argument to invest severe costs doubling down
on that dependence.
In dealing with anti-access and geographic challenges, defenders of short-ranged
aircraft may suggest mid-air refueling as a solution. While mid-air refueling extends
range, it takes for granted a permissive environment where an adversary cannot target
U.S. tanker aircraft. While this has been the U.S. experience against mid- to low-end
adversaries like Iraq’s military in the 1990s and 2003, it cannot be taken for granted
against a near-peer military with advanced air forces.
The fragility of mid-air refueling means the usefulness of the F-35 will be limited by
what some analysts have called the “tanker-tether problem.”40 The tanker-tether
problem states that aircraft combat ranges are limited by the geographical points where
they can be refueled by tanker aircraft. Refueling points, in turn, must remain out of the
combined range of enemy aircraft or else accept high levels of risk. Today in the
Western Pacific, the combination of Chinese aircraft unrefueled combat radii and
missile range could force U.S. tankers to operate 750-1,000nm away from the Chinese
mainland.41 Closer operations risk U.S. tankers being targeted by People’s Liberation
Army Air Force fighters, including stealthy fighters like the J-20 that would be useful
against such high-value assets. Under these conditions, the F-35 will not have sufficient
range to engage in operations near or within Chinese airspace, and will have only
limited time to loiter over forward maritime areas of interest.
4. The Limits of Stealth and the F-35
Lacking maneuverability and payload, the survivability of the F-35 will depend heavily
on its stealth characteristics. In the context of modern warfare, stealth is the suppression
or camouflage of any signature that could be used by the enemy to detect friendly
platforms. With respect to aircraft, this mostly refers to heat or infrared emissions,
electromagnetic emissions, and radar signature. Of these, stealth is usually most
12
associated with minimizing radar signature, an effect produced by a combination of
radar-deflecting shapes and absorbent materials.
Today’s stealth technology is an outgrowth of a broader “hider-seeker” competitive
dynamic for an information advantage fundamental to all warfare, i.e., the evolving
competition between the methods for finding an opponent and the methods for
hiding.42 The kind of stealth technology used in modern aircraft has a development
history dating back to World War II, when Germany experimented with radardeflecting shapes and radar-absorbing materials to counter allied radars. During the
Cold War, the United States attempted to develop stealth technology in a series of
projects, culminating in the stealthy F-117A, B-2, and F-22. By the end of the Cold War,
the United States had invested heavily in stealth and adopted the technology as a part
of its efforts to maintain an airpower advantage. The F-35 is the latest instance of this
trend in the form of a multi-trillion dollar bet that the kind of stealth technology that
has worked in the past will continue to work over the program’s five-decade-long
service life.
The problem for the F-35 is that there is growing evidence that the program is betting
on the wrong side of the hider-seeker competition. Instead, it seems that the seekers –
not the hiders – are gaining the advantage. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Greenert
wrote in 2012 that technological innovations “make stealth and its advantages
increasingly difficult to maintain,” referring primarily to innovations in radar,
computing, and infrared sensors. “Those developments do not herald the end of stealth,
but they do show the limits of stealth design,” he concluded.43 Greenert more recently
characterized stealth as “over-rated.”44 As we detail below, the limits of stealth are very
real. In the case of the F-35, the limits of stealth may be especially harsh because its
radar-evading qualities are built-in and difficult, if not impossible, to significantly alter
once the aircraft is produced.
4.1 Counter-Stealth Radar
The F-35 is reported to have a radar cross section (RCS) of 0.001 square meters from a
narrow frontal aspect. This is the size that the F-35 appears on certain radars, despite its
physical size, and is roughly equivalent to the size of a small ball bearing or insect.45
However, the F-35’s low-observable radar signature has “some gaps in coverage,”46
particularly when viewed from the sides, rear, bottom, or top for which a ten-times
larger RCS of 0.01 square meters or larger has been reported.47 In other words, detection
of the F-35 will be most difficult in head-on engagements and less difficult from other
angles. By comparison, the F-22 is reported to have a smaller RCS of 0.0001 square
13
meters from the same narrow frontal aspect.48
But the returns on the kind of stealth technology employed by the F-35 are being
diminished by advances in radar technology. The low-observable technology on the F35, and to a lesser extent the F-22, is designed to be effective against radar operating in
the X-band range and at shorter wavelengths. The rationale behind this decision was
that X-band radars detect aircraft with a high degree of accuracy and, as a result, are
used to provide fire-control information to anti-aircraft missiles to engage targets.
However, the same properties that make the F-35 stealthy against X-band radars do not
apply as effectively to lower-frequency radars that operate on longer wavelengths.
Lower-band radars are widely employed as surveillance radars to provide early
detection of incoming targets at ranges that typically exceed those of X-band systems.
Since lower-band radars detect targets with less accuracy, they were traditionally
considered unsuitable for providing fire-control information to engage targets.49
But countries threatened by stealth aircraft have had decades of strong incentives to
refine anti-stealth radars. As a result, lower-band radar technology has advanced
considerably. So-called very high frequency (VHF) and ultra-high frequency (ULF)‡
radars that operate on longer wavelengths are now capable of providing usable
targeting information, largely due to more powerful computers that can process
returning radar signals more effectively to filter through clutter and more precisely
locate targets.50 One former Navy official said plainly that because “Acquisition and fire
control radars are starting to creep down the frequency spectrum…I don’t see how you
long survive in the world of 2020 or 2030 when dealing with these systems” using
today’s stealth technology employed by fighter aircraft.51 This is not strictly new. The
effectiveness of such radar systems to target aircraft was demonstrated in 1999 when an
American F-117A Nighthawk stealth attack aircraft (RCS of 0.003 square meters)52 was
shot down by Yugoslav forces using a modified VHF radar model that was introduced
in 1970.53
Foreign militaries are already deploying sophisticated counter-stealth radar systems.
Newer systems like the Russian-built Nebo SVU/M VHF mobile ground-based radar are
reportedly able to not only detect low-observable aircraft but do so accurately enough
to direct missiles toward intended targets.54 The Chinese JY-26 VHF surveillance radar
has reportedly been used to track F-22 flights on the Korean Peninsula.55 But advances
in technology are also making even X-band radars on board fighters more capable of
detecting stealth targets. The IRBIS-E X-band radar developed for the Russian Su-35
‡
The VHF and UHF terminology is unfortunate because, despite their names, VHF and UHF radars actually operate
at lower frequencies than X-band radar, a fact not captured by the nomenclature.
14
fighter can allegedly detect low-observable targets with a RCS of 0.01 square meters –
the same as or smaller than the F-35 from non-frontal angles – at a distance of 50nm.56
4.2 Counter-Stealth Infrared Sensors
Perhaps more significant than counter-stealth radar is the F-35’s vulnerability to
detection by infrared sensors. Infrared search-and-track (IRST) systems, which are
widely deployed on foreign fighter aircraft, can detect aircraft otherwise invisible to
radar at significant distances without emitting any signal of their own. Nodding to IRST
technology’s implications in bypassing radar stealth, Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral Jonathan Greenert stated, “Let's face it, if something moves fast through the
air, disrupts molecules and puts out heat—I don't care how cool the engine can be, it's
going to be detectable.”57 The F-35 will be particularly vulnerable to IRST detection
given its enormous engine that puts out 40,000 lbs. of thrust with no infrared shielding
or suppression.
Already, the OLS-35 IRST featured on the Su-35 can detect aircraft from the frontal
aspect at nearly 30nm, from the rear at 50nm, and missile launches at similar distances.
The Eurofighter Typhoon and other Western fighters are equipped with comparable or
better technology. Moreover, IRST sensors are poised for significant boosts in detection
ranges in the near future. Some analysts have predicted that IRST sensors will soon be
able to detect aircraft or missile launches at ranges of 70nm or greater.58
F-35 Program Costs
Pending the results of the DOD’s review of the number of F-35s it will ultimately
purchase, the Department of Defense presently plans to procure a total of 2,457 F-35s
for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. Broken down by service, the Air Force
intends to purchase 1,763 F-35A conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) variants, the
Navy intends to purchase 260 F-35C carrier variants (CV), and the Marine Corps
intends to purchase 340 F-35B short takeoff/vertical landing (STOVL) variants and 80 F35C variants.59 At a cost of approximately $1.4 trillion, the F-35 is the most expensive
single weapons program in military history.
But for the reasons outlined in the previous section, the capability that the F-35 fleet
offers is very limited. This small return on investment, the result of the F-35’s high costs
and modest capabilities, was not the program’s original intent. The F-35 program began
15
as part of a broader vision of a 5th-generation high-low mix for the U.S. fighter fleet,
whereby the F-22 would provide high-end capability at high cost while the F-35 would
provide less capability at less cost with greater numbers.60 To reduce production and
development expenses in line with this scheme, the F-35 program used a single aircraft
design as the baseline for all three variants that were to share 70-90% common parts.61
However, the design process produced three variants that have only 25%
commonality.62 Rather than save money, analysis by the RAND Corporation found that
the cost of the F-35 program actually exceeds likely costs for three separate aircraft
models by between 37% and 65%.63
Costs mounted and capability decreased as the F-35 program advanced, undermining
the logic of modest capability at an affordable price. Excluding the expense of operating
and sustaining the aircraft, the most recent estimates anticipate a total program cost of
$391.1 billion. These cost estimates are 70% greater than the initial projections of $233
billion made in 2001 when the program intended on acquiring 2,852 aircraft rather than
the 2,457 under current plans (meaning that the program cost per plane has actually
doubled).64 Total program expenses include research and development costs of $54.9
billion (up 60% from an estimate of $34.4 billion in 2001), procurement costs of $331.6
billion (up 71% from $196.6 billion), and military construction costs of $4.6 billion (up
140% from $2 billion).65 Simultaneously, the aircraft grew heavier, less maneuverable,
and shorter-ranged than initially anticipated.
The President’s FY2016 budget request for the Department of Defense requested over
$11 billion for the F-35 program, approximately $8.7 billion of which was for
procurement.66
Going forward, annual expenses threaten to strain procurement budgets in each service.
Current plans are projected to require an average of $12.4 billion per year through 2038
to complete F-35 development and production, hovering around $15 billion per year for
most of the 2020s.67 The Government Accountability Office has warned, “It is unlikely
the program will be able to sustain such a high level of annual funding and if required
funding levels are not reached, the program’s procurement plan may not be
affordable.”68 An additional estimated $1.02 trillion will be required to operate and
sustain the F-35 fleet over its 56-year service life.69
16
Figure 2: Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) For F-35
and 4th-Generation Aircraft it Will or May Replace
Cost in Millions (2014 Constant Dollars)
180
159.2
160
140
120
100
80
$57.30
60
51.6
50.5
40
27.9
18.7
20
0
F-35*
F/A-18C/D
F-15**
*does not distinquish between variants
F-16
AV-8
A-10
**indicates may replace
These costs make the F-35 significantly more expensive than the 4th-generation aircraft it
will replace or serve alongside despite offering less capability in key areas. While some
advocates have claimed the F-35 is comparable in price to 4th-generation fighters and
attack aircraft, the data do not agree. As Figure 2 shows, the Program Acquisition Unit
Cost (PAUC) of the F-35 is nearly $160 million,70 which is anywhere from three to nine
times the cost of the aircraft the F-35 will replace (A-10, AV-8B, F-16, F/A-18C/D) or may
replace (F-15).71 Of the many ways to measure the expense of aircraft, PAUC is the most
complete in that it considers the full direct costs of producing a system, including
research and development, the procurement cost of building the aircraft itself, and the
military construction necessary to field the aircraft.
The F-35 is also significantly more costly to operate compared to 4th-generation aircraft.
The annual cost for sustaining the F-35 fleet is projected at $19.9 billion, $8.8 billion
more (79%) than the $11.1 billion annual cost for sustaining legacy aircraft (F-15s, F-16s,
AV-8Bs, and F/A-18s, excluding A-10s).72 As the result of producing aircraft
concurrently with testing and evaluation, a projected $1.69 billion in additional
expenses will be required to upgrade already produced F-35s to meet operational
standards.73
17
Conclusion
Despite plans for the F-35 to replace most of America’s fighter and attack aircraft, the
platform is ill-suited to cost-effectively counter near-peer foreign militaries. The aircraft
lacks the maneuverability, payload, likely ability to generate sorties, and range to
effectively compete with near-peer competitors despite its lifetime costs of $1.4 trillion.
The aircraft’s survivability depends largely upon stealth characteristics that are already
at risk for obsolescence against adversaries who over the next 50 years will only
continue to upgrade their radar and infrared detection systems. Given the critical
failings of the F-35 program and its exorbitant costs, the aircraft should be regarded as a
bad bet. As such, proceeding with the full program buy of nearly 2,500 units–or any
large-scale buy that approaches that number–should be avoided.
It is not too late to change course. While the outcome of the DOD’s review of its total F35 requirement is not yet clear, the program does not enter into full-rate production
until 2019. Policymakers should take this opportunity to engage in debates about the
future of airpower that have the potential to provide alternatives to a full-scale F-35
program.
Airpower analysts are outlining new options to help counter near-peer adversaries.
While that debate is outside the scope of this study, those options include unmanned
systems, prioritizing effective munitions over expensive aircraft, and returning to a
quantitatively driven approach to airpower featuring large numbers of comparatively
inexpensive platforms. While these are some options, Congress and DOD should begin
a dialogue and study the full range and timetables, costs, and benefits of potential
alternatives to the program.
Whether this opportunity to seriously reassess DOD’s commitment to the F-35 will be
seized remains to be seen. But, by staying fully committed to the F-35 program, the
United States is investing unprecedented resources in the wrong aircraft, at the wrong
time, for the wrong reasons.
18
Appendix A: Comparing F-35
Performance to Other Fighters
In making aircraft performance comparisons, we consulted an array of authoritative
data sources, including Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2014-2015 (In Service; Development
and Production), Jane’s Weapons 2014-2015: Air-Launched, Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft
2004-2005, manufacturers’ specifications, and reports by the Governmental
Accountability Office, the Department of Defense, Congressional Research Service, and
Air Power Australia.
F-35 data presented here consist of official estimates relative to program threshold and
objective requirements or the results of testing and evaluation. As the program is
currently in developmental testing, the F-35’s real performance is still uncertain,
although we did incorporate test results when possible. We reached out to Lockheed
Martin Aeronautics Company in Fort Worth to ensure we portrayed the F-35 as
accurately as possible but received no assistance.
Using performance categories and scenarios collected from these sources, we compared
all three F-35 variants to 4th-generation aircraft they will be replacing in the U.S.
inventory (or may end up replacing in part, as with the F-15), 5th-generation aircraft
they will serve alongside, and foreign 4th generation threat aircraft. These side-by-side
comparisons involved 12 aircraft types measured against 16 performance characteristics
identified as relevant to executing the F-35’s mission, as indicated by the Key
Performance Parameters laid out in the Joint Strike Fighter Operational Requirements
Document and those performance characteristics of fighter aircraft commonly reported
in the literature.
We did not include more specialized kinematic measures such as turn rates because the
data were not available from authoritative sources for the F-35. No such data have been
released by Lockheed Martin to our knowledge or publicly determined by the
Department of Defense or any other authoritative source.
The 16 performance characteristics we tested usually involve variables such as payload,
amount of fuel, and other factors that affect how aircraft perform in specific
circumstances. When possible, we standardized these variables. In all cases, we
specified the assumed variables in the footnotes. As a result, not all comparisons are
fully consistent despite our best efforts, but this is the messy reality of dealing with
19
open-source performance data. Nonetheless, what follows is the most comprehensive,
detailed, and transparent comparison of the F-35 to other fighter and attack aircraft in
any single source of which we are aware.
Performance Categories
Acceleration: How quickly aircraft can accelerate to a given speed determines their
ability to engage and egress at will and also affects fuel burn. The available literature
indicates that acceleration for combat aircraft is typically measured by the number of
seconds it takes to increase speed through the transonic regime (Mach 0.8-1.2).
Transonic speeds are more realistically achieved in combat, as opposed to higher
supersonic speeds that require too much fuel and acceleration time. Altitude and
payload (weapons and fuel) are major factors in acceleration. The acceleration data we
found and present assume comparable payload and are calculated at 30,000 feet, with
the exception of the F-15E (for which the data were calculated at maximum payload and
at 40,000 feet, where acceleration is slower), and Su-27 (fuel and altitude assumptions
unspecified).
Wing loading: Wing loading is the weight of the aircraft divided by wing area, or the
weight supported by each given unit of lifting surface. Wing loading is a measure of an
aircraft’s available lift and an important metric for comparing aircrafts’ ability to
maneuver and turn. Aircraft can maneuver harder when a given weight is supported by
more lift. Note that wing area does not necessarily account for total lift (which can be
produced by surfaces other than the wing of an aircraft). Nor is wing loading the final
word in maneuverability, which is also affected by wing shape, airfoil, and control
surfaces.74 For determining the weight of aircraft, we calculated combat loads using the
same method used for thrust/weight, below. Wing loading is measured in pounds of
weight per foot squared of gross wing area (lb/ft2), with lower measurements indicating
more favorable values.
Thrust/weight: Thrust-to-weight values express the pounds of thrust produced by an
aircraft’s engine per pound of weight of the aircraft. The more thrust per pound of
aircraft available, the faster it can accelerate or climb and the more power it has to
overcome the drag created by hard maneuvers. Our literature review revealed myriad
formulas for calculating thrust/weight values for different aircraft, usually
distinguished by different definitions of accounting for total weight of the aircraft (e.g.,
fuel onboard, weapons load-out, etc.). These varying assumptions made comparing
thrust/weight values between aircraft difficult with the available data. Therefore, we
decided to derive our own baseline formula for a “combat weight” similar to that found
20
in some sources to generate more meaningful comparisons. For our purposes, we
treated combat weight as 50% internal fuel and a full air-to-air weapons load-out, the
composition of which was determined after reviewing weapons configurations and
imagery found in authoritative data sources. This produced the equation Wc = IF/2 + We
+ Ww (except in the case of the A-10, where air-to-ground munitions were added). The
objective was to provide typical and realistic, not necessarily maximum, load-outs (for
example, our F/A-18C has four AIM-120 AMRAAMs when it can technically carry up to
10) to account for factors such as pylons taken up by dropped fuel tanks or the drag
penalties imposed by dual missile rails. We provide separate values for thrust/weight of
engines with and without the use of afterburners.
Maximum thrust: Maximum thrust is the total engine static thrust output with
afterburner. Thrust is important to acceleration, speed, and maneuverability. While the
use of afterburner increases thrust, it consumes large amounts of fuel and is only used
temporarily to enhance performance. Thrust output is measured in pounds of force, or
pound-force (lbf).
Military power: Military power is the total engine static thrust output without
afterburner. Thrust is important to speed and maneuverability. Thrust output is
measured in pounds of force, or pound-force (lbf).
Empty weight: Empty weight is the weight of aircraft with systems, engines, etc.
installed minus internal/external fuel and payload. Empty aircraft weight is measured
in pounds (lbs.).
Maximum Take-Off Weight (MTOW): MTOW is the maximum weight of an aircraft
that is estimated to allow for safe take-off once the weight of fuel and weapons are
added to the aircraft’s empty weight. Along with available space and hardpoints,
maximum take-off weight limits the total weight of weapons, cargo, and other
equipment that can be carried. Maximum take-off weight is measured in pounds (lbs.).
In combat, MTOW is almost never used because it renders the plane far too sluggish.
Maximum payload: Maximum payload is the total load of weapons, cargo, and other
mission equipment that can be carried. Maximum payload weight is measured in
pounds (lbs.).
Internal fuel: Internal fuel is the amount of fuel an aircraft can carry internally,
excluding external drop tanks. Internal fuel capacity is measured in pounds (lbs.).
21
Ferry range: Ferry range is the maximum safe range an aircraft can travel for purposes
of redeployment without needing to return to base, maneuver, or carry payload. Ferry
range is measured in nautical miles (nm).
Range (IF): Range is the distance an aircraft can fly while taking into account fuel
requirements for relevant maneuvers or payload weight. Range is measured in nautical
miles (nm).
Combat radius: Combat radius is the range for conducting and returning from a
particular mission with a specific flight profile without in-flight refueling. Combat
radius is generally calculated rather than proven in testing. Combat radius is subject to
variable inputs such as mission flight profile (i.e., assumptions about getting to the
target area, maneuvering against targets, and returning home), payload configuration,
payload drag, etc. Although combat radii are highly variable, they are nonetheless
important values that capture operational distances in real-world circumstances. We
used combat radius figures from authoritative sources and detailed their assumptions
regarding mission inputs in the footnotes in as much detail as possible. These
assumptions frequently included external fuel tanks or heavy weapons that would
reduce other performance parameters, such as acceleration or thrust to weight, but may
not be reflected in those values on the chart (this was a feature of much of the data we
observed in the literature as well). Combat radius is measured in nautical miles (nm).
Maximum +g: Maximum +g measures the maximum amount of gravitational forces (gforces) that an aircraft’s structure can sustain without damage while maneuvering.
Maximum +g rating of an aircraft is an important variable for airframe durability.
Maximum +g is measured in gravitational force (g) as equivalent to one standard Earth
gravity unit.
Rate of climb: Measured at sea level, rate of climb indicates how quickly an aircraft can
reach a given altitude. Rate of climb is an important aspect of maneuvering. Our charts
measure climb rates in feet per minute (ft/min).
Service ceiling: Service ceiling is the maximum altitude at which an aircraft can
effectively operate. The higher and faster an aircraft can fly, the farther it can deploy its
weapons and sensors. Service ceiling is measured in feet (ft).
A note on maximum speed: While maximum speed can be important in some cases,
reaching maximum speed requires a prohibitive amount of fuel and time to be useful in
most combat circumstances.
22
F-35A CTOL
F-35B
STOVL
77
81 sec
F-35C CV
0.62, 1.00
97
reheat
40,000 lbf
89.75
2 86
lb/ft
0.63, 0.92
98
reheat
38,000 lbf
62.53
2 88
lb/ft
0.77, 1.25
100
reheat
47,540 lbf
109
110
76
Acceleration
63 sec
Wing loading
86.99 lb/ft
2
Max thrust
Military power
Empty weight
MTOW
Max payload
F-15E*
78
~100 sec
25,000 lbf
26,000 lbf
119
120
29,300 lb
32,300 lb
68.07
2 87
lb/ft
0.53, 0.85
99
reheat
40,000
111
lbf
25,000
121
lbf
34,800 lb
130
131
132
133
70,000-lb
142
class
18,000 lb
154
(4,788)
60,000-lb
143
class
15,000 lb
155
(2,695)
70,000-lb
144
class
18,000 lb
(4,788)
58,250 lb
85
Thrust/Weight
108 sec
F-15C*
F-16C 50/52
79
79.05 lb/ft
2
42 sec
84.39 lb/ft
2
F-22A
81
24 sec
78.44 lb/ft
2
84.33 lb/ft
2
62.73 lb/ft
2
MiG-29/S
82
31 sec
65.60 lb/ft
2 94
69.32 lb/ft
0.74, 1.21
101
reheat
113
58,200 lbf
0.70, 1.15
102
reheat
29,100 lbf
0.69, 1.13
103
reheat
35,508 lbf
1.16
114
115
17,800 lbf
21,800 lbf
23,800 lbf
18,130 lbf
22,220 lbf
124
125
126
127
128
14,859 lb
23,611 lb
137
138
30,999 lb
47,400 lb
149
150
17,000 lb
16,000 lb
161
162
23,087 lb
163
(3,069)
10,700 lb
18,000 lb
35,600 lbf
33,946 lb
81,000 lb
134
146
19,643
135
48,000 lb
24,500 lb
158
19,522 lb
159
0.51
105
1.27 reheat
106
70,000 lbf
116
2
84
75.35 lb/ft
2
95
96
0.71, 1.17
107
reheat
36,600 lbf
0.67, 1.31
108
reheat
118
66,140 lbf
117
23,832 lb
147
104
75
27 sec
92
123
93
Su-27
83
91
56,000 lb
136
148
145
23,600 lb
A-10
90
122
28,600 lb
80
AV-8B
89
112
29,180 lbf
28 sec
F/A-18C/D
15,500 lb
160
157
43,340 lb
139
24,030 lb
33,750 lbf
129
36,111 lb
141
72,752 lb
153
17,637 lb
165
20,723 lb
177
2,370 nm
186
2,046 nm
192
140
83,500 lb
151
43,431 lb
152
9,921 lb
164
156
Internal fuel
(IF)
Ferry range
18,200 lb
13,100 lb
19,200 lb
13,455 lb
166
167
168
169
23,340 lb
170
7,116 lb
171
10,860 lb
172
2,500 nm
Combat radius
Max +G
204
Max speed at
altitude
Rate of climb
1,200 nm
900 nm
1,200 nm
187
188
189
456 nm
610 nm
194
195
613 nm
9.0
193
205
7.0
206
7.5
2,400 nm
179
2,415 nm
180
1,800 nm
1,089 nm
175
181
1,965 nm
2,300 nm
182
183
10,229 lb
176
1,600 nm
184
1,565 nm
185
190
1,133 nm
191
207
685 nm
9.0
196
208
Mach 1.6
Mach 1.6
Mach 1.6
Mach 2.5
217
218
219
220
Service ceiling
50,000
230
ft/min
60,000 ft
238
239
229
173
174
178
Range (IF)
7,759 lb
685-750 nm
200-845 nm
290-600 nm
197
198
199
9.0
209
Mach 2.5
9.0
221
50,000
231
ft/min
240
60,000 ft
210
Mach 2.0
7.5
222
50,000
232
ft/min
241
50,000 ft
211
Mach 1.8
223
50,000
233
ft/min
242
50,000 ft
594-627
200
nm
212
8.0
250-540
201
nm
213
7.33
9.0
Mach 0.98
Mach 0.56
Mach 1.7
224
225
14,700
234
ft/min
38,000 ft
6,000
235
ft/min
45,000 ft
243
244
214
50,000 ft
226
245
203
459-702
202
nm
215
9.0
840 nm
Mach 2.3
Mach 2.17
227
228
64,960
236
ft/min
59,060 ft
45,275
237
ft/min
247
59,060 ft
9.0
216
246
KEY:
Pink = F-35 Variant; Blue = 4th-generation aircraft F-35 will or may replace (may replace marked with an asterisk); Green = 5th-generation aircraft F-35 will serve
alongside; Red = Foreign 4th-generation fighters; Gray = no authoritative data discovered.
Notes
1
Gen. Dunford stated, “With projected adversarial threats challenging our current capabilities in coming years, the Joint Strike Fighter is a vital component of our effort to
ensure the Joint Force maintains dominance in the air. Given the evolving defense strategy and the latest Defense Planning Guidance, we are presently taking the newest
strategic foundation and analyzing whether 2,443 aircraft is the correct number. Until the analysis is complete, we need to pursue the current scheduled quantity buy to
preclude creating an overall near-term tactical fighter shortfall.” “Advance Questions for General Joseph F. Dunford Jr., USMC, Nominee for the Position of Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff." United States Senate Committee on Armed Services. Last modified July 9, 2015. Available at: http://www.armedservices.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dunford_07-09-15.pdf
2
Gen. Dunford stated, “Fifth-generation fighter aircraft, including the F-35, are critical as we contend with the technological advancements of near-peer competitors. We must
ensure that we do not allow shortfalls in fighter capability or capacity to develop. The Department has been working diligently to make the overall cost per F-35 more affordable.
Additionally, there will continue to be critical updates throughout the life cycle of the F-35 that will ensure the platform maintains a tactical advantage.” Ibid.
3
Chief of Staff of the U.S Air Force Gen. Mark Welsh said, "The decision to truncate the F-22 buy has left us in a position where even to provide air superiority, which was not the
original intent of the F-35 development, but even to provide air superiority on a theater scale, in a full-spectrum fight against a well-armed foe in 10 years from now, let's say -and, remember, as a platform-based force, we're investing today for capability we'll need then -- you have to have the F-35 to augment the F-22 to do the air superiority fight at
the beginning of a high-end conflict to survive against the fifth generation threats we believe will be in the world at that point in time." Thank you to Mandy Smithberger for
pointing this out to me. “Press Briefing by Acting Secretary of the Air Force Eric Fanning and Air Force Chief of Staff General Mark A. Welsh III on the State of the Air Force in the
Pentagon Briefing Room.” U.S. Department of Defense. December 13, 2013. Available at: http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5344
4
“Deter, deny, and defeat state adversaries” is listed as a top national military objective in the National Military Strategy. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The National Military Strategy of
the United States of America. June 2015. Available at: http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf
5
Lockheed Martin claims the F-35 will succeed in its air-to-air role by leveraging BVR engagements. The Air Force made the same claim with the F-4 Phantom, which turned out
to be false. “The U.S. Air Force Promised the F-4 Would Never Dogfight.” War is Boring. Last modified July 6, 2015. Available at: https://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-u-s-airforce-promised-the-f-4-would-never-dogfight-3e1a66da4e73
6
Time Magazine, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Time Magazine, Military, 2013. Available at: https://timemilitary.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/f-35-jsf-dote-fy12-annual-report.pdf.
7
“The Sustained Turning Performance of the F-35A Lightning II was recently disclosed as 4.95 G at Mach 0.8 and 15,000 ft. A 1969 F-4 Phantom II could sustain 5.5 Gs at 0.8 Mach
with 40 percent internal fuel at 20,000 feet.” Goon, Peter, and Carlo Kopp, “Air Combat: Russia’s PAK-FA versus the F-22 and F-35.” Air Power Australia. Available at:
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-300309-1.html#3.
8
See the program objectives: “Joint Strike Fighter.” Air Power Australia. Last modified June 7, 2014. Available at: http://www.ausairpower.net/jsf.html
9
Air Power Australia, “Joint Strike Fighter.” Air Power Australia. Last modified June 7, 2014. Available at: http://www.ausairpower.net/jsf.html.
10
“The fuel levels and payloads at which maneuverability is calculated differs for each variant but generally focuses on a post-weapons release payload and fuel state at 50% of
the required combat radius.” Bowman, Geoffrey P. “Scorecard: A Case study of the Joint Strike Fighter Program.” Air Command and Staff College, Air University. Last modified
April 2008. Available at: https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q_mod_be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153/q_act_downloadpaper/q_obj_19233467-2759-4d04-8da4e22afe648499/display.aspx?rs=enginespage
11
Government Accountability Office, “Navy Aviation: F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal Operational Improvement at High Cost,” H.R. Doc. No. 104-GAO/NSIAD-96-98, 2d Sess.
(1996). Available at: http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ns96098.pdf.
12
Mills, Chris. “Review of the Defense Annual Report 2010-2011 – Assessing the Evidence Provided by AVM KYM Osley, New Air Combat Capability Project Manager.” Testimony
provided to the Defense Sub-Committee, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade, Parliament of Australia. March 30, 2012. Available at:
www.aphref.aph.gov.au-house-committee-jfadt-defenceannualreport_2010_2011-submissions-sub11(1).pdf
24
13
Bill Sweetman, “Controversy Flares Over F-35 Air Combat Report,” Aviation Week, last modified July 2, 2015. Available at: http://aviationweek.com/defense/controversyflares-over-f-35-air-combat-report.
14
See: “Test Pilot Admist the F-35 Can’t Dogfight.” War is Boring. Last modified June 29, 2015. Available at: https://medium.com/war-is-boring/test-pilot-admits-the-f-35-can-tdogfight-cdb9d11a875. See also: “Read for Yourself – the F-35’s Damning Dogfighting Report.” War is Boring. Last modified July 1, 2015. Available at: https://medium.com/waris-boring/read-for-yourself-the-f-35-s-damning-dogfighting-report-719a4e66f3eb
15
“Joint Program Office Response to ‘War is Boring’ Blog.” Lockheed Martin – F-35 Lightning II. Last modified July 1, 2015. Available at: https://www.f35.com/news/detail/jointprogram-office-response-to-war-is-boring-blog
16
Mills, Chris. “Submission No. 11: Review of the Defense Annual Report 2010-2011 – Assessing the Evidence Provided by AVM KYM Osley, New Air Combat Capability Project
Manager.” Testimony provided to the Defense Sub-Committee, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade, Parliament of Australia. March 30, 2012.
Available at: www.aphref.aph.gov.au-house-committee-jfadt-defenceannualreport_2010_2011-submissions-sub11(1).pdf
18
Mills, Chris. “Submission No. 5: Review of the Defense Annual Report 2010-2011 – Loss-Exchange-Ratios Information.” Defense Sub-Committee, Joint Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade, Parliament of Australia. Available at: www.aphref.aph.gov.au-house-committee-jfadt-defenceannualreport_2010_2011-submissionssub5(1).pdf
19
The simulation against Su-35s was conducted by a firm named REPSIM and modelled force-on-force engagement between 24 Chinese Su-35 as 24 F-35s plus enabling aircraft.
The model assumed U.S. forces were operating from Guam, on the basis that access was denied from closer air basing by PLA precision strikes, and that land-based HighFrequency Over-the-Horizon Radar directed Chinese forces towards the U.S. forces until other advanced sensors allowed them to engage the otherwise stealthy F-35s. See the
following section for why these assumptions are consistent with developments in counter-stealth sensors.
20
Lockheed Martin, “F-35C Carrier Variant.” Available at: http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/f35/f-35c-carrier-variant.html and Majumdar, Dave, “Pentagon Worries
That Russia Can Now Outshoot U.S. Stealth Jets.” The Daily Beast. Last modified December 4, 2014. Available at: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/12/04/pentagonworries-that-russia-can-now-outshoot-u-s-stealth-jets.html.
21
Axe, David, “Joint Strike Fighter’s Outrageous Claim.” Wired. Last modified September 9, 2008. Available at: http://www.wired.com/2008/09/joint-strike-fi/.
22
SinoDefence, “PLAAF SU-27 / J-11 ‘FLANKER’.” SinoDefence | Chinese Aeronautics and Astronautics. Last modified June 20, 2014. Available at:
http://sinodefence.com/chinese-military-aircraft/plaaf-su-27-j-11-flanker/.
23
Patrick Higby, “Promise and Reality: Beyond Visual Range (BVR) Air-To-Air Combat.” Air War College, Air University. Last modified March 30, 2015. Available at:
http://pogoarchives.org/labyrinth/11/09.pdf
24
John Stillion and Scott Perdue, “Air Combat Past, Present and Future.” RAND Corporation, Project Air Force. Last modified August 2008. Available at:
http://www.mossekongen.no/downloads/2008_RAND_Pacific_View_Air_Combat_Briefing.pdf
25
Ibid.
26
Russian and Chinese aircraft deploy digital radio frequency memory (DRFM) jammers which are reported to “effectively memorize an incoming radar signal and repeat it back
to the sender, seriously [hampering] the performance of friendly radars. Worse, these new jammers essentially blind the small radars found onboard air-to-air missiles like the
Raytheon AIM-120 AMRAAM, which is the primary long-range weapon for all U.S. and most allied fighter planes.” See: Majumdar, Dave, “Pentagon Worries That Russia Can Now
Outshoot U.S. Stealth Jets.” The Daily Beast. Last modified December 4, 2014. Available at: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/12/04/pentagon-worries-that-russiacan-now-outshoot-u-s-stealth-jets.html.
27
See Hayward, Doug. “F-35 Weapon System Overview. Report no. JSF 10-205.” N.p.: Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company, 2010. Available at:
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2010armament/TuesdayLandmarkADougHayward.pdf.
28
Osborn, Kris, “New Small Diameter Bomb Doesn’t Fit Inside Marine’s F-35B.” Military.com. Last modified March 4, 2015. Available at: http://www.military.com/dailynews/2015/03/04/new-small-diameter-bomb-doesnt-fit-inside-marines-f35b.html.
25
29
Rogoway, Tyler, “Pierre Sprey's Anti-F-35 Diatribe Is Half Brilliant And Half Bullshit.” Foxtrot Alpha. Last modified June 20, 2014. Available at:
http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/pierre-spreys-anti-f-35-diatribe-is-half-brilliant-and-1592445665.
30
Department of Defense, Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation. FY2014 Annual Report: F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Last modified January 2015. Available at:
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1667970-2014f35jsf.html#document/p22/a205814.
31
Brian Dowling, “Federal Auditors Rate Reliability of F-35 Engine ‘Very Poor,’” Military.com, last modified April 28, 2015. Available at: http://www.military.com/dailynews/2015/04/28/federal-auditors-rate-reliability-of-f-35-engine-very-poor.html.
32
Government Accountability Office, F-35 Sustainment: Need for Affordable Strategy, Greater Attention to Risks, and Improved Cost Estimates. By Cary Russell. GAO-14-778. Last
modified September 2014. Available at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666042.pdf.
33
French, Bill. “Reshaping Pentagon spending and Capabilities: Setting Priorities for the Future.” National Security Network. Last modified March 1, 2013. Available at:
http://nsnetwork.org/cms/assets/uploads/2013/03/NSN-Reshaping-Pentagon-Spending-and-Capabilities_Future-Priorities_FINAL-0313132.pdf.
34
Parish, Karen. “U.S. Following Through on Pacific Rebalance, Hagel Says.” U.S. Department of Defense. Last modified June 1, 2013. Available at:
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120186
35
Eric Stephen Gons, “Access Challenges and Implications for Airpower in the Western Pacific.” RAND Corporation, Pardee RAND Graduate School. Last modified 2011. Available
at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2011/RAND_RGSD267.pdf
36
See: Department of Defense, 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. Last modified March 4, 2014. Available at:
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf Focus on countering anti-access systems has also been reflected in doctrine, first under the Air-Sea
Battle concept, now renamed Joint Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons.
37
In some cases the level of risk incurred by operating within range of Chinese long-range strike systems is severe. For example, one RAND study concluded that 34 sub-munition
warheads delivered by short ranged ballistic missiles (SRBMs) could destroy or damage 75% of the aircraft stationed at Kadena Airbase on Okinawa. For more: John Stillion and
Scott Perdue, “Air Combat Past, Present and Future.” RAND Corporation, Project Air Force. Last modified August 2008. Available at:
https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/files/2008_RAND_Pacific_View_Air_Combat_Briefing.pdf For general information, see: Eric Stephen Gons, “Access Challenges and
Implications for Airpower in the Western Pacific.” RAND Corporation, Pardee RAND Graduate School. Last modified 2011. Available at:
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2011/RAND_RGSD267.pdf and Gunzinger, Mark A. “Sustaining America’s Advantage in Long-Range Strike.”
Center for Strategic and Budget Analysis. Last modified 2010. Available at: http://csbaonline.org/publications/2010/09/americas-strategic-advantage-long-range-strike/
38
For a fairly extensive assessment of the implications of relying on Anderson AFB, see: Gons, Eric Stephen. “Access Challenges and Implications for Airpower in the Western
Pacific.” Publication no. RGSD-267. N.p.: RAND Corporation, 2011. Available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD267.html Ranges of Anderson AFB to the East
and South China Seas were gathered from Google Maps.
39
Berteau, David J., and Michael J. Green, et al. “U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment.” N.p.: Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 2012. Available at: http://csis.org/files/publication/120814_FINAL_PACOM_optimized.pdf.
See also: The Diplomat. “The US Air Force’s New Game Plan in the Asia-Pacific.” The Diplomat. Last modified October 9, 2013. Available at:
http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/the-us-air-forces-new-game-plan-in-the-asia-pacific/
40
Martinage, Robert. “Toward a New Offset Strategy: Exploiting U.S. Long-Term Advantages to Restore U.S. Global Power Projection Capability.” N.p.: Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, 2014. Available at: http://csbaonline.org/publications/2014/10/toward-a-new-offset-strategy-exploiting-u-s-long-term-advantages-to-restore-u-sglobal-power-projection-capability/.
See also: Knepper, Greg, and Peter W. Singer. “Short Legs Can't Win Arms Races: Range Issues and New Threats to Aerial Refueling put U.S. Strategy at Risk.” War on the Rocks.
Available at: http://warontherocks.com/2015/05/short-legs-cant-win-arms-races-range-issues-new-threats-aerial-refueling/?singlepage=1
41
Ibid
42
Watts, Barry. "The Maturing Revolution in Military Affairs." Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Last modified June 2, 2011. Available at:
http://csbaonline.org/publications/2011/06/the-maturing-revolution-in-military-affairs/
26
43
Greenert, Jonathan W., Adm. "Payloads over Platforms: Charting a New Course." U.S. Naval Institute. Last modified July 2012. Available at:
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-07/payloads-over-platforms-charting-new-course
44
Osborn, Kris. "CNO: Next-Generation Navy Fighter Might Not Need Stealth." DefenseTech: Where Technology and Defense Interact. Last modified February 5, 2015. Available
at: http://defensetech.org/2015/02/05/cno-next-generation-navy-fighter-might-not-need-stealth/
45
Global Security. "Radar Cross Section (RCS)." Global Security. Last modified November 7, 2011. Available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/stealth-aircraftrcs.htm
46
Congressional Research Service. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program. By Jeremiah Gertler. Research report no. RL30563. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,
2014. Available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30563.pdf
47
Mills, Chris. "Air Combat: Russia's PAK-FA versus the F-22 and F-35." Air Power Australia: Australia's Independent Defense Think Tank. Last modified March 30, 2009. Available
at: http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-300309-1.html
48
Ibid.
49
For a summary of radar, stealth, and counter-stealth radar technical considerations, see: Watts, “The Maturing Revolution in Military Affairs,” available at:
http://csbaonline.org/publications/2011/06/the-maturing-revolution-in-military-affairs/
50
For a summary of some current and potential dynamics involving lower-band radars, see: Kopp, Carlo. "Russian VHF Counter Stealth Radars Proliferate."
Defense Today, 2008, 32-36. Available at: http://www.ausairpower.net/SP/DT-Rus-VHF-Radar-2008.pdf
51
Majumdar, Dave. "Chinese and Russian Radars On Track to See Through U.S. Stealth." USNI News. Last modified July 29, 2014. Available at:
http://news.usni.org/2014/07/29/chinese-russian-radars-track-see-u-s-stealth
52
Global Security, “Radar Cross Section (RCS).” Available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/stealth-aircraft-rcs.htm
53
See Kopp, “Russian VHF Counter Stealth Radars Proliferate,” 32-36. Available at: http://www.ausairpower.net/SP/DT-Rus-VHF-Radar-2008.pdf
54
Kopp, Carlo. "Russian / PLA Low Band Surveillance Radars." Air Power Australia. Last modified April 2012. Available at: http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Rus-Low-BandRadars.html: Kopp, Carlo. "Assessing Joint Strike Fighter Defense Penetration Capabilities Annex A, B, C." Air Power Australia. Last modified January 7, 2009. Available at:
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-2009-01-Annex.html#mozTocId787784
55
Minnick, Wendell. "China's Anti-Stealth Radar Comes to Fruition." Defense News. Last modified November 22, 2014. Available at:
http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20141122/DEFREG03/311220016/China-s-Anti-Stealth-Radar-Comes-Fruition
56
Kopp, Carlo. "Sukhoi Flankers: The Shifting Balance of Regional Air Power." Air Power Australia. Last modified April 2012. Available at: http://www.ausairpower.net/APAFlanker.html
57
Osborn, “CNO: Next-Generation Navy Fighter Might Not Need Stealth.” Available at: http://defensetech.org/2015/02/05/cno-next-generation-navy-fighter-might-not-needstealth/
58
Quantum Well Imaging Photodetectors (QWIP) increase the sensitivity of infrared sensors and allow the detection of heat signatures from greater ranges and with greater
accuracy. Mills, Chris. “Air Combat: Russia’s PAK-FA versus the F-22 and F-35.” Air Power Australia. Last modified March 30, 2009. Available at:
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-300309-1.html
59
Gertler, Jeremiah, “F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JFS) Program,” (CRS Report No. RL30563). Washington D.C: Congressional Research Service, 2014. Available at:
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30563.pdf.
60
Ibid.
61
This strategy was intended to save “at least $15 billion” compared to the cost of producing three entirely separate aircrafts, one for each service. Ibid
62
Project on Government Oversight, “Air Force’s Rush to Station Unproven F-35A Joint Strike Fighter in Burlington is Irresponsible and Potentially Dangerous.” News release.
November 6, 2013. Available at: http://www.pogo.org/about/press-room/releases/2013/air-forces-rush-to-station-unproven-f35.html?referrer=https://www.google.com/.
63
Lorell, Mark A., Michael Kennedy, Robert S. Leonard, Ken Munson, Shmuel Abramzon, David L. An and Robert A. Guffey. “Do Joint Fighter Programs Save Money?” Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013. Available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1225.
27
64
Thank you to Winslow Wheeler for pointing this out to me via e-mail.
Government Accountability Office, “F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Assessment Needed to Address Affordability Challenges,” H.R. Rep. No. 114-GAO-15-364, 1st Sess. (2014).
Available at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669619.pdf.
66
Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/CFO February 2015, “United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request: Program Acquisition Cost by
Weapon System,” (2015). Available at: http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2016/FY2016_Weapons.pdf.
67
Government Accountability Office, “F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Assessment Needed to Address Affordability Challenges,” H.R. Rep. No. 114-GAO-15-364, 1st Sess. (2014).
Available at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669619.pdf.
68
Ibid
69
Government Accountability Office, “F-35 Sustainment: Need for Affordable Strategy, Greater Attention to Risks, and Improved Cost Estimates,” H.R. Doc. No. 113-GAO-14-778,
2d Sess. (2014). Available at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666042.pdf.
70
The PAUC of $160 million divides the total program costs by the total number of units produced and does not distinguish be the F-35A, F-35B, and F-35C variants.
65
The PAUC for each aircraft was determined by dividing the total cost of each program by the units produced. The data used are from the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) series
produced by the Department of Defense. The specific data used for each aircraft were selected from the most recent report to provide data for that aircraft, meaning those
given were the most comprehensive out of the relevant SARs. However, since the SAR reports stopped on each aircraft, upgrades have continued on each airframe which would
add to the PAUC cost. These costs were not discovered and not included in PAUC costs. While this means that legacy PAUCs are actually higher than those recorded in the SARs,
it is also true that by the time the F-35 reaches its later operational life that additional upgrades which are not presently anticipated will also have to be counted towards the
total cost of the program, which is likewise not reflected in its PAUC.
The dollar values of each aircraft were converted into 2014 dollars using the Department of Labor inflation calculator.
For the F-35, the engine and aircraft figures (recorded separately) were combined from: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics;
Acquisition Resources and Analysis (ARA) Deputy Director of Acquisition Management, Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) Summary Tables, Doc. (2015). Available at:
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/sar/SST-2014-12.pdf.
For the F/A-18C/D, see: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology; Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) Summary Tables, Doc. (1995). Available at:
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/sar/1994-DEC-SARSUMTAB.pdf.
For the F-15, see: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Cost Management; Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) Summary Tables, Doc. (1991). Available at:
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/sar/1990-DEC-SARSUMTAB.pdf.
For the F-16, see: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology; Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) Summary Tables, Doc. (1995). Available at:
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/sar/1994-DEC-SARSUMTAB.pdf.
For the Av-8B see: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Performance Management; Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) Summary Tables, Doc.
(1993). Available at: http://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/sar/1992-DEC-SARSUMTAB.pdf.
For the A-10 see: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) Highlights, Doc. (1982). Available at:
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/sar/1982-MAR-SARSUMTAB.pdf.
28
72
Government Accountability Office, “F-35 Sustainment: Need for Affordable Strategy, Greater Attention to Risks, and Improved Cost Estimates,” H.R. Doc. No. 113-GAO-14-778,
2d Sess. (2014). Available at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666042.pdf
73
Drew, James, “F-35 Concurrency Cost Rises Slightly, but Trend Stabilises.” Flightglobal.com. Last modified May 4, 2015. Available at:
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/f-35-concurrency-cost-rises-slightly-but-trend-stabilises-411882/
75
Refers to models: Su-27/UB/SK/SMK
“The program announced an intention to change performance specifications for the F-35A, reducing turn performance from 5.3 to 4.6 sustained g’s and extending the time for
acceleration from 0.8 Mach to 1.2 Mach by 8 seconds. These changes were due to the results of air vehicle performance and flying qualities evaluations.” Testing conducted at
30,000 ft. The fuel levels and payloads at which maneuverability is calculated differs for each variant but generally focuses on a post-weapons release payload and fuel state at
50% of the required combat radius.
Department of Defense. The Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation. DOT&E FY2012 Annual Report, 30. Last modified December 2012. Available at:
http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2012/pdf/dod/2012f35jsf.pdf and Bowman, Geoffrey. “Scorecard: A Case study of the Joint Strike Fighter Program.” Air Command and
Staff College, Air University. Last modified April 2008. Available at: http://2011.uploaded.fresh.co.il/2011/05/18/36290792.pdf
77
“The program announced an intention to change performance specifications for the F-35B, reducing turn performance from 5.0 to 4.5 sustained g’s and extending the time for
acceleration from 0.8 Mach to 1.2 Mach by 16 seconds. These changes were due to the results of air vehicle performance and flying qualities evaluations.” Testing conducted at
30,000 ft. The fuel levels and payloads at which maneuverability is calculated differs for each variant but generally focuses on a post-weapons release payload and fuel state at
50% of the required combat radius.
Ibid., 32. Available at: http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2012/pdf/dod/2012f35jsf.pdf and Ibid., Available at: http://2011.uploaded.fresh.co.il/2011/05/18/36290792.pdf
78
“The program announced an intention to change performance specifications for the F-35C, reducing turn performance from 5.1 to 5.0 sustained g’s and increasing the time for
acceleration from 0.8 Mach to 1.2 Mach by at least 43 seconds. These changes were due to the results of air vehicle performance and flying qualities evaluations.” Testing
conducted at 30,000 ft. The fuel levels and payloads at which maneuverability is calculated differs for each variant but generally focuses on a post-weapons release payload and
fuel state at 50% of the required combat radius.
Ibid., 33. Available at: http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2012/pdf/dod/2012f35jsf.pdf and Ibid., Available at:http://2011.uploaded.fresh.co.il/2011/05/18/36290792.pdf.
79
At 58,100 lb. gross weight and 40,000 ft. McDonnell Douglas Aerospace. “TO 1F-15E-1 Flight Manual,” 602. Avialogs. Last modified April 15, 1993. Available at:
http://www.avialogs.com/index.php/en/aircraft/usa/mcdonnelldouglas/f-15eagle/to-1f-15e-1-flight-manual-f-15e-aircraft.html#download.
80
“Two IR Missiles + Two BVR Provisions + 50% Fuel.” Goon, Peter and Kopp, Carlo. “Joint Strike Fighter – Comparison: Acceleration Performance at 30,000 FT – ISA.” Air Power
Australia. Last modified 2012. Available at: http://www.ausairpower.net/jsf.html.
81
“Two IR Missiles + Two BVR Provisions + 50% Fuel.” Ibid.
82
“Two IR Missiles + Two BVR Provisions + 50% Fuel.” Ibid.
83
“Two IR Missiles + Two BVR Provisions + 50% Fuel.” Ibid.
84
From 324 kt. to 701 kt., altitude unspecified. Jackson, Paul, Fred Jane, C.G. Grey, John Taylor, and Mark Lambert, eds. Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 2004-2005. 95th ed.
Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 2005.
85
Own calculation: 9,100 lb. fuel + 29,300 lb. empty weight + 180 rounds of 25mm GAU-22/A ammunition at 198 lb. + four internal AIM-120C-5’s at 354 lb. each = 40,014 lb.
2
combat weight, divided by 460 ft wing area. Bushell, Susan, and David Willis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited by Paul
th
Jackson. Hewson, Robert, ed. IHS Jane’s Weapons 2014-2015: Air-Launched. 60 Revised ed. London: Jane’s Information Group, 2014.
86
Own calculation: 6,550 lb. fuel + 32,300 lb. empty weight + 1,017 lb. gun pod with 220 rounds of 25mm GAU-22/A ammunition + four internal AIM-120C-5’s at 354 lb. each =
2
41,283 lb. combat weight, divided by 460 ft wing area. Bushell, Susan, and David Willis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited
by Paul Jackson. Hewson, Robert, ed. IHS Jane’s Weapons 2014-2015: Air-Launched.
76
29
87
Own calculation: 9,600 lb. fuel + 34,800 lb. empty weight + 1,017 lb. gun pod with 220 rounds of 25mm GAU-22/A ammunition + four internal AIM-120C-5’s at 354 lb. each =
2
46,833 lb. combat weight, divided by 688 ft wing area. Bushell, Susan, and David Willis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited
by Paul Jackson. Hewson, Robert, ed. IHS Jane’s Weapons 2014-2015: Air-Launched.
88
Own calculation: 6,727.5 lb. fuel + 28,600 lb. empty weight +940 rounds of 20mm M61A1 ammunition at 528 lb. + four AIM-120C-5’s at 354 lb. each + four AIM-9X’s at 187 lb.
2
each = 38,019.5 lb. combat weight, divided by 608 ft wing area. Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter; Hewson, Robert,
ed. IHS Jane’s Weapons 2014-2015: Air-Launched and McDonnell Douglas Corporation. “F-15 Armament Handbook.” Avialogs. Last modified October 1979. Available at:
http://www.avialogs.com/en/aircraft/usa/mcdonnelldouglas/f-15eagle/f-15-armament-handbook.html
89
Own calculation: 11,670 lb. fuel + 33,946 lb. empty weight + 510 rounds of 20mm M61A1 ammunition at 281 lb. + four AIM-120C-5’s at 354 lb. each + four AIM-9X’s at 187 lb.
2
each = 48,061 lb. combat weight, divided by 608 ft wing area. Bushell, Susan, and David Willis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production.
Edited by Paul Jackson; Hewson, Robert, ed. IHS Jane’s Weapons 2014-2015: Air-Launched and “F-15E 20mm Gatling Gun.” General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems.
Available at: http://www.gd-ots.com/armament_systems/ags_F-15E.html.
90
Own calculation: 3,558 lb. fuel + 19,643 lb. empty weight + 511 rounds of 20mm M61A1 ammunition at 325 lb. + four AIM-120C-5’s at 354 lb. each + two AIM-9X’s at 187 lb.
2
each = 25,316 lb. combat weight, divided by 300 ft wing area. Bushell, Susan, and David Willis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production.
Edited by Paul Jackson; Hewson, Robert, ed. IHS Jane’s Weapons 2014-2015: Air-Launched and “F-16 20mm Gun System.” General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems.
Available at: http://www.gd-ots.com/armament_systems/ags_F-16.html.
91
Own calculation: 5,430 lb. fuel + 23,832 lb. empty weight + 578 rounds of 20mm M61A2 ammunition at 325 lb. + two AIM-9X’s at 187 lb. each + four AIM-120C-5’s at 354 lb.
2
each = 31,377 lb. combat weight, divided by 400 ft wing area. Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter; “F/A-18E/F 20mm
Gatling Gun System.” General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems. Available at: http://www.gd-ots.com/armament_systems/ags_F-18.html; and Hewson, Robert, ed. IHS
Jane’s Weapons 2014-2015: Air-Launched.
92
Own calculation: 3,880 lb. fuel + 14,859 lb. empty weight + 300 rounds of 25mm GAU-12/A ammunition at 330 lb. + four AIM-9X’s at 187 lb. each + two AIM-120C-5’s at 354
2
lb. each = 20,525 lb. combat weight, divided by 243.4 ft wing area. Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter; Hewson,
Robert, ed. IHS Jane’s Weapons 2014-2015: Air-Launched; and Friedman, Norman. The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons Systems, 1997-1998. Annapolis, Maryland:
U.S. Naval Institute, 1997. 267. Available at: https://books.google.com/books?id=lDzknmTgDUC&pg=PA267&lpg=PA267&dq=Harrier+ventral+gun+pod&source=bl&ots=2tcQF1ueDp&sig=ZDn1xMpQWsSt845i0KC3EMIooyA&hl=en&sa=X&ei=A3EXVdjTH4ndsAT
u8YHoBw&ved=0CDEQ6AEwBDgK#v=onepage&q=Harrier%20ventral%20gun%20pod&f=false
93
Own calculation: 5,350 lb. fuel + 23,611 lb. empty weight + 1,350 rounds of 30mm GAU-8/A ammunition at 2,025 lb. + four AIM-9M’s at 189 lb. each = 31,742 lb. combat
2
weight, divided by 506 ft wing area. Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter; Hewson, Robert, ed. IHS Jane’s Weapons
2014-2015: Air-Launched and “30mm GAU-8/A Ammunition.” Orbital ATK. November 2002. Available at: https://www.orbitalatk.com/defense-systems/small-calibersystems/30mm/docs/GAU-8A_Fact_Sheet.pdf
94
Own calculation: 9,000 lb. fuel + 43,340 lb. empty weight + 480 rounds of 20mm M61A2 ammunition at 270 lb. + six AIM-120C-5’s at 354 lb. each + two AIM-9X’s at 187 lb.
2
each = 55,108 lb. combat weight, divided by 840 ft wing area. Jackson, Paul, Fred Jane, C.G. Grey, John Taylor, and Mark Lambert, eds. Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 2004-2005.
95th ed. Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 2005; Hewson, Robert, ed. IHS Jane’s Weapons 2014-2015: Air-Launched and “F-22A 20mm Gatling Gun System.” General Dynamics
Ordnance and Tactical Systems. Available at: http://www.gd-ots.com/armament_systems/ags_F-22A.html
95
Own calculation: 5,114.5 lb. fuel + 24,030 lb. empty weight + 150 rounds of 30mm GSh-301 ammunition at 430 lb. + two RVV-SD’s at 418 lb. each + four R-73EL’s at 231 lb.
2
each = 31,334.5 lb. combat weight, divided by 452 ft wing area. Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter; Hewson, Robert,
th
ed. IHS Jane’s Weapons 2014-2015: Air-Launched. 60 Revised ed. London: Jane’s Information Group, 2014; and Easy Tartar, “MiG-29, Part Seven.” Fighter Tactics Academy. Last
modified 2006. Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20120728094408/http://www.sci.fi/~fta/MiG-29-2.htm
96
Own calculation: 10,361.5 lb. fuel + 36,111 lb. empty weight + 150 rounds of 30mm GSh-301 ammunition at 430 lb. + six RVV-SD’s at 418 lb. each + four R-73EL’s at 231 lb.
2
each = 50,334.5 lb. combat weight, divided by 668 ft wing area. Jackson, Paul, Fred Jane, C.G. Grey, John Taylor, and Mark Lambert, eds. Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 2004-
30
2005. 95th ed. Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 2005; Hewson, Robert, ed. IHS Jane’s Weapons 2014-2015: Air-Launched and Easy Tartar, “MiG-29, Part Seven.” Fighter Tactics
Academy. Last modified 2006. Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20120728094408/http://www.sci.fi/~fta/MiG-29-2.htm
97
Own calculation: 9,100 lb. fuel + 29,300 empty weight + 180 rounds of 25mm GAU-22/A ammunition at 198 lb. + four internal AIM-120C-5’s at 354 lb. each = 40,014 lb.
th
combat weight, divisor to 25,000 lbf. MIL thrust and 40,000 lbf. MAX thrust. Hewson, Robert, ed. IHS Jane’s Weapons 2014-2015: Air-Launched. 60 Revised ed. London: Jane’s
Information Group, 2014.
98
Own calculation: 6,550 lb. fuel + 32,300 lb. empty weight + 1,017 lb. gun pod with 220 rounds of 25mm GAU-22/A ammunition + four internal AIM-120C-5’s at 354 lb. each =
41,283 lb. combat weight, divisor to 26,000 lbf. MIL thrust and 38,000 lbf. MAX thrust. Ibid.
99
Own calculation: 9,600 lb. fuel + 34,800 lb. empty weight + 1,017 lb. gun pod with 220 rounds of 25mm GAU-22/A ammunition + four internal AIM-120C-5’s at 354 lb. each =
46,833 lb. combat weight, divisor to 25,000 lbf. MIL thrust and 40,000 lbf. MAX thrust. Ibid.
100
Own calculation: 6,727.5 lb. fuel + 28,600 lb. empty weight +940 rounds of 20mm M61A1 ammunition at 528 lb. + four AIM-120C-5’s at 354 lb. each + four AIM-9X’s at 187 lb.
each = 38,019.5 lb. combat weight, divisor to 29,180 lbf. MIL thrust and 47,540 lbf. MAX thrust. Ibid and McDonnell Douglas Corporation. “F-15 Armament Handbook.” Avialogs.
Last modified October 1979. Available at: http://www.avialogs.com/en/aircraft/usa/mcdonnelldouglas/f-15eagle/f-15-armament-handbook.html
101
Own calculation: 11,670 lb. fuel + 33,946 lb. empty weight + 510 rounds of 20mm M61A1 ammunition at 281 lb. + four AIM-120C-5’s at 354 lb. each + four AIM-9X’s at 187 lb.
each = 48,061 lb. combat weight, divisor to 35,600 lbf. MIL thrust and 58,200 lbf. MAX thrust. Ibid and “F-15E 20mm Gatling Gun.” General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical
Systems. Available at: http://www.gd-ots.com/armament_systems/ags_F-15E.html.
102
Own calculation: 3,558 lb. fuel + 19,643 lb. empty weight + 511 rounds of 20mm M61A1 ammunition at 325 lb. + four AIM-120C-5’s at 354 lb. each + two AIM-9X’s at 187 lb.
each = 25,316 lb. combat weight, divisor to 17,800 lbf. MIL thrust and 29,100 lbf. MAX thrust (F100-PW-229). Ibid and “F-16 20mm Gun System.” General Dynamics Ordnance
and Tactical Systems. Available at: http://www.gd-ots.com/armament_systems/ags_F-16.html.
103
Own calculation: 5,430 lb. fuel + 23,832 lb. empty weight + 578 rounds of 20mm M61A2 ammunition at 325 lb. + two AIM-9X’s at 187 lb. each + four AIM-120C-5’s at 354 lb.
each = 31,377 lb. combat weight, divisor to 21,800 lbf. MIL thrust and 35,508 MAX thrust. Ibid and “F/A-18E/F 20mm Gatling Gun System.” General Dynamics Ordnance and
Tactical Systems. Available at: http://www.gd-ots.com/armament_systems/ags_F-18.html.
104
Own calculation: 3,880 lb. fuel + 14,859 lb. empty weight + 300 rounds of 25mm GAU-12/A ammunition at 330 lb. + four AIM-9X’s at 187 lb. each + two AIM-120C-5’s at 354
lb. each = 20,525 lb. combat weight, divisor to 23,800 lbf. MIL thrust. Ibid and Friedman, Norman. The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons Systems, 1997-1998.
Annapolis, Maryland: U.S. Naval Institute, 1997. 267. Available at: https://books.google.com/books?id=lDzknmTgDUC&pg=PA267&lpg=PA267&dq=Harrier+ventral+gun+pod&source=bl&ots=2tcQF1ueDp&sig=ZDn1xMpQWsSt845i0KC3EMIooyA&hl=en&sa=X&ei=A3EXVdjTH4ndsAT
u8YHoBw&ved=0CDEQ6AEwBDgK#v=onepage&q=Harrier%20ventral%20gun%20pod&f=false
105
Own calculation: 5,350 lb. fuel + 23,611 lb. empty weight + 1,350 rounds of 30mm GAU-8/A ammunition at 2,025 lb. + two AIM-9M’s at 189 lb. each + two LAU-68/131’s at up
to 317 lb. each + one AGM-65E at 630 lb. + one AGM-65G at 670 lb. + two GBU-38 Mk-82’s at 558 lb. each + one GBU-12 Mk-82 at 510 lb. + one Mk-82 LDGP at 500 lb. + one
Sniper XR targeting pod at 446 lb. = 35,870 lb. combat weight, divisor to 18,130 lbf. Ibid and “30mm GAU-8/A Ammunition.” Orbital ATK. November 2002. Available at:
https://www.orbitalatk.com/defense-systems/small-caliber-systems/30mm/docs/GAU-8A_Fact_Sheet.pdf, and “Sniper Advanced Targeting Pod.” Lockheed Martin Corporation.
2014. Available at: http://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed/data/mfc/pc/sniper-pod/mfc-sniper-pc.pdf.
106
Own calculation: 9,000 lb. fuel + 43,340 lb. empty weight + 480 rounds of 20mm M61A2 ammunition at 270 lb. + six AIM-120C-5’s at 354 lb. each + two AIM-9X’s at 187 lb.
each = 55,108 lb. combat weight, divisor to 70,000 lbf. MAX thrust. Ibid and “F-22A 20mm Gatling Gun System.” General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems. Available at:
http://www.gd-ots.com/armament_systems/ags_F-22A.html
107
Own calculation: 5,114.5 lb. fuel + 24,030 lb. empty weight + 150 rounds of 30mm GSh-301 ammunition at 430 lb. + two RVV-SD’s at 418 lb. each + four R-73EL’s at 231 lb.
each = 31,334.5 lb. combat weight, divisor to 22,220 lbf. MIL thrust and 36,600 lbf. MAX thrust. Ibid; https://web.archive.org/web/20120728094408/http://www.sci.fi/~fta/MiG29-2.htm; and http://web.archive.org/web/20140203073017/http://www.sci.fi/~fta/MiG-29-4.htm
31
108
Own calculation: 10,361.5 lb. fuel + 36,111 lb. empty weight + 150 rounds of 30mm GSh-301 ammunition at 430 lb. + six RVV-SD’s at 418 lb. each + four R-73EL’s at 231 lb.
each = 50,334.5 lb. combat weight, divisor to 33,750 lbf. MIL thrust and 66,140 lbf. MAX thrust. Ibid and
http://web.archive.org/web/20140203073017/http://www.sci.fi/~fta/MiG-29-4.htm
109
th
Lockheed Martin. “F-35A – The World’s Only Multirole 5 Generation Fighter.” F-35 Lightning II, Lockheed Martin Corporation. Available at:
https://www.f35.com/assets/uploads/downloads/13537/f35a_2.pdf.
110
Lockheed Martin. “F-35B – The World’s First Supersonic STOVL Aircraft.” F-35 Lightning II, Lockheed Martin Corporation. Available at:
https://www.f35.com/assets/uploads/downloads/13538/f35b.pdf
111
Lockheed Martin. https://www.f35.com/assets/uploads/downloads/13539/f35c.pdf
112
F100-PW-220/229: 23,370 lbf. Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter
113
F100-PW-229: 29,100 lbf. Bushell, Susan, and David Willis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited by Paul Jackson.
114
For F100-PW-229. F110-GE-129 thrust: 29,588 lbf. Ibid.
115
F404-GE-402 EPE: 17,754 lbf uninstalled. United States General Accounting Office, Navy Aviation: F/A-18E/F will Provide Marginal Operational Improvement at High Cost .
Steven F. Kuhta, Jerry W. Clark, William J. Gillies, Charles R. Climpson, Lawrence A. Dandridge and Lillian I. Slodkowski, contributors. GAO/NSIAD-96-98. (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
General Accounting Office, 1996). 29. Available at: http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ns96098.pdf
116
F119: 35,000 lbf. “F-22 Raptor: Specifications.” Lockheed Martin Corporation. Available at: http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/f22/f-22-specifications.html
117
RD-33: 18,300 lbf. Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter
118
AL-31F-M3: 33,070 lbf. Bushell, Susan, and David Willis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited by Paul Jackson.
119
th
“F-35A – The World’s Only Multirole 5 Generation Fighter.” Lockheed Martin Corporation.
120
“F-35B – The World’s First Supersonic STOVL Aircraft.” Lockheed Martin Corporation.
121
Lockheed Martin. https://www.f35.com/assets/uploads/downloads/13539/f35c.pdf
122
F100-PW-220/229: 14,590 lbf. Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_F-15_Eagle#Specifications_.28F-15C.29
123
F100-PW-229: 17,800 lbf. Serflek, Szabolcs. “Engines.” F-15E.info. Available at: http://www.f-15e.info/joomla/technology/engines/101-engines.
124
F100-PW-229. Ibid. F110-GE-129 MIL thrust: 17,155 lbf. “General Electric F110.” Scramble – The Aviation Magazine. Available at:
http://wiki.scramble.nl/index.php/General_Electric_F110#F110-GE-129
125
F404-GE-402 EPE: 10,900 lbf. Chief of Naval Operations and Naval Air Systems Command. NATOPS Flight Manual – Navy Model F/A-18A/B/C/D 161353 and up aircraft. A1F18AC-NFM-000. (Patuxent River, M.D.: Commander, Naval Air Systems Command, 2008). 1-2-1. Available at: https://info.publicintelligence.net/F18-ABCD-000.pdf
126
F402-RR-408B Pegasus 11-61. . Bushell, Susan, and David Willis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development
& Production. Edited by Paul Jackson.
127
TF34-GE-100: 9,065 lbf. Ibid
128
RD-33: 11,110 lbf. Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter
129
AL-35F: 16,875 lbf. “Directory: Military Aircraft – Sukhoi.” Flight International, May 24, 2004, 71. Available at: http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/2004/200409%20-%200832.html.
130
Bushell, Susan, and David Willis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development
th
& Production. Edited by Paul Jackson., and Lockheed Martin. “F-35A – The World’s Only Multirole 5 Generation Fighter.”
131
Ibid and “F-35B – The World’s First Supersonic STOVL Aircraft.” Lockheed Martin Corporation.
132
Ibid and https://www.f35.com/assets/uploads/downloads/13539/f35c.pdf
133
Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter
134
Bushell, Susan, and David Willis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited by Paul Jackson.
135
With F100-PW-229. With F110-GE-129: 19,880 lb. Ibid
32
136
Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter
Harrier II Plus upgrade. Ibid
138
Ibid
139
“F-22 Raptor: Specifications.” Lockheed Martin Corporation.
140
Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter; and
https://web.archive.org/web/20120728094408/http://www.sci.fi/~fta/MiG-29-2.htm
141
For Su-27. Su-27UB: 38,580 lb. Bushell, Susan, and David Willis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited by Paul Jackson.
142
th
“F-35A – The World’s Only Multirole 5 Generation Fighter.” Lockheed Martin Corporation.
143
“F-35B – The World’s First Supersonic STOVL Aircraft.” Lockheed Martin Corporation.
144
Lockheed Martin: https://www.f35.com/assets/uploads/downloads/13539/f35c.pdf
145
68,000 lb with 9,750-lb. of fuel in two CFTs. Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter
146
Bushell, Susan, and David Willis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited by Paul Jackson.
147
Ibid
148
Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter
149
Harrier II Plus upgrade. Ibid
150
Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter. Manufacturer and Aviation Week cite 51,000 lb. “Program Dossier: A-10
Thunderbolt II.” Aviation Week, 2014. Available at: http://aviationweek.com/site-files/aviationweek.com/files/uploads/2014/10/asd_10_16_2014_dossier1.pdf
151
“F-22 Raptor: Specifications.” Lockheed Martin Corporation.
152
Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter
153
For Su-27SMK. Su-27UB: 73,854 lb. Bushell, Susan, and David Willis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited by Paul Jackson.
154
th
Internal payload calculated as two AIM-120C-5s at 354 lb. each and two GBU-31(V)1/B Mk-84s at 2,040 lb. each. “F-35A – The World’s Only Multirole 5 Generation Fighter.”
Lockheed Martin Corporation., https://www.f35.com/assets/uploads/downloads/13537/f35a_2.pdf, Hewson, Robert, ed. IHS Jane’s Weapons 2014-2015: Air-Launched.
155
Internal payload calculated as two AIM-120C-5s at 354 lb. each and two GBU-32(V)1/B Mk-83s at 993.4 lb. each; data from “F-35B – The World’s First Supersonic STOVL
Aircraft.” Lockheed Martin Corporation. https://www.f35.com/assets/uploads/downloads/13538/f35b.pdf, Hewson, Robert, ed. IHS Jane’s Weapons 2014-2015: Air-Launched.
156
Internal payload calculated as two AIM-120C-5s at 354 lb. each and two GBU-31(V)1/B Mk-84s at 2,040 lb. each; data from
https://www.f35.com/assets/uploads/downloads/13539/f35c.pdf, Hewson, Robert, ed. IHS Jane’s Weapons 2014-2015: Air-Launched.
157
Without CFTs. “McDonnell Douglas (now Boeing) F-15 Eagle Air Superiority Fighter.” Aerospaceweb.org. Available at: http://www.aerospaceweb.org/aircraft/fighter/f15/.
158
Bushell, Susan, and David Willis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited by Paul Jackson.
159
With F100-PW-229. With F110-GE-129: 19,272 lb. Ibid.
160
Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter
161
Useful load (incl fuel, stores, weapons, ammunition, and water injection for engines. Max external stores payload with Pegasus 11-61 engine is 13,235 lb. Max external stores
payload with Pegasus 11-21/Mk 105 engine throughout full maneuvering envelope is 10,800 lb. Ibid.
162
External load with full internal fuel is 12,086 lb. Ibid.
163
Own calculation: “The F-22 has four hardpoints on the wings, each rated to carry 2,270kg, which can carry AIM-120A AMRAAM or external fuel tanks. The Raptor has three
internal weapon bays. The main weapons bay can carry six AMRAAM AIM-120C missiles or two AMRAAM and two 1,000lb GBU-32 joint direct attack munition (JDAM).” AirLaunched; internal payload calculated as two AIM-120C-5s at 354 lb. each, two GBU-31(V)1/B Mk-84s at 993.4 lb. each, and two AIM-9Xs at 187 lb. each. Hewson, Robert, ed.
IHS Jane’s Weapons 2014-2015: Air-Launched.
164
Jackson, Paul, Fred Jane, C.G. Grey, John Taylor, and Mark Lambert, eds. Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 2004-2005. 95th ed. Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 2005.
165
Su-30MK. Bushell, Susan, and David Willis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited by Paul Jackson.
137
33
166
th
“F-35A – The World’s Only Multirole 5 Generation Fighter.” Lockheed Martin Corporation.
Lockheed Martin, F-35B Short Takeoff/Vertical Landing Variant. Available at: http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/f35/f-35b-stovl-variant.html
168
Lockheed Martin, F-35c Carrier Variant. Available at: http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/f35/f-35c-carrier-variant.html
169
Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter
170
13,511 lb. internal fuel plus 9,829 lb. fuel in CFTs. Bushell, Susan, and David Willis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited by
Paul Jackson.
171
Ibid
172
“F/A-18 Hornet.” Global Security. Available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-18-specs.htm
173
Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter
174
Ibid
175
“F-22 Raptor: Specifications.” Lockheed Martin Corporation.
176
7,619 lb. internal fuel plus 2,610 lb. fuel in nonconformal centerline tank. Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter; and
https://web.archive.org/web/20120612052436/http://www.sci.fi/~fta/MiG-29-1.htm
177
3,100 nm with CFTs. Ibid.
178
3,100 nm with CFTs. Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter
179
Bushell, Susan, and David Willis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited by Paul Jackson.
180
Ibid.
181
Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter
182
Unrefueled with four 300-gal (US) external tanks dropped when empty. With tanks retained, ferry range is 1,638 nm. Ibid.
183
Ibid.
184
“F-22 Raptor.” U.S. Air Force. Available at: http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104506/f-22-raptor.aspx
185
MiG-29S. Bushell, Susan, and David Willis, comps. Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter
186
Su-27SMK, tanks discarded when empty. Bushell, Susan, and David Willis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited by Paul
Jackson.
187
th
“F-35A – The World’s Only Multirole 5 Generation Fighter.” Lockheed Martin Corporation.
188
“F-35B – The World’s First Supersonic STOVL Aircraft.” Lockheed Martin Corporation.
189
Lockheed Martin, F-35C Carrier Variant. Available at: https://www.f35.com/assets/uploads/downloads/13539/f35c.pdf
190
Clean plus two AIM-9’s. “United State Navy Fact File – F/A-18 Hornet Strike Fighter.” United States Navy. Available at:
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=1100&tid=1200&ct=1
191
MiG-29S with centerline tank. Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter . Jane's All the World's Aircraft. London,
England: Janes Information Group, 2014.
192
Su-27SMK. Bushell, Susan, and David Willis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited by Paul Jackson.
193
Current estimate, inputs unspecified. Department of Defense, Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) – F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft (F-35). DD-A&T (Q&A)823-198. 2015.
Available at: http://breakingdefense.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2014/04/F-35-2013-SAR.pdf
194
Current estimate, inputs are full internal payload and “fuel to fly 456 nm.” Ibid.
195
Current estimate, inputs unspecified. Ibid.
196
F-15E. Bushell, Susan, and David Willis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited by Paul Jackson.
197
Inputs unspecified. Bushell, Susan, and David Willis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited by Paul Jackson.
167
34
“Armed with four AIM-120As, four 2000 lb Mk 84s and fitted with LANTIRN and three drop tanks, the F-15E will manage a combat radius better than 750 nm with a Hi-Lo-LoHi/100 nm dash mission profile.” Kopp, Carlo. “F-15E – Anatomy of Strike Fighter.” Air Power Australia. Last modified March 1985. Available at: http://www.ausairpower.net/TEF-15E-Strike-Eagle.html
198
Hi-lo-lo-hi profile, four AIM-9s, 450-gal (US) tanks, and two Mk-84s – 688 nm. Lockheed Martin Corporation. “Flight Manual – HAF Series Aircraft – F-16C/D Blocks 50 and
52+.” Last modified June 9, 1997. Figure A9-12, 252. Available at: https://info.publicintelligence.net/HAF-F16-Supplement.pdf
Hi-lo-lo-hi profile, with CFTs, two 2000-lb bombs, two AIM-9s, and 1,040 gal (US) external fuel in retained drop tanks – 735 nm. Bushell, Susan, and David Willis, comps. IHS
Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited by Pauk Jackson.
Hi-lo-lo-hi profile, with CFTs, two 2,000-lb bombs, two AIM-9s, and 1,464 gal (US) external fuel in drop tanks (retained) – 845 nm. Ibid.
Hi-hi-hi profile, four GBU-24s – 200 nm. Stanley, William, and Gary Liberson. “Measuring Effects of Payload and Radius Differences of Fighter Aircraft.” RAND. 1993. 41. Available
at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documented_briefings/2007/DB102.pdf
CAP mission, hi-lo-lo-hi profile, two AIM-120s, two AIM-9s, and 1,040-gal (US) fuel in drop tanks (dropped when empty) – 950 nm. Bushell, Susan, and David Willis, comps. IHS
Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited by Pauk Jackson.
199
Hi-lo-lo-hi interdiction: 290 nm. Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter. Jane's All the World's Aircraft. London,
England: Janes Information Group, 2014.
Low-altitude mission profile with two 330-gal (US) external fuel tanks: 325 nm. United States General Accounting Office, Navy Aviation: F/A-18E/F will Provide Marginal
Operational Improvement at High Cost . Steven F. Kuhta, Jerry W. Clark, William J. Gillies, Charles R. Climpson, Lawrence A. Dandridge and Lillian I. Slodkowski, contributors. 24.
Fighter: 366 nm. Congressional Research Service, Military Aircraft, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet Program. By Christopher Bolkcorn. RL30624. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Research Service, April 22, 2004). Available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/crs/crs_rl30624.pdf
Low-altitude mission profile with two 480-gal (US) external fuel tanks: 393 nm. Pg 24: United States General Accounting Office, Navy Aviation: F/A-18E/F will Provide Marginal
Operational Improvement at High Cost . Steven F. Kuhta, Jerry W. Clark, William J. Gillies, Charles R. Climpson, Lawrence A. Dandridge and Lillian I. Slodkowski, contributors.
Attack: 415 nm. Pg. CRS-4, Congressional Research Service, Military Aircraft, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet Program. By Christopher Bolkcorn
Low-altitude mission profile with one centerline 330-gal (US) and two 480-gal (US) external fuel tanks: 437 nm. Ibid., 23.
High-altitude mission profile with three 330-gal (US) external fuel tanks: 566 nm. Ibid., 26.
High-altitude mission profile with two 480-gal (US) external fuel tanks: >600 nm. Ibid., 26.
200
STO, 12 Mk 82 Snakeye bombs, internal fuel, one-hour loiter – 90 nm. Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter. Jane's
All the World's Aircraft. London, England: Janes Information Group, 2014.
Hi-lo-hi profile, STO, seven Mk 82 Snakeye bombs, two 300-gal (US) external fuel tanks, no loiter – 594 nm. Ibid.
Deck launch intercept mission, two AIM-9’s, two external fuel tanks – 627 nm. Ibid.
Harrier II Plus upgrade. Anti-shipping mission, STO, two Harpoons, two AIM-9s, two 300-gal (US) drop tanks – 609 nm. Ibid.
Harrier II Plus upgrade. Sea surveillance, STO, incl 50nm dash at S/L with two AIM-9s, two 300-gal (US) drop tanks – 608 nm. Ibid.
201
CAS and escort, two-hour loiter, 20-min reserves – 250 nm. Reconnaissance – 400 nm. Ibid.
Deep strike – 540 nm. Deep strike – 540 nm.Bushell, Susan, and David Willis, comps. Ibid.
202
With maximum internal fuel, other inputs unspecified – 459 nm. Jackson, Paul, Fred Jane, C.G. Grey, John Taylor, and Mark Lambert, eds. Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 20042005. 95th ed. Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 2005.
With external tanks – 702 nm. Ibid.
203
Su-27SMK, inputs unspecified. Bushell, Susan, and David Willis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited by Paul Jackson.
Jane's All the World's Aircraft. London, England: Janes Information Group, 2014.
204
Maximum positive acceleration due to rapid change of direction in flight path. Ibid.
35
205
9.0 below Mach 1.05, 7.0 above Mach 1.2. Goon, Peter and Kopp, Carlo. “APA Analysis & Assessment of JSF ORD Maneuverability KPIs,” Air Power Australia. Last modified
2012. Available at: http://www.ausairpower.net/jsf.html.
206
7.0 below Mach 1.05, 6.0 above Mach 1.2. Ibid.
207
7.5 below Mach 1.05, 6.5 above Mach 1.2. Ibid.
208
Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter. Jane's All the World's Aircraft. London, England: Janes Information Group,
2014.
209
“The structure has been strengthened in several areas which allows the aircraft full 9G manoeuvring capability when loaded.” Kopp, Carlo. “F-15E – Anatomy of Strike
Fighter.” Air Power Australia. Last modified March 1985. Available at: http://www.ausairpower.net/TE-F-15E-Strike-Eagle.html
210
Bushell, Susan, and David WIllis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited by Paul Jackson.
211
Kopp, Carlo. “Flying the F/A-18F Super Hornet.” Air Power Australia. Last modified May/June, 2001. Available at: http://www.ausairpower.net/SuperBug.html
212
Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter. Jane's All the World's Aircraft. London, England: Janes Information Group,
2014.
213
“Program Dossier: A-10 Thunderbolt II.” Aviation Week, 2014.
214
Jackson, Paul, Fred Jane, C.G. Grey, John Taylor, and Mark Lambert, eds. Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 2004-2005. 95th ed. Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 2005.
215
MiG-29S. Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter
216
Bushell, Susan, and David WIllis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited by Pauk Jackson. Jane's All the World's Aircraft.
London, England: Janes Information Group, 2014.
217
th
“F-35A – The World’s Only Multirole 5 Generation Fighter.” Lockheed Martin Corporation.
218
“F-35B – The World’s First Supersonic STOVL Aircraft.” Lockheed Martin Corporation.
219
Lockheed Martin, F-35C Carrier Variant. Available at: https://www.f35.com/assets/uploads/downloads/13539/f35c.pdf
220
Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter
221
Bushell, Susan, and David WIllis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited by Pauk Jackson. Jane's All the World's Aircraft.
London, England: Janes Information Group, 2014.
222
Ibid.
223
Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter
224
Ibid.
225
Northrop Grumman Corporation. "A-10 Thunderbolt II Specifications." Northrop Grumman. Last modified 2015. Accessed 2015. Available at:
http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/A10ThunderboltII/Pages/Specifications.aspx.
Never-exceed speed: 450 kt. Cruising speed at 5,000 ft: 342 kt. Ibid.
226
Can supercruise at Mach 1.58. Jackson, Paul, Fred Jane, C.G. Grey, John Taylor, and Mark Lambert, eds. Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 2004-2005. 95th ed. Surrey: Jane's
Information Group, 2005.
227
Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter
228
For Su-27SMK. For Su-27/UB: Mach 2.35. Bushell, Susan, and David WIllis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited by Pauk
Jackson. Jane's All the World's Aircraft. London, England: Janes Information Group, 2014.
229
Measured at sea level.
230
“McDonnel Douglas (now Boeing) F-15 Eagle Air Superiority Fighter.” Aerospaceweb.org. Available at: http://www.aerospaceweb.org/aircraft/fighter/f15/.
231
“F-15 Strike Eagle.” Boeing. Available at: http://www.boeing.com/defense/f-15-strike-eagle/.
232
Pg 114. Winchester, Jim. Jet Fighters: Inside & Out. Weapons of War. New York, NY: The Rosen Publishing Group, 2011.
233
Kable Intelligence Limited. "CF-18 Hornet Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft, Canada." Airforce-technology.com. Last modified 2015. Accessed 2015. Available at:
36
http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/boeingcf18hornetmult/.
Kable Intelligence Limited. "AV-8B Harrier II Plus VSTOL Fighter and Attack Aircraft, United States of America." airforce-technology.com. Last modified 2015. Accessed 2015.
Available at: http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/harrier/.
235
Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter
236
Ibid.
237
Su-30MK. Bushell, Susan, and David WIllis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited by Pauk Jackson. Jane's All the World's
Aircraft. London, England: Janes Information Group, 2014.
238
Usually height equivalent to air density at which maximum attainable rate of climb is 100 ft/min. Ibid.
239
Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter
240
“F-15E Strike Eagle.” United States Air Force. Last modified April 15, 2005. Available at: http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104499/f-15estrike-eagle.aspx.
241
Bushell, Susan, and David WIllis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited by Paul Jackson. Jane's All the World's Aircraft.
London, England: Janes Information Group, 2014.
242
Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter
243
"Historical Snapchat and Technical Specifications." Boeing. Last modified 2015. Accessed 2015. Available at: http://www.boeing.com/history/products/av-8-harrier-ii.page
244
Northrop Grumman Corporation. "A-10 Thunderbolt II Specifications." Northrop Grumman. Last modified 2015. Accessed 2015. Available at:
http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/A10ThunderboltII/Pages/Specifications.aspx.
245
Jackson, Paul, Fred Jane, C.G. Grey, John Taylor, and Mark Lambert, eds. Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 2004-2005. 95th ed. Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 2005.
246
MiG-29S. Hunter, Jaime. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: In Service. Edited by Jamie Hunter
247
Su-27SMK. Bushell, Susan, and David WIllis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited by Pauk Jackson. Jane's All the World's
Aircraft. London, England: Janes Information Group, 2014.
A
Cenciotti, David. “ ‘A-10 will always be better than F-35 in close air support. In all the other missions the JSF wins’ F-35 Pilot Says.” The Aviationist. Last modified April 9, 2015.
Available at: http://theaviationist.com/2015/04/09/f-35-never-as-a10-in-cas/
B
Bushell, Susan, and David Willis, comps. IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2014-2015: Development & Production. Edited by Paul Jackson. (London, England: Jane’s Information
Group, 2014).
C
Hewson, Robert, ed. Jane’s Weapons: Air-Launched 2014-2015 (London, England: HIS Global, 2014).
D“
Lightning Rod: F-35 Fighter Family Capabilities and Controversies." Defense Industry Daily. April 29, 2015.
E
Col. Charles Moore. "The Need for a Permanent Gun System On the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter." Air University, Air War College (April 2007): 12, 25.
F
Ibid., 25-26.
G
Majumdar, Dave. “Newest U.S. Stealth Fighter ’10 Years Behind’ Older Jets.” The Daily Beast. Last modified December 26, 2014. Available at:
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/12/26/newest-u-s-stealth-fighter-10-years-behind-older-jets.html
H
Jacques, David R. and Strouble, Dennis D. “A-10 Thunderbolt II (Warthog) Systems Engineering Case Study.” Air Force Center for Systems Engineering, Air Force Institute of
Technology. Last modified 2010. Available at: http://www.lboro.ac.uk/media/wwwlboroacuk/content/systems-net/downloads/pdfs/A10%20Thunderbolt%20II%20(Warthog)%20SYSTEMS%20ENGINEERING%20CASE%20STUDY.pdf
234
37