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PRINCE SIHANOUK AND THE NEW ORDER IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
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ted States within the meaning
18, Sections 793,794, and 798.
the revelation of its contents i
as well as its use in an
taken on any
be contained
unless such action is first approved by the
O f f Ser. No. 20
PRINCE SIHANOUIC AND THE NEW ORDER IN SOUTHEAST A S I A
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T h i s is a working paper of t h e DD/I Research S t a f f .
I t is t h e f i r s t of our p a p e r s t o d e a l p r i m a r i l y w i t h a
person of i n t e r e s t t o t h e Communists--in t h i s c a s e , Sihanouk
of Cambodia--rather t h a n p r i m a r i l y w i t h t h e a f f a i r s of
t h e Communists themselves.
W
e have had u s e f d l reviews of t h i s paper by several
o f f i c e r s of O C I and DD/P.
In t h i s connection, t h e writer
of t h i s p a p e r , John M. T a y l o r , f i n d s i n Sihanouk's p e r s o n a l
and n e g a t i v e a t t i t u d e toward t h e United S t a t e s perhaps
a more d e c i s i v e i n f l u e n c e on Cambodia's f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s
t h a n have some o t h e r a n a l y s t s of Cambodian a f f a i r s , who
p l a c e t h e g r e a t e r emphasis on Sihanouk's desire to conform
Cambodian p o l i c y t o h i s estimate of S o u t h e a s t Asia's f u t u r e .
The DDI/RS would welcome a d d i t i o n a l comment, addressed
i n t h i s i n s t a n c e t o t h e Chief o r Deputy Chief of t h e s t a f f
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PRINCE SIHANOUK AND THE NEW ORDER IN SOUTHEAST A S I A
Table of Contents
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I.
INDEPENDENCE AND NEUTRAL ISM
A. King Sihanouko....o.............
B. Independent Cambodia.......
C, The Geneva Conference..,...................lO
D. The Troubles of a King.
E. Neutralism: Stage I..............
11.
MILITANT NEUTRALISM
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.........19
Sihanouk Discovers the Bloc................23
Foreign Friends and Domestic Enemies.......28
Righting the Balance..............,..-*.
34
D . . China Again.
38
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B.
C.
111.
ALARUMS A N D EXCURSIONS
..................... 52
46
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..................57
THE POLITICS OF NEUTRALISM
A. The Lonesome Prince.................
........63
B. The Prince Goes Shopping ....................71
C. Laos: Crabs and Crocodileso.......,.......74
D. Belgrade, New York and Bangkok .............78
A.
B.
C.
IV.
V.
....
...............................
Dap Chhuon and Sam Sary
The Aftermath....
Through Sihanouk's Eyes..
GATHERING MOHENTUM
A.
Neutrality for Vietnam.......;.............86
B. "Sarit Is a Pig".
C. Sihanouk Seeks New Guarantees..............93
D. Cambodia and India..
E. Communion in Peiping.........
o..,.........lOl
..........................90
........................-97
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VI.
VII.
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THE STORM
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A.
Homecoming Crisis.........O.
B. Russia and China.O..OO,.......
C. The Two Vietnamso.....9..o.......a........l12
D. Whom the Gods Would Destroy;
E. The Final Breach..........................l23
F-:. "Alone and Unaided",
G. Any Kind of Conference.........
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............105
109
..............115
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............130
134
CONCLUSION.......
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PRINCE SlHANOUK AND THE NEW ORDER I N SOUTHEAST A S I A
Summary
P r i n c e Norodom Sihanouk, onetime King and now Chief
of S t a t e of Cambodia, is t h e undisputed f a t h e r of h i s
c o u n t r y t o most Cambodians. He w a s i n i t i a l l y i n s t a l l e d
as King i n 1941, f o l l o w i n g some s l e i g h t of hand by t h e
French, who b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e 19-year-old Sihanouk would
prove a p l i a b l e figurehead f o r t h e i r Cambodian protectora t e . In t h e general surge of n a t i o n a l i s m f o l l o w i n g World
War 11, however, Sihanouk became a c t i v e in u r g i n g independence f o r Cambodia, c o n t e n d i n g to t h e French t h a t o n l y
complete independence would undercut t h e appeal of Communism t o h i s countrymen.
Various French c a b i n e t s , viewing Cambodia as p a r t
of t h e Indo-China whole, feared t h a t an "independent"
Cambodia would be q u i c k l y absorbed by t h e V i e t Minh, and
were dubious concerning t h e q u a l i t y of Cambodia's p o l i t i c a l
l e a d e r s h i p . E a r l y experiments w i t h p a r l i a m e n t a r y democracy-.-were unpromising, and c o r r u p t i o n w a s endemic among
Cambodian o f f i c i a l d o m . P o l i t i c a l l y - a w a r e Cambodians tended
t o d i v i d e i n t h e i r a l l e g i a n c e , w i t h some s u p p o r t i n g Sihanouk
and o t h e r s f a v o r i n g Son Ngoc Thanh, an ex-premier whose
underground independence movement tended t o a t t r a c t l e i t ist and a n t i - r o y a l i s t elements.
In June 1952, Sihanouk discharged t h e incumbent
premier and assumed p e r s o n a l power f o r a period l i m i t e d
to three y e a r s . The y e a r s of t h e " r o y a l mandate" w e r e
f r u i t f u l ones: g r a n t s of amnesty d e p l e t e d t h e r a n k s of
Thanh's Khmer Issarak (Free Cambodia) a d h e r e n t s , and
t h r e a t s of d r a s t i c a c t i o n by Sihanouk l e d France t o g r a n t
f u l l independence i n November 1953, Sihanouk succeeded
i n d i s c r e d i t i n g t h e once-popular Son Ngoc Thanh t o m o s t
of h i s f i v e m i l l i o n countrymen, and i n so doing r e i n f o r c e d
t h e p r e s t i g e of t h e t h r o n e .
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The Geneva Conference of J u l y 1954, which brought
about t h e p a r e i t i o n of Vietnam, w a s c r u c i a l i n d e f i n i n g
Cambodia s re1a t ions w i t h neighboring c o u n t r i e s
At
Geneva, t h e Cambodian d e l e g a t i o n s u c c e s s f u l l y resisted
Communist e f f o r t s t o e s t a b l i s h a regroupment area w i t h i n
Cambodia f o r t h e Issarak, and secured acceptance of Camb o d i a ' s r i g h t tot seek f o r e i g n m i l i t a r y a i d . Cambodia
agreed n o t t o j o i n any m i l i t a r y pact, or t o p e r m i t f o r e i g n
bases.
.
In March 1955, Sihanouk, d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e
t h r o n e as a v e h i c l e f o r p o l it ical l e a d e r s h i p , abdicated
a s K i n g i n f a v o r of h i s f a t h e r , H e set about o r g a n i z i n g
t h e Sangkum ( P e o p l e ' s S o c i a l i s t Community) as h i s own
p o l i t i c a l m o v e m e n t , and through it urged a program of
economic improvement and welfare.
In 1955, t h e United
States i n i t i a t e d a program of direct economic and m i l i t a r y a i d , though on a s m a l l e r scale t h a n t h a t provided
Thailand and S o u t h Vietnam.
Although Cambodia never s u f f e r e d from i n t e r n a l
c l e a v a g e s comparable t o t h o s e which a f f l i c t e d Laos and
Vietnam, p o l i t i c s tended t o be chaotic. There were few
t r a i n e d a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , and Sihanouk's v a n i t y w a s s u c h
t h a t he o f t e n f a i l e d t o make e f f e c t i v e u s e of t h o s e he
had.
Capable o f f i c i a l s w e r e e a s i l y d i s c r e d i t e d by r i v a l s ,
who found i n Sihanouk a r e c e p t i v e ear t o rumors and goss i p . The P r i n c e ' s own behavior w a s e r r a t i c : i n t h e
t w o y e a r s f o l l o w i n g h i s abdication, he r e s i g n e d t h e
p r e m i e r s h i p three t i m e s , g e n e r a l l y o v e r minor i s s u e s
which he f e l t r e f l e c t e d c r i t i c i s m of himself.
''Interim"
premiers, however, were always approved by Sihanouk and
most o f t e n were handpicked by h i m .
A t approximately t h e t i m e of t h e Bandung conference i n A p r i l 1955, Sihanouk began t o demonstrate a
greater i n t e r e s t i n f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , Whereas'*the prev i o u s three y e a r s had been devoted t o o b t a i n i n g and cons o l i d a t i n g CambodiaOs independence, he now sought t o part i c i p a t e in i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s as a n e u t r a l i s t of t h e
N e h r u s c h o o l . Sihanouk emulated N e h r u as an a p o l o g i s t
f o r Communist China, and l e c t u r e d t h e West on t h e necess i t y of c o e x i s t e n c e . Sihanouk held off r e c o g n i z i n g P e i p i n g
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f o r a t i m e , probably o u t of reluctance t o t a k e any a c t i o n
which might s t i m u l a t e p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y among overseas
Chinese i n Cambodia. In February 1956, however, Sihanouk
undertook the f i r s t of f o u r v i s i t s t o Communist China which
have brought him i n t o close r a p p o r t w i t h Chou En-lai.
The e n s u i n g honeymoon w i t h Communist China d i d
n o t prevent Sihanouk from t a k i n g a c t i o n when n e c e s s a r y
against Cambodian l e f t i s t s , i n c l u d i n g t h e s m a l l cryptoCommunist Pracheachon ( P e o p l e ' s P a r t y ) e I t encouraged
him, however, to t a k e a hard l i n e i n his r e l a t i o n s w i t h
Thailand and South Vietnam, and t o s p u r n any a s s o c i a t i o n
w i t h SEATO. When, in 1958, Sihanouk was angered by t h e
r e c e p t i o n accorded him on a v i s i t t o Bangkok, he vented
h i s pique by r e c o g n i z i n g Communist China and e n d o r s i n g
P e i p i n g ' s p o s i t i o n on i s s u e s s u c h as UN r e c o g n i t i o n and
Taiwan
As t i m & werxt on, Sihanouk came i n c r e a s i n g l y t o l i n k
t h e United S t a t e s w i t h t h e u n f r i e n d l y a t t i t u d e of T h a i - l a n d and South Vietnam, who d i s t r u s t e d Cambodia's neut r a l i t y and w i t h whom Cambodia had o u t s t a n d i n g t e r r i t o r i a l
d i s p u t e s . I n February 1959, Sihanouk--warned by t h e
Chinese and French--crushed t h e a b o r t i v e Dap Chhuon r e v o l t ,
which had been f i n a n c e d and supported by Thailand and
South Vietnam. The i n c i d e n t occurred a t a t i m e when
Sihanouk w a s a l r e a d y s e e t h i n g over a l l e g e d p r o t o c o l
s l i g h t s d u r i n g a v i s i t t o t h e United S t a t e s ; when i n t e r r o g a t i o n of t h e p l o t t e r s uncovered evidence of C I A cont a c t w i t h Chhuon, Sihanouk's anger a g a i n s t t h e United
S t a t e s grew i n t o active h o s t i l i t y . To t h i s day, Sihanouk's
speeches r i n g w i t h o u t r a g e a t C I A O s a l l e g e d s u p p o r t of
Dap Chhuon. When, i n t h e wake of t h e r e v p l t , c l a n d e s t i n e
t r a n s m i t It ers began b r o a d c a s t i n g a n t i-Sihanouk propaganda
from t h e j u n g l e , Sihanouk became convinced t h a t h i s overthrow was an o b j e c t i v e of U.S, p o l i c y .
Over a p e r i o d of y e a r s Sihanouk had come t o t h e
conclusion--unenthusiastically--that
a Communist triumph
i n Soiitheast Asia was a foregone c o n c l u s i o n . H i s t h i n k i n g on t h i s matter is u n c l e a r ; although he w a s c l e a r l y
impressed by what he had s e e n of China', it w a s t h e DRV
which h e appeared most t o f e a r . N e v e r t h e l e s s , h i s a t t i t u d e
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s i n c e 1960 h a s been shaped by two key assumptions: t h e
h o s t i l i t y of t h e United S t a t e s , and t h e i n e v i t a b i l i t y of
a Communist v i c t o r y . On s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s Sihanouk has
argued t h a t there are worse f a t e s t h a n t h a t of a Communist
s a t e l l i t e , and he has c i t e d Poland as a n a t i o n which h a s
p r e s e r v e d i t s i d e n t i t y even though absorbed i n t h e b l o c ,
Sihanouk's v e r y real fear t h a t Cambodia may once a g a i n
be p a r t i t i o n e d between Vietnam and Thailand h e l p s e x p l a i n
h i s f e t i s h on t h e s u b j e c t of t e r r i t o r i a l g u a r a n t e e s , and
h i s w i l l i n g n e s s t o a c c e p t s a t e l l i t e s t a t u s i f t h e Khmer
.
n a t i o n can be p r e s e r v e d by no other means.
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Cambodia's f o r e i g n p o l i c y , although overshadowed
by Sihanouk's o u t b u r s t s , h a s been marked s i n c e 1960 by
disorganized
p e r s i s t e n t e f f o r t s to convene an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference t o g u a r a n t e e Cambodia*s n e u t r a l i t y
and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y . Although there is r e a s o n . t o
b e l i s v e t h a t Sihanouk genuinely desires s u c h a conference, he has made no e f f o r t t o make such a conference
palatable t o t h e T h a i s and t h e South Vietnamese, and t h e
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Apart from t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e n e u t r a l i t y conference, t h e r e is other evidence t h a t Sihanouk h a s l o s t h i s
s u r e touch i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . In t h e e a r l y 1950s,
he had demonstrated c o n s i d e r a b l e acumen i n p r e s s u r i n g
France i n t o a g r a n t of f u l l independence, and i n u n i t i n g
h i s countrymen behind the Sangkum.
I n 1963, however, he
succumbed to h i s emotions i n a series of i n c i d e n t s which
s e r v e d t o isolate Cambodia f u r t h e r from t h e Free World.
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I n January-February 1963, Sihanouk v i s i t e d both
I n d i a and Communist China i n a mission .&o attempt t o res o l v e t h e border d i s p u t e e Notwithstanding h i s pro-Peiping
b i a s , he a t f i r s t regarded China as l e g a l l y a t f a u l t , a
view which prompted h i m t o c h a r g e t h a k t h e West had "incited I n d i a t o provoke China," In a night-long brainwashing
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a t Kunming, however, Chou En-lai converted Sihanouk t o
a p o s i t i o n which was, on balance, f a v o r a b l e to China.
H i s doubts concerning China's u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e s regardi n g Cambodia appear to have been r e s o l v e d when, as i n
1959, h i s hosts provided h i m w i t h accurate and t i m e l y
i n f o r m a t i o n c o n ~ e r n i n go p p o s i t i o n elements a t home,
In A p r i l 1963, t h e Franco-American monopoly on
m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e t o Cambodia was broken when Sihanouk
accepted an o f f e r of MIG a i r c r a f t and a n t i a i r c r a f t guns
from t h e USSR. Later i n t h e y e a r , h e accepted a d d i t i o n a l
equipment f r o m Communist China. On 27 August 1963,
Sihanouk broke r e l a t i o n s w i t h South Vietnam f o l l o w i n g a
series of border i n c i d e n t s and t h e beginning of anti-Diem
demonstrat i o n s by Vietnamese B u d d h i s t s e Since Cambodia
had broken r e l a t i o n s w i t h Thailand t h e p r e v i o u s f a l l ,
Cambodia's r e l a t i o n s w i t h its neighbors had reached a
p o i n t where Sihanouk had r e a s o n t o fear a new attempt t o
overthrow him.,
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A w i l d month i n November-December 1963 w a s t r i g gered b y an u l t i m a t u m by Sihanouk on 5 November, i n which
h e warned t h a t he would t e r m i n a t e U.S, a i d t o Cambodia
i f Son Ngoc Thanh's K h m e r S e r e i (Free Khmer) b r o a d c a s t s
were not h a l t e d by 31 December. On t h e domestic f r o n t ,
Sihanouk annpunced t h e imminent n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of a l l
banks, and named one of h i s sons--then a s t u d e n t i n Cornmunist China--= h i s h e i r t o leadership of t h e Sangkum.
In a 10 November broadcast he underscored t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e
of his actions, remarking t h a t "As people s i n g 'Goodbye,
H a w a i i , ' I say 'Goodbye, F r e e World,P I must t e l l them
goodbye e
The K h m e r Serei radio was s i l e n t f o r more t h a n a
week f o l l o w i n g Sihanouk*s 5 November speech and t h e P r i n c e
appeared t o have second t h o u g h t s concerning t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y
of ending t h e United S % a t e s w$30 m i l l i o n annual a s s i s t a n c e .
On 16 November, however, h e a g a i n l o s t h i s temper, t h i s
t i m e over i n f o r m a t i o n provided by two c a p t u r e d K h m e r Serei
A p u b l i c i n t e r r o g a t i o n brought o u t o n l y t h a t t h e clandest i n e t r a n s m i t t e r s had been provided t o the Vietnamese by
t h e Americans, who had t u r n e d them over t o athe K h m e r S e r e i .
Sihanouk, however, seized upon t h i s l a t e s t llproofll of U. S.
p e r f i d y t o announce t h e immediate t e r m i n a t i o n of US a i d .
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I n a s t a t e m e n t of 2 1 November, P e i p i n g promised
71all-out
f o r Cambodia i n t h e e v e n t of armed
i n v a s i o n by t h e United States or its ltvassalslt--a l i m i t e d
commitment which is as f a r . as t h e Chinese have gone i n
Sihanouk,
pledging a s s i s t a n c e t o 'their erratic supporter
however, appeared s a t i s f i e d w i t h P e i p i n g 's reaction, and
outwardly unconcerned o v e r Cambodia's unprecedented isolat i o n from t h e West.
SihanoukOs r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e West continued t o
deteriorate, I n December, a s l u r a g a i n s t t h e l a t e PresidQnt Kennedy--whom Sihanouk p u b l i c l y characterized as an
enemy of Cambodia--brought a protest f r o m t h e United States
which w a s r e j e c t e d .
I n March 1964, a government-sponsored
demonstration a g a i n s t US and B r i t i s h d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n s
degenerated i n t o a r i o t which caused heavy damage. The
o n l y Western n a t i o n w i t h whom Sihanouk continued to maint a i n c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s w a s France. In January 1964, a
French m i l i t a r y mission agreed t o provide C-bodia
with
some of t h e m i l i t a r y . equipment no l o n g e r a v a i l a b l e f r o m
t h e United S t a t e s .
B a r r i n g a d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n r e l a t i o n s between Cam-
bodia and Communist China, p r o s p e c t s for a s i g n i f i c a n t improvement i n Cambodian-Amer i c a n r e l a t i o n s are n o t b r i g h t
Sihanouk's h a t r e d f o r t h e United States is deep-rooted
and seemingly implaccable. If his commitment t o P e i p i n g
is less t h a n t o t a l , and unsupported by any d e v o t i o n t o
Marxist ideology, it n o n e t h e l e s s stems from a f i r m b e l i e f
t h a t Cambodia r e q u i r e s a champion and t h a t China is t h e
.
o n l y one a v a i l a b l e ,
!
In view of t h e r e c e n t changes of government i n
Thailand and South Vietnam, some improvement i n Cambodia's
r e l a t i o n s w i t h these c o u n t r i e s cannot be r u l e d o u t . Any
meaningful rapprochement, however, is u n l i k e l y i n t h e
absence of a change i n t h e b a l a n c e of power i n Southeast
Asia, Sihanouk ha$ a l l u d e d f r e q u e n t l y t o t h e i n e v i t a b i l i t y
of a Communist t r i u m p h , and he is u n l i k e l y t o o f f e n d Communist China, o r even t h e DRV, i n t h e i n t e r e s t of any
t r a n s i t o r y improvement i n h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h Thailand o r
South Vietnam. Moreover, having s e e n ' i n t o t h e f h t u r e w i t h
s u c h c l a r i t y , Sihanouk w i l l be most r e l u c t a n t t o r e c o g n i z e
a t r e n d f a v o r a b l e t o t h e West s h o u l d one develop.
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Should Sihanouk be overthrown, become i n c a p a c i t a t e d ,
or d i e , almost any s u c c e s s o r would be more e a s y f o r t h e
United States t o deal w i t h t h a n t h e incumbent. The facts
of geopolitics, however, are u n l i k e l y "to d i c t a t e any
dramatic reversal of Sihanouk's policies
Although a
s u c c e s s o r ~ e g i m ewould probably t a k e a more t o l e r a n t
view of U . S . aid, it would be no more d e s i r o u s of antagon i z i n g China t h a n is Sihanouk, and n o t n e c e s s a r i l y more
accommodating towards Thailand and South Vietnam. The
most r e a s o n a b l e hope is f o r an e v e n t u a l r e t u r n by Cambodia
t o more of a " t r u e " n e u t r a l i t y .
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IWDEPENDXNCE AND NEUTRAL ISM
A.
King Sihanouk
To French o f f i c e r s i n Cambodia, t h e l i t t l e protect o r a t e w a s i n 1952 ar backwater i n t h e war a g a i n s t t h e
V i e t Minh f o r c o n t r o l of Indo-China.
The s q u a l i d l i t t l e
c a p i t a l a t Phnom Penh o f f e r e d n e i t h e r t h e comforts of
Saigon nor t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n which a t t e n d e d 9 i e l d s e r v i c e
a g a i n s t t h e V i e % Minh. Y e t to some f o r e i g n o b s e r v e r s ,
Cambodia w a s under a Communist t h r e a t o n l y s l i g h t l y less
grave t h a n t h a t in neighboring Vietnam. Although there
was l i t t l e a c t u a l f i g h t i n g in Cambodia, perhaps h a l f of
t h e c o u n t r y s i d e w a s l o o s e l y c o n t r o l l e d by t h e V i e t Minh.
In a d d i t i o n to t h e V i e t l i n h , s e v s s a l thousand Khmer
Hssarak (Free Cambodia) p a r t i s a n s i n h a b i t e d t h e j u n g l e s ,
demanding complete independence f o r t h e p r o t e c t o r a t e .
I n Phnom Penh, i f n o t in t h e h i n t e r l a n d , t h e
French had t h i n g s p r e t t y w e l l under c o n t r o l . The FrancoCambodian t r e a t y of November 8 , 1949, had made Cambodia
an i n t e r n a l l y s e l f - g o v e r n i n g monarchy, b u t had l e f t m i l i t a r y and f o r e i g n a f f a i r s l a r g e l y i n t h e hands 0% t h e
French. CambodiaDs L0,QOO-man army w a s under French
c o n t r o l , and t h e a c c r e d i t a t i o n of ambassadors was s u b j e c t t o French concurrence. P e t there was growing press u r e f o r complete independence of France, pressure which
t h e French had succeeded i n c o n t r o l l i n g l a r g e l y because
of a s e r i o u s s c h i s m w'ithin t h e independence movement itself.
On one hand was t h e r e i g n i n g monarch, 30-year-old
King Norodom Sihanouk Varman. The r u l e s f o r s u c c e s s i o n
were vague i n Cambodia, and Sihanouk had been placed on
t h e t h r o n e by t h e French i n 1941 i n p r e f e r e n c e t o t h e
h e i r presumptive, who was s a i d t o be independent-minded.
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Sihanouk was f e l t t 0 be no problem on t h i s s c o r e . He
l i k e d f a s t c a r s , f a s t h o r s e s , and g i r l s , girls, g i r l s .
He admired French c u l t u r e , and was studying humanities
a t a French-run s c h o o l i n Saigon. M ~ l ~ e o v e rSihanouk's
,
f a t h e r was a Norodom and h i s mother a Sisowath; t h e
crowning of P r i n c e Sihanouk would r e u n i t e t h e two main
r o y a l l i n e s i n Cambodia.*
Information on Sihanouk's e a r l y y e a r s as King is
s k e t c h y , . b u t the f i r s & decade appears to have been une v e n t f u l ; ' A f t e r leaving the Lycee Chasseloup-Laubat i n
Saigon, where he had s t u d i e d L a t i n sand Greek p r i o r to
1941, t h e King s t u d i e d under t u t o r s i n Phnom Penh. He
was a v i r t u a l p r i s o n e r of t h e Japanese d u r i n g World War
11, b u t was not himselje molested. I t was d u r i n g the
1940's t h a t t h e p r e s s p o r t r a y e d Sihanouk as t h e playboy
King. Sihanouk, who d i d n o t marry u n t i l 1955, is b e l i e v e d
to have. f a t h e r e d a t l e a s t twelve c h i l d r e n by v a r i o u s m i s tresees; t h e royal t r a d i t i o n of concubinage was such t h a t
t a l l were recognized as p r i n c e s and p r i n c e s s e s of t h e
Cambodian c o u r t .
The King's playboy image tended to obscure h i s
v e r y r e a 1 p o l i t i c a l s t r e n g t h a t home. As King, Sihanouk
was a u t o m a t i c a l l y a god-figure t o t h e b u l k of Cambodia's
f i v e m i l l i o n i n h a b i t a n t s . Not o n l y w a s he t h e embodiment
of Cambodian n a t i o n a l i s m , b u t a s head of t h e B u d d h i s t r0l i g i o n i n Cambodia he w a s a s p i r i t u a l leader as w e l l . .
Sihanouk w a s n o t one t o i g n o r e t h e sources of h i s p o l i t i c a l s t r e n g t h . Royal audiences w e r e h e l d i n which any subject could e x p r e s s a g r i e v a n c e t o t h e King. Speechmaking
t o u r s took Sihanouk i n t o e v e r y c o r n e r of t h e kingdom.
To t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r e n g t h of t h e Cambodian monarchy
*When King Nosodom died i n 1904, t h e French r e s i d e n t
proposed t h a t t h e crown p a s s not to h i s son, b u t t o h i s
brother Sisowath
King Sisowath r u l e d u n t i l 1927, and
w a s succeeded by h i s son who r e i g n e d u n t i l 1941. Sihanouk's
mother was a daughter of King S i s o w a t h ; ' h i s f a t h e r was
a grandson of King Norodom.
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Sihanouk brought a l a r g e dose of p e r s o n a l charm and a seemi n g l y genuine desire t o raise t h e l i v i n g s t a n d a r d s of h i s
people.
The q u e s t i o n of independence, however, was something
else again. I n March 1945, Sihanouk had followed t h e
example of Vietnamese Emperor Bao D a i in s e i z i n g upon t h e
c o l l a p s e of Japan t o declare C ~ l > o d i a ~ Y n d e p e n d e n t . "The
e u p h o r i a i n Phnom Benh w a s s h o r t l i v e d ; t h e French r e t u r n e d
i n October 1945 and t h e f o l l o w i n g y e a r Cambodia became
"an autonomous s t a t e w i t h i n t h e French. Union." Independence p a r t i s a n s took to t h e j u n g l e , and t h e K h m e r Issasak
was born. The q u e s t i o n of independence left Sihanouk
perplexed; in February 1947 he observed,
No one is more d e s i r o u s of complete independence t h a n I , b u t we must look facts i n
t h e face. W
e are too poor to support o r
defend o u r s e l v e s . We are dependent upon
some major power to give us t e c h n i c i a n s
If n o t France it would be
and troops.
some other g r e a t n a t i o n .
No s u c h doubts d i s t u r b e d Sihanouk's main r i v a l as
a Cambodian, n a t i o n a l i s t , Son Ngoc Thanh. Thanh had been
born i n 1908 of a Cambodian f a t h e r and a Vietnamese mother,
and had s t u d i e d i n Saigon and P a r i s . In 1936 he r e t u r n e d
t o Cambodia to found a n a t i o n a l i s t newspaper, b u t was
c o n t i n u o u s l y harassed by the French and In 1942 went i n t o
e x i l e , f irsd; t o Thailand and t h e n to Japan. Following
Sihanouk's premature independence d e c l a r a t i o n i n March
1945, Thanh made h i s way back t o Cambodia and--during a
b r i e f honeymoon w i t h Sihanoub-was appointed Foreign Minister and subsequently Prime M i n i s t e r . Thanh was j a i l e d
by t h e French i n October, b u t h i s p r e s t i g e w a s s u c h i n
Cambodia t h a t he w a s removed t o house arrest i n France.
H i s f o l l o w e r s took t o t h e j u n g l e .
Thanh was pardoned i n 1951, and r e t u r n e d to t h e
newspaper which he had founded 15 y e a r s e a r l i e r . But he
was no l o n g e r preeminent among Cambodian n a t i o n a l i s t s .
Sihanouk's always-great prestige had been f u r t h e r enhanced
when t h e French secured t h e r e t u r n t o Cambodia of three
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western p r d v i n c e s l o s t to Thailand d u r i n g W0rld War 11.
Moreover, t h e King had t a k e n up t h e cause of' Cambodian
independence--albeit w i t h a great d e a l more c a u t i o n t h a n
had Thanh many y e a r s before. When t h e French once a g a i n
c l o s e d down h i s newspaper, Thanh d e f e c t e d t o t h e Kh0r
Issarak i n March 1952.
Thanh's a c t i o n s e r v e d t o underscore %he c l e a v a g e
The King spoke of o b t a i n i n g independence through n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e French,
and cited as evidence of F r a n @ e * sgood f a i t h the r e s t i t u t i o a of' Cambodia's w e s t e r n t e r r i t o r i e s , and c e r t a i n cons t i t u t i o n a l c o n c e s s i o n s g r a n t e d i n 1949
Nore m i l i t a n t
n a t i o n a l i s t s , however, f e l t t h a t t h e r e could be no independence so l o n g as t h e French w e r e f i g h t i n g in Vietnam, and needed t o control access t o Cambodia. In cont r a s t t o t h e p e a s a n t s ' b l i n d f a i t h -In t h e i r King, few
among Cambodia's e l i t e s h a r e d Sihanouk's optimism, S i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h e N a t i o n a l Assembly w a s c o n t r o l l e d by members of t h e Democratic Party--whose views roughly p a r a l l e l e d those of Son Mgoc Thanh.
among Cambodian n a t i o n a l i s t s .
e
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In a d d i t i o n t o t h e q u e s t i o n of independence, Cambodian p o l i t ic5ans were undecided concerning t h e i r own
form of i n t e r n a l government. Cambodia's c o n s t i t u t i o n - d r a f t e d under French g u i d a n c e i n 1947--had s o u g h t to
p l e a s e both r o y a l i s t s and advocates of a s t r o n g and
"democrat I C r t p a r l i a m e n t
A l l power w a s declared t o
m a n a t e from t h e King and be e x e r c i s e d i n h i s name. It
provided f o r a c a b i n e t r e s p o n s i b l e to t h e lower house
of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e , b u t allowed t h e King t o a p p o i n t t h e
Pr>ime M i n i s t e r , and t o d i s s o l v e t h e Assembly on t h e
a d v i c e of t h e c a b i n e t . Thus t h e King c o n t r o l l e d t h e
c a b i n e t through t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r and t h e Assembly
t h r o u g h t h e c a b i n e t ; t h e French had weighted t h e cons t i t u t i o n s t r o n g l y i n f a v o r of t h e King.
The struggle between Sihanouk and t h e Assembly
q u i c k l y l e d t o governmental p a r a l y s i s . The f a i l u r e of
t h e Assembly t o r a t i f y t h e Fsanco-Cambodian t r e a t y of
1949 forced t h e King to p u t it i n t o e f f e c t through a
series of p r o t o c o l s . By t h e summer o f ' 1 9 5 2 , rumors of
a showdown between t h e King and t h e Assembly were s i f e .
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On 3 June, t h e King d e l i v e r e d a l e c t u r e to t h e Democratic
c a b i n e t , rebuking it for its anti-French p o s t u r e and rep o r t e d l y warning t h a t i f t h e government d i d not mend its
ways he might have t o assume s p e c i a l powers. French off i c i a l s made no secret t h a t t h e y continued t o s t a n d behind t h e King.
On 15 June, Sihanouk d i s m i s s e d t h e Democratic cabi n e t and p e r s o n a l l y took over t h e government. The A s sembly ,continued t o meet, b u t was powerless. Sihanouk
i n s i s t e d t h a t he had done n o t h i n g b u t e x e r c i s e his royal
p r e r o g a t i v e i n t h e i n t e r e s t of o r d e r , and h e a t e d l y d e n i e d
t h a t he had s o l d o u t t o t h e French. The American Legation
viewed t h e e v e n t s of Yune as a marriage of convenience
between Sihanouk and t h e French:
It w o u l d appear t h a t t h e French,
working d i r e c t l y and also through members of t h e r o y a l f a m i l y , convinced
t h e King t h a t t h e y Just w o u l d not do
b u s i n e s s w i t h t h e Democrats. They made
no secret of t h e i r c o n v i c t i o n t h a t t h e
o n l y s o l u t i o n to t h e French-Cambodian
deadlock w a s t h e assumption of f u l l
powers by t h e King
The King could
n o t f a i l t o n o t e t h a t t h e French view
envisaged t h e continued e x e r c i s e ob h i s
k i n g l y powers whereas t h e Democrat view
seemed t o t a k e for grahted t h e gradual
obsolescence of these powers.
....
In t h e s i x months f o l l o w i n g SihaQQUk'S power p l a y ,
t h e p o l i t i c a l situation showed l i t t l e improvement.
Although t h e King d i s p l a y e d energy i n h i s experiment w i t h
one-man government, t h e r e was XIQ d i s c e r n i b l e p r o g r e s s toward h i s two main o b j e c t i v e s : n a t i o n a l u n i t y and independence. Moreover, t h e estrangement between Sihanouk
and Son Ngoc Tkanh was complete. Thanh had o b t a i n e d a
r a d i o t r a n s m i t t e r , and i n t h e summer and f a l l of 1952
b r o a d c a s t attacks a g a i n s t t h e King. In September Sihanouk
declared his r i v a l an outlaw, and s e n t t h e army to f i n d
him.
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In December, Sihanouk appealed to the Assembly f o r
a s t a t e of emergency, c i t i n g the continued d i s s i d e n c e of
Thanh, a s t r i k e among s t u d e n t s in Phnom Benh, and t w o
bomb-throwing i n c i d e n t s growing out of t h e s t u d e n t g r i e v ances. When t h e Assembly r e f u s e d , Sihanouk played h i s
t r u m p card. On 1 4 January he had 12 d e p u t i e s arrested,'
proclaimed m a r t i a l l a w , and d i s s o l v e d t h e Assembly. As
"Premier" t o ,handle r o u t i n e matters he named a p e r s o n a l
l i e u t e n a n t , Penn " O ~ t h . I n an address to h i s people t h e
King asked three years i n which t o a c h i e v e complete i n dependence.
I
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B
Independent Cambod 1a
Sihanouk's coup of January 1953 was, i n retrospect,
t h e d e a t h k n e l l for democracy in Cambodia. Whether a
western form of g o v e s m e n t c o u l d have t a k e n r o o t may be
q u e s t i o n e d ; i n any case, t h e coup gave complete power t o
Sihanouk, who has never r e t u r n e d a s i g n i f i c a n t amount of
it t o t h e c a b i n e t or Assembly. A n immediate r e s u l t was
a degree of domestic s t a b i l i t y . Only once s i n c e * t h e Democ r a t i c P a r t y c a b i n e t of 1952-1953 h a s Sihanouk faced a
serious i n t e r n a l c h a l l e n g e .
B u t whereas l i f e vas e a s y for Sihanouk when h i s
p o s t e n t a i l e d few r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , he had p r o p e l l e d h i m self i n t o t h e c e n t e r of Cambodian p o l i t i c s . Wotwithst,anding h i s p e r s o n a l p o p u l a r i t y , he hod s e v e r a l d i s t i n c t
l i a b i l i t i e s . Because Sihanouk had not been regarded as
a c a n d i d a t e for t h e t h r o n e , h i s e d u c a t i o n had been c a s u a l ,
and n o t h i n g i n h i s e a r l y y e a ~ sws King had s u g g e s t e d t h a t
he would make any mark on t h e Sobtheas$ Asian p o l i t i c a l
s c e n e . He- was widely regarded by f o r e i g n e r s as a Frenah
stooge, and t h e French themselves were s l o w t o disabuse
themselves. Western newsmen g e n e r a l l y played up h i s saxophone p l a y i n g , h i s penchant for s p o r t s , and t h e harem-like
atmosphere of t h e Cambodian court.
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I
. . Sihanouk, b ~ w e v e r , hard a l r e a d y m?de one shrewd judgment which p l a c e d him far ahead of most of h i s c r i t i c s .
H e had decided t h a t t h e prob1enas of independence and t h e
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Issarak insurgency were i n s e p a r a b l e , and t h a t t h e achievement of f u l l independence w o u l d go f a r toward c u t t i n g t h e
ground o u t from under t h e i n s u r g e n t s . The King s t a r t l e d
o b s e r v e r s in Phnom Penh when,,'Just weeks a f t e r h i s January
coup, he l e f t for a "vacation" on t h e R f v i e r a .
I n Europe, and s u b s e q u e n t l y at t h e UPT, Sihanouk
wide swath. From h i s v i l l a on t h e Fsench . R i v i e r a ,
he s e n t a memorial to t h e P r e s i d e n t of France a s k i n g
f o r immediate independence. A t a t i m e when more t h a n
half' of h i s c o u n t r y was c o n t r o l l e d by the I s s a r a k and t h e
V i e t Minh, Sihanouk used t h e i n s u r g e n t t h r e a t as t h e
main argument for independence:
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The I s s a r a k propaganda s p e a k s of me ' a s
t h e p r i n c i p a l o b s t a c l e to complete independence.. . t h e y s a g t h a t I and my government are too F r a n c o p h i l e t o make o u r
c o u n t r y r e a l l y s o v e r e i g n . Now I ask
you, Mr. P r e s i d e n t , what a m I to r e p l y
t o t h i s propaganda when I a m d e n i e d t h e
means t o f i g h t e f f e c t i v e l y t o defend my
people?. .It seems t o me t h a t it is t h e
d u t y and the s e l f - i n t e r e s t of France to
e n t r u s t to t h e Cambodians themselves t h e
d e s t i n y of t h e i r c o u n t r y .
..
Sihanouk w a s just warming to h i s t a s k . From t h e
R i v i e r a he f l e w to Mew York, where he loosed a then-unprecedented p r e s s b l a s t . The New York Times quoted
Sihanouk as s a y i n g that u n l e s s T e F r e n - a r a n t e e d
Cambodia g r e a t e r freedom "within the n e x t few months,
t h e r e was danger t h a t t h e Cambodians would go o v e r t o
t h e V i e t Minh. "Cambodia is v e r y s o r r y t h a t her w i s h e s
do n o t p l e a s e F r a n c e , " observed t h e King. "If France
does not understand u s . . . I w i l l s i m p l y go home and ask
my people what t h e y want t o do."
B y t h i s t i m e t h e French realized t h a t Sihanouk had
ideas of h i s own c o n c e r n i n g t h e future of Cambodia. I n
Saigon, a s e n i o r French o f f i c i a l t o l d t h e US ambassador
t h a t t h e King was c l e a r l y "amok," s i n c e no r a t i o n a l person in a p o s i t i o n s u c h as Sihanouk's would u s e t h e ' t h r e a t
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of popular u p r i s i n g s t o force o u t a f r i e n d l y , anti-Communist power. N e v e r t h e l e s s , Sihanouk r e t u r n e d t o 50 popular welcome i n Phnom Penh, h i s r e p u t a t i o n as a French
puppet s e r i o u s l y impaired. The King made e a r l y use of
h i s new p r e s t i g e a g a i n s t t h e K h m e r Issasak; i n June 1953,
i n t h e course of a t o u r of t h e we&tern p r o v i n c e s , he psev a i l e d on t h e l e a d e r s of two Hssarak bands to make peace
w i t h t h e government. B o t h accepted commissions as capt a i n s i n t h e Cambodian army.
The French, however, offered no concessions conc e r n i n g Cambodian independence, even though Sihanouk ind i c a t e d t h a t he w a s prepared $0 accept dominion s t a t u s
f o r h i s country, or even a French pledge of independence
f o l l o w i n g defeat of t h e Communists. A new g e s t u r e was
called f o r , and once more Sihanouk w a s equal t o t h e oec a s i o n . The King a g a i n j o l t e d h i s French mentors when,
on 1 2 June, he c r o s s e d i n t o Thailand and requested abylum.
In a t v P a r e w e l l s t a t e m e n t " he stressed t h e same p o i n t
which he had made t o French P r e s i d e n t A u r i o l :
Again I f i n d myself today under t h e
ob1 i g a t i o n of a l e r t i n g world p u b 1 i c opinion, and t o draw French p u b l i c o p i n i o n in
p a r t i c u l a r to t h e t r u e aspirations of t h e
Cambodian p e o p l e , . . .
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Experience and facts have s u f f icie n t l y demonstrated t h a t t h e King is capable of r a l l y i n g about h i m almost a l l t h e
Cambodian r e b e l s as l o n g as He proves hims e l f a b l e t o a t t a i n seal and complete i n dependence f o r Cambodia. Only t h e n can
t h e Cambodians f a c e t h e V i e t l i n h t o defend j o i n t l y t h e i r independence t h e i r ' c i v i l i z a t i o n rand t h e patrimony of t h e i r
ancestors.
Even as he l e f t t h e c o u n t r y , Sihanouk underscored
A t S i e m Reap--site of t h e great r u i n s of t h e
Khmer. empire--he c o n f e r r e d w i t h two semi-autonomous local
c h i e f t a i n s , Puth Chay and Dap Chlhuon. Ohce a g a i n Sihanouk
cast h i s speill: Chay assured h i s s a f e t y t o the Thai b o r d e r ,
and both pledged t h e i r l o y a l t y t o t h e King. Only Son
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h i s point.
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Ngoc Thanh continued o u t w a r d l y i n d i f f e r e n t
campaign f o r Cambodian independence.
$0
Sihanouk's
The King's f l i g h t to Bangkok k e p t Cambodia i n t h e
h e a d l i n e s , b u t o t h e r w i s e was n o t a conspicuous success.
U n t i l h i s b r i e f e x i l e i n T h a i l a n d , Sihanouk a p p e a r s to
have e n t e r t a i n e d f r i e n d l y f e e l i n g s toward t h e T h a i s . He
had on o c c a s i o n corresponded w i t h King Bumipol who, l i k e
Sihanouk, w a s , young and a j a z z b u f f . B u t t h e welcome m a t
was n o t o u t i n Bangkok. The T h a i s t u r n e d down Sihanouk's
r e q u e s t t h a t t h e y b r i n g Cswnbodiavs p l i g h t ts t h e a t t e n t i o n
of t h e UN, and t r e a t e d him more as a p o l i t i c a l r e f u g e e
t h a n a s a d i s t i n g u i s h e d g u e s t . The US embassy i n Bangkok
r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e "strict p r o p r i e t y " of t h e T h a i s had
r e s u l t e d i n Sihanouk's v i r t u a l confinement i n his h o t e l ,
and t h a t t h e b e h a v i o r of t h e T h a i s had s e r v e d t o "improve
local Thai-French r e l a t i o n s . " Sihafiouk never f o r g o t t h e
cool r e c e p t i o n h e received i n T h a i l a n d , however, and h i s
r e s e n t m e n t a t t h e t r e a t m e n t accorded him i n Bangkok would
color Thai-Cambodian r e l a t i o n s f o r a decade t o come.
Sihanouk r e t u r n e d to Cambodia in l a t e June, b u t
n o t t o Phnom Penh. I n s t e a d , he began a self-imposed
e x i l e i n Battambang, l e a v i n g an i n e f f e c t u a l government
i n t h e c a p i t a l t o cope w i t h t h e French, t h e Pssarak, and
t h e day-to-day problems of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . I n t h e hint e r l a n d , Sihanouk resumed h i s campaign t o r e c o n s t r u c t
t h e I s s a r a k ; by July, an estimated 3,OOQ'insurgents had
r a l l i e d t o t h e King, a f a c t which prompted Marguerite
Higgins t o c h a r a c t e r i z e it as "something of a triumph
when you c o n s i d e r how many d o l l a r s and b u l l e t s it takes
t o d e s t r o y 3,000 Chinese or V i e t Minh t r o o p s . "
A main p o i n t of c o n t e n t i o n between Sihanouk and
t h e French remained t h e q u e s t i o n of whether an independent
Cambodia c o u l d defend i t s e l f a g a i n s t t h e V i e t Minh w i t h o u t t h e presence of French f o r c e s . Sihanouk a d m i t t e d to
no d o u b t s . ("Except f o r a few Communists, who are t h e
least numerous of t h e I s s a r a k , almost a l l t h e rebels have
o f f i c i a l l y d e f e c t e d t o t h e King.")
He s t a t e d , however,
t h a t if t h e French f e l t t h a t Cambodia r e q u i r e d a l a r g e r
military force,
- 9 -
.
I have decided, c o m p a t r i o t s , made strong
by .yous d e c i s i o n t o p u t f u l l confidence
i n my success...to put i n t o a p p l i c a t i o n
without d e l a y in our c o u n t r y a p l a n which
I conceived i n Battambang w i t h the assistance of s few eminent collaborators. T h i s
is a plan Of m o b i l i z a t i o n of t h e V i t a l
forces of t h e n a t i o n which should g i v e t h e
c o u n t r y i n a short t i m e a regular army,
p r o v i n c i a l a u x i l i a r y f o r c e s , and people s
and youth supper$ forces s u i t a b l e to cons t i t u t e for o u r F a t h e r l a n d a d e f e n s i v e
m i l i t a r y power and a n argument to p r e s e n t
t o the great nations.
..
It was apparent that Sihanouk meant b u s i n e s s , and
r e s u l t s were forthcoming. I n e a r l y J u l y , France agreed
t o independence f o r a l l three of t h e tli-bsociated Statest1
of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. It was i m p e l l e d t o s u c h
a c t i o n h o t by SihanoukDsoratory, b u t by the need to
b o l s t e r morale i n Vietnam. To most Cambodians, however,
t h e glory belonged t o t h e i r King. On November 8 , 1953,
Sihanoub journeyed from Battambang to Phnom Penh, for
ceremonies commemorating CambodiaPs independence.
C.
The Geneva Conference
The V i e t Minh never o p e r a t e d i n Cambodia on t h e
scale t h a t it d i d elsewhere bn Indo-China.
For one
t h i n g , there were s o c i o l o g i c a l f a c t o r s o p e r a t i v e in
Cambodia which tended t o check t h e Communists' popular
appeal. The Cambodian Communist party--of which more w i l l
be s a i d latbr--was so s m a l l as to be s c a r c e l y secognizable.
R e s i s t a n c e t o Commusisna--albeit p a s s i v e resistance--stemmed f r'om an accumulation of n a t i o n a l , r e l i g i o u s
and ecdnbmic f a c t o r s . Although Cambodia was an underdeveloped c o u n t r y , there was l i t t l e p o p u l a t i o n pressure
and rice enough f o r a l l . The c o u n t r y s i d e was r a c i a l l y
homogeneous, w i t h a l o n g h i s t o r y of l o y a l t y to t h e
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-
monarchy. Acceptance of t h e s t a t u s quo had been encouraged by t h e French, who d i d n o t h i n g t o encourage p o l i t i c a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s among t h e Cambodians.
I n t h e i r campaign to d e v e l o p a "1i b e r a t ion front"
i n Cambodia as t h e y had i n Laos, t h e V i e t Minh encountered major problems. I n a d d i t i o n to t h e f a c t o r s mentioned,
Communis%e f f o r t s t o foment;: d i s c o n t e n t were hampered by
t h e e n e r v a t i n g c l i m a t e , t h e h i s t o r i c m i s t r u s t of t h e Cambodians f o r t h e Vietnamese, and a p o l i t i c a l l y p a s s i v e t e n dency which is a reflection of Cambodia's Theravada Buddhism. The impact of any " l i b e r a t i o n f r o n t " was f u r t h e r
undercut once Sihanouk began a c t i v e l y campaigning for
Cambodian independence.
As f a r as c a n be determined, t h e Viet Minh s t r a t e g y
i n Cambodia appears t o have been t h e development of a common f r o n t w i t h t h e I s s a r a k . I n t h e l a t e 1940s and e a r l y
1950s, t h e l i n e between t h e V i e t Minh and t h e Issarak was
sometimes b l u r r e d ; both o p e r a t e d i n t h e b u s h , and both
were anti-French and anti-Sihanouk.
French o f f i c i a l s
t e n d e d t o add to t h e c o n f u s i o n by d i s m i s s i n g anyone who
f a v o r e d complete independence for Cambodia as a Communist.
V i e t Minh cadres i n Cambodia first appeared i n 1949,
i n t h e guise of t h e "Committee f o r t h e L i b e r a t i o n of t h e
Cambodian People" I n an e f f o r t It0 c a p i t a l i z e on t h e reput a t i o n of Son Ngoc Thanh, and $Q a t t r a c k h i s Issarak f o l l o w e r s , l e a d e r s h i p of t h e L i b e r a t i o n Committee was ascribed t o one Son Mgoc Minh.*
I t enjoyed a precarious e x i s t e n c e u n t i l 1952, when Thanh broke w i t h Sihanouk and h i m s e l f went i n t o d i s s i d e n c e . The e x t e n t of c o o p e r a t i o n
*Thenre i a some q u e s t i o n whether there is or was anyone
named Son Ngoc Minh. The seeming p l a y on words v i s - a - v i s
Son Ngoc Thanh s u g g e s t s t h a t Minh, like K i m I1-song i n
North Korea, may be a local leader a t t e m p t i n g to cash i n
on t h e r e p u t a t i o n of a p o p u l a r hero. The i s s u e has been
clouded, however, by Thanh's r e f u s a l e i t h e r to c o n f i r m
OF deny r e p o r t s t h a t Son Ngoc Minh is h i s brother.
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11
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between t h e I s s a r a k and the V i e % Winh is u n c l e a r , and
t h e r e are b e l i e v e d t o have been i n s t a n c e s in which they.
fought one a n o t h e r . B u t t h e Issarak--who a t one stage
numbered around 10,00Q--could h a r d l y have escaped being
i n f l u e n c e d by V i e t Minh propaganda. Sihanouk was caref u l to d i s t i n g u i s h between t h e mksguided Issarak and t h e
V i e t Minh f o r as l o n g as he w a s able t o secure d e f e c t i o n s
f r o m t h e I s s a r a k . A f t e r 1953, however, he w a s i n c r s a s i n g l y prone to lump Son Ngoc Thanh w i t h the V i e t Minh
and o t h e r f f t r a i t o r s ."
A s t h e war i n Vietnam t u r n e d a g a i n s t t h e French,
t h e Cambodians became more circumspect in t h e i r a n t i Communism. One r e a s o n t h a t t h e French had balked a t all o w i n g Cambodia t o assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r its own def e n s e was Sihanouk's u h w i l l i n g n e s s t o p e r m i t Cambodiap
forces t o s e r v e outside t h e country. Prime M i n i s t e r
Penn N o u t h observed in the f a l l of 1953 t h a t Cambodia d i d
n o t feel bound t o oppose Communism "unless t h e Communists
seek t o impose t h e i r d o c t r i n e on u s by force." Notwiths t a n d i n g these e f f o r t s t o s t a y o u t of t h e l i n e of f i r e ,
Cambodia found itself being invaded by regular V i e t Minh
' f o r c e s i n Markh 1954, on t h e very e v e of t h e Geneva con-
f e r e n c e on Indo-China.
The V i e t Minh i n v a s i o n of t h e Cambodian Northeast
almost made an anti-Communist o u t of Sfhanouk. Following: an i n s p e c t i o n t r i p to t h r e a t e n e d p r o v i n c e s in A p r i l ,
t h e P r i n c e b r o a d c a s t t o h i s people:
Compatriots, a t t h i s moment I have
t h e p a i n f u l d u t y t o announce t o you t h a t
t h e s i t u a t i o n of our c o u n t r y has become
g r a v e . In Stung Treng t h e Communist
f o r c e s of M r . Ho C h i Bbinh, coming from
a neighboring c o u n t r y , have i n f i l t r a t e d
i n an attempt t o d e s t r o y a p a r t of o u r
national foroes
e
e .
.
A t p r e s e n t t h e y openly declare thems e l v e s enemies of o u r c o u n t r y . . .,.The V i e t
Minh are t h e a g g r e s s o r s who act a g a i n s t
human r i g h t s .
I
There is no j u r i d i c a l argument
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'
II
I
~
which p e r m i t s them t o v i o l a t e . . . o u r
nation.
And h e r e is why: The V i e t Minh proclaim
t h a t , i n t h i s w a r , if t h e y invade Laos,
it is t o h e l p t h e courrtry o b t a i n complete
B u t i n o u r c o u n t r y there
independence.
is independence which is t h e r e s u l t of
o u r p e r s o n a l accomplishment..
..
If t h e V i e t Minh r e a l l y want independence, why do t h e y not first of a l l
seek t h e independence of t h e i r own coun-'
t r y ? Why do t h e y come t o a t t a c k u s a t
t h e r i s k of o u r young s o v e r e i g n t y ?
..
The eleventh-hour i n v a s i o n of Cambodia by t h e V i e t
Minh was probably designed to s t r e n g t h e n t h e Communists'
hand a t t h e Geneva n e g o t i a t i o n 3 ; a t one s t a g e i n t h e
talks, Molotov boasted t h a t t h e V i e t Minh h e l d 75 p e r c e n t
of Vietnam, h a l f of Laos, and a "small b u t i n c r e a s i n g "
p o r t i o n of Cambodia. A t t h e conference, however, it w a s
concerning Cambodia t h a t t h e 'bloc made its most s i g n i f ic a n t concessions. When t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s began i n May,
b o t h Laos and Cambodia objected s t r o n g l y t o a Communist
s t a t u s quo a n t e proposal i n which Communist pockets w o u l d
remain i n both c o u n t r i e s f o l l o w i n g a cease-fire. The Cambodians won t h e i r p o i n t , probably because t h e Communists
were aware of t h e i r l i m i t e d assets there, b u t t h e Laot i a n s d i d n o t . The Communists were s i m i l a r l y unsuccessf u l i n s e c u r i n g r e c o g n i t i o n of Son Mgoc Thanh and h i s
I s s a r a k as an o p p o s i t i o n government t o t h a t of Sihanouk.
The conference decided t h a t Viet l i n h forces m u s t be
.
.
. ,
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i
i n t o p l a y world o p i n i o n and world moral
s u p p o r t f o r Cambodia, which w i l l show up.
t h e Communist a g g r e s s o r s for what t h e y
are
,
'
.
!
The main r e s u l t s of t h e Geneva conference were t h e
p a r t i t i o n of V i e t n a m a t t h e 1 7 t h P a r a l l e l , and the "dem i l i t a r i z a t i o n " of Laos and Cambodia. 0% the three HndoChinese states, Cambodia emerged i n by far t h e best shape.
N o t o n l y d i d it secure the withdrawal of Communist troops
(most were indeed p u l l e d o u t , i n f a c t as w e l l as in promise), b u t it s u c c e s s f u l l y demanded t h e r i g h t t o maintain
an army f o r d e f e n s i v e purposes, and t o s o l i c i t m i l i t a r y
a s s i s t a n c e "for t h e purpose of! the e f f e c t i v e d e f e n s e of
t h e t e r r i t o r y . " An I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n t r o l C~namission (HCC)
was established t o observe t h e t r e a t y p r o v i s i o n s i n each
of t h e three Indo-Chinese states.
ID.
The Troubles of a King
. The handling of C m b o d Q a g s i n t e r e s t s a t Geneva .
brought new p r e s t i g e t o its diplomats and its young
.
King. Cambodia had, i n f a c t , p a r l a y e d its m i l i t a r y
weakness into concessions which might not have been
g r a n t e d by t h e Communists 40 a more powerful s t a t e .
Within t h e c o u n t r y , SihanodakPs prestige was a t a z e n i t h .
F i r s t he had brought independence, which had in t u r n
brought a predictable e r o s i o n i n t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e
I s s a r a k . NOWhe had achieved t h e V i e t Winh withdrawal,
without r e c o u r s e t o bloodshed.
Only i n PhnQm Penh itself W e r e d i s c o r d a n t n o t e s
t o be heard. When Sihanouk r e t u r n e d to h i s c a p i t a l i n
November 1953, he was faced with complicated t e c h n i c a l
problems a r i s i n g from t h e t r a n s f e r of powers from France2
Faced w i t h problems such as %he s t a b i l i z a t i o n of h i s
c o u n t r y ' s c u r r e n c y , t h e s u p e r v i s i o n Crp t h e V i e t Minh
withdrawal, and t h e development of' a new economic r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h F r w c e , Sihmouls reacted in an emotional and
p e t u l a n t mahner. The King was h a r d l y a p r o t o t y p e revolut i o n a r y : he had never gone hungry, never thrown 8 bomb,
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14.-
I
and nevef l i v e d i n a g a r r e t . He was, however, of t h e revol u t i o n a r y breed, and h i s e f f e c t i v e n e s s as a s o a p box o r a t o r
was matched by h i s impatience w i t h more p r o s a i c matters
of governmental a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . He w a s f u r t h e r hampered
by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e French had done l i t t l e t o t r a i n
Cambodians f o r t h e c i v i l s e r v i c e
e
A t t h e r o o t of Sihanouk's problems was h i s own une a s i n e s s as t o t h e p r o p e r form of government f o r h i s count r y . I n t h e o r y h e was i n f a v o r of a democracy, and had
promised g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s at t h e close of h i s three-year
" r o y a l maddate" i n 1952. A t %he same t i m e , he had a deep
contempt f o r h i s c r i t i c s i n t h e Assembly and had no d e s i r e - on b o t h p e r s o n a l and p a t r i o t i c grounds--to s u r k e n d e r t h e
i n s t r u m e n t s of p o l i t i c a l power. H e brooded o v e r h i s count r y ' s weakness and o v e r t h r e a t s , s e a l and imagined, t o
h i s own p o s i t i o n . For a l l h i s i n t e l l i g e n c e , he continued
t o p l a c e a c h i l d - l i k e f a i t h I n t h e r o y a l a s t r o l o g e r s whose
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e r o y a l decision-making p r o c e s s was
l i t t l e changed f r o m t h e days of t h e Khmer empire.
Premier Penn Nouth w a s regarded by most o b s e r v e r s
i n Phnom Benh as a d e d i c a t e d p u b l i c s e r v a n t , who had r u n
t h e governmental a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a s w e l l as c o u l d be done
w i t h t h e King i n Battambang. I n December 1954, however,
t h e King ,dismissed him and h i s government, L i k e many of
Sihanouk's " l o y a l " f o l l o w i n g , Nouth would e v e r i t u a l l y r e g a i n
t h e r o y a l f a v o r and make a p o l i t i c a l comeback. The same
c o u l d n o t be s a i d of Son Ngoc Thanh. I n September 1954,
Thanh s e n t a message t o t h e King, p l e d g i n g h i s l o y a l t y
and asking ' f o r an audience. One can o n l y speculate what
prompted Sihanouk's r e p l y . H e may have weighed t h e p r o s
and cons, and determined t h a t a f i n a l r e s o l u t i o n of t h e
I s s a r a k problem was n o t worth t h e t h r e a t of a p o l i t i c a l
comeback by Thanh. Os h e may have reacted more emotiona l l y towards t h e p e r s o n r e s p o n s i b l e for propaganda broadcasts a g a i n s t t h e King h i m s e l f . I n any case Thanh's
a p p e a l was p u b l i c l y . rejected by t h e King, who charged
t h a t ''You would n o t s e r v e H i s Majesty, t h e King, a t t h e
c r i t i c a l hour when he was accomplishing h i s r o y a l m i s s i o n , b u t ' i n s t e a d went i n t o t h e bush t o work a g a i n s t t h e
King
You have broken promises, you 'have openly a t t a c k e d
t h e King; "
....
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15
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. -
I n February 1955, SihanQppk s a i d n o t h i n g of e l e c t i o n s .
I n s t e a d , he h e l d a referendum of s o r t s . In it, ellegible
v o t e r s i n d i c a t e d approval o r dPsappTovaP of t h e King's
In a C Q U ~ where
~ ~ Y illiteracy ran
b a n d l i n g of a f f a i r s .
w e l l over 50 p e r c e n t , t h e people were i n s t r u c t e d , "If you
l o v e your King, v o t e w h i t e ; i f you do n o t , v o t e black.''
The balitoting was n o t secret, and t h e combination of off i c i a l p r e s s u r e and t h e King's genuine p o p u l a r i t y r e s u l t e d
i n 8 99% endorsement for Sihanouk.
I n t h e wake of t h e referendum, popular demonstrat i o n s were s t a g e d i n t h e c a p i t a l . P e t i t i o n e r s a r r i v e d
from the p r o v i n c e s , a l l u r g i n g t h e King t o r e t a i n c o n t r o l
of t h e government and t o keep t h e " p o l i t i c i a n s ' * from reg a i n i n g power. As w i t h t h e referendum, t h e demonstrat i o n s reflected both o f f i c i a l p o l i c y and the popular w i l l ;
t o t h e US h b a s s a d o r , Sihanouk spoke of h i s desire t o
a c h i e v e an amalgum between t h e o r e t i c a l l y p u r e democracy
and t h e c e n t u r i e s - o l d desire of t h e Cambodian people t o
be r u l e d by a kind and e n l i g h t e n e d a b s o l u t e monarch. The
u p s h o t ' w a s t h a t Sihanouk viewed t h e referendum and t h e
demonstrations t h a t followed as a mandate for c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
E'Bforms, and these he o u t l i n e d
19 February.
The key t o Sihanouk's "reforms" w a s a b o l i t i o n of
t4e p a r t y s y s t e m , which had g e n e r a l l y been regarded as
i n e f f e c t i v e under t h e Democratic p a r t y c a b i n e t s of 19501952. The King e n v i s i o n e d t h e c r e a t i o n of v a r i o u s l o c a l assemblies and bne n'ational assembly, whose functions--s%nce a l l
power would reside i n t h e King--would be s t r i c t l y advis o r y . Deputies would have to have resided three y e a r s
i n t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n c i e s - - a seemingly innocuous p r o v i s o ,
which i n e f f e c t d i s e n f r a n c h i s e d a l l I s s a r a k i n apparent
v i o l a t i o n of t h e Geneva agreement. The King would be t h e
f i n a l a r b i t e r of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n , as w e l l as chief execut i v e , w i t h power t o v e t o Assembly b i l l s and t o a p p o i n t
and d i s m i s s c a b i n e t m i n i s t e r s .
.
P r e d i c t a b l y , t h e p o l i t i c a l groups t h r e a t e n e d by
t h e King raised a s t o r m .
Sihanouk was uneasy, as he was
prone t o be when 'tisolated'' i n Phnom Penh, away from h i s
admiring s u b j e c t s i n &he h i n t e r l a n d . bforeover, , h i s
forebodings w i t h r e g a r d to t h e three-year r e s i d e n c e
I
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p r o v i s i o n appeased j u s t i f i e d ; it was widely runbred i n t h e
c a p i t a l t h a t t h e ICC was opposed both' t o t h e 'residence
' p r o v i s i o n a n d t o t h e postponement of e l e c t i o n s . .
On 2 March, Sihanouk a b r u p t l y abdicated as King,
I n an announcement f 3 a i s l y d r i p p i n g w i t h s e l f - p i t y , he
e x p l a i n e d h i s action t o t h e people:
,
.,
.
A f t e r having brought independence
and peace t o our people, I f i n d t h a t I
a m b e t r a y e d , +ill-treated and abused by
men who-use u n j u s t democracy. I have
decided t o f i n d t h e means (to correct
this, situation).
These means are laws
which I have w r i t t e n t o p e r m i t our
humblest c i t i z e n s , who are a m a j o r i t y
and who. are t h e t r u e r e p r e s e n t a % i v e s
of. t h e n a t i o n . t o u s e t h e ~ o w e rdesired
by t h e p e o p l e - a n d t o psote@t themselves
a g a i n s t new i n j u s t i c e s .
e e
.
,
B u t t h i s new l a w provokes t h e opp o s i t i o n of t h e p o l i t i c i a n s , t h e r i c h ,
and t h e educated, who are accustomed
to u s i n g t h e i r knowledge t o d e c e i v e
others and t o place innumerable obstacles in t h e p a t h on which I m u s t lead
o u r people toward p r o s p e r i t y and
justice..
..
I
Poor and humble fellow c i t i z e n s who
are t h e o b j e c t of my l o v e : i n all tasks..
I *have v e r y o f t e n met h o s t i l i t y , t r e a s o n ,
calumny, s o o r n and insaagts from d i s h o n e s t
p e r s o n s who are my enemies. They have
never. l e t m e c a r r y out my m i s s i o n f o r
n a t i o n and p e o p l e e a s i l y . . . . E v e n now I
m u s t oppose these men, ( b u t ) I must first
of a l l bear you w i t n e s s of nay g r a t i t u d e .
I
Po YOU, l i t t l e p e o p l e , I owe much
because you chose t o follow m e ' i n my
e f f o r t s t o a c h i e v e n a t i o n a l independence,
-
17
-
.
*.
I
!
And t u r n i n g a deaf ear to provocation
and t h e incitement of t r a i t o r s . . .you
supported me and enabled m e t o g a i n
a l l s o r t s of v i c t o r i e s for t h e n a t i o n . . . .
I see t h a t even i f I c o n t i n u e t o
r e i g n I w i l l n o t be able t o work f o r
your best i n t e r e s t s . . . I ask, fellowc i t i z e n s , permission t o a b d i c a t e , and
I d e f i n i t e l y do n o t i n t e n d to change
my mind.
I w i s h t o p u t hy f a t h e r and
mother, t o whom I am g r a t e f u l and who
are t h e eldest members of t h e r o y a l
f a m i l y , on t h e throne as King and Queen
t o r e i g n after me.
Sihanouk's a b d i c a t i o n stirred 8 wave of s p e c u l a t i o n ,
most of which was wide of t h e mark. Some o b s e r v e r s expected Sihanouk t o r e t u r n t o t h e t h r o n e by popular demand,
and t h e r e b y sweep aside a l l o p p o s i t i o n t o h i s reform program. O t h e r s accepted h i s a b d i c a t i o n a t face v a l u e , and
assumed t h a t p o l i t i c a l power would i n f a c t as w e l l as
i n t h e o r y p a s s t o Sihanouk's f a m i l y =
Few appeared t o
feel t h a t t h e ex-King--now t i t l e d P r i n c e Sihanouk-could
malntain h i s p o l i t i c a l preeminence a p a r t from t h e t h r o n e .
With t h e advantage of h i n d s i g h t , it is obvious
t h a t Sihanouk had no i n t e n t i o n of y i e l d i n g p o l i t i c a l
!
-
18.-
. . ..
.
.
,
..
.l e a d e r s h i p .
R a t h e r , he appears to :have secogriized a b s o l u t e
monarchy as an anachronism in t h e T w e n t i e t h C e n t u r y , and
Although his
a p o t e n t i a l o b s t a c l e to h i s reform program.
a b d i c a t i o n appears to have been a sudden d e c i s i o n , and
i n p a s t t h e r e s u l t of Sihanouk's s e n s i t i v i t y t o criticism,
t h e ex-King d i d not lack f o r c o u r s e s of a c t i o n . Within
(weeks he was d e v o t i n g a l l h i s e n e r g i e s to o r g a n i z i n g a
new p o l i t i c a l movement, t h e Sangkum Reastr Niyum, OF
P e o p l e ' s S o c i a l i s t Community. It became a p m t t h a t ,
Sihanouk had l e f t t h e t h r o n e l a r g e l y t o g a i n more effect i v e c o n t r o l of t h e p o l i t i c a l arena. In a b d i c a t i n g he
had l e f t no power vacuum i n t h e palace:
SifianouLOs e n e m i e s
would have l i t t l e access to and l i t t l e i n f l u e n c e w i t h t h e r o y a l
couple, Sihanouk's p a r e n t s .
E.
Neutralism:
Stage 1
In t h e months p r i o r to Cambodian independence,
Sihanouk had argued p u r s u a s i v e l y t h a t F r a n c e ' s unwillingn e s s t o g r a n t f u l l independence s e r v e d t o s t r e n g t h e n the
Xssarak and V i e t Minh i n t h e j u n g l e . Although Sihanouk
was not outspoken i n h i s anti-Comunism, h i s i n t e r e s t i n
French c u l t u r e , his l i p s e r v i c e t o demoeratic p r e c e p t s ,
and e s p e c i a l l y h i s o p p o s i t i o n t o t h o s e d i s s i d e n t s whom
t h e French had labeled as Communist, a l l i n s p i r e d ho es t h
h e , ' . would Drove t o be a f r i e n d of t h e West.
+
A t t h e same t i m e , there were signs t h a t Son Ngoc
Thanh was becoming an o b s e s s i n n w i t h t h e P r i n c e .
In d i s c u s s i n g h i s new p o l i t i c a l movement
Sihanou k
emphasized t h a t w h i l e membership
t h e Sanglkum wab open
to. a l l who would renounce t h e i r p r e v i o u s p o l i z e c a l a l l e g i ances, t h i s o f f e r d i d B Q ~apply t o Thanh. 7
1'
remarked t h a t t h e more he observed. Slhanohir, L
I
I
I I~~ :
~
w a s impressed by "the f e e l i n g of almost morbid f a s c i n a t i o n , b o r d e r i n g on terror, w i t h which he r e g a r d s t h i s
id
-
19
-
.
.
somewhat shadowy f i g u r e of Son Ngoc Thanh. Thanh is hidi n g o u t i n t h e j u n g l e . . . y e t the formes King s p e a k s
as
though he were a powerful +warlord, a b l e a t a moment's
n o t i c e t o c h a l l e n g e t h e a u t h o r i t y of the Crown and Cons t it u t ion. '(
...
Sibanouk's a t t i t u d e toward Thanh w a s probably ins p i r e d less by fear t h a n by t h e emotional manner i n which
h e reacted t o criticism. I% appears t o have been a t t h i s
time t h a t French a u t h o r i t i e s - f e a r f u l concerning t h e d i s placement of French by American i n f l u e n c e i n Indo-China-first s o u g h t t o discredit t h e U.S. w i t h Sihanouk by l i n k i n g American agencies w i t h t h e I s s a r a k . ,As e a r l y as April
1955, Ambassador McC1intock w a s obliged t o deny FrenchI n s p i r e d rumors t h a t h i s embassy was "in league" w i t h Son
Mgoc Thanh.
Overshadowing Silaanouk;'s concern w i t h Thanh, how-
ever, were c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of f o r e i g n p o l i c y .
Whether,
i n a d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l s e t t i n g , he might have' k e p t h i s
c o u n t r y on a moderately pro-Western c o u r s e w i l l never be
known. The f a c t w a s t h a t C m b o d i a ' s weakness made it
imperative t h a t she reach 8 modus vivendi w i t h t h e Cowm u n i s t s , whose s k i l l a t i n f i l t r a t i o n w a s d a i l y e v i d e n t
i n Laos. In l a t e r y e a r s he would become preoccupied
w i t h threats, real and imagined, from Thailand and South
. Vietnam. H i s e a r l y moves towards n e u t r a l i s m , however,
appear t o have beEn a l o g i c a l outgrowth of t h e Communist
v i c t o r y a t Dien Bien Phu and t h e subsequent p a r t i t i o n of
Vietnam.
The first major sounding board f o r Sihanouk and
h i s views was t h e Bandung conference i n A p r i l 1955.
There, a t a meeting dedicated to Afro-Asian s o l i d a r i t y
and a n t i c o l o n i a l i s m , Sihanouk was i n f a s t company. From
P e i p i n g came Chou En-lai ( t h e i r meeting a t Bandung was
t h e f isst c o n t a c t between them) ,. North Vietnam was
r e p r e s e n t e d by Premier Pham Van Dong, I n d i a by N e h r u
ahd E r i s h n a Menon, Burma by U Nu.
Although t h e meeting
encompassed n e u t r a l as w e l l as Communist n a t i o n s , t h e
dominant c o u n t r y was acknowledged t o be mainland China
and t h e dominant f i g u r e Chou En-lai.
-
20'-
I
I
I
_
_
I
I
.
- %
-
. ..
-.
.
Sihanouk made two speeches a t t h e c o n f e r e n c e , one
on 1 9 A p r i l and a n o t h e r on 23 A p r i l , c o v e r i n g much t h e
same ground. T h e i r effect was t o p l a c e Cambodia c l e a r l y
i n t h e n e u t r a l camp, as d e f i n e d by N e h r u ' s F i v e P r i n c i p l e s
of C o e x i s t e n c e . Sihanouk showed a keen awareness of t h e
s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e conference:
Eminent v o i c e s have a l r e a d y de%ined
t h e main f e a t u r e s and r e v e a l e d t h e object i v e s of t h e p r e s e n t c o n f e r e n c e : . . .
,
l
That it p u t s i n c o n c r e t e form, for
t h e v e r y first t i m e , the s o l i d a r i t y of
A f r i c a n and Asian peoples, i n t h e i r eommon l o v e of freedom, e q u a l i t y , peace and
welfare.
That it s h a t t e r s t h e f r o n t i e r s which
separated two worlds: t h e Communist and
t h e non-Communist.
Although SZha'nauk had e a r l i e r endorsed the Five
P r i n c i p l e s - - n o t a b l y d u r i n g 8 v i s i t to I n d i a i m m e d i a t e l y
f o l l o w i n g h i s abdication--at Bandung he made them h i s own.
Sihanouk spoke of h i s p r i d e , n o t only a t having l e d h i s
people * s f i g h t f o r independence, b u t a t having r r r e s o l u t e l y
directed o u r nataional p o l i c y towards t h e Five P r i n c i p l e s ,
and t h e community of n e u t r a l n a t i o n s s u c h as I n d i a and
Burma." Although Cambodia s t i l l recognized N a t i o n a l i s t
China, Sihanouk h i n t e d b r o a d l y t h a t P e i p i n g s h o u l d be
a d m i t t e d i n t o t h e UN, o b s e r v i n g t h a t t h e Bandung confere n c e "offers a n o p p o r t u n i t y for r q g r e t ' k l n g t h a t t h e United
Nations have not y e t opened t h e i r doors t o some n a t i o n s
f i h i c h have f u l f i l l e d 7 t h e c o n d i t i o n s of s o v e r e i g n t y and
c a p a c i t y r e q u i r e d I'oF membership
&
I*
'
Sihanouk was so c l e a r l y a convert to n e u t r a l i s m
t h a t he appeared embarrassed concerning n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h
t h e U.S. f o r m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e , t h e n n e a r i n g completion.
Although s u c h "defensivet1 a s s i s t a n c e was p e r m i t t e d u n d e r
t h e Geneva agreement, Sihanouk s t a t e d ,
-
21
-
We rare bound to t h e Western bloc
by no commitment, by no t r e a t y . We
have accepted French and tamerpican a i d ,
because t h e y have been g r a n t e d u s witho u t terms.
One might ask why we have n o t t u r n e d
t o o t h e r I U X ~ ~ Q X I S ~ Q FB ~ s ~ x ? u ~ ~ Q ~I s .
declare %hatwe s h a l l g r a t e f u l l y accept
any s p e c i a l i s t s whom f r i e n d l y c o u n t r i e s
might be w i l l i n g t o propose, according
t o our needs.
Sihanouk summed up his c o u n t r y ' s p o s i t i o n i n terms
of t h e p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s of S o u t h e a s t Asia:
Independent and n e u t r a l Cambodia
now f i n d s herself on the d i v i d i n g l i n e
of two c i v i l i z a t i o n s , C S ~two races,
of two p o l i t i c a l worlds e and as s u c h ,
s h e has the dangerous p r i v i l e g e 0 % s t a n d ing t h e t e s t rand a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e Five
Principles.
.
I
My c o u n t r y has adopted these p r i n c i p l e s and wishes to apply them to t h e
f u l l e s t e x t e n t . In so doing she o n l y
asks an a b s o l u t e r e c i p r o c i t y . She
requests t h a t her independence, her
s e c u r i t y , h e r t r a d i t i o n s and p o l i t i c a l
ideology n o t be t h r e a t e n e d .
TO-
22
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MILXTANT WEWRALHSP
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Sihanouk Discovess:.the Blbc
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Sihanouk h e l d i n September 1955 t h e Asssmbly elect-ions which h a d ' b e e n o r i g i n a l l y scheduled for A p r i l , I n p r a c t i c e , they amounted to n o t h i n g more t h a n a r e - r u n of
t h e . e a r l i e r referendum. A l l r e s o u r c e s of t h e government
were m a r s h a l l e d on b e h a l f of t h e Sangkum, and where s t r o n g a r m t a c t i c s were n e c e s s a r y t h e y were u s e d ; Sihanouk n a y
have been c o n f i d e n t of his own p r e s t i g e , b u t he also
wanted to p u t h i s p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n on a f i r m footing, N o t s u r p r i s i n g l y , Sangkum won a l l t h e Assembly
seats and 82 p e r d e n t of t h e p o p u l a r v o t e .
The once-inf l u e n t i a l Democrats were able t o g a i n o n l y 1 2 gercen.8;.
The e l e c t i o n s marked t h e appearance of a l e g a l csyptoCommunist p a r t y i n Cambodia--the Krom Pracheachon (Group
of t h e Nation)--but it p o l l e d o n l y p e s c e n t of t h e v o t e .
D e s p i t e t h e i r r e g u l a r i t i e s , t h e e l e c t i o n s were c e r t i f i e d
by t h e ICC a s h a v i n g been c a r r i e d out i n conformity w i t h
t h e Geneva agreement,
The e l e c t i o n triumph l e f t Sihanouk a t t h e head of
a government which was now v i r t u a l l y w i t h o u t domestic
o p p o s i t i o n , He had r o u t e d h i s enemies i n t h e p o l i t i c a l
area, and h i s p o p u l a r i t y was i f a n y t h i n g greater t h a n
b e f o r e h i s a b d i c a t i o n . To the image of Sihanouk, F a t h e r
of h i s Country, had been added that of i n t e r n a t i o n a l
s t a t e s m a n , scourge of t h e Y i e t Minh, and now democratic
l e a d e r . . In h i s a b i l i t y t o monopolize t h e t o o l s of
power, y e t r e t a i n t h e a f f e c t i o n of his s u b j e c t s , h e '
,was w i t h o u t p e e s i n Asia.
9
I n January 1956, Sihanouk began a y e a r devoted i n
l a r g e measure .h i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a v e l . Kt s t a r t e d w i t h
P n e i g h b o r l y v i s i t t o t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , where, to t h e
PTince's d i s c o m f i t u r e , h i s views c o n c e r n i n g the b r i g h t
p r o s p e c t s f o r n e u t r a l i s m were s u b j e c t e d to c r i t i c a l
scrutiny
The FIP i p i n o s , under P r e s i d e n t Magsaysay,
e .
.
!
-
23
-
T .I
I
were s t r o n g advocates of t h e f l e d g l i n g SEATO o r g a n i z a t i o n
t o which t h e US had given backing. They d i d not h e s i t a t e
t o p r e s s t h e i r views on Sihanouk, w i t h o u t t h e d e f e r e n c e
t o which he was accustomed a t home. The v i s i t t o Manila
l e f t a bad t a s t e i n his mouth, whibh lasted u n t i l his
next stop--the first of four visits which he has now made
t o Peiping.
A t t h e t i m e of t h i s v i s i t , Cmbodia Bad diplomatic
r e l a t i o n s o n l y w i t h Western powers. The Chinese Nation&listsmaintained a c o s s u l i t e in Phnom Benh, and these
were no r e l a t i o n s a t a l l w i t h N ~ r t l t aVietnam.+ By rejecti n g membership i n SEATQ, however, Sihanouk had a s s u r e d
himself of a w a r m w e l c o m e in Peiping.
I
Of Sihanouk's special r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Chou Enlai--begun a t t h e Bandung conference--more w i l l be s a i d
l a t e r . In t h e course of t h i s f i r s t v i s i t to P e i p i n g ,
however, Sihanouk was wined, dined and f l a t t e r e d i n a
manner which relegated Manila to t h e s t a t u s of a bad
memory. The j o i n t communique l a i d heavy stress on peacef u l c o e x i s t e n c e , and referred f a v o r a b l y to improved
economic and c u l t u r a l r e l a t i o n s . On his r e t u r n t o Bhnom
Penh, Sihanouk announced t h a t he w o u l d send a d e l e g a t i o n
t o P e i p i n g t o n e g o t i a t e an economic agreement, and t h e
f o l l o w i n g A p r i l a $14 m i l l i o n . trade agreement was s i g n e d .
In1 June, an a i d agreement was concluded under which Peip i n g agreed t o p r o v i d e Cambodia w i t h $22.4 m i l l i o n worth
of goods and s e r v i c e s over a p e r i o d of two y e a r s .
*There w e r e some 2 3 0 ,000 o v e r s e a s Chinese i n Cambodia,
about h a l f of them i n Phnom Penh.
In Cambodia as elsewhere i n S o u t h e a s t Asia, t h e i r c l a n n i s h n e s s , t o g e t h e r w i t h
t h e i r d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e i n f l u e n c e i n commerce and t r a d e ,
made them an object of d i s t r u s t to t h e h o s t government.
Sihanouk's h e s i t a t i o n in r e c o g n i z i n g P e i p i s g probably
stemmed i n p a r t from fear t h a t s u c h a c t i o n would i n c r e a s e
the i n f l u e n c e of t h e mainlimd-oriented Chinese community.
-
.
24
-
.
The s u p p a r t of SO powerfull a n " a l l y " must. h a v e , ,
been p a r t i c u l a r l y r e a s s u r i n g to S i h a n ~ u k , -who r e t u r n e d -,
to a full-blown -d'iplomatic crisis w i t h South Vietnam.
Khmer-Vietnamese r e l a t i o n s had been c o o l for. s q m e t i m e .,
a s a r e s u l t OF t e r r i t o r i a l claims l e f t unresolved by .:
t h e French, and from charges by each s i d e c o n c e r n i n g t h e
aL3eged m i s t r e a t m e n t of Cambodian and V i q t n a m e s e minor;
i t i e s . , A t t h e t i m e of Cambodia's independence, Sihanoqk
had u n s u c c e s s f u l l y demanded t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l i a a t i o n
of t h a t port$on of the MekQng R i v e r on which Cambodia
depended for an o u t l e t t o Saigon. South Vietnam pr,eLdictr
a b l y rejected any such arrangement9 b u t i n p r a c t i c e had
u s u a l l y p e r m i t t e d Cambodian shipments to t r a n s i t t h e
c o u n t r y w i t h o u t harassment. Then, i n F e b r u a r y 1956,
South Vietnam c l o s e d its border to trade w i t h Cambodia,.
There was no p u b l i c e x p l a n a t i o n , b u t t h e concensus was
t h a t D i e m had been angered by Sihanouk's charges of bord e r v i o l a t i o n s , as w e l l as by h i s f l i r t a t i o n w i t h .Peiping.
I
Sihanouk r e t u r n e d t o Phnom Penh convinced t h a t
t h e r e was more to t h e Vietnamese move t h a n m e t t h e eye.
To Sihanauk, it w a s one more move to blaclgmail. Cambodia
i n t o j o i n i n g SEATO, and t h e United S t a t e s was behind i t .
The P r i n c e ' s frame of mind w a s n o t improved when he was
a d v i s e d 05' f r i c t i o n i n t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t h e U.S.
a i d program. Cambodian o f f i c i a l s had hoped t h a t U . S .
.
budgetary s u p p o r t f o r t h e armed forces would be i n the
form of d o l l a r g r a n t s , and t h u s c o n s t i t u t e a source 0.f
f o r e i g n exchange. The U.S. i n s i s t e d on t h e u s e of counterp a r t funds, i . e . s Cambodian riels g e n e r a t e d t h r o u g h t h e
s a l e of U.S. goods. A majorprolblem f o r Sihanouk had
always been t h e stream of m i s l e a d i n g and o f t e n i n a c c u r a t e
Pnf ormat ion provided by t h e c o u r t i e r s and syncophants
w i t h which h e . s u r r o u n d e d h i m s e l f .
Now, informed t h a t
t h e U.S. w a s ! ' t h r e a t e n i n g t o colt off its a i d program,!'
Sihanauk saw h i s worst fears confirmed. I n d i a n repres e n t a t i v e s i n Phnom Penh, whose i n f l u e n c e had grown s i n c e
Sihanouk's c o n v e r s i o n t o n e u t r a l i s m , encouraged. him i n
h i s anti-U.S. ,' anel-SEAT0 campaign.
The r e s u l t w a s A a nationwide campaign a g a i n s t those
who would " p r e s s u r e a g a i n s t Cambodian ' n e u t r a l i t y . "
-The
c u r i o u s a s p e c t of t h i s campaign was not t h a t dem0nstr.at i o n s took p l a c e , b u t t h a t t h e y were t a r g e t e d p r i m a r i l y
-
T
-
25
TI
. .. .
>
a g a i n s t t h e U.S. By any s t a n d a r d of "balancedt* n e u t r a l i s m , Sihanouk had matched h i s acceptance of U.S. a i d by
:the n e g o t i a t i o n s i n Peiping; t h e anti-American demonstrations i n Phnom Penh, therefore, Boomed as a spontaneous
reflect i o n of Sihanouk s emotional i n s t a b i l i t y and s u s c e p t i b i l i t y t o anti-American propaganda. "The Americans,"
observed t h e P r i n c e on 6 A p r i l , "who have so often prom i s e d t o defend t h e freedom of l i t t l e c o u n t r i e s , have
j u s t shown t h e i r t r u e f a c e t o Cambodia. I t is not a noble
one." Elsewhere, he c o n t r a s t e d t h e n o - s t r i n g s a i d made
a v a i l a b l e by China w i t h t h e alleged U . S . p o l i c y of a i d i n g
o n l y c o u n t r i e s which "accept its s u p e r v i s i o n
@
."
A t t h e h e i g h t of t h e a g i t a t i o n , i n e a r l y l a r c h ,
Sihanouk had r e s i g n e d h i s p o s t as p r e m i e r i n favor of ,
one K h i m T i t , implying thalt t h e change might molfify
t h e Americans. After a l l , he p o i n t e d o u t s a d l y , Cambodia's
$100 m i l l i o n development program, launched i n t h e f a l l
of 1955, w a s predicated on a set l e v e l of U.S. aid. Any
q u e s t i o n as t o where t h e real power l a y i n Cambodia was
removed when t h e ex-premies warned t h a t f u r t h e r t t p r e s s u r e O
from t h e United S t a t e s o r SEATO would cause h i s c o u n t r y
t o establish closer r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e bloc.
Sihanouk was o u t of t h e p r e m i e r s h i p for only' a
mattes? of weeks. Not l o n g a f t e r he resumed h i s post t h e
Viet'namese--prodded by t h e U.S,--lifted t h e i r blockade
of t h e Mekong. As tempers cooled, the main r e s u l t of
t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n appeared to be 8 speedup In work on a
deepwater p o r t on t h e G u l f of Sfam, a t S i h a n o u k v i l l e .
Actually, Sihanouk had set a p a t t e r n of e r r a t i c behavior
which he h a s continued t o t h i s day.
Sfianouk continued t o e x p l o r e t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s
i n h e r e n t i n n e u t r a l i s m . In J u l y he embarked on a t r i p
to t h e USSR and E a s t e r n E u r o p e . Once again t h e w e l c o m e
mat was o u t : i n a j o i n t commun4que of 7 J u l y , Sihanouk
and S o v i e t Prsmier Bulganin endorsed t h e F i v e P r i n c i p l e s ,
and announced t h a t t h e USSR would p r o v i d e Cambodia w i t h
"uneondit i o n a l " economic and t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e
Ambassadors would be exchanged, and t h e S o v i e t s would b u i l d
and e q u i p a h o s p i t a l i n Phnom Penh as a g i f t t o t h e Cambodian people.
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26
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The same r i t u a l was r e p e a t e d when Sihanouk v i s i t e d
The P o l e s were favosabl'y d i s posed concerning a i d for Cambodla, and promised to add
a wing t o t h e S o v i e t h o s p i t a l .
In Czechoslovakia, agreement was reached concerning 8 trade agreement, to be
f i n a l i z e d i n 'Phnom Penh e In. a j o i n t communique,,Sihanouk
j o i n e d t h e Czechs i n c a l l i p g f o r t h e s e a t i n g of Communist
China i n t h e UN.
5
t h e European s a t e l l i t e s .
,
,
.
-
When Sihanouk r e t u r n e d t o Cambodia, he e x t o l l e d
t h e agreements h e had n e g o t i a t e d i n t h e bloc, emphasizing
n o t o n l y t h e m a t e r i a l benefits they promised butthe fact
t h a t t h e y involved r e c o g n i t i o n of Cambodia's independence.
In an extemporaneous speech a t %he a i r p o r t , he characterized t h s agreements as ''a f o r m of alliance"--a remark
which he l a t e r q u a l i f i e d , b u t which was an e a r l y reflect i o n of Sihanouk's preoccupation w i t h t h e t r a p p i n g s of
s e c u r i t y : r e c o g n i t i o n , endorsement of t h e F i v e P r i h c k p l e s ,
and .border g u a r a n t e e s ,.
. .
If t h e r e w a s aky s o l a c e for t h e West i n Sihanouk"s
j u n k e t , it w a s t h a t t h e P r i n c e w a s now uneasy concerning
t h e very-abundance of p l e d g e s which he had secured from
t h e E a s t e H e moderated h i s c r i t i c i s m of t h e U.S. .aid. program, and appeared anxious n o t t o become dependent . o n : t h e
b l o c o r t o w i v e o u t American a i d . Although C h i n e s e techn i c i a n s a r r i v e d i n Phnom Benh t o begin s u r v e y s f o r a
t e x t i l e p l a n t , 'diplomatic r e c o g n i t i o n of P e i p i n g was n o t
y e t f osthcoming and the C h i n e s e M a t i o n a l i s t c o n s u l a t e
remained.
Sihanouk was prone t o "define" h i s c o u n t r y ' s neutralism to anyone who would l i s t e n , u s u a l l y w i t h emphasis
on Cambodia's weakness and i n s i g n i f i c a n c e i n a world of
super-powers.
On t h e o c c a s i b n of Ambassador McClintock's
d e p a r t u r e from Phnom Penh, Sihanouk made a speech i n which
he stressed t h e bonds of f r i e n d s h i p between Cambodia and
t h e U.S.
He went on t o add,
W e could not, however, declare ours e l v e s n e u t r a l and c o n t i n u e t o conduct
o n l y a one-way n e u t r a l i t y whicli opened
a gag between u s and t h e powers which
r e p r e s e n t more t h a n a t h i r d of t h e
-
27
-
5
1
al
9
E).
.-
I
I
i n h a b i t a n t s of t h e world, when some of
t h o s e powers are p r a c t i c a l l y a t our
e consider t h a t o u r present
doorstep. W
a t t i t u d e w i l l srlPow o u r l i t t l e c o u n t r y
t o be a meeQing,place for t h e governrnents t h a t c o n f r o n t each o t h e r w i t h opposing i d e o l o g i e s , whereas t h e aspip+t i o n s and t h e i n t e r e s t s of a l l p e o p l e
converge on one s i n g l e o b j e c t i v e : peace.
I
,
Foreign F r i e n d s and Domestic Enemies
Sihanouk r e c e i v e d on h i s r e t u r n to Phrmom Penh t h e
tumultuous welcome d u e a conquering .hero. After t h e
f i r s t few days, however, he had d i f f i c u l t y i n a d j u s t i n g
from h i s role of v i s i t i n g d i g n i t a r y t o t h a t of a head
of government w i t h p r o b l e m a t home. Sihanouk was a t h i s
b e s t on ceremonial v i s i t s , when there was qo reminder
sth@t-Cambodia was a small and rather i c s i g n i f i c a n t power,
b u t much of t h e gushy f l a t t e r y which he loved. ’ A t home
there was also f l a t t e r y , b u t t h e r e were also glimpses
of realit y : o f f i c i a l c o r r u p t ion, inadequate budgets,
and even q s i t i c i s m - o f ‘ t h e P r i n c e .
.
I
.
In October Sihanouk i s s u e d another i n a series of,
moving s t a t e m e n t s w i t h which he proclaimed h i s p e r i o d i c
r e s i g n a t i o n s . The main problem appeared t o be anonymous
letters which he had r e c e i v e d a t t h e palace:
,
*
I
I c a n no l o n g e r b e a r t h e contempt,
t h e i n s u l t s and t h e repeated bitter critic i s m which .are b e i n g heaped upon.me by
people of t h e other s i d e e v e r y ’day through
innumerable anonymous ‘ l e t t e r s . They s a y
t h a t I can S e r v e t h e people o n l y through .
words, t h a t . I a m good at mak’inv loud-mouthed
speeches w i t h o u t any r e a l consequence, and
t h a t I l e a v e t h e government b u r e a u c r a c i e s
and t h e d e p u t i e s f r e e to abuse t h e c o n f i dence of t h e people axxi to make off w i t h
p u b l i c - f u n d s i n order t o eat and d r i n k i n
opulence,
I
I
I
--
I
Sihanouk t h e n launched i n t o a rambling, d e f e n s i v e
account bf h i s achievements for Cambodia, of t h e enthuL
siasm w i t h which he had been r e c e i v e d on h i s t r a v e l s ,
and of t h e a i d which he had been promised by h i s s f o r e i g n
f r i e n d s . No c h a r g e w a s s o p e t t y t h a t Sihanouk d i d ' n o t
.feel a need t o r e f u t e it: l a n d r e h a b i l i t a t e d i n Bhnom
Penh's slum c l e a r a n c e program was not b e i n g r e s e r v e d for
t h e r i c h ; c o r r u p t o f f i c i a l s d i d n o t enjoy t h e p r o t e c t i o n
of t h e p a l a c e ; t h e P r i n c e d i d n o t condone c a r o u s i n g by ;
government officials at l o c a l dance halls. I n f a c t , he
had had enough:
.,
I
Why, these d a y s , do some of my compatriots
t r e a t m e as lower than an animal? They
t h i n k t h a t 1 am here to be kicked i n t h e
head anytime t h e y please, j u s t because I
r e c e i v e d the c o n f i d e n c e and t h e v o t e s of
t h e people.
I w i s h to s t a t e t h a t if e v e r
I h e l d power a t one t i m e or a n o t h e r , it
was o n l y in order to be able t o s e r v e you.
I a m n o t power-hungry OF power-mad, for
t h e job of Chief of Government has g i v e n
m e n o t h i n g but u n u t t e r a b l e w e a r i n e s s ,
v e x a t i o n and h u m i l i a t ion
3
e
By r e s i g n i n g , Sihanouk placed h i m s e l f i n t h e unu s u a l r o l e of u n o f f i c i a l host to a Chinese d e l e g a t ' i o n
headed by Chou E n - l a i , who was eager t o r e t u r n t h e v i s i t
p a i d by Sihanouk e a r l i e s i n t h e y e a r . A c t u a l l y , there
w a s some e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e P r i n c e was growing uneasy
c o n c e r n i n g h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e bloc. F i r s t there had
been t h e g r u d g i n g e x p r e s s i o n s of g r a t i t u d e f o r U.S. a i d .
Subsequently, t h e S o v i e t i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Hungary w a s gene r a l l y condemned i n o f f i c i a l circles Pn Phnom Penh, although Cambodia a b s t a i n e d from t h e UN r e s o l u t i o n which
censured the USSR. I n v a r i o u s s p e e c h e s , Sihanouk s o u g h t
t o emphasize t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e Sangkum's brand
of " n a t i o n a l " socialism and t h e s e r v i t u d e i m p l i c i t i n
" i n t e r n a t i o n a l " socialism. On one o c c a s i o n he noted t h a t
t h e Hungarians had 'spreferred to shed t h e i r blood" r a t h e r
t h a n l i v e under Communism.
I
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29
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1
None of t h i s d e t r a c t e d from t h e welcome accorded
A t Phnom Penh a i r p o r t , where an o g f k i a l
greet;lng of 100,000 p e r s o n s had been organized, Prince
Sihanouk introduced, t h e d i s t i n g u i s h e d v i s i t o r s to h i s
p a r e n t s , w h i l e Premier Sara Yun hovered d i f f i d e n t l y nearby. Chou's v i s i t produced n o t h i n g s t a r t l i n g , b u t t h e r e
w a s much t o a s t i n g of t h e Five P r i n c i p l e s , and t h e Indian
Legation played host t o one r e c e p t i o n . There, Chou obs e r v e d t h a t " I n d i a , China and Cambodia have established
c l o s e and f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s on t h e b a s i s of t h e Five
P r i n c i p l e s , '' and t h a t I n d i a had provided " h e l p f u l asgistance t o t h e development of f r i e n d l y t i e s betveen
Chfna and Cambodia ''
Chou E n - l a i .
.
Chou referred to t h e "great honorft he had f e l t a t
working w i t h Slhainoulk a t t h e Barndung conference, and all u d e d t o t h e " g r e a t fs%emdship and admirationtv f e l t by
t h e Chinese people f o r " t h i s s t a t e s m a n defending peace
and cooper a t ion among n a t i o n s . '' He lauded Cambodia s
p o l i c y of n e u t r a l i t y , and o n l y w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e Suez
crisis ("with which .both t h e Chinese and Cambodian people
a r e concerned") d i d he i s d u l g e i n o v e r t propaganda.
Premier Pun, a t a banquet, provided .ample e x p l a a a t $ o n f o r
Cambodia's p o l i c y of n e u t r a l i t y ,
"Qur. people need peace
because t h e y know t h e s e r i o u s disasters war b r i n g s t q
us," he s a i d . "War would undermine t h e work of o u r
beloved P r i n c e t o r e c o n s t r u c t . t h e , country
et'
Cambgdia's f o r e i g n p o l i c y could a t least be said
to reflect i n t e l l i g e n & opportunism. I t c o n t r a s t e d w i t h
t h e domestic scene i n Cambodia, which was chaos. Ever
s i n c e independence, Sihanouk had been hampered by t h e abs e n c e of a t r a i n e d c i v i l s e r v i c e , and by endemic corrupt i o n among t o p o f f i c i a l s . Sihanouk was not r e s p o n s i b l e
f o r t h e f a i l u r e of t h e French t o t r a i n local a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , or f o r t h e low salaries and greed which spawned
c o r r u p t i o n . , The P r i n c e acerbated these shortcomings,
however, by h i s u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o make effective u s e of
those f e w qualified p u b l i c s e r v a n t s who were g v a i l a b l e .
The atmosphere around Sihanouk was s u c h t h a t honest off i c i a l s were u s u a l l y discredited by talebearers, who found
i n t h e P r i n c e a r e c e p t i v e audience. Adding to these adm i n i s t r a t i v e woes there w a s t h e e r r a t i c behavior of
I
,
.
-.
30
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1
I'
Sihanouk h i m s e l f . I n t h e t w o y e a r s f o l l o w i n g h i s abdicat i o n as King, Sihanoub r e s i g n e d t h e p r e m i e r s h i p no fewer
t h a n t h r e e times. The f i r s t i n s t a n c e was d u r i n g t h e a i d
d i s p u t e w i t h t h e U.S. i n A p r i l 1956, a second w a s t h e f o l 'lowing October, when he was u p s e t by t h e anomymous l e t t e r s .
The t h i r d r e s i g n a t i o n was i n June 1957, when Sihanouk
threw up h i s hands o v e r t h e problem of impost l i c e n s e s .
These resignations--whatever t h e i r p s y c h o l o g i c a l
mot i v a t ion--were 1i t t l e more t h a n g r a n d s t and p l a y s by
t h e Br ince
'' I n t e r i m " p r e m i e r s were always approved by
Sihanouk and uEablaltly were hahadpicked by him',' The impact 'of
s u c h r e v o l v i n g i d o o r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was n o n e t h e l e s s uns e t t l i n g , and h a r d l y conducive t o e f f e c t i v e government,
e v e n though some Cambodians took t h e relaxed view. In
June 1957, a p a l a c e o f f i c i a l confirmed t o a U.S. Embassy.
o f i i c e r t h a t Sihanouk had indeed s u b m i t t e d h i s r e s i g n a t i o n
on June l 2 t h , and, when it w a s n o t acted upon, had r e s i g n e d
a g a i n on t h e 1 4 t h . The p a l a c e o f f i c i a l observed i n exp l a n a t i o n , "This is not v e r y s e r i o u s , f o r (Sihanouk) h a s
s u b m i t t e d h i s r e s i g n a t i o n six or s e v e n t i m e s d u r i n g t h e
p r e s e n t government, b u t ( P r i v y Counselor) Penn Nouth sometimes p o c k e t s them and does n o t even hand them on t o t h e
King and Queen u n l e s s p r e s s e d by Sihanouk. On t h e average
two o u t of t h r e e r e s i g n a t i o n s s u b m i t t e d a c t u a l l y reach
T h e i r Majesties.
.
!
A c t u a l l y , government i n t h e formal s e n s e of t h e
word scarcely e x i s t e d i n Cambodia. The N a t i o n a l 'Assembly
m e t p e r i o d i c a l l y , b u t as it comprised o n l y m e m b e r s of t h e
Sangkum it was n o t even much of a d e b a t i n g s o c i e t y . The
p r o v i n c i a l assemblies, which had s t o o d high on t h e l i s t '
o f Sihanoub's proposed r e f o r m s i n 1955, had been elected
i n 1956 b u t had never m e t . Because t h e y had no r e a l res p o n s i b i l i t i e s , t h e r e was no clear d e l i n e a t i o n of f u n c t i o n
between t h e l o c a l groups and t h e N a t i o n a l P-ssembly, and
the government had provided n o f u n d s f o r t h e p r o v i n c i a l
assemblies
--
.
One r e s u l t of t h i s d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n w a s t h a t nona d h e r e n t s of t h e Sangkum--political n e u t r a l 8 as w e l l as
c r i t i c s of Sihanouk--h ail no s a t i s f a c t o r y means of c r i t i c i z i n g t h e government c o n s t r u c t i v e l y or o t h e r w i s e . !:'bile
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31
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Sihanouk's opponents had access t o p r e s s organs i n Phnom
Penh, it was c l e a r l y understood to be i n the b e s t
i n t e r e s t of a l l t h a t any criticism be g e n t e e l and avoid
any p e r s o n a l a t t a c k onlmembess of t h e r o y a l f a m i l y .
In mid-April 1957, Sihanouk i n i t i a t e d a c h a p a c t e r i s t i c a l l y ' b i z a r r e p e r i o d i n Cambodian p o l i t i c s when he *
resumed t h e p r e m i e r s h i p which he had r e s i g n e d t h e p r e v i o u s
f a l l . The o s t e n s i b l e reason for SfhanoukQsr e t u r n was
t h e i n a b i l i t y of Premier S a Yuri to r e g u l a t e t h e i s s u e of
import l i c e n s e s - - p o l i t i c a l plums which p e r m i t t e d t h e
r e c i p i e n t t o import l u x u r y goods which could be resold
a t a high, p r o f i t . Upon resuming the premiership, Sihanouk
appointed a long-time advisor, Sam Sary, ad ecopomic c%ar
w i t h f u l l power to r e g u l a t e t h e i s s u a n c e of import licenses. ,
The p r e d i c t a b l e a'ftesmath t o S a r y ' s appointment
was a s t r f n g af p r o t e s t s which reached Sihanouk bg way
of t h e p a l a c e g r a p e v i n e . Sary was accused of acce'pting
kickbacks and of f avox-ing t h e Chinese over t h e ' Cambodian
.business .community. I n May, t h e angry Sihanouk 'called
a meeting of the c e n t r a l cbmmittee of t h e Sangkunl m d
% b e a r dmore c h a r g e s of b i a s a g a i n s t h i s lieu'tenant. Fina l l y , Sary r e s i g n e d and sought temporary s e c l u s i o n i n a
B u d d h i s t monastery.
Sihanouk s u b m i t t e d a f o u r t h "resignat i o n " and l e f t Phon Penh for t h e s e a s h o r e .
'
Nothing was t e s o l v s d concerning t h e matter of the'
import l i c e n s e s , but by June Sihanouk had withdrawn ' h i s
r e s i g n a t i o n . Sam Sary emerged from t h e monastery, o n l y
t o f i n d key a d m i h i s t r a t i v e posts s t a f f e d w i t h p o l i t i c a l
r i v a l s . In his d i s i l l u s i o n m e h t , Sary found companionship
i n Dap Chhuon, t h e e r s t w h i l e shogun of Battambang province.
Sihanouk's Sangkum--never the-ing
f o r c e which he had
hoped it would be--was g e n e r a t i n g a n anti-Sihanouk f a c t ion.
The h u m i l i a t i n g i n a b i l i t y of h i s government to s o l v e
t h e l i c e n s e problem caused Sihanouk once a g a i n t o throw
up h i s hands. T h i s time it was t h e P r i n c e who betook him-
self t o a monastery. For one of Sihanoyk's temperament,
howeQer, t h i s was a mistake. He appears to have m e d i t a t e d
less on Buddha's p r e c e p t s t h a n on rear and imagined wrongs
I
I
which h e had s u f f e r e d as p r e m i e r , Over a p e r i o d o f g e a r s ,
Sihanouk had demonstrated t h a t h e w a s m o s t formidable
when aggrieved: w i t n e s s h i s t h r e a t of a r e v o l t if France
d i d n o t grant Cambodia e a r l y independence, and h i s abdicat i o n s a s King when h i s reform program encountered o b s t a c l e s .
That he was not always d i s c r i m i n a t i n g i n his a c t i o n s when
aggrieved was demonstrated by t h e ant 8-American demonstrat i o n s f o l l o w i n g t h e b l o c k a d i n g of t h e Mskong by D i e m .
While a t t h e Phnom Koulen monastery, Sihanouk's
d e s p a i r o v e r domestic a f f a i r s t u r n e d i n t o b e l l i g e r e n c e - -
anger directed not a t d i v i s i v e i n f Rusnces within Sangkum,
b u t a t t h e ' l e a d e r s of t h e dormant Democratic p a r t y .
It
is d i f f i c u l t t o f i n d an e x p l a n a t i o n for Sihanoak's gre. Q W U ~ R ~ &w
Q i~t h a p o l i t i c a l fragment which had ilo A s s e m b l y
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and no p a r t y s t r u c t u r e , and which h i d done
n o t h i n g of l a t e to b r i n g down Sihanouk's ire. The P r i n c e ,
however , t h r i v e d on a d u l a t i o n , and t h e D@mocrats--drawn
l a r g e l y from t h e i n t e l l i g e n s i a of Phnom Penh--were g u i l t y
of' withholding this., Moreover, Sihanouk b a d l y needed a
s c a p e g o a t , l e s t his own c r e a t i o n , Sangkum, be s a d d l e d w d t h
t h e onus f o r Cambodia's d e f i c b d n c i d s , ,
Upon l e a v i n g t h e monastery i n A u g u s t , Sihanouk
challenged t h e Democrats to debate government p o l i c i e s
w i t h him.
The Democrats r e f u s e d . Again t h e P r i n c e "inv i t e d " h i s opponents to d e b a t e , couching t h e Bnvitat ion
i n terms which s u g g e s t e d 8 p r i v a t e audience. The r e s u l t
was p u b l i c h u m i l i a t i o n f o r t h e Democrats.
The " p r i v a t e "
a u d i e n c e was h e l d on 11 A u g u s t i n t h e p a l a c e grounds,
with t h e p u b l i c i n v i t e d and radio b r o a d c a s t e r s i n a t t e n dance. SYhanouk b l i s t e r e d h i s opponents as s e e k i n g t h e
d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e monarchy, w h i l e t h e Democrats prot e s t e d t h e i r l o y a l t y t Q Sihanouk. Iiftes t h e clehafe, f o u r
l e a d i n g Democrats w e r e p h y s i c a l l y assaulted o u t s i d e t h e
p a l a c e grounds i n a b u r s t of v i o l e n c e unusual for Cambodia.
Aq for Sihanouk, t h e P r i n c e f l e w o f f f o r a v a c a t i o n i n
France
e
C.
R i g h t i n g t h e Balance
,
Sihanouk's "rest cure" i n France l a s t e d u n t i l t h e
end of t h e yew?; In a c u r i o u s f a s h i o n , it.>brpught. about
new a f f i r m a t i o n s ,$of'
Cambodia's n e u t r a l i t y , ,and t h e first
d i s c e r n i b l e anti-Communist campaign s i n c e ; the Geneva conference.
L
,
q
I
One of Sihanouk's pet p r o j e c t s had been the e s t a b l i s h m e n t , in P a r i s , of a , c e n t e r f o r Cambodian-students
i n France. "Cambodia House," as it came t o be kncwn, provAded a r a l l y i n g - p l a c e f o r t h e 4OQ-odd Cambodian s t u d e n t s
i n P a r i s , who , w e r e to be found i n g r e a t e r , n u m b e r s $ i n
'France than i n any other country. To Sihanouk?s d i s t r e s s ,
however, Cambodians i n P a r i s had demonstrated
susceQtib i l i t y t o l e f t i s t t e a c h i n g s . He planned seyeral t a l k s ,
t o Cambodia House,.,whose s t u d e n t s h e r e g a r d e d w i t h m i l d
d i s t r u s t (many came from urban famillies w i t h a Democratic
p a r t y b i a s ) and who had been denied t h e s p i r i t u a l e n r i c h ment provided by t h e Sangkum. H i s apprehensions w e r e w e l l founded; t h e P r i n c e w a s $he target of barbed q u e s t i o p s
which drew from Sihanouk a f o r t h r i g h t defense of C m b o d i a ' s
t i e s w i t h t h e West:
,
$
I d e p l o r e c e r t a i n d e v i a t i o n i s t s who
. p r e t e n d t o follow m e b u t i n r e a l i t y . h a v e
worked t o make t h e people b e l i e v e t h a t
t h e Sangkum government is f e t t e r e d to
t h e American i m p e r i a l i s t s ; thence t h i s
criticism a t p r e s e n t of American aid..,.
,
L.
. ,
.
T h i s aid; a l t h o u g h it is minimal .
if we compwe it t o . t h a t which is g r a n t e d
t o Thailand or South Vietnam, is much
h i g h e r , t h a n other f o r e i g n a i d t h a t we
have r e c e i v e d up t o now: French a i d
g r a n t e d o v e r a period of three y e a r s
t o t a l s 9OO,QQQ,OOO riels; t h a t of China
810,000,OOQ r i e l s a
m is perhaps nonrenewable. r;lrom-the USSR we have rec e i v e d o n l y a 500-bed h o s p i t a l . '
I
34.-
I
Sihanouk r e t u r n e d to Cambodia on 15 December.
Electlions f o r 8 new N a t i o n a l Assembly were scheduled
for Marchp and although t h e r e s u l t was a Poregone conc l u s i o n t h e campaign provided t h e P r i n c e w i t h an excuse
for t h e barnstorming which he loved, Beginning w i t h t h e
Sangkum convention i n J a n u a r y p it became apparent t h a t
M a s a new emphasis on n e u t r a l i s m as a s h i e l d a g a i n s t
the b l o c as w e l l as t h e West. Three factors appeared to
have i n s p i r e d Sihanoukgs Unusual preoccupatiob w i t h Communism. One was t h e p r e v a l e n c e of leftist, s e n t i m e n t
among t h e s t u d e n t s i n P a r i s . A second w a s t a c t i c a l ; he
had r o u t e d t h e Democrats so completely t h e p r e c e d i n g
August t h a t even he realized t h a t t h e y no l o n g e r posed
any p o l i t i c a l t h r e a t . What a p p e a r s t o have impressed
Sihanouk most, however, w a s evidence of large-scale p 1 - 0 ~ aganda a c t i v i t y OB the p a r t y of t h e Soviet embassy i n
Phnom Penh.
'
The S o v i e t embassy, which had been e s t a b l i s h e d i n
November 1956, had become i n its firs%y e a r of o p e r a t i o n
t h e l a r g e s t propaganda m i l l i n town. Material i n both
Cambodian and French was d i s t r i b u t e d - - o f t e n u n s o l i c i t e d - to s c h o o l s , monasteries and j o u r n a l s . The a c t u a l t h r e a t
posed by such 3. propaganda campaign is n o t e a s y t o evaluate. I t is d i f f i c u l t t o r e g a r d t h e c i r c u l a t i o n of Marxist l f ' t e r a t u r e as a threat t o Cambodian s e c u r i t y equal'
t o the economic influence e x e r t e d by the Chinese community.
Sihanouk's r e a c t i o n probably stemmed i n p a r t f r o m his
s e n s e of p r o p r i e t y : the S o v i e t o p e r a t i o n was e x c e s s i v e
i n its volume, was i m p l i c i t l y c r i t i c a l of X h m e r socialism,
and i n v i t e d comgetit i o n from We3tern o u t l e t s which--unl i k e c o m p e t i t i v e economic aid--held n o t h i n g for Cambodia.
A t no t i m e d i d Sihanouk a t t a c k t h e S o v i e t s by name, b u t
t h e government i n January ordered t h e embassy s h a r p l y t o
c u r b its d i s t r i b u t i o n s , and t o clear any s c h o l a r s h i p offers with t h e ministrsr of education. Sihanouk made himself s u f f i c i e n t l y c l e k i n an a d d r e s s to t h e Sangkum conf erence :
If our n e u t r a l i t y is o f f i c i a l l y ac. cepted by a l l powers, it does not f o l l o w
t h a t it is always r e s p e c t e d i n d a i l y r e a l i t y ,
and our v i g i l a n c e i n p r o t e c t i n g it m u s t
no$ f a i l .
-
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I
35
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I'
I
I
I
I
..
W
e have given SO many proofs of
our a b s o l u t e good w i l l t h a t we heave t h e
r i g h t t o request c e r t a i n powers ( s i c . )
who seem now to be f a v o r i n g an e f f o r t
of s u b v e r s i o n i n our c o u n t r y to g i v e
reasonable l i m i t s henceforth t o their
pr'opaganda a c t i v i t i e s since o t h e r
opposing powers might want t o follow
t h i s example and our p o s i t i o n would
q u i c k l y become d i f f i c u l t
Whe,n Western press organs-including
Time and The
New York T i m e s - - i m p l i e d a " s h i f t v v in Cambodia's f o r e i w
POllCY,
anouk was i n d i g n a n t : h i s c o u n t r y remained a
t r u e n e u t r a l . A c t u a l l y , there w a s room for misunderstan+
ing. While Sihanouk had never been n a i v e r e s p e c t i n g t h e
Communists, as Time implied i n an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d *%ate
Wisdom," h i s ac-s
had not always teflected true neut r a l i s m . Even i n h i s criticism of the S o v i e t propaganda
campaign, SihanoukDs u s e of t h e gPuraP s e r v e d to d i l u t e
h i s p o i n t , and to suggest a w r i s t slap a t one or more
Western embassies as w e l l as t h e S o v i e t embassy.
Then. as now, Sihanouk was Par more i n h i b i t e d i n
his c r i t i c i s m of Communism and t h e b l o c t h a n he was of
t h e . U.S. and t h e West. The USSR was not criticized by
name; t h e U.S. enjoyed nosuch p r i v i l e g e d s t a t u s , and
was o f t e n lumped w i t h "the i m p e r i a l i s t s " - - a metaphor
popular w i t h Sihanouk s i n c e h i s v i s i t t o P e i p i n g . The
g i n g e r l y anti-Communist campaign of e a r l y 1958 had two
main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : unfavorable comparisons between
" i n t e r n a t i o n a l " and Khmer s o c i a l i s m , and p r e s s i t t a c k s
a g a i n s t C'unbodia's home-grown Psacheachon. l o s t p r e s s
organs i n PBnom Penh, f o l l o w i n g S i hanouk rs example,
switched from attacks on t h e West and c i t e d t h e Pracheachan
as "enemies of t h e monarchy." The t r a d i t i o n a l K h m e r
h o s t i l i t y towards t h e Vietnamese prompted s t o r i e s t h a t
the Pracheachon was " i n c o n t a c t " w i t h t h e V i e t Minh.
The e a r l y months of 1958 were marked by a large
number of speeches by Sihanouk, o s t e n s i b l y i n connection
w i t h t h e March e l e c t i o n s . A t Ksunapot, fie p a i n t e d a glowing p i c t u r e of t h e Sangkum brand of socialism, based on
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36
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l
1
"one n a t i o n a l familyTvand dedicated '9% t h e r a i s i n g up
of t h e poor and t h e we&. ''
.
r
I
The Communists s a y t h a t t h e y a i d
i n t h e same manner. I t is not t r u e .
What t h e y do, f Q k 6?%spmlph.3, is LO knQCk
down w i t h a s t i c k %he r i c h people, the
c a p i t a l i s t s i n t h e i r vocabulary, t h a t
is t o say p e o p l e who have g r e a t riches,
b e f o r e t h e y c o n f i s c a t e a l l t h e i r prope r t y . For example, a r i c h man 0wns a
f a c t o r y . The Communists c o n f i s c a t e
t h e f a c t o r y , b u t t h i s c o n f i s c a t i o n is
not f o r t h e b e n e f i t of t h e poor b u t f o r
t h a t of t h e State.
In brief, one takes
Prom t h e rich man to g i v e to t h e State,
which t h u s replaces t h e r i c h man,
When t h e Assembly e l e c t i o n s were h e l d , t h e Sangkum
once a g a i n swept a l l before it, t h i s t i m e g a i n i n g 99.9
p e r c e n t of t h e popular v o t e . The v o t e was p r i m a r i l y a
v o t e of confidence i n Sihanouk, b u t also bore testimony
to h i s e f f e c t i v e n e s s i n i s o l a t i n g o p p o s i t i o n elements
s u c h as t h e Democratic p a r t y and t h e Praeheachon. The
r e s u l t appears t o have been r e a s s u r i n g t o Sihanouk,
for by the summer he was once more preoccupied w i t h
forsign affairs
I n an i n t e r v i e w published i n h i s p r i v a t e press
o u t l e t , Realites Cambodgiennes, Sihanouk i n d i c a t e d t h a t
In the
new f o r e i g n p o l i c y moves would be forthcoming.
i n t e r v i e w , p u b l i s h e d on 5 J u l y , Sihanouk s t a t e d ,
O u r n e u t r a l i t y remains
However , it
m u s t become more a c t i v e (sic.)
W
e have
wished to be t o o "pure.'v By s h u t t i n g ours e l v e s up i n QUF s h e l l w e have l o s t those
indispensable outside contacts
Cambodia
no longer appears on t h e i n t e r n a t i o c a l
s c e n e , e x c e p t i n t h e case of recen"- - f r o n t i e r
e v e n t s . T h is is regrettable. 1 _$pect
w i n person t o Saigon and, t h e n t o
Bangkok to meet w i t h P r e s i d e n t D i e m and t h e
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37
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I
head of t h e T h a i government. These t r i p s
w i l l be. .for t h e purpose of re1 i e v i n g
s t r a i n i n o u r r e l a t i o n s and c l e a r i n g t h e
atmosphere e (Emphasis added)
.
..
The s t r a i n t o which Sihanouk referred d e r i v e d from
an i n c r e a s i n g number of border i n c i d e n t s , some of which
involved t h e Thais b u t most of which grew o u t of counterinsurgency o p e r a t i o n s i n South Vietnam. In l a t e June
Vietnamese t r o o p s , in p u r s u i t of V i e t Cong, had a t t a c k e d
and b r i e f l y occuplied t h e Cambodian v i l l a g e of Pak Nhay.
Such i n c i d e n t s had always drawn s t r o n g p r o t e s t s from
Cambodia, b u t had n o t g e n e r a l l y developed i n t o f u l l blown crises. The a f t e r m a t h of t h e Pak Nhay a f f a i r ,
however, prompted Sihanouk t o c a l l o f f . l i i s t r i p t o Saigon.
One f a c t o r probably w a s t h e appearance of press criticism
of t h e P r i n c e i n the Saigon press; i n c l u d i n g t h e o f f i c i a l
Times of Vietnam, A second f a c t o r w a s i m p l i c i t i n
m o a ' s 5 J u l y i n t e r v i e w ; he wanted Cambodia i n the
h e a d l i n e s , and h i s r e f u s a l t o proceed w i t h h i s t r i p t o
Saigon was one way t o accomplish t h i s .
On t h e day t h a t he w a s to have flown t o Saigon,
Sihanouk l e f t for Bangkok, t a k i n g a c i r c u i t o u s r o u t e t h a t
allowed him to f i r s t c o n s u l t w i t h Nehru i n New Delhi.
Among t h e t o p i c s to be discussed w i t h t h e T h a i s were t r a d e ,
agreement on customs, and j o i n t a c t i o n t o prevent "crimes"
along t h e Khmer-Thai border. Far from p r o v i d i n g t h e b a s i s
f o r a rapprochement, however, t h e Bangkok n e g o t i a t i o n s
proved acrimonious from the s t a r t . Cambodian charges
t h a t Thailand was n o t r e s p e c t i n g Cambodiats n e u t r a l i t y
were countered by T h a i a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t Cambodia was a
base for Communist i n f i l t r a t i o n i n t o Thailand.
Sihanouk
r e t u r n e d t o Phnom Penh convinced more t h a n e v e r t h a t
Thailand and South Vietnam were h i s implacable f o e s .
D.
China Again
Sihanouk had s c a r c e l y r e t u r n e d t o Phnom Penh when
he made a dramatic announcement : Cambbdia would r e c o g n i z e
t h e P e i p i n g government as t h e legal government of China.
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38
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,
.
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39
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I
Although much of Sihanouk's v i s i t was devoted t o
s i g h t s e e i n g , there was a l s o d i s c u s s i o n of t r a d e . The
Chinese--about t o embark on t h e a b o r t i v e Leap Forward-promised to p r o v i d e , i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e i r earlier a i d
commitment, a s s i s t a n c e i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of small i r o n
and s t e e l works i n Cambodia. These is no evidence t h a t
China's "back yard" b l a s t f u r n a c e s e v e r made t h e t r a n s i t i o s t o Cambodia.
Between pledges of e t e r n a l f r i e n d s h i p , a c e r t a i n
amount of n e g o t i a t i o n took place i n P e i p i n g . Subsbguent
s t a t e m e n t s by Sihanouk suggest t h a t he asked t h e Chinese
t o keep t h e V i e t Minh o u t of Cambodia, and r e c e i v e d ass u r a n c e s t h a t t h e y would. The P r i n c e may a l s o have
sought a s s u r a n c e t h a t China would a s s i s t Cambodia in any
w a r w i t h Vietnam OF Thailand. While evidence of any isonclad agreement is l a c k i n g , Sihanouk's subsequent behavior
h a s i n d i c a t e d t h a t he is c o n f i d e n t t h a t , i f f i g h t i n g
broke o u t , t h e Chinese would regard it as i n their i n t e r est t o i n t e r v e n e . The one area i n which Sihanouk app e a r s c e r t a i n t o have p r e s s e d t h e Chinese concerned t h e
o v e r s e a s Chinese i n Cambodia. A t a banquet on 24 A u g u s t
Chou En-lai provided r e a s s u r a n c e :
,
....Some c o u n t r i e s ,
i n o r d e r to s o w
discord between China and t h e S o u t h e a s t
Asian c o u n t r i e s and t o damage China's
i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s t ige , have spread
t h e f a l s e s t o r y about C h i n a s s employing
t h e Overseas Chinese t o c a r r y o u t s u b v e r s i v e a c t i v i t i e s . But the f a c t s show
t h a t t h e overwhelming m a j o r i t y of t h e
Overseas Chinese i n Southeast Asian coun-
t r i e s have always l i v e d on f r i e n d l y terms
w i t h t h e l o c a l i n h a b i t a n t s i n accordance
w i t h t h e d i r e c t i v e s of t h e Chinese government....
W
e note w i t h s a t i s f a c t i o n t h a t f u l l
r e s p e c t and confidence p r e v a i l s between
t h e Chinese and Cambodian governments
on t h e q u e s t i o n of Overseas Chinese,
t h u s p r e v e n t i n g t h e exercise of any
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40
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i n f l u e n c e by sowers of discord. T h i s
is another c o n c r e t e m a n i f e s t a$ ion of
Sino-Caasbod ian f r i e n d s h i p
.
As for Sihanouk, h e avoided echoing h i s h o s t s * a t t a c k s on t h e U.S. on issues s u c h as t h e Lebanon l a n d i n g
and t h e Taiwan S t r a i t s . He was c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y s e n s i t i v e concerning Western c r i t i c i s m of h i s r e c e n t ,aat Pohs ,
and a t one p o i n t s t a t e d t h a t w h i l e Cambodia "thanked" t h o s e
c o u n t r i e s which gave her aid, "if t h e y s h o u l d desire to
withdraw such a i d w e do not t h i n k we wQuld d i e as a '
r e s u l t . In s u c h an e v e n t u a l i t y , w e would simp1y"endare
more sacrifices i n order to p r e s e r v e o u r country."
I
When leave-taking cames it was apparent t h a t Sihanouk
had been g r e a t l y impressed w i t h t h e mixture of p i g i r o n
and flattery-..
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,'
In h i s departure speech the P r i n c e observed,
The Chinese people have a s i n c e r e
l o v e for peace. They sake t h e i s , u n precedented achievements s e r v e t h e w e l fare of t h e e n t i r e people and t h e s t r e n g t h e n i n g of f r i e n d s h i p w i t h other c o u n t r i e s
under an atmosphere of peace and p r o s p e r i t y .
The Khmer people are proud of having your
f r i e n d s h i p , e s p e c i a l l y when w e see t h a t
you are no& haughty and s e l f i s h at a l l , . .
although you are great and strong.
..,
I
His triumphant r e t u r n from P e i p i n g d i d not-mark
the end of Sihanoukos t r a v e l s f o r t h e year. In September
he took o f f f o r t h e opening of t h e UN General Assembly
i n New YQP%. The UEJ s e s s i o n was, i n S i h q o u b t s e y e s ,
t h e embodimenu of d e g r a d a t i o n and h u m i l i a t i o n .
With h i s
encyclopedic memory for i n s u l t s and s l i g h t s , Sihanouk
can t o t h i s day recite h i s g r i e v a n c e s i n connection
w i t h h i s v i s i t s to t h e UN.* Whereas o n l y a month before
*The mist e x t e n m i s c u s s i o n by Sihanouk of h i s " h m i l i a tioqs'l in New Pork is one which he d e l i v e r e d f o l l o w i n g
( f o o t n o t e continued on page 42)
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he had been t h e c e n t e r of attention i n Beiping, i n New
York there was no a d u l a t i o n , l i t t l e praise, and w o r p t
of a l l almost no a t t e n t i o n .
I
(footnote CQntinU@dfrom page 41)
h i s v i s i t to t h e UN i n 1960, to the UN session m a d e memar-
able by Khrushchev's shoe-pounding, On r e t u r n i n g t o Phnom
Penh he poured o u t h i s f r u s t r a t i o n s to h i s countrymen:
The addresses of the ' ~ c o l o ~ s'Ii of
,
t h e "first t e n o r s , 'I of the %tar&, were
applauded n o i s i l y by those who found them
i n t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s , by t h e i r c l a n s ,
by t h e i r s a t e l l i t e s , by their associates
and by t h e i r accomplices. f l h e %tarsf17
l i n g e r i n t h e corridors and-salons t o
i n d u l g e in secret meetings, i n v a r i e d
maneuvers, and also to offer thelrnselves
for t h e a d o r a t i o n of admirers, c o u r t e s a n s
and t h e l a d i e s and gentlemen of t h e press....
((
.
Sihanouk himself d e l i v e r e d i n 1960 a reasoned defense
of Cambodia#s n e u t r a l i s m , called for t h e admission of Communist China, and advocated independence f o r Algeria.
H i s subsequent remarks i n d i c a t e h i s s e n s i t i v i t y to how ,
h i s speech w a s r e c e i v e d :
Among t h e g r e a t s , the Yugoslavs,
t h e French and t h e W e r i c a n s demonstrated
f o r f a i r p l a y . According t o t h e observ a t i o n s of t h e press, Marshal T i t o d i d
n o t h e s i t a t e t o applaud se b r i s k l y behind
an a b s t e n t i o n i s t Khrushchev. W eHerter..,
warmly applauded c e r t a i n passages i n s p i t e
of t h e poisoned arrows t h a t I launched
a g a i n s t c e r t a i n r e s p o n s i b l e parties, cert a i n agents and c e r t a i n American journals.
As t o our French f r i e n d s , t h e y 'too applauded
m e , in spite of t h e paragraph on t h e Algepian
( f o o t n o t e continued on page @)
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( f o o t n o t e continued from page 42)
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q u e s t i o n , s t r o n g l y r i s k i n g t h e d i s p l e a s u r e of
General de G a u l l e , ,.
The rnagority of S i h a n s u k u s g r i e v a n c e s w e r e related
t o matters of protcoeol:
For W . Khyshchev, /Ilaneri@a7r e s e r v e d
hundreds of policemen, several s ~ u a d r o n s
Qf IllQtOPcyCliStS and pai%SQl C8LPS t h a t . C l U t tered t h e e n t i r e c i t y , When our d e l e g a t i o n
had t h e bad luck t o go o u t at about t h e
'same time as t h e S o v i e t prime m i n i s t e r , or
any other "great, the Yankee pol ice rudely
stopped us to make way for t h e passage of
these "greats." T h i s mishap a t t i m e s
brought about more or less l e n g t h y and
embarrassing d e l a y s i n getting t o o u r appointments....
On my a r r i v a l i n New Yo&,
a police-man was assigned to guard t h e door of my
room, By contrast, m e s i d e n t Sukapno,
who l i v e d in t h e same hcptel as I d i d ,
found himself f u r n i s h e d w i t h d e t e c t i v e s ,
bodyguards and uniformed p o l i c e escQrts.
lust I state that I sent my u n f o r t u n a t e ,
sad and s o l i t a r y policeman on h i s way?
fine day7 Marshal T i t o offered t o
accomgany me-to t h e U n i t e d Nations, i n
order, he s a i d , t o g i v e m e t h e b e n e f i t . . .
that h i s escort provided him. He hard a t
h i s disposal two OF t h e e escort CgirS
and a squad of motorcycles, which were
c e r t a i n l y far fewer t h a n what w a s r e s e r v e d
for b¶r. Khrushchev, b u t much more t h a n
what was a u t h o r i z e d for t h e Vice President of t h e Council of Morocco, P r i n c e
Moulay Hassan, who i n comparison had
o n l y an e s c o r t car w i t h siren, b u t no
IIlOtQXWyCleS.
(footnote continued on page 44)
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TI
I
( f o o t n o t e continued fropa page 43)
As Chief of State of Cambodia, I
s h o u l d have enjoyed at least t h e same
p r i v i l e g e s and i a c i l i t i e s as those of
t h e Vice P r e s i d e n t of t h e Moroccan Counc i l . T h i s was made e s p e c i a l l y clear
one day when my car was f o r c e d t o make
way for t h e c a r of P r i n c e MQUlay Rassan,
t h e presence of which was announced by
its powerful s i r e n . . . .
A r a t h e r embarrassed American f r i e n d
thought it n e c e s s a r y t o give me this
a s t o n i s h i n g e x p l a n a t i o n : TQU
me, l t he
s a i d t o me, "one of the r a r e leaders who
h a s only f r i e n d s here in t h e United S t a t e s .
I t is f o r t h i s r e a s o n , I t h i n k , t h a t our
government d i d n o t t h i n k it n e c e s s a r y
t o have you escorted."
I accept t h i s n i c e thesis, b u t doubt
s t r o n g l y t h a t my c o m p a t r i o t s accept it
w i l l i n g l y . They know too w e l l . . . t h e
s e n t i m e n t s of c e r t a i n American circles
toward me and toward our n e u t r a l i t y - i m p e r i a l i s t s e n t i m e n t t h a t is reflected
so n a i v e l y i n Time and o t h e r rags--not
to be t r o u b l e d y t h e n r .
._
,
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Afthougln Sihanouk w a s to become 8 f r e q u e n t v i s i t o r
t o New Yo?&, h i s s t a t e s m a n s h i p never encompassed i s s u e s
beyond those which a f f e c t e d his own country. He had
deanonstrated a c e r t a i n talent i n c a p i t a l i z i n g on the Cold
War t o his e o u n t r y * s benefit. He had skillfuPBy gained
t h e f r i e n d s h i p of China as t h e most l i k e l y SQUFCB of assistance against t h e Thais and Vietnamese. A t 8 meeting
where Cambodian i n t e r e s t s were n o t at stake, howeverp
Sihanouk w a s i n c a p a b l e of taking the broad view, and usu a l l y demonstrated instead a f i r s t - c l a s s i n f e r i o r i t y comg l e x . It is h t e r e s t i n g t h a t his protocol g r i e v a n c e s ,
are directed o n l y in p a r t against $he U.S. as host country;
he w a s deeply r e s e n t f u l toward the big-power diplomacy
in which Kbus$bhev, Sukmno and t h e Vice P r e s i d e n t of
t h e Council of MO~POCCO a l l rated l a r g e r escorts than he.
Sihanouk clung desperately to t h e d i p l o m a t i c f i c t i o n coneemirag t h e e q u a l i t y oi nations. He could accept t h e
p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y t h a t a country of five m i l l i o n w a s s m a l l
potatoe5; when cbeuaastances conspired to deny him even
t h e t r a p p i n g s of eqtiaslity, however, he didnot.want t o p l a y ,
.
.
There was another side t o t h i s saxme c o i n . The
one area in which 8 s m a l l power c o u l d p l a y a role on'
t h e World SC0IIe WIBls i n $he PPQIe Qf arbi$eJP and c o n c i l i a t ~ between
r
t h e two great blocs. But to be a t h i r d
force ~f any kind required t h a t Cambodia be accorded
proper resp@a2t, and t h i s Sihsemouk felt was denied him
sat t h e UNO
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111.
ALARUMS AMD EXCURSIONS
A.
Dap Chhuon and Sam Sasy
When Sihanouk r e t u r n e d home -aqom t h e U . S . , h e a l ready had an i n k l i n g of t r o u b l e on the domestic f r o n t .
Sihanouk probably had an idea as t o one of t h e
troublemakers. Sam Sary, t h e e r s t w h i l e economic c z a r ,
had r e t u r n e d from a l e a d e s ' g r a n t i n the U . S . s u f f i c i e n t l y
pro-Western i n o u t l o o k t h a t Sihanouk named him as -bass a d o r t o Great B r i t a i n . There Sary i n c u r r e d unfavorable
p u b l i c i t y when he defended in letters t o London newspapers his a c t i o n i n b e a t i n g h i s c h i l d r e n ' s Cambodian
governess, even after it was r e v e a l e d t h a t s h e was pregnant by Sary. Brought home i n disgrace, Sapy was rumored
to have j o i n e d Dap Chhuon i n o p p o s i t i o n t o Sihanouk's
n e u t r a l i s m , and t o c e r t a i n of h i s domestic p o l i c i e s - n o t a b l y t h e P r i n c e ' s r e f u s a l t o permit rice e x p o r t s , on
grounds t h a t t h e Royal Astrologer had p r e d i c t e d a poor
rice c r o p f o r 1959.
Although Sihanouk m i s t r u s t e d Sary, he was c u r i o u s l y
r e l a x e d concerning Dap Chhuon, even though Chhuon made
o n l y nominal o b e i s s a n e e t o Sihanouk and r a n Siem Reap
province according to h i s own whim. As e a r l y as March
1956, Chhuon-then c h i e f of t h e palace guard--had t o l d
Ambassador Strom t h a t he was "awaiting' a f a v o r a b l e opp o r t u n i t y " t o f r u s t r a t e Sihanouk's qeutralism and t o
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break r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e bloc. On two other o c c a s i o n s
Chhuon solicited US s u p p o r t for 8 coup, appsarently witho u t t i p p i n g h i s hand to Sihanouk. In Jn3y 1958, Chhuon
s e n t word t o the U,S. m b a s s a d o r t h a t he w a s "ddeply d i s turbed" by h i s country "5 r e c o g n i t i o n of Communist China,
adding t h a t w h i l e he was l o y a l t o Sihanouk t h a t he "loved
h i s country" m0F8 t h a n t h e PPiWe.
i
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In 1958 Chhuon had been promolted t o b r i g a d i e r gene r a l and been made governor of his home province of Siem
Reap. There he commanded three b a t t a l i o n s of t h e Cambodian army, and w a s regarded by some o b s e r v e r s in Phnom
Penh as having c o n s i d e r a b l e i n f l u e n c e also in t h e palace
gward. Undaunted by h i s r e b u f f s from t h e U.S. ambassador,
Dap Chhuon s o l i d i f i d d h i s hold on western Cambodia and contemplated means of b r i n g i n g off a coup.
I
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Chhuonvs p l o t might have remained an i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l problem had n o t Sihanouk, i n November 1958, suspended
diplomat i c re1a t i o n s w i t h Thai1and. In Saigon, P r e s i d e n t
D i e m had l o n g c o n s i d e r e d Sihanouk 8 menace t o h i s country,
t h e channel by which P e i p i n g might achieve a f o o t h o l d i n
S o u t h e a s t Asia w i t h o u t r e c o u r s e to arm. When on 24 November Cambodia l%emporarilg suspended" its r e p r e s e n t a t ion
in Bangkok, Diem had l i t t l e trouble in winning T h a i l a n d ' s
S a r i t to h i s view of Sihanouk. Sihanouk's a c t i o n had
indeed been p r e c i p i t o u s , as t h e border i n c i d e n t s to which
he a l l u d e d i n j u s t i f y i n g t h e break were of no p a r t i c u l a r
consequence. The T h a i s ' main s i n appeared to be t h a t a
number of Bangkok newspapers had criticized Cambodiags
r e c o g n i t i o n of Communist China, rand t h e T h a i police had
t i g h t e n e d c o n t r o l s along t h e Cambodian border.
Prospects %OF SPhanoukgs ouster appeared to b r i g h t e n
in December, when Sam Sary--enticed by t h e Vietnamese-defected t o Saigon, Sary nst o n l y w a s in f u l l agreement
w i t h D i e m concerning t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y of removing Sihanouk,
but w a s able t o a d v i s e t h e Vietnamese concerning Chhuon's
a t t i t u d e , i f t h e y d i d n o t know of it a l r e a d y . In t h e
first .week of J a n u a r y 1959, Ngo Trong H i e u , t h e represent a t i v e of D i e m ' s s p e c i a l i n t e l l i g e n c e (SEPES) i n Phnom
Penh, traveled t o Bangkok for a week'of t a l k s w i t h s e n i o r
members of the T h a i r u l i n g J u n t a , p l y s Sam Sary. In
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conversation
Gene P r a p a t s t a t e d t h a t
t h e T h a i s had determined to s u p k o r t an anti-Sihanouk coup,
b u t conceded t h a t its success involved c o o p e r a t i o p by
Cambodian army chief of s t a f f Lon Nol. The p l o t t e r s ,
however, were n o t e n t i r e l y w i t h o u t assets 02 t h e i r own.
In a d d i t i o n t o Dap Chhuon and his 3,000 men in Siem Reap
p r o v i n c e , an e s t i m a t e d 1,200 Cambodian d i s s i d e n t s under
Son Ngoc Thanh were " t r a i n i n g " on t h e T h a i s i d e of t h e
b o r d e r , and there appears t o have been 8 smaller g r o u p
of Cambodian d i s s i d e n t s i n South Vietnam,
I
P r a p a t , who claimed
t h a t he was
i n " f u l l c o n t r o l t 1 of t h e coup p l o t t i n g , s t a t e
coup would begin w i t h t h e i n f i l t r a t i o n of Sam S a r y i n t o ,
Cambodia f o r t h e purpose of d i s s e m i n a t i n g propaganda and
t l o r g a n i z i n g l t t h e p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n . A f t e r a t i m e there
was t o be an army coup, presumably led by Dap Chhuon w i t h
t h e connivance o f . L o n Nol. The circumstances i n which
Son Ngoc Thanh's force w o u l d be u s e d were vague, b u t it
was presumably a v a i l a b l e t o r e i n f o r c e Dap Chhuon should
t h e need arise.
A t about t h e t i m e t h a t P r a p a t was b r i e f i n g I I c o n c e r n i n g h i s p l a n s , t h e Chinese and S o v i e t embassies in
Phnom Penh were warning Sihanouk of a p o s s i b l e coup a t tempt. A t some p o i n t , t h e French also passed a warning
I t appears l i k e l y t h a t a l l three governt o t h e Prince.
ments derived t h e i r information from t h e same source:
insecure SEPES messages from Saigon t o Bangkok. These
and subsequent messages, i n c l u d i n g some t o Chhuon's headq u a r t e r s a t Siem Reap, were a l s o b e i n g monitored by US
a g e n c i e s , b u t t h e t h r e a t to Sihanouk brought no word of
warning from Washington.
As t i m e went on, Prapat's p l a n gave way t o i m roSam S a ~ gnever d i d r e e n t e r Cambodia,
visation.
Chhuon. Even w i t h outside a s s i s t a n c e , however, Chhuon's
three b a t a l l i 6 n s were badly outnumbered by t h e 25,000
men in Cambodian army u n i t s o u t s i d e his j u r i s d i c t i o n .
For r e a s o n s n o t clear today, Lon N o 1 was f e l t by t h e p l o t - ,
ters t o be sympathetic t o t h e i r cause. In t h e wake of
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t h e bloc and French warnings, however, s e c u r i t y was t i g h t ened i n Phnom Penh, and US Embassy personnel were among
t h o s e p l a c e d under s u r v e i l l a n c e .
I r o n i c a l l y , any s u s p i c i o n which might have a t t a c h e d
t o Dap Chhuon appears to have been d i v e r t e d by S a r y 9 s
d e f e c t i o n . . Sihanouk a c t u a l l y assigned to Chhuon responsib i l i t y for i n v e s t i g a t i n g the coup reports, and for arresti n g Sary. if he c o u l d be located. In p u b l i c speeches on
10 and 13 January, Sihanouk charged t h a t Thailand and
South Vietnam were p l o t t i n g h i s overthrow, i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h Sam Sary and Son Ngoc Thanh, H e confirmed t h a t
h i s information had come from "foreignt1 sources, b u t t h e
lack of speeif i e s s u g g e s @ t h a t t h e P r i n c e ' s f r i e n d s had
been p r o p e r l y vague concerning t h e i r sources of informat ion.
On 24 January, Realites published an i n t e r v i e w w i t h
Sihanouk i n which he s t a t e d t h a t the, United S t a t e s m u s t
know of S a r y * s p l o t t i n g , and t h a t t h e Americansv f a i l u r e
t o warn h i m " p l a c e s t h e i r i m p a r t i a l i t y i n doubt." Even
as Sihanouk spoke, Son Mgerc ThanhPs d i s s i d e n t s were unl i m b e r i n g a mobile, BT,S.-made r a d i o t r a n s m i t t e r , provided
by t h e T h a i s f o r propaganda s u p p o ~ tof t h e coup. D ~ P
Chhuon, meanwhile, informed t h e T h a i s t h a t h i s coup
would take p l a c e i n mid-February, and i n d i c a t e d t h a t he
would require m i l i t a r y as w e l l as propaganda s u p p o r t .
I
By e w l y February Sihanouk had awakened t o t h e danger f r o m Dap Chhuon, who drew a t t e n t i o n t o himself by ref u s i n g t o come to Phnom Penh for t h e wedding of one of
Sihanouk's daughters. The Princeqs s u s p i c i o n s w e r e confirmed when he was t o l d t h a t Cambodian a ~ m go f f i c e r s from
Phnom Penh were no$ permitted t o inspect ChhuonOs t r o o p s .
Chhuon had long been recognized as independent-minded,
and disposed t o r u n h i s Own show i n S i e m Reap. B e l a t e d l y ,
howevere Sihanouk realized t h a t Sam Sary w a s t h e least
of h i s w o r r ~ s .
On 20 February, W u o n p r e c i p i t a t e d P showdown by
forwarding a " d e c l a r a t i o n of d i s s i d e n c e " t o King Suramarit
Chhuon a p p a r e n t l y hoped to e x a c t conCessions from t h e government r a t h e r t h a n t o remove Sihanouk by force, and i n
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p u r s u i t of t h i s modest goal had become i m p a t i e n t f o r a
c o n f r o n t a t i o n . NQ n e g o t i a t i o n s were forthcoming, however,
and t h e r e s u l t w a s disaster f o r Dap Chhuon.
The o n l y Western power which had assumed from the
first t h a t t h e p l o t would S a i l w a s fiance. Once Chhuon
had burned h i s bridges, t h e French set out to assure t h a t
he d i d f a i l . French Ambassador Gorce f l e w t o Siem Reap,
o s t e n s i b l y for a n o t h e r look at t h e monuments at h k o r ,
I n Phnom Penh, t h e French m i l i t a r y mission s u p e r v i s e d
t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n of an armored COlu~nn, and drove it w i t h
unprecedented e f f i c i e n c y t o S i e a Reap OB the n i g h t of
21-22 February. There w a s no r e s i s t a n c e ; Chhuon was
t a k e n so completely by slarprige that h8 was b a r e l y able
t o make h i s escape. Even t h i s was o n l y a r e s p i t e , and
t e n days l a t e r he was shot arnd k i l l e d w h i l e t r y i n g to
reach t h e T h a i border.
In t h e aftermath of h i s s u c c e s s f u l countercoup,
Sihanouk chose to be cozy concerning t h e matter of U.S.
involvement
(For all h i s "mercurial" temperament, Siharnouk has never been one t o f l y off the handle on importa n t matters of s t a t e . Rather, he is prone t o brood on
real or imagined i n j u r i e s u n t i l r i g h t e o u s i n d i g n a t i o n
h a s fermented i n t o implaccable hatred.) He c o n t e n t e d
himself w i t h making it v e r y clear t h a t he was not fooled
by U.S. d e n i a l s of c o m p l f c i t y , and t h i s p o i n t he made not
by formally a c c u s i n g the U.S. b u t by letting t h e conspirat o r s speak f o r themselves.
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On 2 March, SPharnouk accepted &he p l a u d i t s of t h e
m u l t i t u d e a t Siem Reap. In d i s c u s s i n g o u t s i d e s u p p o ~ t
for Dap Chhuon he mentioned only t h e South Vietnamese by
name: 'two Vietnamese r a d i o opertttors, he s a i d , had been
c a p t u r e d i n Chhusn's house along w i t h s i x new radio sets.
Accordhg to Sihanouk, radio logs i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e
sets had been used t o e s t a b l i s h c o n t a c t w i t h Son Ngoc
Thanh's force i n Thailand. The o f f i c i a l Cambodian broadcast s t a t e d t h a t Sihanouk also read t h e c o n f e s s i o n of
Chhuon's b r o t h e r , Kern S ~ s g ,and of h i s n i s t ~ e s s . The
broadcast stated t h a t t h e t e s t h ~ n yhad " s & r i o u s l y i m p l i cate.dVq
t h e Vietnamese r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n Phnorn Posh, 'Nguyen
Van Nhieu, b u t mentioned no Americans.
I n a speech before t h e K h m e r S o c i a l i s t Youth--a
Sangkum af f i l i a t e - - S i h a n o u k d i s c u s s e d t h e p l o t i n greater
d e t a i l on 4 larch. Basic t o t h e p l o t , according t o t h e
P r i n c e , was Cambodia's r e f u s a l t o j o i n SRATO, an a c t i o n
which provided Cambodiass neighbors w i t h t h e p r e t e x t f o r
encroachments on its t e r r i t o r y . After c h a r a c t e r i z i n g
Dap Chhuon and h i s entourage as t h e r o t t e n a p p l e s to be
found in any b a r r e l 9 he expressed g r a t i t u d e for t h e t i m e l y
warnings h e had r e c e i v e d from three fr i e i i d l y governments,
"two governments from t h e S o c i a l i s t camp and one govsrnment from t h e Western camp." He h i n t e d that more r e v e l a tions would f o l l o w :
F i n a l l y , w e s h o u l d mention t h e d e c l a r a t i o n
of a n o t h e r of Dap Chhuon's brothers, former
National Assembly Wputy S l a t P e w , which
r e v e a l e d t h a t he was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r r e g u l a r
c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e embassy of a great SEAT0
power
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51
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I
. .
,
No name was mentioned. Any chance t h a t t h e Dap
Chhuon c a s e might be allowed t o d i e a q u i e t d e a t h , howe v e r , was d i s p e l l e d by t h e i n a u g u r a t i o n of anti-Sihanouk
b r o a d c a s t s by Son Ngoc Thanh's mobile t r a n s m i t t e r s . I n
March, Thanh began b r o a d c a s t s i n t h e .name of t h e K h m e r
S e r e i (Free Khmers). Government f o r c e s were unable t o
l o c a t e and seize t h e t r a n s m i t t e r s , and a s time went on
t h e b r o a d c a s t s became an o b s e s s i o n w i t h Sihanouk.
-
I n September, the background of t h e Dap Chhuon aff a i r came o u t i n t h e open when 18 of h i s f o l l o w e r s , i n c l u d i n g t w o of h i s b r o t h e r s , were t r i e d f o r t r e a s o n by a m i l i t a r y c o u r t . The most s e n s a t i o n a l a s p e c t of t h e t r i a l was
t h e t e s t i m o n y of one of t h e b r o t h e r s , S l a t Peou
;
On February 11, n a p Chhuon7 t o l d
m e t h a t Ngo Trong Hieu had g i v e n him a
q u a n t i t y of gold worth 36) m i l l i o n s ( s i c ) .
Peou went on t o p r o v i d e d e t a i l s of h i s 1
work, which included 1
B.
net-
The Aftermath
P u b l i c a t i o n of P e o u ' s t e s t i m o n y , which could have
been t a k e n p r i v a t e l y , was symptomatic o f Cambodia's deter i o r a t i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e US and South Vietnam. Although
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I
52
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I
t h e Dap Chhuon p l o t appeared t o be t h e m o s t ' i m p o r t a n t
f a c t o r i n f l u e n c i n g Sihanouk's o u t l o o k , it was not t h e
o n l y one.
Sihanouk vacationed i n France during A p r i l and
l a y , and r e t u r n e d t o Cambodia i n a seemingly m e l l o w mood.
Far from preoccupying himself w i t h Thai and Vietnamese
i n t r i g u e s , he appeared prepared to l e t bygones be bygones.
The T h a i f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r v i s i t e d Phnom Penh i n mid-June,
where he and Sihanouk reached agreement on a " p r e s s t r u c e , "
and exchanged pledges of n o n i n t e r f e r e n c e in one a n o t h e r ' s
i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s . For t h e n e x t three months, T h a i and
Cambodian papers r e f r a i n e d f r o m p e r s o n a l a t t a c k s of t h e
kind which had prompted Sihanouk to suspend d i p l o m a t i c
r e l a t i o n s t h e P r e V i Q U S November.*
Sihanoub's next e f f o r t a t fence-mending c e n t e r e d
He v i s i t e d Saigon f o r three days i n
A u g u s t , and there h e l d r e a s o n a b l y cordial t a l k s w i t h D i e m
and h i s a d v i s o r s . Agreement w a s reached on s e v e r a l adm i n i s t r a t i v e problems i n t h e a r e a of trade.r e l a t i o n s and
border c o n t r o l s . On broader i s s u e s , however, the Cambodians and t h e V i e t n a m e s e remained f a r apart. Sihanouk
contended t h a t n e u t r a l i t y was t h e o n l y p o l i c y c o n s i s t e n t
w i t h t h e s e l f - i n t e r e s t of s m a l l n a t i o n s , and c i t e d t h e
c i v i l war i n Laos as t h e r e s u l t of t h e governmentQs taki n g t o o s t r o n g an anti-Communist s t a n d . When chided
about CambodiaOs r e c o g n i t i o n of Communist China, Sihanouk
r e p o r t e d l y observed t h a t "one cannot oppose dest iny'l-?
on t h e Vietnamese.
*Despite these achievements, a number of o u t s t a n d i n g
i s s u e s were l e f t unresolved. Diplomatic r e l a t i o n s were
not 'restored, and t h e r e w a s no agreement concerning Wat
Preah V i h e a r , t h e historic monastery on t h e Thai-Cambodian
b o r d e r which w a s claimed by both c o u n t r i e s b u t occupied
by t h e T h a i s . Moreover, i n p r o v i d i n g a base f o r t h e
Khmer Serei, t h e Thais were even t h e n f l o u t i n g t h e i r pledge
to p r o h i b i t any a c t i v i t y on t h e i r t e r r i t o r y "which could
a d v e r s e l y affect t h e s e c u r i t y of t h e ' o t h e r country.''
I .
-
'
I
53
-
'* .
t
an e a r l y r e f l e c t i o n of Sihanouk's b e l i e f , more f i r m l y h e l d
today, t h a t Communist ascendancy i n Sounheast Asia was
a foregone conclusion.
It s h o u l d be noted t h a t , i n 1959 as today, Sihanouk
spoke w i t h a t l e a s t t h r e e v o i c e s . The first was r e s e r v e d
f o r o f f i c i a l negotXations, as w i t h t h e T h a i s i n Phnom Penh
and w i t h D i e & i n Saigon. Sihanouk's "dipPomatic" v o i c e
was u s u a l l y a f f a b l e r a t h e r t h a n s t r i d e n t , b u t was t h e
l e a s t reliable i n d i c a t o r of t h e P r i n c e ' s t r u e views. A l though he could be f o r t h r i g h t on occasion, as i n c e r t a i n
of h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h t h e Vietnamese, he w a s prone
t o be agreeable as a mattes of d i p l o m a t i c etiquette so
l o n g as he was accorded s a t i s f a c t o r y p r o t o c o l t r e a t m e n t .
The second v o i c e was t h a t of t h e Chautaugua P r i n c e ,
t h e stump speaker who w a s never more a t ease t h a n when
v i s i t i n g remote v i l l a g e s of t h e Kingdom, d e d i c a t i n g s c h o o l s
and e x h o r t i n g h i s s u b j e c t s . In h i s i n t e r m i n a b l e speeches
t o t h e "venerables, bonzes and d e a r c h i l d r e n " , Sihanouk
kicked o v e r a l l t h e traces. As i f i n p r i v a t e conversat i o n (although it w a s a rare s p e e c h by Sihanouk which
was not b r o a d c a s t t h r o u g h o u t Cambodia), he w o u l d e x c o r i a t e
t h e Thais o r t h e K h m e r Serei; s a g e o v e r t h e l a t e s t border
i n c u r s i o n by t h e Vietnamese; f l a u n t h i s w i l l i n g n e s s to
I
a c c e p t a i d from a l l q u a r t e r s ; l a u d Sangkum socialism as
Cambodia's middle way. Sihanouk's impromptu o r a t i o n s became t h e bane of o f f i c i a l v i s i t o r s , f o r no c o n v e r s a t i o n
was too s e n s i t i v e to be s h a r e d by Sihanouk w i t h h i s ''children." The P r i n c e had no compunctim about r e p e a t i n g t h e
substance- of a c o n f i d e n t i a l d i s c u s s i o n o v e r t h e r a d i o t o
f i v e m i l l i o n K h m e r s and anyone else who might happen t o
be l i s t e n i n g . 4
The d i s t i n c t i o n between t h i s u n r e s t r a i n e d second
v o i c e and t h e t h i r d w a s e s s e n t i a l l y t h e d i f f e r e n c e between
'!*he spoken and t h e w r i t t e n word." The d i s t i n c t i o n was
important t o Sihanouk, who resent.ed f o r e i g n monitoring
of h i s r a d i o monologues, and t o t h i s day r e f u s e s t o acknowledge them as o f f i c i a l u t t e r a n c e s . Many of h i s informal
addresses were toned down, e d i t e d , a n d , s u n i n R e a l i t e s ,
The Nat i o n a l ist , or some o t h e r semi-of f i c i a l organ.
mawould a c c e p t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o n l y for s u c h '*off i c i a l " v e r s i o n s of his addresses.
*One example of S i hanoupCts h a n d l i n g of a somewhat d e l i c a t e
i s s u e w i l l be found in Annex l'B.l*
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54
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A p r e d i c t a b l e r e s u l t was t h a t t h e P r i n c e , when u s i n g
h i s t h i r d v o i c e , c o u l d be f a i r l y bland.
On occasion, howe v e r , h i s more f ormal pronouncements embodied some of
S i h a n o u k D sbest-reasoned r a t i o n a l e s of Cambodian p o l i c y .
C e r t a i n of h i s e s s a y s i n Realites have been noted elsewhere. Egualfy i n t e r e s t i n g was an a r t i c l e by Sihanouk
i n t h e July 1959 Sssue of Foreign Affairs,, which h e ' t i t l e d
Tambodia N e u t r a l : The Dictate of Necessity." The g i s t
of Sihanoukss thesis was t h a t there w a s no a l t e r n a t i v e
t o n e u t r a l i t y f o r a c o u n t r y i n CambodiaOs g e o g r a p h i c a l
p o s i t i o n , and t h a t Cambodian n e u t r a l i s m was more l i k e
t h a t of Sweden, or Switzerland than that of Egypt or Indonesiae
Our n e u t r a l i t y has been forced on
u s by n e c e s s i t y . A g l a n c e a t a map of
o u r p a s t of t h e world w i l l show t h a t w e
a r e wedged in between two medium-sized
n a t i o n s of t h e Western b l o c and o n l y
t h i n l y s c r e e n e d by Laos from t h e s c r u t i n y
of t w o c o u n t r i e s of t h e E a s t e r n bloc,
North Vietnam and t h e vast People's Rep u b l i c of China. What c h o i c e have w e
b u t to t r y t o maintain an e q u a l balance
between the " ~ P O C S ? ~ .
..
I have sometimes been r e p r e s e n t e d
t o t h e American p u b l i c a s t r y i n g t o
''flirt w i t h t h e Reds."
The f a c t is
t h a t I abdicated in 1955 t o s a v e t h e
monarchy--not t o abandon it...,I am
s u r e t h a t t h e citizens of the United
States can a p p r e c i a t e t h a t , s h o r t of
being m e n t a l l y deranged, a P r i n c e and
former Xing must be well aware t h a t t h e
first concern of t h e Communists is to
g e t r i d of t h e King and n a t u r a l e l i t e
of any c o u n t r y %hey succeed i n l a y i n g
hands on. By t h a t I d o not mean t o
imply t h a t t h e Communists w i s h t o t a k e
p o s s e s s i o n of Cambodia; t h a t may not '
e n t e r i n t o t h e i r p l a n s a t a l l and, for
t h e moment a t l e a s t , t h e y have f a r
w e i g h t i e r matters t o occupy them,..,
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55
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*
W
e are n o t a "breach" i n t h e Western b l o c
merely because w e cannot be a *Wmpast.'*
In t h e e v e n t of a world c o n f l i c t , we
might v e r y w e l l become one of the first
v i c t i m s of a h a r s h occupation. In t h a t
case, t h e "free world" would have other
t h i n g s t o do besides undertaking our
l i b e r a t ion--or r a t h e r t h e l i b e r a t i o n of
what l i t t l e remained of us.
The g e o p o l i t i c a l i n s e c u r i t y t o which Sihanouk
a l l u d e d was s h o r t l y dramatized i n Phnom Penh. On t h e
evening of 31 August, a p l a s t i c bomb exploded i n t h e
p a l a c e , k i l l i n g t h e c h i e f of p r o t o c o l and t h r e e s e r v a n t s .
Only minutes before, t h e Ring and Queen had been i n t h e
room where t h e e x p l o s i o n took p l a c e ; t h e bomb i t s e l f had
come wrapped a s a g i f t , w i t h a card e x p r e s s i n g t h e wish
t h a t " t h i s humble g i f t . . .might g i v e t h e Queen p l e a s u r e .
"*
I t is u n c l e a r t o t h i s day who was r e s p o n s i b l e for
t h e bomb. Sihanouk e x p r e s s e d t o t h e U.S. ambassador h i s
c o n v i c t i o n t h a t Sam Sary w a s t h e c u l p r i t , and government
spokesmen contended t h a t t h e w r i t i n g on t h e c a r d was i n
S a r y ' s hand. The f a c t t h a t t h e n o t e was on t h e card of
a U.S. e n g i n e e r i n g f i r m , however, and t h e f a c t t h a t t h e
. Jueen was one of t h e f e w c o n s e r v a t i v e v o i c e s c l o s e t o
Sihanouk, allow a good cas.e t o be made for t h e bomb having o r i g i n a t e d w i t h t h e Pracheachon.
To Sihanouk, however, Sary was t h e c u l p r i t , and
Sihanouk w a s a l l too prone to e q u a t e Sary w i t h South Vietnam,
*Even b e f o r e t h e bomb, Sihanouk's p a r e n t s were upset
o v e r p r o s p e c t s f o r c a l e n d a r 1959 as a r e s u l t of c e r t a i n
a u g u r i e s and omens. Allegedly, a Cambodian bonze had
t o l d t h e King three y e a r s e a r l i e r t h a t 1959 would b r i n g
a s e r i o u s upheaval a f f e c t i n g t h e r o y a l f a m i l y . One r e s u l t
of t h e Dap Chhuon a f f a i r was t h a t t h e King r e f u s e d t o go
t o France f o r t r e a t m e n t of a s e r i o u s k$dney a i l m e n t , on
grounds t h a t something might happen to Sihanouk w h i l e he
wag gone.
--56
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. -
T .-
and South V i e t n a m w i t h t h e US. The bomb brought an end
t o Sihanouk's e f f o r t t o improve r e l a t i o n s with his neighbors, and r e i n f o r c e d h i s s e n s e of personal i n s e c u r i t y .
Sihanoukgs a t t i t u d e hardened f u r t h e r f o l l o w i n g t h e apprehension i n September of t h r e e K h m e r Sesei, who s t a t e d
t h a t t h e y had been t r a i n e d a t a s a b o t a g e school i n South
Vietnam. In 8 17 October a r t i c l e in The N a t i o n a l i s t , t h e
P r i n c e warned one and a l l t h a t s u p g o r t f t h e K h m e r Serei
by Cambodiao$ neighbors, if pushed t o o f a r , would force
Cambodia t o a l l y itself w i t h t h e bloc.
C.
I n l a t e A u g u s t , Sihanouk began a series of a r t i c l e s
in Realites Cambodgiennes designed t o set forth h i s view
of t h e w o r l d ' s i t u a t i o n and t h e f u t u r e of Cambodia. The
t i t l e of t h e series--"Will Cambodia Become a Republic?"
--was a misnomer, for the a r t i c l e s were in fact a n extended
d i s c u s s i o n of the v a r i o u s p r e s s u r e s , as s e e n by t h e P r i n c e ,
a t work a g a i n s t Cambodia,
I
I
!
I
Through Sihanouk's Eyes
.
Sihanouk began w i t h a d i s c u s s i o n of monarchies i n
g e n e r a l , w i t h emphasis on t h e number of k i n g s who had
l o s t t h e i r crowns i n t h e y e a r s f o l l o w i n g World War 11.
He t h e n launched into a r e c i t a l of r e c e n t Cambodian h i s t o r y in which h i s o p p o n e n t s - - p a r t i c u l a r l y Son Ngoc Thanh-were c a s t i n t h e role of enemies of t h e monarchy. Only
t h e Democrats came o u t r e a s o n a b l y w e l l i n Sihanouk's
a n a l y s i s ,. He c i t e d w i t h s a t i s f a c t i o n "the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n and almost total i n t e g r a t i o n of t h i s p a r t y i n t h e
body of t h e Sangkum."
R e f l e c t i n g on h i s earlier battles
' w i t h t h e Democratic P a r t y , Sihanouk quoted w i t h approval
Ngo Dinh Nhu as s t a t i n g t h a t t h e h i g h e s t form of courage
f o r a s t a t e s m a n was "to dare to face unpopularity."
To s a v e our c o u n t r y and even o u r democr a c y i t s e l f , I , m y s e l f , d i d n o t hesitate
t o brave u n p o p u l a r i t y . C e r t a i n people
wished, of course, to take t h e merit from
m e i n order t o g i v e it t o e i t h e r t h e " h e r o i c
member of t h e r e s i s t a n c e , Thanli,' (who res i s t e d t h e King b u t never t h e French troops)
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57
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. -
o r t o t h e Geneva c o n f e r e n c e , where our
d e l e g a t i o n n e v e r t h e l e s s fought w i t h
courage and success to s p a r e our people
t h e sad f a t e of our neighboring brothercountries.
V i r t u a l l y a l l of %he ten a r t i c l e s included p o t s h o t s
at Thanh, which were d i s r u p t i v e t o o r g a n i z a t i o n b u t which
l e n t a thread of c o n s i s t e n c y t o t h e series. I n t h e f o u r t h
a r t i c l e , Sihanouk helped $a a n a l y z e ThanhOs d i f f i c u l t y .
"Thanh's error," he wrote, ''is t o have chosen f o r h i s
o b j e c & i v e , . . t o d e s t r o y our n e u t r a l i t y . L i v i n g o u t s i d e
t h e c o u n t r y , Thanh and h i s people are not able t o unders t a n d t h e profound s e n t i m e n t s and c o n v i c t i o n s of t h e i r
compakriots who' have stayed in t h e f a t h e r l a n d . "
Sihanouk wrote w i t h s a t i s f a c t i o n of the defeat of
t h e Dap Chhuon u p r i s i n g . H e characterized Thanh as havi n g done h i s c o u n t r y a s e r v i c e by h e l p i n g t o expose t h e
Sam Sary-Dap Chhuon "gangrene" i n t h e body p o l i t i c .
He
i m p l i e d t h a t he no l o n g e r feared t h e T h a n h i s t s , so comp l e t e l y had t h e y d i s c r e d i t e d themselves. I& w a s d i f f i c u l t
to q u a r r e l with h i s l o g i c : t h e " t r a d i t i o n a l " o p p o s i t i o n
groups i n Cambodia had i n d e e d been assimilated i n t o t h e
Sangkum or d r i v e n o u t s i d e CambodiaBsborders.
'
Beginning w i t h t h e f i f t h a r t i c l e , Sihanouk devoted
most of h i s a t t e n t i o n t o t h e Communists. A t t h e outset
he conceded t h a t t h e Communists had made "progress" i n
Cambadia, and emphasized t h a t , far from being o b l i v i o u & to
t h e Communist threat, he w a s v e r y much aware of it.
Sihanouk contended t h a t Communism had made no p r o g r e s s
w i t h i n Cambodia ( h i s emphasis). He s t a t e d c o r r e c t l y
t h a t t h e monarchy enjoyed t h e s u p p o r t of t h e great m a j o r i t y
of t h e people; he added, w i t h o u t e l a b o r a t i o n , t h a t t h e
Chinese and Vietnamese communities were peaceful and lawa b i d i n g , Sihanouk a r r i v e d a t t h e conclusion t h a t t h e
Communist t h r e a t w a s no greater i n 1959 than i n p r e v i o u s
y e a r s , b u t t h a t it w a s s%illa problem.
Sihanouk viewed Communism as e s s e n t i a l l y a longt e r m threat. He cited f o u r factors as a s s i s t i n g the Communists: the e x i s t e n c e of an "unoccupiedr? class, s u s c e p t i b l e
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58
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t o Communist blandishments; t h e r u r a l exodus, which i n
one y e a r had increased t h e p o p u l a t i o n of Phnom Penh by
10,000 and provided t h e b a s i s of an urban p r o l e t a r i a t ;
t h e v u l n e r a b i l i t y of an uneducated and l a r g e l y i l l i t e r a t e
populace t o Communist propaganda; and t h e a t t h c t i o n of
Communism t o Cambodian s t u d e n t s abroad.
O f those s t u d e n t s a t f o r e i g n u n i v e r s i t i e s (Cambodia
still had no u n i v e r s i t y of its own), 90 p e r c e n t went to
France. Sihanouk favored French e d u c a t i o n i n p r i n c i p l e ,
b u t was concerned o v e r Communist p r o s e l y t i z i n g among homes i c k Cambodian s t u d e n t s :
One m u s t impute.. . t h i s unhappy s t a t e
o f a f f a i r s to t h e Governments- which have
succeeded each o t h e r here in Cambodia s i n c e
1946. They c o n t e n t e d themselves w i t h givi n g s c h o l a r s h i p s t o these youths and sendi n g them off.,.towaxds t h e unknown, t o
adventure i n t h e Tower of Babel which is
t h e " L a t i n Q u a r t e r . ''
O u r diplomatic r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s h a r d l y
bothered themselves. .about t h e l i v i n g
c o n d i t i o n s of these s t a t e s c h o l a r s h i p
s t u d e n t s , away f r o m home, abandoned, in
moral d i s a r r a y ; these l a t t e r could n o t
b u t accept w i t h g r a t i t u d e t h e f a c t t h a t
"someonef1 b o t h e r e d w i t h them.
According to Sihanouk, t h e "someone" was i n e v i t ably a Communist, and as a r e s u l t 70 p e r c e n t of Cambodian
s t u d e n t s i n . F r a n e e r e t u r n e d as Communists. Of t h i s 70
p e r c e n t , s l i g h t l y more t h a n half w e r e *frecoveredt'a f t e r
t h e y "regained touch w i t h n a t i o n a l r e a l i t i e s . rt T h i s st ill
l e f t a Communist hard core comprising 30 p e r c e n t of t h e
total--more t h a n 100 s t u d e n t s p e r year--and t h i s , Sihanouk
conceded, w a s an unhappy s t a t e of a f f a i r s .
Sihanouk t h e n t u r n e d to t h e q u e s t i o n of Communist
economic a i d , and disarmed h i s Western c r i t i c s by concedi n g a t t h e . o u t s e t t h a t t h e presence 09 Chinese and S o v i e t
t e c h n i c i a n s i n Cambodia w a s bound t o produce !'a c e r t a i n
contaminat ion.
H e observed, in e x p l a n a t i o n , t h a t a poor
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c o u n t r y s u c h as Cambodia "could n o t afford t h e luxury''
of r e f u s i n g a f a c t o r y OP a 504)-bed h o s p i t a l .
D e s p i t e h i s misgivings concerning b l o c a i d , Sihanouk
d e r i v e d comfort from h i s b e l i e f in an e v e n t u a l Communist
v i c t o r y . (Although he d i d n o t q u a l i f y h i s s t a t e m e n t s ,
r e f e r e n c e s to t h e i n e v i t a b i l i t y of Communist domination
appeared t o refer p r i m a r i l y to S o u t h e a s t Asia.) He argued,
i m p l i c i t l y , t h a t t h e only p o l i c y f o r Cambodia was to d e l a y
t h e day of reckoning as best it could, and t o avoid ant a g o n i z i n g t h e b l o c where pQS6ible, And s i n c e it w a s o n l y
a matter of time, no r e a l h a r m c o u l d come from t h e accegtance of b l o c aid,
T h i s f i o n s t a n t Communist7
- advance
is undeniaEle. To be f r a n k , I see a s
y e t l i t t l e which would be able t o s t o p
it and make it p u l l b a c k , , , ,
The Hungarian people f a i l e d tragi c a l l y in t h e i r attempt a t r e b e l l i o n ,
w i t h o u t t h e ' V e ~ t "or t h e UN being
able to spare them v i g o r o u s and t e r r i b l y bloody r e p r i s a l s .
Sihanouk p a i d t r i b u t e t o t h e democratic i d e a l , b u t
regarded t h e West as a weak reed i n t h e face of s o c i a l
r e a l i t i e s i n Asia:
The s u p e r i o r i t y of Western Democracy
l i e s i n t h e f a c t t h a t it p l a c e s man a t
t h e s u m m i t p w h i l e man is reducedCommunism to t h e p o s i t i o n of a s l a v e of t h e
all-powerf u l S t a t e , which is not t h e
people b u t a t'symbolt' of t h e people.
The great weakness of Western democr a c y l i e s i n its i n c a p a c i t y t o realize
s o c i a l J u s t i c e in t h e s e n s e understood
bvaarxlsm. .Western democracy is i n t r i n s i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t t o a p p l y i n & i a and i n
Africa. Tha t is why Communism attacks i n
-regions
w i t h so much success: first
t h e s o c i a l i n j u s t i c e s (or i n e q u a l i t i e s ) are
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much more marked t h e r e t h a n elsewhere,
and fiecondly, t h e y are7 more d i f f i c u l t
t o e f i m i n a t e because tEe c o u n t r i e s i n
q u e s t i o n are, as I b e l i e v e M r . Nehru has
s a i d , t w o r e v o l u t i o n s behind Europe or
America and are b a r e l y emerging from t h e
f e u d a l system.
Sihanouk went on t o lecture t h e West concerning
its s p i r i t u a l shortcomings, and t h e n t u r n e d t o t h e quest i o n of t h e s u c c e s s i o n in Cambodia. Emphasizing t h a t he
himself would never r e t u r n t o t h e t h r o n e , he spoke symp a t h e t i c a l l y af those who were concerned over t h e succ e s s i o n t o King Suramarit. Sihanouk launched i n t o a
eulogy of h i s p a r e n t s : t h e K i n g w a s an i d e a l monarch
and a tremendous u n i f y i n g f o r c e , t h e Queen "an i n t e l l i g e n t
woman" who was t h e t o o l of n e i t h e r t h e United States nor
anyone else. Sihanouk conceded t h a t he was n o t sanguine
a s t o p o s s i b l e s u c c e s s o r s t o h i s a i l i n g f a t h e r , even
though t h e Crown Council had 183 p e r s o n s of r o y a l blood
f r o m whom to chose a king.
The Sihanouk who emerges from t h e Realites series
is a bombastic, rambling b u t e s s e n t i a l l y shrewd o b s e r v e r .
As i f s t u n g by charges i n t h e Western press t h a t he w a s
"taken in" by t h e Comun*sts, he demonstrated i n t h e a r t i cles a c l e a r awareness of t h e Communist t h r e a t , i f a l s o
a r a t h e r d e f e a t i s t a t t i t u d e towards it both f o r Cambodia
and t h e West. The most s t r i k i n g a s p e c t of t h e series w a s
t h e i n f r e q u e n t mention of Cambodia" t r a d i t i o n a l enemies,
Thailand and Vietnam, even though t h e p a l a c e bomb i n c i d e n t
occurred e a r l y i n t h e p e r i o d i n which t h e a r t i c l e s were
pub1 i s h e d
.
Thus Sihanouk and Cambodia were f i r m l y committed
to a p o l i c y of n e u t r a l i s m a t t h e end of 1959. T h e i r t i e s
t o t h e West, howepler, were b e i n g f r a y e d . On a' b a l a n c e
s k e e t , Western assets i n Cambodia would have included its
p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y large a i d program, Sihanouk's demonstrated
annoyance w i t h Communist methods and o b j e c t i v e s , and h i s
admiration f o r t h i n g s French. There were, however, s e r i o u s
l i a b i l i t i e s : Sihanouk's fear--acerbated by t h e Dap Chhuon
a f f a i r - - o f encroachments by h i s SEAT0 neighbors; h i s
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admiration for t h e New China, e s p e c i a l l y t h e way it treated
d i s t i n g u i s h e d guests; h i s h y p e r s e n s i t i v i t y to c r i t c i s m ,
which was r a r e l y impinged upon by t h e bloc but o f t e n by
the Western press; and, f i n a l l y , h i s b e l i e f fri the in-,
e v i t a b i l i t y of a Communist triumph in Southeast Asia.
Of' all the factors on t h e balance sheet, t h i s l a s t one
was the most important.
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IV.
1
THE POLITICS OF NEUTRALISM
A.
The Lonesome P r i n c e
I n January 1960, t h e U.S. Embassy a t Pbnom Penh
examined SilaanookPs p o s i t i o n i n Cambodia and found it.s e c u r e . Among t h e peasants--80 p e r c e n t of t h e population--Sihanouk was s t i l l t h e god-king, v e n e r a t e d as t h e
f a t h e r of Cambodian independence. To a c o n s i d e r a b l e
e x t e n t , t h i s u n c r i t i c a l acceptance was also found among
urban workers. Only t h e urban i n t e l l i g e n s i a r e t a i n e d
s t r o n g r e s e r v a t i o n s concerning t h e P r i n c e , and here t h e
p r e v a i l i n g a t t i t u d e was n o t so much h o s t i l i t y as of bored
indifference.
In one speech, Sihanouk v o l u n t e e r e d h i s e s t i m a t e
t h a t 10 p e r c e n t of t h e populace w a s
him.
The
embassy hazarded a guess t h a t t h i s f i g u r e "may 'be somewhat low," but d i s m i s s e d t h e o p p o s i t i o n t o Sihanouk as
a leaderless p o t pouWi comprising a " r e l a t i v e l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t number509 K h m e r Sere i some former Democratic
p a r t y elements, c e r t a i n businessmen opposed to t h e Sangkum
welfare s t a t e , and a "handful" of pro-Western i n d i v i d a a l s
c r i t i c a l of S i h a n o u k v s n e u t r a l i s m .
The Cambodian press was so w e l l t r a i n e d t h a t c r i t i c i s m of t h e P r i n c e was unknown. What c r i t i c i s m e x i s t e d
was directed a t c e r t a i n government programs (such as t h e
manual labor program, which Sihanoak had borrowed from
C h i n a D sLeap Forward) or a t economic phenomena s u c h as
t h e i n c r e a s e d c o s t of l i v i n g , which was a f a c t o r i n t h e
cities b u t not i n t h e c o u n t r y s i d e . Censorship of t h e
p r e s s w a s o n l y o c c a s i o n a l l y necessary, even though Phnom
Penh w a s s u r f e i t e d w i t h newspapers, i n c l u d i n g f o u r c o n t r o l l e d by t h e Communists and t w o by Sihranouk (Realites, The
Nationalist)
Even t h e o p p o s i t i o n p a p e r s w e r -6ycopEaX't i c
concerning Sihanouk p e r s o n a l l y , not from c o n v i c t i o n but
o u t of 8 des i r e t o stay i n p r i n t .
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The death of King S u r a m a r i t i n A p r i l 1960 l e f t
Sihanouk w i t h a p o l i t i c a l problem of some magnitude,,
D e s p i t e t h e ceremonial role t o which t h e monarch had
been r e l e g a t e d , c o n s i d e r a b l e i n t r i g u e accompanied d e l i b e r a t i o n s concerning t h e s u c c e s s i o n . The Queen appears
t o have sought t h e p r e r o g a t i v e s of . t h e l a t e King, and
t o have e n t e r t a i n e d hopes of s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e t h r o n e
a s a c o n s e r v a t i v e bulwark. Sihanouk, p r e d i c t a b l y , had
no desire t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e monarchy; nor was he impressed
w i t h t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n s any of h i s s o n s o r o t h e r m e m b e r s
of t h e r o y a l family. For n e a r l y two months t h e c o u n t r y
o p e r a t e d under a m a k e s h i f t three-man regency comprised
of Sihanouk, P r i n c e Monireth, and t h e Queen.
i
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Although s t e a d f a s t i n h i s own r e f u s a l to r e t u r n
t o t h e t h r o n e , Sihanouk appeared r e l u c t a n t t o see anyone
else i n t h e t h e o r e t i c a l l y paramount p o s t . Thus i n June
he h e l d a n o t h e r of h i s do-yau-love-your-Prince
referendums,
i n which out of o v e r t w o m i l l i o n v o t e r s 99.98 p e r c e n t
voted yes. The r e f e r e n d u m was followed by demonstrations
in which Sihanouk was c a l l e d upon t o a s s u m e t h e post of
chief of s t a t e . Sihanouk r e s i g n e d from t h e regency,
which brought about it s collapse on 1 2 June. The N a t i o n a l
Assembly q u i c k l y amended t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n t o p r o v i d e f o r
t chief of s t a t e , t o be f i l l e d by "an uncontested personal i t y e x p r e s s e d l y d e s i g n a t e d by t h e n a t i o n a l s u f f r a g e . ''
Sihanouk t h u s became k i n g i n a l l except name.
' .
I
,
R e s o l u t i o n of t h e s u c c e s s i o n problem brought l i t t l e
s a t i s f a c t i o n to Sihanouk. His concern over i n t e r n a t i o n a l
a f f a i r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y Cambodia's r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e West,
appears to have brought on a p h y s i c a l r e a c t i o n d u r i n g 1960.
Long a compulsive eater, Sihanouk went on a d i e t in t h e
spring which d i d n o t h i n g t~ improve h i s d i s p o s i t i o n , There
were unconfirmed r e p o r t s i n Phnom Penh t h a t t h e P r i n c e
was s u f f e r i n g from a c a r d i o v a s c u l a r c o n d i t i o n .
High on t h e list of Sihanouk's concerns was t h e
t h r e a t posed by Thailand and Vietnam. These concerns
WePe m i n i s t e r e d to by Chou En-lai, who fron 5-9 Mag ret u r n e d Sibanoukgs p r e v i o u s v i s i t t o Pqiping.
(Sihanouk
l a t e r make of h i s shame a t having t o e n t e r t a i n Chou on
t h e stun; motor launch which he ha; employed in 1956. He
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e x p l a i n e d t h a t he had saved face by r e p a i n t i n g t h e boat
''SO t h a t Chou would n o t r e c o g n i z e it.")
Reports on t h e i r
c o n v e r s a t i o n s i n d i c a t e t h a t Sihanouk r e t u r n e d t i m e and
t i m e again to t h e q u e s t i o n of Cmbodia*s d e f e n s e and
security. According t o one r e p o r t , t h e Chinese promised
Itto u s e t h e i r i n f l u e n c e " w i t h Ho Chi Minh t o persuade t h e
V i e t Cong t o r e s p e c t Cambodia's n e u t r a l i t y , and to avoid
i n c i d e n t s close t o t h e Cambodian border. Following a
cruise on t h e Bay of Siam i n Sihanouk's newly-painted
launch, Chou announced China's s u p p o r t for Cambodia's
t i t l e t o s e v e r a l s m a l l i s l a n d s claimed by t h e South V i e t namese.
Concerning Sihanouk's hunger for a s s u r a n c e s of
m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t against any of the SEATO powers, Chou
was e v a s i v e . The f i n a l communique w a s bland, and t h e
Chinese went no f u r t h e r t h a n to promise "moral and p o l i t i c a l s u p p o r t " t o Cambodia. Any other a s s i s t a n c e , Chou
s t a t e d , would depend on Cambodia9s needs, t h e r e s o u r c e s
a t P e i p i n g q s d i s p o s a l , : and t h e c o n d i t i o n s p r e v a i l i n g a t
any given t i m e .
If Sihanouk w a s d i s a p p o i n t e d by t h e c a u t i o u s Chinese
commitment, he gave no i n d i c a t i o n . N e i t h e r d i d he d i s courage s p e c u l a t i o n t h a t a d e f e n s e pact comprised a secret
p r o t o c o l reached d u r i n g Chou's v i s i t . Whatever t h e reason, Sihanouk appeared g r e a t l y buoyed by h i s conferences
with t h e Chinese. In June, he f e l t s u f f i c i e n t l y b o l d t o
take t h e issue of t h e d i s p u t e d Preah' Vihear temple t o
t h e World Court--an a c t i o n which i n f u r i a t e d $he T h a i s ,
and which Sihanouk had l o n g hesitated t o t a k e .
Sihanouk had much on h i s mind, but one of h i s chief
complaints was t h e US a i d program, i n both t h e m i l i t a r y
and t h e economic f i e l d s . The p u b l i c s c a n d a l w a s t h e U . S . Khmer F r i e n d s h i p Highway, which l i n k e d Bhnom Penh w i t h
S i h a n o u k v i l l e on the G u l f of Si-,
The highway had been
completed i n J u l y 1959, and opened b r i e f l y t o t r a f f i c .
From t h e f ikst, however, it was a laughing-stock.
So
shoddy was t h e work (by a U.S. c o n s t r u c t i o n f i r m ) and so
haphazard t h e Cambodian maintenance, t h a t t h e highway was
almost c o n t i n u o u s l y closed for r e p a i r s .
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Sihanouk w a s p r e d i c t a b l y d i s g u s t e d 0ver t h e .Friends h i p Highway fiasco, b u t h i s main annoyance was with t h e
e x t e n t of t h e U.S, m i l i t a r y a i d t o h i s c o u n t r y . Here he
was impossible t o p l e a s e , f o r he i n v a r i a b l y viewed U.S.
a i d i n term r e l a t i v e t o t h a t provided South Vietnam and
Thailand. Sihanouk conceded t h a t t h e U.S. had sound reasons for p r o v i d i n g much greater assistance to its a l l i e s
t h a n t o a s m a l l n e u t r a l , A t t h e same t i m e , he viewed
w i t h alarm an a i d program which armed Carnbodia*s p o t e n t i a l
enemies a t 8 much greater r a t e t h a n it a s s i s t e d Cambodia.
In a I4 J u l y speech a t Siem Reap, Sihanouk s t a t e d
t h a t China and t h e USSR had promised m i l i t a r y assistance,
and warned t h a t if! t h e U.S. r e f u s e d h i s r e q u e s t t o prov i d e jet p i l o t t r a i n i n g he might send h i s p i l o t s t o the
USSR for t r a i n i n g . He a t t a c k e d both South Vietnam and
Thailand Bd; l e n g t h , and s t a t e d t h a t he would never be
s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e l e v e l of U . S . m i l i t a r y aid u n t i l it was
e q u a l t o t h a t provided Cambodia's enemies. Sihanouk
went on to p r a i s e China, and s t a t e d t h a t i f Cambodia
w e r e invaded i d ; could count on Communist a i d .
*
No$ f o r some t i m e had Sihanouk spoken so d i s p a r a g i n g l y of t h e US. In a l l l i k e l i h o o d h i s pique stemmed i n
p a s t from o u t s i d e f a c t o r s , s u c h as h i s h e a l t h and t h e
d e b a c l e of the Frkendship Highway, B u t SihanoukOs speech
at Siem Reap w a s one of a series of i n d i c a t o r s t h a t he
was t e n d i n g t o r e g a r d China as t h e best guarantor of
Cambodia's s e c u r i t y . In October 1959, he had for t h e
f i r s t t i m e p e r m i t t e d Cambodian t e c h n i c i a n s t o v i s i t China,
in o r d e r $0 l e a r n t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e t e x t i l e and cement
p l a n t s b u i l t i n Cambodia by t h e Chinese. In June 1960,
f0Plowing Chou's v i s i t , he had s e n t t h r e e of h i s own s o n s
t o s t u d y in China--a d r a m a t i c g e s t u r e for t h e Francophile
Sihanouk, and one probably aimed a s a warning to t h e US.
*
Hnterest i n g l y enough,, none of h i s other v e n d e t t a s
prevented Sihanouk from c o n t i n u i n g h i s feud w i t h t h e
It f l a r e d i n t o open w a r f a r e over a seemingly
Pracheaehon.
minor i s s u e : criticism in Communist papers, Led by The
Observer, of a p e t p r o j e c t of Sihanonkgsi t h e e x p a n a n
of French-language t r a i n i n g i n Cambodian elementary s c h o o l s .
In August 1960, Sihanouk gave t h e Communists t h e f u l l ,
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v e r b a l t r e a t m e n t , complete w i t h comparisons to t h e K h m e r
Serei:
. . .
..
The K h m e r S e r e i are n o t p a t r i o t s
s i n c e t h e y have n o t h i n g construct3Get o propose and j u s t keep on s a y i n g t h a t
under t h e Sangkum and Sihanouk t h e count r y is not advancing b u t d e c l i n i n g .
The K h m e r Reds..hardly d i f f e r i n t h e i r
c r i t i c i s m from t h e Khmer Serei. One of
t h e r a r e t h i n g s t h e y approve of is manual
l a b o r . B u t w h i l e o u r n a t i o n a l i s t s are
working and glowing and g e t t i n g sunburned
a t it, our Reds are c o n t e n t w i t h c o v e r i n g
reams of paper i n t h e i r newspaper o f f i c e s . .
,
..
Does P e o p l e v s China understand us?
We c o n s i d e r her s i n c e r e l y
and g r a t e f u l l y a s our g r e a t f r i e n d . B u t
from o u r a n g l e , w e o n l y c o n s i d e r Cambodia
. and our own i n t e r e s t s .
This is t h e unbridgable gap which today s t i l l so serio u s ) ~d i v i d e s t h e n a t i o n a l i s t m e m b e r s of
t h e Sangkum and t h e Communists and proCommunists whether t h e y be members of t h e
Pracheachon or d i s g u i s e d w i t h i n t h e
Sannkum.
And s u p p o r t u s ?
!
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Sihanouk had long been prone t o regard an a t t a c k
on Sangkum programs as p e r s o n a l c r i t i c i s m of himself and,
on occasion, as e f f o r t s t o undermine t h e monarchy, In
h i s e f f o r t to r e f u t e Communist o p p o s i t i o n t o h i s educat i o n a l program Sihanouk l a u n c h e d i n t o a rambling d e f e n s e
of e v e r y t h i n g Cambodian,
I
L e t m e s p e a k first of a l l t h e Khmer
p r i n c e s i n g e n e r a l . One s u r e l y cannot
say t h a t our democracy had p r e s e r v e d many
p r i v i l e g e s for them.,..Three days ago...
t h e r o y a l p r i n c e s s H e r Royal Highness Lorn
Ankasaw fias apprehended7
- o r g a n i z i n g cert a i n gGes w i t h cards. Although she is
t h e daughter of t h e King fiic.7 and h e r
name, F l o r i d a z , is a very-preTty one, s h e
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w i l l have to c o o l her heels i n t h e cent r a l p r i s o n f o r a f e w months....
As f a r as I a m concerned, I r e p e a t
t h a t my o n l y d e s i r e is to abandon t h i s
power to which 99 p e r c e n t of t h e electorate i n s i s t s on c o n f e r r i n g on m e . I a m
f r e q u e n t l y saddened when I see t h e s e
f r e q u e n t popular demonstrations o b l i g i n g
m e c o n s t a n t l j . t o postpone my r e s i g n a t i o n .
The speech marked t h e beginning of one of SihanoukDs
b l a c k moods, n o t a b l e o n l y f o r t h e f a c t t h a t t h e Communists
r a t h e r t h a n t h e West w e r e t h e main t a r g e t f o r h i s d i s p l e a sure, On 1 5 A u g u s t , t h e government closed t h e f o u r Communist newspapers and arrested t h e i r e d i t o r s .
Sihanouk l e f t f o r France s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , f o r
t h e long rest recommended by h i s p h y s i c i a n s .
Vacations,
however, were never more t h a n q u a l i f i e d successes f o r
Sihanouk, f o r he never lost s i g h t of h i s g r i e v a n c e s and
at t h e R i v i e r a was able t o devote f u l l t i m e t o brooding
on them. In OCtober, Sihanouk cabled t o Phnom Penh t h a t
he wished t o r e s i g n as c h i e f of s t a t e ''at l e a s t tempora r i l y , I 1 as a r e s u l t of l l i n t o l e r a b l e l ' p r e s s u r e from t h e
Communists.
Sihanouk's message brought hand-wringing i n Phnom
Penh e The Acting Premier professed t o be "overwhelmed"
by t h e news, and s e n t a message begging Sihanouk t o rec o n s i d e r ,. The National Assembly called a s p e c i a l s e s s i o n
to d r a f t a message e x p r e s s i n g f u l l s u p p o r t f o r t h e P r i n c e
and h i s p o l i c i e s and imploring him t o c o n t i n u e as chief
of s t a t e .
Sihanouk w i t h d r e w his r e s i g n a t i o n , and extended
. his v a c a t i o n . He had e a r l i e r accepted i n v i t a t i o n s from
Moscow and P e i p i n g f o r a s t a t e v i s i t i n December; i n t h e
wake of Sihanouk's a l t e r c a t i o n s w i t h t h e Pracheachon
there w a s s p e c u l a t i o n i n Phnom Penh t h a t . t h e v i s i t s might
be postponed. Sihanouk continued i n a d i s t u r b e d frame
of mind. While he probably had not intended t h a t h i s
r e s i g n a t i o n be accepted, a speech by t h e P r i n c e a t Cambodia
House provided some i n t e r e s t i n g i n s i g h t s i n t o h i s o u t l o o k ,
T
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Sihanouk s p ~ k ef o r f i v e hours--from 5:30 u n t i l
10:30--on 19 November 196O.b He began by e x p l a i n i g g why he
had come t o France, t h a t he needed a cool climate and
a place where he need n o t ' b e bothered by v i s i t o r s . H e
stated t h a t it w a s important f o r him t o l o s e weight i n
order t h a t he c o u l d w e a r l a s t y e a r ' s clothes to t h e
next UN General Assembly.
I
Sihanouk w a s f r a n k i n a d m i t t i n g t h a t a n b t h e r
r e a s o n for h i s coming t o France was t h a t he was d i s t r a u g h t
over c r i t i c i s m by t h e Pracheachon, t h e p l o t s of Son Ngoc
Thanh, and by t h e t h r e a t posed by Cambodia's SEAT0 neighb o r s . In h i s only known r e f e r e n c e t o s u i c i d e he s t a t e d ,
"I t r u l y thought of k i l l i n g myself i n order t o remove
t h i s burden."
He spoke moodily 09 h i s h e a l t h , o b s e r v i n g
t h a t after doing h i s s t i n t of manual l a b o r on t h e Phnom
Penh-Sihanoukville r a i l w a y he was so exhausted t h a t he
could h a r d l y d e l i v e r h i s speech. The P r i n c e rambled on
a t l e n g t h concerning Cambodia's neighbors, s a y i n g n o t h i n g
which he had not s a i d on other o c c a s i o n s b u t b e t r a y i n g
concern o v e r t h e c i v i l w a r i n Laos.*
Sihanouk appeared t o have bad a change of heart
concerning U.S. m i l i t a r y a i d . "America is t h i s way,"
e x p l a i n e d t h e P r i n c e . "If you want them t o come and g i v e
you a i d , t h e n you m u s t not ask o t h e r c o u n t r i e s for a i d .
If Red c o u n t r i e s g i v e u s ficonomic7 a i d America w i l l be
v e r y unhappy, 'and if t h e Red d o u n s r i e s g i v e u s m i l i t a r y
a i d t h e Americans w i l l want to s t o p t h e i r s e V 1Sihanouk-b e f o r e what he regarded as a l e f t i s t s t u d e n t audience-was c h a r i t a b l e in h i s assessment of t h e U . S . e o b s e r v i n g
a t one p o i n t t h a t "America is an o l d f r i e n d of o u r s and
there is no p o i n t i n k i c k i n g someone f o r no reason."
There
*Cambodian i n f o r m a t i o n media were i n u r e d t o Sihanouk's
ruminations, and it was a r a r e speech of t h e P r i n c e which
d i d not r e c e i v e s a t u r a t i o n coverage even when d e l i v e r e d
abroad. H i s Cmbodia House speech, however, was handled
v e r y g i n g e r l y , w i t h o n l y one paper p r d n t i n g t h e full t e x t .
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was, however, a s t r o n g element of t h e pragmatic i n
SihanoukOs t h i n k i n g :
An i n c r e a s e i n /Cambodian budget7
funds for n a t i o n a l d s f e n s e would makz
it impossible f o r us t o b r e a t h e , therefore, in o r d e r to give u s breath f o r
c o n s t r u c t i o n , it is best t o ask America
to g i v e u s t h e pay for our t r o o p s . So,
although China, t h e USSR, Czechoslovakia
and other' Red c o u n t r i e s f u r n i s h u s w i t h
equipment and t e c h n i c a l a i d , t h e y are
u n w i l l i n g t o g i v e us t r o o p pay. America,
on t h e o t h e r hand, is w i l l i n g t o f u r n i s h
t r o o p pay, and w e may as w e l l ask Uncle
Sam t o f u r n i s h it.
Sihanouk, l i k e many a n o t h e r head of s t a t e i n count r i e s r e c e i v i n g U.S. a i d , w a s f r u s t r a t e d by h i s i n a b i l i t y
t o count on a set l e v e l of a s s i s t a n c e :
I t o l d h i m /%me n o t given; perhaps
Pres i d e n t EisenhZwer7 Excellency, you are
only g i v i n g u s t r o o g pay, what else? The
troop pay is c o n t i n u a l l y d e c r e a s i n g . We
s t i l l need you as b e f o r e . L e t us know
how much you w i l l reduce i t , and w e w i l l
accept t h a t much!,.,.
I f you hear t h a t t h i s year it has
n o t been reduced, it is because OUY Gene r a l Lon N o 1 has gone to America for
t a l k s ; Uncle Sam is a f r a i d t h a t w e w i l l
go to t h e o t h e r s i d e , and _
fie7
- w i l l release q u i t e a lot.
I n c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h a Western o f f i c i a l on t h e Bollowing day, Sihanouk underscored his n e u t r a l i s m in more
The West s h o u l d n o t be concerned
conventional 1anguage
o v e r h i s forthcoming b l o c t o u r , he s a i d . He would accept
o f f e r s of economic a i d i f it w a s " s u i t a b l e , " b u t i n no
case would he accept m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e . On h i s r e t u r n
t o Phnom Penh he would t h a n k China and t h e USSR f o r t h e i r
o f f e r s of a i d , b u t would r e i t e r a t e Cambodia's c o n t inliing
neutrality.
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The P r i n c e Goes Shopping
Sihanouk was no stranger i n Prague, Moscow.or
Pelping. H e had v i s i t e d a l l t h r e e i n 1956, and had been
g r a n t e d a i d by each. H i s ' j u n k e t of November-December
1960, however, w a s h i s most t r a n s p a r e n t shopping t o u r .
to d a t e . Nothing was allowed t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h its s u c cess; i n Phnom Penh, t h e Communist newspapers which had
been shut down i n August were p e r m i t t e d t o r e s u m e p u b l i c a t i o n i n October.
Viewed as a shopping e x p e d i t i o n , Sihanouk's t o u r
was 8x1 u n q u a l i f i e d success. A t Prague, he w a s promised
s i x mobile X-ray u n i t s by the Czechs, and arrangements
w e r e m a d e for a K h m e r - C z e c h s h i p p i n g combine which would
s e e k t o p r o v i d e Cambodia w i t h t h e rudiments of a merchant
marine
.
Sihanouk was even more s u c c e s s f u l i n Moscow. For
many months he had badgered t h e U.S. concerning h i s d e s i r e
f o r a t e c h n o l o g i c a l s c h o o l i n Phnom Penh. His r e q u e s t
had never been f l a t l y t u r n e d down, b u t it had f l o u n d e r e d
i n red t a p e while t h e Prince g r e w i n c r e a s i n g l y i m p a t i e n t .
In Moscow, a j o i n t cornunique on 3 December proclaimed
Khrushchev's i n t e n t i o n t o p r o v i d e t h e s c h o o l concerning
which Sihanouk had u n s u c c e s s f u l l y approached t h e U.S.
The S o v i e t s t o s s e d i n a h e l i c o p t e r , f o r u s e by Sihanouk
i n barnstorming h i s c o u n t r y , They also agreed t o make
c e r t a i n g e o l o g i c a l s t u d i e s , i n c l u d i n g soulidings f o r a
h y d r o e l e c t p i c dam on t h e Mekong.
The S o v i e t s , however, exacted a q u i d p r o quo.
Indeed, t h e cynicism with which Sihanouk m i z t e d h e
S o v i e t s and Chinese is nowhere b e t t e r i l l u s t r a t e d than
by h i s n e g o t i a t i o n s i n MQSCOW.O
I n t h e 3 December communigue, Sihanouk s u p p o r t e d t h e admission to t h e UN of
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both China and O u t e r MQngolia, a c o u n t r y w i t h which Camb o d i a d i d n o t even m a i n t a i n d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s . In
t h e same communique Sihanouk endorsed t h e S o v i e t demand
f o r "general and completev1disarmament, e x p r e s s e d conI
e..
, h e r i c a n 7 i n t e r v e n t ion** i n Laos,
cern over "foreign /
and became one of a-handful of non-bloc n a t i o n s to s u p port Khrushchev's " t r o i k a " p l a n for t h e reorgamisation
of t h e UN. As i n Prague, t h e P r i n c e r e c e i v e d i n Mascow
a s s u r a n c e s of s u p p o r t f o r maintenance of Cambodia's t e r r i t o ri a l i n t e g r i t y
I
!
i
i
!
!
The greatest f a n f a r e was r e s e r v e d f o r Sihanouk's
v i s i t t o Peiping. His s t o p o v e r w a s t h e o c c a s i o n f o r t h e
s i g n i n g of a t r e a t y of nonaggression and f r i e n d s h i p , embodying new and l o f t i e r e x p r e s s i o n of the Five P r i n c i p l e s
of Coexistence. The Chinese announcement r e f l e c t e d recogn i t i o n t h a t t h e y had 8 good t h i n g going f o r them in Cambodia.
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As everyone knows, H i s Royal Highness
P r i n c e Sihanouk and t h e Royal Cambodian
Government have c o n s i s t e n t l y supported
ChinaOs peaceful f o r e i g n p o l i c y
and
have sympathized w i t h t h e Chinese p e o p l e ' s
j u s t stand i n safeguarding national
s o v e r e i g n t y and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y . * .
...
.
The Royal Cambodian Government has
a l s o shown w a r m r e s p o n s e and s u p p o r t t o
t h e peace p r o p o s a l r e p e a t e d l y b u t forward
by t h e Chinese Government t h a t t h e countries i n Asia and around t h e P a c i f i c , inc l u d i n g t h e United S t a t e s , conclude a peace
pact of m u t u a l nonaggression and make t h i s
area a r e g i o n free of n u c l e a r weapons.
FOP t h i s , w e w i s h to e x p r e s s o u r profound
thanks
Cambodia w a s also g r a t e f u l
Sihanouk s t a t e d ,
O u r understanding of New China h a s
been made complete by t h e i n i t i a l results
of t h e generous a i d which s h e accorded u s
i n 1956 and b y t h e j o i n t f r a t e r n a l labor
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of t h e Chinese and K h m e r t e c h n i c i a n s .
t h e inauguration
From 1958 t o 1960,
of t h e f i r s t group of f a c t o r i e s b u i l t
w i t h Chinese a i d and t h e i r going i n t o
p r o d u c t i o n , t h e p u t t i n g i n t o s e r v % c e of
a great radio s t a t i o n p r e s e n t e d by China,
t h e d i s p a t c h i n g of more and more...students
t o p u r s u e t h e i r s t u d i e s i n China, and t h e ,
a r r i v a l i n Cambodia of new Chinese techn i c i a n s who, w i t h admirable devotion,
have c o n t r i b u t e d t o our n a t i o n a l cons t r u c t i o n , and educated and made p e r f e c t
young K h m e r cadres, t h e f r i e n d s h i p and
c o o p e r a t i o n between China and Cambodia
have registered a great ''leap f o r w a r d . w
...
According t o an aide who accompanied Sihanouk,
a l l e x c e p t two of h i s c o n f e r e n c e s i n P e i p i n g were c o n f i d e n t i a l tete-a-tetes w i t h Mao, L i u Shao-chi and Chou
En-lai.
Entertainment w a s l a v i s h , and Sihanouk w a s s a i d
t o be v i s i b l y impressed t h a t at no t i m e w a s he t u r n e d
over t o lower e c h e l o n s of government, A l l members df
t h e Cambodian p a r t y were l a d e n w i t h g i f t s , i n c l u d i n g .
s i l k s ; TV sets and ginseng.
A second m e m b e r of Sihanouk's
entourage characterized t h e P r i n c e as "overwhelmed" by
t h i s , . h i s t h i r d v i s i t t o P e i p i n g , and far more impressed
w i t h China t h a n w i t h e i t h e r Czechoslovakia OF t h e USSR.
SihanoukOs h o s t s scored not o n l y w i t h t h e i r protocol t r e a t m e n t b u t w i t h o f f e r s of a i d . P e i p i n g had a l ready provided economic a s s i s t a n c e t o t a l i n g $28; 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 ;
on t h e o c c a s i o n of SihanoukOs v i s i t , t h e Chinese promised
$26,500,000 more. The funds would be u s e d t o expand and
complete projects a l r e a d y u n d e r way, t o b u i l d 8 s t e e l
m i l l and a machine p l a n t , and t o a s s i s t i n t h e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of CslrnbodiaOs r u r a l producer c o o p e r a t i v e s .
Sihanouk r e t u r n e d t o Phnom Penh on 26 December
understandably pleased w i t h h i m s e l f . In h i s a i r p o r t speech
he s t a t e d , " 1 am glad t o inform you t h a t my p r e s e n t v i s i t
was completely s a t i s f a c t o r y from e v e r y p o i n t of view.
He r a t t l e d o f f t h e a i d commitments o b t a i n e d , X-rays, h e l i c o p t e r s and a l l . Concerning t h e t e c h n o l o g i c a l i n s t i t u t e ,
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,:
:.
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he r i d i c u l e d t h e U.S.; Khrushchev had t o l d h i m t h a t he
a l r e a d y knew t h a t Cambodia
had n e g o t i a t e d w i t h a n o t h e r f r i e n d of
o u r s from the West, a b i g f r i e n d from
t h e West, and asked t h i s f r i e n d t o
g r a n t u s a t e c h n i c a l s c h o o l . . .He t o l d
m e t h a t I was e n t i r e 1 free to a c c e p t
OF redect t h i s g i f t of a t e c h n o l o g i c a l
I
I
!
!
.
'
.
P
.
.
i n s t i t u t e 7 s i n c e i t was j u s t a s u g g e s t i o n
of h i s o%n....I
had n o t heard of any
i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t a n o t h e r f o r e i g n power
wanted to g r a n t us t h i s a i d , and I therefore accepted.
Sihanouk w a s not b l i n d t o t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of h i s
At t h e a i r p o r t , he observed t h a t h i s s u p p o r t f o r
ChinaOs "16gitimate r i g h t s , " i . e . , to UN admission and
t o Taiwan, was worth as much to China as China's a i d was
t o Cambodia. But Sihanouk, t o o , had r e c e i v e d m o r e t h a n
material b e n e f i t s , s i n c e a l l t h r e e bloc c o u n t r i e s had
h e l d h i s hand, and gone on r e c o r d as r e s p e c t i n g Cambodia's
t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and n e u t r a l i t y . If he l o s t anyt h i n g , it w a s self-respect: t h e j o i n t communique f u l l
of Communist j a r g o n , and t h e o p p o r t u n i s t i c endorsement
of KhrushchevDsUN t r o i k a , s e r v e d t o underscore Sihanouk's
p o i n t t h a t Cambodia*s n e u t r a l i s m was pragmatic r a t h e r
than ideological.
trip:
C.. Laos:
Crabs and Crocodiles
For a l l h i s enjoyment of b l o c h o s p i t a l i t y , Sihanouk
l i k e d h i s Communists a t a d i s t a n c e . In a F e b r u a r y 1961
i n t e r v i e w i n Le blonde, Sihanouk conceded t h a t t h e e x i s t ence of an anm--nist
regime i n South Vietnam was t o
CambodiaOs advantage. Three months l a t e r , i n a second
i n t e r v i e w , he v o l u n t e e r e d t h a t **In order t o remain on
good terms w i t h my Communist f r i e n d s , we prefer n o t t o
have a common border w i t h them,"
- 74 T
-.-.
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Sihanouk's c o n f i r m a t i o n t h a t absence made t h e
h e a r t grow fonder w a s a l o g i c a l e x t e n s i o n of t h e t i g h t
r e i n he had kept on Communism w i t h i n Cambodia. What
prompted h i s remarks was the s i t u a t i o n in Laos, which
had changed d u r i n g 1960 from one merely of d i s o r d e r , t o
one which embodied a c o n f r o n t a t i o n between t h e Western
and Communist blaas
In "normal" c i r c u m s t a n c e s Sihanouk
was prone t o take a p a t r o n i z i n g t o n e concerning Laos,
comparing unfavorably its c h r o n i c f a c t i o n a l i s m w i t h t h e
n a t i o n a l u n i t y he had achieved i n Cambodia. With Laos
c l e a r l y t h r e a t e n e d by a Communist t a k e o v e r , Sihanouk
w a s apprehensive and p e s s i m i s t ic
.
.
As e a r l y as August 1959, Sihanouk had e x p r e s s e d
concern t h a t t h e civil w a r i n Laos might escalate a s a
result of great power i n t e r v e n t i o n , H e c r i t i c i z e d t h e
U. S. for "sabotaging" t h e n e u t r a l government of P r i n c e
Souvanna Phouma in f a v o r of t h e r i g h t i s t Phoumi, and
a t t a c k e d t h e U. S. penchant for " i n t e r f e r i n g r t i n L a o t i a n
a f f a i r s , a s he f e l k t h e U.S. had i n t e r f e r e d i n Cambodia.
In a d d i t i o n , he f e a r e d t h a t U.S. a c t i v i t y i n Laos might
provoke t h e Communists i n t o more a c t i v e i n t e r v e n t ion.
SihanoukOs advocacy of a n e u t r a l i z e d Laos was one
of t h e few c o n s i s t e n t e l e m e n t s i n t h e complex L a o t i a n
s i t u a t i o n d u r i n g 1960. Western f o r t u n e s these f l u c t u a t e d
e v e r y f e w months; t h e y were d e a l t a j o l t , however, when
i n A u g u s t Kong Le emerged as a t h i r d f o r c e i n o p p o s i t i o n
to t h e U.S.-supported Phoumi government. Sihanouk called
f o r an expanded v e r s i o n of t h e 1954 Geneva conference,
t o assure t h e t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and n e u t r a l i t y of
Laos. By l a t e 1960, however, right-wing f o r c e s were a g a i n
i n t h e ascendancy, and t h e United States t u r n e d a deaf
ear to Sihanouk. On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e USSR supported
t h e Cambodian p r o p o s a l f o r a 14-nation conference on Laos.
When t h e P a t h e t Lao recouped t h e i r m i l i t a r y losses,
Sihanouk f e l t himself f u l l y v i n d i c a t e d .
The p r e s e n t (and f u t u r e ) e v o l u t i o n
of e v e n t s i n Laos w i l l work o n l y t o t h e
advantage of t h e P a t k e t Lao ang t o those
who s u p p o r t i t . Under s u c h circumstances
I am unable t o see t h a t t h e S o c i a l i s t
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powers w i l l p e r s i s t i n s u p p o r t of my
p r o p o s i t i o n for t h e e f f e c t i v e and
guaranteed n e u t r a l i z a t i o n of Laos, I f ,
d e s p i t e t h e i r advantage, t h e s e powers
c o n t i n u e t o s u p p o r t it, one m u s t hope
t h a t t h e y w i l l s i n c e r e l y consent t o
s a c r i f i c e t h e i r major advantages i n
t h e i n t e r e s t of world peace. . B u t i n
t h i s world c o n f l i c t , is it r e a s o n a b l e
t o hope t h a t t h e b i g powers w i l l make
a sacrifice g r a t u i t o u s l y ?
Even when t h e West agreed t o an i n t e r n a t i o n a l
conference, Sihanouk was p e s s i m i s t i c concerning t h e outcome.* In c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h Averell Harriman, he s t a t e d
t h a t he c o u l d see "no hope" f o r a t r u l y n e u t r a l Laos, and
thought t h a t t h e c o u n t r y would be dominated by t h e P a t h e t
Lao, whom he equated w i t h t h e Communists. He c o r r e c t l y
assessed Souvanna Phouma as not s u f f i c i e n t l y s t r o n g a
p e r s o n a l i t y to resist P a t h e t Lao pressure,
When t h e conference w a s f i n a l l y h e l d in Geneva,
Sihanouk was one of t h e star a t t r a c t i o n s . He p r e s i d e d
over t h e opening s e s s i o n on 1 6 May, and found both t h e
major b l o c s r e c e p t i v e in p r i n c i p l e to n e u t r a l i z a t i o n .
I n t h e p r o t r a c t e d wrangling which followed--centered on
t h e s e a t i n g of r i v a l L a o t i a n d e l e g a t i o n s , and t h e devising of a means t o p o l i c e t h e cease-$ire--Sihanouk was
more impressed w i t h t h e Western dele a t i o n s t h a n w i t h
t h o s e of t h e bloc, According td
,Sihanouk
was angered by t h e arrogance of G~oinkyoand Chen Y i ,
which compared unfavorably w i t h t h e l l c i v i l i z e d l l manner
of t h e Western delegates, who d e f e r r e d t o Sihanouk and
convinced h i m of t h e i r genuine desire t o r e s o l v e t h e
1
I
Sihanouk intended to t r y a t Geneva t o " l i m i t t h e loss"
i n Laos, and t o "buy time" f o r Cambodia. H i s comment is
an i n t e r e s t i n g r e f l e c t i o n of Sihanouk9s b e l i e f i n an
e v e n t u a l Communist triumph i n Southeast Asia.
0
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L a o t i a n impasse. A m e m b e r of Sihanouk's e n t o u r a g e des c r i b e d t h e P r i n c e as having d i s c o v e r e d t h a t , when bloc
i n t e r e s t s were a t s t a k e , Communists were n o t f r i e n d l y
t o any o u t s i d e r .
The conference r a n i n t o June, and t h e n i n t o J u l y .
Sihanouk was no longer in t h e l i m e l i g h t , and h i s a t t e n -
dance became i r r e g u l a r . More and more t i m e was s p e n t
a t v a r i o u s h e a l t h spas i n Z u r i c h , and on 8 J u l y he arr i v e d back a t Phnora Penh. There was t h e u s u a l a i r p o r t
speech.
I knew t h a t u n i t i n g o u r L a o t i a n
b r o t h e r s would be as d i f f i c u l t a s keepi n g crabs in a basket, and t h a t g e t t i n g
t h e g r e a t powers t o m e e t would be as
d i f f i c u l t as keeping c r o c o d i l e s i n a
house.. ..My e f f o r t s to b r i n g t h e concerned p a r t i e s t o m e e t i n Geneva c o u l d
be compared t o the e f f o r t s of a middleman i n a marriage. A f t e r going t o t h e
b r i d e v s home t o convince her p a r e n t s
t o a g r e e t o t h e marriage, t h e middleman
m u s t go t o t h e bridegroom's to convince
h i s p a r e n t s , . . A s a middleman i n t h i s
L a o t i a n a f f a i r I w a s n o t lucky d e s p , i t e
a l l my e f f o r t s ; I c o u l d not s c o r e a
v i c t o r y . Yet some important and s a t i s ' f a c t o r y r e s u l t s were achieved.
.
Sihanouk went on t o compare Laos w i t h a house a f i r e ,
t h r e a t e n i n g all around it. I n ~ a a b l i n gf a s h i o n , he i m p l i e d t h a t t h e Geneva conference h e l d o u t promise t h a t
t h e f i r e w o u l d n o t be allowed to s p r e a d . Whatever s u c cess was achieved was d u e l a r g e l y to Cambodia:
Thanks t o o u r e f f o r t s , a meeting
between t h e three L a o t i a n p r i n c e s was
achieved. When t h e great powers r e f u s e d
to a t t e n d t h e Geneva conference on grounds
t h a t t h e Boun Oum p a r t y was a b s e n t , I
persuaded t h e Boun Oum p a r t y t o go t o t h e
conference and t h e y agreed
....
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We have been away from our c o u n t r y
fop almost two months and have s p e n t a
l o t of money, Expenses were considerable and numerous:
p l a n e t i c k e t s , gasol i n e , r e c e p t i o n s and so f o r t h . The great
powers are m i l l i o a a i r e s ; t h e y can a f f o r t
enormous expenses. The L a o t i a n p a r t i e s
s p e n t t h e money of t h e i r bosses. B u t w e
K h m e r s s p e n t t h e money of o u r people. A s
I Pound t h a t our expenses were e x c e s s i v e ,
I decided t o r e t u r n home and work f o r o u r
nation.
..
!
I m u s t conclude t h a t w e w i l l have t o
l e t the L a o t i a n s s e t t l e t h e i r own a f f a i r s
because--as t h e s e L a o t i a n s have said--"theg
a r e no l o n g e r c h i l d r e n and t h e y need a d v i c e
But w e e n t r e a t them n o t t o
from nobody."
l e t t h e f o r e i g n e r s lead t h e m because, up
t o now, t h e i r words have n o t been L a o t i a n
words.
D.
Belgrade, New York and Bangkok
Sihanouk was home f o r l i t t l e more than a month.
In September he was off again, first t o t h e conference
of! nonaligned n a t i o n s a t Belgrade, and t h e n t o t h e openi n g of t h e UN s e s s i o n i n New York.
I
!
Sihanouk had f o r some t i m e viewed T i t o , together
w i t h Nehru, as a l e a d i n g p r a c t i t i o n e r of t h a t brand of
common-sense n e u t r a l i s m which h e himself f a v ~ r e d . Moreo v e r , T i t o had behaved t h o u g h t f u l l y toward Sihanouk in
s h a r i n g h i s motorcycle e s c o r t a t t h e UM opening i n 1960,
.and t h e P r i n c e P s e l e p h a n t i n e memory encompassed c o u r t e s i e s
as w e l l as s l i g h t s . Sihanouk was d o u b t l e s s pleased t o
be i n v i t e d t o Belgrade, and to a s s i s t h i s h o s t i n exerti n g a moderating i n f l u e n c e on t h e newly independent African
s t a t e s . A t Belgrade, there was a d i s t i n c t c l e a v a g e between t h e Asian and t h e African groups, i n which t h e Asians
sought t o head off a d r i v e by African d e l e g a t i o n s t o t u r n
t h e conference i n t o an anti-Western r a l l y
Individual
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m e m b e r s of both groups s o u g h t to a i r t h e i r p e t hates,
be it Israel or South Africa.
The speech b y Sihanouk on 3 September showed t h e
P r i n c e a t h i s b e s t , and was one of h i s most a r t i c u l a t e
e x p o s i t i o n s of h i s c o u n t r y ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y . N e touched
on most of t h e major problems of t h e cold war. A f t e r
condemning " t h e i m p e r i a l i s m of t h e t w o great b l o c s , " he
spoke on t h e subject of Germany. Sihanouk observed t h a t
t w o German s t a t e s c l e a r l y e x i s t e d , and Cambodix enjoyed
economic and c u l t u r a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h each. He urged-w i t h o u t going i n t o s p e c i f i c s - - t h a t t h e way t o o b t a i n
s t a b i l i t y i n Western Europe would be t o r e u n i f y Germany
"under t h e e x p r e s s c o n d i t i o n t h a t it be n e u t r a l i z e d e I t
The concept of b u f f e r states and n e u t r a l i t y b e l t s
h e l d a f a c i n a t i o n for Sihanouk. He had earlier urged t h e
c r e a t i o n of Laos as a n e u t r a l b u f f e r i n S o u t h e a s t Asia,
and had b r o a d l y h i n t e d t h a t Thailand and South Vietnam
would be b e s t o f f n e u t r a l e When d i s c u s s i n g . areas o u t s i d e
of S o u t h e a s t Asia, however, h i s t h i n k i n g tended t o be
s u p e r f i c i a l . Concerning Germany, he o f f e r e d no suggest i o n s as t o t h e implementation of h i s n e u t r a l i t y p r o p o s a l ,
which took no account of t h e a s p i r a t i o n s of m o s t West
Germans e
On t h e issue of disarmament Sihanouk continued t o
urge "complete** disarmament, b u t sought to erase t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t he w a s i n complete accord w i t h t h e S o v i e t
p o s i t i o n . He conceded t h a t a need for c o n t r o l s e x i s t e d ,
though here a g a i n h i s s o l u t i o n w a s i m p r a c t i c a l .
Before concluding I would l i k e t o
,I
w i l l c o n t e n t myself w i t h s t r e s s i n g t h a t
w e t h i n k disarmament should be complete
and s i m u l t a n e o u s l y c o n t r o l l e d . But,
along w i t h f i h a n a i a n 7 P r e s i d e n t Ilkrumah,
I b e l i e v e tEat to b s e f f e c t i v e t h i s cont r o l should n o t be assured by t h e two
great r e s p o n s i b l e powers..,but by a neut r a l commission of nonaligned c o u n t r i e s
say a f e w words about disarmament..
.
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,
,
Sihanouk h e l d f o r t h on t h e s u b j e c t of f o r e i g n
b a s e s , and attempted t o steer a m i d d l e c o u r s e . He contended t h a t no n a t i o n had t h e r i g h t . t o m a i n t a i n bases
on t h e t e r r i t o r y of another w i t h o u t its c o n s e n t , and
came o u t i n s u p p o r t of T u n i s i a i n its campaign to
o u s t t h e French from Bizerte. Sihanouk added, however,
t h a t he d i d n o t f a u l t t h o s e states w h o found it i n
t h e i r i n t e r e s t to p e r m i t f o r e i g n b a s e s ,
His protests
had been directed o n l y a t t h e s u p p l y i n g of arms to
c e r t a i n Southeast Asian c o u n t r i e s who t h e n used them
n o t a g a i n s t t h e Communists b u t a g a i n s t Cambodia,
I
I
.
.
.
Sihanouk spoke a t some l e n g t h a g a i n s t racism i n
a l l forms, and made u s e of t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o attack
South Vietnam for its t r e a t m e n t of t h e Cambodian m i n o r i t y
there, By and l a r g e , however, h i s speech was moderate
i n t q n e , and B a r more acceptable t o Western ears t h a n
t h e d i a t r i b e s of Mkrumah and N a s i r .
As f o r Sihanouk, he
appeared to e n j o y h i s r o l e .
..
From Belgrade Sihanouk went t o New York, He was
n o t e n t h u s i a s t i c concerning t h e r e s u l t s a t Belgrade,
where t h e c o n f e r e e s had ended up i s s u i n g a bland communiq u e d e c r y i n g c o l o n i a l i s m . There is some evidence that
Sihanouk*s estrangement from Nehru may have begun a t B e l grade; I
the Prince f e l t
Nehru t o have been "gloomy and loItye'" O t h e r delegates,
t o o , w e r e i r r i t a t e d by N e h r u ' s ' p o n t i f i c a t i n g , and Sihanouk
may have p r i v a t e l y r e s e n t e d t h e I n d i a h ' s penchant for t h e
1i m e l i g h t
In New YQPB, Sihanouk had h i s first meeting w i t h
P r e s i d e n t Kennedy and t h e leaders of h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
H e appears t o have been f a v o r a b l y impressed by P r e s i d e n t
Kennedy, who m e t w i t h h i m f o r o v e r an hour in New York.
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , Sihanouk w a s impossible t o please.
L i k e c e r t a i n s t a t e s m e n i n t h e Free
World, P r e s i d e n t Kennedy is v e r y c l e v e r .
He does n o t l i s t e n t o t h e p r e s s and he
knows how to f l a t t e r n e u t r a l c o u n t r i e s . . . ,
During my v i s i t , W . Kennedy petted and
f l a t t e r e d m e fop an hour and c o n g r a t u l a t e d
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I
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m e f o r my speech d e s p i t e t h e Pact t h a t
it contained criticisms of t h e F r e e
World a Meanwhile, t h e Communist b l o c
d i d not d a r e compliment m e , maybe because I had c r i t i c i z e d both b l o c s .
N e v e r t h e l e s s , it appeared t h a t MI?.
Kennedy w a s d e t e r m i n e d to get t h e bett e r of t h e Communists f i y 7 r e p e a t i n g
t h a t /my7 speech was f h Z , t h a t he admired-aKd congratuXated m e for Cmbod i a qs genuine, nonaligned n e u t r a l i t y , and
t h a t h e hoped %he K h m e r s would h e l p t h e
L a o t i a n s achieve t h e same t y p e of
n e u t r a l i t y . T h i s proves t h a t t h e Free
World knows how to p e t me though it disl i k e s neutral countries.
Nothirrg ever seemed t o go r i g h t for Sihanouk i n
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , and his v i s i t in 1961 was no e x c e p t i o n
t o t h e r u l e . "Mew York is n o t a n i c e p l a c e f o r Cambod i a n s t o l i v e , " he r e p o r t e d after r e t u r n i n g t o Phnom Benh.
"Each t i m e w e asked for room service, t h e h o t e l boys
grimaced t o show t h e i r r e l u c t a n c e t o serve u s . Once t h e
boy I had c a l l e d to c a r r y my c l o t h e s to t h e laundry g o t
angry and s c o l d e d my SuboPdinates for c a l l i n g him so
often.
Sihanouk's v i s i t to t h e UN i n ' 1 9 6 0 h i d foundered
on matters of r e l a t i v e p r o t o c o l . A y e a r , l a t e r he .
had fewer complaints on t h i s score, b u t w a s not apprecia b l y h a p p i e r . T h i s time his bete n o i s e was the p r e s s ,
n o t a b l y Time, Newsweek and T h - w m
Times. The magazincs p e r s i s t e d i n d w e l l i n g 3 m
a s thelayboy
P r i n c e ; t h e Times w a s e q u a l l y c u l p a b l e i n Sihanouk's e y e s
f o r its i n s i m o n s t h a t Cambodia w a s p r o v i d i n g s a f e
haven for t h e V i e t Cong. E f f o r t s to c u l t i v a t e t h e bigc i t y p r e s s appear t o have been unsuccessfu1, and Sihanouk
r e t u r n e d to Phnom Penh w i t h a t a l e of woe:
-
Concerning t h e Americans, I w i l l say
t h i s to a l l who have come h e r e . . . . I m u s t
s a y t h a t t h e American j o u r n a l i s t s are most
c o r r u p t men. One day, I e n t e r t a i n e d American j o u r n a l i s t s at a f i r s t - c l a s s banquet
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w i t h champagne d u r i n g which I t a l k e d
w i t h t h e m f ~ three
r
S u c c e s s i v e hours.
B d i d t h i s because, as t h e expenses
were borne by our. n a t i o n a l budget, I
thought t h a t t h e American j o u r n a l i s t s
would consequently t a k e p i t y on t h e
K h m e r n a t i a n . The j o u r n a l i s t s enjoyed
t h e banquet v e r y much.
They c l e v e r l y
managed to have each of them i n t u r n
t a l k to m e w h i l e t h e o t h e r s a t e a t ease.
As a result, I myself c o u l d . n o t eat
anything and, t h e r e f o r e , f e l t d i z z y .
At t h e end of t h e banquet t h e y declared
t h a t t h e y had f u l l y understood my views,
t h u s making me t h i n k t h a t my move w a s
s u c c e s s f u l . But t h e y d i d n o t w r i t e a
s i n g l e l i n e on Cambodia.
There was something about r e t u r n i n g t o Phnom Penh
f r o m abroad-be
it from Mew York or Peiping--that made
Sihanouk wish t o f l e x his m u s c l e s . Perhaps he f e l t a
need t o shake his countrymen o u t of t h e i r t r o p i c a l l e t h a r g y ,
and was m 0 r e s e n s i t i v e to t h i s problem a f t e r r e t u r n i n g
from a temperate climate. I n any case, he r e t u r n e d from
New'York t o a crisis w i t h Thailand which marked a t u r n i n g
point i n Cambodia's i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s .
Even b e f o r e t h e conferences a%Geneva and Belgrade,
Cambodia was engaged i n 8 new border squabble with South
Vietnam.
In March, Sihanouk had touched a s e n s i t i v e nerve
by c h a r g i n g the D i e m government w i t h mistreatment of
South VietnamOs e t h n i c Cambodians--the charge which he
r e i t e r a t e d a t Belgrade. Y e t Sihanouk w a s i n d i g n a n t when
t h e Vietnamese press responded by a t t a c k i n g t h e P r i n c e
i n v i o l a t i o n of a press t r u c e agreed upon six months
earlier; he responded w i t h casual r e f e r e n c e s t o t h e ine v i t a b i l i t y of V i e t Cong v i c t o r y which. he c o r r e c t l y assumed mould i n f u r i a t e t h e Vietnamese.
The L a o t i a n crisis, and Sihanouk's subsequent preoccupation at Geneva and Belgrade, may have a v e r t e d a
crisis w i t h Vietnam. Whatever t h e r e b o n , Cambodia's
major c o n f r o n t a t i o n of 1961 w a s n o t w i t h Vietnam b u t w i t h
Thailand. The immediate cause, however, was t h e same
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as i n t h e a l t e r c a t i o n w i t h Saigon:
charges t h a t t h e Thais
had v i o l a t e d t h e press t r u c e .
A% Geneva, Sihanouk had r e p e a t e d l y made c a u s t i c
remarks concerning Thailand, p a r t i c u l a r l y as regarded
t h e T h a i s ' s u p p o r t f o r t h e r i g h t i s t s i n Laos. On 26)
October, S a r i t - - w i t h o u t mentioning him by name--charged
Sihanouk w i t h " t r e a c h e r y to Southeast Asian n a t i o n s " and
w i t h allowing Cambodia to be used as a base for Commun$st
a t t a c k s . On 23 October, Sihanouk d e l i v e r e d a two-hour
d i a t r i b e t o t h e N a t i o n a l Assembly, c a l l i n g f o r t h e s e v e r i n g of d i p l o m a t i c ' r e l a t i o n s w i t h Thailand and a t t a c k i n g
t h e U . S . as S w r i t ' s mentor. The b i t t e r n e s s of Sihanouk's
attack s u r p r i s e d even t h e American Embassy, l o n g i n u r e d
t o the Prince's oratory.
I n an u n o f f i c i a l t r a n s l a t i o n ,
Sihanouk was quoted as d e s c r i b i n g S a r i % as "running around
l i k e a mad pig." H e charged t h a t Allen D u l l e s w a s s e e k i n g
t o overthrow him, and t h r e a t e n e d t o t a k e t o t h e bush
r a t h e r t h a n s u r r e n d e r . Diplomatic r e l a t i o n s were broken
on t h e same day t h a t Sihanouk spoke.
Sihanouk had long argued t h a t t h e U.S., i f it
wished, could b r i n g s u f f i c i e n t pressure t o bear on Thail a n d and S o u t h Vietnam to f o r c e them to respect Cambodia's
n e u t r a l i t y . The i s s u e t o Sihanouk was n o t whether Vashi n g t o n had t h e means, b u t whether it had t h e w i l l t o make
D i e m and S a r i t come t o heel. The f a i l u r e of the US t o
take s u c h a c t i o n was regarded by Sihanouk--along w i t h t h e
Dap Chhuon p l o t , t h e e x t e n s i v e U.S, s u p p o r t of Cambodia's
t r a d i t i o n a l enemies, and p r o t o c o l gaffes i n New York--as
evidence of American ill w i l l t o w a n m and h i s country.
A t a s c h o o l d e d i c a t i o n on 26 October, Sihanouk accused
t h e US of wishing to " k i l l u s , " and announced t h a t he no
l o n g e r considered h e r i c ans as f r i e n d s
.
Eighteen months earlier, Sihanouk's q u a r r e l s w i t h
h i s neighbors had prompted him t o make almost e q u a l l y h a r s h
c r i t i c i s m of t h e United S t a t e s , With t h e passage of t i m e ,
he appeared more c e r t a i n t h a t his c o u n t r y would command
s u p p o r t from China i n any c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h SEATO, and
correspondingly more prepared t o t a k e chances.
Neverthe-
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t h a t China "always stands by Cambodia."
Not
u n t i l a', 0 ober, however, f o u r days a f t e r t h e b r e a k w i t h
T h a i l a n d , did Peoplevs D a i l y p u b l i c l y s u p p o r t Sihanouk's
" j u s t s t a n d o t ' Even t h e n r e was no promise of m i l i t a r y
s u p p o r t ; a month l a t e r Sihanouk observed, "1 had c a r e f u l l y
r e f l e c t e d before l a u n c h i n g my n o i s y campaign t o defend
my dear c h i l d r e n . . . . I made b e l i e v e there was someone behind me t o support me.
In r e a l i t y , t h e r e was no one a t
t h a t moment.
If t h e enemy had attacked us d u r i n g t h a t
w e e k , ' . t h e r e were o n l y Khmers and no one else."
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Thus d i d the u n i n h i b i t e d Sihanouk l a y t o rest t h e
rumors of a secret m i l i t a r y t r e a t y between Cambodia and
China. T h i s is n o t t o s a y , however, t h a t t h e t h r e a t of
Chinese i n t e r v e n t i o n w a s e n t i r e l y i l l u s o r y . Sihanouk may
w e l l have f e l t t h a t , when t h e c h i p s w e r e down, China would
r e g a r d t h e maintenance of Cambodia's t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y
as in its own i n t e r e s t . H e was s u f f i c i e n t l y compos m e n t i s
t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t he was p l a y i n g a dangerous game:
We prefer n e u t r a l i t y because we want
complete freedom and independence. But i f
t h e Free World and Messrs. S a r i t and Ngo
Dieh D i e m c o n t i n u e t o t r y to e n s l a v e u s . .
w e w i l l be forced t o ask t h e Communists'
h e l p t o be able t o wage w a r w i t h t h e Free
World.
If t h e Communists e n e r g e t i c a l l y
a i d u s , w e will s u r e l y be v i c t o r i o u s :rnd
o u r c o u n t r y w i l l s u r e l y become Red as $em u s t show t h e Reds o u r g r a t i t u d e . /Emphasis
added/
e
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Having elected t o r i s k Communist domination i n
r e t u r n for a degree of - s e c u r i t y f r o m h i s n e i g h b o r s ,
Sihanouk s p e n t much of t h e f a l l of 1961 making h i m s e l f
u s e f u l t o P e i p i n g w i t h b l a s t s a g a i n s t t h e U.S. and Thail a n d . A t t h e same t i m e , he c o n t i n u e d s e n s i t i v e t o press
coverage of Cambodia i n t h e West, d e m o n s t r a t i n g an almost
c h i l d l i k e desire both t o tweak t h e Eagle's beak and t o
command l a u d a t o r y a r t i c l e s i n t h e American press. In a
28 October broadcast a t t h e beight of t h e crisis w i t h
T h a i l a n d , Sihanouk charged t h a t t h e American p r e s s had
"unceasingly worked a g a i n s t o u r n e u t r a l i t y and a g a i n s t
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my own person," s i n g l i n g o u t once a g a i n Time, Mewsweek
and The New York Times. H i s g r i e v a n c e o x i s o c c a s i o n
is aiiInnteE€TEg-6iGE
The American p r e s s is also respons i b l e for t h e legend of a prince w i t h a
changeable, incons i s t e n t and u n s t a b l e
c h a r a c t e r and of unforeseeable and ine x p l i c a b l e d e c i s i o n s . In f a c t , it has
never p a i d t h e least c o n s i d e r a t i o n to
t h e p e r s i s t e n c y w i t h which I have pursued t h e aims e n t r u s t e d t o me by my
n a t ion
I t is p o s s i b l e t o f e e l some sympathy for t h i s s t a t e ment: i n 1961 as b e f o r e , his g r e a t g o a l was t o m a i n t a i n
h i s c o u n t r y Os independence and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y .
B u t t h e means by which Sihanouk sought to m a i n t a i n the
s t a t u s quo were changing. As t i m e went on, h e had r e l i e d
i n c r e a s i n g l y on Chinese p r o t e c t i o n , and less on a p o l i c y
of t r u e n e u t r a l i t y . Following t h e break with T h a i l a n d ,
Sihanouk embarked on a p e r i o d i n which he f e l t a need to
c u r r y favor with P e i p i n g i n r e t u r n f o r t h e m i l i t a r y prot e c t i o n which he hoped China would afford.
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V.
GATHER1NG MOMENTUM
A.
. .
,..
,
N e w t r a l i t y f o r Vietnam
Sihanouk's p r o t e s t t h a t h e was n o t an e r r a t i c
p r i n c e , and t h a t he l e d h i s c o u n t r y along an e s s e n t i a l l y
c o n s i s t e n t c o u r s e , had a c e r t a i n merit. That h e ' w a s
s t i l l c a p a b l e of coming down hard on domestic Communism
w a s demonstrated e a r l y i n 1962 i n a widely-publicized
i n s t a n c e of Communist s u b v e r s i o n . On 10 J a n u a r y , Cambodian
p o l i c e a r r e s t e d Non Suon, e d i t o r of a Communist newspaper,
and 13 o t h e r Pracheachon members, complete w i t h a q u a n t i t y
of i n c r i m i n a t i n g documents. Those a r r e s t e d were tried b y
a s p e c i a l m i l i t a r y c o u r t , found g u i l t y , and s e n t e n c e d t o
d e a t h . Sihanouk later commuted t h e s e n t e n c e s t o p r i s o n
terms on t h e recommendation of a review board.
("Last night
The i n c i d e n t l e f t Sihauouk d i s t u r b e d .
1 was u n a b l e t o s l e e p . " )
I n a speech b e f o r e t h e N a t i o n a l
Assembly h e read from t h e documents, many of w h i c h were
information-collection d i r e c t i v e s , targeting t h e r e c i p i e n t
a g a i n s t t h e army, the p e a s a n t r y , or some other segment of
on a s u b j e c t which was occupying an i n c r e a s i n g amount of
h i s attention:
t h e maintenance of n a t i o n a l u n i t y i n t h e
f a c e of t h e i n e v i t a b l e Communist triumph:
I f w e p r a c t i c e Communism, w e w i l l a c h i e v e
major p r o g r e s s i n t h e p r o d u c t i o n of r i c e , maize,
s t e e 1 , ' a n d s o f o r t h . But . . .w i l l w e f i n d i n o u r
pagodas t h e same atmosphere as w e have now?.
If o u r people d e c i d e t o p r a c t i c e Communism,
I w i l l not object t o it
B u t , I beg o u r d e a r
c o m p a t r i o t s t o r e c a l l t h a t as o u r c o u n t r y is very
s m a l l , t o succeed i n any t a s k a l l of us must f o l l o w
t h e same p a t h and must n o t be d i v i d e d i n t o groups . . . .
If we f o l l o w t w o d i f f e r e n t p a t h s w e w i l l d i e .
That i s why I have o f t e n t o l d t h e Khmer Communists
t h a t t h e y should t e m p o r a r i l y abandon t h e Communist
p a t h f o r t h e n a t i o n a l i s t p a t h f i i n c g / when Communism
triumphs i n A s i a they w i l l b e Tree f o p r a c t i c e
Communismwithout having t o c a r r y o u t any r e v o l u t i o n .
-86!
Sihanouk went on t o say t h a t h e was p r e p a r e d t o
release t h e 14 c u l p r i t s if t h e y promised t o g i v e up t h e i r
s u b v e r s i v e a c t i v i t i e s and r a l l y t o t h e Sangkum. The
i n c i d e n t d i d n o t a f f e c t h i s favorable a t t i t u d e towards
Communist China; a n a l y s i s of t h e c a p t u r e d documents conf i r m e d Sihanouk's s u s p i c i o n t h a t t h e y had been t r a n s l a t e d
i n t o Cambodian from Vletnamese. I n his s p e e c h e s i n e a r l y
11962, Sihanouk lumped t h e V i e t Minh w i t h returned-fromP a r i s s t u d e n t s a s t h e major l e f t i s t t h r e a t s t o n a t i o n a l
stability.
The a f f a i r of t h e 14 Communists d i s t r a c t e d Sihanouk
from i n t e r n a t i o n a l matters o n l y b r i e f l y . At v a r i o u s t i m e s
i n e a r l y 1962 h e elaborated upon a p e t scheme, t h e n e u t r a l i z a t i o n of South Vietnam b y means of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f e r e n c e s u c h a s had been h e l d on Laos. A c t u a l l y , Sihanouk
could be s a i d t o be on a b u f f e r - s t a t e binge. I n a speech
a t t h e Geneva conference on Laos, he had advocated a n e u t r a l
zone s t r e t c h i n g from Vietnam t o I n d i a . I n September 1961,
a t t h e UN, h e had urged t h a t a l l d i v i d e d c o u n t r i e s become
n e u t r a l b u f f e r s -- an e x t e n s i o n of h i s program f o r German
r e u n i f i c a t i o n s e t f o r t h at ,Belgrade.
-
I n c o n t r a s t t o Laos, w h e r e t h e three main f a c t i o n s
p e r i o d i c a l l y took t o t h e c o n f e r e n c e t a b l e , South Vietnam
was a t l e a s t nominally u n i f i e d behind D i e m , who w a s n o t
i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e n e u t r a l i z a t i o n of h i s c o u n t r y . Sihanouk
r e g a r d e d D i e m a s t h e major o b s t a c l e t o h i s p l a n , and q u i t e
h a p p i l y provided asylum t o one of t w o South Vietnamese
p i l o t s who bombed D i e m ' s p a l a c e i n t h e c o u r s e of a n a b o r t i v e
coup. (Sihanouk expressed s u r p r i s e a t t h e bombing. "Before
dropping bombs," h e p h i l o s o p h i z e d over t h e n a t i o n a l r a d i o ,
"it s h o u l d be determined whether M r . D i e m is a t home. I f
h e is o u t i t would be u s e l e s s t o d r o p bombs on h i s house.")
!
I n l a t e February, P e i p i n g set f o r t h a p r o p o s a l f o r
an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference t o "resolve" t h e f i g h t i n g i n
South Vietnam. On 1 March, Sihanouk gave i t h i s b l e s s i n g .
According t o Sihanouk, t h e l a t e s t Geneva c o n f e r e n c e had
demonstrated i n t h e case of Laos t h a t such m e e t i n g s , even
i f t h e y do n o t a c h i e v e a l l o b j e c t i v e s , e x e r t a r e s t r a i n i n g
effect i n preventing certain s i t u a t i o n s " f r o m generating
i n t o a n irredeemable c a t a s t r o p h e . "
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On t h e s u r f a c e , Sihanouk's u r g i n g of a c o n f e r e n c e
which had v i r t u a l l y no chance of b e i n g h e l d appeared
p u z z l i n g . Moreover, Sihanouk himself appeared uneasy
a b o u t t h e p r o s p e c t of a r e u n i f i e d V i e t n a m , and p r o p e r l y
s k e p t i c a l of DRV s t a t e m e n t s t h a t t h e North would be
s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e replacement of D i e m and a withdrawal
of U.S. f o r c e s from Vietnam. To t h e U.S. ambassador,
Sihanouk observed t h a t w h i l e American i n t e r v e n t i o n i n
Vietnam was merely d e l a y i n g t h e i n e v i t a b l e , h e himself
was a p p r e h e n s i v e of "Vietminh hordes" moving i n t o South
Vietnam, and t h a t h i s good r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e Chinese
d i d n o t extend t o h i s wanting a common f r o n t i e r w i t h
them. N e v e r t h e l e s s , on 15 March t h e Cambodian radio
a g a i n endorsed t h e Chinese proposal:
A s a m e m b e r of t h e Geneva c o n f e r e n c e , China
h a s t h e r i g h t t o propose t h e convening of t h i s
i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f e r e n c e . It i s a l s o a s a m e m b e r
of t h e Geneva conference t h a t t h e Cambodian Chief
of S t a t e seconds t h e Chinese p r o p o s a l . I n f a c t ,
t h e i n c r e a s i n g t h r e a t of t h e SVN s i t u a t i o n f o r c e s
people . . .t o reopen a Geneva Conference on t h e
Indochina i s s u e i n o r d e r to take measures f o r
d e f e n d i n g world peace.
The Sino-Khmer p r o p o s a l p r e d i c t a b l y foundered when
D i e m would have no p a r t of i t . The most r e v e a l i n g a s p e c t
of t h e a f f a i r was e v i d e n c e of c l o s e c o o r d i n a t i o n between
itxinrr: and Phnom Penh concerning t h e c o n f e r e n c e p r o p o s a l .
IChou En-lai
1
er statebman Penn
I
Nouth t h a t Sihanouk once a g a i n g i v e p u b l i c endorsement t o
It
t h e Chinese p r o p o s a l f o r a c o n f e r e n c e on V i e t n a m .
a p p e a r s l i k e l y t h a t t h e i n i t i a t i v e on the c o n f e r e n c e prop o s a l had been Pe-iping's from i t s i n c e p t i o n -- and t h a t
Sihanouk had a l l b u t jumped through hoops on b e h a l f of
h i s f r i e n d Chou E n - l a i .
T h e i n c i d e n t w a s an ominous p r e c e d e n t i n terms of
Cambodia's b e i n g used as a sounding board f o r Communist
China. I n one r e s p e c t , however, Sihanouk e l a b o r a t e d on
P e i p i n g ' s p r o p o s a l : Sihanouk i n d i c a t e d din c o n v e r s a t i o n
t h a t h e f e l t t h a t any c o n f e r e n c e s h o u l d deal w i t h a l l of
Vietnam and n o t j u s t t h e " s t r u g g l e " i n t h e S o u t h .
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’
. Sihanouk appears to have realized that the conference proposal would get nowhere. I
/he indicated in July tiat ne
saw little I I K eiinooa OL a conference so long as Diem was
alive. He conceded that anti-Diem nationalists were also
critical of any solution involving the neutralization of
Vietnam. Sihanouk reportedly hoped to see a coup against
Diem by army elements, whom he felt could be prevailed
upon to see the virtues of neutralization.
The Sihanouk who was so responsive to Chou En-lai’s
foreign policy proposals understandably felt the heed to
condition his people to the inevitability of a Communist
triumph. He sought to delay the inevitable, and to avoid
if possible the political fragmentation of his country in
the face of the Communist threat.
When the right time to become Communist comes,
we will not need to communize ourselves as the
Communists -will immediately come to transform us.
There is no need for certain gentlemen like Mr. Non
Suon and others to practice Red doctrine as when
the right time comes we will immediately have a
Communist regime . . . .
I’have sent my own children to study in
Communist countries because I know very well that
the Khmers will not be able to avoid becoming a
satellite of the Communists .... If w e have not yet
become Xed, it is because the Reds do not want us
to become Red but only want us to practice
neutrality at first. Look at Laos and you will
understand.
Sihanouk ruminated at length concerning his professed desire to step down. In justifying his continuance
in office he cited the absence of qualified successors in
terms doubtless intended to reach Yeiping:
Some have said that /%hanour/
is fond of
power and, therefore, does not wa5t to resign. I
am not happy at all at having power. Dear comrades,
I have been in power since I waq 18 and now I am 41.
I must realize that this is enough for me; otherwise,
I would be a bad fellow. . . .What obliges me to stay
and work is my four or five million people and my
country. I f I abandon my country, it will immediately
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become a n o t h e r Congo and n o t a c o u n t r y l i k e t h a t
of Mr. Mao Tse-tung
T h e r e f o r e , I must s t a y i n
power u n t i l t h e Khmers c a n f i n d a Mao Tse-tung
and n o t a Vansak, Sam Sary or Son Ngoc Thanh.
None of t h e l a t t e r three can s u b s t i t u t e f o r a
Mao Tse-tung.
If i t w e r e Mao Tse-tung, I would
n o t object and would r e a d i l y q u i t power.
For t h e f i r s t t i m e , Sihanouk went i n t o s p e c i f i c s
concerning how he thought Communism would come t o Cambodia.
The p i c t u r e h e p a i n t e d w a s n o t a r o s y one.
I t w i l l perhaps b e i m p o s s i b l e f o r us t o become
a d i r e c t s a t e l l i t e of R u s s i a or China a s w e s h a l l
a t f i r s t become a s a t e l l i t e of t h e Vietrninh . . . .I t
is d i f f i c u l t f o r China or R u s s i a t o c o l o n i z e u s . . . .
b u t t h e Vietnamese are beside u s and Vietnam is
very populous. If w e took t h e Vietnamese a s
masters f o r Communist i n d o c t r i n a t i o n , they would
come i n l a r g e numbers t o our country. . .Thensome
t i m e l a t e r o u r c o u n t r y would resemble Cochinchina
where there are o n l y some 600,000 Khmers a g a i n s t
11 m i l l i o n Vietnamese.
.
i
B.
!
" S a r i t 1s a Pig"
Although Cambodia was a member of t h e Afro-Asian
b l o c a t t h e UP?, Sihanouk's preoccupation w i t h h i s own
area caused Cambodia o f t e n t o be a r a t h e r p a s s i v e m e m b e r .
By any s t a n d a r d , Sihanouk w a s "soft" on c o l o n i a l i s m ;
a l t h o u g h h e went along w i t h t h e Afro-Asians on m o s t i s s u e s
before t h e UN, and was prone t o n e e d l e t h e French conc e r n i n g A l g e r i a , h i s penchant f o r long v a c a t i o n s i n France
made him s u s p e c t t o his p e e r s . And w h i l e Sihanouk d i d n o t
s a y s o , he was s u s p e c t e d of r e g a r d i n g t h e centusy-long
French p r o t e c t o r a t e i n Cambodia a s having saved t h e country
from p r e d a t o r y Afro-Asians i n t h e area.'
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Sihanouk's disinterest in anti-colonia is$, . a n t i base campaigns had been demonstrated at the Belgrade
conference, It was also reflected in his relations with
Indonesia, Although he and Sukarno had exchanged visits,
not until late 1962 were Khmer-Indonesian relations
marked by any degree of cordiality. 'dn the course of a
week-long visit in December, Sihanouk recehed the red
carpet treatment that he loved. He expressed proper
admiration for Indonesia's long struggle against colonialism, and applauded the peaceful resolution of the
West New Guinea issue. He refused to join Sukarno in
a declaration opposing Malaysia, however, and Sukarno
reportedly was miffed when his guest flew directly to
Singapore from Ojakarta at the end of his tour.
In the acrimony which surrounded Cambodia's
relations with Thailand and South Vietnam, it was d i f f i cult to tell which country Sihanouk regarded with the
greater dislike. Between the two of them, according to
Sihanouk, Cambodia's border was violated 91 times during
1962. In a bygone day, Sihanouk had been disposed to
take a more-in-sorrow-than-in-anger approach concerning
the Thais, whose common Buddhist heritage with the Khmers
he was q u i c k to acknowledge. In purely political terms,
he appears to have regarded the Vietnamese as posing the
greater threat. The Prince, however, was not controlled
by political factors alone.
Cambodia would eventually sever relations with
South Vietnam as well as Thailand.
The priority accorded
the Thais was essentially a matter of personalities. In
conversation with a Western observer in May 1962, Sihanouk
characterized Sarit's deprecating remarks concerning himself as a reflection of the Thais' "patronizing attitude"
towards Cambodia. In his barnstorming trips, Sihanouk
appealed to his subjects' pride with reminders that the
Thais had used Cambodian slave labor to dig the canals at
Bangkok.
I
There was less need to generate popular awareness
concerning the Vietnamese. Most Cambodians wanted no part
of the civil war to the east, and found their own Vietnamese
minority to be dangerously aggressive in business and
commerce. As for Sihanouk, he claimed that he had no
i.e., the Diem
desire to become embroiled with a regime
which was on the verge of collapse. To
Government
a Western observer he mentioned another reason: that while
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1
h e was a t t a c k e d i n t h e Saigon p r e s s , P r e s i d e n t D i e m had
p e r s o n a l l y observed the d i p l o m a t i c p r o p r i e t i e s i n d e a l i n g
w i t h him, To Sihanouk, t h i s c a r r i e d g r e a t weight. He
conceded, however, t h a t t h e r e was an economic r e a s o n f o r
c a u t i o n i n his d e a l i n g s w i t h t h e D i e m government. Cambodia
w a s s t i l l dependent on t h e p o r t of Saigon, and a new
blockade of t h e lekong would d e p r i v e Cambodia of t h e bulk
of i t s o i l s u p p l y .
I f r e l a t i o n s w i t h South Vietnam w e r e m a i n t a i n e d
through a c e r t a i n observance of t h e a m e n i t i e s , t h e
o p p o s i t e was t r u e w i t h r e s p e c t t o Thailand. I t c o u l d
be p r e d i c t e d that Sihanouk would f i n d l i t t l e i n common
with I
Sarit.
I n June 1962, t h e
World Court upheld t h e uamDo]dian c l a i m t o Preah V i h e a r
temple. The d e c i s i o n enraged t h e T h a i s , and prompted
S a r i t t o i n i t i a t e a s q u a l i d exchange of i n s u l t s w i t h
Sihanouk, a form of d u e l at which Sihanouk acknowledged
n o p e e r . I n one radio broadcast Sihanouk d i s c u s s e d
Thai-Khmer r e l a t i o n s :
The Vietnamese have s a i d t h a t I a m a
Communist l a c k e y . I a m n o t angry w i t h them.
They are f r e e t o i n s u l t m e . They do s o
because t h e y are j e a l o u s of m e . The T h a i are
also j e a l o u s of m e .
S a r i t T h a n a r a t called m e
a p i g and boasted t h a t h e is a l i o n and t h a t
P l i o n d o e s n o t need t o speak t o a p i g ,
As I
have t o l d t h e c h i l d r e n i n Svay Chek, I t o o k a
mirror and looked i n t o i t t o see whether I
resemble a p i g . I know S a r i t . A c t u a l l y h e is
a p i g because h e is f a t t e r t h a n I . If p e o p l e
kill me t o make Chinese soup t h e soup would n o t
be d e l i c i o u s , b u t i f p e o p l e k i l l t h i s p i g S a r i t
t o make Chinese soup, t h e SOUP would be d e l i c i o u s
because t h i s pork c o n t a i n e d t h r e e l a y e r s of g r e a s e .
A few days l a t e r , Sihanouk a g a i n took to t h e e a r t h y
metaphor t o r e f u t e Vietnamese c h a r g e s of border v i o l a t i o n s
by t h e Cambodians.
S i n c e w e were s o busy, how c o u l d w e s p a r e
go and mistreat Vietnamese c i t i z e n s , t o
look f o r Vietnamese g i r l s , o r disembowel V i e t namese women? S i n c e Khmer girls a r e numberless,
why s h o u l d Khmers n o t c o u r t them? Our Khmer
g i r l s and my own g i r l s are n i c e . T h e r e f o r e , i t
t i m e to
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i s n o t n e c e s s a r y t o t a k e p a i n s t o look f o r
Vietnamese g i r l s , who have narrow h i p s and
no beauty. Though f a m i l i a r w i t h Vietnamese
g i r l s , I do n o t have a t a s t e f o r them. Were
I t o be p a i d f o r t a k i n g Vietnamese g i r l s , I
would r e f u s e .
C.
Sihanouk Seeks New Guarantees
I n J u l y 1962, t h e endemic c h a r g e s of b o r d e r viol a t i o n s between Cambodia and i t s n e i g h b o r s assumed a m o r e
s e r i o u s character. Although t h e Cambodians were a l s o
g u i l t y of c a t t l e r u s t l i n g e x p e d i t i o n s i n t o T h a i l a n d and
Cambodia, t h e number of border v i o l a t i o n s by Vietnamese
t r o o p s a p p e a r s t o have i n c r e a s e d i n mid-year.
When Thai
t r o o p s "on maneuvers" c r o s s e d i n t o Cambodia i n J u l y ,
Sihanouk appeared b o t h a p p r e h e n s i v e o v e r h i s n e i g h b o r s '
i n t e n t i o n s and concerned a t t h e i n a b i l i t y of h i s armed
forces a d e q u a t e l y t o p o l i c e t h e border areas.
P e i p i n g seized upon c e r t a i n of t h e more p u b l i cized border v i o l a t i o n s t o a s s u r e Cambodia of i t s s u p p o r t ,
a l t h o u g h t h e r e w e r e no promises of m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n .
Moscow w a s much less r e s p o n s i v e t o e v e n t s i n Cambodia;
o n l y r a r e l y d i d t h e S o v i e t s a l l u d e t o t h e broder f o r a y s ,
and i n c o n t r a s t t o t h e Chinese, t h e y had n e v e r endorsed
Sihanouk's c a l l for a c o n f e r e n c e t o " n e u t r a l i z e r t Vietnam.
I n l a t e J u l y , however, an a r t i c l e by Observer i n Pravda
characterized t h e "provocations" by Thailand and
Vietnam a s having assumed a p a r t i c u l a r l y s e r i o u s c h a r a c t e r ,
and warned " t h o s e who l i k e t o p l a y w i t h f i r e " t h a t Cambodia
had l o y a l f r i e n d s "who would n o t leave i t i n t h e lurch."
The U . S . Embassy i n Moscow e v a l u a t e d t h e a r t i c l e a s
a n a t t e m p t by t h e S o v i e t s t o m a i n t a i n i n f l u e n c e i n Southe a s t A s i a vis-a-vis P e i p i n g . A s f a r a s Sihanouk w a s conc e r n e d , however, t h e S o v i e t s were h a r d l y i n t h e r u n n i n g .
. Ithe,two-month v i s i t of
ex-Premier Penn Nouth t o L'nina (April-June 1962) w a s
designed t o determine how f a r P e i p i n g was p r e p a r e d t o go
i n s u p p o r t of Sihanouk's f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s . The
f i r s t of t h e s e o b j e c t i v e s was t o b r i n g about a new
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I
convening of t h e 1954 % n a t i o n Geneva Conference f o r t h e
purpose of r a t i f y i n g Cambodia's n e u t r a l s t a t u s and of
guaranteeing its t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y .
.
Sihanouk made h i s p i t c h a t a p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e on
14 August. Speaking i n Kompong p r o v i n c e , he c a l l e d for
i n t e r v e n t i o n by t h e g r e a t powers " t o end t h i s g r o s s
comedy p l a y e d by t h e Bangkok and Saigon governments."
The p r o p o s a l p u t t h e U.S. s q u a r e l y on t h e s p o t . The
T h a i s , already concerned over i n d i c a t i o n s of Communist
s u b v e r s i o n i n n o r t h e a s t e r n T h a i l a n d , were c r i t i c a l of any
move by t h e U.S. t o c o n c i l i a t e Sihanouk. On 23 August,
T h a i l a n d ' s a c t i n g f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r e x p r e s s e d t h e hope
t h a t h i s c o u n t r y v s a l l i e s would n o t be " t r i c k e d " i n t o
any arrangement which tended t o c r e d i t Sihanouk's c h a r g e s
of a g g r e s s i o n by his SEATO n e i g h b o r s . The U.S. Embassy
i n Saigon urged t h a t t h e U.S. n o t n e g o t i a t e any agreement
based on Sihanouk's p r o p o s a l , n o t i n g t h a t t o t h e V i e t namese t h e U.S. would appear t o be s i d i n g w i t h a c o u n t r y
f u l l y prepared t o c o l l a b o r a t e w i t h t h e Bloc and a g a i n s t
o n e engaged i n a b i t t e r s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t Communist i n surgency.
The United S t a t e s sought t o g a i n t i m e , and s e v e r a l
months were s p e n t i n s e c u r i n g " c l a r i f i c a t i o n " of Sihanouk's
p r o p o s a l . The t h r u s t of h i s p l a n changed s u f f i c i e n t l y
from week t o week t h a t a good d e a l of c l a r i f i c a t i o n was
r e q u i r e d . I n i t i a l l y , Sihanouk appeared t o have hoped t h a t
t h e t e r r i t o r i a l g u a r a n t e e p r o v i s i o n might embody i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e c o g n i t i o n of Cambodia's s o v e r e i g n t y of s e v e r a l
d i s p u t e d p r o v i n c e s h e l d by t h e Vietnamese. Moreover,
Sihanouk viewed t h e most r e c e n t c o u f e r e n c e on Laos as
h i s model, and f o r a t i m e contemplated t h e w i t h d r a w a l of
a l l Western m i l i t a r y m i s s i o n s , i n c l u d i n g MAAG, and even
t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of Western m i l i t a r y a i d . I n a speech on
22 August h e s t a t e d ,
Our n e u t r a l i t y i s n o t a f a l s e n e u t r a l i t y b u t i s
a p u r e n e u t r a l i t y . I t must be r e s p e c t e d . A l l
c o u n t r i e s must declare t h a t t h e y w i l l r e s p e c t our
nebtrality
They must a l s o r e g p e c t o u r f r o n t i e r .
N e u t r a l i t y does n o t have a form b u t t e r r i t o r y h a s
a form. I% t h e y r e s p e c t our n e u t r a l i t y w i t h o u t
r e s p e c t i n g o u r t e r r i t o r y t h e r e will be v i o l a t i o n s
of our t e r r i t o r y by p l a n e s and armored cars....
....
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I
L e t u s now w a i t and see. If we do n o t
have t h e Free World's a s s u r a n c e t h a % w e w i l l be
r e s p e c t e d , t h e n w e cannot remain n e u t r a l . W
e
must a c t e x a c t l y as accused by t h e Siamese and
Vietnamese, and must be a l l i e d w i t h t h e Communists.
I f w e do n o t a l l y w i t h t h e Communists, w e w i l l
n o t have s e c u r i t y .
I n August, Sihanouk began a correspondence w i t h t h e
13 o t h e r Geneva s i g n a t o r i e s , aimed a t s e c u r i n g t h e i r s u p p o r t
f o r a c o n f e r e n c e such as h e had mentioned. P e i p i n g came
t h r o u g h w i t h 8 f i r m s t a t e m e n t of s u p p o r t , p r o b a b l y i n
accordance w i t h a commitment made t o Benn Mouth. H a n o i ,
which had no common b o r d e r w i t h Cambodia, gave i t s blessi n g t o Sihanouk's p r o p o s a l . Of the Communist s i g n a t o r i e s ,
o n l y t h e USSR q u a l i f i e d its a p p r o v a l ; t h e S o v i e t s m e r e l y
endorsed Sihanouk's p l a n " i n p r i n c i p l e . " F r a n c e i s s u e d
a s t a t e m e n t of s u p p o r t , b u t warned t h a t t h e t e r r i t o r i a l
embodying Sihanouk's claims a g a i n s t South
clauses
might c a u s e d i f f i c u l t i e s . Sihanouk, w i t h a
Vietnam
d i s p l a y of f l e x i b i l i t y , a g r e e d t o d r o p t h e t e r r i t o r i a l
c l a u s e s and t o s e t t l e f o r an agreement "similar in scope"
t o t h a t concluded for Laos.
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By December, r e t u r n s were i n from most of t h e
n a t i o n s p o l l e d . T h a i l a n d and South Vietnam were adamantly
opposed, and i f one of Sihanouk's aims was t h e d i s r u p t i o n
of SEATO h e w a s a t l e a s t p a r t i a l l y s u c c e s s f u l . The U.S.,
t h e U.K. and I n d i a equivocated. Sihanouk r i d i c u l e d t h e
West f o r i t s h e s i t a t i o n , b u t was e n j o y i n g t h e l i m e l i g h t
and appeared i n no h u r r y t o embrace t h e b l o c , I n a speech
on 31 December he s t a t e d ,
N e g o t i a t i o n s t o o b t a i n an i n t e r n a t i o n a l
agreement on our c o u n t r y w i l l be l o n g , even very
long. N e g o t i a t i o n s by correspondence r a t h e r t h a n
assembled c o n f e r e n c e c a n o n l y make t h i n g s d r a g
o u t . Our c a s e i s , however, much s i m p l e r t h a n
t h a t of Laos. I t could be solved i n one second
i f t h o s e who p r e t e n d t o r e s p e c t o u r s o v e r e i g n t y ,
our n e u t r a l i t y , our t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and
o u r i n t e r n a l peace were sincere....They s h o u l d a t
l e a s t make some e f f o r t t o p r e v e n t o u r two n e i g h b o r s
from committing o t h e r o f f e n s e s a g a i n s t o u r c o u n t r y .
I f t h e y succeed i n s t a b i l i z i n g t h e p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n
and p r e s e r v i n g peace w i t h t h e s e n e i g h b o r s , w i t h
r e s p e c t f o r o u r f r o n t i e r s , w e can p a t i e n t l y await t h e
day, d o u b t l e s s f a r o f f , of t h e s i g n a t u r e of the agreement on our c o u n t r y .
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Although Sihanouk p a i d l i p s e r v i c e t o this longterm view, h e a p p e a r s t o have been b i t t e r towards t h e
West, p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e U.S. I n c o n v e r s a t i o n 71
i n December, h e s t a t e d t h a t however
Is y m
. .p.a t n e t i c one might
f e e l towards t h e Americans, one
was bound t o d i s t r u s t them. He added t h a t h e f e l t
more drawn t o China t h a n t o t h e U.S. and t h a t t h i s had
n o t been t h e case b e f o r e .
.
Sihanouk had a change of h e a r t concerning U.S.
a i d , and made no move t o t e r m i n a t e e i t h e r BdAAG o r t h e
U.S. aid program. I n one b r o a d c a s t h e conceded t h a t f o r
Cambodia t o have t o s u p p o r t its own armed f o r c e s would
slow n a t i o n a l development; i n a second he p o i n t e d o u t
t h a t s h o u l d he t e r m i n a t e U . S . a s s i s t a n c e t h e r e w a s no
a s s u r a n c e t h a t t h e Bloc would make up any d i f f e r e n c e .
He s h e l v e d f o r t h e t i m e b e i n g h i s e a r l i e r argument t h a t
a c o n t i n u a t i o n of m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e was i n c o m p a t i b l e
w i t h a Laos-like n e u t r a l i t y . *
L a r g e l y overlooked i n ' t h e d i s c u s s i o n of t h e
mechanics of Sihanouk's p r o p o s a l was i t s long-term e f f e c t
on h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e U.S. Since 1955, U.S. m i l i t a r y
a i d , t o g e t h e r with French a s s i s t a n c e i n t r a i n i n g , had
been Cambodia's bulwark a g a l n s t i n t e r n a l s u b v e r s i o n and
* P o s s i b l y i n r e s p o n s e t o Sihanouk's doubts concerning
b l o c a i d , Chinese Vice Premier Chen Y i informed t h e
Cambodian ambassador in October t h a t an o f f e r of Chinese
arms
made two y e a r s e a r l i e r
w a s s t i l l open. Accordi n g t o t h e ambassador, Chen o f f e r e d t o p r o v i d e "modern
c o n v e n t i o n a l weapons o b t a i n e d from t h e USSR." As Sihanouk
had l o n g complained t h a t t h e U.S. provided o n l y o l d weapons,
t h e o f f e r w a s doubtless appreciated.
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!
foreign attack.
Although most of Sihanouk's verbiage
was directed against his SEAT0 neighbors, he had demonstrated concern over Communist incursions, particularly
by the Viet Minh. Bloc acceptance of his neutrality
plan, in Sihanouk's scheme of things, involved an
automatic downgrading of U.S, assistance. Ne felt
less need of the U.S. which, in any case, had been
of little assistance in curbing border violations by
its allies. And should bloc endorsement of Cambodia's
neutrality and territorial integrity not have a deterrent
effect on Thailand and South Vietnam, there would still
be time to take up Chen Yi on his offer of arms.
To the extent that the West retained a foothold
in Cambodia, the influence was that of France rather than
the U.S. Sihanouk's liking for France was ips instinctive
and natural as h i s dislike of the United States. He
required a friend in the West if Cambodia was to talk
convincingly of "pure neutrality", and in De Gaulle he
had a Western statesman who was as anxious to cultivate
Sihanouk as Sihanouk was to retain the friendship of
France. In his speeches, Sihanoub cited France with
those bloc powers which had demonstrated statesmanship
in supporting the neutrality and territorial integrity
of Cambodia.
D.
Cambodia and India
When ex-Premier Penn Nouth had gone to Peiping in
April, the trip ostensibly was for treatment of a nervous
condition. As he had returned from therapy in France
only weeks before, Nouth's trip took on obvious political
overtones. Like Sihanouk, his advisor traveled extensively
in China, w a s lavishly feted, and met repeatedly with
Chou En-lai.
.
.
One reason for Nouth's trip appears to have been
to obtain Chinese support for Sihanouk's neutralization
guarantee. A second objective, aocording to a senior
Cambodian official, was to urge the Chinese to intervene
on Cambodia's behalf with the North Vietnamese, and to
obtain'assurances that the Viet Cong would respect
CambodiaOs border. In all likelihood Nouth broached
both of these subjects; according to Defense Minister
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Lon Nol, h e a l s o worked o u t t h e d e t a i l s of a secret
t r e a t y w i t h China, whereby China would p r o v i d e both
materiel and t r o o p a s s i s t a n c e i n t h e e v e n t Cambodia
was invaded by T h a i l a n d 6r South Vietnam.
I n November 1961, a month f o l l o w i n g h i s b r e a k
w i t h T h a i l a n d , Sihanouk had confessed t h a t g h e had no
a s s u r a n c e of Chinese t r o o p s u p p o r t had t h e T h a i s
r e s o r t e d t o m i l i t a r y a c t i o n . If t h i s admission is
a c c e p t e d a t f a c e v a l u e , h i s desire f o r some commitment
from China is understandable.* Whether or n o t a m i l i t a r y
agreement w a s a c t u a l l y s i g n e d i n P e i p i n g , t h e p e r i o d of
Penn NoutB's v i s i t i n a u g u r a t e d a p e r i o d of even g r e a t e r
c o r d i a l i t y between Phnom Penh and P e i p i n g . Sihanouk
s e n t a s p e c i a l message to t h e UN i n October, u r g i n g the
s e a t i n g of Communist China and c h a r a c t e r i z i n g P e i p i n g
as having " c o n t r i b u t e d g r e a t l y t o t h e s a f e g u a r d i n g of
p e a c e i n Asia and t h e freedom of small n a t i o n s who are
t h e v i c t i m s of i m p e r i a l i s m and i t s i d e o l o g y of h a t r e d . "
I n t h e p a s t , Sihanouk had conceded t h a t t h e s t a t u s of
Taiwan posed a s p e c i a l problem i n A s i a , and had spoken
of some form o f p l e b e s c i t e t o d e t e r m i n e i t s s t a t u s
vis-a-vis t h e Mainland. Now h e denounced t h e two-Chinas
concept as "absurd," o b s e r v i n g t h a t " t h e i s l a n d of
Taiwan i s c e r t a i n l y C h i n e s e a n d must be a d m i n i s t e r e d by
t h e o n l y l e g a l government of China, t h e CPR."
With t h e o u t b r e a k of f i g h t i n g a l o n g t h e Sino-Indian
f r o n t i e r , Sihanouk f a c e d t h e unhappy c h o i c e between t h e
claims of t w o f r i e n d l y powers. Although h i s e r s o n a l
a d m i r a t i o n f o r Nehru had l o n g s i n c e c o o l e d ,
r e p o r t s s u g g e s t t h a t Sihanouk i n i t i a l l y r e g a r e
as c u l p a b l e , and was uneasy over i t s seeming encroachment
CZEJ
Ireports of a
d w i t h a n upsurge
i n i n c i d e n t s a l o n g t h e Cambodian b o r d e r , or w i t h v i s i t s t o
P e i p i n g by Cambodian V I P s . I n t h e o p i n i o n of t h e writer,
however, t h e t r e n d i n Cambodiaes f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s subs e q u e n t to Nouth's v i s i t l e n d s c r e d e n c e t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y
t h a t some form of u n d e r s t a n d i n g . w a s reached. The p r o v i s i o n
f o r s e c r e c y would appear t o p l a y i n t o t h e hands of t h e
Chinese, by e n a b l i n g them t o avoid involvement i n any of
Sihanouk's more bizarre a d v e n t u r e s .
C
l ambodian " t rde a t y
e
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on a neutral neighbor. Although Peiping radio was able
to quote expressions of support from leftist Cambodian
newspapers, not until 30 October did Sihanouk's organ,
The Nationalist, put in a good word for Peiping. On
that date the paper welcomed China's proposals
centering on a joint withdrawal of Chinese and Indian
for a peaceful settlement of t h e dispute.
forces
India's refusal to accept them, the paper editorialized,
would be of concern to the people of the world.
--
--
-.
According to
- I
it was in early
November that Chou dn-lal Pnvltea s ihanouk to serve as
a mediator between China and India, and to v i s i t China
prior to his scheduled trip to India in January 1963.
Sihanouk reportedly observed privately that he did not
desire the role of peacemaker, adding that the Chinese
were clearly in the wrong and that he had said as much
in a letter to Chou. Gradually, however, his position
began to shift. In late November, Sihanouk agreed to
attend the Colombo conference of nonaligned nations called
to discuss the Sino-Indian situation.
'
For two weeks prior to the Colombo conference,
Sihanouk was Sukarno's guest on a state visit -to Indonesia.
He appeared to entertain mixed feelings concerning his host.
On one hand,.Sukarno was careful to give Sihan0uk.a grand
welcome, and in conference the two found themselves in
agreement on key world issues. On the other hand, Sihanouk
was reportedly suspicious of Sukarno's designs on Malaysia,
and of his alleged aspirations concerning leadership of
the Afro-Asian bloc. Sihanouk was generous in his praise
of Indonesia's struggle against colonialism, but from
Djakarta he flew directly to Singapore en route to Colombo
a move which was interpreted by the Indonesians as
indicating less than total sympathy with Sukarndls Malaykia
policy.
--
Sihanouk indicated both before and during the conference (10-14 December 1962) that he was pessimistic concerning its prospects for assisting in 8 settlement of the
Sino-Indian fighting. Only six nations were represented
Ceylon, Indonesia, Cambodia, Ghana, h r m a and the UAR.
The conferees..shared a reluctance to discuss the merits
of the border dispute, and discussion centered on the form
which should be used for an appeal to the disputants.
The Ghanaian delegation initially favored a positive
approach, in which the conferees would call for a neutral
--
I
-99-
I
I
I
-.
"'
zone, to be policed by both sides until a boundary
could be agreed upon. Sihanouk, however, argued that
the conference's role seemed limited to an appeal for
negotiations, or for a Sino-Indian agreement to refrain
from action "calculated to aggravate the existing situation."
Sihanouk contended that no technical arrangement
could compensate for the absence of good will on the part
of the antagonists, and from t h i s premise moved on to an
account of Thai and Vietnamese depredations against Cambodia.
Finally, the conference agreed to send Mme. Bandaranaike
to New Delhi and Peiping to relay the conferees! hopes
for a negotiated settlement. Sihanouk observed to intimates that the conference had been a complete waste of time.
The Prince returned to Cambodia.long enough to
lead a party of officials, diplomats and foreign journalists on a pilgrimage to Preah Vihear temple, so recently
"liberated" from the Thais. He then left for India and
China, in effect accepting Chou's invitation but visiting
India first as originally planned.
Sihaaouk did not enjoy his two weeks in Idnia. A
contributing factor was the unwillingness of the Indians
to be drawn i n t o bilateral talks with the Chinese, as
Sihanouk and the other Colombo conferees desired. The
major cause of Sihanouk's unhappiness, however, appeared
to bet,thatthe Indians simply did not "make" over him as
Sukarno had done. A member of Sihanouk's entourage
characterized him as surprised at the 'Isapathy and ignorance" demonstrated by Indian officials towards Cambodia,
and angered by questions such as whether there were roads
or radio stations in his country.
On 9 February 1963, Sihanouk and his party left
for China. Sihanouk was weary from his travels within
India, and had wired to Peiping that he would appreciate
a short rest before beginning his official visit. Chou.
En-lai was happy to oblige, and from Calcutta Sihanouk
flew to a VIP villa in Kunming.
-100-
I
.,
,
E.
,
Communion in Peiping
In all likelihood, Sihanouk and Chou were in
frequent correspondence. Whether the P r i n c e operated
“in compliance“ with “directives” from Chou is a subjective question, and it is questionable whether anyone
could make Sihanouk jump through the hoop. Nevertheless,
there was ample evidence of close coordination of foreign
policy between Cambodia and its “good friend” to the north
since the period of Penn Nouth’s visit in the spring of
1962. In his public statements, however, Sihanouk had
given little support to Peiping on the India border issue,
and privately the Prince had indicated that he regarded
the Chinese as at fault.
Sihanouk arrived in Kunming on 9 February, On
the following day Chou En-lai flew down from Peiping,
ostensibly to greet his guest. On his return to Phnom
Penh, Sihanouk described the evening of 10 February:
On the first day, Ir. Chou En-lai, being
informed of my arrival, left Peiping at once to
join me in Kunming. He brought a file with him
and dlscuased it with me from morning till evening,
even after banquets and theatrical performances.
Instead of sleeping, I studied the Chinese file.
-101-
..
According to 1
the Prince was flattered by Chou's attention and "apparently spellbound" by Chou's personality, Me states that
Sihanouk accepted the Chinese version of the origins of
the Sino-Indian dispute "wi-thout a murmur, a contention
largely born out by Sihanouk's subsequent behavior.
Sihanouk himself described his reaction as follows:
5
f
'
.
f
After studying the Chinese file, I found
that /fie Sino-Indian dispute7 has a very deep
c a u s e y Therefore, it is difgicult to condemn
one or the other pasty and we must not pass
judgment on the problem without due consideration, China did not ask us to condemn India
as the culprit. But at the same time, s h e w a s
disgusted because certain persons condemned her.
I found in the Chinese document s o much evidence
that I could not condemn China, and China is
aware of our feelings toward her. We must not
pass judgment on this Sino-Indian problem...
We could only beg them to negotiate.
.
In winning Sihanouk over to at least a benevolent
neutrality, Chou achieved what must have been his major
objective in connection with the Cambodian visit.* The
Prince was not.so suecessful. Sihanouk had hopes of
obtaining a financial grant from China or, that failing,
long-term credits. Cambodiags foreign exchange reserves
I
I
*In conversation with a Western journalist in April,
Sihanouk stated that Chou had shown him the complete
Chinese dossier on the border conflict. Sihanouk stated
that the Indians had slowly infiltrated "Chinese territory"
until the CPR had been obliged to react by attacking
"illegal" Indian posts, The Indians had then mounted an
offensive,which had to be countered. The Chinese were surprised at the feeble resistance they encountered and,
according to Chou, found themselves "inside India" with
an embarrassingly successful "counterattack" on their hands.
Sihanouk reportedly characterized Chou's account as
possibly a true veision, ihough conceding that the Indians
denied that they had infiltrated Chinese territory, Noting
that the Chinese did n o t accept the Maclahon line, Sihanouk
implicitly criticized the Indians for taking the position
that the existing frontier was unnegotiable. Sihanouk compared unfaarorably this "intransigence" with the ''more
reasonable" Burmese attitude on border matters.
I
I
had f a l l e n , and h e had been informed by t h e U.S. t h a t
American a s s i s t a n c e would c o n t i n u e t o be reduced.
Although Chou l e t h i m down g e n t l y , t h e best t h a t
Sihanouk w a s a b l e t o a c h i e v e was an agreement whereby
China agreed t o accept i n b a r t e r Cambodian r a w materi a l s such a s r u b b e r and paper i n r e t u r n f o r manufactured
goods. The economic talks, however, w e r e but a sidel i g h t t o t h e pageantry which accompanied Sihanouk's
v i s i t . A t P e i p i n g three of h i s sons were p r e s e n t ; one
was s t u d y i n g there, and t w o o t h e r s had been flown from
Moscow by t h e Chinese for t h e p e r i o d of Sihanouk's v i s i t ,
I n P e i p i n g , Sihanouk d e l i v e r e d a n address
1 4 August c a l c u l a t e d t o repay insome measure t h e
of h i s h o s t s . H e reiterated h i s s u p p o r t f o r t h e
of Taiwan t o t h e mainland, and gave f u l l s u p p o r t
b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h New D e l h i concerning
disputed f r o n t i e r . Further:
-
on
kindness
return
for
the
I a m here t o t e l l you t h a t t h e s i x m i l l i o n
Cambodians E i c 7 a r e l i n k e d w i t h t h e 700 m i l l i o n
Chinese by an u n b r e a k a b l e f r i e n d s h i p
I would
l i k e t o add t h a t our r e l a t i o n s w i l l become even
closer b e c a u s e now w e know t h a t c o l o n i a l i s m and
i m p e r i a l i s m are powerless b e f o r e t h e w i l l and
d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e Asian p e o p l e s t o defend
t h e i r freedom and t h e i r r i g h t t o h a p p i n e s s and
prosperity.
....
H e went on t o s t a t e t h a t of t h e 13 n a t i o n s a s k e d t o
g u a r a n t e e Cambodiass n e u t r a l i t y and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y ,
o n l y f i v e -- China, t h e USSR, t h e DRY, F r a n c e and Poland
had r e p l i e d a f f i r m a t i v e l y t o Sihanouk's message. The
Western c o u n t r i e s , a l l e g e d Sihanouk, e i t h e r "evaded t h e
i s s u e by advancing unconvincing e x p l a n a t i o n s " o r , l i k e
T h a i l a n d and South Vietnam, f a i l e d t o r e p l y . I
--
I
I
The p u b l i s h e d v e r s i o n of Sihanouk's speech does
dramatic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n )
-103-
I.
,.-.
h o w e v e r , K l m a y w e l l have been
a major &la ribe. From P e i p i n g
S i h a n o u k w e n t on a t o u r of Chinese c i t i e s . N e a r l y t h r e e
weeks l a t e r , on t h e eve of h i s r e t u r n t o Cambodia,
Sihanouk s t a t e d t h a t h e had been advised by Chou En-lai
whose i n f o r m a t i o n was from "reliable a g e n t s i n
t h a t Non Ngoc Thanh had v i s i t e d Taiwan
Bangkok"
where h e met s e c r e t l y w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of Thailand,
South Vietnam and "an i m p e r i a l i s t power which I need
n o t name."* The purported s u b j e c t of t h e meeting was
t h e a s s a s s i n a t i o n of Sihanouk.
--
--
The Chinese may also have alerted Sihanouk conc e r n i n g domestic r u m b l i n g s i n Phnom Penh; i n any case,
t h e i r b r i e f i n g s impressed a v i s i t o r more accustomed to
p a l a c e g o s s i p and a s t r o l o g i c a l p r e d i c t i o n s . In h i s
28 February speech on r e t u r n i n g from China, Sihanouk
r e c a l l e d g r a t e f u l l y t h e i n f o r m a t i o n provided by t h e
Chinese a t t h e t i m e of t h e Dap Chhuon p l o t , and i n d i c a t e d
' t h a t he had r e c e i v e d new warnings:
When I w a s i n China I was informed of a
grave a f f a i r concerning our m a j o r i t y p a r t y . As
i n t h e Dap Chhuon a f f a i r , B was informed....of
a new s u b v e r s i v e p l o t a g a i n s t me.
I was greatly
f r i g h t e n e d , because upon my a r r i v a l i n P e i p i n g
M r . Mao Tse-tung himself asked m e to do my b e s t
t o avoid being overthrown. M r . Chou E n - l a i . . . .
asked m e t o be c a r e f u l because "something is
b e i n g prepared a g a i n s t you.''
I
LO
t h e arfair was i a r g w n .i t e d t o i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h e
U.S. as a p a r t i c i p a n t i n t h e Taiwan t a l k s . Although
Thanh is b e l i e v e d t o receive funds from South Vietnam
and p o s s i b l y T h a i l a n d , t h e C h i n e s e N a t i o n a l i s t s appear
t o have l o s t i n t e r e s t in Thanh a s a means of deposing
Sihanouk.
I
,
I
VI.
I
THE STORM
A.
Homecoming C r is is
Sihanouk r e t u r n s d h o m e o n 28 February 1963. It
was not n e c e s s a r y f o r him t o s t i r Phnom Penh o u t of its
l e t h a r g y ; for once, there had been ample a c t i v i t y i n h i s
absence, I n t h e f i n a l week of t h e P r i n c e ' s t o u r , longs t a n d i n g s t u d e n t g r i e v a n c e s a g a i n s t p o l i c e and school
a d m i n i s t r a t o r s l e d t o r i o t i n g i n s e v e r a l locales. The
naost.serious d i s t u r b a n c e s were a t Siem Reap on 23 February. There s t u d e n t s fought w i t h police, paraded banners
proclaiming t h a t "The Sangkum Is Rotten," and ripped down
and trampled uppn p o s t e r s of Sihanouk--the l a s t an a c t
of le'se m a j e s t e_-p o s s i b l y unprecedented i n Cambodia.
P
The governmental p a r a l y s i s which characterized
Cambodia d u r i n g Sihanouk's j u n k e t s abroad was v e r y much
apparent d u r i n g and a f t e r t h e r i o t s . Troops were f i n a l l y
called i n t o restore order i n Siem Reap, b u t t h e r e p o r t
s e n t t o Sihanouk i n China downplayed t h e e x t e n t of t h e
v i o l e n c e and r e p o r t e d l y made no mention of t h e i n s u l t s
t o t h e P r i n c e h i m s e l f . When Sihanouk r e t u r n e d t o h e a r
t h e whole s t o r y , he w a s r e l u c t a n t t o accept a s s u r a n c e s
t h a t t h e demonstrations had been e s s e n t i a l l y n o n p o l i t i c a l .
H i s humor was n o t improved by evidence of c o r r u p t i o n i n
Cambodia's n a t i o n a l l o t t e r y , u n f r i e n d l y e d i t o r i a l s i n
t h e l e f t i s t press, and g e n e r a l i n e p t i t u d e on t h e p a r t of
t h e government headed by Worodom Kantol.*
A t a 1 March
m e e t i n g with t h e c a b i n e t , Sihanouk a n g r i l y accepted t h e
r e s i g n a t i o n of t h e Kantol government and announced t h a t
he himself would head t h e new government.
*From rnid-lml t o e a r l y 1963, Cambodia's f o r e i g n exchange dropped from $115 m i l l i o n t o about $95 m i l l i o n ,
even w i t h U.S. a i d . Although v a r i o u s ' f a c t o r s c o n t r i b u t e d
t o t h e drop, l e f t i s t s charged most of it t o g r a f t and m i s management.
I
I
.
105
-
. .With t h e Chinese warnings s i n g i n g i n h i s ears, Sihanouk looked c l o s e l y i n t o t h e r e p o r t s of t h e r i o t i n g a t
Siem Reap. I n a rambling address h e a s c r i b e d b l b e f o r
t h e r i o t s t o T h a i , Vietnamese, C h i n e s e N a t i o n a l i s t and
i m p e r i a l i s t elements, who, according t o Sihanouk, had
i n s t i g a f e d Son Ngoc Thanh t o cause t r o u b l e . The l i n k i n g
of t h e N a t i o n a l i s t s with s c a p e g o a t s of l o n g e r s t a n d i n g
is i n t e r e s t i n g i n view of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n provided Sihanouk
i n Peiping.
Sihanouk*s i a L t i a l r e a c t i o n appears t o have been
.
to r e l a t e t h e riots to t h e warnings r e c e i v e d i n Peiping,
and f o r t h i s r e a s o n to d i s c o u n t t h e l i k e l i h o o d of l e f t i s t
involvement.* By 2 March, however, local l e f t i s t s were
a l s o under s u s p i c i o n , presumably as a r e s u l t of informat i o n provided by Sihanoukvs a d v i s o r s . Sihanouk added t h e
names of s e v e r a l l e f t i s t m i n i s t e r s t o those of Thanh,
Chiang Kai-shek and others " r e s p o n s i b l e " f o r t h e r i o t s ,
and announced t h a t on r e f l e c t i o n he would no$ head a new
I n s t e a d , he c a l l e d f o r d i s s o l u t Ion
government af Iter a l l
of t h e Sangkum, t h e r e s i g n a t i o n of t h e Kantol government,
and new e l e c t s o n s t o t h e Assembly, Whether Cambodia remained a monarchy, o r became a r e p u b l i c or p e o p l e ' s rep u b l i c , would be u p t~ t h e new government. To underscore
t h e s e r i o u s n e s s w i t h which Sihanouk regarded t h e s i t u a t ion, army t r o o p s s e c u r e d key i n s t a l l a t i o n s i n c l u d i n g Radio
Cambodia, t h e information m i n i s t r y , and t h e N a t i o n a l Assembly.
*On 8 J m u a r y , however, Sihanouk had found it necessary
t o refute criticism i n t h e l e f t i s t p r e s s of Cambodia's
continued acceptance of U.S. a i d . I n a speech he charged
the l e f t i s t s w i t h d e s t r u c t i v e criticism, o b s e r v i n g t h a t
!'the Americans have never bound our arms and l e g s /F.e.,
attached s t r i n g s t o aid7
The Americans have conzinued
to g i v e u s a i d even afxer w e r e c e i v e d a i d from t h e USSR,
Czechoslovakia, t h e CPR and o t h e r R e d c o u n t r i e s e t f
....
-
106
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I
I
The f o l l o w i n g morning Premier Eantol-happy
to
on behalf of h i s c a b i n e t .
In Bhnom Penh and i n t h e p r o v i n c e s , Sangkum groups
i n i t i a t e d demonstrations urging Sihanouk! s c o n t i n u a t i o n
i n power, maintenance of t h e monarchy, and l o n g l i f e t o
t h e Sangkum. Sihanouk, f o r t h e time being, continued
t o strike out i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y a t Thoanhisfs, Seatoists,
Communists and i m p e r i a l i s t s . Apparently inf luenced by
Defense M i n i s t e r Lon N o l , however, he g r a d u a l l y came
around t o t h e view t h a t the immediate troublemakers were
leftists.
In a 3 March speech he charged the " i n t e l lectuals"--Sihanouk's synonym f o r pso-Communists--with
s u b v e r t i n g the s t u d e n t s . In an attempt t o p u b l i c l y
h u m i l i a t e h i s l e f t i s t c r i t i c s , he called s u c c e s s i v e l y
on l e a d i n g l e f t i s t s t o f o r m a government, o n l y t o be told
by each t h a t he c o u l d n o t command sufficient s u p p o r t .
By 8 March, no less t h a n 34 l e a d i n g l e f t i s t s had r e f u s e d
the p r e m i e r s h i p , and most of these had f i n a l l y proclaimed
t h e i r l o y a l t y to Sihanouk and t h e Sangkum. In an address
on 1 4 March, Sihanouk drew a moral from t h e a f f a i r :
be o u t from under--resigned
~
There is no denying t h e fact t h a t
these l e f t i s t s , if' t h e y took charge of t h e
government, would be unable t o r u n i t ,
for t h e y are s t r o n g f i n l y 7 a t o r g a n i z i n g
mobs. Once t h e y assumed-power, t h e peop l e w o u l d see that they are n o t " c l e a n e r , "
more educated, and more p a t r i o t i c t h a n
o t h e r s . Thus t h e i r f u t u r e w o u l d be doom@d,
a f a c t which h a s prompted them t o refuse
t o form a c a b i n e t . Row t h a t they have
s h i r k e d the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of l e a d i n g a
government, it is better t o m a i n t a i n t h e
p r e s e n t government.
As f o r me, I refuse t o take charge
of t h e government. B u t I wish it would
s t r i v e t o do its b e s t . I w i l l r u n it a f t e r
it f a i l s i n its task OF when t h e s i t u a t i o n becomes s e r i o u s .
The crisis t h u s completed a full c i r c l e . The Sangkum was not d i s s o l v e d , Sihanouk d i d not r e s i g n as c h i r
-
-
107
-
I
.
'
.
of s t a t e , and t h e Kantol government remained i n o f f i c e .
Cambodian l e f t i s t s breathed easier, and g e n e r a l l y d i d n o t
blame Sihanouk f o r t h e i r embarrassment. According to one
Pracheachon m e m b e r , a l l l e f t i s t s would be *ldeadtvw i t h o u t
'sihanouk, s i n c e t h e army and t h e p o l i c e , l e d by Lon Mol,
would j a i l or murder a l l l e f t i s t s were it n o t f o r SIhanoukOs
r e s t r a i n i n g influence.
The March "homecomingt1 crisis, f o r a l l t h e n o i s e
and c o n f u s i o n , l e f t no l a s t i n g impression on the Cambodian
domestic s c e n e . Its greatest e f f e c t appears to have been
i n t h e area of Sino-Cambodian r e l a t i o n s . Sihanouk had
been warned i n P e i p i n g t h a t he was r e t u r n i n g t o a p o l i t i c a l crisis '("I w a s informed of a g r a v e a f f a i r c o n c e r n i n g
His i n i t i a l r e l u c t a n c e to accept
o u r m a j o r i t y party")
h i s ' advisors e x p l a n a t i o n of l e f t i s t i n s t i g a t i o n p r o b a b l y
stemmed f r o m s u r p r i s e that h i s Chinese * * f r i e n d s "would
a l e r t h i m to a maneuver to which t h e p r e s t i g e of t h e
Pracheachon and other l e f t i s t s was committed
Whatever surge of g r a t i t u d e may have f i l l e d Sihanouk's
breast was probably f o l l o w e d by an attempt t o d i s c e r n more
l o g i c a l l y Peiping@s motives in t h e a f f a i r . H e p r o b a b l y
reached the o b g ~ i ~ uc os n c l u s i o n t h a t maintenance of the
s t a t u s QUO i n Cambodia meant m o r e to t h e Chinese t h a n t h e
prospects of t h e i r n o n d e s c r i p t leftisft b r e t h r e n on t h e
s c e n e , If so, he was v i n d i c a t e d i n a l l y i n g Cambodia i n
e v e r y t h i n g b u t name to t h e Colossus of t h e N s r t h .
In any case, t h e Chinese Communists added t o t h e i r
prestige w i t h Sihanouk. On a t l e a s t two Q@CaSiQn--the
Dap Chhnam a f f a i r and now t h e S i e m Reap r i o t s - - t h e y had
provided him w i t h a c c u r a t e and t i m e l y i n f o r m a t i o n which
e n a b l e d him t o cope w i t h s e r i s u s i n t e r n a l t h r e a t s . The
Chinese had g e n e r a t e d n o t o n l y goodwill, b u t a r e p u t a t i o n
for omniscience i n t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e f ield--as exemplified
by t h e i r "Bangkok r e p o r t " on S0n N g ~ cThenh's t r i p t o Taiwan. Any i n f o r m a t i o n which t h e Chinese saw f i t t o feed
to Sihanouk was now a s s u r e d of a r e s p e c t f u l h e a r i n g .
-
108
-
B.
R u s s i a and China
Considering its close r a p p o r t w i t h Communist China,
Cambodia was l i t t l e i n f l u e n c e d by t h e r i v a l r y between
Moscow and P e i p i n g
Cambodia's o c c a s i o n a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n
in bloc front groups, noted e a r l i e r , involved l i t t l e more
t h a n t h e a i r i n g of well-known Cambodian o b j e c t i v e s , and
was u n r e l a t e d t o i s s u e s i n c o n t e n t i o n between t h e USSR
and China. Domestically, t h e Pracheachon d i d not even
acknowledge ttself to be a Communist p a r t y , much less
take a s t a n d on i n t r a b l o c issues. As f o r Sihanouk, h i s
a f f e c t i o n f o r Communist China stemmed n o t from P e i p i n g ' s
r e v o l u t i o n a r y elan--which he viewed w i t h misgivings--but
f porn p e r s o n a l i t y f a c t o r s t o g e t h e r w i t h immediate cons ide r a t i o n s of CambodiaDs s e c u r i t y .
a
. * . )
:
The Cambodian press r a r e l y commented on t h e SinoS o v i e t r i v a l r y . Sihanouk h i m s e l f appeared l o a t h t o comment on t h e s p l i t , lest acknowledgement of its e x i s t e n c e
cast doubt on h i s t h e s i s t h a t LCommunismw a s t h e wave of
t h e f u t u r e . On 16 D e c e m b e r 1962, however, Chinese-language papers in Phnom Penh had r e p r i n t e d t h e P e o p l e ' s Daily
xwticle of t h e p r e v i o u s day denouncing Khrushchev. The
t i m i n g of t h e r e p r i n t s l e n t credence t o reports t h a t t h e
Chinese embassy mads a v a i l a b l e advance c o p i e s of t h e t e x t .
Five d a y s l a t e r , : t h e semi-off i c i a l R e a l i t e s e d i t o r i a l i z e d
t h a t there was no cause to r e j o i c e a% t h e r u p t u r e between
China, "our most f a i t h f u l f r i e n d at t h e c e n t e r of what
was t h e S o c d a l i s t B l o c , " and R u s s i a , "our good f r i e n d . "
CambodiaPs r e l u c t a n c e t o t a k e sides w a s understandable, s i n c e t h e USSR and its E a s t e r n s a t e l l i t e s , as w e l l
as China, w e r e s o u r c e s of economic a s s i s t a n c e . I t was
u n l i k e Sihanouk, however, t o remain completely a p a r t from
Either
anything as i n t e r e s t i n g a s t h e Sino-Soviet d i s p u t e
t o stir greater S o v i e t i n t e r e s t i n Cambodia, OF t o demons t r a t e i n one more a r e a h i s f r i e n d s h i p f a r China, Sihanouk
began t o s i d e w i t h P e i p i n g on c e r t a i n issues i n c o n t e n t i o n .
The first, and most g r a t u i t o u s , Cambodian i n t r u s i o n i n t o
the b l o c 9 s f a m i l y quarrel had come in September 1962, when
Slhanauk agreed t o e s t a b l i s h d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h
Albania on the ambassadorial l e v e l . Since Camba>diagscont a c t s w i t h Albania were almost n o n e x i s t e n t , t h e move was
c l e a r l y designed t o c u r r y f a v o r i n P e i p i n g .
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I n A p r i l 1963, Cambodia made i t s . . f i r s t agreement
t o o b t a i n m i l i t a r y equipment from. t h e bloc:. U n t i l t h e n
Cambodia had ignored a long-standing S o v i e t offer t o
p r o v i d e Sihanouk w i t h a i r c r a f t and a i r d e f e n s e equipment.
In A p r i l , a Cambodian economic mission t o MOSCOW obtained
a S o v i e t commitment not o n l y to assist in t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a h y d r o e l e c t r i c dam b u t t o p r o v i d e m i l i t a r y a i d .
The S o v i e t s agreed to p r o v i d e three MIG 17 f i g h t e r s , one
MIG 15 t r a i n e r , w i t h ground s u p p a s t and t e c h n i c i a n s , p l u s
24 a n t i a i r c r a f t guns
e
The 'WIG deal" was s i g n i f i c a n t not i n t e r m s of t h e
equipment i t s e l f , b u t as a precedent, and as b l o c insurance a g a i n s t any rapprochement between Cambodia and its
n e i g h b o r s . Rather t h a n t o compete w i t h t h e Chinese, t h e
S o v i e t m o t i v a t i o n appeared t o have been t o break the
Franco-American monopoly on a r m s for Cambodia, and t o
p r o v i d e Sihanouk w i t h t h e means t o keep up border f r i c t i o n
w i t h Thailand and South Vietnam.
In c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e
Chinese, t h e S o v i e t s d i d n o t go overboard i n i n g r a t i a t i n g
themselves w i t h Sihanouk. The S o v i e t s i n i t i a l l y r e f u s e d
a Cambodian request t h a t t h e equipment be provided as a
g i f t , b u t eventually d i d agree.
By 1963, t h e C h i n e s e economy w a s e x p e r i e n c i n g such
d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t P e i p i n g c o u l d n o t a f f o r d economic bonuses
t o c o u n t r i e s a l r e a d y committed to its l i n e . Sino-Cambodian
r e l a t i o n s remained warm, however, as was demonstrated on
t h e o c c a s i o n of Liu Shao-chigs s t h t e v i s i t i n t h e first
week of May. The L i u v i s i t provided a n o t h e r o p p o r t u n i t y
f o r t h e Chinese t o ' e x p r e s s t h e i r s u p p o r t f o r Sihanouk,
and f o r h i s n e u t r a l i t y p r o p o s a l s . In t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e
r o l e 8s SihanoukOs c o n f i d a n t e , protector and i n t e l l i g e n c e
o f f i c e r , however, t h e Chinese were able t o u s e t h e t r i p
t o boost t h e i r p r e s t i g e w i t h Sihanouk and w i t h i n Cambodia's
Chinese community.
P r i o r t o L h 0 s a r r i v a l on 1 May, t h e Chinese r e p o r t e d l y informed Sihanouk t h a t t h e y had evidence of a Nationa l i s t - S o u t h Vietnamese p l o t t o assassinate both L i u and
Sihanouk d u r i n g the s t a t e v i s i t . The Chinese o f f e r e d t o
p r o v i d e an e x t r a s e c u r i t y d e t a i l f o r t h e period of t h e
v i s i t , an o f f e r which Sihipnouk accepted. L i u ' s six-day
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t a u r t h u s included t h e unusual s p e c t a c l e of a h o s t count r y v i r t u a l l y t u r n i n g over its i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y respons i b i l i t i e s t o the police of 8 v i s i t i n g s t a t e . An undisclosed number of persons i n Phnom Penh--comprising l a r g e l y
members of t h e small Talwan-or i e n t e d Chinese community-were removed from Phnom Penh as t 8 s e c u r i t y ri&s.'*
Western news media took n o t i c e of t h e strict secur i t y p r e c a u t i o n s , b u t t h e Cambodians were t i g h t - l i p p e d
and appeased t o t a k e t h e Chinese warning s e r i a u s l y . Whether
t h e Chinese Communists r e a l l y had wind of a p l o t is unknown, b u t there was no disproving t h e i r allegation, and
t h e i r p a s t record i n thda area, i n Sihanouk's eyes, wm
w i t h o u t blemish. In a j o i n t communique on 6 May, Cambodia
s u p p o r t e d P e i p i n g ' s claim t o Taiwan and t o T a i p e i ' s seat
in t h e UN, and " h i g h l y e v a l u a t e d t h e d e c i s i o n made by t h e
CPR on its own i n i t i a t i v e on t h e release of $he captured
Sihanouk viewed L i u * s v i s i t w i t h enthusiasm. C h i n a ' s
f a i l u r e to v o l u n t e e r any new a i d o f f e r appears t o have
been more t h a n compensated f o r by its endorsement of Sihanouk's p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s , and by t h e f a c t t h a t no one
had been a s s a s s i n a t e d d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d of L i u ' s v i s i t .
A t t h e a i r p o r t Sihanouk observed,
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H i s Excellency L i u Shao-chi's v i s i t
h a s been a success, T h i s all-round. s u c cess is d e f i x i i t e l y of g r e a t s i g n i f i c a n c e
t o o u r common f u t u r e , because it has proved
t o t h e world what I s a i d i n P e i p i n g t h r e e
months ago, t h a t Cambodia and China are
determined $a forge ahead hand in hand,
and t h a t no f o r c e in the world c a n check
them.
C.
The Two V i e t n a m
For Cambodia, t h e s p r i n g of 1963 was a period of
accelerated l e f t w a r d d r i f t . There was t h e MIG deal i n
A p r i l , followed by L i u ' s v i s i t i n May. L e s s d r a m a t i c
t h a n e i t h e r of these, y e t f a r - r e a c h i n g i n t h e i r implicat i o n s , were i n d i c a t ions of improved re1a t i o n s between
Cambodia and t h e DRV.
On returninghome from C h i n a , Sihanouk had announced
t h a t HQ C h i Minh would pay a v i s i t t o Cambodia d u r i n g
1963.* In view of Cambodia's past problems i n communicati n g w i U h t h e DRV, and his concern over Hanoi's u l t i m a t e
d e s i g n s concerning Cambodia, it is v i r t u a l l y c e r t a i n t h a t
Cambodia-DRY r e l a t i o n s were a major t o p i c of d i s c u s s i o n
i n China. In t h e s t a t e m e n t i n
d u r i n g S i h a n o ~ k ~stay
s
which he announced R d S scheduled v i s i t , Sihanouk volunteered t h a t Cambodia's r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e DRV were "on t h e
road &o improvement," in t h a t Banoi had given e v i d e n c e of
good f a i t h by s u p p o r t i n g h i s n e u t r a l i t y p r o p o s a l s .
A t a press conference on 11 A p r i l , Sihanouk o f f e r e d
c o n t r a s t i n g views of Nor%h and South Vietnam. Whereas
t h e DRV had accepted h i s n e u t r a l i t y p r o p o s a l s , South Vietnam
*The v i s i t was l a t e r postponed u n t i l 1964, r e p o r t e d l y
a t Hanoi's r e q u e s t . A t t h i s w r i t i n g , ' n o date for t h e
v i s i t has been s e t
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had r e j e c t e d them. Whereas South Vietnani w a s ' g u i l t y of
r e p e a t e d border v i o l a t i o n s , North Vietnam had always res p e c t e d C a m b o d i a ' s ' t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y . Sihanouk t h e n
s e i z e d ' u g o n t h e p u r p o r t e d remark of' a DRV commercial repr e s e n t a t i v e t o p i c t u r e t h e Hanoi regime i n an even more
c o n c i l i a t o r y l i g h t . According to Sihanouk, t h e DRV r e p r e s e n t a t i v e (whom he referred t o as "the North Vietnamese
Minister") had recognized on behalf of h i s government Cambodia's s o v e r e i g n t y over those c o a s t a l i s l a n d s claimed
by South Vietnam.
I
Such f l a g r a n t wooing of North Vietnam was i n t e s e s t ing f o r a number of I ~ E I G O ~ S . It demonstrated Sihanouk's
d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o w r i t e off South Vietnam n o t o n l y verbally-which he hed been doing for some t i m e w i t h his p r e d i c t i o n s
of a V i e t ong victory--but i n d i p l o m a t i c terms as w e l l .
Pn so doing he placed one more o b s t a c l e among a n a l r e a d y
formidable number of h u r t l e s c o n f r o n t i n g h i s n e u t r a l i t y
p r o p o s a l s . Although t h e y had remained unacceptable t o
both Thailand and South Vietnam, the s u p p o r t accorded
Sihanouk by France as well a s t h e bloc might have perm i t t e d c o n s i d e r a b l e pressure t o have been b r o u g h t t o bear
on t h e r e c a l c i t r a n t SEATO powers. I n s t e a d , Sihanouk
chose t o c o u r t t h e DRV, and t o remove whatever i n c e n t i v e
may ha8e e x i s t e d for South Vietnam to placate its neighbor.
*
+The e x t e n t t o which the V i e $ Cong used Cambodia f o r
s a n c t u a r y t h e n or now is u n c l e a r . Sibanouk has r e p e a t e d l y
cited an i n s p e c t i o n conducted by Robert Trumbull of The
New Pork Times, i n the f a l l of 1962, a f t e r a Times a m c l e
haa al;legGiT€ie presence of V i e t cong i n s t a l l a t i o n s i n
Cambodia. Folaowing a three-day, u n r e s t r i c t y d i n s p e c t i o n
of t h e b o r d e r , T r u m b u l l concluded t h a t t h e o n l y m i l i t a r y
i n s t a l l a t i o n s i n t h e area were Cambodian. H i s f i n d i n g s
beg t h e i s s u e of Cambodian b o r d e r guards l o o k i n g t h e
o t h e r way when V i e t Cong bands seek temporary a s y l u m from
ARVN f o r c e s .
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In an even broader s e n s e Sihanouk's a t t i t u d e t o wards t h e t w o V i e t n m s r e f l e c t e d a f u r t h e r l e f t w a r d d r i f t .
It was p o s s i b l e to r & t i o n a l i z e Cambodia's t a c i t a l l i a n c e
w i t h C h i n a , on t h e grounds k h a t Sihanouk r e q u i r e d a gratector and t h a t China w a s c a p a b l e of f u l f i l l i n g t h i s r o l e .
This l o g i c , however, d i d not extend t o t h e DRV. Sihanouk's
renewed d e n i g r a t i o n of South Vietnam, combined w i t h h i s
o v e r t u r e s t o t h e North, appear to have been t h e r e s u l t
of p i q u e , and t o have been p u n i t i v e i n i n t e n t . Such a
course may have been urged on Sihanouk P n P e i p i n g , though
he had for some t i m e himself t h r e a t e n e d d r a s t i c diplomatic
action i n t h e e v e n t of f u r t h e r South Vietnamese border
v i o l a t ions
Hypersensitive t o questions involving h i s
c o u n t r y ' s t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , Sihanouk appeared t o
have blown t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e offshore i s l a n d s o u t of
p r o p o r t i o n , and to have regarded t h e f a i l u r e of South
Vietnam t o t u r n them over as f u r t h e r evidence of aggressive intent.
In a l l l i k e l i h o o d , a break between Cambodia and
South Vietnam was o n l y a m a t t e r of t i m e after Sihanouk
r e t u r n e d from P e i p i n g i n F e b r u a r y
The South Vietnamese,
howeveP, made Sihanouk's d e c i s i o n easier f o r him. Several
months of r e l a t i v e t r a n q u i l i t y along t h e Cambodia-Vietnam
b o r d e r ended in t h e s p r i n g of 1963, when on 9 A p r i l South
Vietnamese armored v e h i c l e s p e n e t r a t e d a m i l e i n t o Cambodia and a t t a c k e d a K h m e r v i l l a g e . Sihanouk made h i s
u s u a l i n d i g n a n t p r o t e s t , and s e c u r e d an apology from
Saigon. T h i s t i m e , however, Sihanouk was not t o be m o l l i f ied.
I n a speech on 12 A p r i l , he characterized Camb o d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s w i t h North Vietnam as h a e i n g "considera b l y improvedt1 w h i l e t h o s e w i t h t h e South "had deteriorated."
He announced t h e grd3ected v i s i t of Eo C h i Minh to Phnom
Penh, but i n s i s t e d t h a t Cambodia had n o t y e t made ''a
deliberate choice" between North and South Vietnam. Acc o r d i n g t o Sihanouk, improved r e l a t i o n s w i t h Hanoi had
r e s u l t e d from its endorsement of h i s n e u t r a l i t y p r o p o s a l s
and its alleged r e l i n q u i s h m e n t of any claim on t h e d i s puted i s l a n d s e
In mid-August, Cambodia charged t h a t two Vietnamese
a i r c r a f t had s t r a f e d a guard p o s t insdde t h e Cambodian
b o r d e r . Although the i n c i d e n t was less f l a g r a n t t h a n t h a t
of 9 A p r i l , Sihanouk on 24 A u g u s t announced h i s i n t e n t i o n
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t o break r e l a t i o n s w i t h South Vietnam, and d i d so three
days l a t e r . I n h i s announcement Sihanouk c i t e d n o t o n l y
ttrepeated?fv i o l a t i o n s of Cambodian t e r r i t o r y by South
Vietnamese m i l i t a r y u n i t s , but--in h i s r o l e as defender
of t h e f a i t h - - c i t e d a l s o r e p r e s s i o n " of B u d d h i s t s by t h e
D i e m government
The break in r e l a t i o n s w i t h South Vietnam, which
carried w i t h it t h e v e r y r e a l danger of a blockade of
t h e Mekong, was one more d@monstration t h a t Sihanouk was
more t h a n b l u f f . H e had t h r e a t e n e d a break w i t h Thailand
i f T h a i " i n s u l t s " c o n t i n u e d , and e v e n t u a l l y had carried
o u t his threat. He had t h r e a t e n e d t o turn t o t h e b l o c
i f t h e U.S. "permitted" v i o l a t i o n s of Cambodian . t e r r i t o r y
by its a l l i e s - - a n d was c a r r y i n g o u t t h i s threat w i t h evesyt h i n g s h o r t of a formal a l l i a n c e , Be had r e p e a t e d l y t h r e a t ened 8 break with Vietnam, and now bad done so, presumably
a f t e r r e c e i v i n g a s s u r a n c e s i n P e i p i n g which may have inc l u d e d a promise of m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e should South V i e t nam atta6k Cambodia f o l l o w i n g a break i n r e l a t i o n s .
That Cambodia*s " n e u t r a l i t y f 1 was e s s e n t i a l l y host i l e was accepted as a f a c t of l i f e i n Saigon, and there
was no s e r i o u s r e a c t i o n t o t h e diplomatic break. The
d e p a r t i n g South Vietnamese r e p r e s e n t a t i v e announced i n
Phnom Penh t h a t h i s c o u n t r y would not blockade t h e Mekong
u n l e s s Sihanouk t o o k f u r t h e r h o s t i l e a c t i o n , s u c h as
r e c o g n i z i n g North Vietnam.
D.
Whom t h e Gods Would Destrov
The w i l d e s t p e r i o d of Silhanouk's r u l e t o d a t e
spanned a p e r i o d of 34 clays i n l a t e 1963. With a speech
on 5 November, Sihanouk t r i g g e r e d a t r a i n of events which
brought h i s r e l a t i o n s with t h e United S t a t e s to an a l l t i m e low, a l l b u t isolated Cambodia from t h e West, d e a l t
t h e Cambodian economy a blow from which it h i s y e t to rec o v e r , and demonstrated anew t h a t his undeniable g i f t s
i n t h e d i p l o m a t i c a r e n a were l a r g e l y n u l l i f i e d by a lack
of emotional balance
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The November c r f s i s was t r i g g e r e d by t h e K h m e r
S e r e i , whose f e w hundred diehard members l i v e d a handto-mouth e x i s t e n c e along Cambodia's b o r d e r s . They cont i n u e d t o operate--from d i f f e r e n t l o c a t i o n s i n Thailand
and South Vietnam--an estimated three mobile r a d i o t r a n s m i t t e r s provided by t h e host c o u n t r i e s . Sihanouk's
s e n s i t i v i t y t o any c r i t i c i s m was a c u t e w i t h respect t o
t h e Khmer Serei broadcasts, f o r he saw behind them a new
Thai-South Vietnamese-U.S. p l o t t o overthrow h i s government. To Sihanouk t h e t r a n s m i t t e r s were t h e l i n e a l
descendants of t h o s e provided Dap Chhuon in 1959, and he
overlooked no o p p o r t u n i t y t o warn t h e populace a g a i n s t
t h e ''Son Ngoc Thanh-Sam Sary c l i q u e v 1and its machinations.
Sihanouk seemed to hope t h a t t h e broadcasts would
simply go away. When, i n October, t h e broadcasts resumed
a f t e r a p e r i o d of s i l e n c e , Sihanouk ma'de t h e o c c a s i o n t h e
subject of an e d i t o r i a l i n The R a t i o n a l i s t :
A f t e r a rather l o n g disappearance,
t h e K h m e r Sesei r e a p p e a r n o i s i l y on t h e
s t a g e of t h e s o - c a l l e d "ant i-Sihanouk
theater, whose s t a g e managers have s u c h
names as D i e m , S a r i t and t h e C I A ,
Every
day t h e i r a i r waves carry f o r s e v e r a l
h o u r s f l o o d s of i n s u l t s and s l a n d e r s
a g a i n s t m e c h a n t i n g t h e most lTclassic"
r e f r a i n s , s u c h as tlSihanouk, the u s u r p e r " ;
"Sihanouk, t h e ' t r a i t o r s o l d t o t h e Communists ;
tlSihanouk, who l e a d s Cambodia
t o war and d i s a s t e r " ; and so f o r t h .
...
I'
"...
A f t e r c h a r g i n g t h a t two of t h e c l a n d e s t i n e r a d i o
sets had been newly provided t o t h e Vietnamese by t h e
U.S., Sihanouk h i t out a t Washington:
U . S . diplomats w i l l undoubtedly remind u s once a g a i n t h a t South Vietnam
is a ''sovereign country" and, conseque n t l y , the r i g h t t o c o n t r o l t h e i r m i l i t a r y personnel is c o n s i d e r a b l y , l i m i t e d .
/]But what7 would o u r American f r i e n d s
s a y , and-would they m a i n t a i n their economic
. ..
- 116 -
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I
and m i l i t a r y a i d t o Cambodia if, f o r
example, our government allowed t h e
V i e t Cong t o set up i n o u r c o u n t r y an
Itant i-Diem" radio b r o a d c a s t i n g c e n t e r
t h e n e c e s s a r y U. S. weapons
and * * l e n t t *
and m i l i t a r y equipment to t h e Hoa Hao,
C a o d a i s t s , OF other p o l i t i c a l refugees
in Phnom Penh?...
I must warn t h a t i f nambodian
n e u t r a l i f y 7 is once d e s t r o y e d , it w i l l
not be thz Western wave t h a t w i l l submerge Cambodia, b u t i n f a l l i b l y t h e Communist wave. Those who work unceasingly
f o r my defeat s h o u l d n o t d e l u d e thems e l v e s i n t h i s regard!
Sihanouk thus had t h e Khmer Serei v e r y much on h i s
mind when, on 1 November, t h e D i e m government was overthrown by a m i l i t a r y coup in Saigon. The coup, .accompanied
a s it w a s by t h e murder of D i e m , brought a mixed r e a c t i o n
from Sihanouk. In a rambling Speech on 2 November he a l l u d e d t o t h e coup as an e v e n t "which has g r e a t s i g h i f i c a n c e , "
and c i t e d a speech of h i s own a f e w days e a r l i e r in which
he had a n t i c i p a t e d t h e e a r l y collapse of t h e D i e m government. "Two days l a t e r , he mused, "everything occurred
as I had a n t i c i p a t e d .
Sihanouk observed t h a t "Although
we srhould n o t l a u g h a t t h e m i s f o r t u n e of t h e Ngo f a m i l y . .
w e m u s t admit f r a n k l y t h a t we feel r e l i e v e d because D i e i n
was a s o r t of t h o r n which pricked deeply i n t o o u r h e a r t s . "
.
For a l l h i s i l l - d i s g u i s e d r e j o i c i n g , t h e Saigon
In common
coup was a source of apprehension t o Sihanouk.
w i t h much of t h e world, he saw t h e hand of t h e United
S t a t e s behind D i e m ' s overthrow, and r e l a t e d it t o steppedup b r o a d c a s t i n g by t h e Khmer S e r e i . If overthrow and
d e a t h were t h e fate of a s t a u n c h U . S . a l l y who had out1ived h i s u s e f uPness , what would be Sihanouk * a f a t e
should t h e r e be a s i m i l a r coup i n Cambodia? In a *cmess a g e to t h e Khmer people'* on 5 November, Sihanouk brooded
o v e r t h e e v e n t s of t h e p a s t f e w weeks:
I must inform t h e c l e r g y and my dear
c o m p a t r i o t s t h a t t h e N ~ oDinh D i e m government
- 117 -
f e l l and D i e m d i e d a f e w d a y s ago and
t h a t , d e s p i t e t h i s , t h e broadcasting
s t a t i o n of the Khmer S e r e i t r a i t o r s .
h a s continued t o o p e r a t e and t o direct
i n s u l t s a t mell l l l l l l l l l
..
S i n c e , aceording t o Sihanouk, t h e new government i n South
Vietnam would h a r d l y go o u t of its way t o perpetuate bad
r e l a t i o n s w i t h Cambodia, t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n of t h e broadcasts
w a s new evidence t h a t t h e K h m e r Serei were i n f a c t cont r o l l e d by t h e Americans.
The U.S. gentlemen are v e r y angry
The o t h e r day t h e
U.S. charge d w a f f a i r e s called a t t h e
m i n i s t r y of f o r e i g n a f f a i r s and f o r
hours d i s c u s s e d . , , t h e f a c t t h a t I have
g r o u n d l e s s l y accused the U.S. government and people. Penn Nouth t o l d t h e
charge d ' a f f a i r e s t h a t Sihanouk had accused n o t t h e U.S. government and peop l e , b u t o n l y c e r t a i n c i r c l e s and t h e
CIA. He s a i d w e have s u f f i c i e n t proof
of t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s d i s r e g a r d f o r
Cambodia's n e u t r a l i t y and its leader..
w i t h m e , Sihanouk.
..
The c h a r g e < d ' a f f a i r e s r e p l i e d t h a t
there is no c o n f u s i o n because t h e CIA has
always o p e r a t e d under t h e d i r e c t orders
of t h e U.S. government and t h a t by accusi n g t h e C I A Sikanouk s i m u l t a n e o u s l y accusses t h e U . S . government
....
Then Penn Nouth t o l d t h e charge
d'affaires:
''If you say so t h e a f f a i r
w i l l become even more grave,
because
in so s a y i n g you imply t h a t t h e Victor
Matsui-Slat Peou case, t h e arrest
of t w o Vietnamese i n p o s s e s s i o n of a
t r a n s m i t t e r i n Dap Chhuon's house, and
...
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'
-
t h e e x i s t e n c e of Son Ngoc Thanh's and
Sam S a r y ' s t r a n s m i t t e r s are proof of
t h e U. S , government s involvement
As h i s speech west on (It ran more t h a n two h o u r s ) ,
Sihanouk9s o r a t o r y became impassioned. A key theme w a s
t h a t t h e coup i n Saigon had demonstrated t h a t t h e U.S.
had t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o e n f o r c e its w i l l on Thailand sand
South Vietnam when it was in t h e U.S. interest t o do so.
Towards t h e end of t h e s p e e c h Sihanouk dropped h i s bomb:
If f i h e Americans7 have s u c h power
over /%Xiland and So6th V i e t n a d , why
d i d t h e y s a y t h a t t h e y could noE f o r b i d
S a r i t and D i e m to do such-and-such?
That
is why I b e l i e v e U.S. a i d is poisoned a i d ,
as t h e K h m e r R e d s have s a i d . That is why
I cannot remain n e u t r a l .
If I cannot remain n e u t r a l , I w i l l h ave t o g i v e up U.B.
a i d . Ef Ig i v e up U,S. aid, I must change
the economic s t r u c t u r e of o u r country and
t u r n our n a t i o n a l and B u d d h i s t s o c i a l i s t
regime i n t o . . .an almost Communist regime-t h a t is, a Communist-model or Ben B e l l a model s o c i a l i s t regime--so t h a t our count r y can s u r v i v e . . . .
To d e p r i v e /TIE Americans7 of a l l pret e x t s t o attack Us, I w i s h to-warn them of
this:
A t p r e s e n t there is not any change.
But if on 31 December 1963 t h e Khmer S e m i
radio is s t i l l f u n c t i o n i n g - - t h a t is t h e t i m e
*&
e d i t o r i a l e n t i t led "Washington and t h e CIA" i n t h e
25 October Realites had observed, "We w i s h t~ make a d i s -
t i n c t i o n between a government and a d v e n t u r e r s . W
e think
I t likely t h a t t h e White House and Department of State
are n o t aware of a l l t h e c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t i e s i n which
this /Kgency7 has engaged i n t h e F a r E a s t . "
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l i m i t - - 1 . w i l l take appropriate steps.
I w i l l order our aged ambassadors abroad
t o r e t i r e , because t h e y are t o o o l d hid.
I w i s h to warn t h e F r e e World, especTalTy
the United S t a t e s , t h a t i f on 31 December
1963 t h e K h m e r Serei radio is s t i l l funct i o n i n g , I w i l l ask the United States t o
c u t off$ economic and m i l i t a r y a i d and
to withdraw its a i d missions Prom our
c o u n t r y . I w i l l . nbt c u t d i p l o m a t i c relations..
I w i l l only r e f u s e t o receive
aid,
I w i l l b r i n g in t h e Chinese t o
teach us new s o c i a l i s m . This is not a
bluff
fimphasis added7
-
.
Sihanouk's a g i t a t e d s t a t e of mind is reflected
o n l y p a r t l y i n t h e p r i n t e d t e x t . Even here, however,
his i n s e r t i o n of an u n r e l a t e d s e n t e n c e conderning t h e
r e t i r e m e n t of aged ambassadors h i n t s s t r o n g l y concerni n g t h e s t a t e of h i s mental h e a l t h . Elsewhere i n has
speech, h i s remarks took on a morbid east. Sihanouk announced t h a t ''they" would have to k i l l h i m to p r e v e n t
him from c a r r y i n g o u t h i s r e s o l v e .
("If t h e y want t o
k i l l m e t h e y m u s t do it before t h e /51 December7 deadHe might e a s i l y have added-that he haa n o t get
line,")
begun t o f i g h t .
As e a r l y as June 11963 there had been r u m o r s t h a t
Sihanouk contemplated drastic a c t i o n i n connection w i t h
t h e Cambodian economy. One r e p o r t !
i n d i c a t e d t h a t l e f t i s t m i n i s t e r s i n t h e government had
formulated p l a n s f o r t h e n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of c o n s i d e r a b l e
s e c t o r s of t h e economy, but were faced w i t h t h e problem
of b r e a k i n g through Sihanouk's d i s i n t e r e s t i n economics.
T h i s was n o t t h e i r o n l y problem: Cambodia's economy w a s
i n f l u e n c e d by a v a r i e t y of non-economic factors, i n c l u d i n g
urban h o s t i l i t y towards t h e Chinese merchant class, w e l l founded f e a r s of Sihanouk's e v e n t u a l p l a n s f o r t h e count r y , and the penchant 087 seemingly-responsible o f f i c i a l s
t o act on t h e advice of a s t r o l o g e r s .
1
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-
t h e ~ ~ m of
e r1963, and one m i n i s t e r argued there t h a t
t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of an agency t o s u p e r v i s e t h e e x p o r t of
rice would d i s c o u r a g e s p e c u l a t i o n and c u r b l o c a l Chinese
rice t r a d e r s . The economy, was g e n e r a l l y regarded as
s t a g n a n t , and each Cambodian had h i s p r i v a t e scapegoat
for t h i s s t a t e of a f f a i r s . Sihanouk, for one, c o n s i d e r e d
t h e U,S.-sponsored commodity import program, which alloc a t e d f o r e i g n exchange t o t h e p r i v a t e sector of the
economy, as an i n c i t e m e n t t o s p e c u l a t i o n and g r a f t .
Although there was widespread agreement concerning
.
t h e need f o r economic reform i n Cambodia, t h e sweeping
s o c i a l i z a t i o n decree p u t o u t by Sihanouk on 10 November
was a s much a p o l i t i c a l a s an economic m e a s u r e . Sihanouk
viewed h i s t e r m i n a t i o n of U . S . a i d as t h e end t o Cambodiafs
n e u t r a l i t y , a symbolic r e p u d i a t i o n of' t h e West. By t h e
same token, he felt o b l i g e d , i n h i s search f o r a limbo
somewhere between t h e s t a t u s of a n e u t r a l and a Communist
s a t e l l i t e , t o r e o r i e n t t h e Cambodian economy i n a direct i o n consistent with t h i s political objective,
Sihanouk's speech 09 10 November was e s s e n t i a l l y
an emotional r e c i t a l of g r i e v a n c e s a g a i n s t h i s neighbors
and t h e West, ("As people s i n g 'Goodbye, Hawaii,' V s a y
I must t e l l them goodbye.")
It
gGoodbye, Free World:
w a s n o t a b l e s o l e l y f o r Sihanouk's announcement t h a t t h e
government w o u l d t a k e over a l l export-import t r a n s a c t i o n s
a t t h e end of t h e year. E s s e n t i a l l y , t h i s involved t h e
n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of a l l banks i n f o r e i g n trade, and these
Sihanouk d i r e c t e d to wind up t h e i r a f f a i r s by 1 J u l y 1964.
Although t h e N a t i o n a l Assembly had no foreknowledge of
Sihanouk's move, it rubbes-stamped h i s d e c i s i o n on 1 2
November.
Meanwhile, t h e Chinese Communists appear t o have
been' d i s t u r b e d by Sihanouk's assumption that t h e y were
prepared to a s s u m e t h e United S t a t e s v economic role i n
Cambodia. Messages from Chinese o f f i c i a l s on t h e 1 0 t h
a n n i v e r s a r y of Cambodia ' s independence were b s ief and made
no reference t o Cambodia's r e j e c t i o n of U . S . a i d . Sihanouk
w a s probably d i s t u r b e d by t h i s s i l e n c e on t h e p a r t of h i s
"great f r i e n d s
On 20 November-- i n 'an a c t i o n probably
designed to underscore h i s cozying-up to Peiping--Sihanouk
.
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121
-
_.
.named an unpromising son, P r i n c e Naradipo, as h i s s u c c e s s o r
as head of t h e Sangkum.
A t t h e ceremony of cremation of my
f a t h e r , P swore n o t t o make one of my
sons king.
I wish t o make it p l a i n t h a t
-f l a r a d i p o 7 is d e s i g n a t e d to replace m e
as p r e s i a e n t of t h e Sangkum. I do n o t
want h i m t o be king, b u t if t h e c h i l d r e n
want h i m to succeed m e as chief of s t a t e
i n o r d e r t o c o n t i n u e t o h e l p you, I
thank you a l l .
He is well educated by
q u a l i f i e d i n s t r u c t o r s . He is now i n
China, where Chen I and Chou E n - l a i teach
...
him.
H i s mother, P r i n c e s s MQni-Kessor,
has a l r e a d y d e p a r t e d t h i s l i f e . She was
v e r y virtuous, u n l i k e the mothers of my
o t h e r c h i l d r e n , who are less s e r i o u s . . . .
Most of my wives do not have good character. B u t this w i f e named Moni-Kessor
was v i r t u o u s . .During h e r l i f e t i m e , I
loved her less t h a n my o t h e r shrewd, bad
wives. She bore m e a son and passed away
a s h o r t t i m e l a t e r . This s o n of mine does
not know h i s mother. F o r t u n a t e l y , he is
now educated by Bilr. and Mrs. Chen I and
bk. Chou En-lai.
SihanoukPs naming of Naradfpo as h i s successor--an
act by which he d o u b t l e s s intended to assure P e i p i n g of
continued i n f l u e n c e i n Cambodia--coincided w i t h Peipirrg's
first p u b l i c e x p r e s s i o n s of s u p p o r t for Sihanouk's 5
November u l t i m a t u m .
In a s t a t e m e n t on 21 November, Peip i n g promised * l a l l - o u t support" f o r Cambodia in t h e e v e n t
of armed i n v a s i o n by t h e U . S , and its
PlayTpg
on Sihanoukgs s u s c e p t i b i l i t i e s , t h e Chinese communique
charged t h e U . S . w i t h l l f u r t h e r i n t e n s i f y i n g its aggress i v e a c t i v i t i e s t 1 a g a i n s t Cambodia f o l l o w i n g its anti-Diem
COUP i n Saigon.
.
Although P e i p i n g ' s announcement was probably h e a r t e n i n g t o Sihanonk, t h e f a i l u r e of t h e Chinese t o respond
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I
t o SihanoukOs 5 November speech w i t h anything resembling
a l a c r i t y , and t h e o l e a r i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t " a l l - o u t supportrt
would be forthcoming i n case of invasion o n l y , , was somewhat embarrassing. Cambodia's u s e f u l n e s s t o P e i p i n g as
a l l n e u t r a l i s t l l s u p p o r t e r had l o n g been recognized by Communist and Western o b s e r v e r s ; it now appeared t h a t Sihanouk's
o s t e n s i b l e desire f o r q u a s i - s a t e l l i t e s t a t u s w a s n o t evoki n g comfiarable enthusiasm w i t h i n t h e bloc
e
P e i p i n g ' s blase a t t i t u d e , t o g e t h e r w i t h concern
among h i s a d v i s o r s a t Cambodia's estrangement f r o m t h e
West, appear t o have had an e f f e c t on Sihanouk. On 13
November, w h i l e s t i l l a w a i t i n g a s s u r a n c e s f r o m P e i p i n g ,
Sihanouk s t r u c k a d i f f e r e n t n o t e . ''1 have a l r e a d y t o l d
t h e Americans," he s t a t e d on a nationwide broadcast, " t h a t
if they w i s h t o c u t a i d before 1 January 1964, t h e y are
welcome do SO do h h p h a s i s added7." Having i m p r m - t
any t e r m i n a t i o n of aid would be-on U.S. i n i t i a t i v e , he
c r i t i c i z e d c e ' s t a i n aspects of t h e U.S. a i d program w h i l e
praising others. He i n d i c a t e d t h a t i f t h e K h m e r Serei
r a d i o remained s i l e n t he might c o n t i n u e t o a c c e p t U.S.
aid, on a s e l e c t i v e basis
a
Frankly speaking, the Americans can
c u t some areas of t h e i r aid i f t h e y want
t o , even though t h e K h m e r S e r e i hold t h e i r
tongues. If they maintain other areas of
a i d w e s h o u l d c o n t i n u e t o accept it,
especially in the c u l t u r a l field.
.
e
The r a d i o s t a t i o n of t h e K h m e r S e m i
h a s n o t broadcast for s i x d a y s . Thus,
if)t h e Khmer Serei keep s i l e n t f o r good,
t h e n we s h o u l d c o n t i n u e to receive U.S.
a i d . . . I t is better t o c o n t i n u e t o r e c e i v e
a i d which materializes i n the b u i l d i n g
of r o a d s , h o s p i t a l s or dams.
E.
The F i n a l Breach
Following h i s n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n speech of 10 November,
Sihanouk was quiescent for about a week. H i s c o n s e r v a t i v e
-
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3 I P Y w x xE T
I
a d v i s o r s , so o f t e n cowed by t h e Sihanouk mystique, s o u g h t
t o impress upon him t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of h i s r e b u f f ' s t o the
West.* Sbmewhat n a i v e l y , Sihanouk maintained d u r i n g t h e
period 6-15 November t h a t he was prepared t o c o n t i n u e
r e c e i v i n g U.S. a i d provided t h a t t h e K h m e r Serei radios
remained s i l e n t .
The calm, however, w a s d e c e p t i v e o On about 1 4 Wovember, a f o l l o w e r of Son Mgoc Thanh--Preap In--slipped i n t o
Cambodia from South Vietnam to a m e e t i n g w i t h t h e governor
of T&eo province. Granted safe conduct while i n Cambodia,
:.
I
I
Preap In o u t l i n e d to t h e governor a p r o p o s a l i n v o l v i n g
t h e r e t u r n of Thanh t o Cambodia. Whether t h e approach
was an a t t e m p t t o e n l i s t t h e governor i n a coup p l o t , o r
whether Thanh w a s merely h o p e f u l of some f o r m of amnesty,
is u n c l e a r . The p r o v i n c i a l governor h u s t l e d Preap I n
t o Phnom Penh, w i t h a n o t e s u g g e s t i n g t h a t Sihanouk t a l k
t o him.
On 16 November, i n t h e same speech i n which he
named Naradipo h i s s u c c e s s o r , Sihanouk t o l d a g a t h e r i n g
i n Pknom Penh t h a t while t h e K h m e r S e r e i had suspended
t h e i r broadcasts, " r e c e n t l y . e t h e y came to Takeo province"
d i s g u i s e d i n U.S. uniforms.
After r e h a s h i n g his charge
t h a t t h e K h m e r S e r e i were supported by t h e .Americans, and
a t t a c k i n g t h e mechanics of t h e U.S. a i d program, Sihanouk
announced,
Children, beginning today U. S. a i d
is ended, Beginning today, the K h m e r
*Sihanouk u s u a l l y went through t h e motions of accepti n g advice from h i s m i n i s t e r s , and t h e conservatives-p a r t i c u l a r l y when s u p p o r t e d by the Queen--were sometimes
a b l e t o d e l a y h i s more p r e c i p i t o u s moves. On t h e o t h e r
hand, there is no evidence t h a t any of Sihanouk's major
d e c i s i o n s r e s u l t e d from t h e i n f l u e n c e of l e f t i s t a d v i s o r s ,
Although these were to be found i n abundance, p a r t i c u l a r l y
i n t h e information f i e l d , Sihanouk made h i s own p o l i c i e s
and, as has been n o t e d , was o f t e n con,temptuous of t h o s e
f u r t h e r t o t h e l e f t t h a n himself.
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Royal Armed Forces are free, as U.S. a i d
is ended. A l l t h a t remains for ne is t o
o f f e r a r e c e p t i o n f o r our f r i e n d s i n MAAG
who p l a y e d v o l l e y b a l l *kith us..
e .
I am going t o ask General Tioulong
t o v i s i t and ask f o r a i d from t h e f r i e n d l y
S o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s which h a v e s a i d t h e y
l i k e n e u t r a l Cambodia. Cambodia is now more
n e u t r a l t h a n b e f o r e because it. no l o n g e r
accepts U.S. a i d .
By choosing to regard t h e Preap I n a f f a i r a s e q u i v a l e n t t o a resumption of K h m e r Serei b r o a d c a s t i n g , Sihanouk
once a g a i n demonstrated t h a t h i s u l t i m a t a , although somet i m e s modified, were n o t i d l e t h r e a t s . Having made h i s
d e c i s i o n , Sihanouk sought t o impress upon his people t h e
American p e r f i d y which had prompted a r e j e c t i o n of aid.
On 19 November, a t a special r a l l y i n Phnom Penh, Sihanouk
surfaced Preap In, along w i t h a p r e v i o u s l y apprehended K h m e r
Serei, and q u e s t ianed them p e r s o n a l l y .
After reminding h i s audience of t h e Dap Chhuon af-
f a i r , Sihanouk charged t h a t Son Ngoc Thanh--advised by
t h e U.S. and t h e South Vietnamese--had s e n t t w o of h i s
f o l l o w e r s , Preap In and S a t San, t o sound o u t s e n t i m e n t
f o r a coup by Thanh. Sihanouk quoted from a S e c u r i t y
S e r v i c e r e p o r t , which s t a t e d t h a t Preap In had a d m i t t e d
t h a t t h e K h m e r S e r e i were commanded by South Vietnamese
and U.S. o f f i c e r s , and t h e n demanded t h a t the t w o c u l p r i t s
be brought t o the r o s t r u m .
The f o l l o w i n g dialogue ensued
between Sihanouk and Sat San:
Sihanouk: Were you t h e announcer of t h e
r a d i o t h a t i n s u l t e d me?
San:
Yes, t h a t is t r u e .
Sihanouk: You see: I w i l l P e t you off
i f you s a y t w o words t o t e l l me whether
t h e United S t a t e s and t h e South Vietnamese
governments have supported t h e K h m e r S e r e i .
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Y e s , t h a t is t r u e .
San:
Sihanouk: Well! fiheers and applause7 Now
I am going t o l e t you off. B u t you hzve
o n l y t o s a y two more words....I ask you
t o t e l l m e who h a s provided t h e r a d i o s .
..
,
San: Yes, t h e r a d i o s belonged t o t h e V i e t namese government, b u t t h e y were provided
by t h e Americans
.
Sihanouk: You see: f i h o u t s and applause7
As f o r guns, who h a s g i v e n them t o t h e
K h m e r Serei?
San: Yes, t h e guns are Vietnamese guns,
b u t t h e y w e r e provided by t h e Americans.
!
Sihanouk: You s e e , it is v e r y clear.
/-s h o u t s and applause7 Therefore I t e l l
you t h a t you may taEe off.
I thank /Sihanouk;-/
- and t h e Congress.
San:
Preap In, whose s a f e t y had been a s s u r e d by t h e prov i n c i a l governor, was less f o r t u n a t e . Sihanouk asked t h e
crowd what s h o u l d be h i s f a t e , and i n t e r p r e t e d t h e response as a demand f o r t h e death p e n a l t y . Sihanouk t h e n
r e t u r n e d to San’s testimony and asked h i s l i s t e n e r s i f
t h e y were prepared t o make sacrifices on behalf of t h e
n a t i o n . He announced t h a t “our honor o b l i g e s P r i n c e
K a n t o l ’ s government i m e d i a t e l y t o inform t h e U.S. g e n t l e men t h a t as of today t h e y s h o u l d w i t h d r a w t h e i r economic,
c u l t u r a l , m i l i t a r y and a l l o t h e r missions
zpplause7”
-
..../
With the o f f i c i a l Cambodian r e j e c t i o n of U.S. a i d
on 20 November, Khmer-American r e l a t i o n s appeared t o have
reached a n a d i r . The impression of a Cambodia h e l l - b e n t f o r
s a t e l l i t e s t a t u s was underscored when, on 25 November,
it s i g n e d w i t h Communist China a long-pending c i v i l air
agreement p r o v i d i n g for a i r s e r v i c e between Phnom Penh
and P e i p i n g . The worst, however, was’ yet t o come.
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I
For a l l h i s penchant for d e a l i n g i n p e r s o n a l i t i e s ,
Sihanouk as y e t had s a i d l i t t l e t h a t could be construed
as c r i t i c a l of P r e i s e n t Kennedy.
There .was r e a s o n t o
b e l i e v e t h a t Sihanouk admired t h e P r e s i d e n t , and was not
u n a p p r e c i a t i v e of t h e red c a r p e t t r e a t m e n t accorded h i m
by Mr. Kennedy on h i s l a s t v i s i t t o t h e UN. The P r e s i d e n t ' s ,
assassination, however, came d u r i n g a period of stress
when Sihanouk w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y s e n s i t i v e t o p o r t e n t s and
a s t r o l o g i c a l p r e d i c t i o n s , On 2 November he had remarked
concerning D i e m O s overthrow,
Venerables and dear c h i l d r e n , YOU
know t h a t 29 October was t h e a n n i v e r s a r y
of my b i r t h d a y . On t h a t day, I went to
t h e S i l v e r Pagoda t o make my o f f e r i n g
and p u t f l o w e r s on t h e grave of t h e l a t e
King Norodom. I prayed t o my l a t e grandf a t h e r t o h e l p h i s grandson t r i u m p h o v e r
t h e enemies of t h e Cambodian people....
I prayed t o t h e l a t e King Norodom t o
punish Ngo Dinh D i e m q u i c k l y and e f f i c i e n t l y because his t h r e a t s a g a i n s t t h e
l i f e of our kingdom were becoming increasingly grave. *
..
I informed t h e v e n e r a b l e s and bonzes
who came t o Khermarin P a l a c e on 30 October,
on t h e o c c a s i o n of my b i r t h d a y , t o pres e n t t h e i r wishes and s p r a y m e w i t h h o l y
water, t h a t I w a s convinced Ngo Dinh D i e m
and h i s regime were on t h e b r i n k of c o l lapse and t h a t t h e y c o u l d n o t s u r v i v e
for long. They had persecuted Cambodians
f o r years. Now t h e y wanted t o d e s t r o y
Buddhism.
If t h e y d a r e d d e s t r o y Buddhism
t h e y would q u i c k l y go t o h e l l . . . . I t o l d
a l l these t h i n g s t o t h e v e n e r a b l e s and
bonzes on 30 October. I t o l d them t h a t
t h i s guy was ruShing ta his death. Two
days l a t e r e v e r y t h i n g occurred as I had
.
ant i b i p a t e d
.
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On 8 December, Thai Premier S a r i t d i e d of kidney
f a i l u r e i n Bangkok. To Sihanouk, t h e p a s s i n g of D i e m ,
Kennedy and S a r i t i n s u c h r a p i d s u c c e s s i o n could: h o t
be e x p l a i n e d away as c o i n c i d e n c e . That his p r a y e r s for
t h e punishment of D i e m and S a r l t had c o i n c i d e d w i t h
P r e s i d e n t Kennedy's a s s a s s i n a t i o n appeared to confirm,
a p r i o r i , t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t , too, had been an enemy of
ea-,
A t t h e t i m e of t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s death Cambodia
observed t h e p r o p r i e t i e s , i n c l u d i n g a three-day p e r i o d
of mourning. On 9 December, however, Sihanouk used t h e
f o l l o w i n g language i n announcing S a r i t ' s death on t h e
national radio:
.
At two-week i n t e r v a l s o u r enemies
have d e p a r t e d , one a f t e r t h e other.
A t first t h e one i n t h e South, t h e n t h e
great Boss and now t h e one i n t h e West.
A l l t h r e e have sought t o v i o l a t e o u r .
n e u t r a l i t y and t o make t r o u b l e for u s ,
t o seek our m i s f o r t u n e . Now t h e y are
a l l going t o meet i n h e l l where t h e y
w i l l be able t o b u i l d m i l i t a r y bases f o r
SEATO. Our other enemies w i l l j o i n
them.
Imminent j u s t i c e s t r i k e s t h e m
down. The gods punish a l l t h e enemies
of n e u t r a l and p e a c e f u l Cambodia. The
s p i r i t s of o u r formes k i n g s p r o t e c t u s .
The d e a t h of S a r i t Thannarat is a r e a l
re1 ief e
The " o f f i c i a l " t r a n s c r i p t was far more bland, ref l e c t i n g as it d i d t h e u s u a l watering-down accorded Sihanouk's d i a t r i b e s :
\
W e do n o t wish e v i l t o anyone, and
w e do n o t l a u g h a t t h e m i s f o r t u n e s t h a t
a f f l i c t others, b u t f o r u s who are Budd h i s t s and who b e l i e v e i n imminent j u s t i c e
it is no a c c i d e n t t h a t , i n t h e space of
one month and a h a l f , a t an i n t e r v a l of
several weeks, t h e leaders of t h e o n l y
c o u n t r i e s t h a t have caused harm t o independent and neutral Cambodia have d i e d .
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Meanwhile, S a r i t ' s death w a s celebrated by a week's
s c h o o l h o l i d a y , t w o weeks of s h o r t e n e d work hours for
government employees, t h e flying of f l a g s on p u b l i c
b u i l d i n g s , .and s p e c i a l m u s i c a l programs i n Phnom Penh/
When t h e S t a t e Department immediately p r o t e s t e d
t h e b r o a d c a s t , Sihanouk was a g g r e s s i v e and unrepentant
H e rejected t h e p r o t e s t , o r d e r e d home t h e Cambodian
e
ambassador t o Washington and most of h i s staff, and
ordered t h e chancery i n Washington p u t up f o r r e n t .
C h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y , he stopped s h o r t of a complete
break i n r e l a t i o n s : s u c h a s t e p might be un-neutral.
Moreover, Sihanouk's w i l d behavior w a s c a u s i n g u n e a s i n e s s a t home, t o s a y n o t h i n g ~f s p e c u l a t i o n as t o who
was going t o make up t h e $30 m i l l i o n annual a i d which had
been provided by t h e United S t a t e s - The free maxket
v a l u e of t h e r i e l was down, and b u s i n e s s a n x i e t y was ref l e c t e d i n an exodus of c a p i t a l and commodity hoarding.
!
As i n t h e d a y s f o l l o w i n g h i s 5 November ' u l t i m a t u m ,
Slhanouk i n early D e c e m b e r began t o s h o w s i g n s of une a s i n e s s 0 v e r h i s a c t i o n s . H e i n d i c a t e d t h a t he w a s psepared t o n e g o t i a t e a new aid agreement w i t h t h e U . S . pmvlded t h a t t h e terms w e r e more a c c e p t a b l e , and omitted
obnoxious p r o v i s i o n s s u c h as t h o s e a g a i n s t t h e mingling
of U.S. and bloc a i d , I n c r e d i b l y , a Cambodian c a b i n e t
spokesman, i n a i d t e r m i n a t i o n t a l k s w i t h U . S , o f f i c i a l s ,
decried t h e " u n i l a t e r a l 1 ' U,S. d e c i s i o n t o end its assls t a n c e , and urged t h a t aid c o n t i n u e f o r a t e r m i n a l
p e r i o d of s i x months, a f t e r which a new agreement could
be n e g o t i a t e d , He i n d i c a t e d t h a t under a new agreement,
MAAG and AID p e r s o n n e l w o u l d be p e r m i t t e d t o remain i n
r e d u c e d numbers.
Although Sihanouk retracted n o t h i n g , t h e e l e v e n t h attempt of t h e Kantol government ,to seek a continuat i o n of aid c o u l d o n l y have been made w i t h Sihanouk's
concurrence. Slhanouk continued t o i n s i s t t h a t he d i d
not want Cambodia t o become a Communist s a t e l l i t e , b u t
thought it might be d e s i r a b l e to become "free l i k e Yugos l a v i a . " He promised t h a t Cambodia would n o t become
Communist if there were no a g g r e s s i o n g a g a i n s t it. At
Sihanouk's r e q u e s t , t h e N a t i o n a l Assembly endorsed a new
p l e a . f o r a conference t o g u a r a n t e e Cambodids n e u t r a l i t y .
hQUP
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PeipingOs 2 1 November communique had stressed its s u p p o r t
f o r t h e conference p r o p o s a l , i n c o n t r a s t t o its vagueness concerning m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t .
In retrospect, t h e fiovember crisis involved no
actioa by Sihanouk which could be regarded as t o t a l l y
unexpected. He had warned for y e a r s t h a t he regarded
t h e threat of Communist domination as secondary t o t h a t
posed by Cambodia's neighbors, and would a c t a c c o r d i n g l y . > {
His i i a t i o n a l i z a t i o n measures were a more r e c e n t phenomenon,
b u t even these had been u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n c e e a r l y
summer, H i s i n o r d i n a t e concern o v e r t h e Khmer S e r e i , a n d ,
h i s f i r m c o n v i a t i o n t h a t t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s were c o n t r o l l e d
by t h e U.S., were a matter of r e c o r d .
The s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e November crisis t h u s l a y
n o t i n any s i n g l e a c t i o n by Sihanouk, b u t i n t h e i r cumulat i v e e f f e c t coming as t h e y d i d i n close s u c c e s s i o n . In
t h e space of three weeks he managed t o b r i n g an end to
U.S. aid, f o r c e t h e ouster of Western banking i n s t i t u t i o n s , and b r i n g Cambodia t o t h e b r i n k of a d i p l o m a t i c
r u p t u r e w i t h the United States. In so doing he a l l b u t
i s o l a t e d Cambodia f r o m t h e West, w h i l e c r e a t i n g a p o l i t i c a l and economic vacuum which he probably hoped w o u l d be
f i l l e d by t h e Communists. That t h e Chinese were t o o
a s t u t e t o take up where t h e U.S. had l e f t off w a s a t r i b u t e
t o t h e i r s a g a c i t y , n o t t o Sihanouk's.
F.
"APone and Unaided"
As a r e s u l t of Sihanouk's r e b u f f s t o t h e United
States, France was t h e on3y Western power w i t h whom
Sihanouk maintained a n y t h i n g resembling c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s .
Only D e G a u l l e , by sugpcsrting Cambodia's demand f o r g u a r ant.8es a g a i n s t its neighbors, had i n d i c a t e d t h a t he d i d
n o t share t h e Anglo-Saxon a v e r s i o n t o Sihanoukqs brand
of n e u t r a l i s m .
In l a t e November, Sihanouk elaborated on h i s c a l l
for a conference on Cambodia w i Z h a p r o p o s a l for t h e l i n k i n g of Cambodia and South Vietnam i n t o a " n e u t r a l confedi
eration"--in e f f e c t , combining h i s p e r i o d i c p l e a s for t h e
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n e u t r a l i z a t i o n of both c o u n t r i e s . Even t h e Wench Pound
t h i s hard to take, and P a r i s press organs charged Sihaneuk
w i t h a t t e m p t i n g to p e r p e t u a t e t h e d i v i s i o n of Vietnam.
Sihanouk, however, argued &hat t h e Comunists could n o t
be defeated i n South Vietnam, and waua/d n o t permit t h e
n e u t r a l i z a t i o n of a l l of Vietnam, ("But how can t h e
V i e t Minh adopt a n e u t r a l p o l i c y when they are already
Red? The Red color can never be washed and made white.")
To Sihanouk's way of t h i n k i n g , t h e r e f o r e , t h e only hope
f o r South Vietnam l a g i n s e c u r i n g H a n o i q s consent t o 9 t s
neutralization.
-
By t h e end of 1963 Sihanouk had f l o a t e d a s u f f i c i e n t
number of schemes i n v o l v i n g n e u t r a l i z a t i o n g u a r a n t e e s f o r
Cambodia t h a t t h e government felt o b l i g e d t o c l a r i f y which
one was o p e r a t i v e . A r o y a l communique recalled Chat i n
A u g u s t 1962 Sihanouk had asked the s i g n a t o r i e s t o t h e 14n a t i o n agreement on L a o t i a n n e u t r a l i t y to work o u t a
s i m i l a r agreement t o assure the n e u t r a l i t y and t e r i i t o r i a l
i n t e g r i t y of Cambodia. When t h e Western powers, except
f o r France, had balked a t p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n s u c h a conf e r e n c e , Sihanouk had sought t o achieve t h e same r e s u l t
b y means of a reconvening 02 t h e nine-nation Geneva conference of 1954, and it w a s t h i s p l a n which r e c e i v e d
P e i p i n g s unequivocal endorsement i n its communique of
2 1 November. On 22 November, Cambodia had f o r m a l l y petit i o n e d t h e co-chairmen of t h e Geneva conference--Great
B r i t a i n and t h e USSR--to reconvene t h e conference. When
h i s " n e u t r a l conf edesat ion" scheme found no takers, it
was t o t h e nine-power conference p l a n t h a t Sihanouk returned
.
'Eo Sihanouk, B r i t a i n s obstruct ionism concerning
t h e conference p u t t h e B r i t i s h i n t h e same class as t h e
Americans. The B r i t i s h had r e p l i e d t h a t t h e y w o u l d supPOP$ any proposal acceptable t o Cambodia and its neighbors--the l a t t e r a q u a l i f i c a t i o n t h a t e f f e c t i v e l y r u l e d
o u t any conference and i n f u r i a t e d Sihanouk, On 1 4 December,
Sihanouk d e l i v e r e d an emotional d i a t r i b e a g a i n s t Great
B r i t a i n which ranked w i t h any t h a t he had d e l i v e r e d a g a i n s t
the United S t a t e s .
,
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5
I t was just l i k e a race of s n a i l s
y e s t e r d a y when t h e B r it ish Ambassador
came t o see MI-. Sambath and t o l d him
t h a t it is now v e r y d i f f i c u l t fop. t h e
B r i t i s h , who are the Cambodians' f r i e n d s ,
t o a s s i s t t h e Cambodians. B r i t i s h gentlemen, what is t h e matter w i t h yau? What
problem are you f a c i n g ?
....
How long have t h e B r i t i s h helped
Cambodia? They have never helped Cambodia. eMr. Khrushchev s'tated that t h e
conference on Laos was i n i t i a t e d by Cambodia a n d A s oit w a s n e c e s s a r y t o hold
t h e conference i n Phnom Penh.,..He t h u s
honored Cambodia g r e a t l y . O u r c o u n t r y
of Cambodia was g r e a t l y honored t h a n k s
t o I&.
Khrushchev. And who opposed
Phnom Penh as t h e s i t e of t h e conference?
Great B r i t a i n , It was Great B r i t a i n . ,
e .
..
They t h i n k t h a t t h e Cambodians are
Negroes
e
Sihanouk continued i n semieoherent f a s h i o n , f i n a l l y announcing t h a t he was c l o s i n g t h e Cambodian embassy in
London, though not r e c a l l i n g h i s ambassador. He left
no doubt as to h i s p e r s o n a l a t t i t u d e towards t h e B r i t i s h
and t h e A m e s i c a n s :
TQ avoid d i s p u t e s on t h e d e a t h of
Sarit...H no l o n g e r want t h e Anglo-Saxon
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s h e r e . T h i s is t h e o n l y
way t o avoid d i s p u t e s . In o t h e r words,
i n o r d e r for us t o have peace w i t h t h e
Anglo-Saxons. it is b e t t e r f o r t h e B r i t i s h
t h e Americans n o t t o s t a y i n Cambodia
If YOU want t o s t a y , you
longer.
s t a y . B u t do n o t s a y t h a t w e i n v i t e d
t o s t a y . It is b e t t e r for you t o leave
country.
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December brought no improvement i n Cambodia's
r e l a t i o n s with &he United S t a t e s . Hn Washington, Ass i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of State Earriman c o n s u l t e d with Cambodian Ambassador Nong Kimny, and suggested t h a t Dean
Acheson be sent to Bhnom Penh for t a l k s w i t h Sihanaou%.*
I n Cambodia, Sihanoulk q u i c k l y t h r e w c o l d water on any
such a move
In a speech, on 18 December, Sihanouk set
t h r e e p r e c o n d i t i o n s to any m e e t i n g w i t h Acheson: t h a t
the United States would withdraw its charge t h e Sihansuk's
s l u r on P r e s i d e n t Kennedy w a s " b a r b a r i c ; " t h a t t h e h e r i can embassy would withdraw its p r o t e s t over t h e i n c i d e n t ;
and t h a t C I A would s i l e n c e the K&ner Serei r a d i o . Vdless these c o n d i t i o n s were m e t , s a i d Sihanouk, a t r i p
to Cambodia by Acheson would be lluseless.lv
a
. .
A ' s i d e l i g h t to Sihanouk * P f u l m i n a t i o n s a g a i n s t
t h e West is t h e r e a c t i o n t o them fn Peiping and Moscow.
Although hard evidence is l a c k i n g , there were i n d i c a t i o n s
t h a t t h e b l o c was somewhat p u t off by Sihanouksg e r r a t i c
behavior. Not =til 114 December d i d Psavda mention Sihanoukos November appeal for a new Geneva conference, and
then P i m i % e d its comment to a low-keyed r e f e r e n c e to t h e
need to preserve Cambodia's n e u t r a l i t y . Also in midDecember, t h e Cambodian ambassador. t o P e i p i n g was quoted
as s a y i n g that n e i t h e r he personaiiy nor t n e Yenping rehime was "in accord" w i t h Sihanouk's
r e c e n t a c t i o n s . The mbrssador added that Sihanouk--who
had been undergoing a d r a s t i c reducing d i e t - - d i d n o t look
81w e l l and '9shou8d be under p s y c h i a t r i c c a r e . "
Although Sihanouk's b a i t i n g
0% the
West i n s p i r e d
most of t h e head~dnaes, w i t h i n Cambodia it w a s no& h i s
XenQpPhQbla b u t h i s economic decrees t h a t i n s p i r e d the
strongest r e a c t i o n . During December, Sihanouk railroaded
thrcsugh &he Assembly a law c a l l i n g for t h e n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n
*Acheson, in his p r i v a t e l e g a l capacity, had endeared
himself to the Cambodians in 1962 by sucoessfully r e p r e s e n t i n g Cmbodia b e f o r e t h e World Couqt in the case of
the d i s p u t e d temple, Preah VihetPs.
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of a l l banks i n Cambodia, much as he had e a r l i e r n a t i o n alized all foreign-owned banks. In Supplementary l e g i s l a t i o n , t h e government decreed p r i s o n terms for all bank
employees who r e f u s e d t o c o n t i n u e i n t h e i r p o s t s uaider
government management. The two l a w s aroused c o n s i d e r a b l e
According to one Canabodimofficial,
resentment
government officials, i n c l u d i n g members of the c a b i n e t ,
opposed t h e measure, and there was even mutter%nga g a i n s t
Sihanouk h i m e l f . The p r e s i d e n t of t h e private Bank of
Bhnom Penh Pled t o South Vietnam on 2% Bcernber.
e
The Assembly debated the nat i o n a l i x a t i o n m e a s u r e s
for s e v e r a l days, an unusual b i t of isot-dragging which
prompted Sihanouk to t h r e a t e n it w i t h Begislation p r o h i b i t i n g debate and formalizing its f u n c t i o n as a l e g i s l a t i v e
rubber-stamp.
He stumped t h e provinces to drum u p s u p port for t h e l e g i s l a t i o n , and t o b e l a b o r t h e U.S.
The
Assembly c o u l d o n l y b r i e f l y d e l a y the l e g i s l a t i o n , however,
and Sihanoukgs speaking tour s e r v e d as 8 reminder of t h e
hold he had on the people, In the end, all banks were
scheduled fop n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n by 11 J u l y 1964.
Analyzing Sihanouk's November-December rampage,
$he American embassy e x p r e s s e d t h e belief t h a t Sihanouk,
"alone and i n a sense unaided,11 had manufactured a major
crisis i n f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s o u t of t h i n a i r . The eaabaqsy
saw f o u r major f a c t o r s as i n f l u e n c i n g Sihanouk's conduct:
.a c o n v i c t i o n t h a t t h e Communists w i l l win S o u t h e a s t Asia;
h i s mental s t a t e , i n c l u d i n g apparent p a r a n o i a c t e n d e n c i e s ;
h i s p a t h o l o g i c a l hatred of t h e U.S.; and--in a m p l i f i c a t i o n of t h i s l a s t point-the
lack ~f any desire t o improve
h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e UnSted S t a t e s , C e r t a i n l y t h e reb u f f of t h e Acheson mission w a s no$ the act o% a person
who wished to r e s t o r e correct r e l a t i o n s w i t h Washington.
G o Any Kind of Conference
Bn t h e first half of 1964, as fer much of t h e y e a r
b e f o r e , the c r i t e r i a by which Sihmouk i d e n t i f i e d t h e
f r i e n d s and enemies sf Cambodia was t h e a t t i t u d e of each
c o u n t r y concerning a confereqce to f o r m a l i z e Cambodian
n e u t r a l i t y . Sihamoukgs a i m . was commendable, and the need
,/'
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:
TP) ShOW
t h e world OUT pa@ifiSlaa,
88Qd OUIP aXd@Qd lOWe $OF
neuQraXity, H propose today to the United
States and its t w 0 a l l i e s , ThaiUmd and
South Vietnam, a new s ~ l l ~ d i owhich,
n
if
approved , w ill settle our problem and
$0
OBF gOOd W i l l ,
the cornon crisis to the satisfaction of
both camps.
F i r s t , the governments of' the United
States, Thailand and South Vietnam will
send their p l e n i p o t e n i a r y representatives
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t o Phnam Penh.
e
to sign a quadripartite
accord according t o which t h e United
S t a t e s , Thailand and South Vietnam w i l l
r e c o g n i z e Khmer n e u t r a l i t y and the present o u t l i n e Qf Cambodian f r o n t i e r s .
In r e t u r n , Cambodia w i l l promise to obs e r v e strict n e u t r a l i t y , not become t h e
a l l y of anyone, and preven$ &he e s t a b l i s h ment of f o r e i g n m i l i t a r y bases on its
Cimbod i a w 1 a l s o prevent
terr i t s r y
t h e p a s s i n g t h r o u g h and the presence
on its territsrv sf rebel bands. /Emphasis
ia
added/
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*
w
For a t i m e it appeared t h a t a q u a d r i p a r t i t e conf e r e n c e might a c t u a l l y be h e l d . 1x1 c o n t r a s t to a Genevat y p e conzerence, where b o t h Communist China and t h e USSR
would be i n a t t e n d a n c e , t h e propaganda forum i n h e r e n t i n
8 q u a d r i p a r t i t e conference was less a problem t o the United
States. Sihamouk, however, began adding c o n d i t i o n s almost
e v e r y time he d e l i v e r e d a speech. He i n d i c a t e d that South
Vietnam w o u l d be expected Ita disavow, i n advance, any
r e s i d u a l claim to t h e much-debated c o a s t a l i s l a n d s . He
s t a t e d k h a t a c.ountrgqs a t t e n d a n c e at t h e q u a d r i p a r t i t e
conference would s i g n i f y its w i l l i n g n e s s to accept an enlarged ICC! for p a t r o l l i n g t h e Cambodian-Vietnam b o r d e r .
Not c o n t e n t w i t h t h i s campaign to t h s n t h e conference
i n t o a rubber stamp, Sihanoak observed pakenthet i c a l l y
%hat SaigonOs r e c o g n i t i o n (49 Cambodiaos n e u t r a l i t y m u s t
n e c e s s a r i l y be p r o v i s i o n a l , s i n c e the u l t i m a t e r u l e r of
Vietnam wolaPd be €Io C h i Minh and not any U. S. puppet.
Sihanoukgs p e r s i s t e n c e i n d e s t r o y i n g his own b r a i n Of a l l t h e means Sihanouk
c h i l d is not easily e x p l a i n e d .
+This is t h e only s t a t e m e n t ~ I W W to
~ the writer in
which Sihsrnouk has conceded i m p l i c i t l y t h a t V i e t Cong
bands were o p e r a t i n g w i t h i n Cambodia,, and t h a t m o r e could
be done t~ deny them t r a n s i t t h a n t h e Cambodian gevern-
meet was doing.
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. .
a g a i n s t t h e U . S . and B r i t i s h embassies turned i n t o P full
scale r i o t . A t t h e B r i t i s h embassyp 12 cars were overt u r n e d and burned; at t h e USIS office, some 10,QdbO books
were burned. Although there were no serious injuries,
t o t a l damage mounted to over $250,000. The v i o l e n c e
of t h e r i o t i n g was unprecedented i n r e c e n t Cambodian history, and a f u r t h e r ominous note w a s t h e f a c t t h a t government o f f i c i a l s were observed l e a d i n g the mobs.
A U.S. embassy postnmrteen on t h e affair concPuded
that although it was i n i t i a t e d by the government, the
e x t e n t t o which the 40,OOQ-odd p a r t i c i p a n t s wronl.d get
out of hand had n o t been f o r e s e e n .
Sihanouk apologized
for t h e CPbBlmage, and promised compensation. He added,
however, t h a t he c o u l d not blame the rioters, t h a t Cambodians were " h a b i t u a l l y k i n d toward those who r e s p e c t
them, ' and become wicked o n l y toward those who d e c e i v e
them.
In a speech immediately f o l l o w i n g the r i o t , Siheanouk
s t a t e d that he was abandoning t h e attempt $0 convene a
q u a d r i p a r t i t e conference. He stated t h a t he was s e n d i n g
a Cnmbodian d e l e g a t i o n to Hanoi, t o n e g o t i a t e r e c o g n i t i o n
of Cambodisngs f r o n t i e r s , and t h a t i f t h e n e g s t i a t i o n s were
s u c c e s s f u l Cambodian r e c o g n i t i o n of Wore&h Vietnam would
follow. He started t h a t Cambodia weuld n o t seek t o conc l u d e 81 arajlllftary a l l i a n c e w i t h e%therHanoi or P e i p i n g ,
as it was s u f f i c i e n t l y p r o t e c t e d by Chinags s t a t e d w i l l ingness to i n t e r v e n e i n case of outside a g g r e s s i o n a g a i n s t
Cambodia
e
I t soon became apparent that Sihanouk w a s a n g l i n g
for t h e best deal he coaPd make with either government
of Vietnam. On 16 March, he announced t h a t because of!
Wanoi*s f a i l u r e "to give a clear answer'' to h i s r e q u e s t
for r e c o g n i t i o n 0% GambodiaDs p r e s e n t b o r d e r s , he no l o n g e r
intended to r e c o g n i z e North Vietnama, At Sihanouk's suggestion, a South Vietnamese delegatiesn f l e w to Bhnom Penh
$OF't a l k s e
Once a g a i n there was a f l i c k e r of hope that, i n
the absence 0% a better o f f e r from Hanoi, Sihanouk might
reach some form of accommodation w i t h Satgor~. On 19 March,
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however, South Vietnamese forces a t t a c k e d t h e v i l l a g e
of C h a n t m a , s e v e r a l k i l o m e t e r s i n s i d e Cmbodisa, and
k i l l e d 1 6 Cambodians. The i n c i d e n t precluded any negot i a t i o n s , and Sihansuk warned t h a t if another such i n c i d e n t occurred Cambodia would i n i t i a t e ' f d ~ a sicfv
t m i l itarg
a c t i o n . For the m ~ m e ~ thowever,
,
Saigon's prompt apology,
together w i t h Sihanolak's pique a t ithe North Vietnamese,
delayed Cambodian r e c o g n i t i o n of Hanoi:
E s s e n t i a l l y , Cambodians r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e b l o c
d u r i n g t h e first half of 1964 w e r e rejBBecti'o'aas of its
deteriorated r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e West. f i t h e u g h Sihalnouk
p e r i o d i c a l l y t h r e a t e n e d t o enter mllitaary a l l i a n c e s w i t h
China and North Vietnam, Cambodia's estrangement from
t h e West w a s no% accompanied by a commensurate d r i f t in
t h e d i r e c t i o n of closer r e l a t i o n s w i t h the b l o c .
C e n t r a l to t h i s paradox w a s the p e r s o n a l i t y of
Sihanouk. On one hand, he overlooked f e w o p p s r t u n i t i e s
t o be of s e r v i c e te t h e bloc, p a r t i c u l a r l y t o China.
( I n A p r i l , Cambodia pledged " f i r m S U ~ ~ Q F %and
''
1L%r8terna1
s o l i d a r i t y 1 f with Cuba in i t s s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t t h e American i m p e r i a l i s t s ; in March, Cambodia s e n t a message t o
B r a z i l , urging; the releaseof n i n e Chinese Communist nat i o n a l s ttbarb8rously" d e t a i n e d by B r a z l P on behalf of
*WeS. imperialism"
On t h e other hand, Shhanouk remained
a confirmed n a t i o n a l i s t , w i t h a phobia concerning t h e
t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of h i s kingdom. Gjiven t h e s e circumstances, no great discernment was reglaired for t h e
Chinese t o decide ta l e t w e l l enough alone. Cambodia
was f a r more u s e f u l to t h e b l o c a s a thorn i n t h e s i d e
of SEATO and the West t h a n as a smgthl and u n r u l y s a t e l l i t e .
Sino-Khmer r e l a t i o n s in early 1964 c e n t e r e d about
SihanoukQseffo~tsto o b t a i n a i d , i n c l u d i n g m i l i t a r y eguipment, t o make up for t h a t once provided by the U . S .
In
March, Defense M i n i s t e r Lon N Q ~headed a Cambodian deleg a t i o n t o China, where he w a s given red carpet t r e a t m e n t
not u n l i k e t h a t p r e v i s u s l g accorded Sihanouk h i m s e l f .
MaoThe-tung expressed a d m i r a t i m far Sihansuk's p o l i c i e s ,
a s s u r e d Nolthat China wesuld a i d Cambodia in case of a war,
and, cur ioushygt,warned t h a t &Be Khmer, S e m i were p l a n n i n g
an i n v a s i o n of Cambodia. (In wntrast to t h e accuracy
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of p r e v i o u s i n f o r m a t i o n passed t o Sihanouk, there is
evidence t h a t the Khmer Serei Bas ever s e r i o u s l y considered an '*invasion" of Cambodia.)
I n China, the Lon Idol
m i s s i o n r e c e i v e d t h e red c a r p e t b u t nothing else. In a
s h o r t e r v i s i t t o t h e USSR, it r e c e i v e d a S o v i e t c o m i t q e n t
to provide two more MIG f i g h t e r s and a d d i t i o n a l antiaircraft guns.*
A t home, Sihanouk sought to rationalPze h i s unwi'811iragness t o take up t h e o l i v e branch p r o f e r r e d by the Xhamh
government. In a speech on 23 A p r i l , Sihanouk a l l u d e d
t o a c o n v e r s a t i o n Le had had i n Phnom Benh with Winston
B u r c h e t t , t h e A u s t r a l i a n ComnnunPst J o u r n a l i s t . Although
he conceded Burchett'S p o l i t i c a l bias, Sibanouk a p p a r e n t l y
accepted a s s u r a n c e s from him r e g a r d i n g t h e V i e t Cong:
I found o u t /zrom Burchetlt7 t h a t
t h e V i e t Cong havg attacked t h G Khmer
Serei for us. Each t i m e t h e y m e e t t h e
Khmer S e r e i t h e y attack them v i c i o u s l y .
Moreover, t h e Viet Cong have t o l d him
t h a t I s h o u l d not be w o r r i e d . 'We
pledge t o attack t h e Khmer Serei i n
Kampuchea for Sihanouk." The V i e t
Cong have sent me proof of t h e i r attacks
a g a i n s t t h e Khmer Serei.
,:E
s p i t e their need t o c u l t i v a t e MQSCOW for purposes
oh
Cambodian o f f i c i a l s f e l t much closer to China
t h a n the USSR. They appear drawn to P e i p i n g not only
by r a c i a l and g e o p o l i t i c a l factors, b u t by its m i l i t a n t
anti-Americanism.
According to one r e p o r t , S o v i e t off i c i a l s in Phnom Pelnh adopted a " d i s t a n t a t t i t u d e " t ~ wards one of S i h a n o u k g s Ewepean p r e s s a d v i s o r s because
of h i s a l l e g e d pro-Chinese bias. The l e f t i s t Despeche
e d i t o r i a l ized i n May, however t h a t , s i n c e Cmbod i a was
" n e u t r a l " between East and West, it s h o u l d attempt t o
maintain n e u t r a l i t y i n t h e Sino-Soviet d i s p u t e . I t
noted t h a t neither Moscow nor Peiping.had sent "CIA
types" t o buy up Cmbodiant consciences
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I n June, the United S t a t e s endorsed a p r o p o s a l
that a UPJ commission be e s t a b l i s h e d t o police t h e Cambodia-South Vietnam b o r d e r , but Sihanouk would have no
,
part of i t . He r e f u s e d to c o n s i d e r an57 s e t t l e m e n t which
d i d not take i n t o account t h e d i s p u t e d i s l a n d s , although
a show of goodwill on h i s p a s t might very w e l l have i q duced concessions on t h i s issue from Saigon. He c o n t e n t e d
himself w i t h a s s e r t i o n s t h a t the bmrder w a s a l r e a d y s u f f i c i e n t l y marked, and Ithaat ne s a n c t u a r y was b e i n g provided the V i e t @@ngin Cambodia.' The m o s t l o g i c a l explanat i o n for Sihanou&*s a t t i t u d e is t h a t he w a s r e l u c t a n t t o
a n t a g o n i z e Hanoi by corning to any agreement with Saigon.
Y e t he had not hesitated Ita r e c a l l A i s Q W ~mission from
Hanoi i n March, and two weeks l a t e r had s e n t e n c e d 13
alleged V i e t Cong to a year i n j a i l for c r o s s i n g i n t o
Cambodia.
In e a r l y June, Sihanouk l e f t for one of h i s periodic
rest cures i n France. A b u l l e t i n by h i s a t t e n d i n g p h y s i c i a n s
there spoke of a 30-dag v a c a t i o n , and a l l u d e d t o ''a s t a t e
of f a t i g u e caused by p s y c h o l o g i c a l and material c o n d i t i o n s
Bic7 t h a t m e i n h e r e n t i n . .fib r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 7 , " No
5ne-was prepared t o take t h e glunge and say t h a t The chief'
of s t a t e was i n c a p a c i t a t e d . Some idea of h i s s t a t e of
mind, however, can be drawn from a speech i n e a r l y A p r i l :
If we have t o l e a v e Phnom Penh and
t a k e refuge, i n t h e J u n g l e s , d e a r c h i l d r e n ,
I w i l l not regset l e a v i n g nay b e a u t i f u l
v i l l a s . /Tn French:7 If I t h i n k o n l y
of my p e r s o n a l intePests and pay no att e n t i o n t o my peopleDs l i v e s , I w i l l be
comparable t o our i n t e l l e c t u a l s
Moreo v e r , what is war?. ,. .When t h e w a r is
ended I will come out from t h e j u n g l e w i t h
incomparable glory. I t w i l l be wonderful
for me. I w i l l be a s u p e r h e r o and so
forth, b u t a hero who w i l l r e i g n over
a r u i n e d Cambodia, a s u f f e r i n g people,
an unhappy people and an unhappy n a t i o n . e e
.
that
I
i
i
i
i
/ i n Khme~:7 Do not b e l i e v e e r r o n e o u s l y
A t t h a t moment
f am af'saxd of war.
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the c h i l d r e n w i l l know who is a f r a i d
of war
R e m e m b e r t h i s : when these is
wm, fear will make our intellectuals
u r i n a t e i n t h e i r pants.. e .
e
/pn French:7 Since t h e day we renounezd U . S . aia, we have never been so
r i a h in arms as we are today. Ha ha ha!
F i r s t of a l l , FPamce gives us enormous
m i l i t a r y aid. .The S o v i e t Union, People*s
China, YugoslavAa and now Czechslovakia
have asked to have t h e i r names i n s c r i b e d
on the list, Bee he@ bee! .As the L a t h s
say, "Si v i s pacem, para bellram."
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Bt would be d i f f i c u l t for anyone w r i t i n g about
Sihanouk, whatever h i s bias, to conclaade other than
that he AS h i s OW^ worst enemy, H i s b ~ ~ b a s wIPZ%
t,
rec r i m i n a t i o n s , and f r e q u e n t l y undignifiqd behavior have
a l l but succeeded i n o b s c u r i n g t h e t e n a c i t y w i t h which
he has p u r s u e d c e r t a i n fundamental g o a l s s i n c e coming to
power. In o t h e r words, w h i l e h i s t a c t i c s have f l u c t u a t e d
w i l d l y , his main o b J e c t i v e s m e l i t t l e changed s i n c e 1933.
In t h a t
Silh~OUIkfaced the %asks 0% g:sbinillag
full independence from France, of subduing the K h m e r
Issarak, of c o n s o l i d a t i n g h i s own p o l i t i c a l power, and of
a d m i n i s t e r i n g t h e government and economy. T ~ d a ylie is
preoccupied with e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same problem, to an
e x t e n t which raises q u e s t i o n s concerning his a b i l i t y t o
r e c o g n i z e changed s i t u a t i o n s as t h e y arise, Although
Cambodian independence is a f a c t , Sihanouk behaves as
though his c o u n t r y is i n imminent danger of SEAT0 enslavement. The Khmer Serei (Pssarak) are on t h e verge
of e x t i n c t i o n , y e t Sihanauk regards the motlrehe~tas a
dagger p o i n t e d a t the heart of Cambodia. H i s p e r s o n a l
popularity c o n t i q u e s at a l e v e l d i f f i c u l t for Westerners
t o comprehend, y e t t h e Prince c o u r t s h i s fo8lowers l i k e
a dark-horse c a n d i d a t e for c0eanty clerk.
alist.
To Sihanoukvs c r e d i t , he remains a dedicated n a t i o n %achy as i n 31952, his o v e r r i d i n g concern is for
the independence and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of h i s country, He has improved t h e s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g of h i s people, and for a l l h i s erratic behavjor, he has brought a
degree of p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y to C m b ~ d i awhich c e r t a i n l y
compares f a v o r a b l y t o a n y t h i n g to be found i n Laos, V i e t ntm or even Thailand. He has r e i n f o r c e d t h e Cambodian
s e n s e of n a t i o n a l i t y , m i n s u r a n c e a g a i n s t t h e Communist
triumph i n Southeast A s i a which he regards as i n e v i t a b l e .
The paeh which Sihanouk chose $or Cambodia i n int e r n a t i o n a l tf f a i r s w a s what he called n e u t r a l i s m , b u t
1
143
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which,
He has
issues
appear
itself
on examination, barely q u a l i f i e d as 8On-a~ignmQQt
r a r e l y been other than capittical of the West on
i n the Cold WEOF, and h i s professions
neutralism
based s o l e l y on Cambodia's f a i l u r e $0 date to a l i g n
by t r e a t y w i t h the Communist bloc.
Although there has always been a Bef$is% t i n g e to
it, SihanoukOs " ~ @ u t ~ ~ a lcon
i s ~be
n ~said
~
$0 have had three
r e c o g n i z a b l e stages, The first stage spanned most of the
t h r e e y e a r s up to the s p r i n g of 1955, dulpjllng which Sihanouk
was occupieQ mainly w i t h . domestic a f f a i r s , i n c l u d i n g %Re
launching of the Saangkum, During t h i s period Sihanouk
was c ~ n c e with
~ ~ ~t hde problem of Coxnsnunist s u b v e r s i o n ,
and could no% afford $0 antagonize u n n e c e s s a r i l y either
t h e East OF West. Ipe sought non-invdvement as w e l l as
nowalignment i n forefgaa a f f a i r s , and it is h a r d l y coinc i d e n t a l t h a t t h i s w a s t h e period of S f h a n o u k p s m ~ s t
l a s t i n g achievements. He secured independence, subdued
t h e I s s a r a k , b u i l t up a p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , and
launched Cambodia on the r o a d t o becoming 8 r e c i p i e n t
of a i d from both E a s t and West.
A t approximately t h e t i m e (0% t h e Bandung conference
i n 1953, Sihanouk began t o demonstrate a greater interest
i n i n t e e n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . He p r o f e s s e d $0 be a n e u t r a l i s t
of t h e Nehsu s c h o o l , and p e r i o d i c a l l y l e c t u r e d the West-p a r t i c u l m l y t h e United States--concerning its inabi'llity
to understand the Asian mind. Although Sihansnk enthus i a s t i c a l l y endorsed t h e " f i v e p r i n c i p l e s ' # of coexiseence
developed by Nehrta and Chou En-lai, C m b o d i a o s was a l w a y s
a small-nation n e u t r a l i s m .
There wets none of SukarnoOs
i r r a d e n t i s u b l u s t e r , or NehruOs third-force ambitions.
Probably because t h e Afro-Asians looked elsewhere for
l e a d e r s h i p , Sihanouk was never an e n e r g e t i c p a r t i c i p a n t
i n the n e u t r a l i s t bloc:. He could never see far beyond
Cambodiaos b o r d e r s , and t h e nonalignment which Sihanouk
c a l l e d n e u t r a l i s m had a n a t i o n a l i s t i c and prap2atic a s p e c t d
He probably had 8 l o n g i n g t o p l a y a greater r o l e on t h e
internat i s m a stage ; c e r t a i n l y he demonstrated a f irstclass i n f e r i o r i t y complex concerning p r o t ~ ~ matters.
ol
In p r a c t i c e , however, h i s interest w a s l a r g e l y conf ined
&O SQsltheaSt Asia.
-
144
-
The period during which Sihanouk made some e f f o r t
t o praCd;ice "tETl8" loeutS?di$$ covered the period fr0lB
e a r l y 1955 u n t i l some t i m e during 1959, In t h a t year
Sihanouk was shaken i n q u i c k s u c c e s s i o n by the Dap Clhhuoaa
kearolt, the p a l a c e bomb p l o t , sand t h e i n a u g u r a t i o n ob
propaganda b r o a d c a s t s by the Khmer S e m i , Even during
h i s middle period, however, Sihanouk's neutraalisn w a s o m
of c o ~ ~ e n i t ~
sather
~ c e than conviction. His ego s u f f e r e d
repeated b r u i s e s a t t h e hands of t h e United S t a t e s , part i c u l a r l y on t h e o c c a s i o n of his visits,to,$hs W.
By c o n t r a s t , h i s junkets t o the kloc--beginning i n 1956-were personal triwmphs as w e l l as economic windfalPs.
Sihanouk*s vanity was s u c h t h a t t h e red c a r p e t treatment he r e c e i v e d i n P e i p i n g and e l s e w h e r e i n t h e b l o c
generated g r a t i t u d e out of a l l p r o p o r t i o n to t h e amount
of aid r e c e i v e d .
There is no doubt t h a t d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d he f e l l
,
very s t r o n g l y under the s p e l l of Chou En-lai. The ensuing
honeymoon with Communist China d i d n o t prevent Sihanouk
from t a k i n g a c t i o n when n e c e s s a r y a g a i n s t Communists a t
home, b u t s t i f f e n e d h i s r e s o l u t i o n t o take a hard Pine
in his always-delicate r e l a t i o n s w i t h Thailand and South
Vietnam. @ambodiagsr e l a t i o n s with the United S t a t e s
cooled as he came i n c r e a s i n g l y t o link t h e United States
t o t h e p o l i c i e s of his SEA'IPO neighbors, and t o view U,S.
aid mainly i n terms of the l a r g e r amoqnts being s u p p l i e d
t o h i s enemies.
The P r i n c e ' 8 dark s u s p i c i o n s concerning t h e United
States were confirmed to his s a t i s f a c t i o n by the events
of 1959. From that time t o the p r e s e n t , he has never
t i r e d of r e c i t i n g t h e s t o r y of "C3Aos" attempt to over-
throw IhU, and of i k s alleged sponsdaship sf c l a n d e s t i n e
b r o a d c a s t s designed to Q V e k t h r Q W his regime. Nor h a s
he forgotten $hat China. and France, but not t h e United
Stakes, warned him of Dap ChhaonOs p l o t t i n g .
Under t h e
circumstances, it is n o t e n t i r e l y s u r p r i s i n g that Sihanouk
concluded that only China c o u l d be counted upon t 0 = S i &
in p r e s e r v i n g Cambodia's independence, I t was in t h i s
c o n t e x t t h a t he s e n t three sons to study i n china i n 1964).
A t the end of the yeas, in r e t u r n for 'bloc economic assistance, he swallowed t h e bloc propaganda line whole, r e c o g n i z i n g
- 146 -
I
I
I
I
I
O u t e r Hongol i a 9 s u p p o r t i n g Khrus)hchev on disarmament,
a t t a c k i n g U. S
i n t e r v e n t ion'? i n Laos and even endorsi n g t h e S o v i e t t r o i k a @lpoposal f o r the UN.
e
Over a p e r i o d of y e a r s Sihanouk had come t o t h e
conclusion--unenthusins$i@ally--t~~t 8 Communist t r i u m p h
i n Southeast Asia was a foregone c o n c l u a i o n o H i s t h i n k i n g on t h i s matter is uncPear; although he was doubtless
impressed by h i s visits to China he is just as l i k e l y to
have a r r i v e d at h i s b e l i e f on t h e basis of a s e r o l o g i c a l
p r e d i c t i o n s . The f a c t remains t h a t from 1960 t o t h e
present t w o dominant f n f l u e n c e s have shaped Cambsdiass
p o l i c i e s : hostility towzards t h e United States and the
assumption of a Communist t r i u m p h In Asia. On s e v e r a l
o c c a s i o n s Sihanouk has i n d i c a t e d t h a t there m e worse
fates than t h a t of a Commuljlist s a t e l l i t e , and he has cited
Poland as an example of a n a t i o n which has p r e s e r v e d i$s
i d e n t i t y even though absorbed i n t h e bloc. Sihanouk*s
v e r y r e a l f e a r that Cambodia may once again be p a s t i t i o n e d between Vietnam and Thailand h e l p s e x p l a i n his
f e t i s h concerning t e r r i t o r i a l guarantees. f o r h i s coun%ry,
and a l m h i s w i l l i n g n e s s $0 accept s a t e l l i t e status i f
t h e Cambodian n a t i o n c m be p r e s e r v e d by no other means,
Because of SihanoukPs penchant f o r a i r i n g h i s
hopes and fears on the n a t i o n a l radio, in speeches which
have of ten degenerated i n t o anti-Western d i a t r i b e s , he
h a s become s e n s i t i v e on the subject of Cambodia's "neut r a l i s m . '? He 1i n d s no incons isteney i n profess i n g neut r a l i s m w h i l e s e r v i n g as PeipingOs sounding board, s o
l o n g as there is no formal a l l i a n c e , arnd is prone t o
p o i n t t o CambodirsDsc o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h Wance as
evidence 09 its desire f o r t i e s w i t h t h e West. Only
i n unguarded moments has Sihanouk hinted t h a t Cambodia
has in fact abandoned n e u t r a l i s m . Cambodia was obliged
t o g i v e up U o S , aid, he observed on 5 November 1963, because he was gnable t o remain n e u t r a l ,
It was i n a s p i r i t
of k i c k i n g over t h e traces t h a t Sihanouk t e r m i n a t e d U . S .
a i d , d i s p a r a g e d P r e s i d e n t Kennedy, and threw himself a t
P e i p i n g w i t h shrill threats t o become a Communist satell i t e . But t h e t r e n d away from 8 more-or-leas t r u e neut r a l i s m can be t r a c e d back a t least t o t h e Dag Chhuon
affair
-
146
-
..
,
Allthough Sihanouk * s more dramat ib: tantrums have
involved h i s r e l a t i o n s with the United States and its
a l l i e s , Cambodian f o r e i g n p o l i c y has been marked since
1960 by disorganAzed b u t p e r s i s t e n t efforts to convene
an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference t o guarantee Cambodia's
n e u t r a l i t y and t e s r i % o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , Although t h e s e
is good reason to b e l i e v e t h a t Sihaznou& desires that a
conference be h e l d , he has made no effort to make s u c h
a meeting palatable to the Thais and Vietnamese, and
the conference may end up a easusblty of Sihanouk's dec l i n i n g e f f e c t i v e n e s s as an hteraaa%ionalp o l i t i c i a n .
N e v e r t h e l e s s , it should be recalled that t h e g u a r a n t e e s
he s e e k s wwould be b i n d i n g on t h e Csmununis.&sas w e l . 1 as
CambodiaOs SEATO neighbors, and S i h a n o u b - w i t h h i s c h i l d l i k e f a i t h i n t r e a t i e s and guaran&ees--is most anxious
t o o b t a i n recogni$ion by t h e DRV of CmbodiaVsp r e s e n t
borders
A p a r t from t h e q u e s t i o n OB t h e n e u t r a l i t y conf e r e n c e , there is s t h e r evidence &ha&Sihanouk has l o s t
h i s s u r e touch i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s .
In the e a r l y
1960s Sihanouk was a& h i s best i n obtaining f u l l independence from France, and in u n i t i n g h i s countrymen behind
t h e monarchy.
Re w a s t h e n c a p a b l e of f o r g i v i n g enemies,
made s k i l l f u l u s e of communications media, and was able
t o keep in p e r s p e c t i v e the r e l a t i v e threats posed to his
c o u n t r y by t h e T h a i s and the V i e t Minh. It is hard t o
r e C O l Z ; n i Z e in t h i s e a r l y Sihanouk t h e p r i n c e who c u t off
$30 m i l l i o n in annual aid on a whim, and who has so isolated h i s c o u n t r y from the West t h a t it is now dependent
om t h e goodwilP of Communist China.
N o great i n s i g h t is r e q u i r e d $0 conclude t h a t
SihsPnoukPs recent f a i l i n g s m e c f o s e % y related to h i s
mental h e a l t h . C e r t a i n of h i s p r e j u d i c e s , i n c l u d i n g his
d i s l i k e of t h e United States, can be Bxpltained i n terms
of some of his e x p e r i e n c e s . Others, such as his disprop o r t i o n a t e fear of Uhe Khmer Serei, h i s s e n s i t i v i t y t o
any kind 02 criticism, the f r e q u e n t Baorbid r e f e r e n c e s i n
h i s speeches, and t h e e x c e s s i v e v i t u p e r a t i o n of h i s c r i t i c s ,
appears r o o t e d i n Sihmoukes p e r s o n a l i t y , mere is a tendency among Western observers .B;s attelngt t o "pigeonholdf'
Sihanouk: $0 t h e f a v o r a b l y d i s p o s e d , he is 8 temperamental
- 147 -
1I
'. .
but e s s e n t i a l l y shrewd r u l e r , who h a s gained and p r e s e r v e d
h i s c o u n t r y P s independence i n t h e face of trenendous obs t a c l e s . To h i s d e t r a c t o r s , he is a p e t t y l e f t i s t t y r a n t ,
mad as a March h a r e , whose l i m i t e d achievements are a
byproduct of Communist preoccupation elsewhere i n A s i a .
To come up with t h e "true" Sihaxaouk it is not necess a r y to reject e i t h e r of t h e s e views b u t it is necessary
t o combine them. FOP a l l h i s p o p u l a r i t y a t home, there
is ample evidence t h a t h i s judgment, i n c e r t a i n areas,
is b a d l y impaired. H e does n o t appear o u t of t o u c h w i t h
r e a l i t y so much as a v i c t i m of h i s emotions. The mystique
surrounding SqhanQUk, which c o n t r i b u t e s so g r e a t l y to h i s
p o p u l a r i t y i n t h e countrys.ide, appears t o have bred a
sycophancy among h i s a d v i s o r s which p r e c l u d e s any e f f e c t i v e check on h i s a c t i o n s .
B a r r i n g a d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n r e l a t i o n s between Cambodia and Communist China, prospects f o r a significant
improvement i n Cambodian-Ameilcan r e l a t i o n s are not b r i g h t .
Sihansuk's hatred f o r t h e United S t a t e s is deep-rooted
and seemingly implaccable. If h i s commitment t o P s i p i n g
is today less t h a n t o t a l , and. presumably undefined by a
formal t r e a t y , i t s t i l l r e p r e s e n t s a f i r m belief t h a t Cambodia requires a champion and t h a t China is t h e o n l y one
available e
In view of the r e c e n t changes in government in
Thailand and South Vietnam, some improvement i n Cambodiass
r e l a t i o n s w i t h these c o u n t r i e s cannot be r u l e d o u t , ' ThaiCambodian r e l a t i o n s in p a r t i c u l a r would appear to be s u s c e p t i b l e 0% improvement, inasmuch as there is no l o n g e r
8 t e r r i t o r i a l matter i n d i s p u t e , and S a r i t is no l o n g e r
premier. Any s i g n i f i c a n t rapprochement however, appears
wnlikely i n the absence of a change in t h e balance of
power i n Southeast Asia f a v o r a b l e t o t h e V e s t . Sihanouk
has a l l u d e d f r e q u e n t l y to t h e i n e v i t a b i l i t y of a Co-uhist
triumph, and he is understandably r e l u c t a n t to offend
h i s "great f r i e n d , " Communist China, i n t h e i n t e r e s t of
any t r a n s i t o r y improvement of r e l a t i o n s w i t h Thailand or
Vietnam. By t h e stme token, he can be counted upon to
be mong t h e l a s t t o recognize any t r e n d a g a i n s t t h e Comm u n i s t s , s h o u l d one develop.
- 3.48 -
Sihanouk does not look for a l o n g l i f e f ~ r . t h e
Cambodian m n a r c h y , and i n h i s p e s s i m i s t i c moods ruminates
on t h e problems i n h e r e n t i n conversion $0 8 P e o p l e a s
Republic. B a s i c a l l y , however, he is far less i n t e r e s t e d
i n what form of government mag evolve i n Cambodia than
in p r e s e r v i n g it as a p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y . If i n t h e land
of the b l i n d the one-eyed man is King, Sihanouk mag in
f a c t deserve mention w i t h t h e Khmer rulers of old.
It is l i k e l y t h a t a successor regime t o t h a t of
Sihanouk--presumabl y r e p r e s e n t i n g some amalgam of pal ace
and Sangkum elements--would be more e a s y for t h e United
States t o deal with than is t h e c u r r e n t regime. ,The
faces of g e o p o l i t i c s , however, are u n l i k e l y to b r i n g
about any dramatic r e v e r s a l of Sihanouk's p o l i c i e s -by 8
s u c c e s s o r . Although a successor regime would presumably
take a more t o l e r a n t view of U.S. a i d , ' i t would be. no
more d e s i r o u s of a n t a g o n i z i n g China t h a n is Sihanouk, and
not n e c e s s a r i l y any more acclommodat ing concerning Thailand
and South Vietnam. The most r e a s o n a b l e hope is f o r a
r e t u r n by Cambodia to more of a "true" n e u t r a l i t y .
-
149
-
A CAIYIBODIA CHRONOLOGY
23 A p r i l 41
May 4 1
-
Sihanouk s u c c e e d s King Sisowath as monarch.
-
J a p a n e s e - d i r e c t e d t r e a t y cedes w e s t e r n p r o v i n c e s
i n Thailand.
-
March 1945
Japan a u t h o r i z e s "independent" s t a t e s i n
Indo-China; Son Mgoc Thanh i n s t a l l e d as Cambodian
premier.
-
September 45
French r e t u r n to Cambodia; Thanh goes
i n t o exile.
-
November 45
France forces r e t u r n by T h a i s of Cambodia's
western provinces.
7 January 46
-
France r e c o g n i z e s Cambodia as an "autonomous
s t a t e of t h e French Union," b u t r e s e r v e s most powers.
l a t e 1946
-
Khmer Issarak, s u p p o r t e d by V i e t Minh, appear
as Cambodian d i s s i d e n t group.
- Cambodian c o n s t i t u t i o n , p r o v i d i n g f o r p a r l i a mentary government, promulgated by Sihanouk.
6 May 47
- New Franco-Cambodian t r e a t y g r a n t s
Cambodia i n c r e a s e d i n t e r n a l autonomy,
9 November 49
September 51 - Son Ngoc Thanh r e t u r n s from e x i l e , b u t
French o p p o s i t i o h t o h l s independence a c t i v i t i e s
s h o r t l y d r i v e s him underground.
-
March 52
Thanh t a k e s t o j u n g l e ; h i s f o l l o w e r s merge
with Issarak.'
'
-
15-17 June 52
Sihanouk d i s c h a r g e s government, b e g i n s
3-year " r o y a l mandate. '*
13 J a n u a r y 53 - Sihanouk d i s s o l v e s Assembly, s t s e n g t h e n b g
h i s c o n t r o l of government.
-150-
..
,
May 53
-
Key I s s a r a k l e a d e r , Puth Chhay, reconciles
w i t h Sihanouk.
-
Jwne 53
Sihanoukgs one-week e x i l e i n Bangkok seeks
to draw attentican t o Cambodian demand f o r f u l l
independence.
J u l y 53
-
Sihanouk, a t Riviesa and New Pork, p u b l i c i z e s
independence demand.
'9 November 53
- Cambodia f u l l y independent.
-
February 54
Continuing Issa+a& d e f e c t i o n s .&o government l a r g e l y i s o l a t e Thanh.
-
April 54
Heavy f i g h t i n g i n Vietnam s p i l l s i n t o
n o r t h e r n Cambodia.
J u l y 54 - Geneva Conference ends Vietnam war, p r o v i d e s
for Cambodian n e u t r a l i t y .
September 54 - Thanh a s k s amnesty of Sihanouk and is
ref used.
January 55
-
2 March 55
-
U.S. begins a i d program to Cambodia.
Sihanouk a b d i c a t e s as King, naming f a t h e r
as successoP
0
A p r i l 55 - Sihanouk o r g a n i z e s Sangkum as o r g a n i z a t i o a a l
vehicle
e
-
Bandung Conference b r i n g s Cambodian endorse*men&of FAve P r i n c i p l e s , launches Sihanouk as
Rehru-style n e u t r a l i s t
A l p s i x 55
May 55
- Cambodia concludes m i l i t a r y assistance .agreement
w i t h U.S.
December 55
-
Cambodia admitted t o UN;
11 September 55
- Sangkkum wins
all Assembly seats i n election..
-151-
-
February 56
Sihanouk, on f i r s t v i s i t t~ P e i p i n g , is
promised Chinese aid
May 56
-
Cambodia and USSR a g r e e to establish d i p l o m a t i c
relations.
-
November 56
Chou En-lai v i s i t s Phnom Penh.
1
-
6 November 57
Sihanouk s i g n s " n e u t r a l i t y l a w , " pledging
m i l i t a r y o r ideological pacts.
IO
-
March 38
Sangkum wins n e a r l y 100% of vote An Pssemblg
elec%
ions.
22 J u l y 58
-
Sihanouk r e c o g n i z e s Peiping.
14-29 August 58
-
Sihanouk makes second visit t o China.
-
Sihanouk v i s i t s U . S . ,
September-October 58
by p r o t o c o l t r e a t m e n t .
is offended
January 59 - Sam Sary flees Cambodia, is accused of
p l o t t i n g a g a i n s t Sihanouk.
February 59 - Sihanouk guts down Dap Chhuon r e v o l t
f o l l o w i n g warnings from S o v i e t s , Chicoms, French.
f
-
March 59
Jungle t r a n s m i t t e r s i n i t i a t e Khmer S e r e i
propaganda b r o a d c a s t s .
13 June 59 - V i s i t to ?horn Penh by Thai f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r
b r i n g s s h o r t - l i v e d 'press truce.
-
31 August 59
Bomb a t t r i b u t e d t o Son Wgoc Thanh and Sam
Sary explodes i n p a l a c e , killing t h r e e .
-
October 59
Cambodia submits its claim t o Preah V i h e a r
temple to World Court.
-
A p r i l 60
King: Suramarit d i e s ; three-man regency serves
.
as stopgap,
-152-
!
..
I
5-9 M~~
-
60
June 60
dune 60
Chou En-lai visits Cambodia.
- Sihanouk s e n d s three s o n s t o s t u d y i n Communist
China e
- C o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendment makes Sihanouk Chief
of State.
-
September-October 60
Sihanouk speaks a t UEJ, again
irked by t r e a t m e n t i n U.S.
December 60
May 6 1
-
-
Sihanouk makes t h i r d pilgrimage t o P e i p i n g .
Sihanouk c h a i r s Geneva conference on Laos.
-
Sihanouk a t t e n d s Belgrade conferSeptember-October 6 1
ence of non-aligned n a t i o n s ; tabes moderate
neutralist line
-
October 6 1
Resumption of press w a r causes Cambodia to
break s e l a t i o n s w i t h Thailand
-
Cambodia asks t h a t 1954 Geneva conference
reconvene to g u a r a n t e e Cambodia's n e u t r a l i t y and
terr itssi a l i n t egrlty
A u g u s t 62
- Sihanouk observes t h a t "China has saved"
Cambodia from Thailand and South Vietnam.
20 A u g u s t 62
-
September 62
Sihanouk t h r e a t e n s t o a s k P e i p i n g to
seat ion troops in Cambodia
!
September 62
-
Cambodia a g r e e s t o exchange ambassadors
w i t h Albania.
-
October 62
Sihanouk d i s t u r b e d by Sino- Endian f i g h t i n g ,
condemns West for " L n c i t i n g I n d i a t o provoke China."
November 62 - Sihanouk warns Saigon t h a t new border i n c u r s i o n s
w i l l b r i n g c a l l f o r Chinese t r o o p s .
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December 62 - Sihanouk v i s i t s Indonesia, a t t e n d s Colombo
conference on Sino- I n d i a n s i t u a t i o n .
January-February 6 3 - Sihanouk v i s i t s I n d i a and China;
won over to Chicom l i n e on Sino-Indian f i g h t i n g .
- USSR o f f e r s Cambodia MIG a i r c r a f t and a n t i a i r c r a f t guns ; Sihanouk's acceptance b r e a k s
Western arms monopoly.
A p r i l 63
-
1-6 May 63 L i u Shao-chi visits Cambodia, amid rumors
of Chinat p l o t to a s s a s s i n a t e h i m .
-
27 A u g u s t 63
Cambodia breaks r e l a t i o n s w i t h South
Vietnam; holds of% r e c o g n i t i o n of Hanoi.
5 November 63
-
Sihanouk warns t h a t he w i l l t e r m i n a t e
U.S. a i d if K h m e r Serei b r o a d c a s t s n o t h a l t e d
by 31 December.
16 November 63
-
19 November 63
-
10 November 63
Sihanouk decrees n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of banks.
Sihanouk names a son t h e n i n P e i p i n g ,
P r i n c e Naradipo, a s h i s h e i r a s head of Sangkum.
Sihanouk t e r m i n a t e s U.S. a i d f o l l o w i n g
apprehension of two alleged Khmer S e r e i a g e n t s .
I
-
21 November 63
Beiping b e l a t e d l y promises " a l l - o u t
support" f o r Cambodia i n case of invasion.
25 November
-
S.ino-Cambodian c i v i l a i r agreement s i g n e d .
-
1 December 63
Sihanouk urges n e u t r a l i z a t i o n of SE A s i a ,
i n c l u d i n g South Vietnam.
- Sihanouk d i s p a r a g e s l a t e P r e s i d e n t Kennedy
as enemy of Cambodia.
6 December
-
3 December 63
Sihanouk a t t a c k s " u n i l a t e r a l " U . S . a i d
t e r m i n a t i o n , urges new agreement.
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.. ...
-
January 64 French m i l i t a r y mi9sioa offers Cambodia
tanks trucks prop aircraft.
-
February 64
Sihanouk offers t.0 settle for f ~ u r - p o w 6 ~
(Thailand, South Vietnam, U.S.
Cambodia) on
neutrality guarantee.
-
Saigon sends ItliSSiQPl to Phnom Penh t o
2 Mmch 64
pave way for 4-power conference
10 March 64 - Eon MOP m i l i t a r y m i s s i o n leaves for China,
USSR to seek arm.
11 Isarch 64 - Rioters s a c k U.S., British embassies i n
protest over delay i n neutrality ~ ~ n f e r e n ~ e . .
-
19 March 64
ABVN OOPS kill 16 i n Cambodia border
v i l l a g e ; o u t c r y forces withdrawal of Saigon mission.
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ANNEX "B"
T h i s is t o inform a l l dear' c i t i z e n s t h a t f o l l o w i n g
t h e r e c e n t e v e n t which provoked d i s c o n t e n t and dishonor
i n a number of families of compatriots, t h e l a t t e r came
.to t e l l m e t h e i r s u f f e - r i n g s . For my p a r t , I[ was d i s tressed by t h i s news and f e l t p i t y f o r these f a m i l i e s .
They complained to me t h a t H i s Royal Highness P r i n c e
Yuvanath, my eldest s o n , had gone to bed w i t h t h e i r
daughters. On l e a r n i n g t h i s , I was s o r r y for t h e honor
and f u t u r e of those g i r l s who had i n v o l u n t a r i l y allowed
themselves t o be l e d i n t o l o s i n g t h e l r maidenhood. Q u i t e
a t a l o s s t o assist these bpothers and sons because I
was faced w i t h accomplished f a c t s , I c o u l d do nothing
b u t s e e k ways t o a l l e v i a t e t h e i r g r i e f . Therefore, I
made e n t r e a t i e s t o t h e p a r e n t s and t u t o r s of t h o s e g i r l s
and p a i d them i n d e m n i t i e s .
To s p a r e a l l c i t i z e n s d i s h o n o r and g r i e f , I must
inform them t h a t s i n c e I have n o t i c e d t h a t my e l d e s t
son Norodom Yuvanath Pikes o n l y to r u n a f t e r g i r l s , I
have r e p e a t e d l y advised and s c o l d e d h i m . Whenever I
d i d so, he promised m e obedience or remained s i l e n t 8 ; ,
B u t once o u t of s i g h t , he became q u i t e h i s old self a g a i n
and d i d not make a5y change; Then I t h o u g h t of founding
a f a m i l y f o r him SO as t o provide him w i t h a moral
p r i n c i p l e i n a d d i t i o n t o t a k i n g o t h e r measures t o cur@
him of t h i s bad h a b i t . Thus, I s u e d on h i s behalf f o r
t h e hand of Miss Tea K i m Yin, a daughter of widowed
Mrs Khien Theanh,
.
On 20 January 1962, t h e wedding ceremony of His
Royal Highness Norodom Yuvanath and Miss Tear Kim YIn
was solemnly celebrated under t n e honorable a u s p i c e s
of H e r Majesty t h e Queen and myself; f b e l i e v e d t h a t
this wedding would n o t o n l y be a h e l p t o my s o n and a
s i g n of happiness f o r t h e b r i d e and bridegroom, b u t would
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a l s o serve as a n o t i c e t o a c q u a i n t a n c e s and t h e p u b l i c
t h a t young Yuvanath had t a k e n a w i f e a c c o r d i n g to
t r a d i t i o n and t h a t no g i r l s h o u l d h e n c e f o r t h become
h i s mistress. If a g i r l allowed h e r s e l f t o be Ped
a s t r a y by him, s h e would o n l y b r i n g d i s g r a c e on h e r
f a m i l y , and h e r f u t u r e would be i r r e t r i e v a b l y marred.
I
T h e r e f o r e , I m u s t inform a l l brothers and s o n s
t h a t on l e a r n i n g of t h i s communique, t h e y m u s t advise
t h e i r d a u g h t e r s and warn them a g a i n s t f a l l i n g in l o v e
w i t h His Royal Highness Morodom Yuvanath. As f o r m e ,
i n my c a p a c i t y as a f a t h e r , I w i l l n o t allow my s o n to
c o n t i n u e t o do s u c h t h i n g s and I w i l l c o n t i n u a l l y
a d v i s e and scold him. As of t o d a y , if c e r t a i n p a r e n t s
and d a u g h t e r s do n o t b e l i e v e m e and pay a t t e n t i o n t o
my warning, t h e y s h o u l d n e i t h e r c o n s i d e r m e a h e a r t l e s s
man n o r hold m e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r such facts.
Done on 1 A p r i l 1962.
Nosodom Sihanouk.
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.. .
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