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COIST HANDBOOK
Foreword
In the current operational environment, small units are forming and resourcing
company-level intelligence (S-2) sections. These sections or cells are necessary due
to the decentralized nature of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and go by a
variety of names that includes the company intelligence cell, the company
exploitation cell, the company S-2 section, or the company intelligence support
team (COIST). For the purposes of this handbook, the term COIST will be used.
In conventional operations, intelligence is passed from higher to lower
headquarters, as the higher headquarters is resourced with intelligence-gathering
capabilities and sufficiently staffed with the analytical personnel necessary to
collect, analyze, and disseminate pertinent information. In COIN operations,
information generally flows in the opposite direction. Small units operating on the
ground must gather and determine the significance of intelligence, often without the
assistance, analysis, and filtering of higher-level intelligence staff support. This
small-unit intelligence enables the company to maintain situational awareness and
possibly even attain brief periods of situational understanding and information
superiority as it conducts daily activities such as patrols, engagements, and combat
logistics patrols.
Key concepts covered in this publication include:
• COIST mission and purpose
• COIST organization
• COIST systems and tools
• COIST battle rhythm
• Integration of COIST operations in platoons through brigades
• COIST targeting
• Tactical Ground Reporting System debriefing techniques
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Company Intelligence Support Team Handbook
Table of Contents
Chapter 1. Company Intelligence Support Team Mission and
Purpose
1
Chapter 2. Company Intelligence Support Team Organization
7
Chapter 3. Company Intelligence Support Team Systems and
Tools
17
Chapter 4. Company Intelligence Support Team Battle Rhythm
25
Chapter 5. Integration of Company Intelligence Support Team
Operations: Platoon Through Brigade
35
Chapter 6. Company Intelligence Support Team Targeting
43
Appendix A. Ten-Step Tactical Ground Reporting System
Debrief
51
Center for Army Lessons Learned
Director
Colonel Robert W. Forrester
Chief, Analysis Division
George J. Mordica II
CALL Analyst
Brice Johnson
Production Coordinator
Kristine Bell
Editor
Jenny Solon
Graphic Artist
Dan Neal
Distribution Manager
Candice Miller
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED
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Chapter 1
Company Intelligence Support Team Mission and Purpose
The mission of COISTs is to describe the effects of the weather, enemy, terrain, and
local population on friendly operations to reduce uncertainty and aid in decision
making. This is a simple and clear mission with a powerful purpose. However, the
operation of the company COIST is far from simple. Company leaders must review
and interpret huge volumes of data on a daily basis to determine their relevance and
relationships. A few examples of this data include weapons intelligence team
reports, patrol debriefs, intelligence summaries (INTSUMs), link diagrams, and
be-on-the-lookout (BOLO) lists. Although the commander will determine and
direct the exact requirements for the COIST, specified and implied tasks usually
include targeting; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); patrol
briefings and debriefings; detainee operations; and site exploitation.
The COIST provides a 24/7 analytical, production, and dissemination capability at
the company level, which gives the commander options to exploit enemy
vulnerabilities. Analysis is focused on the company OE, with the ability to report
and help populate the overall battalion (BN) and brigade combat team common
operational picture. If managed properly, a COIST will assist the commander in
managing battlefield effects and operational expectations across all full spectrum
operations. COIST operations in a COIN environment are typically conducted in
conjunction with the company fire support team. The company commander
establishes a COIST that is a company-level intelligence section and provides an
array of capabilities to the company. The COIST is part of the command post or
fusion cell and has the following responsibilities:
• Provides SA and SU for the commander.
• Secures assets and intelligence information to target insurgents.
• Proposes targets to the commander for review and nomination.
• Requests classified products and sensitive information from the BN S-2
for inclusion in the target packet.
• Develops the company-level target packets, and requests assets and/or
effects in support of lethal and nonlethal operations.
Key tasks for COIST operations include the following:
• Collect data and conduct pattern analysis to include the following:
º Collect and analyze patrol debriefs.
º Collect all electronic data such as the Biometrics Automated
Toolset (BAT) and Handheld Interagency Identity Detection
Equipment systems and cellular exploitation from returning
patrols.
º Track and analyze all significant activities.
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º Generate analytical, assessment, and mission summary products
for the commander.
º Conduct local intelligence analysis, forecast enemy actions, and
prepare the threat situation template (SITEMP) to include threat
most likely course of action/most dangerous course of action.
º Battle track enemy significant activities to develop enemy patterns
and tactics, techniques, and procedures.
• Facilitate the exchange and dissemination of intelligence such as
information flow between company and BN S-2 graphic intelligence
summaries and intelligence sharing with adjacent units, as well as
perform the following:
º Maintain updated intelligence boards for outgoing patrols.
º Conduct mission prebriefs and debriefs.
º Produce, process, and analyze information/material from site
exploitation.
º Disseminate combat information and actionable intelligence.
º Continuously update all intelligence trackers and databases
(Tactical Ground Reporting [TiGR] System), and maintain SA
within the company area of operation (AO) and area of interest.
º Conduct predictive analysis, and maintain a predictive analysis
board identifying likely enemy activities over the next 48 hours
and over the next few weeks.
º Establish clear communications with the BN S-2 and adjacent
companies, and ensure that information flows both up and down
the chain of command in a timely manner.
º Request information from the BN S-2 as required.
• Advise the commander on intelligence-related matters to include the
following:
º Conduct intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) for
company operations.
º Support situational development and maintain understanding of
the OE.
º Recommend company priority information requirements (PIRs)
and specific information requirements (SIR) to the commander.
º Provide deception recommendations to the commander.
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º Conduct assessment of effects and exploitation following a
mission.
º Provide predictive analysis to the commander.
º Prepare to brief the commander on the current situation at any
time.
º Analyze friendly trends from the enemy’s perspective, and
identify unnecessary vulnerabilities and patterns the company is
setting.
º Request assistance from the BN S-2 to conduct specific detailed
analysis beyond company capabilities.
• Manage the company’s lethal and nonlethal targeting. At the company
level, targeting is the overall synthesis of all sources of available
intelligence—BN and sister-company INTSUMs, link diagrams, events
pattern analysis (indirect fire, sniper, improvised explosive device [IED]),
terrain analysis, BOLO lists, and most importantly, patrol debriefs. This
continuous data fusion helps create a running SITEMP of the unit’s OE.
º Work with the commander to further develop targets and identify
gaps in the current intelligence picture.
º Provide targeting recommendations to the commander.
º Assist in target development (both lethal and nonlethal).
º Develop company-level high-value individuals (HVIs) and
associated target packets to effectively action targets of
opportunity.
• Supervise the company’s ISR program. Based on the commander’s
guidance regarding particular targets, the COIST develops collection SIR
and an ISR collection matrix, which may require the COIST to request
BN or higher-level assets, task the company’s unmanned aircraft system
team, or work with the commander to task organic patrols to gather
required information through observation or tactical questioning (TQ).
º Conduct planning, synchronization, and request for assets.
º Ensure all casual and regular informants are entered into the
informant contact log and have been entered into the BAT system.
º Coordinate with the BN S-2 and human intelligence collection
team for review of products and the assignment of contact
tracking numbers.
º Facilitate walk-in informants.
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º Establish an informant meeting and debriefing area, and ensure
that security personnel are prepared to receive local national
informants:
* The meeting room should have chairs or couches, a table,
drinks available, an ashtray, large-scale unmarked maps
for map-tracking purposes, and no windows.
* When walk-in informants are expected, ensure that
security personnel are well briefed on what to expect and
what to do when an informant arrives.
* COISTs are not authorized to task a source. They may
request information from local nationals and other willing
informants.
• Manage the patrol prebrief and debrief processes for the company. The
patrol prebrief is not to be confused with the patrol order given by the
patrol leader. The prebrief is generally given by a member of the COIST
to the patrol prior to departing the forward operating base, combat
outpost, or joint security site. The prebrief is perhaps the most important
function of the COIST. During this brief, the team shares events that
occurred in the OE over the past 12–24 hours, route status, ISR collection
assets in use throughout the BN’s OE, SIR tasked to answer, other units
operating within the OE, BOLO lists, applicable target packets, and
predictive analysis based on analysis during the targeting phase. During
this process, outgoing patrols are briefed on the following:
º Current threat assessment for the AO with regard to significant
activities in the last 24 hours.
º Current IED threats and locations of concentrated IED attacks.
º Enemy activity expectations for the next 24 hours.
º Current HVI list with pictures if possible.
º Information requirements.
º Possible TQ guidance.
The debrief, when based on a solid prebrief, feeds the COIST with data
to continue its IPB and ultimately help begin the next targeting cycle for
the company. The debrief should provide feedback on all areas covered
in the prebrief as well as provide updated pictures and may also include
data from detainee operations and site exploitation. Other important
points regarding debriefs include the following:
º Debrief incoming patrols to develop the common operational
picture for the company AO.
º Ensure a standard and approved debriefing form is used to record
all pertinent information.
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º Post updated intelligence information for ease of reference by
patrol leaders, and consider operational security when choosing a
location in which to post the information.
º Identify little-known areas within the company AO that require
informal assessments by patrols to identify the following:
* Areas
* Structures
* Capabilities
* Organizations
* People
* Events
º All debriefs should be entered as quickly as possible as a text
report in TiGR so information can be entered into the database
and shared throughout the unit’s OE.
Detainee Operations
Detainee operations for the COIST are twofold:
• Ensure departing patrol units are armed with complete detainee packets
and the knowledge to properly complete the forms and use the equipment.
• Maintain detainee packet data, copies of complete packets, and track the
current location and status of the company’s detainees.
Site Exploitation
This function is similar to detainee operations in that the COIST must ensure units
depart on patrols trained and equipped with the proper site exploitation paperwork
and equipment. Upon completion of the patrol and following debriefs, the COIST
sorts through photos collected, downloads biometric data, and manages databases.
It is here that the COIST once again begins its data synthesis to update its targeting,
thus beginning the cycle again. The COIST submits document and media
exploitation material to higher headquarters in a timely manner.
COISTs must ensure company-level TQ does not inadvertently become unlawful
interrogation by adhering to the following guidance:
• TQ will involve direct questions only.
• TQ will not use interrogation approaches, defined as “any means used to
entice a detained person to give information he would not normally give.”
At no time will TQ involve threats directed at the detainee or his family.
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Conclusion
The COIST is not manned, equipped, or authorized by a modified table of
organization and equipment but is commonplace in deployed companies due to
terrain, distances, and the decentralized nature of operations being conducted in
theater. COIST functions are performed through an ad hoc arrangement of
personnel, equipment, communications, and procedures employed by a company
commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and
operations in the accomplishment of the company’s assigned mission. Companies
do not possess specialized staff personnel to perform this mission and must
constitute COISTs out of hide. Regardless of how large or how well manned, the
COIST must facilitate the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information
both up and down the chain of command. Providing accurate, timely information
assists, informs, and enables the commander to make key decisions and effectively
manage unit resources. The Army has formally recognized the need for a COIST,
and a pending force design update, when implemented, will address this
requirement.
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Chapter 2
Company Intelligence Support Team Organization
Companies, regardless of function, are currently neither authorized nor staffed for
company intelligence support team (COIST) operations. As mentioned in chapter
one, a force design update will address this shortcoming. In the meantime, tough
decisions regarding manpower and personnel are necessary. Every Soldier or leader
involved in COIST operations is one less Soldier or leader who can be sent on
patrol, provide security, or man a quick reaction force.
That being said, most commanders with combat experience in theater believe the
contributions of the COIST are well worth the costs associated with resourcing it.
There are multiple ways to man the COIST. However, a good rule to follow is, “If it
doesn’t hurt, it’s probably not the right personnel.” The payoff for manning the
COIST appropriately is large dividends in the volume, timeliness, and value of
information passed to the commander, his subordinates, and leaders to drive
operations.
The overall goal of the COIST is twofold:
• Aids the company commander in his decision making by bringing a fused
intelligence picture down to the company.
• Assists the battalion (BN) by providing a flow of bottom-up intelligence
to higher units.
While the COIST is a company asset, its effectiveness is contingent on its ability to
fuse diverse forms of information from both inside and outside the company sector
into a picture that will aid the company commander in his decision making. The
quality and format of the information one COIST provides have a direct impact on
the success of its adjacent units and thus these things must be managed from the
higher (BN) level. Consequently, the BN intelligence officer (S-2)/COIST
relationship is critical to the success of the BN. BN S-2 shops typically have very
limited manpower and therefore must set themselves up for success by putting
significant effort into the COIST processes.
Battalion Intelligence Section
The creation of systems whereby the BN receives analyzed intelligence products
rather than raw information will reduce the overall workload on the BN analysts
and lead to the creation of better intelligence products at all levels. To achieve this
effect, the S-2 needs to provide five things to the COIST:
• Training
• Standing operating procedures (SOPs)
• Guidance
• Feedback
• Advocacy
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Training
A typical maneuver BN only has school-trained Military Occupational Specialty
35F Intelligence Analysts within the BN S-2 shop. While mobile training teams
provide a baseline of training to most COISTs, many Soldiers never attend due to
moves within the company, so the S-2 shop must step up to ensure these individuals
receive basic analytical training.
In addition to basic analyst tasks, S-2 shops owe their COISTs training on aspects
of the intelligence fight specific to their particular area of operations (AO).
Examples of training would be the following:
• Instruction in the BN standard debriefing process.
• Classes in the threat groups and enemy tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTP) of a particular AO.
• Classes in database search techniques that would be effective in a
particular AO (i.e., entity-based searches versus geography-based
searches).
• Classes in the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets
that operate within the AO.
As the analytical skill of the COIST improves, more complicated tasks such as
intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), development of enemy courses of
action, and writing of company intelligence requirements (IRs) should also be
taught. If the BN S-2 takes a hands-off approach to the training of the COISTs, their
effectiveness will be greatly diminished upon arrival in the combat zone.
SOPs
The BN S-2 owes the COIST detailed SOPs on all aspects of COIST operations.
Again, the format and quality of information posted by one COIST have a direct
impact on the success of adjacent COISTs and thus must be managed from the
higher level. The SOPs required generally fall into four broad categories:
• Primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency communications
• Reporting requirements
• Intelligence synchronization products
• Databasing and knowledge management guidelines
Some common examples of procedures the BN S-2 owes the COIST are the
following:
• Battalion debrief SOP.
• Targeting products SOP.
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• Daily intelligence summary/graphic intelligence summary SOP (or
whatever format is used to pass information between company and BN
level).
• Data entry SOPs for the various Tactical Ground Reporting (TiGR)
System functions (significant activities, human intelligence reports,
signals intelligence reports, personality entry, place entry, and area
cataloging).
• SOP for the format of products produced by company-level ISR systems
(unattended ground sensors, Raven, integrated communications (ICOM)
scanners, Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment towers/Cerberus towers, and
biometric data systems).
• SOP for the immediate exploitation and then passage of information
gleaned from site exploitation.
• SOP for the exploitation and transportation of detainees.
• Other SOPs a BN S-2 might determine apply to a specific AO.
The BN S-2 must use his understanding of the overall intelligence fight as well as
his knowledge of the specific capabilities of various ISR and analytical platforms
when developing these SOPs. The basic guideline is the SOPs must be
understandable to Soldiers at even the most junior level. They should be written in
a way that maximizes the use of digital systems to make the company’s information
searchable to adjacent units. Commanders need to recognize the creation of these
SOPs is an extensive amount of work for the BN S-2 shop but is necessary to
ensure a smooth flow of information throughout the BN sector.
Guidance
While the COIST works for the company commander, the company is in fact the
best intelligence asset in the BN’s possession. As a result, the company will be
often tasked to answer BN-level IRs. The information a BN commander needs to be
successful can at times be broad and extremely complicated. The S-2 must work to
redefine this broad swath of necessary information into clear and specific
information requirements (SIR) and then work with the S-3 (operations and training
officer) to task these requirements to the appropriate units. Ideally, they will be
pushed to the company as part of the BN daily fragmentary order in the form of
specific orders and requests (SOR) or intelligence taskings. The S-2’s work does
not end here, however, as he must ensure the company tasked with the IRs has a
clear understanding of the meaning and importance of the request and then develop
an adequate method of tracking the results. His interaction with the COIST will be
crucial to ensuring these BN-level IRs are answered in a timely and effective
manner.
Feedback
The BN S-2 owes the COIST clear and useful feedback on all products it produces.
COISTs that believe they are operating in a vacuum and no one is looking at the
work they present will invariably produce substandard products. Feedback on
whether products such as debriefs and area assessments are meeting the intent for
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the BN can easily be entered through the comment feature on TiGR but is best
offered in a discussion between the S-2 and the COISTs. This discussion usually
takes the form of a meeting (either face-to-face or over a digital communications
system) between the S-2 shop and COISTs to discuss the information that has
flowed into each company sector during the week and also the status of any IRs that
have been answered or remain unanswered. The more feedback the COISTs receive
on their piece of the intelligence effort, the better the results will be for both the
company and the BN.
Advocacy
The understanding of COIST operations is still at a low level within the Army.
Often the positive effects of a successful COIST may be invisible to a company for
many months, and the commander and first sergeant may wonder why they have
sacrificed four to six Soldiers toward this effort. The S-2, however, should always
be looking at the big picture of the BN’s intelligence fight and therefore should
always understand the effect of the COIST. The BN S-2 is often the individual who
must fight for the most capable Soldiers to be assigned COIST duties. The S-2 must
also fight to limit the number of side or distracter taskings that COIST members
encounter. Finally, the S-2 will know the origin of effective intelligence and must
ensure that company and BN commanders are aware of what successes have
resulted from the hard work of the COIST. Only by sharing the successes of
effective COISTs can the BN bring about a general understanding of the
importance of their efforts.
Overall, the successful implementation of COISTs involves extensive effort on the
part of the BN S-2. If the S-2 fails to do the required preparatory work, his own
effort to effectively utilize the COIST will likely fail. S-2s must put in the required
planning to ensure the fused intelligence picture is pushed to the company level.
COISTs must understand that no matter what their geographic disposition, their
efforts are not isolated, and a failure to implement the guidance and SOPs of the
BN S-2 could lead to their own failure as well as a weakening of their adjacent
units’ COIST efforts. Commanders at all levels must understand the S-2/COIST
relationship to ensure effective flow of intelligence from the lowest levels up,
which will ultimately ensure the success of the unit in intelligence-based
operations.
The company commander is a key player in all aspects of company-level
operations. This is especially true when it comes to the structure, manning, and
integration of the COIST. The commander and his subordinate leaders can greatly
increase the effectiveness of the COIST by selecting the best qualified individuals
for this duty. The personnel selected should:
• Possess or be able to be granted a secret security clearance.
• Possess strong analytical aptitude.
• Have an ability to think, speak, and write clearly.
• Possess strong computer skills and normal color vision.
• Understand battle tracking, and have an ability to organize information.
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• Understand how to work with intelligence system hardware and software
(see Chapter 3).
• Possess operational experience to understand what information is
important and how to present it.
It is also important the COIST has a sufficient number of personnel to conduct
continuous 24-hour operations.
Leaders in the COIST must be vigilant in the following areas to derive the most
benefit from the organization:
• Enforce the debrief standards.
• Enforce priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), SIR, and SOR
(commanders cannot allow their IRs to stagnate).
• Follow SOPs.
• Maintain regularly scheduled communication with higher headquarters’
staff.
• Maintain and retain COIST personnel once they have been trained.
• Minimize distracter tasks for the COIST.
Recommended COIST Organization Manning Chart
Six COIST personnel:
• One COIST noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC)
• One analyst
• Four Soldiers
Figure 2-1
Company Intelligence Support Team Leader/Soldier Responsibilities
Company commander responsibilities include the following:
• Creates, equips, selects, and trains personnel.
• Integrates COIST into all aspects of company-level operations:
º Military decision-making process
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º Targeting
º Patrol briefing and debriefing
• Listens and acts on the analyses and recommendations of the COIST.
• Allocates space for execution of COIST responsibilities and functions.
• Provides guidance and direction on information presentation, and
approves PIRs.
The COIST NCOIC has the following responsibilities:
• Supervises intelligence operations within the company.
• Responsible for all COIST actions and operations.
• Gives updated enemy threat briefs to patrols prior to start point time.
• Ensures COIST members are tasked appropriately and identifies priorities
of work.
• Ensures priorities are completed and analysts have time and appropriate
area to work.
• Acts as liaison between the COIST and higher echelon S-2 sections.
• Requests BN intelligence and collection assets for company and platoon
operations, and synchronizes collection efforts and priorities with the BN
S-2.
• Assists in the preparation of indicators to satisfy PIRs.
• Manages all current and emerging targets, and ensures target packets are
created to facilitate servicing of targets.
• Recommends to the commander when a target is actionable and what
assets are available.
• Responsible for and recommends options to the commander on nonlethal
fight operations.
The COIST analyst is responsible for reading, interpreting, researching, and
analyzing intelligence and information pertaining to the company’s operational
environment. Additional traits and responsibilities include the following:
• Most knowledgeable and informed member of the COIST (debriefs and
prebriefs, communicating with the BN S-2 analyst).
• Makes recommendations and gives the commander his “best guess” based
on information he obtains.
• Updates PIRs, SIR, and SOR from the commander.
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The COIST Soldiers’ responsibilities include the following:
• Prepare intelligence products to support the commander/company.
• Assist in establishing and maintaining systematic, cross-referenced
intelligence records and files.
• Receive and process incoming reports and messages.
• Assist in determining significance and reliability of incoming
information.
• Assist in integrating incoming information with current intelligence
holdings.
• Prepare and maintain the situation map.
• Assist in the analysis and evaluation of intelligence holdings to determine
changes in enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of
action.
• Assist in the preparation of order of battle records using information from
all sources and the preparation of estimates of enemy unit and
organization strengths and capabilities.
• Assemble and proofread reports and assist in consolidating them into
military intelligence.
• Prepare IPB products.
• Assist in the preparation of reports on captured enemy material.
• Draft periodic and special intelligence reports, plans, and briefings.
• Brief and debrief patrols.
Materiel
To effectively perform its functions, the COIST should be equipped with dedicated
computers and access to communications equipment. The COIST can function on
two computers but ideally should be resourced with three: one for biometrics (if
allocated); one for mapping, personality and event linkage, and event-trend
analysis; and one for prebriefs and debriefs via TiGR, if available.
Currently the Army resources mapping through Falcon View, the Distributed
Common Ground System–Army, or Aeronautical Reconnaissance Coverage
Geographic Information System mapping applications; personality linkage through
Analyst Notebook, an analyst development tool; and event linkage through Crystal
software application. However, units are currently fielding newer, updated software
such as Analysis and eXploration of Information Sources Professional (AXIS Pro)
(see Chapter 3).
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A suggested equipment and materiel list includes:
• Equipment:
º 3x workstations (2x SECRET Internet Protocol Router [SIPR]/1x
Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router [NIPR])
º Laptop computer
º AXIS Pro/Analyst Notebook (AXIS Pro is replacing Analyst
Notebook)
º TiGR
º Falcon View
º Microsoft Internet Relay Chat (mIRC) or other chat capability
software
º Microsoft Office Suite
• Systems:
º Biometric Automated Toolset and Handheld Interagency Identity
Detection Equipment
º One System Remote Video Terminal
º Cellular exploitation/CelleBrite handheld, portable forensic device
for cellular phones
• Materiel:
º Color printer, scanner, and copier (1x SIPR/1x NIPR)
º Safe
º Secure Voice Over Internet Protocol phone
º Digital camera
º In-focus projector
º Shredder
º Maps
º Tent, tables, chairs, dry-erase board, power source, lights, and
environmental controls (air/heat)
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Location
The COIST must stay current on all operations and should be collocated with the
company command post, which allows it to communicate directly with the BN S-2
as well as units on patrol. Further, its proximity to radios increases situational
awareness. Again, to maintain continued intelligence collection and analysis, the
COIST serves as a function of the command post. Do not use the COIST to run the
company-level command post. Control measures must be established so sensitive
material is only seen by those with appropriate access. The proximity of the COIST
to the primary company command post is essential to enable the COIST to have
timely situational awareness and always be up to speed on current company
activities. The COIST also requires close access to the company decision maker
(commander, first sergeant, or executive officer).
Figures 2-2 and 2-3 depict a way to lay out a COIST for operations in a tactical
environment. The graphics depict what a COIST should be able to produce and
disseminate and represent what should be included and displayed on a COIST wall,
not how it should be arrayed. The COIST should tailor the location of its products
to best suit briefing the individual company and its commander.
Figure 2-2. COIST physical layout
The analysis area of the COIST is where all the intelligence analysis tools are
located so they can be used as efficiently as possible. The briefing area of the
COIST is where all the products for the outgoing patrol leader, convoy leader, or
commander are consolidated. The area facilitates a focused one-stop location where
all available information is displayed and disseminated.
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Legend:
COA: Course of action
EVENTEMP: Event template
FCIR: Friendly critical information
requirements
HVIL: High-value individual list
SITEMP: Situation template
SOI: Sphere of influence
TQ: Tactial questioning
Figure 2-3. COIST product display
The COIST should establish a patrol tracker separate from the operations patrol
tracker. The patrol tracker is designed to assist the COIST in identifying patterns
and TTP the company is creating. During the patrol prebrief, the briefer should
recommend certain actions to the patrol leader, such as leaving at a different time or
taking a different route.
Conclusion
Intelligence-driven operations have become a cornerstone of the contemporary
counterinsurgency fight. Senior tactical commanders are requiring more of their
subordinates. Accordingly, companies are establishing COISTs. The COIST
mission, function, and resource requirements are known or can be determined;
however, its success in combat will be limited if the requirements are not
adequately addressed. The secret to its success is commander involvement,
leadership, and participation. The commander’s mission and intent are critical to
the COIST as they provide PIRs, SIR, SOR, and indicators. Additionally, the
commander must establish clear priorities to assist the COIST in the execution of
his intent. The commander will set the tone by selecting, training, and assigning the
correct personnel for the job and by integrating the COIST, its capabilities,
analyses, and recommendations into operations and planning.
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Chapter 3
Company Intelligence Support Team Systems and Tools
To accurately conduct predictive analysis on enemy activity, the company
intelligence support team (COIST) must accurately track and analyze enemy
activity. In addition to tracking events, the COIST must be able to display and brief
the information to the commander and the unit. There are many methods for
collecting and tracking data on the enemy and events. The data must be tracked
daily; however, whatever the method chosen to conduct analysis, the COIST must
conduct weekly and monthly event analyses to determine patterns of enemy events
(i.e., time, place, and type of activity).
The COIST is responsible for collecting and archiving data at the company level for
use at all echelons. It also maintains a local database for use in company operations
and planning. Additionally, given the capability, the COIST can search existing
databases and update the company database or gather information to fill
intelligence gaps. To manage company information, the COIST must establish a
filing system for information gained by the unit.
The COIST will have access to several systems and tools to aid in the collection,
analysis, reporting, and dissemination of information. These systems and tools can
help build an accurate intelligence picture within the company area of operations
(AO). Some of these tools are just now becoming common at the company level,
while others are traditional skills and systems that have been available for some
time.
Systems and Tools
Digital cameras and photographs
The digital camera can be an outstanding surveillance and recording tool for
patrols. A patrol armed with a digital camera can bring back dozens of images to
the COIST that provide detailed data and additional information and insight. For
example, operational use of digital cameras has proven valuable to identify both
friendly and enemy key personnel.
Figure 3-1 is an example photo that would come from the patrol’s photograph log.
The photograph and marginal information should be updated as soon as possible
after each patrol when practical. Note that in the example, the date-time group, unit
identifier, and Military Grid Reference System (MGRS) are on the photograph. The
direction and photograph series number are also printed on the photograph. The
narrative that accompanies this digital photograph could read as follows:
Platoon Sergeant Smith: Picture of Alpha Company western ECP
(entry control point). The al-Nafar tribe is protesting the lack of
water in the town. The police chief and his lieutenants are being
escorted into the company reception area. The main instigator of the
protest is circled and is believed to be Abu Haneffa.
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Figure 3-1. Example digital photo
Digital cameras can also provide timely images of new graffiti, posters, and signs
for translation/interpretation when on-scene linguists are not with the patrol. For
example, this collection tool provides significant insight to a report that might have
otherwise read something like, “New graffiti noted within neighborhood XX along
route YY.” Upon analysis of the words and context, the graffiti may give warning
of future danger or a hint of a change in mood—positive or negative—of the
populace.
Reconnaissance and surveillance teams can show a commander actual color
photographs of his objective. In addition to greatly enhancing detailed planning, an
exact image can be passed along to the battalion (BN) for further exploitation. To
support this mode of collection, the COIST should establish a picture log. This log
will have a company/patrol identifier with date, picture number, and location using
the MGRS. It also indicates where the photograph was taken, general direction of
the photograph, and any other amplifying remarks. The picture number may have a
unit coding system so other people can easily identify which unit took the
photograph.
Photographs must be secured and carefully controlled. COISTs must treat
photographs as sensitive information with strict controls and guidance for their
handling. For example, if the object of a photograph knows that he is being
collected against, he may relocate. This may disrupt other collection methods in
place such as human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) that
are not under the control of the COIST. Additionally, there is always the possibility
that our own photographs could somehow be used for propaganda against us or to
possibly reveal some of our tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).
Video cameras
Although it is not as easy to carry as a digital camera, a video camera can record
exactly what happened during significant events witnessed by Soldiers during the
conduct of routine operations and patrols. Instead of relying solely upon a verbal
debrief, a patrol can show the COIST exactly what happened and review each event
in sequence. This data can also be easily passed on to the higher headquarters in its
original format, ensuring the analysts at the BN, brigade combat team (BCT), or
division level can see everything just as Soldiers on the ground saw it.
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Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)
Figure 3-2. Raven
The Raven is small and can be transported easily in three small cases that fit into a
ruck sack. The crew can bring it with them and operate wherever the patrol goes.
The Raven has three different cameras that attach to the platform: an electrical
optical camera that sends data either through a nose camera or a side camera, an
infrared (IR) camera, and a side-mounted IR camera. The IR technology is still too
big to fit into the nose section of the platform. The camera does not have a zoom
feature and is unable to lock on a target but provides enough resolution to show
someone carrying a weapon. The Raven has about 45 to 60 minutes of flight time
on one battery. The kit comes with spare batteries and a charger that plugs into a
high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle, so the operator can land it, pop in a
spare battery, and get it back in the air.
The Raven can be launched in just minutes by hand into the air like a model
airplane. It lands itself by auto-piloting to a near hover and dropping to the ground
without needing landing gear or carefully prepared landing strips. Since it is
launched and recovered in this manner, it does not require elaborate support
facilities and is ideally suited to a forward-deployed unit. Its automated features and
Global Positioning System (GPS) technology also make it simple to operate, and it
requires no specially skilled operators or in-depth flight training.
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Figure 3-3. Shadow
The Shadow UAS is the brigade commander’s primary reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition asset. The Shadow is equipped with an
electro-optical/IR camera. It has a range of approximately 100 kilometers, can fly
for up to 4 hours, and operates at altitudes between 6,000 and 10,000 feet. One
advantage of the Shadow is that it is an in-house intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) asset that can provide a BN or BCT commander with tactical
overwatch whenever needed. The COIST can request use of or information from
this BCT-level asset through the BN S-2 as part of the company ISR plan.
Additional COIST intelligence systems
• One System Remote Video Terminal (OSRVT): The OSRVT is an
innovative modular video and data system that enables warfighters to
remotely downlink live surveillance images and critical geospatial data
directly from a joint operations tactical UAS. The OSRVT has the ability
to capture all UAS platforms regardless of who tasked them, which
means that with the OSRVT a COIST can watch footage of any area that
a platform is observing as long as the OSRVT and the asset are linked up
digitally. The OSVRT is also small enough to be vehicule-mounted,
enabling the commander on the objective to receive real-time
information.
• Tactical Ground Reporting (TiGR) System: TiGR is a Web-based
application that allows Soldiers to download information into one
program. TiGR is the main reporting and database tool for the COIST. It
allows for flattening networks and provides situational awareness across
the BN and BCT operational environment. The intelligence can include
photographs Soldiers have taken with digital cameras, observations
Soldiers have made and written in simple text, or detailed maps of the
areas gathered by GPS devices. Before leaving on patrol, Soldiers can
study high-resolution satellite imagery of what routes they will be taking.
Icons for roadside bombs, ambushes, or weapons caches populate the
map so Soldiers do not have to wade through enormous text files. They
can click on a roadside bomb icon, for example, to see if there is a picture
showing where the bomb was hidden, how it was disguised, and any TTP
related to the specific device.
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• Analysis and eXploration of Information Sources Professional (AXIS
Pro): This is the system that is replacing Analyst Notebook and is
installed on Distributed Common Ground System–Army (DCGS–A)
systems. It performs many of the same functions as Analyst Notebook
(e.g., link diagrams) but is more user friendly because it reduces the
amount of time analysts spend on data input. AXIS Pro is a visualization
tool. It allows analysts to find data of interest, organize and refine the
results, and then visualize the results and detect patterns. AXIS Pro also
allows the analyst to manage data through visualization; AXIS Pro
automatically loads new data as needed, freeing the analyst from the need
to perform additional searches, import extra data, or build case files.
AXIS Pro provides a two-way connection to multiple data sources. The
analyst can build link diagrams using information from multiple data
sources and then create, edit, or delete that information and add changes
directly to the data source. AXIS Pro provides a simple multi-intelligence
analysis toolset. AXIS Pro extends AXIS core features to provide
integrated analysis, data management, and intelligence visualization
capabilities. AXIS Pro aids the analyst in the process of creating
intelligence from large amounts of information. AXIS Pro base
capabilities include link, temporal, pattern, and geospatial analysis tools;
net centric alarm and alerts; automated entity and relationship extraction
from text documents; and an integrated Web portal for information
searching and sharing. Additionally, to facilitate interoperability, AXIS
Pro comes standard with adaptors for plotting information to additional
maps, importing and exporting to both Microsoft Excel and other link
analysis tools, and can be configured to work with structured query
language servers. AXIS Pro can also be customized to work with other
data sources.
• Document and media exploitation (DOMEX) and cellular exploitation
(CELLEX): DOMEX capabilities at COIST level are extremely limited.
Beyond limited on-scene analysis for rapid decisions or targeting, the
COIST must forward DOMEX data and material to a higher-level
headquarters where DOMEX can be conducted. The COIST should know
how to request and access analyzed DOMEX data. COISTs will have
CELLEX kits and possess the capability to conduct limited CELLEX.
DOMEX will support a wide range of intelligence activities to include
all-source analysis, open-source exploitation, HUMINT, SIGINT,
geospatial intelligence, and measurement and signature intelligence.
DOMEX reporting and analysis are considered intelligence products.
• Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE): CIDNE is a
secure Internet host site that contains an engagement tool for tracking
three types of entities: people, facilities, and organizations. Additionally,
CIDNE is the primary means by which HUMINT collection team (HCT)
reporting is fused into the theater intelligence database (BCT/HUMINT
officer [S-2X]/military intelligence company/HCT). The underlying
principle behind CIDNE is that information is only useful when it is
readily available at the right time and place to support decision makers.
Often decisions in the operational environment are made without the
benefit of critical information that may exist but is not operationalized
and therefore not available to the decision maker. CIDNE captures and
correlates data and then makes that information and its relationships
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available to other systems as well as to CIDNE users. The interfaces to
other systems include a complete set of Web services based on industry
standards. TiGR, addressed above and which the COIST will have, is
capable of pulling and displaying CIDNE information.
• Ground Movement Target Indicator (GMTI) Tracking: Tracking can be
done using GMTI-type indicators that can observe all the objects moving
in the area of interest. GMTI measurements supplied by the sensor are
assumed to belong to the road network. On the basis of this assumption,
several techniques have been studied to take this information into
account. GMTI products should be requested from the brigade S-2
through the BN S-2 as part of the company ISR plan. The COIST does
not have the capability to receive and interpret direct GMTI feeds.
• Microsoft Internet Relay Chat (mIRC) (or Jabber chat): mIRC is a system
that allows the COIST to both monitor multiple situations at once and
communicate instantly across the battlefield with anyone who is
connected. Chat is a primary means of communicating in theater and is
the most common means for communicating with theater-level assets,
such as full-motion video. mIRC is similar to any instant messaging
application found on the Internet. COIST personnel can monitor a number
of chat rooms depending on their preferences. The COIST needs someone
to monitor mIRC at all times because of the time-sensitive information
that moves across it. Monitoring mIRC will not be the only job this
individual performs, but the assigned Soldier will be responsible for
checking it constantly. It is suggested the Soldier monitoring mIRC has a
maximum of five windows on his computer open at any one time to
ensure information overload does not occur. Many units are beginning to
transition to Jabber chat—both systems have similar capabilities.
• Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT) and Handheld Interagency Identity
Detection Equipment (HIIDE) systems: BAT collects fingerprints, iris
scans, facial photos, and biographical information on persons of interest
into a searchable database. It is used for tactical operations, detainee
operations, base access, improvised explosive device (IED) forensics
operations, and local hire screening and intelligence. HIIDE collects and
matches fingerprints, iris images, facial photos, and biographical
contextual data of persons of interest against an internal database. HIIDE
is interoperable with BAT for biometrics data exchange back to the
Department of Defense biometrics data repository.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Request Procedures
When the COIST requests ISR assets, it should request a capability and not an asset
(i.e., “A company requests full-motion video,” not “I need a Shadow/Predator”).
The reason for this is that if the COIST requests an asset and that particular asset is
not available, the COIST will not receive any support. If the COIST requests a
capability (such as IR or full-motion video), it will get support from whatever asset
is available with that capability. Additionally, units should include a task and
purpose and how/when the information needs to be collected.
All ISR requests will be sent up to the BN, consolidated, and, if necessary,
requested from brigade. The COIST needs to be as specific as possible when
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explaining why it needs a particular capability. The demand for ISR assets is
extremely high, and the COIST needs to be able to convince higher headquarters
what it needs is a priority and all other organic assets have been exhausted.
Maps
There are several environments where standard 1:50,000 maps or even satellite
imagery collected years ago are insufficient, inaccurate, or simply not available.
The COIST can assist Soldiers and patrols by requesting the most updated map and
imagery data through the BN S-2. Additionally, Soldiers operating in these areas
will instinctively scout them to increase their familiarity with new surroundings and
must record the information they find and report it for appropriate dissemination
(i.e., within the company as well as to higher and adjacent units). They do this by
improving either existing maps or creating usable sketch maps of key areas. Then,
to prepare units that may have to patrol or fight in this area in the future, the COIST
should update its maps of the area and disseminate this information up, down, and
laterally. Maps can be updated in TiGR, and updates can be viewed by anyone with
TiGR access.
Sketch maps: overlays
This basic map skill should be known and practiced at the squad level. A Soldier
can produce an adequate sketch map using a sheet of paper, pencil, straight edge,
and any known reference point. The process can be as simple as tracing grid lines
from an existing map and adding details such as new trails, bridges, or anything of
importance that is not on the issued map. For example, a 1:50,000 map may not
contain a series of irrigation canals that severely restrict cross-country mobility
alongside an important main supply route. When this is known, the COIST might
designate this location as a potential site for future enemy ambushes.
Graph paper is particularly useful for creating sketch maps. In this case, a patrol can
be dispatched to the area with the current map, paper and pencils, straight edge, and
other tools such as the Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver, Defense Advanced
GPS Receiver, compass, and graph paper and sketch in the details about the
irrigation canals and bypass routes. The COIST can then reproduce this sketch map
on overlays on separate sheets of paper for dissemination within the company and
to higher and adjacent units. The next step is to update the maps within the
company command post.
Field sketches
The field sketch is closely akin to a sketch map, but in the absence of a digital
camera, it will include sketches of an objective, key facility, or other important area
to aid commanders in planning. An example would be an observation post
producing a sketch of a compound suspected of containing enemy forces. This
sketch can be given to the commander to identify details that require additional
planning, aid the assault force in identifying the target building, and possibly even
save time by eliminating the need for a full leader’s reconnaissance.
Field sketches are obviously not as useful as digital photographs in terms of
presenting a picture and they are certainly more difficult to disseminate, but they
are another tool available for collectors to pass on information to those who need it.
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Conclusion
The COIST will have access to several systems and tools to aid in the collection,
analysis, reporting, and dissemination of information. These systems and tools can
help to build an accurate intelligence picture within the company AO. However, to
be used effectively and as significant enablers, Soldiers and leaders assigned to the
COIST must be familiar with their operation, characteristics, and capabilities.
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Chapter 4
Company Intelligence Support Team Battle Rhythm
Battle rhythm and operational tempo (OPTEMPO) are critical aspects of both
command post (CP) and company intelligence support team (COIST) operations.
An established, effective, and understood battle rhythm assists in efficiency and
shortens the time required to share information. The commander is responsible for
establishing the COIST battle rhythm. Although the purposes and missions of the
CP and the COIST are different, the two entities are collocated. Even with a
necessary and clear delineation of duties and responsibilities, some overlap and
redundancy will occur between the CP and the COIST. This potential overlap
occurs primarily because at the company level commanders do not have staffs;
therefore, the company battle staff becomes those personnel in the unit who operate
the CP and the COIST. This chapter begins by looking at the overall company
battle rhythm and then focuses on COIST and intelligence-specific considerations.
Successful continuous operations at the company level are more demanding than at
higher-level organizations. The unit requires a tactical standing operating procedure
(SOP) allowing rest, especially for critical personnel. At company level, the
commander and first sergeant will find it very demanding to try to rest. Their rest
plan must be a priority for the organization to be led effectively and for their units
to be successful on the battlefield.
The cycle of recurring events within a CP/COIST focuses the leaders and Soldiers
on meeting information and action requirements. Company personnel are normally
required to attend battalion (BN) and company recurring meetings, which has an
impact on company CP/COIST operations and schedules and must be incorporated
into the small unit’s battle rhythm. Examples of recurring events include the
following:
• Shift changes
• Battle update briefings to the commander
• BN battle updates without the commander
• BN targeting meetings
• BN reports
• BN commander’s collaborative sessions
• Company CP officer in charge (OIC) and noncommissioned officer in
charge (NCOIC) shift change briefings and collaborative sessions
The company CP and COIST OIC and NCOIC must achieve battle rhythm for
updating and viewing information and understanding how to use it to affect
operations. A well-established battle rhythm aids the commander and leaders with
the CP and COIST organization, information management and display, decision
making, and fighting the battle. Battle rhythm demands careful planning and
design. Many competing demands must be deconflicted. Even subordinate platoons
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and sections affect a company battle rhythm based on their needs and unit
procedures.
The company CP and COIST should be staffed for 24-hour operations; however,
the company must also conduct cyclical missions. SOPs establish methods of
ensuring the right personnel are available for either cyclical or 24-hour operations.
Regardless of the method used, practice during exercises will determine the
strengths and weaknesses of headquarters personnel for CP and COIST operations
and the training required for additional personnel who may be used to staff the CP
and COIST during continuous or sustained operations. Such knowledge allows
leaders to focus on the critical areas and personnel requiring additional training.
In planning, company and COIST leaders must consider battle rhythm requirements
of subordinate platoons, sections, and squads. Depending on the situation, the
company may schedule missions that allow platoon or section/squad rotations to
maintain their battle rhythm.
Absence of Battle Rhythm
Without procedures establishing battle rhythm, leaders and units reach a point of
diminished returns. This point typically occurs between 72 and 96 hours of
continuous operations. As leader fatigue sets in, information flow, planning
process, execution, and sustainment suffer, often greatly. Symptoms of diminished
battle rhythm include the following:
• Leader fatigue
• Leaders not fully aware of critical decision points
• Leaders not available at critical decision points
• Disjointed timelines between various levels of command
Presence of Battle Rhythm
Battle rhythm allows units and leaders to function at a sustained level of efficiency
for extended periods. Effective battle rhythm permits an acceptable level of
leadership at all times. It can focus leadership at critical points in the fight or during
particular events. Procedures and processes facilitating efficient decision making
and parallel planning are critical to achieving battle rhythm. Every component of
battle rhythm contributes uniquely to sustained operations.
Training
It is difficult, if not impossible, to establish battle rhythm while simultaneously
conducting operations. Preplanning makes battle rhythm happen. Planning,
preparing, and training before deployment lay a solid foundation for viable battle
rhythm during operations. Commanders must ensure all company personnel are
trained on CP setup and operations and they understand the team concept required
to conduct CP and COIST operations during combat operations for extended
periods. Additionally, company commanders must coordinate with BN staffs during
training to deconflict staff operations and requirements counterproductive to the
company battle rhythm.
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Battle Rhythm Elements
Battle rhythm is a multifaceted concept that includes the following elements:
• Sleep/rest plans
• Trained second- and third-tier leadership in CPs and COISTs
• Synchronized upward multiechelon timelines
• Parallel planning
• Established processes and SOPs
Command Post Personnel Depth
Established processes and SOPs relieve many antagonistic effects of extended
operations. SOPs that establish and maintain battle rhythm by facilitating routine
decisions and operations are a step in the right direction. Soldiers trained to act
appropriately in the absence of leaders or orders can relieve commanders and
leaders of many of the time-consuming tasks that rob them of essential rest.
Examples of tasks noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and junior officers can
accomplish for the commander include the following:
• Battle summaries and updates during a fight
• Intelligence updates before, during, and after a battle
• Sustainment updates before, during, and after a battle
• Updates to the next higher commander
• Shift change briefings
Noncommissioned Officer and Junior Officer Responsibilities
At the company level, all personnel are critical to the success of the operation and
provide valuable contributions. It is imperative commanders ensure each Soldier
understands the importance of even the most menial tasks, such as CP security and
tactical operations center setup and teardown. Given the amount of personnel in a
company, 24-hour operations, and force protection requirements, commanders must
utilize all personnel available to successfully accomplish CP and COIST
operations. The improper use of personnel produces the following results:
• Key leaders become exhausted.
• CP and COIST operations-trained personnel become exhausted.
• The initiative of trained subordinates is stifled, and the incentive to train
is diminished.
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The following techniques ensure proper use of personnel:
• Appropriate tasks are assigned to junior NCOs and specialists.
• Effective training and SOPs instill trust in officers and confidence in
junior NCOs and specialists.
• Effective command guidance conveys to the company that the operation
is a team effort and all personnel available contribute to the effort.
Continuous Operations and Timelines Synchronization
Timelines for the operation at hand must allow for not only the next operation but
also extended continuous operations. Synchronized, multiechelon timelines assist
units in achieving battle rhythm. If units do not address critical events at least one
level up and down, disruption results. An example of an unsynchronized timeline is
a BN rehearsal that conflicts with platoon precombat inspections or other events in
its internal timeline. Lower echelon units as well as platoons and sections seldom
recover from a poor timeline directed by a higher headquarters. Company
commanders must coordinate with their BN staffs on developing SOPs that include
planning, rehearsal, and execution timelines one level below BN to prevent these
conflicts.
Standing Operating Procedures Utilization
SOPs must be practiced and reviewed during professional development and
sergeants’ time. The existence of an SOP will not resolve troop-leading challenges
unless the SOP is practiced often and internalized by unit members. Checklists are
critical, as many leaders will often find themselves rushed, physically fatigued,
distracted, and deprived of sleep. Checklists ensure each step is considered even
when leaders are exhausted.
Company Intelligence Support Team-Specific Battle Rhythm
The COIST must establish an internal SOP and battle rhythm that outline both
recurring cyclic events, such as meetings and shift changes, and also incorporate the
intelligence battle rhythm of its higher headquarters. While the exact times and
requirements may vary from unit to unit, the following outline can be used as a
baseline template to assist companies in developing a predictable, routine, and
sustainable tempo to COIST operations:
• Daily:
º Facilitate and collect patrol debriefs (senior COIST Soldier).
º Conduct mission prebriefings and debriefings for patrols and
operations (COIST analysts).
º Review and analyze patrol debriefs (COIST OIC/NCOIC).
º Conduct data processing, and update maps, templates, and
graphics (COIST analysts).
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º Supervise detainee packets (COIST OIC/NCOIC).
º Provide deception recommendations as required (COIST
OIC/NCOIC).
º Exchange data with the BN S-2 and brief the commander (COIST
OIC/NCOIC).
º Collect, report, and disseminate through pertinent channels site
exploitation and weapons intelligence (senior COIST Soldier).
º Update all trackers and graphs (senior COIST Soldier).
º Update intelligence board for outgoing patrols (senior COIST
Soldier).
º Contact adjacent units for intelligence sharing (COIST
OIC/NCOIC).
º Update biometric information.
• Weekly:
º Analyze week’s events (COIST OIC/NCOIC).
º Conduct pattern analysis for the last 30 days (COIST analysts).
º Refine enemy situational template (COIST analysts).
º Forecast enemy actions (COIST analysts).
º Identify potential targets (COIST analysts).
º Identify and update company, troop, and battery named areas of
interest (senior COIST Soldier).
º Update company, troop, and battery priority information
requirements (COIST OIC/NCOIC).
º Update sewer, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, and
security; and area, structures, capabilities, organizations, people,
and events assessments (COIST analysts).
º Brief commander (COIST OIC/NCOIC).
• Monthly:
º Analyze month’s events (COIST OIC/NCOIC).
º Analyze patterns for the last 30 days (COIST OIC/NCOIC).
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º Produce detailed monthly intelligence summary (INTSUM)
(COIST OIC/NCOIC).
º Brief company leadership (COIST OIC/NCOIC).
Intelligence Battle Rhythm
The intelligence battle rhythm is designed around the brigade combat team (BCT)
and BN battle rhythm. The intelligence battle rhythm will be adjusted as required
by theater and operational requirements. The following schedule can be used as a
baseline template to inform and assist companies in planning for and developing a
predictable and recurring intelligence:
• Company/BN:
0800 – Shift change slides information cutoff (S-2)
0830 – Shift change slides due to BN battle captain (CPT)
0830 – Company fusion cell (CFC)/S-2 net call via Adobe Connect
0900 – BN shift change
1000 – BN battle update assessment (BUA)/staff synchronization
(synch) meeting (S-2)
1300 – BN intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
synch meeting (S-2, CFC)
1700 – BN collection planning session (S-2, CFC)
1800 – Company collection plan due to BN (CFC)
1900 – CFC INTSUM information cutoff (CFC)
2000 – CFC INTSUM due to BN
2000 – Shift change slides information cutoff (S-2)
2030 – Shift change slides due to BN battle CPT
2030 – BN INTSUM posted
2100 – BN shift change
• Brigade (BDE)/Sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF):
0800 – BN shift change slides information cutoff
0800 – SCIF shift change slides information cutoff (SCIF NCIOC,
operations, fusion, S-2X, collection management and dissemination
[CM&D], and signals intelligence [SIGINT])
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0900 – BN shift change slides due to BDE
0930 – BDE shift change
0930 – BDE shift change slides due to SCIF
1000 – SCIF shift change
1030 – S-2 conference call via Adobe Connect
1100 – BCT BUA/staff synch meeting (S-2)
1400 – BDE ISR synch meeting (S-2, ISR, targeting, and military
intelligence company)
1530 – BCT daily targeting meeting (S-2, ISR, and targeting)
1830 – BN collection plan/asset status update to BCT (ISR)
1830 – SCIF huddle (SCIF NCIOC, fusion, S-2X, CM&D, and
SIGINT)
1900 – BN INTSUM information cutoff
2000 – BN shift change slides information cutoff
2000 – SCIF shift change slides information cutoff (SCIF NCIOC,
operations, fusion, S-2X, CM&D, and SIGINT)
2030 – BN INTSUM due to BDE (S-2)
2100 – BN shift change slides due to BDE
2130 – BDE shift change
2130 – BDE INTSUM posted
2130 – BDE shift change slides due to SCIF
2200 – SCIF shift change
Figure 4 illustrates the company-level intelligence cycle.
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Legend:
AIF: Anti-Iraqi forces
CEC: Counter explosive cell
CMO: Civil-military operations
CO: Company
FSO: Fire support officer
HVI: High-value individual
info: Information
INTS: Intelligence summary
IO: Information operations
ISF: Iraqi Security Forces
ops: Operations
PL: Platoon
Rep: Representative
RTE: Route
THT: Tactical HUMINT team
TQ: Tactical questioning
Figure 4. Company-level intelligence cycle
Conclusion
Successful continuous operations at the company level are more demanding than at
higher-level organizations due to available personnel and mission requirements.
Battle rhythm and OPTEMPO are critical aspects of both company CP and COIST
operations. Although the purposes and missions of the CP and the COIST are
different, the two entities are collocated. Even with a necessary and clear
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delineation of duties and responsibilities, some overlap and redundancy will occur
between the CP and the COIST; therefore, the company battle staff becomes those
personnel in the unit who operate the CP and the COIST. The relationship between
OPTEMPO, battle rhythm, and the unit intelligence cycle necessitates the
development of SOPs and tactics, techniques, and procedures that account for and
encompass all COIST and intelligence-specific considerations.
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Chapter 5
Integration of Company Intelligence Support Team Operations:
Platoon Through Brigade
For the company intelligence support team (COIST) to be effective, its activities,
analysis, and reporting must be carefully integrated from bottom to top and from
top to bottom. Integration encompasses open, two-way information exchange from
the platoon level to the brigade combat team (BCT) level. There should be no
confusion as to if or how the COIST replaces or negates the need for battalion
(BN)- and BCT-level intelligence sections. It absolutely does not! Instead, the
COIST is most effective when its work is complementary, supporting, and
coordinated with the efforts of existing higher echelon intelligence sections’
planning and collection efforts. Although intelligence, synchronization, and
reconnaissance (ISR) efforts are undertaken at all levels—company to BCT—one
of the primary intelligence-gathering vehicles available at the small-unit level is the
patrol. For this illustration of COIST through BCT integration, the patrol will be
used to illustrate the connections necessary to achieve complete integration.
Intelligence cells reside at all levels—from BCT to company. At the BCT level,
there will be an S-2 section that conducts detailed intelligence analysis of the BCT
area of operation (AO). Additionally, the BCT staff serves as a conduit or link to
echelon-above-BCT intelligence-gathering systems and platforms. Based on the
BCT’s mission and commander’s intent, the S-2 section in conjunction with the
entire BCT staff develops an ISR plan or matrix to answer the commander’s
priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), assist in targeting, and gather intelligence
and indicators to drive tactical operations and orders to subordinate units. These
orders and operations can take the form of specific information requirements (SIR)
and specific orders and requests (SOR). The SIR and SOR are then allocated
against available collection assets, which can be from higher echelons, organic, or
passed to subordinate units. In some configurations (e.g., Stryker BCT) the BCT
may also have a reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition squadron with
additional assets and expertise to assist in intelligence analysis as well as for
planning and conducting ISR.
The BN will also have an S-2 section. This section is not as robust as the BCT-level
S-2 section, but it does have the capability to conduct detailed intelligence
preparation of the battlefield (IPB). The BN S-2 section in conjunction with the
entire BN staff develops an ISR plan or matrix to answer higher and BN-level PIRs
and assist in targeting and the gathering and analysis of available intelligence to
drive tactical operations and orders to subordinate companies and specialty
platoons. As at the BCT level, BN PIRs can be addressed by requesting
higher-echelon assets—using organic BN assets such as scout and sniper
platoons—or they can be passed to subordinate companies in the form of maneuver
orders, SIR, and SOR.
At the company level there is no organic organizational intelligence analysis
section, but as stated throughout this handbook, most company-size elements are
organizing COISTs to fulfill this requirement. Within its capability, the COIST
conducts IPB and assists the commander in the development of company-level PIRs
and a company level-ISR plan. This plan will support the collection of information
on the company commander’s PIRs as well as incorporating the PIRs, SIR, SOR,
and maneuver orders of the BN and BCT commanders. The SIR and SOR
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developed can then be addressed by requesting ISR assets from higher echelons or
by using company-level organic assets.
The PIR and ISR plans from BCT to company are linked as PIRs, SIR, and SOR.
Maneuver orders from higher commanders can become company-level PIRs, SIR,
SOR, or tasks. At the company level these requirements can be passed to patrols
during patrol prebriefings and collected back at patrol debriefings and reported to
higher headquarters.
To be effective, the COIST must understand how to conduct effective patrol briefs
and debriefs and report, analyze, and exploit the information and intelligence
derived from these reports to develop enemy estimates, conduct pattern/predictive
analysis, and support the targeting process. These processes and systems must be
established and trained on to facilitate quick reporting and enable both company
and higher-level organizations to conduct timely intelligence-driven operations
throughout the AO.
It is essential at the platoon level that leaders and Soldiers debrief their respective
intelligence sections/teams and provide information for the development of refined
intelligence in support of the ISR efforts at company, BN, and BCT levels to
ultimately answer their commanders’ PIRs.
The patrol brief is the key delivery method for sharing intelligence with or on
adjacent and subordinate units prior to departing the forward operating base,
combat outpost, or joint security site. Depending on terrain and where the company
headquarters is located, the patrol brief can be issued by either the BN S-2 or the
COIST. Intelligence shared during a patrol brief should not be limited to lethal
targeting or effects but should also focus on nonlethal effects. As the
counterinsurgency (COIN) environment matures, it is essential that commanders
and leaders focus on nonlethal targeting and the operational environment (political,
military, economic, security, social, information, infrastructure, physical
environment, and time [PMESSII-PT]) or area structures, capabilities,
organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE).
During the patrol brief, COISTs and S-2s must submit requests for information
(RFIs) and SOR to the patrolling unit. These RFIs and SOR allow Soldiers the
opportunity to answer intelligence gaps and assist in answering the commander’s
PIRs. Refined collection focus aids in the support of ISR plans. The ISR
plan/matrix should be continually updated as intelligence is collected. Additionally,
it is crucial that units have a task and purpose and understand the reporting
requirements and SOR they are being tasked with.
The patrol brief should be thought of as an abbreviated IPB brief. The S-2/COIST
conducting the prebrief must:
• Describe the effects of terrain and weather.
• Define the operational environment.
• Describe operational effects.
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• Evaluate the threat.
• Determine the threat courses of action.
Key intelligence items to discuss during the patrol prebrief include the following:
• Last 24–48 hours significant activities in the area of responsibility
(storyboards or graphic intelligence summary).
• Route status.
• ISR collection assets and priorities.
• Current assessments and future expectations.
• High-payoff target list (HPTL) (distribute and brief).
• Updates on key personalities (spheres of influence [SOI]), groups, events,
and threats).
• Collection priorities (ISR matrix and intelligence synchronization matrix)
in support of the commander’s PIRs.
• Be-on-the-lookout list.
• Updated ISR matrix (intelligence requirements, SIR, SOR, named areas
of interest [NAIs]) in support of the commander’s PIRs.
• Updated biometric files for the Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT) and
Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment (HIIDE) systems at
patrol level.
• Updated graphics (routes, imagery, objectives, NAIs, and targeted areas
of interest [TAIs]).
• Updated assessments of the operational environment in regard to
PMESSII-PT and ASCOPE.
Patrol debrief tactical ground reporting
At the conclusion of a mounted or dismounted patrol, leaders and Soldiers must
debrief their respective unit and intelligence counterparts to ensure information and
intelligence are not lost. The patrol leader along with his entire patrol must debrief
every piece of information even though it might not seem important or of
intelligence value. Routine information often provides indicators of the operational
environment and is decisive in the targeting process (lethal/nonlethal). General
village assessments and debriefs of a key leader engagement (KLE) with an SOI
allow the company commander and his COIST or the BN commander’s staff the
ability to focus their efforts in developing the target synchronization matrix and
refining the lines of effort (LOE).
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To have an effective patrol debrief, the COIST must have a standardized patrol
debrief format consistent with the reporting requirements of higher headquarters.
This checklist allows for a detailed debrief and ensures all information collected by
the patrol is captured. When a successful debrief is conducted, the COIST can
analyze the information, develop it into an intelligence product, and distribute the
product to the BN S-2. Additionally, this data will feed the intelligence cycle,
continue the IPB process, and ultimately begin the next targeting cycle for the
company, BN, and BCT.
Two systems the S-2/COIST can use to capture this data are the Combined
Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) and the Tactical Ground Reporting
(TiGR) System. (Note: These databases are addressed extensively in Chapter 4.)
The databases allow analysts the ability to upload text debriefs, assessments, and
media; organize debriefs geographically; and allow adjacent units the ability to
query the database utilizing filters. In addition to uploading the database, these
systems allow other intelligence collectors the opportunity and ability to share and
synchronize intelligence. It is imperative that Soldiers understand that patrol
debriefs and operation debriefs are what feed the intelligence and targeting cycle.
TiGR and CIDNE are two databases for the entry of company information;
however, they have very different functions. CIDNE is for the receipt of formal
reports such as a KLE or a civil affairs report. TiGR, on the other hand, is a tool
that provides context to the report. As an example, “This KLE happened and this
was the result” is a typical CIDNE report. “This KLE happened after a
sophisticated attack delayed the patrol, and the village elder had been killed a day
before” is a TiGR report on the same incident. The two systems are used together to
enable the level of detail a COIST should provide to the company commander.
Reports need to be entered directly into TiGR and not as an attached text report. An
honesty trace must be used. Additionally, photographs and significant activities
occurring during the patrol must be associated with that patrol. All this is done to
ensure the data is searchable for later use. Debriefing checklists are helpful, but a
debrief is not a check-the-block affair, and there must be room for free text within
the debrief to portray the context and meaning of the information presented. Ensure
the debrief format captures data that will pass the basic tests such as:
• Is this report searchable through text?
• Is this report searchable through geography?
• Can this report be viewed with other similar reports (i.e., is it filterable
through the system)?
• Is it written in a format that is conducive to the use of the search tools
provided? (For example, one-word answers to questions are almost
worthless due to the inability of TiGR to run Boolean searches. As a
result, paragraphs and sentences are required to provide context to the
report, which then facilitate subsequent searches.).
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There are several methods of debriefing patrols, and units should be prepared to use
whichever technique best supports the situation. Each method can be modified as
necessary, but there are pros and cons associated with each technique:
• Debrief the entire patrol at one time:
º Pros: Provides the best information and all points of view.
º Cons: Takes time, and requires a large secure area.
• Debrief squad leader and key leaders:
º Pros: Faster, gets leader input, and requires less space.
º Cons: Does not get all points of view.
• Platoon leader and platoon sergeant debrief patrol, then debrief COIST:
º Pros: Frees up COIST, and gets all points of view.
º Cons: May take longer, requires training, and information may get
lost in translation.
• Platoon leader writes up debrief, and COIST reads and ask questions:
º Pros: Less time-demanding for COIST since debrief is written.
º Cons: May miss important information from other points of view.
Ultimately, the S-2/COIST must analyze this data and answer the commander’s
PIRs to update the ISR plan and answer any RFIs or intelligence gaps.
Key intelligence items to discuss during the patrol debrief include the following:
• Answers to PIRs, SIR, SOR, and observed actions and inactions in NAIs.
• Route taken/route tasked and status of routes.
• Observations of populace:
º Key engagements
º Items discussed
º Attitudes observed
º Photographs taken
º Unusual sounds or odors
º New graffiti/enemy propaganda
º Changes to terrain or physical environment
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• Changes to operational graphics or observations from route/main supply
route.
• SOI assessments, observations, and notes from KLE.
• Updates to ISR matrix and PIRs.
• Updates to patrol-level PMESSII-PT, ASCOPE, and other related
assessments.
• Updates to town/village assessments.
• Host nation security force assessments.
• HIIDE device upload to BAT database.
• Updates to intelligence databases (Command Post of the Future and
TiGR).
Target Development/Prioritizing Lethal and Nonlethal Targets
It is imperative that all members of the target working group review all target
nominations and understand how the enemy network ties into the AO/area of
influence (AI) and adjacent units’ AOs and AIs. Identify and establish a working
relationship with other agencies operating in your AO (i.e., explosive ordnance
disposal, weapons intelligence team, and special operations forces) and share your
targeting lines with these organizations to see how they fit into their targeting lines
of operation (LOO)/LOE and targeting matrices. Synchronized targeting LOO/LOE
facilitates an excellent joint effort to defeat the network and get in front of the
enemy’s decision cycle. Consider, within the constraints of protection and
operational security, sharing the targeting LOO/LOE with the host nation security
forces. It is an opportunity to bring both host nation police and army leaders
together and share intelligence. This can also be conducted jointly with military
transition teams or security transition teams to fully integrate the coalition
force/host nation security force targeting cycle.
To increase the ability of host nation security force partners to conduct unilateral or
bilateral operations, units are encouraged to distribute targeted personalities’ names
(HPTL) and photographs to the host nation security forces and strive to conduct
joint targeting with them.
Synchronization and Integration of Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaisssance and Collection Assets
ISR synchronization has a significant impact on integrating lethal and nonlethal
targets/fires. ISR synchronization is critical regardless of mission, but the
importance is greatly increased with the size of the operational environment. To
aggressively deter enemy actions, particularly with indirect fires, units need to
detect the enemy before he can deliver assets. The challenges are that often this is
placed solely in the hands of a very junior COIST/S-2 and is not synchronized with
BCT and above-level assets. Units need to know what assets are available, request
them based on predictive analysis, and most importantly, synchronize the effort to
provide the best ISR coverage. This should be a significant part of the targeting
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process at all levels, with focused emphasis on NAI refinement and the use of all
available assets, including the myriad of nonstandard ISR platforms such as unit
snipers, combat logistics patrols, and rotary- and fixed-wing flight crew debriefings
and reports.
Things to consider when requesting ISR:
• Understand the air tasking order and the ISR cycle (usually 72–hour
cycle). This is normally refined by the brigade aviation element and
brigade collection management and dissemination process managers.
• Understand the brigade’s collection priorities and what unit has priority
of assets by type (human intelligence [HUMINT], signals intelligence
[SIGINT], unmanned aircraft system [UAS], etc.).
• Utilize the BN commander’s priorities from targeting meetings and target
working groups, and ensure ISR assets (ground/aerial) are tied not only to
PIRs but also to the target synchronization meeting.
• Synchronize ISR with an NAI or TAI, and request the asset during times
of combat operations or when it is thought the enemy is active in the
specified geographic area.
• Ensure all assets have a task and purpose and have clear reporting
requirements (SOR).
• Validate the collector requested is the correct asset to provide observation
of the NAI.
• Justify the need for collection systems by having companies and the BN
staff attach a concept of the operation (CONOP) to the ISR request. The
CONOP allows the collection manager to prioritize collection systems
and will aid the requesting BN with obtaining the asset needed to support
the mission.
The COIST needs to address the following questions with the commander and the
BN staff:
• What intelligence sources are in the unit’s area of operation (HUMINT,
SIGINT, etc.)?
• How long does it take to get the information from subordinate collectors?
• Does the architecture for data storage support rapid recall and
manipulation? Are the following connections available, adequate, and
functioning: joint network node, command post node, and SECRET
Internet Protocol Router node access point?
• What ISR and technical systems are available to find, fix, and finish
targets?
º When are they available?
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º Are any mutually exclusive?
º How do we maintain coverage if one system is withdrawn or
inoperative?
Conclusion
The COIST must disseminate and distribute intelligence products daily both up and
down the chain of command.
The COIST must ensure all collectors understand the commander’s PIRs and know
how to answer them. This includes all patrols, Soldiers, and enablers (HUMINT
collection teams, UAS, and SIGINT teams).
The COIST must ensure patrol leaders/Soldiers understand the capabilities of
enablers and how and when to request them. It is also imperative patrol
leaders/Soldiers understand how to control assets once allocated in support of their
AO.
Patrol briefs are the key delivery method for sharing intelligence with adjacent and
subordinate units.
The COIST must receive and integrate intelligence products submitted daily from
patrols and collectors. These products allow the COIST to refine intelligence
estimates and update enemy assessments. Additionally, the COIST must receive the
platoon leaders’ assessments of their respective AOs.
The COIST is the company-level entity and entry point into fully integrated
top-to-bottom and bottom-to-top intelligence and information exchange. The
COIST does not replace or replicate the functions of higher-level intelligence cells
but instead informs, coordinates with, and complements overall BCT and BN
intelligence plans and collection efforts. The interrelationship, nesting, and
integration of PIRs, SIR, SOR, and ISR planning and collection facilitate and
necessitate the deliberate, thoughtful, and proactive integration of intelligence
exchange and integration from the platoon level to the BCT level.
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Chapter 6
Company Intelligence Support Team Targeting
As discussed previously, a company-size element has very limited resources. At the
brigade combat team (BCT) and battalion (BN) levels are adequately staffed
sections to cover baseline requirements while at the same time contribute to staff
planning meetings, working groups, and boards. The current operational
environment has placed added emphasis on the targeting process in both lethal and
nonlethal constructs. The BN and BCT target working group reviews all target
nominations and attempts to understand how the enemy network ties into the area
of operation (AO) and area of influence (AI) and adjacent units’ AOs and AIs. At
these above company-level headquarters, synchronized targeting line of effort
facilitates efforts to defeat enemy networks and get in front of the enemy’s decision
cycle.
The company intelligence support team (COIST) is the company-level entry point
into the targeting process. The COIST, in addition to in-house analysis and
targeting, feeds information gained from patrols and engagements to the company’s
higher headquarters. This information is used to inform and assist the BN and BCT
targeting cycle. At the COIST, the key to successful targeting is separating the
important from the unimportant and then focusing and directing limited company
and external resources where they can best and most positively influence the
company area of responsibility (AOR).
Targeting at the company level is actually sorting and prioritizing information from
patrols and engagements until there is enough information to act on with an
acceptable level of certainty. Company-level targeting is not limited to lethal means
such as direct and indirect fires but should be all-encompassing and include all
available assets such as building projects, security for host nation personnel,
Medical Civic Action Program, and host nation police and military assistance.
Many units use the fire support officer to lead the COIST. In these cases, the
COIST may be expected to assume lead planning and responsibility at the company
level for targeting, employing enablers, and other operations as directed by the
commander.
Company Intelligence Support Team Target Development Support
A target is an entity or object considered for possible engagement or action by
lethal or nonlethal means. It may be an area, complex, installation, force,
equipment, capability, function, individual, group, system, entity, or behavior
identified for possible action to support the commander’s objectives, guidance, and
intent.
Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the
appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and
capabilities. The purpose of targeting is to disrupt, delay, or limit threat interference
of friendly activities; it requires coordinated interaction between operations and
intelligence personnel. Based on the commander’s guidance and targeting
objectives, the staff determines what targets to engage and how and where to
engage them. Targets should be assigned to the best systems to achieve the desired
effects. Targeting is based on the enemy’s assets that provide them an advantage,
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friendly scheme of maneuver, and tactical plans. Targeting options can be either
lethal or nonlethal.
Targeting in stability operations requires a detailed understanding of social
networks, insurgent networks, actions, and civil considerations. In stability
operations, there is greater emphasis on the effects of combat operations on the
local government, army, police, and civilian population. The consideration of
second- and third-order effects is critical. For example, it makes sense to separate
the insurgent forces from the local population. If friendly forces conduct a
successful cordon and search and find a room full of improvised explosive devices
(IEDs), the first order of effect is to potentially disrupt IED attacks. However, the
second order of effects that must be addressed could be civilian concerns over
damage caused by the cordon and search. If civilian concerns are not addressed,
friendly forces may have to deal with demonstrations that will drain the combat
power needed for other operations. If the population’s security and facility needs
are not addressed, insurgent forces and weapons could/will return to the area, the
third-order effect.
Targeting Meeting
The targeting meeting provides the company with a means to focus and synchronize
the unit’s efforts based on the current enemy situation, current unit success, and
operation orders and fragmentary orders from higher echelons. It is also a means of
assessing current lethal and nonlethal effects to determine if a change to the current
plan is needed. The end state of a targeting meeting is the commander’s decision for
what to target, how to detect the target, how to deliver assets against the target, and
how to assess the results of operations. The targeting meeting at the company is a
regularly recurring event to keep the unit continuously focused on command
priorities and to confirm whether the desired effects are being achieved. Targeting
meetings can also be hasty meetings prior to missions to ensure the unit receives all
relevant information and the commander’s most current and up-to-date guidance.
Pretargeting Meeting
To conduct successful targeting meetings, the COIST must have information
prepared to share with all participants of the meeting. The COIST inputs for the
pretargeting meeting are the following:
• Light and weather data (received from higher headquarters).
• Terrain data in the form of maps or imagery.
• High-value target list (HVTL) with link and pattern analysis.
• Current and proposed priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), specific
information requirements (SIR), and specific orders and requests (SOR)
(received from higher headquarters and refined by company).
• Enemy course of action (COA) and event template.
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• Battalion intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan for the
next 72 hours.
• ISR assets available.
COIST inputs for the targeting meeting include the following:
• Light, weather, and terrain data.
• Current enemy situation template, incident overlay, and link and pattern
analysis.
• Status of nonorganic ISR assets requested by the company.
• Battle damage assessment of attacked targets as required (last 12–24
hours), highlighting changes in enemy capabilities.
• Current and proposed PIRs, SIR, SOR, and high-value targets (HVTs).
• Enemy COA for the targeting period.
The COIST compiles data for the target packet from information received from
higher echelons and information gathered by unit missions. The target packet
should be an all-source product with vetted, validated information in support of the
designated desired effect. This packet can be used for lethal and nonlethal targets.
As the information is gathered, the COIST will assemble the information and create
a packet for the HVT or the high-value individual (HVI). This product, if properly
formatted, allows patrols to carry a reference guide on any mission. For nonlethal
targets, its format can be used to keep files on important personnel in the unit AOR
and can be used as a quick reference for units if there is a planned engagement or
meeting with the individual. This is a working document and should be updated as
any new information on the HVT or HVI is obtained. Subsequent pages will
contain all other data known about the individual, including copies of the source
reports. Targeting factors that should always be considered are the following:
• Effective targeting demands accurate and well-organized intelligence.
• Plan for site exploitation.
• Be prepared for a follow-on mission.
• Have an information operations message prepared for missions.
• Beat the enemy to the media.
• Update target packets upon completion of the mission.
• Targets do not always have to be physical. (Think of ways to “steal” the
enemy’s support base and safe haven.)
In addition to the target packet, there are other analytic products and tools to assist
the COIST and the unit in developing information for the AOR. Other products the
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COIST can maintain to assist with the targeting effort are a link diagram, HVTL,
and be-on-the-lookout (BOLO) list.
Diagram Human Networks
Hostile individuals may blend with the population, but they will have a network of
other individuals who will assist them. An example of when a link diagram is useful
is an IED network. An IED explosion is the culmination of a networked operation
that supported the IED. Someone emplaced the IED and may have initiated it. All
of those “someones” make up a network. Some members of networks are more
important than others; using the IED network example, financiers may support
many operations. The IED maker builds many IEDs. Both will likely have contacts
linking them to multiple IED incidents. Both of these individuals are important to
the organization, whereas an individual who emplaces the IED is more easily
replaced and less important. Additionally, it is important to remember that when an
individual from the network is removed from the network, someone else must
assume the duties of that individual.
Diagramming human networks as they emerge in intelligence operations helps the
unit see how the threat is organized. Diagrams will show which individuals are
working together. The diagram should show both professional relationships and
blood relationships as they are identified. Such diagrams will show missing links or
unknown persons whose existence is deemed probable if not certain. The diagrams
may have a name of an individual but no picture or a picture with no name. Units
must update these link diagrams as information becomes available. Link diagrams
can include information on individuals, such as the types of cars they drive and the
locations of their houses.
The key to link diagrams is to show the relationships between the hostile
individuals. Link diagrams must be current to be useful. Update the diagram to
show individuals who have been killed, captured, or recently released from jail.
There are software programs such as Analyst Notebook and Analyst and
eXploration of Information Sources Professional to build the diagrams. Microsoft
PowerPoint also works well if the unit has no access to these programs. An example
link diagram is shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Example link diagram
High-Value Target List
The HVTL is initially developed at the BCT or higher echelon and sent to the
company. Sometimes the targets that are of high value to higher echelons are not of
high value to the company; many will not even be in the company’s AO. The
opposite is equally true. The company may be very interested in an individual who
shoots at company Soldiers routinely. The individual is probably not an insurgent
cell leader and the activities are not of high interest to higher echelons; however,
the activities make him a HVI for the company. The company will take the initial
HVTL and tailor it to the individuals affecting the company’s AOR.
There is no standard number of individuals to be placed on the list; however, it
should be prioritized with the most important individuals on top. The list should be
maintained daily and information added or modified as it becomes available. If a
target is detained, remove the individual from the active list, but keep the
information so if the individual returns to the AOR, the data will still be available.
The list can be managed in several different ways but should have an active and
inactive component. If an individual has not been reported on in a set amount of
time, remove him from the active list and place him on the inactive list.
The following information should be placed on the list at a minimum:
• Target number. When an individual becomes significant enough to be
placed on the HVTL, he should receive a target tracking number and have
a target packet started.
• Name. Include the individual’s full name and any aliases.
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• Position. What does the unit believe this person does? This information is
a brief explanation of where the individual fits into the threat picture in
the AOR and why he is a HVT.
• Address. Any known or suspected residences the individual may use.
There may be several, and as more information becomes available, the
unit can confirm or deny the validity of the addresses.
• Phone number. Individuals will likely have more than one phone number
and may change numbers frequently.
• Picture. Include a picture of the individual, if available.
• Remarks. This information is a freeform column where the unit can link
associated reports to the individual, make notes about the individual, or
put in a physical description. Even with a picture, a physical description
helps because it describes height, weight, style of dress, and behavior. It
can also have the latest date of information about the individual .
Be-On-the-Lookout List
The BOLO list tracks vehicles involved in hostile activity or belonging to
individuals involved in hostile activities. If a unit finds a suspicious vehicle, the
BOLO list is a quick-reference document to see if the vehicle has been previously
reported in hostile activity. A BOLO list is a spreadsheet that contains the following
information:
• Make and type of vehicle.
• Model.
• Color.
• License number.
• Driver and passengers of the vehicle (names of hostile individuals
associated with the vehicle).
• Activity; why the vehicle is wanted.
• Date the vehicle was last seen.
• Last location by grid or route name.
If local cars are not the same type of cars that would be seen in the United States, a
book with pictures of the local cars should also be assembled.
Targeting Standing Operating Procedures
Units will develop targeting standing operating procedures (SOPs) to refine,
streamline, and improve the overall company targeting process. An example
company-level targeting SOP follows.
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Lethal Targeting Operations
• The COIST will develop company-level targets based on the
commander’s PIRs/IRs.
• Lethal operations must be conclusively researched through all
SECRET Internet Protocol Router (SIPR)/Non-Secure Internet
Protocol Router sources.
• At a minimum, the COIST will provide three separate reports before
committing to lethal operations:
º SIPR (Combined Information Data Network Exchange)
contains theater reporting through human intelligence
(HUMINT), signals intelligence, and significant activities.
Historical and recent reporting may be gained through this
means.
º Local sworn statements:
* Sworn statements and reporting through host nation
police agencies are an acceptable means of identifying
lethal targets.
* HUMINT collection teams may provide sworn
statements for lethal operations.
º Local detention facilities. Statements furnished to U.S. Army
interrogators may also be used to identify lethal targets.
• All lethal target operations must be approved through BN operations
and the BN S-2 and assigned a target tracking number before
operations.
Lethal targeting packets will at a minimum include the following:
• Cover with target number, date, and name of individual who
assembled/updated the packet.
• Target overview.
• Personal description with known associates.
• Link diagram.
• Imagery of the object/target.
• Reporting information.
• Site exploitation plan.
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Nonlethal Targeting Operations
Nonlethal operations encompass all civil affairs, engineering, medical, political,
and social structures. Nonlethal operations are not only an effort to win hearts
and minds but may be used to shift local power from anti-coalition forces to a
local population that supports anti-insurgency activity.
All nonlethal targeting operations must be approved through BN operations and
assigned a target tracking number before execution.
Nonlethal targeting packets should include at a minimum:
• Cover with target number, date, and name of individual who
assembled/updated the packet and classification.
• Imagery with physical description, biographical information,
background, and engagement goal.
• Known relationships and associations.
• Notes from previous engagements.
• Intelligence updates.
• Related civil-military operations projects.
• Engagement worksheet.
• Historical notes.
Conclusion
The COIST is the company-level entry point into the targeting process. The COIST
records and analyzes information gained from patrols and engagements to the
company’s higher headquarters. This information is used to inform and assist the
BN/BCT targeting cycle. At the COIST, the key to successful targeting is
separating the important from the unimportant and then focusing and directing
limited company and external resources where they can best and most positively
influence the company AOR. Targeting at the company level is actually sorting and
prioritizing information from patrols and engagements until there is enough
information to act on with an acceptable level of certainty. Company-level targeting
is not limited to lethal means, such as direct and indirect fires, but should be
all-encompassing and include all available assets.
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Appendix A
Ten-Step Tactical Ground Reporting System Debrief
The slide presentation on the following pages graphically demonstrates an example
ten-step method to employ the Tactical Ground Reporting (TiGR) system when
debriefing patrols. The presentation addresses preparing the system, initiating a
report, entering a patrol narrative, creating a record of the patrol's route, attaching
media, affiliating the debrief, and saving the report.
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