Design of a Transoceanic Cable
Protection System
Surveillance System
Undersea Fiber-Optic Cables
Mission Control
Isaac Geisler, Kumar Karra, Felipe Cardenas, Dane Underwood
1
Project Overview
• Submarine fiber optic cables carry 99% of all international communications.
• Billions of dollars are invested into the network, causing it to grow by 36%
annually since 2007.
• Between 100 and 150 cable damages occur each year.
• Up to 21% of causes are never identified.
• Each fault incurs millions of dollars in repair and loss of bandwidth.
• Our project seeks to monitor cables, identify threats, decrease cable
downtime and prevent damage whenever possible.
[TeleGeography, 2015] [Carter, 2011] [Ruggeri, 2014] [Burnett, 2014] [Khazan, 2013] [Main, 2015]
2
Agenda
1. Concept Definition
1.
Context, Stakeholder Analysis, Gap, Problem, Need
2. Operational Concept
Operational Concept, Model Framework, Operational Scenario, Stakeholder Changes, Design
Alternatives, Requirements, System Risks
3. Simulation and Analysis
Simulation Requirements, Framework, Validation, Utility
4. Project Management
WBS, Current Status
3
International Submarine Cable Network
Status 2015
343 Cable systems in service
53 Transoceanic, ‘long-haul’ systems
$11.8 billion investment in new
cables from 2008-2014
31 New cable systems worth $4.8
billion will come online by 2017.
[TeleGeography, 2015] [Ruggeri, 2014]
4
Wide Variety of Cable Systems
FLAG Atlantic-1 Cable
Connects US, UK and France
2.4 Tbps Capacity
14,500km total length
6500m max depth
$1.1 Billion Install cost
Known spying incident by
UK government
Jonah Cable
Connects Italy and Israel
7 Tbps Capacity
2,300 total length
4500m max depth
JASUKA Cable System
Interconnects Indonesia
and Malaysia
0.16 Tbps Capacity
10,860km total length
120m max depth
[TeleGeography, 2015] [NOAA, 2015] [Submarine Networks, 2015] [White, 2014]
5
Growing Bandwidth Demand
Transoceanic Bandwidth Projected Growth 2007-2020
800
Sub-Saharan African
Intercontinental
Activated Capacity in Tbps
700
600
Austrailia & New
Zealand
Intercontinental
500
North America - South
America
400
South Asia & Middle
East Intercontinental
300
Pan-East Asian
200
Transpacific
100
Transatlantic
0
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
Transoceanic capacity was 87 Tbps at year end 2013
Rate of capacity increase from 2007-2013 is 36% per year.
Projects planned to bring total capcity to 742 Tbps by early 2020’s
[Ruggeri, 2014]
6
Cables are Vulnerable to Threats
Transoceanic/transregional cables - FLAG Atlantic-1
SeaMeWe-3 Cable System
Connects 39 countries
0.48 Tbps Capacity
39,000km Total Length
7500m max depth
12 Reported Faults from 2005-2015
Over 1 year of cable downtime since 2005
Reported to have been spied on by the
Australian Government
[TeleGeography, 2015] [NOAA, 2015] [Submarine Networks, 2015] [SubTelForum, 2015]
7
Causes of Cable Faults
Sources of 2,162 Faults, 1959-2006
1200
1000
Approximately 150 faults reported per year.
Over 20% are cause unknown. Even when
the cause is known, identifying a
responsible party is difficult.
962
800
70% of faults occur in water of less than
200m deep.
600
460
400
Each fault costs millions of dollars in lost
bandwidth revenue and repair costs.
315
200
155
149
Component
Failure
Natural
Causes
No central database or logging of
threats/faults exists.
116
0
Fishing
Anchoring
[Carter, 2011] [Carter, 2009] [Hawn 2015]
Other
Unknown
New FCC regulations will mandate
reporting of US based cable faults.
8
Intentional Sabotage and Espionage
Increasing fears of intentional cable damage
Known incidents of sabotage, damage or
theft in Indonesia, Egypt and Libya.
Very difficult to prove intentional damage
after the fact
Russian ship Yantar, equipped with 2
submersibles capable of cutting cables
Increasing fears of cable espionage
Cable system transmits valuable financial
data, government communications
Known incidents of underwater devices
capable of reading data from the cables
[Bustraan, 2015] [Gertz, 2015] [Sanger, 2015] [Reuters, 2015] [Kirk, 2013] [Cahyafitri, 2013] [Malta Today, 2011]
9
Cable Protections - Armor
Advantages
Good protection against threats
Outer layers can be damaged without affecting cable
function
Tradeoffs
Significantly more expensive
Significantly heavier - complicates installation
Problems
Not possible at all depths –heavy cable will snap itself
More likely to entangle on anchors or fishing equipment still causes a fault, but more damaging to the cable and
the ship.
Unarmored
[Carter, 2011] [Burnett, 2014] [AKORN, 2012]
Single Armor
Double Armor
10
Cable Protections - Burial
Advantages
Provides good protection against most threats
Makes sabotage or espionage more difficult
Can be buried in up to 2000m of water
Tradeoffs
Very slow process: 0.2-0.5 km/h burial rate
High cost - ~$12,000 per hour
Disrupts marine environment
Can slow and increase cost of fault repairs
Problems
Only possible in soft seabed
Becomes exposed over time
Little protection against anchors
[Burnett 2014] [Carter, 2011] [KIS-ORCA, 2015]
11
Cable Protections - Legal
Cables are protected by international organizations and treaties
● International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC)
● Atlantic Cable Maintenance & Repair Agreement (ACMA)
● North American Submarine Cable Association (NASCA)
Protections include:
● Cable protection zones
● Up to $300,000 fines
● Liability of repair costs
● Civil or criminal charges
[Carter, 2011] [Burnett, 2014] [Carter, 2009]
12
Repair Process and Delays
Threat Causes Fault
Poor data collection,
difficult to determine
threat causes and fault
probabilities
Find Fault Location,
Notify Repair Ship
Delays due to inaccurate
or slow fault location info
Not enough repair ships
to service all faults
Delays due to permitting
and contracting ships
[Rain, 2009] [Carter, 2011] [Kokusai, 2010]
Repair Ship Travel
Delays due to
inaccurate or slow
fault location info
Delays due to poor
weather
Repair
Delays due to
inaccurate or slow
fault location info
Delays due to poor
weather
13
Repair Delay Distributions
Fault finding and
Notification Delay
1 + WEIB(6.78, 1.07)
Repair Ship Travel
1 + WEIB(2.07, 1.26)
Telegeography Study
Delay and Travel times
2008 - 2012
Data from 456 faults
Data from 40 countries
Analyzed data with Arena Input Analyzer
[Telegeography, 2014] [Rain, 2009]
Repair Time On-Site
3 + LOGN(1.73, 2.02)
Tyco Telecommunications Estimates
Generated distribution based on Tyco
Telecommunications estimates
Lognormal shape
Minimum of 3 days
Mean of 4 days
Possibility of long delays
14
Major Stakeholder Interactions
Service
Insurance
Companies
Telecommunication
Companies
$$$
Large
Technology
Companies
Latin
America
Financial
Institutions
Europe
Southeast
Asia
Espionage
$$$
Economic Growth
$$$
Middle
East /North
Africa
$$$
Cable
Maintenance
Cable
Installation
US Gov .
Agencies
Service
$$$
Economic Growth
Political Capital
End Users
Service
Shipping
Companies
—
$$$ Litigation for damages
Threat of Espionage
Ports
Fishing
Industry
Interactions
Cable Service
/
Benefit (Operating)
Installation Repair
Benefit (Non-Operating)
Submarine Fiber -Optic
Cables
Risk /Damage
Damage / Service Disruption
Threat
[Ruggeri, 2014]
15
Performance Gap
• Reduce the number of cable damages by 30% per year.
• Increase surveillance on cables from 0% to 80% of the entire
length of the cable.
• Reduce mean notification time by 2 days.
Current
Desired
Time
[Carter, 2011],[Telegeography 2015]
Expected Mean Notification Time
Notification Time (Days)
Cable Damages
Expected Cable Damages vs. Time
7
6
5
4
Current
Desired
3
2
1
0
2015
2020
2025
2030
Year
16
Problem Statement
•
There are over 150 cable faults every year
•
Primary causes are fishing and shipping incidents
•
21% go undetected and unidentified
•
It takes roughly 3 weeks and over $3 million to locate and fix
a damaged cable
[Burnett, 2011]
17
Need Statement
There is a need to increase surveillance of cables in order to
decrease the number of faults, increase the rate of detection, and
improve the mean notification time of damaged cables.
Win-win scenarios will be achieved by:
• Minimizing damage by preventing identified threats
• Minimizing down time by increasing fault reaction time
• Mitigating threats through identification
• Increasing the value of investment through long-term savings
in cost
18
Agenda
1. Concept Definition
1.
Context, Stakeholder Analysis, Gap, Problem, Need
2. Operational Concept
Operational Concept, Model Framework, Operational Scenario, Stakeholder Changes, Design
Alternatives, Requirements, System Risks
3. Simulation and Analysis
Simulation Requirements, Framework, Validation, Utility
4. Project Management
WBS, Current Status
19
Operational Concept
1. Identification
●
Identify surface-level threats
●
Identify underwater threats
●
Identify fault locations and extent of damage
2. Prevention
●
Prevent damage before it happens by monitoring shipping and fishing.
●
Detect underwater threats prior to fault
●
Provide deterrance to both accidental and intentional through identification
3. Organization of Repair
●
Notify reparair companies of fault type and location
20
OPSCON - Model Framework
21
OPSCON - Model Framework
22
Mission Control
23
Stakeholder Changes
Service
Insurance
Companies
Telecommunication
Companies
$$$
Large
Technology
Companies
Latin
America
Financial
Institutions
Europe
Southeast
Asia
Espionage
$$$
Economic Growth
$$$
Middle
East /North
Africa
$$$
Cable
Maintenance
Cable
Installation
US Gov .
Agencies
Service
$$$
Economic Growth
Political Capital
End Users
Service
Shipping
Companies
—
$$$ Litigation for damages
Threat of Espionage
Ports
Fishing
Industry
Interactions
Cable Service
/
Benefit (Operating)
Installation Repair
Benefit (Non-Operating)
Submarine Fiber -Optic
Cables
Risk /Damage
Damage / Service Disruption
Threat
[Ruggeri, 2014]
24
Stakeholder Changes
Service
Insurance
Companies
Telecommunication
Companies
$$$
Large
Technology
Companies
Latin
America
Financial
Institutions
Europe
Southeast
Asia
Espionage
$$$
Economic Growth
$$$
Middle
East /North
Africa
$$$
Cable
Maintenance
Cable
Installation
US Gov .
Agencies
Service
$$$
Economic Growth
Political Capital
End Users
Increased Uptime
—
UISS Protected Cables
/
Installation Repair
Loss Prevention
Benefit (Non-Operating)
Threat
Fishing
Industry
Prevent Agency Espionage
Reduced Revenue
Cable Service
Ports
No litigation
Increased Security
Interactions
Benefit (Operating)
Shipping
Companies
Environmental
Groups
Environmental Damage
Damage Prevention
New Market
[Ruggeri, 2014]
System
Manufacturers
25
Stakeholder Changes
Positive
Entity
Current System
With System
Owners
Low Reliability
Increased Uptime
Governments
Threat of Espionage
Increased Security
Maritime Industry
Vessel Damage/Litigation
Prevention/Clarity
System Manufacturers
No Market
Increased Revenue
Entity
Problem
Solution
Repair Companies
Reduced Revenue
Shift Resources from Repair
to Monitoring/Installation
Environmental Groups
Disruption of Ecosystem
Extensive Testing/Minimal
invasiveness
Negative
[Ruggeri, 2014]
26
Surface Identification Alternative
Marine Traffic Monitoring and Warning (MTMW)
Automatic ID System (AIS)
Capabilities
Required on all ships over 299 tons
Tracks location, speed, ID
GPS updates every 10-180 seconds
Limitations
100-200 nm range
Only tracks surface ships
Ships must have active transponder
[MarineTraffic, 2015] [USCG, 2010]
27
Underwater Identification Alternative - Active
Underwater Surveillance and Threat Detection (USTD)
Kongsberg Seaglider with
Synthetic Aperture Sonar (SAS)
Seaglider Capabilities
1,000 meter depth rating
7,200 hour battery life
0.9 km/hour cruise speed
Returns to surface to relay information
SAS Capabilities
300 meter signal range
3 cm resolution
6,000 meter depth rating
Kongsberg Seaglider
[NOAA, 2015], [WHOI, 2015],[Garmin, 2015]
28
Underwater Identification Alternative - Active
Platform Alternatives
Sonar Alternatives
Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV)
Raytheon AQ/ANS-20A Minehunting Sonar
Kongsberg REMUS 6000 AUV
Kongsberg HUGIN AUV
Klein System AUV 5000 V2
Compressed High Intensity Radar Pulse
(CHIRP)
Widely used in sport and commercial fishing
Very high-resolution images
Up to 300 meter signal range
Remote Operated Vehicles (ROV)
ASI Falcon ROV
Oceaneering NEXXUS ROV
Oceaneering Millenium Plus ROV
Side-scan and Multibeam
Used heavily for oceanographic purposes
Very reliable and tested extensively
Lower resolution but greater coverage area
[Oceaneering, 2015], [Raytheon, 2015], [Kongsberg, 2015], [ASI-Marine, 2015]
29
Underwater Identification Alternative - Passive
Underwater Surveillance and Threat Detection (USTD)
Node Network with Hydrophones
Network Capabilities
Stationary nodes installed along cables
Communication with surface buoys
Up to 3 year life span
Hydrophone Capabilities
Listens for noise instead of emitting signal
Up to 16 km listening range
Several localization techniques
3,500 meter tested depth rating
Underwater Node Network
[NEC, 2014]
30
Prevention and Repair
Organization
Prevention
• All identification alternatives will relay data on threats to
mission control
• Mission control will send messages based on threat type:
• Messages to marine traffic to prevent accidental damage
• Messages to relevant authorities (e.g. USCG) to intervene
for sabotage or espionage threats.
Organization of Repair
• In case of faults, mission control will relay
accurate fault type and location data
gathered by identification alternatives to
repair companies.
• Aim to significantly reduce location finding
and repair notification delays.
[Steward, 2015] [Fachot, 2012]
31
Mission Requirements
MR 1.0
MR 1.1
The system shall prevent cable damage and reduce incidents by
30% per year.
The system shall survey and monitor 80% or the total cable
length.
MR 2.0
The system shall identify the potential threat to the cable.
MR 3.0
The system shall reduce cable downtime by 30%.
MR 3.1
The system shall identify location of cable damage 50% faster.
32
Functional Requirements
FR 1.0
The system shall monitor and survey cables.
FR 1.1
The system shall be able to operate at depths greater than 1,000 meters.
FR 1.2
The system shall have at least a 95% uptime.
FR 2.0
FR 2.1
The system shall identify threats.
The system shall aggregate collected information to determine safety of
cables.
FR 3.0
The system shall detect cable faults.
FR 4.0
The system shall allow communication with outside stakeholders
FR 5.0
The system shall perform self-monitoring to ensure the safety of the system.
33
Design Requirements
DR 1.0
The system shall have an above water subsystem.
DR 1.1
The system shall have servers that manage all collected data integrally.
DR 1.2
The system shall have data processing technology.
DR 1.3
The system shall display the data to the operator.
DR 1.4
The system shall have communication equipment.
DR 2.0
The system may have an underwater subsystem.
DR 2.1
The system shall have communications equipment for exchanging
information with the above water subsystem.
DR 2.2
The system shall have threat detection technology.
DR 2.2.1 The system shall have sonar sensor technology.
DR 2.2.2 The system shall have a platform for sonar sensor technology.
34
System Risks - FMEA
Failure
S
L
D
RPN
Mitigation
Tapped Cables: Human action
undetected and cables are
tapped.
10
4
8
320
Use logged surveillance data to
identify suspicious activity in
above surface and underwater.
System Self-Security: System
is damaged by human threat.
10
9
2
180
Surveillance must be covert and
hidden from human threats. Be
prepared for maintenance in case
damage occurs.
Communication: Cannot
communicate through technical
means or language barrier.
9
10
1
90
Maintain and provide difference
communciation means.Learn local
language to warn ships and
fishing vessels.
Severity (S): 1 (less severe) - 10 (very severe)
Likelihood (L): 1 (less likely to occur) - 10 (almost certain to occur)
Detection (D): 1 (able to detect before problem) - 10 (almost unable to detect before it occurs)
35
System Risks - FMEA
Failure
S
L
D
RPN
Mitigation
Intentional Damage
Undetected: Human action
undetected and cables are cut.
8
5
1
40
Use logged surveillance data to
identify suspicious activity in
above surface and underwater.
Accidental Damage
Undetected: Ship and fishing
vessels not warned of CPZ,
damages cable.
6
3
1
18
Keep constant monitoring of ship
traffic in CPZ. Inform ships in
vicinity of fault and identify cause.
Natural causes and disaster
on System: System and/or
subsystem(s) is inoperable
because of natural disaster.
8
1
1
8
Keep constant monitoring of ROV
and sonar system to determine
functionality. Have maintenance
ready to be performed if
damaged.
Severity (S): 1 (less severe) - 10 (very severe)
Likelihood (L): 1 (less likely to occur) - 10 (almost certain to occur)
Detection (D): 1 (able to detect before problem) - 10 (almost unable to detect before it occurs)
36
Agenda
1. Concept Definition
1.
Context, Stakeholder Analysis, Gap, Problem, Need
2. Operational Concept
Operational Concept, Model Framework, Operational Scenario, Stakeholder Changes, Design
Alternatives, Requirements, System Risks
3. Simulation and Analysis
Simulation Requirements, Framework, Validation, Utility
4. Project Management
WBS, Current Status
37
Simulation Requirements
SR 1.0
The simulation shall model a representative cable system as closely as possible.
SR 2.0
The simulation shall generate threats at interarrival times based on research
data.
SR 3.0
The simulation shall determine the utility of various design alternatives by
tracking cost, detection chances, fault prevention and cable downtime reduction.
SR 4.0
The simulation shall generate all possible data from random distributions based
on collected research.
SR 5.0
The simulation shall output results to a comma separated text file that can be
analyzed.
SR 6.0
The number of simulation replications shall be determined by a 10% halfwidth
and 95% confidence interval.
38
Design of Experiment
Inputs
Cable
Active Alt(s)
Passive Alt(s)
Surface
Replications
1
FLAG Atlantic-1
None
None
None
7700
2
FLAG Atlantic-1
Seaglider AUV w/ SAS
None
None
7700
3
FLAG Atlantic-1
Remus 6000 AUV w/ SAS
None
None
7700
4
FLAG Atlantic-1
None
Hydrophone
None
7700
5
FLAG Atlantic-1
None
None
AIS System
7700
6
FLAG Atlantic-1
Seaglider AUV w/ SAS
Hydrophone
None
7700
7
FLAG Atlantic-1
Seaglider AUV w/ SAS
None
AIS System
7700
8
FLAG Atlantic-1
Seaglider AUV w/ SAS
Hydrophone
AIS System
7700
9
FLAG Atlantic-1
Remus 6000 AUV w/ SAS
Hydrophone
None
7700
10
…
…
…
…
…
11
Jonah Cable
None
None
None
7700
12
Jonah Cable
Seaglider AUV w/ SAS
None
None
7700
13
…
…
…
…
…
39
Simulating the FA-1 Cable
FLAG Atlantic-1 (FA-1) Cable System
NOAA Bathymetric Map
Estimates of depths through
long cable sections
[Telegeography, 2015] [NOAA, 2015]
40
Java Simulation Model
Implemented
Design
Alternatives
Implemented
Cable Model
41
Estimating Poisson Interarrival
Estimate probability of each fault based on data from 2,162 fault
study. Allocate unknown threats to other types, add in sabotage and
espionage threats.
Normalized
Probability of
Probability of Fault
Fault Type
type
P * 0.5
faults/year
Threat
Est. Prob. threat Threats per year of Threats per hour of
Interarrival rate
results in fault
each type
each type
in hours
Fishing
0.444
0.541
0.2704
0.05
5.408
0.000617356
1619.8
Anchoring
0.156
0.190
0.0950
0.25
0.380
0.000043382
23051.2
Component
0.072
0.088
0.0438
1.00
0.044
0.000005006
199776.7
Natural
0.069
0.084
0.0420
0.10
0.420
0.000047970
20846.3
Espionage
0.04
0.049
0.0244
0.00
0.024
0.000002740
365000.0
Sabotage
0.04
0.049
0.0244
1.00
0.024
0.000002781
359598.0
Total
0.821
1
0.5
2.4
6.300
0.000719234
1390.4
For 1 Cable:
Serious threats per year
Threat interarrival rate
Poisson mean λ
[Carter 2011]
6.3
1390.4 hours
0.00750628
42
Java Simulation Parameters
Threat
Probability
Loiter time
Distributions [N(μ, σ)]
Fault Conversion
Probability
Fishing
0.541
N(2, 0.5)
0.05
Anchoring
0.19
N(12, 6)
0.25
Component
0.088
0
1.00
Natural
0.084
N(48, 24)
0.10
Espionage
0.049
N(4380, 1095)
0.00
Sabotage
0.049
N(4, 1)
1.00
Example Normal Dist
Fishing Loiter Time
N(2, 0.5)
Delay, Travel, Repair and Downtime Calculations
Based on distributions, specific to the FA-1 Cable
downtime = notifyDelay + travelTime + repairTime
Lost Bandwidth and Repair Cost Calculations
capacity = 2.4 Tbps
10 Gbps rental rate = bandUnitCost = $25,000 (est)
shipCost = $12,000 per hour (est)
bandwidthCost = downtime * bandUnitCost * capacity
repairCost = (travelTime + repairTime) * shipCost
Detection probabilities:
Based on platform, sonar, other
parameters
Interaction of UISS Agent and
threat type, location and depth
Still being implemented
[Carter, 2011] [Carter, 2009] [Burnett 2014] [Rain, 2009] [Burnett, 2010]
43
FA-1 Simulation Output: As-Is
For the As-Is case:
66 threats and 4 faults over 10 years
301 hours (12.5 days) of downtime per fault
$2.4 million in repair costs per fault
$2.4 million in lost bandwidth per fault
44
Validation
As-is Simulation
•
•
Outputs “as-is” simulation compared to
historical data
z-distribution with 95% confidence interval
UISS Simulation
•
•
•
•
[37]
No hard data on system (does not exist)
Ensure “as-is” simulation is accurate
Ensure accuracy of input data and parameters
Clearly layout assumptions of model
45
Utility Analysis
Stakeholder
Prevention
Identification Downtime
Lifespan
Private
0.40
0.29
0.23
0.18
Government
0.40
0.23
0.26
0.11
● Prevention > Identification > Downtime ~ Lifespan
● Specific utility function for each model scenario
● Based on stakeholder needs
● Further decomposition
46
Agenda
1. Concept Definition
1.
Context, Stakeholder Analysis, Gap, Problem, Need
2. Operational Concept
Operational Concept, Model Framework, Operational Scenario, Stakeholder Changes, Design
Alternatives, Requirements, System Risks
3. Simulation and Analysis
Simulation Requirements, Framework, Validation, Utility
4. Project Management
WBS, Current Status
47
Work Breakdown Structure
48
A task is critical if there is no room in the schedule for it to slip.
Learn more about managing your project's critical path.
Project Management
Name
Start
Finish
Remaining
Work
Resource Names
Practice Presentation
Sun 10/4/15
Sun 10/4/15
2 hrs
Dane,Felipe,Isaac
,Kumar
R&U Project Plan
Sun 10/4/15
Tue 10/6/15
5 hrs
Isaac,Kumar
R&U Concept Definition
Sun 10/4/15
Mon 10/5/15
1 hr
Dane
R&U System Alternatives
Sun 10/4/15
Mon 10/5/15
1 hr
Isaac
R&U CONOPS
Tue 10/6/15
Thu 10/8/15
10 hrs
Isaac,Kumar,Felip
e
R&U System Model
Mon 10/5/15
Thu 10/8/15
10 hrs
Dane
R&U SOW
Wed 10/7/15
Thu 10/8/15
5 hrs
Kumar
Practice Presentation
Sun 10/25/15
Sun 10/25/15
4 hrs
Dane,Felipe,Isaac
,Kumar
R&U System Alternatives
Sun 10/25/15
Mon 10/26/15
4 hrs
Felipe,Isaac,Kum
ar
R&U System Model
Mon
10/26/15
Tue 10/27/15
10 hrs
Dane,Felipe,Isaac
,Kumar
R&U Utilitiy Analysis and
Recommendations
Tue 10/27/15
Wed 10/28/15
4 hrs
Kumar
utility function extension
Thu 11/5/15
Fri 11/6/15
8 hrs
Dane,Isaac,Felipe
,Kumar
R&U System Model
Fri 11/6/15
Sat 11/7/15
6 hrs
Dane,Felipe,Isaac
,Kumar
R&U Utility Analysis and
Recommendations
Sat 11/7/15
Sat 11/7/15
6 hrs
Dane,Felipe,Isaac
,Kumar
Current Status
●
●
●
●
●
Phase 7 completed
EV: $36,180
AC: $34,200
Cost Variance: $1,980
Ahead of schedule
49
Questions?
50
WBS
● Deliverable Oriented-Phased Planning system
● Allows for Review and Update process
● Granular control over scheduling/cost variances
● 3 hour work day per member (21hrs per week)
● $60 per hour for each resource
51
Timeline
52
Critical Tasks
53
Validation
•
Test Sim “as-is” with historical data
•
As sim expands, add more statistics
•
Z distribution (n>1000)
•
95% confidence interval
Sim
Confidence Interval
Actual
# Faults/Year
0.49 per year
0.4272 per year
Downtime
12 days
11 days
54
Earned Value Management
● Assuming 21 hour work weeks.
● Overhead - 1:1 Ratio of Indirect costs to direct costs.
● $30/hr X 2 = $60 hourly rate.
● Project duration: 9/13/15 - 5/13/16
Individual Total (9/13- Team Total (9/135/13)
5/13)
Planned Time
(Hours)
623.8
2495.2
Planned Value (PV)
$37,428
$149,712
55
EVMS (10/25/15)
Current Status
●
●
●
●
●
Phase 4 completed
EV: $21,900
AC: $18,403
Cost Variance: $2,640
Ahead of schedule
56
Project Management Risks
Risk
S
L
D
RPN
Mitigation
Critical Tasks
9
8
5
360
Start early and allot extra time for critical
tasks.
Requirements
Inflation and
Unexpected Scope
Expansion
8
8
5
320
Have weekly meetings to ensure project
is still in scope and progress is made.
Misspecification and
Errors
10
5
5
250
Team members meet weekly to discuss
progress of project and hold each other
accountable.
Simulation
9
5
5
225
Set objectives before simulation begins
to clarify goals of simulation. Research
thoroughly beforehand. Start before Fall
semester ends and work through winter
break.
Severity (S): 1(less severe) - 10 (very severe)
Likelihood (L): 1 (less likely to occur) - 10 (almost certain to occur)
Detection (D): 1 (able to detect before problem) - 10 (almost unable to detect before it occurs)
57
Project Management Risks
Risk
S
L
D
RPN
Mitigation
Background
Information
8
7
3
168
Use open source data and sensible
estimations.
Stakeholders
8
5
3
120
Justify solution by achieving
stakeholder's feasible objectives.
Communication with
Sponsor
3
5
6
90
Allow ample time for sponsor to
respond.
Severity (S): 1(less severe) - 10 (very severe)
Likelihood (L): 1 (less likely to occur) - 10 (almost certain to occur)
Detection (D): 1 (able to detect before problem) - 10 (almost unable to detect before it occurs)
58
Functional Block Diagram
59
Design Alternative Matrix
Alternative
Platform
Sonar
Traffic Monitoring
1
None
None
MTMW
2.1.1
AUV
SAS
None
2.1.2
AUV
CHIRP
None
2.1.3
AUV
HP
None
2.1.4
AUV
SSM
None
2.2.1
ROV
SAS
None
2.2.2
ROV
CHIRP
None
…
…
…
…
2.n.m
n-platform
m-sonar
None
3.1.1
AUV
SAS
MTMW
3.1.2
AUV
CHIRP
MTMW
…
…
…
…
3.n.m
n-platform
m-sonar
MTMW
60
Design Alternative 1: Marine Traffic
Monitoring and Warning (MTMW)
Mission Control
Marine Traffic Monitoring
and Warning
Warning Message to
Vessel
61
Design Alternative 2: USTD
Mission Control
Platform Alternative
Sonar Alternative
62
Design Alternative 3: MTMW and USTD
Mission Control
Platform Alternative
Sonar Alternative
Images copyright www.wikimedia.com, www.unmanned.co.uk, www.adweek.com
Ship-based Communication
63
[1] Synthetic Aperture Sonar
● Objective: to produce very high resolution
images along with bathymetry (depth
information).
● Up to 10X higher resolution than current
sonar.
● Uses consecutive pings along with acoustic
beams to determine depth.
● Current status: relatively new and could
replace side-scan sonar.
Image copyright whoi.edu
64
[2] CHIRP
● Compressed High Intensity Radar
Pulse
● Objective: to produce detailed images of
fish, objects, or seabeds.
● Uses bursts of signals to help compensate
for inconsistencies in sonar detection,
primarily with fish.
● Current status: used mostly for fishing.
Also used for producing detailed images
in shallow water.
Image copyright www.garmin.com
65
[3] Side-scan and Multibeam
● Multibeam sonar
● Transmits signal directly below ship’s
hull.
● Return signal is converted to depth.
● Side-scan sonar
● Energy is transmitted in the shape of a
fan that sweeps the seafloor, usually 100
meters wide.
● Return echo produces an image of the
sea floor.
Image copyright www.whoi.edu
66
Sonar Design Alternatives
[4] Sidescan and
Multibeam
[1] SAS
[2] CHIRP
[3]
Hydrophones
Max Depth
6,000 m
6,800 m
3,500 m
4,000 m
Signal
Range/Listening
Range
300 m
300 m
1-15,000 Hz
Up to 16 km
400 m
Resolution
3 cm
15 mm
204 dB re 1
V/µPa
30.5 cm
Frequency
175 kHz
350-650 kHz
46 kHz
150-1800
kHz
67
Platform Design Alternatives
[1] AUV/UUV
[2] ROV (Shiptowed)
[3] Sonar
Network
Max Depth
4,000 m
4,000 m
Up to 7,000 m
Operating Time
Up to 6,000 hours
0.25-2 m/s
Dependent on ship
capabilities
833-1290 days
Range
Dependent on
Speed and
Operating Time
Up to 10 km by
tether
Unlimited
~$1.2-2 million
ROV cost +
$26,000$55,000/day
operating cost
Very High and
Dangerous
Cost
68
[4] Hydrophones
● Objective: To listen for sounds, rather than
Hydrophone vs. Microphone
emitting signals and listening for echos.
● Used heavily in marine biology and
submarines - anti-submarine warfare and
navigation.
● First used in WWI
● Relays detection information to an on-board
or on-shore monitor.
Image copyright www.ccrma.stanford.edu
69
[1] Autonomous/Unmanned Undersea
Vehicles
● AUV/UUV
● Can be programmed to travel specific
routes, record data, scan for objects,
etc.
● Equipped with on-board computer
and sonar, cameras, and other sensors.
● Lithium-ion battery is most common
power source..
Images copyright asi-group.com
70
[2] Remote Operated Vehicles
● ROV
● Large fleet of ROVs with multiple
capabilities.
● Connected via tether and contains
propulsion engines to maneuver.
Images copyright asi-group.com
71
[3] Sonar Network
● Uses a network of sonar nodes
(hydrophones) and communicates
with on-board or onshore station.
● Long Baseline Localization: Fixed
location of nodes along with time
delay allow for localization of
objects.
● Extremely comprehensive and
would provide excellent coverage.
● Very costly to install at depths
greater than 200 meters.
● Can provide accuracy within 5
meters.
Image copyright www.nec.com
72
Further Simulation Work
In Progress
Complete implementation of agents
Calculate detection probabilities of
alternatives
Account for various movement
patterns of AUVs/ROVs
Determine costs for alternatives
Model additional cable systems
To be Implemented
Add dimensions to cable model to
account for vertical and lateral movement
Add movement of appropriate threats
73
Design Alternatives - Control Center
● Need for a control center to operate, monitor and communicate
with the system.
● Could also serve as a base to communicate with outside
stakeholders.
● Shipping and fishing vessels
● Law enforcement
● Military, etc.
● Centers of operation would be regional and offer faster and
more reliable communication.
74
Positive Changes
Entity
Current System
With System
Owners
Low Reliability
Increased Uptime
Governments
Threat of Espionage
Increased Security
Maritime Industry
Vessel Damage/Litigation Prevention/Clarity
System Manufacturers
No Market
Increased Revenue
Negative Changes
Entity
Problem
Solution
Repair Companies
Reduced Revenue
Shift Resources from
Repair to Monitoring
Environmental Groups
Disruption of Ecosystem
Extensive
Testing/Minimal
invasiveness
75
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[2]
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[3]
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[4]
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[5]
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[6]
M. Islam. (2015, May 8). Submarine Cable plans to sell bandwidth to Italian firm at low price [Online]. Available:
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[7]
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[8]
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[9]
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[10]
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76
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[12]
W. Rain. (2009, December 14). Problems faced by Industry in the repair of damaged submarine
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[13]
Y. Ruggeri et al. “Submarine Telecoms Industry Report” Terabit Consulting. Cambridge,MA, Issue 3, 2014.
[14]
“Global Bandwidth Research Service Executive Summary” TeleGeography. Washington D.C. 2015
[15]
“Australia & Pacific Bandwidth Review” TeleGeography. Washington D.C. February, 2015.
[16]
US Coast Guard. (2010, July 13). Types of Automatic Identification Systems [Online]. Available:
http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=typesAIS
[17]
“Technical characteristics for an automatic identification system using time-division multiple access in the VHF maritime mobile band” Intl.
Telecommunication Unit –
Radiocommunication, Geneva, Switzerland, Recommendation, ITU-R M.1371-4, April 2010.
[18]
Kokusai Cable Ship Co. (2010) Optical Submarine Cable Repair Method [Online]. Available: http://www.kkcs.co.jp/english/solutionRepairingMethod.html
[19]
D. Burnett. Submarine Cables: The Handbook of Law and Policy. Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff, 2014.
[20]
A. Chang. (2013, April 2). Why Undersea Internet Cables Are More Vulnerable Than You Think [Online]. Available:
http://www.wired.com/2013/04/how-vulnerable-are-undersea-internet-cables/
[21]
O. Khazan. (2013, July 16). The Creepy, Long-Standing Practice of Undersea Cable Tapping [Online]. Available:
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/07/the-creepy-long-standing-practice-of-undersea-cable-tapping/277855/
[22]
W. Landay, “The Navy Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) Master Plan,” Nov. 2004. [Online]. Available:
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/technology/uuvmp.pdf
[23]
[24]
"Side Scan Sonar." NOAA's Office of Coast Survey. 2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.nauticalcharts.noaa.gov/hsd/SSS.html.
"Harbor Monitoring Network System." NEC.com. N.p., 2015. Web. 31 Aug. 2015.
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77
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[25]
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[26]
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http://www2.l-3com.com/oceania//products/maritime_aussnet.htm.
[27]
“ROV Fleet,” ASI-Marine, 2015. [Online]. Available:
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[28]
[29]
D. Main. (2015, April 2). Undersea Cables Transport 99 Percent of International Data [Online]. Available:
http://www.newsweek.com/undersea-cables-transport-99-percent-international-communications-319072
S. Whitehead. “Submarine Cable Testing” Anritsu Corp., Richardson, TX, Application Note MW90010A, Dec. 2010.
[30]
D. R. Burnett, “Recovery of Cable Repair Ship Cost Damages from Third Parties That Injure Submarine Cables,” Tul. Mar. L.J., vol. 35, p.
103, 2011 2010.
[31]
A. Palmer-Felgate et al. “Marine Maintenance in the Zones - A Global Comparison of Repair Commencement Times” presented at the
SubOptic Conference
Presentation, Paris, France, May 2013.
[32]
G. White. (2014, November 20). Spy cable revealed: how telecoms firm worked with GCHQ [Online]. Available:
http://www.channel4.com/news/spy-cable-revealed-how-telecoms-firm-worked-with-gchq
[33] B. Gertz. (2015, September 22). Russian Spy Ship Makes Port Call in Caribbean [Online]. Available: http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russianspy-ship-makes-port-call-in-caribbean/
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[Online]. Available: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/26/world/europe/russian-presence-near-undersea-cables-concerns-us.html?_r=0
[35] L. Stewart. (2015, February 2). 20,000 leagues under the sea... a trawler hit an internet cable and sent broadband into meltdown [Online]. Available:
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[37]
https://www.google.com/search?q=validation&rlz=1C1CHWA_enUS642US642&espv=2&biw=1536&bih=825&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahU
KEwi-9NL4oZ7JAhWGPCYKHWxcDEgQ_AUIBygC#imgrc=NaXG1PmRWU9SrM%3A
78
Causes of Cable Faults
Approximately 150 faults reported per
year.
Over 20% are cause unknown. Even
when the cause is known, identifying a
responsible party is difficult.
70% of faults occur in water of less than
200m deep.
Each faults costs millions of dollars in
lost bandwidth revenue and repair costs.
No central database or logging of
threats/faults exists.
New FCC regulations will mandate
reporting of US based cable faults.
79
Design Alternatives - Ship Monitoring
and Communications
● Automatic ID system (AIS) transponder
required on all vessels larger than 299 tons
● Live GPS updates every 10sec to 3 minutes
[16]
● Ship ID, position, speed, navigation status
[16]
● Can send text messages [16]
● Marine VHF radio system required on all
commercial vessels and all vessels over 20m
in length
● 100-200 nm range
● Required monitoring of Channel 16 for
emergency and safety messages
Image copyright marinetraffic.com
80
Design Alternatives - Fault Location Finding
Shunt Fault (electrical)
● Use PFE (power feed equipment) to vary
voltage at CLS to find approximate location
of cable fault based on known voltage drop
per km.
● Onsite at all CLS servicing cables with
repeaters.
● Not very accurate, many additional factors
Optical Fault [29]
● Use Coherent / Optical Time Delay
Refractometer (COTDR/OTDR)
● Test pulse of known pulse width, measure
light backscattering to determine fault
location
● Can quickly determine fault segment and
linear location of fault to as close as 10m
● Not equipped at most CLSs
Images copyright Advantest
81
EVMS
82