INITIAL DRAFT
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Chapter 1
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SYNCHRONIZATION
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“There is still a tendency in each separate unit…to be a one-handed puncher.
By that I mean that the rifleman wants to shoot, the tanker to charge, the
artilleryman to fire…That is not the way to win battles. If the band played a
piece first with the piccolo, then with the brass horn, then with the clarinet, and
then with the trumpet, there would be a hell of a lot of noise but no music. To
get the harmony in music each instrument must support the others. To get
harmony in battle, each weapon must support the other. Team play wins. You
musicians of Mars must not wait for the band leader to signal you…You must
each of your own volition see to it that you come into this concert at the proper
place and at the proper time…”
General George S. Patton, Jr., 8 July 1941, address to the
men of the 2nd Armored Division, The Patton Papers, Vol.
II, 1974
1-1. Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space and
purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time.
Combined arms operations are the synchronized and simultaneous application of
several arms, such as infantry, armor, aviation, artillery, engineer, intelligence
and air defense to achieve greater effects on the enemy than that achieved if each
arm were used against the enemy in sequence or against separate objectives. The
challenge to the combined arms commander, given the assumption that he does
not possess unlimited combat resources, is to achieve synchronization. While
success in any battle, engagement or operation is never guaranteed, its
achievement is much more likely for the commander who can synchronize
military actions.
OPERATIONS AND DOCTRINE
1-2. The range of operations for which the combined arms commander must be able to
synchronize military actions is broad. While primarily concentrating on offensive and
defensive operations, he must also be able to synchronize his unit’s activities during stability
operations and support operations (SASO) when given those missions. This manual will
focus primarily on Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) for synchronizing maneuver
and fire support in offensive and defensive operations. It will also present considerations for
synchronizing actions during SASO – to include the consideration of Information
Operations in all operations. The capstone doctrinal references for fire support are JP 3-09,
Doctrine for Joint Fire Support (12 May 1998) and FM 3-09, Doctrine for Fire Support
(TBP 1st Qtr, FY02).
Tactics
1-3. Tactics are: The employment of units in combat; the ordered arrangement and
maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or the enemy in order to use their full
potentialities; the art and science of employing available means to win battles and
engagements; the specific techniques used in the movement and positioning of forces on the
battlefield in relation to the enemy, the provision of fire support, and logistical support of
forces prior to, during, and following engagements with the enemy.
1-4. FM 3-40, Tactics, is the basic doctrinal reference for tactics. Knowledge of its contents
is assumed for maneuver commanders. Similarly, armor and mechanized commanders
delineate their TTP in the FM 71-series, infantry in the FM 7-series and aviation in the FM
1-1
FM 3-09.31 (6-71)_______________________________________________________________
INITIAL DRAFT
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1-series. Combined arms commanders must insist that their FSCOORDs and FSOs
understand the maneuver TTP of these manuals – fire supporters must take it upon
themselves to become as well versed as possible in maneuver TTP. Conversely,
FSCOORDs and FSOs should recommend that their supported commander become familiar
with the TTP of this manual and with the respective FM 6-series fire support TTP manual
for their level of command (FM 6-20-60 – Corps; FM 6-20-30 – Division; FM 6-20-40 –
Brigade; FM 6-30 – Battalion / Task Force and Below). This manual presents the tactics of
fire support by providing considerations for the commander and FSCOORD/FSO during
offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations. These considerations should be used
to ensure the major planning and executing “fundamentals” of fire support are recognized
and their utilization thought out as a concept of the operation is formulated.
Techniques and Procedures
1-5. Techniques are: The general or detailed methods used by troops and/or commanders to
perform assigned missions and functions, specifically the methods of using equipment and
personnel. A procedure begins with a specific, documentable event that causes an activity to
occur.
The activity must produce a product that normally affects another
organization/element. Frequently, that product will be the event that causes another
procedure to occur. It is important to recognize that a procedure determines “what” an
organization must do at critical periods but does not direct “how” it will be done. FM 6-2040 delineates TTP for Fire Support for Brigade Operations. FM 6-30 does the same for TTP
for Observed Fire and Fire Support at Battalion and Below. This manual presents
summarized techniques and procedures for synchronizing fires and maneuver during the
planning, preparation and execution phases of an operation.
INTEGRATION OF FIRE SUPPORT INTO THE CONCEPT OF THE
OPERATION
1-6. Fire support plans that are not integrated with maneuver plans result in unsuccessful
fires in support of the operation. Integrating fire support leads to synchronization. It
requires the commander and his staff to think both maneuver and fires at each step of the
Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). Conversely, it should also cause commanders
and staff to think both fires and maneuver throughout the targeting process. At brigade and
battalion, the targeting process can be subsumed within the MDMP and requires no more
people, equipment or time than what is used already in the MDMP.
1-7. The MDMP and targeting process require the same people: the battle staff. Targeting
merely requires each member of the battle staff to provide more specific information and
clearer focus at each step of the MDMP. Every order produced by a maneuver staff is a
product of the targeting process. The decision to use an armored versus a mechanized task
force is the result of the targeting process (DECIDE function). As for time, nothing extra is
being added to the staff’s battle rhythm. Initial targeting decisions are made within the
purview of the MDMP. Subsequent decisions are made daily or as the situation dictates as
the staff jointly assesses current and future operations within the context of what have
become known as targeting meetings (which occur while the DETECT, DELIVER and
ASSESS functions of previous targeting meetings are being executed). [More on targeting
within the MDMP in Chapter 4]
TTP TIPS
Throughout this manual, certain information will appear in text boxes under
the title: TTP TIPS. These summarize a Center for Army Lessons Learned
finding or a TRADOC trends reversal study and provide you with additional
considerations to use in solving the synchronization challenge.
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