Politics and the Social Contract:
John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau
Clark Wolf
Iowa State University
jwcwolf@iastate.edu
Argument for Analysis
Since people have fundamentally equal
rights and abilities, radically unequal
distribution of wealth and goods is
fundamentally unjust. But where political
institutions protect rights to private
property, radical inequalities are sure to
arise. Since the right to property leads to
injustice, property rights are unjust.
Argument for Analysis
If property rights can arise without the
violation of anyone’s rights, then property
rights are permissible. If property rights
are required for implementation of Natural
Law, then property rights are required by
justice. But the protection of property
rights leads to radical inequalities. It
follows that radical inequalities are
sometimes consistent with justice.
NOTICE:

Those who would like to re-take midterm or Quiz
may do so on Friday between 2:00 and 3:00.
Catt Hall 407.

If you can’t make it then, see me!

Anyone may re-take these exams. The new
grade will not replace the old, but will be taken
into account in your final grade for the course.
Argument for Analysis
Locke argues that we can gain property in land by
“mixing our labor” with it, as long as we don’t
appropriate more than we can use without waste, and
as long as we leave “enough and as good” for others.
But Locke’s theory can’t justify existing property rights:
the world is finite, and the human population of the
earth is large. At this point, there is no land left to
appropriate. So previous appropriation cannot have
left “enough and as good” in the common, so it must
have violated the ‘enough and as good’ requirement.
So on Locke’s view, existing property rights in land are
illegitimate.
Argument for Analysis
1) Locke specifies that legitimate appropriation
must leave ‘enough and as good’ for others.
2) At present there is no land left in a common.
3) previous appropriation did not leave “enough
and as good” in the common.
4)Previous appropriation was unjustified.
5) on Locke’s view, existing property rights in
land are illegitimate.
Argument for Analysis
The political theories of Hobbes and Locke
are irrelevant. Hobbes and Locke both
describe civil government as arising from
a pre-social state of nature, where society
is unorganized and has no strucuture. But
people have never lived in such a state, so
we can’t learn anything about real
societies by looking at such an artificial
construct.
1) Hobbes and Locke both describe civil government
as arising from a pre-social state of nature, where
society is unorganized and has no structure.
3) But people have never lived in such a state, so
4) we can’t learn anything about real societies by
looking at such an artificial construct.
5) [IP] If we can’t learn anything about real societies
from the works of a political theorist, then that
theorist’s work is irrelevant.
6) The political theories of Hobbes and Locke are
irrelevant.
Two kinds of answer:
1) People really are (or have been) in a ‘state of nature.’
2) Conceiving of political institutions on the model of a
contract can still inform us about their essential
properties.
Argument for Analysis:
Soujourner Truth, Women's Convention in Akron, Ohio, 1851:
“Well, children, where there is so much racket there must be something out of kilter. I think that
'twixt the negroes of the South and the women at the North, all talking about rights, the white
men will be in a fix pretty soon. But what's all this here talking about?
That man over there says that women need to be helped into carriages, and lifted over ditches,
and to have the best place everywhere. Nobody ever helps me into carriages, or over mudpuddles, or gives me any best place! And ain't I a woman? Look at me! Look at my arm! I have
ploughed and planted, and gathered into barns, and no man could head me! And ain't I a
woman? I could work as much and eat as much as a man - when I could get it - and bear the
lash as well! And ain't I a woman? I have borne thirteen children, and seen most all sold off to
slavery, and when I cried out with my mother's grief, none but Jesus heard me! And ain't I a
woman?
Then they talk about this thing in the head; what's this they call it? [member of audience
whispers, "intellect"] That's it, honey. What's that got to do with women's rights or negroes'
rights? If my cup won't hold but a pint, and yours holds a quart, wouldn't you be mean not to let
me have my little half measure full?
Then that little man in black there, he says women can't have as much rights as men, 'cause
Christ wasn't a woman! Where did your Christ come from? Where did your Christ come from?
From God and a woman! Man had nothing to do with Him.
If the first woman God ever made was strong enough to turn the world upside down all alone,
these women together ought to be able to turn it back , and get it right side up again! And now
they is asking to do it, the men better let them.
Obliged to you for hearing me, and now old Sojourner ain't got nothing more to say.”
Argument for Analysis

Either I’ll stay on campus between
classes, or I’ll go home. If I go home, my
roommate will distract me and I won’t get
my Philosophy reading done. But if I stay
on campus, I won’t have anyplace quiet to
work, so I won’t be able to get my
philosophy reading done. I guess I won’t
get my reading done!
Argument for Analysis
1) Either I’ll stay on campus between classes, or
I’ll go home.
2) If I go home, my roommate will distract me
and I won’t get my Philosophy reading done.
3) But if I stay on campus, I won’t have anyplace
quiet to work, so I won’t be able to get my
philosophy reading done.
4) I won’t get my reading done!
Dilemma
1) Either C or H
2) If H then D & ~P
3) if C then ~W and ~P.
4) ~P
Argument for Analysis
If we arm campus police, then there will be more
guns on campus because the campus police will
bring them. But if we don’t arm campus police,
then the criminals will bring more guns to
campus. So no matter what we do, there will be
more guns on campus.
If there are guns on campus, it’s better that they
be in the hands of the police than in the hands
of the criminals. So we should arm the police.
Argument for Analysis
There can be no such thing as justice unless
there are institutions to punish people who break
their promises and contracts. Justice involves the
rational requirement that people should keep
their promises and abide by the contracts to
which they freely agree. But unless there are
public institutions that will punish people who
break promises and contracts, it is not rational for
people keep them. Since requirements of justice
must be requirements of reason (rationality), it
isn’t ‘just’ to keep contracts where there is no
punishment, it’s just irrational and foolish.
Argument for Analysis
1) Justice involves the rational requirement that people
should keep their promises and abide by the contracts to
which they freely agree.
2) But unless there are public institutions that will punish
people who break promises and contracts, it is not
rational for people keep them.
3) Since requirements of justice must be requirements of
reason (rationality), it isn’t ‘just’ to keep contracts where
there is no punishment, it’s just irrational and foolish.
4) There can be no such thing as justice unless there are
institutions to punish people who break their promises
and contracts
Argument for Analysis
Terms like ‘good’ and ‘beautiful’ essentially refer to the
attitudes of the person who uses them: to say that
something is beautiful is to say that one likes looking at
it; to say that something is good is to say that one
appproves of it. Since different people find different
things beautiful and good, such terms change their
meaning when they are used by different people. But
reasoning requires terms that have a stable meaning:
proper reasoning cannot be done with terms that have
a different meaning for different speakers. Ethics is the
philosophy of ‘good,’ just as aesthetics is the
philosophy of ‘beauty.’ It follows that there can be no
reasoning in ethics or aesthetics.
Argument for Analysis
1) Ethics is the philosophy of ‘good,’ just as aesthetics
is the philosophy of ‘beauty.’
2) To say that something is beautiful is to say that one
likes looking at it; to say that something is good is to
say that one approves of it.
3) Since different people find different things beautiful
and good, such terms change their meaning when they
are used by different people.
4) Reasoning requires terms that have a stable
meaning
5) Therefore, there can be no reasoning in ethics or
aesthetics.
Language and Knowledge: Right
Definitions and the "Sticky twigs of
language..."
"Seeing that truth consisteth in the
right ordering of names in our
affirmations, a man that seeketh
precise truth had need to remember
what every name he uses stands
for, and to place it accordingly; or
else he will find himself entangled
in words, as a bird in lime twigs,
the more he struggles the more
belimed. And therefore in
geometry, (which is the only
science that it hath pleased God
hitherto to bestow on mankind)
men begin at settling the
significations of their words; which
settling of significations they call
definitions and place them in the
beginning of their reckoning."
-Leviathan, Ch 4, p. 501.

Reason:
REASON... is nothing
but reckoning (that is,
adding and
subtracting) of the
consequences of
general names agreed
upon for the marking
and signifying of our
thoughts. (Ch 5, p. 503)

Knowledge: Hobbes is an Empiricist. Knowledge
comes from our senses. False and misleading
ideas we get are added by imagination and "fancy."

Empiricism: The theory that all knowledge comes to
us through the senses.

Insignificant Speech: Literally meaningless noise
presented under the false guise of communication.
Hobbes believes that we become literally incoherent
when we are not careful about the meanings of the
terms we employ.

"The common sort of men seldom speak insignificantly, and are
therefore by those other egregious persons counted idiots. But to be
assured their words are without any thing correspondent to them in
the mind, there would need some examples; which if any man
require, let him take a School-man into his hands and see if he can
translate any one chapter concerning any difficult point, as the
Trinity; the Deity; the nature of Christ' transubstantiation; free-will,
&c. into any of the modern tongues, so as to be able to make the
same intelligible. (...) What is the meaning of these words: "The first
cause does not necessarily inflow anything into the second, by force of the
essential subordination of the second causes, by which it may help it to
work." They are the translation of the title of the sixth chapter of
Suarez' first book, Of the Concourse, Motion, and Help of God. When
men write whole volumes of such stuff, are they not mad, or intent
to make others so?" (Ch 8, end, p. 617)
Hobbes on Philosophical
Nonsense:

Philosophers are the worst, according to Hobbes:
"And of men, those are of all most subject to
[absurdity] that profess philosophy. For it is most
true that Cicero saith of them somewhere; that there
can be nothing so absurd but may be found in the
books of philosophers." (Ch 5p. 504)

The Point: Hobbes hopes to clear up earlier
philosophical messes by making language precise.
He hopes to do for politics, morals, and knowledge,
what Euclid did for Geometry.
Hobbes on Psychology and
Human Motivation:
Psychological Egoism: All human actions are
(ultimately) selfish.
Ethical Egoism: All right actions are selfish.
Questions:
1) Why would anyone believe these theories?
2) Are these two consistent with one another? Why
or why not?
3) Is Hobbes a psychological egoist?
4) Is Hobbes an ethical egoist?
POWER AND DEATH: THE
BASIC HOBBESIAN MOTIVES:
"I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and
restless desire for power after power, that ceaseth only in death.
And the cause of this is not always that a man hopes for a more
intensive delight than he has already attained to; or that he cannot
be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure
the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without
the acquisition of more. And from hence it is that Kings, whose
power is greatest, turn their endeavours to the assuring it at home
by laws or abroad by wars: and when that is done, there
succeedeth a new desire; in some of fame from new conquest: in
others, of ease and sensual pleasure; in others, of admiration, or
being flattered for excellence in some art, or other ability of the
mind." (Ch 11 p. 523)
Hobbesian Psychology: Egoism?

IS HOBBES A PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOIST?

For: He does seem to define our words in the
language of self-interest...

Against: Not all of our interests may be selfregarding. When we act on other-regarding interests,
we're not egoists. In MAN AND STATE Hobbes
makes it clear that he is not a psychological egoist.
(Good thing too, since no reputable psychologist
now regards psychological egoism as a plausible
theory of human motivation.)
Value:

Value and "Good:"

"Whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or
desire, that it is which he for his part calleth good;
and the object of his hate and aversion, evil and of
his contempt vile and inconsiderable. For these
words of good, evil, and contemptible, are ever used
with relation to the person that useth them: there
being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any
common rule of good and evil, to be taken from the
nature of objects themselves; but from the person of
the man. (...)" (Ch 6, p. 506)
Value Realism and
Value Subjectivism

Compare:
Hamlet: "...there's nothing good or bad but thinking makes it
so."

Epictetus: Things are not good or bad in themselves, but only
in relation to our desires and aversions. So it's 'bad' to want
something and not get it, or to be averse to something and get
it. [But, Epictetus will go on, if you train yourself not to want or
be averse to the wrong things, then nothing will be good or bad
for you.]

BUT BY CONTRAST: Compare Plato on "Good." What is Plato's
reason for thinking that "good" can be a non-subjective term?
Does Plato's reason apply to Hobbes' theory?
Terms of "inconstant signification" and reasoning: a
source of "insignificant speech":
"The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please and displease us
because all men be not alike affected with the same thing, nor the same man
at all times, are in the common discourses of men of inconstant signification.
For seeing all names are imposed to signify our conceptions, and all our
affections are but conceptions, when we conceive the same things
differently, we can hardly avoid different naming of them. For though the
nature of that we conceive, be the same; yet the diversity of our reception of
it, in respect of different constitutions of body and prejudices of opinion,
gives every thing a tincture of our different passions. And therefore in
reasoning a man must take heed of words which besides the signification of
what we imagine of their nature, have a signification also of the nature,
disposition, and interest of the speaker; such as are the names of virtues and
vices; for what one man calleth wisdom another calleth fear, and one cruelty
what another justice, one prodigality what another magnanimity, and one
gravity what another stupidity, &c. And therefore such names can never be
true grounds of any ratiocination." (Ch 4, end p. 502)

Paradiastole [OED 2071]: "A figure in which a
favorable turn is given to something unfavorable by
the use of an expression that conveys only part of
the truth... When with a milde interpretation or
speech we colour others or our own faults, as when
we call a subtile man wise, a bold fellow courageous,
or a prodical man liberal... pradastiole by some
learned Rhetoriticians called a faulty turn of speech,
opposing the truth by false terms and wrong names.
[You will not be asked to define this on an exam!]

Example from Plato: Conversation between Clessippus and
Dionysdorus from Plato's Euthydemus:
“You say that you have a dog?”
“Yes, a villain of one,” said Clesippus.
“And he has puppies?”
“Yes, and they are very like himself.”
“And the dog is the father of them?”
“Yes,” he said, “I certainly saw him and the mother of the
pupps come together.”
“And is he not yours?”
“To be sure he is.”
“Then he is a father, and he is yours, ergo he is your father, and
the puppies are your brothers!”

The Point: Hobbes believed that fallacious arguments like
these could be avoided, if only we take care to use words
carefully, according to firm, supportable definitions.
Hobbes on Values and
Reasoning:

Implications for a Philosophy of "Good:"
1) Evaluative terms like 'good' 'bad' 'better' 'worse'
are perspectival.
2) Perspectival terms cannot be the basis for
reasoning.
3) Therefore there can be no reasoning about what is
good or bad or better or worse.

Question: How would Aristotle or Plato respond to
Hobbes Argument? Where have we seen a position
like this before? (Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic,
Book I!)
Hobbes's State of Nature and the
Foundations of Civil Society

The Question: Given Hobbes' account of
human motivation and the desire for power
(and fear of death), how is it possible for
human beings to cooperate with one another
in society? How could we move from a presocial situation (a state of nature) into a civil
society with laws and government? What do
we gain (and loose) in the transition from the
state of nature to the state of civil society?
Hobbes’s State of Nature:

Rough Equality, No exclusive rights to anything.

"Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of body and
mind' as that though there be found one man sometimes
manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another'
yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man
and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon
claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend
as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has
strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret
machination, or by confederacy with others that are in the
same danger with himself." (Ch 13 p. 531)
State of Nature is a State of War:
"And from this equality of ability, ariseth
equality of hope in the attaining of our
ends. And therefore if any two men
desire the same thing, which
nevertheless they cannot both enjoy,
they become enemies; and in the way
to their end, endeavor to destroy or
subdue one another. (Ch 13, p. 531)
War and the Causes of Quarrel:
"In the nature of man, we find three principle
causes of quarrel. First competition, second,
diffidence, thirdly glory. The first maketh
men invade for gain, the second for safety,
the third for reputation. The first use violence
to make themselves masters of other mens
persons, wives, children, and cattle; the
second to defend them; the third for trifles as
a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any
other sign of undervalue." (632)
State of Nature is a State of War:

"Hereby it is manifest that during the
time men live without a common power
to keep them in awe, they are in that
condition which is called war; and such
a war as is of every man against every
man." (632)
Why War is Bad:

What is life like in the "state of nature," this war of "all
against all?

"In such condition there is no place for industry
because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently
no culture of the earth; no navigation; nor use of the
commodities that may be imported by sea; no
commodious building; no instruments of moving and
removing such things as require much force' no
knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time;
no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all,
continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of
man solitery, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." (632-33)
Justice in War, and the
Prospects for Peace:

In such circumstances all talk of justice is meaningless, claims Hobbes:
"To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent.
That nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and
injustice have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is
no law, where no law no injustice. Force and fraud are in war the two
cardinal virtues. justice and injustice are none of the faculties neither of
the body nor mind.(...)
The passions that incline men toward peace are fear of death, desire of
such things as are necessary to commodious living, and a hope by their
industry to obtain them. And reason suggesteth convenient articles of
peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles are
they which otherwise are called the Laws of Nature whereof I shall speak
more particularly in the following two chapters. (633)
COMPETITION, GLORY,
AND THE CAUSES OF WARRE!!

To the State of "Warre"
Equality + [Competition, "Diffidence," and
"Glory"] => WARRE of all against all.

Competition: Limited goods, we all want 'em.
Diffidence: We all fear for our safety and
mistrust others.

Glory: Desire for reputation; over-estimating
our own capacities, underestimating costs of
war.
Law and Right

Natural Laws and Natural Rights
Right: What you can do without obstruction
Law: A constraint on liberty.

Hobbesian Right of Nature: The liberty to use
one's power to protect one self however one
sees fit to do it.
Hobbesian Laws of Nature: rules of reason
that tell us to do what it is in our interest to
do.
Right of Nature in the SON:

Right of Nature: In the SON (State of Nature), everyone has a right to
everything.

"And because the condition of man is a condition of war of everyone
against everyone, in which case everyone is governed by his own
reason and there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a help
unto him in preserving his life against his enemies, if followeth that in
such a condition everyone has a right to every thing, even to one
anothers' body. And therefore as long as this natural right of every
man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man,
(how strong or wise soever he be), of living out the time which nature
ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently it is a precept, or
general rule of reason that every man ought to endeavour peace as far
as he has hope of attaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he
may seek and use all helps and advantages of war. The first branch of
which rule containeth the first and fundamental law of nature which is
to seek peace and follow it. The second the sum of the right of nature
which is by all means we can, to defend ourselves.”
Laws of Nature in SON:

First Law of Nature: [80] Seek peace.

Second Law of Nature: "...that a man be willing, when others are
so too, as far-forth for peace and defense of himself he shall think
it necessary, to lay down this right to all things and be contented
with so much liberty aggainst other men as he would allow other
men against himself. For as long as every man holdeth this right
of doing anthing he liketh, so long are all men in the condition of
war. But if other men will not lay down their right, as well as he,
then there is no reason for anyone to divest himself of his: for that
were to expose himself to prey (which no man is bound to) rather
than to dispose himself to peace. This is that law of the Gospel;
whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to
them. (636)

Second Law of Nature: Be willing to contract to lay down some of
the liberties implicit in right of nature to seek peace, but only
when others are also willing.
The Prisoners’ Dilemma

The Original Prisoner's Dilemma: Avery and Terry have been
captured during the commission of a minor crime, but the DA knows
that they are guilty of a much more serious crime, which they
committed together. The DA places them in separate rooms, and
says to each one: If either of you individually confesses and turns
states evidence on your accomplice, you will be set free. But if your
accomplice confesses and turns states evidence while you keep
silent, we will punish you with the full force of the law: In this case,
50 years in prison. If you both turn states evidence, we will punish
you only a little bit less severely: you will each receive 49 years in
prison. However, if neither of you confess, the most we can give you
for your minor crime is that you will both receive one year in prison.
The Prisoners’ Dilemma
In the table below, outcomes are represented in "years in prison," with
Avery's sentence first and Terry's sentence later so that [0,50] refers to
the outcome in which Avery goes free (0 years in prison) and Terry gets
a 50 year sentence.
Payoffs are represented in years in prison, and as ordered pairs:
[Payoff for Avery, Payoff for Terry]
Action of Terry 
Action of Avery 
Keep Silent
Turn State’s Evidence
Keep Silent
[1,1]
Second best for
both, and really not
that bad.
[50,0]
Worst for Avery, best
for Terry
Turn State’s
Evidence
[0,50]
Worst for Terry,
Best for Avery
[49,49]
Third best for both,
and almost as bad as
the worst.
Prisoners’ Dilemma: The Dominance Argument
Dominance Argument: If each wants to minimize years spent in prison,
then Avery and Terry should both reason as follows: The other person will
either choose to keep silent, or to turn state's evidence. "cooperate" or to
"defect." I can not influence the choice that person makes-- in this sense, it
is as if the choice has already been made.
Suppose my partner turns states evidence: Then the only outcomes I could
achieve are 45 year in prison (if I also turn states evidence) or 50 years in
prison (if I keep silent). Better 45 years in prison than 50 years, so if I knew
that my partner was planning to sell me down the river I wouldn't want to be
a sucker: I would want to turn states evidence too.
Suppose my partner keeps silent: Then the outcomes available to me
include freedom (if I turn evidence) or one year in prison (if I keep silent too).
Freedom is better than a year in prison, so if I knew that my partner was
planning to keep silent, then it would be better for me to defect.
It follows that no matter what the other person does, I will minimize my years
in prison if I turn states evidence. A choice is Dominant just in case it’s the
best choice no matter what other people do. So breaking trust is a
Dominant Strategy.
Prisoners’ Dilemma: Some Terms
Dominant Strategy: A strategic option dominates alternatives just in case the actor is better off
choosing this option no matter what anyone else does.
Nash Equilibrium: The outcome achieved if each "player" adopts an individually rational
strategy. [Which outcome in the matrix above is the Nash Equilibrium?]
Cooperative Outcome: The outcome achieved if both "players" cooperate with one another
rather than defecting. [In the example above, the outcome in which we both keep silent is the
cooperative outcome.]
Pareto Optimum: An outcome is a pareto optimum if there is no alternative outcome that is
preferred by at least one person which is not worse for some other.
Paradox: In the "Prisoner's Dilemma," the Nash
equilibrium is worse for both. So if both players are
“rational” and make the choice that is likely to maximize
individual benefit, the outcome is worse
for both.
In the prisoners’ dilemma, the ‘rational’ outcome is not the
pareto optimum. Does this ever really happen?
From Prisoners’ Dilemma to Public Goods to
Commons Tragedy
...the coral reefs of the Philippean and Tongan islands are currently
being ravaged by destructive fishing techniques. Where fishermen
once used lures and traps, they now pour bleach (i.e. sodium
hypochlorite) into the reefs. Partially asphyxiated, the fish float to
the surface and become easy prey. Unfortunately, the coral itself
suffocates along with the fish, and the dead reef ceases to be a
viable habitat. ("Blast fishing," also widely practiced, consists of
using dynamite rather than bleach.) What goes through the minds
of these fishermen as they reduce some of the most beautiful
habitats in the world to rubble? Perhaps some of them think, quite
correctly, that if they do not destroy a given reef, it will shortly be
destroyed by someone else, so they might as well be the ones to
catch the fish.
-David Schmidtz, “The Limits of Government.”
From Prisoners’ Dilemma to Public Goods to
Commons Tragedy
Everyone Else 
Fish with lures and traps
Fish with Dynamite
and Bleach
Me
Fish with Lures and Resource is preserved,
Traps
we all catch less fish.
Resource is
destroyed, and I catch
less than anyone else.
Fish with Dynamite Resource is preserved
and Bleach
(my destruction isn’t
enough to waste the
resource) and I get lots of
fish!
Resource is destroyed
and at least I get as
much as everyone
else.
Prisoners’ Dilemmas
and Commons Tragedies:

Thomas Hobbes on Covenants in the State of Nature:
(Leviathan, Part I, Chapter 14)

"If a covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties perform
presently, but trust one another; in the condition of mere nature,
(which is a condition of war of every man against every man,) upon
any reasonable suspicion, it is void: but if there be a common power
set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compel
performance, it is not void. For he that performeth first has no
assurance that the other will perform after; because the bonds of
words are too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger, and
other passions, without the fear of some coercive power; which in
the condition of mere nature, where all men are equal and judges of
the justness of their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed. And
therefore he which performeth first, does but betray himself to his
enemy; contrary to the right (he can never abandon) of defending
his life, and means of living."

The Single-Shot Crop Harvesting Dilemma: I need your help to bring in my crop of
grain, which ripens in late summer. You will need my help to bring in your apples
which ripen in early fall. Can we achieve an agreement to cooperate? Not in the state
of nature, implies Hobbes.

Your choice in late summer: Help me or don't help me. My choice comes in early fall:
Help you (keep my "contractual promise") or don't help you (break my promise).

Payoffs in the matrix below are given in terms of the rank order of the outcome in
question for [Me, and You]. So [1,3] means that the box in question is my first choice
outcome and your third choice outcome.
You
Me
Help me this summer
Don’t Help me
Help you in Fall
[2,1] Second best for me,
best you can hope for.
This outcome is not
achievable, since I won’t
help you unless I’m
compensated.
Don’t help you in the Fall
(Break my “promise”)
[1,3] Best for me, since I
gain your cooperation at no
cost. (Worst for you,
Sucker!)
[3,2] Third best for me,
since I’d rather cooperate
than not. Second best for
you, since at least you’re
not exploited by your
unscrupulous neighbor.
The Elemental Form of the Prisoners’ Dilemma
In the box below, outcomes are identified
as 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th choice preferences
instead of quantitative payoffs.
You 
Me
Cooperate
Defect
Cooperate [2,2]
[4,1]
Defect
[3,3]
[1,4]
The Elemental Form of the Prisoners’ Dilemma
Sadly, the Logic works the same even when the cooperative benefit is
only slightly less than the exploitation payoff: the downside risk that
one might get the “sucker payoff” if one cooperates is sufficient to
make it narrowly “rational” to defect every time. In the matrix below,
payoffs represent the prize or reward that each person will get:
You 
Me
Cooperate
Cooperate
[$99.99,$99.99] [0,$100]
Defect
[$100,0]
Defect
[$.01,$.01]
Conditions for a Commons Tragedy:

Nonrivalrous Consumption: One person’s
consumption of the good does not prevent
others from enjoying it as well.

Non-Excludability: Noncontributors (or
noncooperators) cannot be excluded from using
the common.
In fact, these conditions are a matter of degree.
Few resources are purely nonrivalrous or purely
nonexcludable.
Two Problems that Create a PD
or Commons Tragedy:

ASSURANCE PROBLEM: Even if people would prefer
to cooperate might not be willing to do so unless they
can be assured that others would also cooperate.
(Shows that good will is not enough)

COORDINATION PROBLEM: People might be willing to
cooperate IF ONLY they could coordinate their actions,
but they may be unable to achieve the necessary
coordination to make cooperation worth-while. (Shows
that good will is not enough, even if people know that
others are good willed)
Hobbes on the
Problems in the SON







No way to coordinate
no way to cooperate
no way to promise, even when it would be better
for all
No way to make covenants
no way to be secure in property
no way to gain fruits of prudence or creativity
No possibility for 'Justice' in the SON: "Covenants
without the sword are but words..." (Ch 17)
The Prisoners’ Dilemma
In the table below, outcomes are represented in "years in prison," with
Avery's sentence first and Terry's sentence later so that [0,50] refers to
the outcome in which Avery goes free (0 years in prison) and Terry gets
a 50 year sentence.
Payoffs are represented in years in prison, and as ordered pairs:
[Payoff for Avery, Payoff for Terry]
Action of Terry 
Action of Avery 
Keep Silent
Turn State’s Evidence
Keep Silent
[1,1]
Second best for
both, and really not
that bad.
[50,0]
Worst for Avery, best
for Terry
Turn State’s
Evidence
[0,50]
Worst for Terry,
Best for Avery
[45,45]
Third best for both,
and almost as bad as
the worst.
Hobbes Solution: The State as Crime Boss

What happens to the Prisoners’ Dilemma if we
add a “crime boss” who will murder anyone who
rats on another member of the Gang?
Action of Avery 
Action of Terry 
Keep Silent
Turn State’s
Evidence
Keep Silent
[1,1]
Each gets one year
in prison. First
choice for both!
[50,0 + dead]
Bad for Avery who
gets 50 yrs. Worst
for Terry who gets
dead.
Turn State’s
Evidence
[0 + dead, 50]
Bad for Terry who
gets 50 yrs. Worst
for Avery who gets
dead
[dead, dead]
Worst for both, since
the kingpin rubs them
both out.
On the Hobbesian Solution:

Upshot: With a crime kingpin, ‘Keeping silent’ becomes a dominant
strategy for both, and they can achieve cooperation.

According to Hobbes, this is what the threat of legal sanction does
for us all.

The function of the state is to hold a sword over our heads and
threaten us into behaving well. This, he argues, will solve the
problem of the commons! While it is usually a disadvantage to have
someone holding a sword (or a threat) over your head, Hobbes
shows that it can sometimes be an advantage.

The modern correlate of the Hobbesian view is the theory that
commons problems must be solved by restrictive legislation.
Sadly, this may sometimes be the only way to go.
“Covenants without the sword are but words,
with no strength to secure a man at all.” -Thomas Hobbes
Hobbes and the Foole:

1) Hobbes urges, contrary to the “Foole,” that
justice not contrary to reason
2) He argues that ‘covenant breakers’ must be
excluded from society

QUESTION: How can people lay down their
rights to a sovereign? All must act at ONCE,
else it's no good. (Coordination and assurance
problems arise here too.)
From Hobbes to Locke…

John Locke: Second Treatise of Government

Locke's State of Nature:
1) State of "Perfect Freedom," but within the "law of nature."
2) State of "natural equality." Locke refers not only to (rough) equality of
abilities and capacities, but also to the fact that all are equally bound by the
law of nature.

AN OBJECTION TO HOBBES: Without initial honesty and truth telling, we
can't leave SON. Once we GET a sovereign, Hobbes has no problem, but
before the sovereign, we can't contract.
The Upshot: We can’t make a social contract unless one is already in place.

LOCKE'S SOLUTION: "Truth and keeping faith belongs to men as men,
and not as members of society."(745*)
ROUSSEAU
1) Is social inequality natural or artificial? [In Rousseau's work, this
seems to be a question about the justification of inequality: Are vast
inequalities justified by the law of nature or are they unjustifiable and
horrible?]
2) What social circumstances make it possible for some people to
subjugate and enslave others?
3) What features of human beings are natural, and what features are
social accretions? And how can we tell?
4) When we look around the world, we see people oppressing one
another and perpetrating unspeakable violence on one another. What
makes people capable of such brutality? What must a person believe
or desire in order to have the ability to brutalize other human beings?
PROPERTY, EQUALITY, AND
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

The Problem of Distributive Justice:How
should the burdens and benefits of social
organization be distributed?

Egalitarianism: These goods (and bads) should
be distributed equally. People should not be
treated differently unless there are good
justifying reasons for unequal treatment.
PROPERTY, EQUALITY, AND
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Rousseau: "...since inequality is practically non-existent in the
SON, it derives its force and growth from the development of
our faculties and the progress of the human mind, and
eventually becomes stable and legitimate through the
etablishment of property and laws. Moreover, it follows that
moral inequality, authorized by positive right alone, is contrary
to natural right whenever it is not combined in the same
proportion with physical inequality" a distinction that is sufficient
to determine what one should think in this regard about the sort
of inequality that reigns among all civilized people, for it is
obviously contrary to the law of nature, however it be defined,
for a child to command an old man, for an imbecile to lead a
wise man, and for a handful of people to gorge themselves on
superfluities while the starving multitude lacks basic
necessities."
PROPERTY, EQUALITY, AND
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

Propertarianism: (Locke) Give to each person what she or he is
entitled to. People own whatever they legitimately acquire.
Acquisition is either creation, original appropriation, or transfer from
another legitimate owner.

What considerations support property rights (Lockean or
otherwise)? The notion that people are entitled to things they've
made with their own efforts is ancient, and has roots in widely
divergent social traditions. It may not be "natural" in the sense that
Locke thinks: the laws of Acquisition don't seem to be objective
universal truths like the laws of physics or mathematics. But they
may be natural in the sense that it's easy to understand how people
could come to feel proprietary. Where laborers have been forced to
work without gaining any entitlement to the fruits of their labor, they
have often resented their situation as unjust.
PROPERTY, EQUALITY, AND
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

What considerations support egalitarianism? The notion that
social institutions should treat people equally also has an ancient
history, and once again the idea has sprung up in widely different
societies around the world. Oddly enough, equality seems most
likely to be articulated as an ideal in societies that are most
flagrantly inegalitarian.

Question: Are these conceptions of justice "natural?" What would it
mean for a conception of justice to be "natural?"
Perhaps not in the sense Locke implies. But it may be that common
properties of human beings and common features of the human
condition lead people to develop notions of property and equality,
and to regard these notions as a kind of ideal.
PROPERTY, EQUALITY, AND
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

PROBLEM: These two conceptions of distributive justice are not
compatible. Where property rights are guarded, ineqalities will
eventually arise. Over time, inequalities will become more
pronounced, until eventually some are extravagantly wealthy while
others are destitute. [Or so argues Rousseau. Was he wrong?]

Locke's Solution: Property rights are clearly OK (they're part of
Natural Law). So if property rights generate inequalities, then some
inequalities must be OK. As long as no one's rights are violated,
there's no limit to the extent of justified inequalities.

Rousseau's Solution: Extreme Inequalities are pernicious,
oppressive, and clearly can't be justified as part of the "Natural"
order of things. If property rights are sure to generate these
inequalities, then property rights must be illegitimate (un-natural).
Rousseau’s Conjectural History

1) "Natural Man" (Sprung from the ground overnight, full grown like a mushroom;
expresses many of Rousseau's own prejudices and idealizations)

2) Families stay together

3) Villages of families (tools & huts). (876) [There are problems already at this stage:
(877).]

4) Agriculture (property rights arrive on the scene...) (878) [Dependence introduces
possibility of oppression: (878)]

5) Notions of Right and Justice set in stone the oppression of the weak, lead them to
see their oppression as part of the natural order of things. (Locke, Hobbes)

6) Devotion to Abstractions like Natural Right and Natural Law (These are just
artificial creations, says Rousseau.)

7) Nationalism: Devotion to abstractions of group identity. (889) (Atrocities become
possible.)
Rousseau’s Conjectural History
The Psychology of Rousseau's "Natural" Human Being:
1) Two Principles of Natural Motivation: Empathy and Self Interest.
2) Hobbes was wrong to suggest that lacking an idea of goodness,
human beings would be vicious. [868] (Did Hobbes really hold this view?)
3) Pity a natural disposition to virtue (869)
4) Sentience, not rationality, is source of moral concern. (870)
5) Other virtues spring from pity (870)
6) Reason can eliminate this natural source of virtue. (870)
7) Philosophical accounts of morality always get things wrong. (855)
8) Pity takes the place of Law in the SON (870)
Rousseau’s Conjectural History

Question: There are many points at which some of us probably don't agree
with Rousseau. If we're unconvinced by his account of "Natural Human
Beings," does it follow that his account of oppression and inequality is also
flawed?

Consider the reasons he gives why we should believe the account he
gives: (883)
1) supposed "right of conquest" could not arise in any other way. (Referring
to the notion that the wealthy are justified as Conquerors)
2) words "strong" and "weak" are equivocal, since we're naturally equal
from the metaphysical/natural perspective. These then stand in for "rich"
and "poor."
3) The poor had nothing to loose but their liberty, and could not rationally
have submitted that for any price. (As Locke's argument against Hobbes!)
4) Further, it's reasonable to believe that a thing was invented by those to
whom it is useful rather than by those to whom it is harmful.
Rousseau’s Conjectural History
Rousseau’s Conjectural History
Rousseau’s Conjectural History
Rousseau’s Conjectural History
Rousseau’s Conjectural History
Rousseau’s Conjectural History