Preventing Nuclear Proliferation
Chain Reactions:
Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
January 2008
Authors
Elizabeth Bakanic, Mark Christopher, Sandya Das, Laurie
Freeman, George Hodgson, Mike Hunzeker, R. Scott Kemp,
Sung Hwan Lee, Florentina Mulaj, Ryan Phillips
Project Advisors
Robert Einhorn, Frank von Hippel
Table of Contents
Abbreviations and Acronyms
3
Executive Summary
4
About the Report
7
Part I: Introduction
8
Part II: Northeast Asia
9
Japan
Nuclear History
Constraints on Developing Nuclear Weapons
Recent Developments in Japan’s Strategic Environment
Factors Likely to Affect Japan’s Nuclear Decision Making
9
9
9
10
11
South Korea
Nuclear History
Constraints on Developing Nuclear Weapons
Recent Developments in the Strategic Environment
Factors Likely to Affect Nuclear Decision Making
12
12
13
13
15
Policy Recommendations: Northeast Asia
RECOMMENDATION 1: Strongly reaffirm the U.S. commitment to a nuclear
weapon-free Korean Peninsula and Japan
RECOMMENDATION 2: Engage South Korea in discreet contingency planning for a
possible North Korean collapse scenario
RECOMMENDATION 3: Manage tensions with Japan and South Korea to ensure that
the U.S. alliances with and assurances to them remain robust
• Demonstrate Japan’s continued importance to the United States
• Prepare for a potential review of wartime OPCON transfer with the new South
Korean administration
RECOMMENDATION 4: Promote multilateral mechanisms for addressing regional
security issues
RECOMMENDATION 5: Encourage reconciliation between South Korea and Japan
• Support regional forums that bring together Japan and South Korea
• Maintain an impartial stance on territorial disputes and other historical issues
between Japan and South Korea
RECOMMENDATION 6: Resume U.S.-North Korea negotiations to reduce
Pyongyang’s ballistic missile threat
15
17
PART III: MIDDLE EAST
18
Egypt
Nuclear History
Constraints on Developing Nuclear Weapons
Recent Developments in the Strategic Environment
Factors Likely to Affect Nuclear Decision Making
18
18
18
19
20
15
16
16
16
16
17
17
17
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
15
1
Table of Contents
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
Policy Recommendations: The Middle East
RECOMMENDATION 7: Declare a new regional security doctrine
RECOMMENDATION 8: Strengthen the regional nonproliferation regime
• Demonstrate U.S. commitment to a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone
(WMDFZ) in the Middle East
• Endorse a Fuel Cycle-Free Zone as a first step toward a Middle East WMDFZ
RECOMMENDATION 9: Restart the Middle East Security Forum
RECOMMENDATION 10: Provide conditional support for Egypt’s drive to build
a civilian nuclear energy program
RECOMMENDATION 11: Strengthen the U.S.-Egypt bilateral relationship and
bolster Egypt’s leadership role in the region
• Establish a U.S.-Egypt Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
• Encourage Egypt to play a leading role in regional initiatives such as Israel-Palestine
peace talks and a revived regional security forum
2
21
21
22
22
22
22
23
23
23
23
PART IV: THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME
24
Policy Recommendations: Nonproliferation Regime
RECOMMENDATION 12: Raise the cost of withdrawal from the NPT. Ensure
that any withdrawal is automatically examined by the full UN Security Council
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter
RECOMMENDATION 13: Strengthen the IAEA verification system
• Continue to seek universal adherence to the Additional Protocol, beginning in the
United States
• Push the IAEA to increase the frequency and quality of its inspections of research reactors
• Encourage the IAEA to extend safeguards to the input of all uranium hexafluoride
(UF6) production facilities
• Increase the IAEA Safeguards Budget
RECOMMENDATION 14: Take further action towards irreversible and verifiable
disarmament
RECOMMENDATION 15: Withdraw Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP)
support for pyroprocessing in South Korea
24
24
25
25
25
25
26
26
26
APPENDIX A: INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED
28
APPENDIX B: INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH PAPER TOPICS
32
Abbreviations and Acronyms
Arms Control and Regional Security
Ballistic Missile Defense
Combined Forces Command (U.S.-ROK)
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
Exclusive Economic Zone
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
Free Trade Agreement
Highly Enriched Uranium
International Atomic Energy Agency
Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
National Democratic Party (in Egypt)
National Defense Program Outline
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
Operational Control
People’s Liberation Army
People’s Liberation Army Navy
Qualified Industrial Zone
Republic of Korea (South Korea)
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
United Nations
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
ACRS:
BMD:
CFC:
CTBT:
DPRK:
EEZ:
FMCT:
FTA:
HEU:
IAEA:
KAERI:
NATO:
NDP:
NDPO:
NPT:
OPCON:
PLA:
PLAN:
QIZ:
ROK:
START:
SORT:
TIFQ:
UN:
WMD:
WMDFZ:
3
Executive Summary
Nuclear activity in North Korea and Iran presents numerous challenges to the global nonproliferation regime.
Not least among these challenges is the possibility that the pursuit of nuclear weapons or a nuclear option by
these or other countries could cause neighboring states in Northeast Asia and/or the Middle East to revisit their
own nuclear postures. This report looks at the nuclear calculus facing three key U.S. friends and allies: Japan,
South Korea, and Egypt. It identifies the push factors that might induce each to consider developing nuclear
weapons, as well as the significant barriers each would have to overcome were it to pursue such a course.
The authors of this report deem it unlikely that South Korea, Japan, or Egypt will choose to pursue nuclear
weapons in the foreseeable future. The barriers to doing so are too high. That said, it remains in the U.S.
national interest to further reduce these countries’ incentives to develop weapons, particularly in light of nuclear
activity in Iran and North Korea. Toward this end, the report recommends country-specific, regional, and nonproliferation regime-wide policies that the United States should pursue to reduce the likelihood that any of these
three countries would pursue a nuclear weapons option.
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
With regard to U.S. policy toward Northeast Asia, the report recommends the following:
4
1. Reaffirm the U.S. commitment to a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula and Japan. The United States
should publicly and privately reiterate its opposition to new nuclear weapon states, including friends and allies. It should continue to make clear that it will not tolerate the continued presence of nuclear weapons in
North Korea.
2. Engage South Korea in discreet contingency planning for a possible North Korean collapse scenario. Contingency planning—initially between the United States and South Korea, and perhaps later involving China as
well—would help to mitigate both the dangers of loose nuclear materials and of nuclear inheritance by South
Korea.
3. Manage tensions with Japan and South Korea to ensure that U.S. alliances with and assurances to them
remain robust. Perceptions that U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea are strong contribute to the credibility of U.S. security assurances, including extended deterrence. Conversely, a lack of confidence in these
alliances raises the risk that Japan and South Korea might pursue nuclear weapons. To allay Japanese concerns
about neglect, the United States should look for both substantive and symbolic opportunities to demonstrate
that Japan remains a key U.S. partner. It should also commit to resolving the abductee issue in the context of
the Six Party Talks. To allay South Korean fears of U.S. disengagement, the United States should be prepared
to revisit discussion of the timetable for transferring wartime operational control of South Korean forces,
should the new South Korean administration so request.
4. Actively promote multilateral mechanisms for addressing regional security issues. The six-party forum
should, once North Korea has been denuclearized, evolve into a permanent regional security institution. The
United States should also support other forums for regional security discussions, involving China where appropriate.
5. Encourage reconciliation between South Korea and Japan. The United States should promote greater
consultation and coordination between South Korea and Japan by encouraging them to cooperate with one
another in regional forums. At the same time, the United States should maintain impartiality on territorial
disputes and historical issues between Japan and South Korea.
6. Resume U.S.-North Korea negotiations to reduce Pyongyang’s ballistic missile threat. The United States
should reengage in talks with North Korea on limiting North Korea’s missile capabilities, perhaps including
Japan where appropriate.
With regard to the Middle East, the report recommends the following:
8. Strengthen the regional nonproliferation regime. A new round of nonproliferation and arms control efforts
in the Middle East could increase regional stability while decreasing Egypt’s incentives to develop nuclear
weapons. This endeavor should consist of two elements: commitment to an eventual Middle East WMD-Free
Zone (WMDFZ), and pursuit of a regional Fuel Cycle Free Zone as a step toward that goal.
9. Restart the Middle East Security Forum. The forum should aim to improve security through confidencebuilding measures between states in the region. It could be modeled on the Working Group on Arms Control
and Regional Security (ACRS) of the early 1990s. Iraq, Syria, and Iran should be encouraged to participate.
10. Provide conditional support for Egypt’s drive to build a civilian nuclear energy program. The United
States should offer technical and financial support for a civilian nuclear energy program in Egypt in return for
a commitment from Cairo to support a Fuel Cycle Free Zone in the Middle East and to adhere to the Additional Protocol.
11. Strengthen the U.S.-Egypt bilateral relationship and bolster Egypt’s leadership role in the region. The
United States should establish a bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Egypt and increase Egypt’s profile
by giving it a leading role in regional initiatives such as the Middle East peace process and a revived regional
security forum.
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
7. Declare a new U.S. security doctrine in the Middle East. In order to allay security fears that could lead to
proliferation, the United States should declare a new security doctrine that clearly defines U.S. policy toward
the dominant threats—both conventional and non-conventional—in the Middle East. This doctrine should
declare as U.S. policy the following three commitments: 1) to protect access to strategic resources and keep
open shipping lanes in the region; 2) to take all necessary steps to defend U.S. friends and allies in the region
in the face of military aggression by another regional state; and 3) to affirm that the United States would
consider any threat or use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East as a threat to its own vital security interests
and would respond to such a threat by any means necessary. To lend credibility to this new security doctrine,
the United States should maintain a robust regional military presence and increase military cooperation with
its friends in the Middle East.
5
Executive Summary
Finally, the report provides recommendations for strengthening the nonproliferation regime in ways that would
have particular relevance to the three countries studied:
12. Raise the cost of withdrawal from the NPT. At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the United States should
propose automatic review by the UN Security Council, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, of a state’s
withdrawal from the NPT. The United States should also support the proposal that a withdrawing state
should give up any facilities, materials, equipment and technology that it acquired while a party to the NPT.
13. Strengthen the IAEA verification system. The United States should press for universal adherence to the Additional Protocol. It should encourage more frequent inspections of research reactors and pressure the IAEA
to apply material balance safeguards at UF6 production plants. To help fund these measures, the United
States should pledge to increase its voluntary contribution to the IAEA’s safeguards budget.
14. Take further action towards irreversible and verifiable disarmament. Both the United States and Russia
should pursue deeper irreversible cuts in their nuclear arsenals beyond their current commitments.
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
15. Withdraw GNEP support for pyroprocessing in South Korea. The United States should withdraw GNEP
support for South Korea’s pyroprocessing research and development program.
6
About the Report
This report is the product of research conducted by a team of ten graduate students at Princeton University’s
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs during the fall of 2007.
Team members traveled to Japan, South Korea, Egypt, and Israel, where they interviewed government officials,
academics, scientists, and other experts. The group also conducted research in the United States, including
interviews with diplomats from Japan, South Korea and Egypt and discussions with officials from the U.S.
Government.
A full list of the interviewees is provided in Appendix A. Many officials spoke candidly about sensitive issues on
the condition that their comments remain off the record; in accordance with their wishes, attribution of opinions and insights has been restricted where necessary.
Each member of the team also produced a research paper on a topic relevant to this report, a list of which can be
found in Appendix B.
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
We express our thanks to all who gave generously of their time to meet with us. We are grateful also for the financial support of the Woodrow Wilson School, without which this report would have been impossible. Above
all, we would like to thank Robert Einhorn and Frank von Hippel, who conceived of this project and offered invaluable advice and expertise throughout. Responsibility for any errors or omissions contained herein, however,
remains with the authors.
7
Part I: Introduction
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 injected a new urgency into U.S. efforts to counter the spread of
nuclear weapons. In pursuing this aim, Washington has understandably focused on states believed to be actively
seeking nuclear weapons. But countries that have thus far chosen not to develop nuclear weapons also merit attention. A given state’s decision to forego nuclear weapons is not permanent. Domestic political developments,
newly emerging threats, changes in the strategic environment, or perceived shifts in nonproliferation norms can
all cause states to reconsider their commitments to remaining non-nuclear.
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
This report examines the factors that could lead Japan, South Korea, and Egypt—three currently non-nuclear
allies or close friends of the United States—to re-consider their nuclear options. It then proposes policies that
the United States should pursue to help reduce the likelihood of their doing so.
8
The focus on Japan, South Korea and Egypt is not meant to imply that these are the only countries facing the
pressures associated with proliferation chain reactions, nor that they are the states most likely to acquire nuclear
weapons. A number of other countries—notably Saudi Arabia, Syria, Taiwan and Turkey—could provide
similarly fertile ground for analysis of this kind. Nonetheless, Japan, South Korea and Egypt merit particular
attention for several reasons. First, each faces the threat of nuclear activity by an unfriendly neighbor: North
Korea in the cases of Japan and South Korea, and Iran in Egypt’s case. Second, the United States plays a critical
role in the security calculations of each. Japan and South Korea are formal U.S. treaty allies, while Egypt and
the United States enjoy a longstanding security relationship. Third, each of the three countries has in the past
either considered developing nuclear weapons (Japan), or actually attempted to do so (South Korea and Egypt).
Finally, each of the three has been a staunch supporter of the global nonproliferation regime. The acquisition of
nuclear weapons by any one would deal a damaging if not fatal blow to the accepted norms of nonproliferation.
The report does not argue that proliferation chain reactions are inevitable. Such a suggestion would not only be
mistaken but also counter-productive, since public predictions about which countries are next in line to acquire
nuclear weapons weaken the normative restraints on the pursuit of such weapons and risk becoming self-fulfilling prophecies. Rather, the following analysis highlights the complexity of each country’s nuclear calculus,
including the significant barriers to developing nuclear weapons that each faces. Nonetheless, as the report
notes, Japan, South Korea and Egypt do face pressures to develop nuclear weapons. Given the stakes involved,
pursuing policies that mitigate these pressures is firmly in the U.S. strategic interest and will remain so for the
foreseeable future.
The report is divided into four parts` Part I is the introduction. Part II, on Northeast Asia, is divided into
subsections on Japan and South Korea. Each subsection provides background information on the country’s past
interest in nuclear weapons and technology, assesses the institutional and structural barriers the country would
face in developing nuclear weapons, looks at recent developments influencing strategic and nuclear calculations,
and suggests future conditions that might lead the country to reconsider its non-nuclear status. The section
concludes by proposing country- and region-specific recommendations for reducing incentives for Japan South
Korea to acquire nuclear weapons. Part III mirrors the structure of Part II but deals with Egypt and the Middle
East. Part IV discusses the overall nuclear nonproliferation regime and suggests regime-wide policies that the
United States should pursue to counter proliferation chain reactions, particularly in the three countries covered
in this study.
Part II: Northeast Asia
Japan
Nuclear History
As a direct result of the World War II nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan developed a strong
aversion to nuclear weapons. Yet, this nuclear allergy notwithstanding, Japan has in the past explored the nuclear weapons option. Japanese leaders have studied the desirability and feasibility of acquiring nuclear weapons
twice: first after China tested nuclear weapons in 1964, and then again in 1994 while formulating the country’s
post-Cold War global strategy. On both occasions, Japan concluded that becoming a nuclear weapons state
was not in its interests.1 As part of its robust civil nuclear energy program, however, Japan has developed both
enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. Some have suggested that this is part of a hedging strategy that would
give Japan the ability to produce fissile material quickly should it ever decide to develop a nuclear weapon.2
Following North Korea’s ballistic missile tests in 1998 and 2006 and its nuclear test in 2006, the Japanese government and people have shown more willingness to discuss publicly the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons. At present, the discussion remains essentially a debate on whether to have the debate, but even this level of
discourse indicates a significant increase in Japanese tolerance of the subject.
Constraints on Developing Nuclear Weapons
The U.S.-Japan alliance is a key variable in Japan’s calculus on nuclear issues. Pursuing nuclear weapons would
severely damage if not destroy Japan’s alliance with the United States, on which Japan relies for security guarantees including extended nuclear deterrence.
Japan has long been a vocal supporter of the nonproliferation regime. Given the rigorous and intrusive inspections regime to which Japan subscribes under the Additional Protocol of the NPT, the country could not easily
pursue a covert nuclear weapons program. As a result, any decision to pursue nuclear weapons would likely take
place openly and involve withdrawing from the NPT. Reneging on its NPT obligations would severely damage
Japan’s international reputation.
Japan’s arrangements with uranium suppliers strictly prohibit Tokyo from using imported uranium for purposes
other than fueling its civil nuclear energy program. Were Japan to launch a weapons program, uranium
1 Llewelyn Hughes , “Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet),” International Security, vol.31, no.4, Spring 2007. The 1994 report concluded that, even under the “worst-case scenario,” wherein the U.S.-Japan alliance no longer existed and the multilateral nonproliferation regime
had disintegrated, Japan should still not develop its own nuclear deterrent. See Hughes, pp. 78-9.
2
Hajime Izumi and Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Not Going Nuclear: Japan’s Response to North Korea’s Nuclear Test,” Arms Control Today,
June 2007, p. 6.
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
Japan’s relationship with the United States, its longstanding commitment to nuclear nonproliferation, its dependence on uranium imports for power, its established policies, and Japanese public opinion all discourage the
country from pursuing nuclear weapons.
9
Part II: Northeast Asia
imports would be suspended. Given that nuclear energy accounts for approximately one-third of Japan’s electricity production,3 suspension of uranium imports would take a heavy toll on Japan’s economy.
Japan’s standing policy on nuclear weapons is summarized by the “three no’s”: no manufacturing, no possession,
and no introduction of foreign nuclear weapons into Japanese territory. While these principles are not legally
binding, they attract significant political support. Tokyo has discussed dropping or amending the third “no” to
allow U.S. nuclear-armed vessels to visit Japanese harbors, but any changes would spark intense public debate
and considerable opposition.4 The 1955 Basic Law on Atomic Energy also strictly limits Japan’s use of nuclear
energy to peaceful purposes; changing this law would require action by the Diet. Finally, Article 9 of Japan’s
constitution prohibits the country from developing offensive military capabilities. Many Japanese leaders—
including current Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and his immediate predecessor Shinzo Abe—have stated that a
nuclear option could be considered a defensive capability and is thus compatible with Japan’s constitution, but
putting this interpretation into practice would likely spark a constitutional debate.5
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
Japan is undergoing something of a generational shift on nuclear issues. Many Japanese policymakers take as
axiomatic that younger Japanese, those without firsthand experience of the WWII nuclear bombings, tend to be
less opposed than older generations to the idea of acquiring nuclear weapons.6 Still, the majority of the public
continues to view the nuclear option unfavorably, and debate on the topic—while more open than in previous
years—remains stifled. In short, Japan’s “nuclear allergy” is still strong.
10
Recent Developments in Japan’s Strategic Environment
North Korea: The 1998 “Taepodong shock,” in which a North Korean missile on a test flight over-flew Japan
and landed in the Pacific Ocean, rattled Japan and led it to start cooperating with the United States on a ballistic
missile defense (BMD) research program. However, it took the renewed North Korean nuclear crisis in 2002 to
crystallize Japan’s interest in BMD and convince it to procure off-the-shelf BMD technology from the United
States.7 Since North Korea’s October 2006 nuclear test, Japan has stepped up its investment in BMD, acquiring
both upper- and lower-tier BMD systems from the United States.8
Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear tests in 2006 also sparked discussions among Japanese leaders about the possibility of launching preemptive strikes with conventional weapons against North Korean missile bases. Soon
after the tests, then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe made the argument that, given the absence of alternative
3
Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/japan/nuke>
4 Llewelyn Hughes, “Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet),” International Security, vol.31, no.4, Spring 2007, p.88.
5 Howard French, “Taboo Against Nuclear Arms is Being Challenged in Japan,” New York Times, 9 June 2002.
6 Interviews with Japanese officials and academics, 28 October-2 November 2007.
7 Daniel Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World: Embracing a New Realpolitik, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 2006) pp.93-107. Previous inhibitions about the unconstitutionality of collective defense appear to be giving way to
an expanded reinterpretation of self-defense, at least as it relates to BMD. The “inadvertent” use of Japanese BMD assets to defend U.S.
territory and the exchange of theater-area sensor information, which had previously been deemed prohibited, is now seen as permissible.
8 The upper-tier system is the sea-based Navy Theater Wide Defense (NTWD). The lower-tier is the PAC-3. Christopher Hughes, Japan’s
Re-emergence as a “Normal” Military Power, Adelphi Paper 368-9, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p.109.
options for preventing a missile attack, attacking the missile bases could be considered self-defense, permissible
under Japan’s constitution.9
China: After repeated Chinese incursions into Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)10 and the discovery of a
Chinese nuclear submarine off Okinawa in 2004, Japanese leaders have become increasingly wary of the security threat posed by China. In a departure from its longstanding practice of avoiding the explicit designation
of China as a threat, Japan’s 2004 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) discussed the modernization of
China’s nuclear forces and missile capabilities. The 2005 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee Joint
Statement included in its list of common strategic objectives “encouraging China to improve the transparency
of its military affairs.”11 Japan is also concerned about the role China plays in propping up the North Korean
regime and how China might respond in the event of North Korean collapse.
Fraying ties with South Korea: Relations between Seoul and Tokyo, already rocky as a result of historical animosity, have noticeably soured in recent years. Divergent perceptions of the threats posed by North Korea and
China have compounded the existing tensions over history and seabed rights between the two countries.
Factors Likely to Affect Japan’s Nuclear Decision Making
No one event would be enough to convince Japan to consider developing nuclear weapons. For the country
to do so would require a “perfect storm” of more than one of the following factors. Common to any plausible
scenario in which Japan were to seriously consider pursuing weapons would be a severe deterioration in JapanU.S. relations.
9
Martin Fackler, “Tokyo talks of military strike on North Korea; Debate rises over revising Constitution,” The International Herald Tribune, 11 July 2006.
10
Even though China’s naval incursions into Japan’s EEZ are legal under international law, China’s search for oil and natural gas there is
not.
11
Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, 19 February 2005 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/42490.
htm
12
Some recent examples include the collocation of the US Army I Corps headquarters with the Ground Self Defense Forces°Ø new rapid
reaction force headquarters at Camp Zama, and the establishment of the joint BMD and airspace control center at Yokota.
13
The issue surrounds the fate of several Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea during the 1970s and 1980s. To date, North Korea
has admitted to abducting 13 Japanese citizens. Japan believes that more have been abducted and remains unsatisfied with North Korea’s
explanation of their fates.
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
U.S.-Japan alliance: Overall, the U.S-Japan alliance remains strong. Japan and the United States have increased
their strategic and tactical military cooperation over the past ten years within the framework of an alliance transformation process encouraging a more robust defense posture for Japan.12 At the same time, difficulties have
also surfaced, notably over the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea.13 Washington has indicated
that it may be willing to remove North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism before the abduction
issue has been settled, leading Japan to doubt U.S. commitment to resolving the issue. The perception that
Washington does not take seriously an issue that is of paramount importance to Tokyo causes resentment and
exacerbates a more general concern that the United States takes Japan for granted.
11
Part II: Northeast Asia
Erosion of confidence in the U.S.- Japan security alliance: The strength of the U.S-Japan alliance and the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella are critical to Japan’s sense of security. A perceived U.S. failure to live up to
its obligations, especially in a regional crisis situation, would undermine Japanese confidence in the alliance and
could drive Japan to consider seeking security through its own nuclear capabilities. Such a fracture might arise if
the United States failed to provide adequate support to Japan in a potential conflict with China, if it sided with
South Korea over possession of the Dokdo/Takeshima islands14 or in other historical disputes, or if it undertook
major regional security decisions (e.g. significant troop reductions or realignments) without first consulting
Tokyo.
Failure to denuclearize North Korea: A U.S. failure to prevent additional North Korean nuclear or missile tests
could cause Japan to feel more vulnerable and consequently to think more seriously about developing its own
nuclear deterrent. A permanent settlement that fell short of completely eliminating North Korea’s nuclear program could have a similar impact.
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
A unified Korea with nuclear weapons: The deep historical tensions between Japan and South Korea could cause
Japan to seek its own nuclear weapons if a unified Korea were to inherit North Korea’s nuclear weapons, or if a
post-unification Korean government decided to develop nuclear weapons on its own.
12
Excessive Chinese military buildup: China’s military transformation has intensified in recent years. For the most
part, China has focused on modernizing the Peoples’ Liberation Army and the Peoples’ Liberation Army Navy.
Many of these improvements have been driven by the fear that China’s armed forces are being left behind by a
high-tech “revolution in military affairs.” China has also begun investing heavily in strategic and power-projection capabilities, including its nuclear arsenal, ballistic missile inventory, and blue water navy.15 These developments are of concern to Japan, and could, if they continue, cause Tokyo to rethink its non-nuclear stance.
South Korea
Nuclear History
South Korea today is non-nuclear and committed to supporting the nuclear nonproliferation regime, but it has
not always taken this position. In 1974, amid fears of abandonment following President Nixon’s withdrawal of
an infantry division from Korea, President Park Chung Hee authorized a clandestine nuclear weapons program.
South Korea attempted to purchase reprocessing equipment from France and Belgium and a heavy water reactor
from Canada. The program was, however, quickly uncovered by a concerned United States, which succeeded
in convincing Park to suspend it in 1976.16 More recently, in its first declaration under the Additional Protocol
in 2004, South Korea informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that the Korea Atomic Energy
14 South Korea currently controls the islands, but they are also claimed by Japan.
15 See Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2007, Chapters 1, 4 and 5. For a
detailed examination of China’s naval modernization efforts, refer to the Office of Naval Intelligence’s report China’s Navy: 2007
16 It has been reported that, as late as 1989, Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff presented a proposal for an all-out effort to acquire nuclear weapons. President Roh Tae-Woo is said to have rejected the plan in 1991. Selig Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and US
Disengagement, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 250.
Research Institute (KAERI) had performed laboratory-scale experiments in the 1980s and in 2000 to study
the enrichment of uranium and separation of plutonium, ostensibly without the government’s authorization.
Although the IAEA found no indication that the experiments had continued, it expressed “serious concern”
about the nature of these activities and Seoul’s failure to report them promptly in accordance with its safeguard
obligations.17
Constraints on Developing Nuclear Weapons
Not unlike Japan, South Korea would face a number of barriers were it to pursue nuclear weapons, including its
relationship with the United States, its dependence on uranium imports, and its commitment to nonproliferation, especially on the Korean peninsula.
Any move by South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons would damage the country’s relationship with the United
States. Such a decision would jeopardize the U.S. security assurances, including extended deterrence, that form
the bedrock of South Korea’s security calculations.
South Korea is a party to the NPT and the Additional Protocol, and has ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty. Furthermore, although North Korea has violated both the spirit and letter of the 1992 Joint Declaration
on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, South Korea remains committed to it, including its prohibition of enrichment and reprocessing activities.
Recent Developments in the Strategic Environment
North Korea’s nuclear detonation and U.S. security assurances: Despite North Korea’s 2006 missile tests and
nuclear explosion, most South Koreans do not believe that nuclear weapons in the North are directed against
them. Neither the missile tests nor the explosion has swayed Seoul from trying to engage Pyongyang. Newly
elected South Korean President Lee Myung Bak has expressed his intention to pursue a somewhat tougher line
toward the North; the extent of actual policy changes remains to be seen.
Transformation of the U.S.- South Korea alliance: The United States and South Korea have recently made some
of the most significant changes to their military alliance since the end of the Korean War, agreeing to transfer
wartime operational control (OPCON) of Korean forces from the United States to South Korea by 2012, to
reduce U.S. force levels in South Korea to around 28,000, and to consolidate remaining U.S. troops in two
large bases south of Seoul, away from the demilitarized zone. Many South Korean conservatives have misgiv17
Report by the IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea,” GOV/2004/84,
11 November 2004, p 8.
18 Nuclear Power in Korea, Australian Uranium Association, Briefing Paper no. 81, December 2007, <http://www.uic.com.au/nip81.htm>.
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
South Korea maintains bilateral agreements with uranium suppliers that prevent it from using imported uranium for non-peaceful purposes. Given that South Korea relies on imported uranium fuel, and that nuclear
energy accounts for about 40 percent of its electricity,18 the suspension of uranium imports would deal a heavy
blow to the South Korean economy.
13
Part II: Northeast Asia
ings about these changes, fearing that they signal (including to Pyongyang) U.S. disengagement.19 As a result
of these fears, the new conservative administration in Seoul may ask Washington to revisit the timetable for
OPCON transfer.
The rise of China: The rise of China is dramatically changing South Korea’s strategic environment. China has
become South Korea’s largest trading partner and the top destination for South Korean overseas investment. At
the same time, China’s economic interests in North Korea have also grown significantly.20 Many South Koreans
fear that China might not support reunification of the Korean Peninsula, or that Beijing might try to play an
unacceptably large role in influencing a post-unification political arrangement.
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
Many South Koreans also fear being torn between China and the United States. As the U.S.-South Korea alliance evolves to provide U.S. forces in Korea with greater “strategic flexibility”— i.e. the ability to respond to
contingencies beyond the Korean Peninsula—Seoul may find it increasingly difficult to balance between South
Korea’s only ally and its largest trading partner. Many South Koreans are concerned about the dilemma they
would face in the event of hostilities between the U.S. and China over Taiwan, particularly if the United States
sought to respond using forces stationed in Korea.
14
Normalization of Japan’s Military: South Korea is uneasy about the prospect of Japan’s becoming a more “normal” military power. It sees reason for concern in Japan’s decision to elevate its Defense Agency to a cabinetlevel ministry, its debates over constitutional revision, its continued attempts to procure offensive strike capabilities from the United States, and its nascent debate on nuclear options,. Washington has long urged Japan to
upgrade its military capabilities, but more explicit U.S. support for Japan’s acquisition of offensive capabilities
risks unsettling the U.S.-South Korea alliance.
Nuclear energy issues: South Korea is the world’s sixth largest producer of nuclear power. In accordance with the
1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, South Korea possesses neither uranium enrichment nor spent fuel reprocessing capabilities. Japan has been allowed to develop both technologies.
The asymmetry rankles. South Korea also has a mounting nuclear waste management problem. Its nuclear
establishment has begun researching pyroprocessing as a means of reducing the volume of high-level nuclear
waste. With the 1974 civil atomic energy cooperation agreement between the United States and South Korea
due to expire in 2014, some in South Korea have suggested that any new agreement should help South Korea
gain mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle, possibly by granting South Korea blanket permission to pursue certain
types of fuel cycle research.21
19
Song Dae-Sung, “Change in U.S. Forces in Korea and Korea’s Security,” Sejong Policy Research, vol. 3, no. 1, 2007, pp. 42-46 (in Korean).
20
Since 2001, North Korea’s trade with China has increased from roughly US $700 million to $1.6 billion, while trade with South Korea
has risen from $400 million to just over $1 billion. See Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, <www.unikorea.go.kr>
21
Interview with staff of UDNP members of the South Korean National Assembly, October 2007.
Factors Likely to Affect Nuclear Decision Making
A number of factors could push South Korea toward developing nuclear weapons. As is the case for Japan, a
major shift in Korea’s nuclear weapons policy would require a combination of factors, one of which would have
to be a severe weakening of the country’s alliance with the United States.
A loss of confidence in the United States as a security partner: A number of scenarios could weaken South Korea’s
confidence in its partner. Possible examples include a unilateral U.S. attack or U.S. acquiescence in a Japanese
attack against North Korea, breakdown of the Six Party Talks due to a rift between Seoul and Washington over
North Korea policy, a U.S. failure to consult with South Korea over future changes in the posture or use of U.S.
forces on the Peninsula, or the perception that the United States was siding with Japan in territorial or historical
disputes with South Korea.22
Japan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons: A nuclear-armed Japan would likely trigger Seoul to consider a nuclear
option. Short of Japanese nuclear armament, development by Japan of conventional weapons capable of striking targets on the Korean Peninsula could also exacerbate South Korean security concerns.
Policy Recommendations: Northeast Asia
It is unlikely that either Japan or South Korea will decide to pursue nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future.
The likely costs of doing so are too great, and the benefits too few. However, given the high stakes involved, it
is important to reduce further the likelihood of Japan’s or South Korea’s developing nuclear weapons. With this
objective in mind, we put forth the following policy recommendations:
RECOMMENDATION 1: Strongly reaffirm the U.S. commitment to a nuclear weapon-free Korean Peninsula
and Japan
The United States should actively counter speculation in Japan and South Korea that it might be willing to
tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea. It should also restate its commitment to keeping both the Korean Peninsula and Japan free of nuclear weapons, including in the event that Korean reunification takes place before the
elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.
RECOMMENDATION 2: Engage South Korea in discreet contingency planning for a possible North Korean
collapse scenario
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
A serious strategic disadvantage arising from nuclear asymmetry vis-à-vis North Korea: Pyongyang’s use of its
nuclear capability to coerce or intimidate South Korea could push South Korea to consider acquiring nuclear
weapons to offset the imbalance.
22
The United States currently avoids involvement in these disputes.
15
Part II: Northeast Asia
Collapse of North Korea before denuclearization could allow the country’s nuclear materials to fall into the
hands of terrorists or hardliners, unsettling its neighbors (particularly Japan) and increasing instability in the
region. South Korea would obviously be a key player in any collapse scenario. Contingency planning, initially
between the United States and South Korea, and perhaps later involving China as well, would help to mitigate
the dangers. South Korea has thus far been reluctant to engage in such planning for fear of upsetting Pyongyang. The United States should urge the new administration in Seoul to reconsider, with the understanding
that any planning that occurs must be undertaken with all possible discretion.
RECOMMENDATION 3: Manage tensions with Japan and South Korea to ensure that the U.S. alliances with
and assurances to them remain robust
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
Maintaining the strength of the U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea is critical to the credibility of U.S.
security guarantees. Neglect or coercion of these allies, or a failure to work with them in a spirit of partnership,
lowers their confidence that the United States will support them, especially on issues that are seen as only of
peripheral importance to Washington. Decreased confidence in Washington’s continued support heightens the
risk that Japan or South Korea might seek other means of ensuring their own security, possibly including nuclear
weapons. In order to maintain the strength of its alliances with these two countries, the United States should
pursue the following policies:
16
Demonstrate Japan’s continued importance to the United States
The United States should continue to hold regular high-level meetings with Japanese officials and look for
opportunities, both substantive and symbolic, to demonstrate that Japan remains an important ally in addressing Northeast Asian issues. The United States should also reassure Japan of its commitment to resolving the
abductee issue with North Korea in the context of the 6-Party Talks.
Prepare for a potential review of wartime OPCON transfer with the new South Korean administration
Disallowing the possibility of discussing the timetable for OPCON transfer could unnecessarily alienate the new
administration in Seoul, which is otherwise enthusiastic about improving the bilateral relationship. One option
for Washington, should President Lee formally request that the timetable be pushed back, would be to propose
that a bilateral, blue ribbon panel conduct a full technical review of the existing transition roadmap, including progress to date. Such a review could further demonstrate that the transfer will not result in an erosion of
necessary capabilities, with the added benefit of providing President Lee with political maneuvering room on the
issue.
RECOMMENDATION 4: Promote multilateral mechanisms for addressing regional security issues
Contingent upon success in persuading North Korea to abandon its nuclear program, participants in the Six
Party Talks have discussed expanding the forum into a wider framework for addressing regional security issues.
The United States should support this goal. Additionally, the Washington should promote broad participation
in other regional forums (see Recommendation 5). In pursuing these policies, the United States should continue to welcome China’s increased participation in regional affairs and multilateral institutions and avoid creating
the perception that such groupings are meant to contain China.
RECOMMENDATION 5: Encourage reconciliation between South Korea and Japan
U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea form the bulwark of Washington’s security strategy in Northeast
Asia, yet these two allies continue to view one another with apprehension, if not outright hostility. Indeed,
both Japan and South Korea would see the development of nuclear weapons by the other as a potential trigger
for their own pursuit of nuclear weapons. Improving Japan-South Korea relations would have myriad benefits
for Northeast Asian stability, including reducing tensions that could lead to nuclear proliferation. The United
States therefore should pursue the following measures:
Support regional forums that bring together Japan and South Korea
To help promote consultation and coordination between Japan and South Korea, the United States should
encourage the new South Korean administration to participate in the ministerial-level U.S.-Japan-Australia strategic dialogue. The United States should also seek to reinstate the U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG), with a view to broadening the group’s agenda beyond North Korea issues.
RECOMMENDATION 6: Resume U.S.-North Korea negotiations to reduce Pyongyang’s ballistic missile threat
North Korea’s missile program is particularly alarming for Japan, since a missile would be the most likely way
for North Korea to strike Japan with either a conventional payload or weapons of mass destruction. The United
States could help to address concerns in Japan and elsewhere by restarting negotiations on limiting North Korea’s missile capabilities.23 These negotiations could include Japan, which might be willing to offer North Korea
financial or other incentives to comply. Negotiations should address all aspects of research and development,
production, and export of medium- and long-range missiles. Any such negotiations should proceed in parallel
to the Six Party Talks, with progress in one not necessarily contingent upon the other.
23
Following the1998 missile tests, the United States engaged with Pyongyang to address North Korea’s missile threat. This process
culminated in its September 1999 moratorium on long-range missile tests. The United States also came close to negotiating a framework
for freezing elements of North Korea’s indigenous missile program and ending all missile-related exports. The seventh and last round of
negotiations on North Korea’s missile program took place in November 2000. The United States formally suspended talks in March 2001.
Since the development of the nuclear crisis, missile negotiations have remained on the back burner.
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
Maintain an impartial stance on territorial disputes and other historical issues between Japan and South Korea
Bilateral problems between Japan and South Korea risk stoking dangerous nationalist passions in both countries. Perceived U.S. bias towards one country or the other would only exacerbate these tendencies. Washington
should continue to avoid direct comment on or involvement in these matters, so as not to damage its relationship with either country. The United States should continue to encourage interaction, confidence-building
measures, and amicable resolution of differences between its allies.
17
Part III: Middle East
Egypt
Nuclear History
Egypt’s longtime interest in nuclear energy dates back to a research program launched by President Gamal
Abdel Nasser in the early 1950s.24 Nuclear energy never emerged as a national priority, however, and after the
Chernobyl disaster in 1986, President Hosni Mubarak suspended the fledgling program. In 2006, President
Mubarak announced his intentions to revive it, but any significant progress on such venture would be heavily
dependent on foreign financing and technology.
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
In addition to researching nuclear power, Egypt also pursued a short-lived nuclear weapons program. In
response to Israel’s public unveiling of its nuclear reactor at Dimona in 1960,25 President Nasser launched an
Egyptian weapons program, which included sending physicists abroad for training, researching fuel-cycle
technologies, and attempting (unsuccessfully) to purchase nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union and China.26
The program did not come to fruition. In 1967, the Six Day War placed such significant economic burdens on
Egypt that it effectively ended its nuclear weapons program, shifting its focus to reclaiming territory lost in the
war, establishing peace with Israel, and improving relations with the United States.
18
In the early 2000s, speculation surfaced that Egypt had been involved in secret nuclear weapons-related activities, including possible contact with the A.Q. Khan network.27 In an unrelated 2004 incident, the IAEA
concluded while preparing an evaluation report on Egypt that certain research activities demanded further
investigation.28 Egypt cooperated fully with the IAEA, admitting that it had failed to report several past research
experiments but maintaining that the experiments were allowed under the NPT. Ultimately, the IAEA concluded that Egypt had conducted unreported nuclear research, but that the research did not appear to be aimed
at developing nuclear weapons and did not include uranium enrichment.29
Constraints on Developing Nuclear Weapons
Pursuing nuclear weapons would jeopardize the privileged relationship with the United States that Egypt has developed since the 1978 Camp David accords. Egypt receives approximately $2 billion worth of U.S. foreign aid
24
For a history, see Robert Einhorn, “Egypt: Frustrated but Still on a Non-Nuclear Course,” in The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States
Reconsider their Nuclear Choices, Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution
Press, 2004).
25
In December 1960, in the face of intense media speculation, Prime Minister Ben Gurion confirmed what his government had previously
denied: that Israel was building a nuclear reactor at Dimona. For more information, see: Jim Walsh. “Bombs Unbuilt: Power Ideas and
Institutions in International Politics.” MIT PhD dissertation. p. 147, <http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/1721.1/8237/1/50305557.pdf>.
26
Einhorn, p. 46.
27
Allegations were made that A.Q. Khan had traveled to Egypt on several occasions and that clandestine nuclear cooperation between
Egypt and Libya had taken place. These allegations were never substantiated.
28
Various open-source documents prepared under the auspices of the Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority (AEA) suggested that certain
nuclear material, activities, and facilities in Egypt relating to uranium extraction and conversion, irradiation of uranium targets and reprocessing had not been reported to the IAEA. For more details, see: IAEA Report. “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in
the Arab Republic of Egypt.” February 14, 2005, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/Egypt_Feb_2005.pdf>.
29
Ibid.
per year, making it the second largest U.S. beneficiary after Israel. The Egyptian military also enjoys closer ties
with its U.S. counterpart than other Arab states, including through regular training programs and Operation
Bright Star, a biennial multilateral coordination exercise hosted by Egypt. In addition to military cooperation,
Cairo hopes to sign a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States within the next decade. A decision
by Cairo to pursue nuclear weapons would imperil both the economic and military aspects of the U.S.-Egypt
relationship.
In terms of nuclear capabilities, Egypt is the least technologically advanced of the three countries analyzed in
this report. Unlike South Korea or Japan, Egypt lacks the scientific and technological base for the development
of nuclear weapons. Any nuclear weapons program that Egypt attempted to pursue would be heavily dependent
on equipment, material and technology from abroad.
Recent Developments in the Strategic Environment
Iran’s nuclear program: Despite Iran’s insistence that its nuclear facilities are strictly for peaceful civilian purposes,
Egyptian officials remain skeptical. Egypt is particularly worried that a nuclear-armed Iran could embolden
radical forces in the region, including Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran
has amply demonstrated its ability to undermine regional stability through proxy forces. Egyptian officials are
concerned that a nuclear-armed Iran would become even more assertive.
The U.S.-Egypt relationship: The post-9/11 security environment and the Iraq war have caused new strains in
the bilateral relationship. The U.S. government’s announcement of its new “Freedom Agenda” in 2005, along
with U.S. pressure for democratic reforms in Egypt, have also caused serious tension. Egypt has rejected the
calls for reform as ‘unacceptable interference’ in Egyptian affairs.33 In 2006, ties began to improve as the United
States toned down its demands for reform and expressed its commitment to maintaining its military assistance
30
Gamal Mubarak made this announcement at the September 2006 National Democratic Party (NDP) Annual Conference.
31
Andrew England, “Egypt announces nuclear energy plans,” Financial Times, 29 October 2007.
32
“Egypt won’t sign nuclear deal protocol, Minister,” Reuters, 11 December 2007, <http://africa.reuters.com/wire/news/usnL11697190.
html>.
33
Nadia Abu Al-Magd. “Egypt criticizes U.S. after congressional delegation meets with Muslim Brotherhood lawmaker.” Associated Press
Worldstream, 27 May 2007.
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
Nuclear energy and economic development: Egyptian leaders have recently made a concerted public effort to link
nuclear energy and economic development, claiming that Egypt needs nuclear energy to diversify its energy
supply and promote energy security. In September 2006, President Mubarak’s son Gamal Mubarak announced
plans to build a first 1,000-megawatt plant at Al-Dabaa, to be followed by three additional power plants by
2020.30 In October 2007, President Mubarak confirmed Egypt’s commitment to its nuclear energy program.31
To date, the government has not announced any plans to develop nuclear fuel cycle facilities. It has, however,
refused to forego the right to do so. It has also refused to ratify the Additional Protocol, which would require it
to declare a much broader range of nuclear-related activities than it currently does, and to allow IAEA inspections to check the completeness and accuracy of such declarations.32
19
Part III: Middle East
program with Egypt for the next ten years.34 Although the relationship now appears to be on solid ground once
more, these recent bumps show that it is not unshakable.
The Muslim Brotherhood and the 2005 election: President Mubarak is concerned about the growing influence
that Islamic organizations wield in Egypt. Although the Muslim Brotherhood has been outlawed since 1954,
it managed to win 20 percent of the parliamentary seats in 2005 by running candidates as independents. The
Brotherhood is now one of the most visible Islamic organizations in the region and the largest opposition bloc in
Egypt. The political platform of the Brotherhood openly advocates a nuclear-weapons program, and it is widely
accepted within Egyptian government circles that a supermajority of Egyptians (the figure often given is 90
percent) would support the acquisition of nuclear weapons.35 Given the apparently extensive public support for
an Egyptian bomb, Mubarak’s ruling National Democratic Party may find it increasingly difficult to maintain its
firmly non-nuclear position.
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
Factors Likely to Affect Nuclear Decision Making
20
A nuclear-armed Iran: Relations between Egypt and Iran since Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution have been difficult.36 Diplomatic contact has remained frozen, and Sunni Egypt has become increasingly suspicious of Shiite
Iran’s regional ambitions. Already dealing with its own brand of Islamic militancy, Egypt fears Iran’s revolutionary influence. If faced with a nuclear-armed Iran, Cairo would be forced to reevaluate its national security
policies.
Declaration by Israel of its nuclear weapons capability: Any public acknowledgement by Israel of its nuclear weapons capability would increase the pressure on Egypt to pursue its own nuclear deterrent.
Egypt’s upcoming presidential transition: President Mubarak, who will turn 80 in May 2008, is scheduled to step
down in 2011. It is unclear who will succeed him. While Gamal Mubarak is seemingly being groomed as a
successor, he lacks support among the military and general public. Both father and son have ruled out familial
succession.37 No matter who ultimately becomes the next president, the looming transition creates uncertainty
and raises questions about whether Mubarak’s successor will be as committed to or as successful as he has been
in resisting pressures to pursue nuclear weapons.
Regional Leadership Role: Egypt has long regarded itself as the natural leader of the Arab world. If future Egyptian governments are unable to demonstrate regional leadership through peaceful means, the Egyptian public
34
Since the signing of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty in 1978, the U.S. has provided Egypt with an average of $1.3 billion in military aid per
year. The 2006 promise of $13bn over 10 years maintains this support in nominal (i.e., non-inflation adjusted) terms. See CRS Issue Brief
for Congress, “Egypt-US relations,” 15 June 2005, pp. 9-10, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/IB93087.pdf>.
35
Conversations with Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, October 2007.
36
Hostility between Egypt and Iran has been fueled by a number of events in the Middle East during the past two decades, including the
Iran-Iraq War, the First Gulf War, the Second Gulf War, Iran’s opposition to the Egypt-Israel Camp David Accords, and Iran’s support of
anti-government movements in the region.
37
Michael Slackman, “Son of Mubarak eyes succession,” International Herald Tribune, 19 September 2006, <http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/09/19/news/egypt.php>. See also Maggie Michael, “Mubarak’s son denies succession move,” ABC News, 5 November 2007,
<http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=3824190>.
will likely press the government to re-establish its leadership role by becoming the first Arab nuclear weapons
state.
Increasing security threats combined with weaker security assurances: Egypt’s relationship with the United States has
been strained since the Iraq war. A bilateral relationship characterized by disagreements and sporadic tensions
is unlikely by itself to change Egypt’s nuclear calculus, but if coupled with greater security threats, a strained
relationship with the United States could push Egypt toward nuclear weapons.
Policy Recommendations: The Middle East
As noted above, Iran’s actions are a key variable in the nuclear calculus of Egypt and other states in the region. It
is beyond the scope of this report to consider the Iran nuclear issue in detail, but a few points do bear particular relevance to nuclear calculations in Egypt, Japan, and South Korea. In view of Iran’s past massive violation
of the NPT with its secret nuclear program, the United States should be ready to push for further multilateral
sanctions or to tighten its own, should Iran continue to defy the UN Security Council’s demand that it halt its
enrichment and heavy-water reactor programs. Strong action is needed to demonstrate the continued viability
of the nonproliferation regime. At the same time, the United States should indicate its commitment to finding
a negotiated solution by dropping the condition that Iran suspends its enrichment program before direct negotiations between the United States and Iran can begin.
RECOMMENDATION 7: Declare a new regional security doctrine
A number of America’s friends in the Middle East have questioned whether the United States has an overarching strategy for containing Iran and promoting stability in the region, particularly given its difficulties in Iraq.
To address these concerns, the United States should declare a new security doctrine that addresses the dominant
threats—both conventional and non-conventional—to the region’s stability. This doctrine should declare as
U.S. policy the following three commitments: 1) to protect access to strategic resources and keep open shipping lanes in the region; 2) to take all necessary steps to defend U.S. friends and allies in the region in the face of
military aggression by another regional state; and 3) to affirm that the United States would consider any threat
or use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East as a threat to its own vital security interests and would respond to
such a threat by any means necessary.
In order to lend credibility to this new security doctrine, the United States should maintain a robust military
presence in the region and increase its bilateral and multilateral military cooperation. In this vein, the United
States should return its participation in Operation Bright Star to pre-2003 levels once a drawdown of U.S.
forces in Iraq makes additional troop commitments possible. The United States should also increase its Proliferation Security Initiative cooperative activities in the Persian Gulf. Finally, Washington should continue to work
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
With regard to Egypt specifically, we deem it unlikely that Egypt will decide to pursue nuclear weapons in the
foreseeable future. Yet, as is the case with Japan and South Korea, it remains important for the United States to
reduce further the likelihood of Egypt’s developing nuclear weapons. To help allay Egypt’s security concerns, we
submit the following recommendations for U.S. policy:
21
Part III: Middle East
with friends in the region to increase multilateral cooperation on air and missile defense, including networking
of capabilities among countries.
RECOMMENDATION 8: Strengthen the regional nonproliferation regime
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
As a result of Iran’s ongoing interest in nuclear technology and the continued nuclear asymmetry between Egypt
and Israel, Cairo has become increasingly dissatisfied with the nuclear nonproliferation regime. A new round of
nonproliferation and arms control efforts in the Middle East could increase regional stability and decrease pressure for Egypt to develop nuclear weapons. Such an endeavor should include the following two elements:
22
Demonstrate U.S. commitment to a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East
Egypt has in recent years stepped up its campaign for a WMDFZ in the Middle East, an objective it has advocated since 1974. Given the presence of nuclear weapons in Israel and suspected chemical and biological programs in a number of Middle Eastern countries, a comprehensive WMDFZ is not a realistic goal in the near future.38 However, the United States should demonstrate its commitment to an eventual WMD-free Middle East
by endorsing phased regional arrangements and non-nuclear confidence building measures. Interim agreements
such as a fuel cycle-free zone (see below) could serve as realistic, concrete steps toward an eventual WMDFZ. In
the meantime, the United States should support and lobby on behalf of Egypt’s WMDFZ proposal at the 2010
NPT Review Conference.39 In doing so, the United States would reaffirm Egypt’s role as a regional leader in
nonproliferation efforts and help situate it more firmly on the side of nuclear abstinence.
Endorse a Fuel Cycle-Free Zone as a first step toward a Middle East WMDFZ
As an interim measure on the way toward a WMDFZ, some key states in the region—notably Egypt and
Israel—might be willing to accept the creation of a regional fuel cycle-free zone. Such a plan would not require
Israel or Iran to shut down their nuclear reactors, but it would require that Israel cease reprocessing plutonium
at Dimona, and that Iran halt construction on its enrichment facility at Natanz. Although Israel would certainly rather operate its nuclear program unfettered, it might support a fuel cycle-free zone as a means of addressing
Iran’s enrichment program without giving up its own existing deterrent capabilities. Egypt, for its part, would
prefer that Israel fully adhere to the NPT, but it might see a fuel cycle-free zone as a means of both constraining
Iran and beginning to limit Israel.
RECOMMENDATION 9: Restart the Middle East Security Forum
The United States should help create a Middle East Security Forum to build confidence between and among
states in the region. This forum could be modeled on the Working Group on Arms Control and Regional
Security (ACRS) of the early 1990s. Ideally, Iraq, Syria, and Iran, which did not join the ACRS talks, would
participate. Even without these three, though, a forum could create opportunities to help to reduce the regional
tensions that lead to insecurity and so increase the attractiveness of nuclear weapons.
38
Israel’s policy to date is that it will not participate in a WMDFZ without first achieving comprehensive peace in the region, while other
states demand that Israel first denuclearize before they will participate in peace talks.
39
The United States supported Egypt’s proposal for a WMDFZ in the Middle East at the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review and Extension
Conferences, but not at the 2005 Conference.
RECOMMENDATION 10: Provide conditional support for Egypt’s drive to build a civilian nuclear energy
program
The United States has said that it is prepared to work with Egypt on its planned nuclear energy program.40
Washington’s aim should be to establish Egypt as a regional leader in the responsible use of nuclear energy. One
way to purse this aim would be to offer assistance on nuclear energy in exchange for Egypt’s commitment to
forego fuel-cycle facilities and to adhere to the Additional Protocol. Washington could put forward a package
consisting of several elements, including technology transfer, affordable financing, guaranteed—and possibly
subsidized—access to fuel, and assistance with waste management, possibly including removal of spent fuel.
RECOMMENDATION 11: Strengthen the U.S.-Egypt bilateral relationship and bolster Egypt’s leadership role
in the region
The United States should reinforce ties with Egypt and bolster Cairo’s standing as a regional nonproliferation
leader in the following ways:
Encourage Egypt to play a leading role in regional initiatives such as Israel-Palestine peace talks and a revived
regional security forum
Providing Egypt with constructive opportunities to exhibit regional leadership is vital to keeping Egypt non-nuclear. Since the 1978 Camp David peace accords, Egypt has been instrumental in advancing Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations. President Mubarak has hosted several peace conferences and encouraged other Arab states to support U.S. peacemaking efforts. The current U.S. focus on the Middle East peace process provides a valuable opportunity for Egypt to reassume its regional leadership position, especially if the U.S. gives it the symbolic honor
of hosting future talks. The Middle East security forum proposed above (recommendation 9) could provide
another opportunity to give Egypt a leading stake in efforts to promote regional security.
40
Sally Buzbee, “Egypt announces plans to build nuclear plants—latest in Mid East rush,” Associated Press, 30 October 2007.
41
George W. Bush, “Remarks in Commencement Address at the University of South Carolina,” 9 May 2003, <www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/
rm/20497.htm>.
42
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, p. 26.
43
It is estimated that an FTA would increase Egyptian GDP by approximately 3 percent and help solidify domestic economic reforms initiated since 2004. For details, see: Ahmed Galal and Robert Lawrence. Anchoring Reform with a U.S.-Egypt Free Trade Agreement. Institute
of International Economics. Washington, DC. May 2005.
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
Establish a U.S.-Egypt Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
Since the late 1990s, U.S. policymakers have discussed creating a free trade agreement with Egypt. In 2003,
President Bush proposed establishing a Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) by 2013,41 and in 2006, the
Bush Administration argued that both bilateral FTAs with countries in the Middle East and the MEFTA were
closely linked to America’s national security interests.42 A bilateral FTA with Egypt would reduce Cairo’s nuclear
incentives in two ways. First, an FTA would boost Egypt’s economy, reducing discontent and support for radicalism that might otherwise contribute to domestic political pressure for nuclear weapons.43 Second, it would
bind Egypt’s economy more closely to the United States, thereby increasing the potential economic costs of
pursuing nuclear weapons against the wishes of the United States and the international community.
23
Part IV: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime
The global nonproliferation regime has facilitated the establishment of export controls and nuclear weaponfree zones, the reversal of nuclear weapon programs in several countries, and the roundup of “loose nukes” in
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan after the collapse of the Soviet Union.44 At the core of the regime is the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which partially alleviates pressure to acquire nuclear weapons by binding
its non-weapon state members to nuclear non-possession. Over the past decade, the regime has been expanded
through the Additional Protocol and UN Security Council Resolution 1540.45
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
Making the NPT work requires effective verification and enforcement. Verification serves to assuage concerns
of other states, as well as to detect misuse of nuclear technology. Enforcement entails punishments that deter
members from pursuing weapons and persuade violators to return to compliance.
24
Selective enforcement and slower-than-expected progress towards disarmament following the end of the Cold
War have collectively taken a toll on the NPT’s legitimacy and efficacy. These challenges present serious longterm threats to the regime. The spread of certain technologies associated with nuclear energy creates other
challenges. Article IV of the NPT permits the peaceful use of nuclear energy, but many elements of the nuclear
fuel cycle can also be used to pursue weapons. Uranium-enriching gas centrifuges are central to the global
nuclear fuel market yet have the potential to undermine the nonproliferation regime. They can be used to make
highly enriched uranium for weapons and are difficult or impossible to detect if covertly deployed. At the back
end of the fuel cycle, reprocessing of spent fuel poses a different threat. The process separates weapon-usable
plutonium from otherwise self-protecting spent fuel.46 Interest in reprocessing has seen something of a revival in
recent years, with advocates suggesting it may offer a solution to some nuclear waste problems by decreasing the
volume of hazardous material requiring permanent disposal. In truth, the value of reprocessing is questionable.
Over the long-term, reprocessing merely postpones the need to establish a permanent nuclear waste repository.
In the short- to medium-term, storing spent fuel at reactor sites in dry casks is a safer, more economical, and
more proliferation-resistant option than attempting to reprocess.
Policy Recommendations: Nonproliferation Regime
The legitimacy and viability of the non-proliferation regime are central to nuclear weapons decisions in Japan,
South Korea, and Egypt. While there are many possible ways by which the nonproliferation regime could be
strengthened, the following actions would have a particularly strong impact on the three countries in this study.
RECOMMENDATION 12: Raise the cost of withdrawal from the NPT. Ensure that any withdrawal is automatically examined by the full UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter
44
For a review, see: “Successes of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime.” Tariq Rauf. Center for Non-Proliferation Studies., 8 October
1999.
45
The Additional Protocol provides for a more intrusive inspections system. Resolution 1540 establishes binding obligations on all UN
member states under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to take and enforce effective measures against the proliferation of WMD, their means
of delivery, and related materials.
46
Nuclear material is considered “self-protecting” if it is too radioactive to be manipulated without killing the handler. Material of this
kind poses minimal proliferation risks; its lethality renders it nearly impossible to steal or divert.
Making withdrawal more difficult would raise the costs of leaving the regime, binding Japan, South Korea,
and Egypt more tightly to the system. It would also increase these countries’ confidence that other states will
continue to adhere to their nonproliferation commitments. Washington has shown itself keen to strengthen the
cost of withdrawing from the NPT, including through specifying more clearly the role of the Security Council
in such a situation. But the United States appears reluctant to push for automatic review of a withdrawal by the
Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, backing instead a weaker review proposal, “depending
on the circumstances.”47 Automaticity would not prevent a permanent member of the Security Council from
using its veto to shield a friend or ally from international pressure (as did China when North Korea withdrew
from the NPT in 2003), but it would ensure that the issue be discussed at an appropriately high level.
In addition to supporting automatic Security Council review, the United States should back the proposal that
withdrawing states be forced to forfeit the use of materials, facilities, equipment, and technology they acquired
while a party to the treaty, either by returning them to the supplying state or dismantling them under international oversight.
RECOMMENDATION 13: Strengthen the IAEA verification system
Continue to seek universal adherence to the Additional Protocol, beginning in the United States
Additional Protocol measures have proven effective in detecting activities related to nuclear weapons programs.
Although the U.S. Senate ratified the Additional Protocol in 2004, it is not yet in force in the United States.
Washington should complete the implementing regulations and deposit its instrument of ratification with the
IAEA, and should actively encourage other parties to do likewise.
Push the IAEA to increase the frequency and quality of its inspections of research reactors
Research reactors can be used to produce plutonium covertly that can then be diverted to nuclear weapons programs. More stringent IAEA oversight of research reactors would create even greater barriers for states attempting to pursue covert weapons programs.
Encourage the IAEA to extend safeguards to the input of all uranium hexafluoride (UF6) production facilities
At present, the IAEA begins its safeguard measures at the output end of the facilities that convert uranium oxide
into uranium hexafluoride for enrichment by uranium gas centrifuges. Diverting UF6 from these plants before
it falls under IAEA safeguards would be relatively easy. This omission makes it possible for states to produce
more UF6 than they declare, or to purchase UF6 from another country covertly, for use in an undeclared
enrichment plant. The IAEA could make such acquisition of UF6 more difficult by applying material balance
47
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, “Article X of the NPT: Deterring and Responding to
Withdrawal by Treaty Violators,” 2 February 2007, <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/80518.htm>.
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
The IAEA’s ability to verify that states remain in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations is crucial to
the regime’s continued success. The United States should pursue a number of concrete measures to strengthen
the IAEA’s verification capabilities.
25
Part IV: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime
safeguards to UF6 and UF6 production plants.48 The IAEA has determined that these safeguards are permitted
under the terms of the NPT safeguards agreement (INFICIRC/153).49 Such measures might prove especially
helpful in reducing Iran’s potential for covert highly enriched uranium (HEU) production.
Increase the IAEA Safeguards Budget
In order to ensure that the IAEA can undertake these additional efforts, the United States should pledge to increase its voluntary contributions to the IAEA’s safeguards budget.50 The United States should not make funds
contingent on whether other countries “pay their share.” Rather, Washington should set an example on this
issue and thereby encourage other donors to increase their own contributions. Even absent funding from other
countries, additional money spent on IAEA safeguards would demonstrate a renewed U.S. commitment to the
nonproliferation regime and would be a worthwhile investment in U.S. security.
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
RECOMMENDATION 14: Take further action towards irreversible and verifiable disarmament
26
Differing compliance standards for nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states remain a significant
source of tension among signatories to the NPT. To reduce this tension follow through with NPT disarmament obligations, and maintain the legitimacy of the regime, both the United States and Russia should agree
to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), which expires on 5 December 2009, with a legally
binding agreement to reduce their nuclear forces to levels well below those provided for in the Moscow Treaty
of 2002.51 Russia has already expressed a desire to reduce its arsenal further and would likely welcome a U.S.
proposal for further reductions.52
Deeper irreversible cuts in the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals would have a particularly positive impact on
Japan, a country that closely identifies with the normative principles underlying the nonproliferation regime and
positions itself as a champion of nonproliferation.53 If the regime is strong and legitimate, Japan will have incentives to continue this policy; if the regime is weakened, Japan’s incentives for compliance will weaken as well.
RECOMMENDATION 15: Withdraw Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) support for pyroprocessing in
South Korea
48
Preliminary studies suggest that region-specific, wide-area environmental monitoring might be able to verify the absence of covert UF6
production facilities. See: R.S. Kemp, Initial Analysis of a Method for Detecting Clandestine Enrichment and UF6 Conversion Plants (http://
www.princeton.edu/~rskemp).
49
See IAEA “Policy Paper 18: Safeguards Measures Applicable in Conversion Plants Procesing Natural Uranium. Date of Entry Into
Force: 2003-06-17.” Safeguards Manual, SMR 2.18, October 2003.
50
The IAEA’s safeguards budget was about $109 million in 2006, a small sum considering the importance of this task. About a third of
IAEA’s budget comes from U.S. contributions, both assessed and voluntary.
51
The Moscow Treaty requires the United States and Russia to reduce deployed strategic warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 each. It
does not have a verification framework, but the United States and Russia are using the verification provisions in the START Treaty to assess compliance.
52
Wade Boese, “Arms Issues Divide U.S. and Russia,” Arms Control Today, September 2007, < http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_09/
USRussiaArms.asp>.
53
During interviews, Japanese officials and experts indicated their belief that the United States could reduce its arsenal to approximately
1000 warheads without compromising the credibility of its extended deterrent.
Pyroprocessing, or pyrometallurgical reprocessing, is a technique currently being researched in South Korea
as a way of reducing the volume of high-level radioactive waste of which it must dispose. The United States
supports South Korea’s research program through GNEP, on the basis of its belief that pyroprocessing is significantly more proliferation resistant than conventional PUREX reprocessing.54 Studies have shown, however, that
fissile material could be extracted from the products of pyroprocessing.55 Additionally, spent fuel that has been
pyroprocessed loses many of its self-protecting qualities. Pyroprocessing arguably breaches South Korea’s 1992
commitment not to carry out reprocessing on the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, it does not offer significant benefits. In the long-term, it does not solve the problem of high-level radioactive waste disposal; and in the shortto medium-term, it compares unfavorably to alternatives such as dry cask storage at reactor sites. The United
States should therefore withdraw GNEP support for pyroprocessing.
U.S. Department of Energy press release, “Department of Energy Welcomes the Republic of Korea to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership,” 11 December 2007, <http://www.gnep.energy.gov/gnepPRs/gnepPR121107.html>.
55
R.G. Wymer, H.D. Bengelsdorf, G.R. Choppin, M.S. Coops, J. Guon, K.K.S. Pillay and J.D. Williams, An Assessment of the Proliferation
Potential and International Implications of the Integral Fast Reactor, report # K/IPT-511 prepared for the Departments of State and Energy
by Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Oak Ridge, TN, 1992, p. 80.
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
54
27
Appendix A: Individuals Interviewed
The team of graduate students from Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs
conducted interviews with policymakers, academics, journalists, scientists, and other experts in Japan, South
Korea, Egypt, Israel, and the United States. Listed below are the individuals with whom we spoke, including
their titles, organizational affiliations, and the interview locations. Interviews outside the United States were
conducted between 26 October and 4 November 2007.
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
Japan
28
Name
Yusuke Arai
Yutaka Arima
Nobumasa Akiyama
Robert Cekuta
Ronald Cherry
Bart D. Cobbs
Joseph R. Donovan
Amb. Tetsuya Endo Raymond F. Greene
Takuya Hattori
Tomiko Ichikawa
Masafumi Ishii
Nobuo Ishizuka
Nobukatsu Kanehara
Professional Affiliation, Place of Meeting
Principal Deputy Director, First North America Division,
North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo
Principal Deputy Director, Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division,
North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo
Associate Professor, Hitotsubashi University, School of International
and Public Policy, Tokyo
Minister/Counselor for Economic Affairs, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo
Energy Attaché, Director, U.S. Department of Energy, Japan Office,
U.S. Embassy, Tokyo
Unit Chief, Environment, Science and Technology Unit, Economic
Affairs, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo
Minister, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo
Advisor to Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo
Chief, Political-Military Affairs Unit, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo
President, Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Tokyo
Director, Non-Proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Division,
Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Science Department, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Tokyo
Minister, Head of Political Affairs Section, Embassy of Japan to the
U.S., Princeton
Senior Managing Director, Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Tokyo
Director, Policy Coordination Division, Foreign Policy Bureau,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo
Dr. Masahiro Kikuchi
Marc E. Knapper
Amb. Takeshi Nakane
Dr. Masashi Nishihara
Dr. Shinichi Ogawa
Amb. Shotaro Oshima
Director, Planning Division and Development Division, Nuclear
Material Control Center, Tokyo
Deputy Director, Political Affairs, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo
Director-General, Disarmament, Nonproliferation and Science
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo
President, Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo
Director of Research Department, National Institute for Defense
Studies, Tokyo
International Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo
Masakatsu Ota
Junichiro Otaka
Prof. Gil Rozman
Amb. Yukio Satoh
Kiyoshi Serizawa
Tatsujiro Suzuki
Masa Takubo Hitoshi Tanaka
Dr. Kunihiko Uematsu
Col. Paul H. Vosti
Amb. Shunji Yanai
Fumihiko Yoshida
Staff Correspondent, Foreign News Section, Kyodo News, Tokyo
Principal Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Division,
Disarmament, Non-Proliferation, and Science Department, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo
Musgrave Professor of Sociology, Princeton University, Princeton
President, Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo
Director, Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division, Ministry of
Defense, Bureau of Defense Policy, Tokyo
Visiting Professor, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Public
Policy, Tokyo
Independent consultant on nuclear policy issues, Tokyo
Senior Fellow, Japan Center for International Exchange, Tokyo
Senior Advisor, International Affairs, Japan Atomic Industrial Forum,
Tokyo
Director, Plans and Policy, U.S. Forces, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo
Director, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Japan Atomic Industrial
Forum, Tokyo
Editor, Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo
Name
Charles Atkinson
Dr. Young-Koo Cha
Dr. Soon Heung Chang
Dr. Kwan-Kyoo Choe
Dr. Chaesung Chun
Yung-Woo Chun
Dr. Sung-Joo Han
Jin-Ha Hwang
Dr. Jae-Guk Jeon
Dr. Jung-Min Kang
Dr. Hak-Joon Kim
Professional Affiliation, Place of Meeting
Second Secretary, Political Section, U.S. Embassy, Seoul
Former Deputy Minister of National Defense for Policy, Lieutenant
General (Ret.) ROK Army, Seoul
Provost, Professor of Nuclear and Quantum Engineering, Korea
Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Seoul
Director of Nuclear Control Policy Division, Korea Institute of Nuclear
Nonproliferation and Control, Daejon
Associate Professor of International Relations, Seoul National
University, Seoul
Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Seoul
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, President of Korea University, Seoul
Member of the National Assembly (Grand National Party), Lieutenant
General (Ret) ROK Army, Seoul
Deputy Minister of National Defense for Policy and Public Affairs,
Seoul
Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford
University, Seoul
President and Publisher, The Donga-A Ilbo Daily, Seoul
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
South Korea:
29
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
Appendix A: Individuals Interviewed
30
Dr. Sung-Han Kim
Dr. Jae-Chang Kim
Sang-Min Kwak
Dr. Kwang-Seok Lee
Tae-Sik Lee
Dr. Jung-In Moon
Young-Han Moon
Chul-Min Park
Dr. Jin Park
Dr. Seong-Won Park
Young-Min Park
Yong-Ok Park
Amb. Evans J.R. Revere
Sung-Won Shin
Dr. Young-Sun Song
Amb. Alexander Vershbow David J. Wolff
Byung-Se Yoon
Dr. Young-Kwan Yoon
Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Korea University,
Seoul
Co-Chairman, Council on South Korea –U.S. Security Studies, General
(Ret.) ROK Army, Seoul
Political Secretary to National Assemblyman Hwa-Young Lee, Seoul
Director/Principal Researcher, Nuclear Policy Research Center, Korea
Atomic Energy Research Institute, Seoul
Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the U.S., Princeton
Professor, Yonsei University, Ambassador for International Security,
Seoul
Visiting Professor, Korea Military Academy, Major General (Ret.) ROK
Army, Seoul
Director of Disarmament and Nonproliferation, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, Seoul
Member of the National Assembly (Grand National Party), Seoul
Vice President, Sustainable Nuclear System Development, Korea
Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejon
Adviser to National Assemblywoman Myeong-Sook Han, Seoul
Chief Executive Vice President, Hallym Institute of Advanced
International Studies, Seoul
President, The Korea Society, New York
Director of North America Division II, North American Affairs Bureau,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Seoul
Member of the National Assembly (Grand National Party), Seoul
U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, Seoul
Chief, Political Military Unit, U.S. Embassy, Seoul
Senior Secretary to the President for Foreign Affairs and National
Security, Seoul
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Professor of International
Relations at Seoul National University, Seoul
Egypt:
Name
Makram M. Ahmed
Abdel Monem Said Ali
Wael Al-Assad
Amb. Nabil Fahmy
Lisa Kenna
Amb. Daniel Kurtzer
Ahmed Hassan Mariy Professional Affiliation, Place of Meeting
Journalist, Al-Musawwar newspaper, Cairo
Director, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo
Director, Department of Multilateral Relations, Arab League, Cairo
Ambassador of Egypt to the U.S.
Officer for Political and Military Affairs (U.S. Embassy), Cairo
Ambassador in Residence, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton
Professor, Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, Cairo
Ziad Moussa
Hatem Seif An-Nasser
Amb. Francis Ricciardone Mohammed Kadry Said
Mostafa Elwi Saif
Mohammed Abdel Salam
Ali Serri
Sayed A. Shalaby
Mohammed Shaker
William Stewart
Abeer Yassin
Researcher, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo
Assistant Foreign Minister for American Affairs Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Cairo
Ambassador to Egypt, U.S. Embassy, Cairo
Military Advisor, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies,
Cairo
Chairman of Political Science department, Cairo University, Egyptian
Council for Foreign Affairs, Cairo
Director, Regional Security and Arms Control, Al-Ahram Center for
Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo
Director, Disarmament Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Cairo
Executive Director, Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, Cairo
Vice Chairman, Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, Cairo
Minister Counselor for Economic and Political Affairs, U.S. Embassy,
Cairo
Researcher, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo
Name
Uzi Arad
Shlomo Brom Benny Dagan
Amnon Efrat
Mark Heller
Ephraim Kam
Ariel Levite
Israel Tkiochinski
Merav Zafary-Odiz
Amb. Miriam Ziv
Professional Affiliation, Place of Meeting
Chairman of The Atlantic Forum of Israel, Tel Aviv
Institute for National Strategic Studies, Jaffee Center, Tel Aviv
Head of Middle East Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Jerusalem
Director, Regional Security Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Jerusalem
Institute for National Strategic Studies, Jaffee Center, Tel Aviv
Institute for National Strategic Studies, Jaffee Center, Tel Aviv
Former Deputy Director General of Policy, Israel Atomic Energy
Commission, Tel Aviv
Arms Control Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem
Director, Policy and Arms Control, Israel Atomic Energy Commission,
Tel Aviv
Ambassador & Director General of Strategic Affairs, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
Israel
31
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt
Appendix B: Individual Research Paper Topics
32
Elizabeth Bakanic
Japan’s Nuclear Choices in a Changing Environment
Mark Christopher
International Nuclear Fuel-Supply Arrangements
Sandya Das
The Israel Factor: The Impact of Israel’s Nuclear Capability on
Egypt’s Nuclear Decision-Making
Laurie Freeman
Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime
George Hodgson
Preventing Proliferation Chain Reactions: South Korea
Mike Hunzeker
Eight Ways to Reassure an Ally: Military Options for Reducing
Security Concerns
R. Scott Kemp
Technological/Industrial Base for Pursuing Nuclear Weapons
Sung Hwan Lee
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Status, Threats, and
Motivations
Florentina Mulaj
Approaching Iran’s Nuclear Program
Ryan Phillips
Egypt and Non-Proliferation in the Middle East