TOBIAS SALZ
https://sites.google.com/site/tobiassalz/
salz@nyu.edu
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
Address
Phone
19 West Fourth St., 6th Floor
New York, NY 10012-1119
917-855-0313 (mobile)
917-855-0313 (office)
Placement Director: Alberto Bisin
Graduate Administrator: Marjorie Lesser
alberto.bisin@nyu.edu
marjorie.lesser@nyu.edu
212-998-8916
212-998-8923
Education
PhD. In Economics, New York University, 2010-2016 (expected)
Thesis Title: Essays in Empirical Industrial Organization.
Diplom in Economics, University of Bonn, 2010
Visiting Student, University of Chicago, 2008-2009
References
Professor Guillaume Fréchette (co-chair)
19 West Fourth St., 6th Floor
New York, NY 10012-1119
212-992-8683 (office)
frechette@nyu.edu
Professor Alessandro Lizzeri (co-chair)
19 West Fourth St., 6th Floor
New York, NY 10012-1119
212-998-8907 (office)
alessandro.lizzeri@nyu.edu
Professor John Asker
Bunche Hall 8363
405 Hilgard Avenue, UCLA
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477 USA
310-794-4892 (office)
johnasker@econ.ucla.edu
Professor Kei Kawai
Department of Economics
530 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA, 94720-3880
kei@berkeley.edu
Teaching and Research Fields
Primary fields: Industrial Organization
Secondary fields: Applied Econometrics and Experimental Economics
Research Experience and Other Employment
Summer 2014, 2015
Summer 2013
Summer 2012
Summer 2011
Summer 2009
2004-2008, 2010
NYU, Research Assistant for Professor Alessandro Lizzeri
Visitor, Max-Planck-Institute for Research on Collective Goods
NYU, Research Assistant for Professor Alessandro Gavazza
Chicago-Argonne Institute on Computational Economics
University of Chicago, Research Assistant for Professor Ali
Hortacsu
Student Researcher, Max-Planck-Institute for Research on
Collective Goods
Teaching Experience
Spring, 2012
Spring, 2013
Spring 2014
2007-2008
Principles of Microeconomics, NYU, TA
Principles of Microeconomics, NYU, TA
Principles of Microeconomics, NYU, TA
Statistics, University of Bonn, TA
Professional Activities
Referee RAND Journal of Economics, Discussant NET Institute Conference NYU Stern
Presentations
2015
2014
2013
IIOC Boston, NYU Stern Applied Micro
EARIE Milan, NYU Stern Applied Micro, CREED-CESS
Amsterdam
ESA Santa Cruz, NYU Stern Applied Micro, Max-Planck
Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Scholarships and Fellowships
2015-2016
2010-2015
2008-2009
Dean’s Dissertation Fellowship
MacCracken Fellowship
DAAD North America Fellowship for studies at the University of
Chicago
Job Market Paper
Intermediation and Competition in Search Markets: An Empirical Case Study
In many decentralized markets buyers rely on intermediaries to find sellers. The study of this
important class of markets requires an understanding of the competitive and welfare effects of
intermediaries. Intermediaries can affect buyer welfare both directly by reducing search expenses of
buyers with high search cost but also indirectly through a search externality that affects the prices
paid by those buyers that do not use intermediaries. To investigate these two distinct effects this
project uses data from the New York City trade-waste market in which all businesses in the city
contract individually with private waste carters to arrange for their waste disposal. Search in this
market is costly for buyers because of the large number of sellers and the idiosyncratic nature of the
contractual arrangements. There are a large number of suppliers (carters), and buyers can either
search and haggle by themselves or through a waste-broker. Combining elements from the empirical
search and procurement-auction literature, I construct and estimate a model for such a decentralized
market setting. Results from the model show that buyers both in the broker market and in the search
market benefit significantly from the activity of intermediaries. Intermediaries also improve overall
welfare by reducing the cost of price discovery and the mis-allocation of sales to higher cost sellers.
Additional Research Papers
Frictions in a Competitive, Regulated Market Evidence from Taxis (with Guillaume Fréchette and
Alessandro Lizzeri)
This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model of a taxi market. The model is estimated
using data from New York City yellow cabs. Two salient features by which most taxi markets deviate
from the efficient market ideal is the need of both market sides to physically search for trading
partners in the product market as well as prevalent regulatory limitations on entry in the capital
market. To assess the relevance of these features we use the model to simulate the effect of changes
in entry and an alternative search technology. The results are contrasted with a policy that improves
the intensive margin of medallion utilization through a transfer of medallions to more efficient
ownership. We use the geographical features of New York City to back out unobserved demand
through a matching simulation.
Estimating Dynamic Games of Oligopolistic Competition: An Experimental Investigation (with Emanuel
Vespa)
We evaluate dynamic oligopoly estimators with laboratory data. Using a stylized entry/exit game, we
estimate structural parameters under the assumption that the data are generated by a Markov-perfect
equilibrium (MPE) and use the estimates to predict counterfactual behavior. The concern is that if the
Markov assumption was violated, we would find biased estimates and errors in counterfactual
predictions. The experimental method allows us to compare estimates to the true induced parameters,
and counterfactual predictions to true counterfactuals implemented as treatments. Our main finding is
that restricting attention to MPE is, in fact, not very restrictive.
Robust Decisions for Incomplete Models of Strategic Interaction (with Konrad Menzel)
We propose Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) methods for estimation and inference in gametheoretic models with a particular focus on settings in which only a small number of observations for
a given type of game is available. In particular we do not assume that it is possible to concentrate out
or estimate consistently an equilibrium selection mechanism linking a parametric distribution of
unobserved payoffs to observable choices. The algorithm developed in this paper can in particular be
used to analyze structural models of social interactions with multiple equilibria using data
augmentation techniques. This study adapts the multiple prior framework from Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989) to compute Gamma-posterior expected loss (GPEL) optimal decisions that are
robust with respect to assumptions on equilibrium selection, and gives conditions under which it is
possible to solve the GPEL problem using one single Markov chain. The practical usefulness of the
generic MCMC algorithm is illustrated with an application to revealed preference analysis of twosided marriage markets with non-transferable utilities.
Work in Progress
Learning and Adjustments in a Competitive Industry (with Guillaume Fréchette and Alessandro Lizzeri)
Regulatory Interventions in the Gasoline Market (with Dominik Grafenhofer and Klaus-Peter Hellwig)
We collect a high frequency price panel (in 15 minute intervals) that covers the universe of gasoline
stations in Austria. The regulator in this market collects price data in real time and makes the prices of the
cheapest 50% of all gas stations in a regional market available to consumers. This leads to discontinuous
pricing incentives for firms to compete for the spots that grant better price discovery. This discontinuity
lends itself to an identification strategy in which extremely small price changes by competing firms are
used as instruments for the presence in the observable part of the price distribution. We explore how
gasoline stations pricing incentives are affected by this regulation.