ANALYSIS AND HIGHLIGHTING OF LESSONS LEARNT
AND BEST PRACTICES IN THE URBAN RENEWAL
PROGRAMME
REPORT
PREPARED FOR
CITY OF CAPE TOWN
BY
June 2011
Report prepared by:
Ronnie Donaldson
&
Danie du Plessis
June 2011
Project team:
Project leader: Ronnie Donaldson
Team members: Danie du Plessis, Ruth Massey
Assisted by: Hennie Conradie
Tourism and Urban Research Unit cc
Stellenbosch
rdonaldson@sun.ac.za
021 – 88 33882
ii
Table of contents
i.
Executive summary
vii
Part A: Analysis of six components of the Urban Renewal Programme (URP)
1
1
2
3
4
5
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
6
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6
6.7
6.8
6.9
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16
7
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
7.8
7.9
7.10
7.11
7.12
7.13
7.14
7.15
8
8.1
8.2
1
6
7
10
12
12
15
17
20
21
21
21
22
23
23
24
24
24
27
29
29
29
30
30
30
31
32
32
32
33
34
34
36
37
38
40
41
41
42
42
43
44
44
45
45
48
Introduction
Methodology
URP context
Urban renewal defined and foreseen benefits
Study area: Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain URP nodes
Background
Public perceptions on the impact of URP
The URP in a crime-prevention context
Investment in hard infrastructure and soft social interventions in KMP
Crime prevention and the URP
Institutional arrangements
Background
Perceptions of the institutional positioning
'Claiming turf': Improve communication
Stable workforce
Brushstroke mentality
NGOs, the workhorses for the people
Community participation structures: Disabling institutional structures?
Benefits and pitfalls of broad based community participation
Vested interest and agendas
Capacity and capacitation of community structures
Local presence
Learning by doing
Public-private partnerships
Role clarification and internal coordination
Regime change: Political instability at metro level as institutional paralysis
Government communication regarding URP
Integrated project planning and implementation
Need for a comprehensive strategy and business plan for integration and alignment
Project identification and prioritisation
Process and involvement of role players
Does size matter? Quick wins versus longer-term projects
Hard versus soft focus for political gain
Operation and maintenance
Availability of information, and monitoring and evaluation
Spatial and environmental planning
Integration with city-wide spatial planning
Safety and security
Involve private sector in planning
Knowledge management is part of project planning and implementation
Reliable data for successful project completion
Raising the bar for innovative projects
An adequately staffed unit with high morale?
Programme and project financing
Background
Grant monitoring
iii
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6
8.7
8.8
8.9
8.10
8.11
8.12
8.13
8.14
9
9.1
9.2
9.3
9.4
9.5
9.6
9.7
9.8
9.9
9.10
9.11
10
10.1
10.2
10.3
10.4
10.5
10.6
10.7
10.8
10.9
10.10
10.11
11
11.1
11.2
11.3
11.4
11.5
11.6
12
13
13.1
13.2
13.3
13.4
13.5
13.6
Funding: A bottomless pit
Spending funds wisely or unwisely
Budgeting for and funding of operational requirements: Whose funding to sustain
maintenance?
Financially justifying soft projects
Fragmented funding sources require a coordinated mechanism
False perceptions about NDPG target areas
Keeping track of spending
Value of investing in research
Invest correctly
Funding and investment: URP does not provide sustained jobs
Funding complexities
Private sector funding and investment
Intergovernmental relations
Background
Commonly experienced institutional problems
Coordination between various spheres of government
Structure and procedures for alignment
Connecting social and physical renewal?
Benefits of dealing with local government
Intergovernmental cooperation the platform for private enticement
Capacity building through partnerships and intergovernmental cooperation
The us and them syndrome
IDPs as integrative tool?
Stemming the mainstreaming tide
URP as an area-based (ABA) approach for crowding in
Background
Lessons learnt for and against ABA
Danger of ABA stigmatisation
URP as inward- or outward-looking ABA approach?
Space matters
Doing your homework first
Strategies and programmes all over the show
Sectoral versus area approach
Evaluation system to monitor area approach
Striking a balance between the people and place dimension of urban reneal
Mainstreaming
Political champions
Background
Failure of political champions
Rooting out favouritism
Taking pride in projects: technical champions
Unrealistic political championing concepts
Absence of technical and project champions in horizontal coordination
Selected key lessons learned
Selected recommendations
Introduction
Crime prevention
Communication about the URP
Expanding URP skills boundaries to the province
The URP in a changing urban policy context
Knowledge is power: Showcasing improvements of urban social outcomes through research
48
49
50
50
50
51
51
52
52
53
54
55
56
56
59
60
60
61
62
62
63
63
63
63
64
65
67
68
68
69
69
69
69
70
70
71
71
71
74
74
74
74
75
75
79
79
79
80
80
81
82
iv
13.7
13.8
13.9
13.10
13.11
Reviewing and reprioritising the city’s commitment to urban renewal of deprived areas
Skills development of the URP team
Pointers for integrated project planning and implementation
Lobbying for funding and organisational support
Rethinking of the championing role
82
83
83
84
84
Part B: Case studies: Watergate Estate Housing, Kuyasa Clean Development Mechanism Project;
Swartklip multipurpose sports complex; Khayelitsha CBD
86
14
14.1
14.2
14.3
14.4
14.5
14.6
14.7
14.8
15
15.1
15.2
15.3
15.4
15.5
15.6
15.7
15.8
15.9
16
16.1
16.2
16.3
16.4
16.5
16.6
16.7
17
17.1
17.2
17.3
17.4
17.5
17.6
18
19
87
87
88
88
90
92
95
96
98
100
100
101
102
102
102
103
103
104
106
108
109
110
111
112
114
114
119
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
127
130
133
Watergate Estate housing
Background
Project selection
Project objectives
Project preparation and design
Institutional arrangements
Project management arrangements and implementation
Lessons learnt and best-practice proposals
Conclusion
Kuyasa Housing Clean Development Mechanism Project
Background
Overview of the project
Project selection
Project objectives
Project preparation and design
Institutional arrangements
Project management arrangements and implementation
Lesson learnt and best-practice proposals
Summary
Swartklip Multipurpose Sports Complex (MSC): A R65 Million White Elephant?
Background
Project objectives
The Swartklip MSC in the context of the greater Swartklip area
Project preparation and design
Project management arrangements and implementation
Lesson learnt
Conclusion
Khayelitsha CBD
Background and overview
Project selection and objectives
Project preparation and planning
Institutional arrangements
Project financing
Operations and maintenance
Lessons learnt and best practice
Conclusion
References consulted (not necessarily cited)
v
Acronyms
ABA
ACT
ASGISA
BNG
CBD
CDM
CoCT
CoGTA
CPTED
DPLG
EC
EIA
EPWP
GTZ
IDP
IGR
KDF
KfW
KM
KCBD
KMP
MFMA
MIG
MPDF
MSC
MSDF
NPDG
NSDP
SAEDF
SDF
SIPP
SWG
URP
VPUU
Area-based approach
Area coordinating teams
Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa
Breaking New Ground (settlement policy)
Central business district
Clean development mechanism
City of Cape Town
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs
Crime prevention through environmental design
Department of Provincial and Local Government
European commission
Environmental impact assessment
Expanded public works programme
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
Integrated development plan
Intergovernmental relations
Khayelitsha Development Forum
German financial co-operation
Knowledge management
Khayelitsha central business district
Khayelitsha-Mitchells Plain
Municipal Finance Management Act
Municipal infrastructure grant
Mitchells Plain Development Forum
Multi sports complex
Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework
Neighbourhood partnership development grant
National Spatial Development Perspective
South African Export Development Fund
Spatial Development Framework
Special Integrated Presidential Project
Solar-water geyser
Urban Renewal Programme
Violence prevention through urban upgrading
vi
(i) Executive summary
Introduction
February 2011 marks a decade since the announcement of the inception of the URP as a
nationally-initiated policy to renew eight urban nodes of deprivation in six South African
cities. Cape Town has unlike the other cities in the national programme, been subjected to
regime changes that have had a distinct impact on the manner and direction in which the
URP has played out since its inception in 2003 in the city. Within the relatively short
time span of eight years the unit has galvanised into one with the capacity to play a
facilitative role in urban renewal. This facilitative role has realised the securing of
significant funding from a range of sources (national to local) and a key knowledgemanagement system that provides the necessary imputes for informed decision making
on spatial, social, economic and infrastructural planning of services and facilities. The
unit has been able to achieve this despite the absence of dedicated organisational support
from the CoCT management where the support was perceived to have been
overshadowed by the FIFA 2010 World Cup and of late the Integrated Rapid Transport
(IRT), and in difficult working environments faced by hostility from certain quarters in
the organisation and an exodus of key senior skilled personnel after establishment of the
unit. Contrary to the findings of market research on the residents’ awareness and
knowledge of the programme conducted in 2005 during the take-off phase of
implementing the URP, it is clear from engagement with stakeholders that the URP has
become a brand in its own right over the past ten years. The market research survey
identified the three most pressing challenges in Khayelitsha as crime (including theft and
different forms of violent crimes), unemployment, and the lack of and low quality of
housing. In Mitchells Plain they were drug abuse (including the use of Tik and other
forms of hard drugs), unemployment, and crime and gangsterism.
The announcement of the URP came shortly after South Africa had completed a
structural reform process at the subnational level, which resulted in the creation of nine
provinces and 284 local governments, followed soon after in 2000 by the municipal
elections. All these events had an impact on the institutional psyche at the time of having
to deal with yet another nationally-imposed institutional structure. The institutional
arrangements of the URP unit evolved over three main time periods: (1) with the national
inception of the programme in 2001 the Democratic Alliance (DA) was in power in the
CoCT and there was little coordination between the CoCT and the provincial and national
governments. Both were under ANC rule at the time. There was also no commitment to
the URP in the CoCT; (2) in late 2002 the NNP/ANC coalition was formed to govern and
the unit appointed a manager and finalised a business and marketing plan so that the unit
appeared through a political lens to have a lot of clout; and (3) when the DA coalition
came to power in 2006, initially the URP unit’s status was seemingly institutionally
orphaned and viewed with distrust by city officials. However, once the then mayor, Helen
Zille, understood what the URP was about, the working relations eased and the unit could
facilitate its projects without political animosity or distrust.
This report analyses and highlights lessons learnt from and best practices in the URP as
experienced in the two Cape Town nodes – Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plan – between
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2003 and 2011. The report is not intended to be a comprehensive assessment of the
programme in all its complexities. Instead, it aims to reflect, as far possible, on the
achievements of the programme by focussing on six specified components:
• URP institutional arrangements (internal and external),
• integrated project planning and implementation,
• programme and project financing,
• intergovernmental relations,
• area-based approach, and
• political championing.
Additionally, two case studies in each of the nodes are packaged to illustrate best
practices and lessons learnt, and capture as far as possible (within the limitations of
availability of time, data and documentation) the project evolution from concept stage to
decommissioning stage. The four case studies covered in this report are:
(1) Khayelitsha CBD
(2) Kuyasa Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) project in Khayelitsha
(3) Swartklip multipurpose sports complex in Mitchells Plain
(4) Watergate Estate housing development in Mitchells Plain.
Urban renewal context
Urban renewal is a very broad concept with various meanings, depending on how one
wishes to interpret it. Urban renewal as defined by the CoCT Council at the start of the
programme is: “A 5 to 10 year process of developing inter-governmental, business,
community and donor partnerships in order for the CoCT to better meet community
needs through infrastructure upgrading and improved service delivery, simultaneously
with communities being better empowered to access city opportunities through
development programmes.” The national URP project was coordinated and monitored by
the national DPLG (later CoGTA). Mitchells Plain and Khayelitsha are located adjacent
to one another essentially forming a massive nodal focus area for the URP. In Cape Town,
the URP is implemented and monitored by the URP department of the CoCT. Political
URP champions from various spheres of government were appointed: national ministers
as national political champions, and the current second-and third-tier champions are
Premier Helen Zille as provincial political champion, and the Executive Mayor of the
City of Cape Town, as the local political champion. The URP is founded on the principle
concept of nodal development in specified municipalities. Two principal structuring
mechanisms are used to drive the programme: spatial focus, and targeting of funding and
resource allocation from the three spheres of government and strategic partners in
response to indicators of both poverty and economic opportunity. As a laboratory for
innovative ideas and flexibility, an area-based approach (ABA) is seen as an
experimental policy, trying out new things and providing alternative policy ideas. Being
seen as pilots provides ABAs the flexibility of being risky and if successful being rolled
out more widely, although in international experience this is rare.
Methodology
The study is mainly qualitative in nature, being a reflection on the views and perspectives
of a segment of programme stakeholders, supported by insights from a wide range of
secondary sources such as key reports on the URP, both nationally and locally, and
viii
specific project documentation. The non-availability of the latter has been a major factor
inhibiting the study and a recent national report on the URP, A Nodal Approach to
Development (2009), echoes this shortcoming in assessing the progress of the
programme. The assumptions and findings made in the report have to be considered in
the context of the views expressed by the number of stakeholders interviewed. Most of
the interviewees are line managers and others have been actively involved in one way or
another in a specific project. It is probable that a somewhat different picture would have
emerged had a different range of stakeholders been interviewed. In total over 40
interviews were conducted over the project duration between February and May 2011.
Institutional arrangements
The World Bank has identified the phrase ‘institutions matter’ as one of the four key
lessons learned in the last fifty years of development experience. After the DA acceded to
power in Cape Town, they embarked on a process of rationalisation and restructuring.
Between 2006 and 2009 the URP was located in the service delivery integration (SDI)
directorate, and following another round of restructuring was relocated to the housing
directorate (since 2009). No doubt, whoever is in political control of the city, there will
always be a perception of this unit as being politically aligned if it were to be a standalone unit as was the case under ANC governance where it was stand-alone and linked
only to the city manager's office (a similar institutional arrangement has been place at all
but one of the other URP nodes nationally). Perceptions of the institutional positioning
of such a unit have to be tested before casting it in stone. The main lessons learnt on
where the URP should fit into the city organisational structure are crucial for its longterm survival and its gaining the respect of other line departments. Aligning such a unit to
the office of the city manager is fatal as that creates an expectation and the perception of
it being untouchable.
Among the many challenges facing municipalities is to attract and retain skilled
personnel. The stability in the manager portfolio in Khayelitsha-Mitchells Plain (KMP)
appears to be a success story. It became evident from the interviews that stability in
managing nodes led to stable working relations (wherever applicable) between the URP,
officials and councillors and it improved communication, understanding and appreciation
among them.
In terms of community engagement, at the URP’s inception, the management framework
made provision for local structures (a Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF) and a
Mitchells Plain Development Forum (MPDF)) that would have had the responsibility of
developing the local vision and strategy, directing project objectives and integration,
building local partnerships and community-based initiatives, ensuring effective
community involvement, monitoring and evaluating the progress of the programme, and
reporting needs and issues to the government sponsors. These structures were represented
by sub-councils which have jurisdiction in the area, civil-society structures at area and
local level, NGOs and local-business interests. In this regard, the Khayelitsha experience
proved to be highly successful with a strong community involvement through the KDF.
The same cannot be said for the MPDF. The political cohesion in Khayelitsha (a strong
base for a single political party support, the ANC) as opposed to Mitchells Plain’s
fragmented and highly contested political terrain (ANC, NNP, DA, ID) is perhaps the
main reason for this level of institutional disintegration. A key lesson learnt from this is
ix
that other line departments with skills and expertise in facilitating community
participation, such as community and social development, should have a greater role to
play to set up and maintain structures of community participation and leave the work to
the URP to sustain. Another important lesson learnt here is that when institutional
conflicts in relation to community participation are prevalent at the CoCT, it will be
difficult to have any form of successful public participation at nodal level, especially if
the node is highly stratified. It is questionable whether the URP community participation
had to be facilitated through the IDP process or not. The establishment of local project
offices proved to be an essential element of effective and ongoing interaction between
government structures and the affected communities. Interaction such as the setting up of
private-public partnerships has been limited to the business areas of both nodes and more
innovative approaches with greater spin-offs for the community must be considered. The
perception exists that in many projects the private sector should be incorporated from the
start and those projects where facilities are neglected and underused, the private sector
should be co-opted to run them.
Although varying opinions on the composition, overall location within the organisation,
and skills profile of the URP unit emerged during the interviews, there is widespread
recognition that the URP office has a potentially important role to play. There is a widely
held view that limited technical expertise hampers the impact of their initiatives, and that
the ability to manage complex multidimensional projects is an important prerequisite.
The important role of the URP unit concerning technical interface with politicians
regarding components of the URP programme in particular is recognised. There is
consensus that for the URP to be successfully implemented, a clear distinction and
description of the division of roles and responsibilities of politicians, provincial and
national officials, and officials of the CoCT regarding their roles and involvement in the
URP programme and projects are required. A recurring lesson learnt by almost all the
stakeholders interviewed is that communication between the URP and line departments
must improve.
It is argued in the study that the processes of achieving greater alignment between and
within spheres around the URP cannot be divorced from macro-level institutional
processes such as city restructuring. Although the ANC is the governing party at national
level, it is the formal opposition party in the multiparty Cape Town Metropolitan Council
(from 2006 to 2011). These political dynamics impact profoundly on intergovernmental
relations, local governance and political interactions. Significantly, the local state cannot
be separated from national forces and economic and political processes that affect the
actions of the local state and the nature of development policies. Therefore, political
actors have the power to shape the urban environment through the alliances they make,
the policies they implement and by means of their linkages with national forces. At the
start of the programme, many politically-related problems in the CoCT administration
hindered progress. In the first three years of the existence (2000 to 2003) of the CoCT
there was three different mayors. There has been a dual approach to spatial planning
under the ANC and the DA regimes. Under the former the focus was pro-poor whereas
under the DA it was market-driven. Institutional instability within the city during the
course of the URP has impeded the possibilities for gaining the level of stability required
to achieve both greater strategy coherence and project-based alignment internally and
between spheres of government. Associated with this instability has been a flux around
x
the prioritisation of the URP. Furthermore, the opinion has been expressed that this
period of instability has resulted in a lack of focus on innovation and being proactive
(MCA Africa, 2006: 20).
Integrated project planning and implementation
From the onset, holistic nodal development plans were required in each node to ensure
that issues of social development and economic growth are adequately catered for. The
URP required an appropriate balance between local needs and national policy imperatives
and it was reasoned that this would be best managed via a fully participative IDP process,
coupled with rigorous monitoring, evaluation and reporting. There is a range of factors
influencing and hampering the achievement of improved alignment of projects and
initiatives. The preparation and existence of a detailed strategy and business plan alone
not necessarily ensures that all these challenges are adequately addressed. The MCA
2006 evaluation study also questioned whether the formulation of a comprehensive
revised URP development strategy and MTEF will in its own right create the necessary
conditions for alignment. A comprehensive project and business plan is generally
regarded as a prerequisite for successful implementation of multidimensional and
multiyear programmes. The apparent lack of a long-term vision, clearly defined
programme objectives, and a comprehensive business plan for the URP has been noted by
a number of interviewees. Some respondents were of the opinion that the municipal IDP
process and URP programme did not mutually inform one another in terms of overall
strategies and multiyear budgeting processes. The original 2003 URP business plan
represented an important effort to provide a joint strategy base for achieving greater
alignment, but to a large degree it has not achieved the level of coordinated and targeted
budgeting hoped for.
The DPLG (n.d: 12) report on lessons learnt (mid-2000s) was decisive in the selection of
projects on the basis of real need and it stated that “effective upfront research and
consultation increases the potential of a coherent plan and implementation strategy that
can then roll out without significant changes or delays that may result from opposition
towards projects.” Ideally, within an area-based approach the focus should be on
dedicated zones within the area as opposed to projects (especially the quick-wins) being
scattered. In this way the real needs, pre-project research, community engagement and
proper structuring of an implementation plan can be achieved.
The approach of sectoral identification of projects within the community development
forums to ensure a comprehensive initial project list is generally viewed as one of the
early successes of the URP programme. One of the points of criticism against this
approach is that it placed too much emphasis on smaller localised projects which are
viewed as less sustainable in the longer term.
One of the most notable features of the URP programme in Cape Town is the apparent
lack of consideration of operational and maintenance issues during the initial stages of
project conceptualisation and planning. This resulted in the underuse of high-level
facilities created through the URP programme (e.g. Swartklip multipurpose sports
complex) and the lack of maintenance at certain facilities that are beginning to emerge at
some components of the Khayelitsha CBD. It is claimed that the absence of municipal
xi
facility-management committees resulted in limited or no operational and management
capacity for newly created facilities (e.g. Swartklip multipurpose sports complex).
The recurrent story resonating from the interviews is that the implementation of a project
fails due to insufficient planning and that planning fails mainly due to a lack of buy-in by
a line department and the lack of feasibility studies being conducted. In some cases no
beneficiaries are identified and in many there is no capacity in project management.
Moreover, there is no monitoring and adjustments by the URP or relevant line
department(s) to rectify situations. This is where a monitoring process would be key to
minimising wasteful expenditure and holding those responsible for their actions or
inaction. A key aspect of integrated project planning is monitoring progress through a set
of indicators. The URP application in Cape Town had no monitoring process to track the
extent to which the strategic objectives or results are being achieved. No indicators
appeared to have been defined for the strategic objectives overall nor for individual
projects. Broadly stated outcome indicators were provided for the seven identified
outcomes of urban renewal. These were however not intended to measure the successful
implementation of the URP.
The spatial integration of urban renewal projects was significantly enhanced through the
preparation of a detailed spatial development framework in 2006 for the nodal areas. This
local SDF ensured that the nodal projects and initiatives are aligned with the broader
metropolitan-level initiatives such as the municipal SDF. An important lesson is that this
comprehensive SDF played a crucial role in the preparation of funding applications and
motivations for URP projects from other spheres of government and should ideally be
replicated in new URP nodes.
Programme and project financing
The URP is a programmatic mechanism instituted to achieve synergy across existing
budgets at three tiers of governance. Two main aspects pertaining to project financing
have stood out over the past ten years. First, there was no substantial dedicated funding
source allocated to the URP at inception, causing initial frustration, panic and uncertainty.
The funding philosophy was based on the premise of an integrated approach that allows
financial and technical resources from all three spheres of government to be channelled to
nodes for development. Second is the counterpoint to the first, namely that once the
programme got going a basket of finance options opened up. The funding for nodal
projects and programmes has been aligned, budgeted, reprioritised and linked to the IDP
processes and the national budgeting and planning processes to ensure linkages and
create synergies between the budgets and outputs of the three spheres. The URP’s ability
to access funding empowered it to “make their presence felt within the fiercely contested
space of provincial and local government” (DPLG, n.d.: 71). This ability has become the
trademark of the URP in Cape Town over the past decade and it is a strength the unit
must exploit and strengthen perhaps even becoming the core function of the unit in the
next phase of the URP. The URP has earned the reputation as a unit where line
departments can quickly and relatively easily secure funding for projects. Funding is
sometimes allocated late which complicates planning at line-department level. However,
alignment must be sought between the URP funds-allocation processes and the annual
budget processes of line departments.
xii
The general impression gained is that the funding of ongoing operational and
maintenance aspects of projects has received little, if any, attention in the initial project
planning and budgeting phases. This resulted in examples where facilities created through
the initial capital investment are not operated and maintained at the expected levels. It
transpires that interdepartmental meetings led by the URP have primarily dealt with
progress reporting of project implementation, with limited attention given to postconstruction management and operational aspects. In some instances, the funding or staff
required for operation and maintenance purposes of specific facilities are not planned for
nor available. Arising from the intergovernmental coordination challenges outlined above
is the point that successful coordination of budgeting and planning from various spheres
of government has only achieved marginal success. A particular matter of concern for
many interviewees is the process of internal funding allocations from line-department
budgets which were viewed by some as ‘top slicing’ departmental budgets to fund URP
projects.
The internal budgeting processes also need to be coordinated through various internal
mechanisms of the municipality, including its annual IDP revision process forming part
of the IDP cycle, the overall city budgeting processes, and the linkages with the
municipal performance-management system. Without the overall vision of objectives and
strategies of the URP programme being embedded in all these components, it is hardly
possible to achieve coordination and alignment of budgeting processes and funding
sources. This lack of a coordinated approach to budgeting and funding processes
necessarily resulted in a characteristically ‘shotgun’ approach in the URP nodes where
resources are thrown at the nodes without the guidance of a clearly defined multiyear
strategy and budget.
It appears that funding across spheres and sectors, and the ability to attract external
funding, have been primarily achieved through the concerted efforts of individuals at a
project level, and not necessarily from a coordinated programme-level budgeting
approach. It is evident from the 2011 review that the effectiveness of the CoCT URP
department in dealing with information flow is seriously inadequate. Institutional
memory regarding projects is seemingly engraved in the memories of selected individuals.
Record keeping of projects and budget spending are haphazard and incomplete.
The availability of funding for research is recognised by stakeholders for the value
research adds to strategic thinking, planning and effective management of the URP as a
whole. However, others have reservations about the actual follow-up of suggestions and
lessons-learnt findings of consultancy research. The feeling persists that consultancy and
other research reports are seen as end-products instead of them being viewed as starting
points for strategic planning.
Intergovernmental relations
Institutional arrangements are complex and differ among the many institutional types,
namely intra- and intergovernmental partnerships; local government-led multidisciplinary
coordination often through corporatised government units; public housing authorities;
private housing developers; housing associations and cooperative housing institutions;
community banking institutions; and community-based organisations.
xiii
Apart from the internal coordination between line departments within the City of Cape
Town as described above in the section on integrated project planning and
implementation, a number of prominent challenges relating to coordination among
various spheres of government relating to the URP programme have been identified.
These include: (i) The absence of a comprehensive multiyear business plan for most of
the duration of the URP programme which compromised the ability to achieve
coordination between the activities of the various spheres of government concerning
timing, budgeting and location of individual interventions. (ii) Prior to the preparation of
a detailed spatial development framework for the URP nodes, there was a lack of spatial
focus and coordination between initiatives of national, provincial and local government.
The preparation of a detailed spatial development framework for the URP node has
successfully addressed this challenge. (iii) During the earlier years of the URP there may
have been a perception in some quarters that national government imposed their
development agendas on local government regarding the selection of choice for URP
nodes with limited consultation.
Clustered public investment into multi-use nodes (public services, recreation, transport
interchange, retail) has succeeded in building a solid platform to attract private sector
investment nationally in the URP nodes. Coordinating the presence of a range of
government departments and state infrastructure (magistrate’s courts) laid the platform
for the first significant private-sector investment in large townships after apartheid. These
nodes were successfully developed through the building of networks and closer working
relationships between the three spheres of government.
The URP as an area-based approach (ABA) for crowding in investment
Turok (2004) argues that in highly economically polarised societies, such as South Africa,
area effects will be significant and therefore an ABA to renewal should be supported in
this context. According to him place affects economic and social processes and by
targeting an area as a whole by means of strategic environmental and infrastructural
improvements and enhanced security (all these were characteristics of the Cape Town
URP) “a strong signal can be given of public sector commitment to renewal and
revitalisation” (Turok, 2004: 3). In doing so, area-wide action if applied correctly, may
counter negative perceptions of decision makers and help turn around the misfortunes of
an area. Creating a new sense of place is thus key to successful ABA renewal. Why was
it decided to run the URP along an ABA? According to Forster et al (2006) there were
typically four rationales for implementing URP in an ABA. First, to ‘crowd in’, prioritise
and integrate investment and effort in the area to solve a priority problem or capitalise on
a special opportunity. Second, to mobilise partnerships with locally orientated partners,
i.e. to use territory as a mobilising force. Third, to deepen the participation of groups of
an area in the democratic life of the city. Last, to develop or test new approaches in a ‘hot
house’ for subsequent broad-scale application. While it is possible to pursue all
simultaneously, trade-offs in terms of time, capacity and impact are inevitably implied.
The URP seeks to achieve all four of these base objectives.
The area-based management (ABM) approach involves a “dedicated team of specialist
officials focused on ensuring that there is synergy in the governance, planning and
implementation in a specific geographic area. Each area has a dedicated budget. This
approach is not without its management complexity. Tensions arise between the relative
xiv
freedom and level of integration of area-based management and the demands and
constraints of line department functioning. The approach is palatable to those
departments with a spatial, geographic focus, but it is difficult to get buy-in from nonspatial departments” (DPLG, undated: 38). Although the area-based approach
undoubtedly had a significant positive impact in these two areas, the absence of a
comprehensive evaluation and monitoring system hampers the ability to quantify the
levels of success of the area-based management approach. An important finding of the
URP case study report on lessons learned by the department of Cooperative Governance
and Traditional Affairs (CGTA, undated) is that this approach requires a dedicated team
of specialists focussed on ensuring synergy in governance, planning and implementation
in a specific geographical area. Given the management complexity of ABA, it is only
effective if adequately resourced with experienced officials.
Political champions
The introduction of the political championing concept can be traced to the initial
selection of urban renewal nodes. It appeared to have been both highly political and
quasi-scientific. Political considerations, not necessarily strategic planning, clearly played
an important part in the selection of nodes and this has created some irrationality and a
lack of similarity across the sites, making some aspects of programme design and
management difficult. It has been the experience at most URP nodes in the country, and
more so in KMP, that the institution of political championship was largely ceremonial in
nature. The support and facilitation expected from political champions (national,
provincial, city and councillors) varied. Generally the national support was, with the
exception of an occasional drive through the node, non-existent. A contrary view the
DPLG (undated: 37) report on lessons learnt points out is that the “local URPs have not
necessarily kept political champions abreast of development in their areas, and have not
called on them for support”, a sentiment echoed by some interviewees.
This study contends that the political championing of projects was not necessarily a good
idea. In a highly politicised environment such as Cape Town, unlike the other URP nodes
in the country, an apolitical approach to championing projects would perhaps have had a
better outcome.
Case studies
Four URP anchor projects were case studied and the key observations measured against
the selection criteria for URP projects are shown in the Box i.
(i)
(ii)
The Watergate Estate housing development, launched in August 2009, is a
privately-funded R1.2 billion affordable-housing development aimed at a specific
section of the first-time homeowners market. It is envisaged that the development
will on completion consist of 3 368 properties on 22 hectares. Phase A comprises
2 436 sectional title units and phases B, C and D 932 freestanding dwellings. The
development over four phases will offer various housing types priced from R299
900 to R409 000. It is the first privately-funded affordable housing project in the
Western Cape.
The Kuyasa Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) pilot project involves the
retrofitting of 2300 of these low-cost homes with solar water geysers (SWGs),
insulated ceilings and energy-efficient lighting. The project has seen an
xv
(iii)
(iv)
immediate and significant impact on the social, health and economic well-being
of the targeted residents. This is South Africa’s first internationally-registered
CDM project under the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. It is also the first Gold
Standard Project to be registered in the world. The Kuyasa project has generated
significant interest locally and internationally as a pilot for the energy-efficient
adaptation and retrofitting of South African low-cost housing.
The development of the Swartklip multipurpose regional sports complex in
Mitchells Plain is in the ambit of social cohesion that seeks to build resilient
communities where the facility serves to integrate Mitchells Plain and
Khayelitsha. The site, Swartklip, is located in Mitchells Plain and aims to provide
a safe and secure regional sports complex to serve the communities of Mitchells
Plain and Khayelitsha.
The Khayelitsha CBD became the main anchor project for Khayelitsha with its
primary aim to establish a vibrant and viable CBD in the area. The KBD project
included a variety of components funded by both the public sector (e.g. regional
magistrates court, offices for the department of Social Welfare and the
department of Home Affairs, swimming pool complex, Khayelitsha cricket oval
and club-house facility, KCBD multi-purpose centre, and the 230-bed
Khayelitsha Hospital) and the private sector which developed the 17 500 m²
retail centre completed in December 2006 at a total capital cost of R86,5-million.
Due to the high demand for trading space, a further 2 000 m² was subsequently
developed. It is estimated that the shopping centre has appreciated by about
R140-million and this windfall is retained in the Khayelitsha Community Trust.
Four URP anchor projects were case studied and the key observations measured
against the selection criteria for URP project
Box i:
Selection
criteria for
URP
projects
Partnerships
Kuyasa CDM
The project was a collaborative
partnership between the City of
Cape Town, the national
Department of Water and
Environmental Affairs (DEAT
(now DEA), the Provincial
Department of Housing and
Local Government, the SAEDF
and the community of Kuyasa.
Involving the community as a
partner was a key to the success
of this project. The URP offices
at the City of Cape Town also
provided assistance on the
ground and served at the
community’s direct link to the
City.
Khayelitsha CBD
The KBD provides an excellent
example of partnerships between
the community, various spheres
of government and the private
sector. Agreements were put in
place to reduce both the burden
on the community trust by
creating
a
management
company, whilst at the same
time facilitating the flow of
benefits back to the community.
The KCT was established at an
early stage as a non-profit body
representing the interests of the
people of Khayelitsha. They
became an important contact
point between the major
stakeholders. The KCT is the
principal equity holder in the
development
and
various
companies were set up to
manage the different entities
within KBD (KManco, K-Retail,
Khayelitsha Housing Company).
Watergate Esate gaphousing
The development is the first
public-private
affordable
housing development in the
City of Cape Town. The URP
provides municipal process
assistance and can leverage
funds from the national URP
fund for items in the
development. The developer
constructs the development and
hands over the public spaces
and facilities to the City.
Swartklip multipurpose
sports complex
Partnerships fizzled out over
time and there is no clear track
record of ownership.
xvi
Community
contributions
The energy-efficient technology
training, targeting 2309 people,
was delivered by Ndamane and
his project team. Life skills
training for this same group are
facilitated through full-time
trainers. To date, 50 of the
Kuyasa residents have been sent
on specific employment-related
training (Goldman, 2010). The
Kuyasa CDM project head office
in Cape Town has employed six
people on its staff. The project
has created 87 job opportunities
for local community members in
Kuyasa, The community has
also been able to save on energy
costs.
Multisectoral
impact
The Kuyasa project addresses
environmental,
social
and
economic needs. It delivers
energy-efficient and energy
saving
systems
to
the
community and has provided
skills training, awareness raising
and job opportunities for the
community.
Representation
All members of the community
were represented regardless of
financial or economic situations,
gender or age.
From the outset, the Khayelitsha
Development Forum played a
critical role in the development
process. The
KBD
was
launched in 2000 after intensive
consultation
with
the
Khayelitsha community and
other role players. The result of
this consultation was the
drafting of a “stakeholders’
forum agreement” in which the
community identified a number
of proposals regarding the
community involvement and
participation in the project.
KCT owns the buildings and is
paying off the loan using rental
income from the business owner,
Khayelitsha Retail Company (KRetail). This retail centre
ownership model ensures that
the Khayelitsha community
benefits directly from the
development. It is estimated that
the
shopping
centre
has
appreciated by approximately
R140-million in value and this
value is retained in the
Community Trust. It has been
reported that the trust has been
instrumental in facilitating and
assisting local contractors and
labourers to procure contracts
and employment in retail
construction. In total, 16 local
companies were engaged in the
construction of the retail centre
providing employment to more
than 160 local people.
The KBD had a very strong
multisectoral
impact
and
includes
various
economic
elements such as the retail
centre,
social
development
elements (e.g. new Khayelitsha
hospital, regional magistrate’s
court,
offices
for
the
departments of Social Welfare
and
Home
Affairs)
and
community facilities such as the
sport complex.
The KCT was established at an
early stage as a non-profit body
representing the interests of the
people of Khayelitsha. They
became an important contact
point between the major
stakeholders. From the outset,
the KDF played a critical role in
the development process. The
KBD was launched in 2000 after
intensive consultation with the
Khayelitsha community and
other role players. The result of
this consultation was the
drafting of a “stakeholders’
forum agreement” in which the
community identified a number
of proposals regarding the
community involvement and
participation in the project
The construction of the
development has created 500
jobs. Certain subcontracting
operations have been awarded
to companies from Mitchells
Plain. However, it has been
identified that, in future, a
larger component of sweat
equity should be from the local
community. It is also envisaged
that the development would
create
approximately
250
permanent
jobs
in
the
commercial precinct and in the
maintenance
of
the
development.
Data on actual jobs created is
unknown but it is clear that local
labour did benefit from the
construction of the complex
where certain subcontracting
operations were awarded to
companies from Mitchells Plain.
The
Watergate
Estate
development
addresses
housing, social and economic
needs. It delivers affordable gap
housing,
provides
public
facilities for residents of
Mitchells Plain and creates job
opportunities
through
the
mixed-use development which
includes a commercial precinct.
As a mixed-use site, the impact
has been minimal thus far
because of the lack of a facility
implementation strategy.
The development contributes to
housing requirements in the gap
housing market. The public
facilities are not for the
exclusive use of the residents
but are open to all. The
boulevard through Phase A of
the development allows for
access to the Mitchells Plain
District Hospital.
Although the aim of the project
was to integrate the communities
of
Mitchells
Plain
and
Khayelitsha, this clearly has not
happened. The site is viewed as
being representative of the
Mitchells Plain community and
to change these perceptions will
take
considerable
effort,
planning and identifying a
champion to steer the process.
xvii
Sustainability
The sale of the carbon credits
has allowed for monitoring and
continued support for the
project. The Gold Standard
certification
and
CER
certification
require
that
maintenance is provided for the
installations. The national and
international acclaim for this
project has also allowed for its
sustainability. The CDM office
in Kuyasa ensured continued
support and communication
within the project.
Innovation
The use of a CDM model and
the registration of this project
with the UNFCC have been an
innovative moves on the part of
the developers. This caters for
sustainability and for ongoing
support and acclaim. The focus
on the community and continued
participation has taken on an
innovative approach with the use
of local economic forums,
community liaison officers and
local community representation.
Ease of
implementation
The URP has assisted the
developer
in
identifying
challenges in the development
process and has facilitated
problem solving of issues. This
process has had a number of
setbacks, particularly in terms of
financial
spending
and
sustainability as well as the
differences in approach between
the partners. This has been a
pilot project and a number of
lessons emerged. These lessons
were experienced with the
community and its partners and
that will strengthen further rollout.
In the KBD case, the large area
allocated for housing (which has
been vacant for a number of
years) has never been threatened
by land invasions. This is
evidence of good relationships,
local community understanding
and
acceptance
of
the
development plans for the area.
Neither KCT nor K-Manco is
presently in a position to fulfil
its
mandate
to
procure
operations and maintenance
services due to its lack of a
revenue stream, and the CoCT is
currently
providing
basic
maintenance
and
cleaning
outside of the retail area. The
efficiency of the operations and
maintenance
aspects
can
significantly
influence
the
attractiveness of the business
area, and could have long-term
consequences
for
its
sustainability.
Based on available information,
the KBD retail centre is the only
one in South African townships
that is not commercially owned.
The creation of a community
landowning trust as well as the
opportunities for community
equity participation creates a
sustainable long-term vehicle for
social capital enhancement.
Public
land
improvements
should be kept in a community
trust (through a land availability
agreement), and the community
should be allowed to gain the
value added to land by the
development. This retail centre
ownership model, which is
unusual in South Africa, ensures
that the Khayelitsha community
benefits directly from the
development. It is estimated that
the
shopping
centre
has
appreciated by about R140m in
value and this value is retained
in the Community Trust
The KBD initiative has required
substantial input from the City
of Cape Town to ensure its
success. There is no doubt that
projects of this scale require
dedicated project management
resources and a “project
champion” who is familiar with
the
bureaucratic
processes
(development and funding) and
who can engage with a variety of
external role players. The KBD
process has also indicated that
the process of packaging private
sector finance is costly and
needs to be budgeted for.
The sustainability of the
development
would
be
determined by the residents’
participation
in
the
homeowners
association
(HOA). This is a challenge as
HOAs are new to the gap
housing
segment.
It
is
envisaged that the URP would
play a facilitating role in the
HOA.
The sustainability of the
complex is not doubted, but it
will mainly depend on the
implementation of a facility
implementation and operations
plan that would seek the
necessary buy-in from sports
bodies, clubs, organisations,
schools and communities to
make this a viable sporting
space.
The high-density development
has a focus on public transport
and pedestrianisation, which in
itself is an innovative idea for
gap housing in Cape Town. The
residents
will
have
the
opportunity to become active
participants in the affairs of the
development through the HOA.
There is clearly a lack of
innovation as far as the
management of the complex is
concerned.
The URP has assisted the
developer
in
identifying
challenges in the development
process and has facilitated
problem solving of issues.
There are two problems that
need attention: the finalisation
of the access road and the
process of approval of building
plans.
The KCBD initiative has
required substantial input from
the City of Cape Town to ensure
its success. There is no doubt
that projects of this scale require
dedicated project management
resources
and
a
project
champion who is familiar with
the
bureaucratic
processes
(development and funding) and
who can engage with a variety of
external role players. The KCBD
process has also indicated that
the process of packaging privatesector finance is costly and
needs to be budgeted for.
xviii
Selected key lessons learned
Selected lessons and achievements of the URP are listed below.
The URP brought novel thinking on developmental issues (something many
line managers still grapple with).
Active involvement and making the programme a community-driven process
was achieved (some case studies testified to the contrary but generally the
community involvement was successful).
Being a legitimate project, it was clear to communities that beneficial things
would happen and this stemmed the tide of illegal invasions as residents took
ownership of projects.
The URP introduced integrated planning and project management by reducing
duplication of sources. Who the driver is and who is to take ownership in the
before, during and post-construction phases is said to be very clear in an
integrated approach. Whether this has been the case in all the projects is
debatable.
The URP pilot provided a solid foundation for the long-term sustainability of
urban renewal.
It achieved the shedding of professional egos once the end product was in
sight.
By understanding the bigger picture of urban renewal, the URP became
skilled (almost professional) in how to mobilise resources from the state and
private sectors (although donor sourcing and private-sector sourcing could
have been better).
By providing projects, anchor status assumes that all mandates must happen.
The programme can essentially be viewed as pro-poor development and it
speaks to the process of urbanisation.
The programme has dramatically changed the face of the two nodes (but much
more remains to be done).
Networking has almost become practice in the URP.
A key challenge is to elevate the programme to strategic level.
To establish a unit mandated from the highest level of authority in the country
in an unstable and highly contested political environment requires creative
planning and thinking outside the box. Nominating political champions to
steer the cause of the mandate was deemed to fail from the start.
Launching a programme at this scale without a budget, strategic framework
and clear policy directives was a major failure at national level and the failure
of some URP initiatives is to be directly blamed on this level of governance.
A parallel can be drawn between the way in which the two nodes’ community
forums performed and that of the URP establishment. In one node success was
grown organically (KDF) with a solid foundation, whereas in the other
(MPDF) it was ‘forced’ and subsequently disintegrated. Imposing a unit such
as the URP on a municipality experiencing regime change is problematic.
Ideally, such a unit should have grown organically from within existing
structures. No unit should be directly aligned to a municipal manager’s office
only. The perception of favouritism created from this institutional
arrangement had damaging consequences for the unit in the long term of the
programme and for the unit in the way it is perceived by various line
departments.
xix
Cheap politicking has sounded a death knell for the URP throughout the pilot
period. Various governments in authority used the URP to showcase their
political prowess with very little understanding of the actual workings of the
programme or the philosophy behind urban renewal. There was scant regard
for the difficult circumstances in which the unit had to work, such as lack of
job security and inadequate policy and strategic direction from the CoCT,
provincial and national governments.
The reprioritised funding model is not ideal for URP nodes. A dedicated
budget for the unit has to provide the foundation from which to work. All line
managers must undergo compulsory training in integrated planning, integrated
relations and on the philosophy behind urban renewal in a postmodern
urbanism context. Inappropriate ways of thinking about urban renewal and not
having a clear understanding of the actual purpose and role of the URP unit
proved to be counterproductive to achieving the aims of the URP.
It is crucial for future URP nodal roll-outs to have established a SDF and EMF.
Having these legislated frameworks in place serves as de facto expedition of
public participation and the meeting of all environmental considerations.
xx
Images from Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain
Photos: Authors, 2011
xxi
Part A: Analysis of six components of the
Urban Renewal Programme (URP)
1.
Introduction
The spatial geography of urban apartheid is internationally well known. The most
neglected urban spaces during apartheid are still largely the most neglected spaces in
democratic South Africa. These are now referred to as exclusion areas that continue to
suffer high levels of spatial, economic, social and political exclusion from mainstream
society. Townships were spatially engineered by the architects of apartheid and excluded
by design. Today they are typified by high levels of poverty and crime. It is in the
undoing of these two social malaises that the Urban Renewal Programme (URP) has
anchored itself on the policy agenda. In the process, crime prevention is placed at the
centre of the urban renewal programme. The excluded-by-design areas have become
excluded-by-decline areas. In the report by Leon (2007) entitled “The place of township
transformation within South African policy and strategies” the areas of exclusion are
succinctly depicted as:
“….. old formal townships, and while they may often include some informal settlements they are
different from large freestanding informal settlements. They often accommodate populations with
strong working-class roots, but currently have high levels of unemployment, high levels of social
frustration and alienation (which often takes the form of gangsterism and crime) and seriously
decaying infrastructure that urgently needs rehabilitation and upgrading. Typically, the formal
housing stock is overcrowded and informal settlement often takes the form of backyard shacks for
rental. There are also urgent needs for access to health services, education facilities, better
sanitation, and improved law enforcement. While these areas may have more developed social
capital than large freestanding informal settlements, the resident population is generally poorly
educated with a low level of skills. These areas do not represent economic opportunities, as their
levels of poverty and underdevelopment make it difficult for them to attract significant volumes of
private capital, and to generate savings; they are thus trapped in an under-development lock-in”
(Leon, 2007: 6).
Given the scale and tragedy of everyday living in spaces of exclusion, it is worthwhile to
question the absence of a national policy directive on township renewal. The current
policy remains at programmatic level. The three most prominent of these plans of action
since the advent of democracy are the Special Integrated Presidential Projects (SIPPs)
initiated in 1994, followed in 2001 by the National Urban Renewal Programme (URP),
and more recently the Neighbourhood Development Programme since the mid-2000s.
According to Mammon (2005), there are four key and mutually reinforcing strategies that
can begin to achieve a restructured urban surface in pursuit of the good city. These are
(re)-location, reclamation, restructured public transport (including non-motorised
transport), and re-emphasising public facilities, places and open spaces.
In his 2001 state of the nation address, former President Thabo Mbeki announced the
launch of the Urban Renewal Programme (URP), an area-based approach (ABA), as a
ten-year initiative to address poverty and underdevelopment in targeted areas, with
specific emphasis on improving joint government planning and implementation. The
URP intended to focus on eight urban townships (called URP nodes – Figure 1) in the
-1-
country as pilots to pave the way for an urban development strategy on urban renewal to
be developed and implemented nationally once the ten-year pilot period elapsed.
In hindsight, launching a programme of this magnitude without a policy guideline proved
to be problematic in numerous respects. An uncoordinated and disjointed working
environment, working in a policy vacuum, trying to please government (the President) in
what seemed to have become a trademark of the Mbeki presidency, namely a top-down
approach to governance and development, set the scene for a decade of learning lessons
the hard way with many successes but also failures. The URP was tasked with a dual
mission. First was to test and demonstrate how best the notion of joined-up government
can be operationalised to achieve better results (coordination). Second, and leading from
the first, was to produce lasting and tangible impacts into creating cohesive communities
in the nodes and transforming them in more liveable environments (integration).
According to CoGTA (2009: 11) this dual mission implied “the sense that the HOW is as
important as the WHAT. In order to address the WHAT, practitioners require a strong
sense of guidance, as there was no abundant experience with this rather unique challenge
for South Africa. In such context, it is crucial to build a common sense of purpose and to
be equipped with some operational instruments right in the early stages of the pilot
programme.”
Figure 1: Locations of South Africa's eight URP nodes
-2-
This report was commissioned by the URP office at the City of Cape Town (CoCT). The
purpose of the study, as set out in terms of reference, entails the extraction of major
lessons learnt (both positive and negative) from URP since its inception in the two nodes
located in CoCT (Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain) by specifically focussing on the six
components detailed in Table 1:
Table 1: Six components of CoCT commissioned study of the city’s URPs
Components of study
Rationale
Functions/characteristics
(1) URP institutional
arrangements (internal
and external)
(2) Integrated project
planning and
implementation
In the earlier phases of URP reports
noted to be areas of institutional
weaknesses. After the establishment
of the City of Cape Town metro in
2000, the urban nodes were newly
amalgamated areas within broader
city jurisdictions. Experience gained
in the nodes indicates that real
critical technical skills shortages
exist that require innovative models
for government to deliver.
The principle of sector department
contributions towards integrated
government interaction at a nodal
point has been tested during the 10year URP period. How can these
lessons now be mainstreamed?
Reviewing
aspects
on
the
compilation,
maintenance
and
communication of the strategies and
programmes;
compilation
and
maintenance of multi-agency, multiyear indicative plans; identification
and prioritisation of programmes
and projects necessary to secure
outcomes
Coordination and integration
of development initiatives,
programmes and projects
Convening of quarterly URP
multi-stakeholders’ forum
meetings
Convening and management
of integrated nodal steering
committees
Communication of project
progress/initiatives
Alignment of projects and
programmes
with
IDP,
Provincial
Growth
and
Development Strategy (PGDS)
and
national
government
strategies and priorities
Facilitation of development
initiatives
Strategic planning to direct
and inform project prioritization,
budgeting and implementation,
e.g. URP business plan, Spatial
Development Framework (SDF),
etc.
Development of detailed
nodal plans
Project packaging for
implementation
Monitoring and evaluation of
URP programmes
Convening of multi
stakeholders’ forum meetings
Writing of bi-annual national
cabinet lekgotla reports and
reporting to council
administration and political
structures
Convening of integrated nodal
steering committee meetings
Conducting of socio-economic
impact assessments and
documenting of case studies
-3-
(3) Programme and
project financing
Financing was one of the most
complex and problematic aspects of
the URP. The RDP Fund model was
not replicated, instead the funding
approach was based on the concept
of reprioritisation within existing
budgets, at national, provincial and
local levels (Rauch, 2002). It was
expected that local authorities and
line departments prioritised
allocations to the urban renewal
nodes
At the inception of the URP
(4) Inter-governmental
relations (co-operative programme initiated coordination
structures performed modestly. This
governance)
has been superseded by the
establishment of the broader
intergovernmental relations
structures
(5) Area-based approach
(6) Political and technical
championing concepts
Purposefully targeted areas of
underdevelopment and deprivation
within which the approach of coordinated governmental action and
impact on development could be
tested with the aim of extending the
programme to similar areas.
Political champions (from national
government to the councillors) may
have had a valuable contribution in
drawing attention to the poverty
nodes. What was the leveraging of
the support provided to the nodal
area by the political champions?
Resource mobilization (financial
and non-financial)
Leveraging of public and
private funds (including donor
funding) to address urban
development
and
service
delivery challenges.
Rendering of professional
/technical support /advice to line
departments in relation to project
implementation.
Rendering of financial support
to line departments.
Unblocking of blockages in
relation
to
project
implementation.
Intersphere, intersectoral
project planning, budgeting
and implementation
URP is an intersphere and
intersectoral programme and is
inherently intergovernmental in
character.
URP reflects an attempt to
adopt a whole-of-government
approach to the development of
specific areas as well as forging
of a partnership approach
between the private sector,
communities and government.
The crowding in of investment to
selected urban spaces.
Communications and
Marketing
Quarterly stakeholders’
engagement including
beneficiary communities on URP
implementation
Bi-annual newsletters on URP
progress
Regular engagements with
sub-council chairpersons,
councillors, managers on URP
implementation
Quarterly updating and
regular posting of key
information on the URP website
Organising URP annual
service delivery open day events
URP annual achievements
awards event.
Source: After CoCTA (2009) and Urban Econ (2011)
-4-
This report is not intended to be a comprehensive assessment of the programme in all its
complexity. Instead, it aims to reflect, as far possible, on the achievements of the
programme over a decade, focussing on the six specified components. Additionally, two
case studies in each of the nodes are packaged to provide best lessons learnt, capturing as
far as possible (within the limitations of availability of time, data and documentation) the
project evolution from the concept stage to decommissioning stage. The four case studies
covered in this report are:
(1) Khayelitsha: CBD
(2) Kuyasa Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) project in Khayelitsha
(3) Swartklip multipurpose sports complex in Mitchells Plain
(4) Watergate housing development in Mitchells Plain.
Surprisingly, there is very little published material on academic debate on the URP,
hence most sources on the URP are government policy documents and consultancy
reports. To date, numerous reports have been produced on the URP nationally as well as
several specific studies of the Cape Town nodes. Some key works used as reference
guides in finalising this report are listed in Box 1.
Box 1: Key reports on URPs
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
CoGTA (Department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs). 2009. A Nodal
Approach to Development. Urban Renewal Programme and Integrated Sustainable Rural
Development Programme 2001 – 2009.
CoCTA, 2009. The Mainstreaming Guide to Urban Renewal.
City of Cape Town. 2004 to 2010. Various Cabinet Lekgotla reports. URP Office, CoCT.
City of Cape Town. No date. URP: Monitoring and Evaluation Framework. Report compiled and
produced by Umtha Strategy Planning and Development Consultancy.
CoCT and MCA Africa. 2006. Urban Renewal Spatial Development Framework for Khayelitsha
and Mitchells Plain final draft for comment.
CoCT, 2006. Socio-economic Profiling of Urban Renewal Nodes – Khayelitsha and Mitchell’s
Plain compiled by: QSJ Consultants & Unit for Religion and Development Research (University
of Stellenbosch), commissioned by: CoCT
Information and Knowledge Management
Department.
CoCT, 2003. URP: Business Plan.
CoCT. 2005. Draft Environmental Management Framework for Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain
Urban Renewal Programme. Prepared for City of Cape Town by Environmental Evaluation Unit
University of Cape Town.
CoCT. 2010. Communications & Marketing Strategy (sic) for the Urban Renewal Programme.
CoGTA & CoCT. 2010. Accelerating Local Economic Development in the KhayelitshaMitchell’s Plain area of Cape Town: Feedback from the Nodal Economic-Development
Workshop 08/09 May 2008.
DPLG, No date. Guidelines for Political Champions.
DPLG. No date. Toolkit for Programme Managers.
DPLG. No date. National Urban Renewal Programme Lessons learnt.
DPLG. No date. National Urban Renewal Programme. Implementation framework.
Info Wizz Information Services & Business data solutions, 2006. A Draft Knowledge
Management Strategy for the City of Cape Town.
Info Wizz Information Services & Business Data Solutions, 2006. A Review of Literature
Emanating from and Related to the City Of Cape Town’s Urban Renewal Programme.
MCA Africa, 2006. Shared Learnings from the City of Cape Town’s Urban Renewal
Programme. Study done for CoCT Information and Knowledge Management department.
MCA Africa, 2006. Preliminary Impact Assessment for the Khayelitsha Mitchells Plain Urban
Renewal Programme.
-5-
•
•
National Treasury (& SA Cities Network). 2010. Operations and Management of Township
Nodal Developments: Khayelitsha Business District Case Study. Training for Township Renewal
Initiative.
Urban-Econ, 2011. URP Socio-Economic Impact Assessment Report
Note: Regretably, most government publications and reports are not given dates
2.
Methodology
The study is mainly qualitative in nature, being a reflection on the views and perspectives
of a segment of programme stakeholders1, supported by insights from secondary sources
such as reports and project documentation. The non-availability of documented data on
projects has been a major factor inhibiting the study and a recent national report on the
URP, A Nodal Approach to Development (2009), echoes this shortcoming in assessing
the progress of the programme. The following key stakeholders were personally
interviewed over a two-month (March and April) period in 2011:
Allemeier, Jodi. Urban-Econ
Anthony, Ivan. Mitchells Plain URP area manager
Asmal, Osman. Director of the Environmental Resource Management Department, CoCT
Austin, Greg. AGAMA
Bedford, Wadiah. Parks and Recreation, CoCT
Benu, Michael. Kuyasa Development Forum
Beukes, Andre. First Plan - town planner and urban designer
Booi, Monwabisi. URP Strategic Integration and Coordination manager
Cedras, David. Sub-council manager
Christians, Danny. Ward councillor for Mitchells Plain
Cotani, Fezekile. Sub-council manager
Dharsey, Fayruz. Western Cape Provincial Government, Department of Economic
Development and Tourism, Director LED
Essop, Anver. Managing director, New Age Property Developers
Forbes, Alexander. CoCT, Enviro management
Gaula, Mkhululi. Khayelitsha Community Trust CEO
Gexa, Nolufefe. Ward councillor for Khayelitsha
Gusman, T. Community member
Human, Andre. CoCT, Manager: Development, Property Management Department
Jacobs, Rosemary. Umtha Consulting
Kotzee, Alida. CoCT, Director: Strategy, Support and Coordination
Laubser, Alwyn. AL & Associates - project manager
Lili, Andile. Ward development forum
Mabeta, Sipho. CoCT, Sport and Recreation
Makula, Siyanda, CoCT, URP
Malokoti, Simphiwe. CoCT, City Parks
Matthews, Yoliswa. CoCT, URP
1
The findings and assumptions made in the report have to be viewed within the context of the views
expressed by the limited stakeholders interviewed. Most of the interviewees are line managers and others
have been actively involved in one way or another in a specific project. It is probable that a completely
different picture may have been presented should other key stakeholders have been interviewed.
-6-
Meyer, Kader. Provincial Project Manager, Social Responsibility Programme,
Department of Environmental Affairs (formally DEAT)
Morris, Glyn. AGAMA
Mthiyane, Khethokuhle, CoCT, URP
Ndamani, Zuko. Kuyasa site manager
Ngani, Patrick. SANCO LEC
Nhose, Joseph. CoCT - City Parks
Nqadini, Patrick. CoCT, Khayelitsha URP area manager
Phankisa, Simon. CoCT, URP
Penxa, George. CoCT, Director: URP
Raubenheimer, Stefan. South South North
Roggen, Wouter. CoCT, Environmental Resource Management Department
Siwisa, Thando. Sub-council manager Khayelitsha
Solizwe, Mpendulo. Ward councilor Khayelitsha
Steyn, Herman, CoCT, Director Department of Housing
Swanson, Malville. CoCT, Transport
Thorne, Steve. South South North
Van der Merwe, Martin, CoCT, IDP Director
Van Eeden, Riaan. CoCT, Manager: District Spatial Planning
Visser, Stanley. CoCT, Urban Agriculture Unit
Ward, Sarah. CoCT, ERM
Wesselink, Carl. SAEDF
Williams, Rohland. CoCT, Parks and Recreation
3.
URP context
In essence, the URP is an integrated process that specifically targets the regeneration of
purposefully identified underdeveloped geographic areas to achieve sustainable
development by bringing a balance between the social, economic, environmental and
infrastructural aspects of city life (Anthony, 2006). The URP aims to address issues of
poverty and exclusion in urban areas, by marshalling the resources of the three spheres of
government (local, provincial, national) in a coordinated way to address the challenges
posed. The various URP programmes intended to “lead to socially sustainable
communities, with access to amenities, and to conditions that will contribute to growth
and development” (DPLG, undated: 2).
Over the past decade, various interpretations of the aims and objectives of the Urban
Renewal Programme (URP) have been provided from a range of sources. Nevertheless,
the overall objectives of the URP, as captured in its founding documents, are:
• Promoting local economic development to reduce poverty and unemployment.
• Providing a safe and secure environment by supporting crime-prevention
initiatives.
• Supporting education, training and skills development.
• Creating a quality urban environment where people can live with dignity and
pride.
• Developing efficient, integrated and user-friendly transport systems.
• Creation of jobs through labour-intensive methods of work.
-7-
•
Delivering well-managed safety nets (cohesive and sustainable communities).
(CoCT, 2011, 5 - Monitoring and Evaluation Framework)
By late 2002 in the early stages of the programme an advisory team on development
planning appointed by the minister of Provincial and Local Government had critically
observed the absence of a clear policy framework as one of the weaknesses of the URP,
resulting in confusion about the meaning of 'urban renewal' and the nature of urban
renewal projects. The team recommended a reconceptualisation of the URP, with an
emphasis on two overarching goals. First was to deliver visible projects that contribute to
the development (renewal) of dormitory townships; and the second was to demonstrate
best practice in relation to integrated service delivery, extending beyond the delivery of
urban infrastructure to include the way that urban development projects are implemented
in South Africa (Rauch, 2002). As implementation of the programme progressed, the then
national department responsible for the URP (the DPLG with support from GTZ and the
EC) launched an initiative to support and strengthen nodal URP delivery with four
interventions; namely
(1) an Implementation Framework that coheres and clarifies the policy, institutional,
systems, and financing architecture of the URP;
(2) an operational guide for URP practitioners focussing on the management systems
and practices at nodal level;
(3) documenting emerging practice that would evaluate and document emerging
nodal case study material relevant to the challenges experienced at the nodal
level, and
(4) technical hands-on support to the nodes through learning systems (Forster, Leon
and Menguele, 2006).
The programme was defined as a systematic and sustained intervention to alleviate
poverty (see Box 2) and to significantly address underdevelopment.
Box 2: Crucial reasons for public investment in poverty alleviation
According to Urban Landmark (2008: 6) there are “several reasons why investment in public infrastructure
in the interest of poverty alleviation in South Africa is critical:
The bulk infrastructure requirements for an efficient and sustainable urban form are not different for the
wealthy or poorer sectors of the resident population. Efficient cities work better for everyone and increase
the access of people to job opportunities as well as the access and mobility of employment opportunities
and sites of production to labour. However, the dependence of the poor on such efficiencies and on lower
costs of accessing such public services, in order to access income generating opportunities, are greater.
Bulk infrastructure in South African cities is reaching capacity in many places and key infrastructure for
energy generation is inadequate. Well functioning and economically effective urban space requires that the
necessary infrastructure web be in place.
Public infrastructure provides the utility foundation to attract private investment in employment
generating activities. This is a direct investment in job creation.
The combination of extreme backlogs in bulk infrastructure provision and a post-apartheid focus on
directing investment towards developmental, social and micro-infrastructure has meant that the country’s
ageing infrastructure is highly stressed. Ongoing investment in a capital web and bulk infrastructure - and
the maintenance thereof – provides a basis within which the extension of services to the poor within that
framework are relatively easily achieved and are not a dramatic exercise or cost.”
-8-
By May 2002, the broad objectives of the URP were being described as:
• To ensure that citizens participate in activities that seek to develop and shape their
communities.
• To support and promote IDPs as a primary tool to inform investment decisions by
all spheres of government.
• To pilot approaches to intergovernmental fiscal re-engineering.
• To do things differently – in terms of planning, design, implementation and
financing.
• To foster real partnerships with a wide range of partners in development.
• To pilot approaches to intersectoral and intersphere integration in planning,
budgeting and implementation (DPLG, undated, Overview Report on the URP).
The programme was never conceptualised within a policy framework: instead it was
launched as an intended programme of action. Five years on the DPGL released an
Implementation Framework that catered for five components, viz
(1) a policy and strategic framework;
(2) a financing and funding framework;
(3) an organisational and institutional framework;
(4) a management systems and instruments framework; and
(5) a framework for the mobilisation of human resources and capacities.
The URP Implementation Framework has identified three core outcomes or external
objectives that are fundamental to intervention in the URP nodes:
(1) integration into the city: socio-political integration, economic integration, and
spatial integration;
(2) enhancing the autonomy of the areas by improving intra-area access to services,
information and infrastructure; and
(3) enhancing human and social capital focussing on crime and violence, education
and skills, local economies and capacity of local institutions.
The developmental objectives of the URP, as encapsulated in the urban renewal
framework, emphasises the following principles:
• Mobilise people to become active participants in the processes targeted at the
upliftment of their own communities.
• Coordinate, integrate and focus the activities of the three levels of government.
• Secure private sector cooperation and participation in the programme.
• Develop ways of prioritising and aligning budgets and expenditures of the three
levels of government and associated line functions to better achieve desired
outcomes.
• Ensure cluster and intercluster, as well as cross-level approaches to planning,
budgeting and implementation.
• Improve the capacity in all levels of government to deliver outputs needed to
achieve outcomes.
Nationally, eight nodes were identified according to the following three criteria:
(1) Institutional capacity of the metro municipality
• Financial and administrative management
-9-
• Technical skills
• Staffing per capita
• Revenue base
(2) Infrastructure defined by basic service provision and condition of the
infrastructure
• Roads
• Water and sanitation
• Electricity
• Telecommunications
• Clinics
• Schools
(3) Poverty, with a focus on the beneficiaries of the programme
• Income
• Unemployment
• Population numbers.
(Source: DPLG, 2006: 15)
In contributing to the new economic growth targets set out in the Accelerated and Shared
Growth Initiative of South Africa (ASGiSA), DPLG initiated an economic development
programme of action for the urban nodes in September 2005 - A Programme of Action for
Building Productive and Sustainable Nodal Economies. The plan intended to stimulate
economic growth and development nationally in the URP nodes. However, key
information about these areas was lacking. It was important to understand the economic
potential of the nodes, to identify opportunities for public and private sector investment,
to identify barriers and constraints to economic activity within the nodes, to make
recommendations on strategic interventions for improving the nodal business climate,
and make related institutional recommendations for implementation. Subsequently, three
deliverables emanated from the plan: Nodal Economic Profiles (containing information
such as demographics, institutional capacity, potential economic interventions, space
economy, competitiveness profiles); the Nodal Investment Atlas (a compendium of
public and private sector investment opportunities); and the Centre for Excellence
(recommendations and proposals) (Western Cape Province, 2007).
4.
Urban renewal defined and foreseen benefits
Urban renewal is a very broad concept with various meanings, depending on how one
wishes to interpret it. Urban renewal as defined by the CoCT Council at the start of the
programme is:
“A 5 to 10 year process of developing inter-governmental, business, community and
donor partnerships in order for the CoCT to better meet community needs through
infrastructure upgrading and improved service delivery, simultaneously with
communities being better empowered to access city opportunities through
development programmes” (CoCT, File T/CO-18/2/1/5/1, URP Khayelitsha office).
- 10 -
Ten main benefits of urban renewal through the URP were foreseen by the CoCT at the
start of the project:
• Capital grant funding from external sources (national government) as well
as donor finance made available.
• Use of local labour and skills training schemes linked to capital projects
would have provided some relief from unemployment.
• URP would be a major credibility boost for IDP because short-term results
can be delivered.
• Attract unprecedented levels of national and donor funding over 5 to 7year period.
• A climate conducive to private sector investment would be created to
strengthen the city’s tax base and avoid further degeneration.
• A culture of payment for services would be reinforced.
• The immense cost of poverty (social impacts of crime, policing measures
and underuse of economic skills base) would be reduced.
• Infrastructure would be optimally matched to needs and communities
would take care of new facilities.
• It would be a learning experience for renewing other parts of the city in a
similar fashion.
• The URP would improve the image of the city and its attractiveness to
tourists and investors (CoCT, File T/CO-18/2/1/5/1, URP Khayelitsha
office).
The CoCT URP website states that there are six categories of proposed outcomes for the
URP (see Table 2).
Table 2: Five areas of intended URP outcomes
Infrastructure
(effective service
delivery)
development
Social development
Provision of basic services (water, sanitation/ablution facilities, electricity)
Provision of permanent surfaces to all street and roads
Provision of effective stormwater management systems
Sidewalk paving
High mast and street lighting
Infill housing developments to ensure densification on well-located land
Conversion of hostels into self-contained units
Eradication of informal settlements
Upgrading and maintenance of infrastructure
Public transport facilitation, including transport hubs
Disaster mitigation and risk management programmes
Provision of refurbishment of health facilities
Provision of Multi-purpose Community Centres
Maximum use of all public (“school”) infrastructure (through NGOs) and
recreational facilities
Programmes in:
Moral regeneration
HIV/Aids prevention
HIV/Aids orphan support
Home-based care
Community capacity building
Sport and recreation development
Vulnerable group support
Standard of education improvement
Adult literacy
Excellence incentive (role models)
Enhanced social capital
- 11 -
Economic
development
Environmental
development
Safety and security
Effective
governance
Development of markets and/or community stalls
Roll-out of backyard rental initiatives
Revitalising existing commercial properties or infrastructure owned by
government
SMME development and support
Programmes in:
Urban agriculture
Private sector investment
Labour-intensive public works
Skills development and empowerment
Tourism development
Establishing reliable waste management systems
Bush clearing, cleaning of public open spaces, gulleys and wetlands
Using natural resources efficiently
Programmes in:
Urban greening
Environmental awareness and management
Conserving and protecting core botanical sites
Coastal management and development
Making policing more visible
Neighbourhood watch
Social crime prevention
Implementing public lighting
Ensuring that schools are safer
Enforcing traffic rules
Regulating shebeens
Developing an integrated service centre
Ensuring integrated development planning
Developing partnerships
Building capacity
Promoting the “Batho Pele” ethos (putting people first)
Involving citizens in governance
Monitoring and evaluating governance
Source: CoCT URP website
5.
Study area: Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain URP
nodes
5.1 Background
Post-apartheid investment (public and private) and urban renewal attempts in the
Khayelitsha-Mitchells Plain (KMP) area is nothing new. The city’s first post-apartheid
blueprint for spatial development, the Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework,
promoted corridors and nodes along with a fixed urban edge and a metropolitan open
space system as the main structuring elements to achieve spatial integration for Cape
Town. Only one of the four nodes identified by the MSDF was located in a previouslydisadvantaged area in the city, namely Philippi. The development of activity corridors
and urban nodes aimed to promote commercial and industrial development and higherdensity housing to build thresholds to create more efficient public transport systems. The
nodes and corridors defined as “emerging” (such as Philippi) were intended to be the
focus of public expenditure, assuming that the preconditions for investment would be
created. However, studies show that this did not happen (MCA Africa, 2006) – see Figure
2. By the early 2000s, a WESGRO report found that the majority of the projects were still
in an early-planning stage and many had held this status for many years; that many of the
projects were local-government efforts and did not have a project driver or promoter; that
- 12 -
many were residential or retail projects and did not represent new investment in
productive activity; and that most private sector initiatives had failed due to their inability
to raise financial support (WESGO, 2002).
Figure 2: Public and private investments inside and outside designated activity corridors
Source: MCA Africa (2006:15)
The Philippi node as identified in the MSDF as the key locality for development on the
broader Cape Flats area, was the focus of concerted government attention since the mid1990s. Before the announcement of the URP, Turok and Watson (2002) argued that this
move was contentious because the MSDF proposal aimed at directing public and private
investment into a metropolitan-scale node in the Philippi area, in essence into a system of
activity corridors linking the main metropolitan nodes and extending into some of the
poorer townships such as Khayelitsha. Such a move implied that the location of
investment would be legally enforced through the statutorisation of the plan. Furthermore,
they criticised the MSDF
“for being based on an assumption that it is possible to legislate where private sector investment
should locate (on the defined corridors and nodes), when in fact much of it is scattered or
responding to a spatial logic of freeway access and amenity. Large-scale, private-sector office and
shopping centre developments, in particular, are tending to occupy sites outside corridors and
nodes. Spatial plans simply do not have the power to dictate to private investors. It is possible, for
example, that some investors may decide not to locate in the city at all if they are forced into
locations they consider inappropriate. The MSDF is also considered over-ambitious in its aim to
direct economic activity into particular locations, especially areas of deep poverty, such as the
Philippi node” (Turok and Watson, 2002).
Turok and Watson (2002) suggested the identification of a series of urban transformation
projects that would promote spatial integration, and to allow planning and
- 13 -
implementation to proceed in tandem. Such projects were to be focussed on particular
localities although their large scale means they have an impact on the overall functioning
of the city. According to Turok and Watson transformation projects would ideally be
located in the zones between better-off and poorer areas of the city in order to help knit
them together, but also linked into city-wide movement routes to maximise accessibility.
Such projects were to be initiated by the public sector but thereafter managed by a
partnership including the private sector. At the time of making these planning
recommendations, the URP was announced and a concerted effort in renewing two of the
many previously-disadvantaged areas (so-called areas excluded by design) in Cape Town
was placed on the national agenda. It became clear that the MSDF with its anticipated
Philippi nodal-growth strategy was dead and buried. The Wetton-Lansdowne Philippi
corridor project was abandoned and Philippi subsequently fell off government radar
regarding planning and budgetary prioritisation. Government attention has since shifted
to the URP in Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain - areas located in the same planning
district as Philippi (Brown-Luthango, 2011).
The common characteristics of excluded-by-design areas which accommodate the
majority of South Africa’s urban population, are apartheid townships (excluded and
marginalised); poverty, and high crime rates (broadly conceptualised as a vicious circle
of crime, insecurity, poor housing, ill-health and stress within the community that
hampers progress, undermines confidence and damages the prospects of attracting private
investment and generating a development momentum) (Turok and Watson, 2002); formal
engineering infrastructure installed but decayed and in need of rehabilitation/upgrading;
mainly formal housing stock with an informal housing component; need for substantial
improvements in maintenance and operating (through greater budget allocation and
improved efficiency); scant in internal economic opportunities; low education and skills
levels of resident population; poorly connected to surrounding neighbourhoods; level of
available services largely disproportionate to the needs of the resident population;
enterprise culture limited due to a lack of available opportunities for the resident
population; low levels of social capital, in many cases due to a supply-driven approach to
service delivery that has encouraged dependencies instead of promoting an enterprise
culture (Source: DPLG. undated. Toolkit for Programme Managers).
Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain present bleak pictures concerning key statistics of their
socio-economic and infrastructural status. The DPLG & Business Trust’s (2007) nodal
economic profiling of the nodes is summarised in Table 3.
Table 3: Selected socio-economic profiling data for the KMP urban nodes
Node
Population
(000s)
Poverty
incidence*
Number of
households
below HSL
(000s)
Employment
rate
Households
not having
piped water
within
200m from
dwelling
Households
that do not
use
electricity as
source for
lighting
Adults aged
20+ with no
schooling at
a secondary
level or
above
Khayelitsha
329
72%
62 000
35%
17%
24%
32%
Mitchells
399
48%
46 000
43%
13%
18%
28%
Plain
* Note: Poverty incidence is the percentage of households earning less than the household subsistence level
(HSL) (R19,200 p.a. in 2007).
- 14 -
The national URP project is coordinated and monitored by the national DPLG (later
renamed CoGTA). Mitchells Plain and Khayelitsha, are located adjacent to one another in
Cape Town, essentially forming a massive nodal focus area for the URP in the Western
Cape (see Figure 3). In Cape Town, the URP is implemented and monitored by the URP
department of the CoCT. Political URP champions from various spheres of government
were appointed: national ministers as national political champions, and the current second
and third tier champions are Premier Helen Zille as provincial political champion, and the
Executive Mayor of the City of Cape Town, Dan Plato, as the local political champion
(http://www.capetown.gov.za/en/urbanrenewal/Documents/URP_Newsletter_Jun_2010.pdf).
Figure 3: The URP nodes of Mitchells Plain and Khayelitsha (Source: CoGTA &
CoCT, 2010: 2)
5.2 Public perceptions on the impact of URP
It is clear from engagement with stakeholders that the URP has become a brand in its
own right over the past ten years. URP signboards are familiar sights in KMP. However,
public awareness of the URP was very low in the take-off phase of implementing the
URP. A comprehensive and representative sample survey among residents in the two
nodal areas was conducted in 2006 by QSJ Consultants and Unit for Religion and
Development Research (University Stellenbosch) to test among other issues, residents’
perceptions and awareness to the URP.
- 15 -
In both nodes the majority of respondents indicated that they had no knowledge of the
URP; 78% and 63% in Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain respectively saying that they had
never heard of this programme (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Awareness of the URP (Source: Compiled from QSJ Consultants
and Unit for Religion and Development Research)
Interestingly, but not surprising the lack of knowledge about the URP does not
correspond to the level of knowledge regarding selected individual projects. Except for
the Swartklip Regional Sports Facility and Colorado multi purpose centre, most of the
respondents (more than 40%) were aware of the other projects tested in the questionnaire,
of which the Khayelitsha CBD and Mitchells Plain mall projects are best known. The
study found that in Khayelitsha, respondents had a high level of awareness of the URP
but not necessarily for the different projects. In contrast, in Mitchells Plain, the awareness
of the different projects and the URP in general were more or less the same. The general
opinion that the URP projects have had very little impact on the households’ quality of
life is confirmed in Figure 5. Access to public transport, roads, and services and shopping
opportunities is contributing to quality of life in KMP. Information about HIV/Aids is
impacting households more in Khayelitsha than in Mitchells Plain.
Figure 5: Proportion of respondents indicating that URP projects
did have an impact on their households’ quality of life (Source:
Compiled from QSJ Consultants and Unit for Religion and Development
Research)
- 16 -
The three most pressing challenges in Khayelitsha were identified as crime (including
theft and different forms of violent crimes), unemployment, and the lack of and low
quality of housing. In Mitchells Plain they were drug abuse (including the use of Tik and
other forms of hard drugs), unemployment, and crime and gangsterism. When asked to
express their desires for projects to improve their quality of life in Khayelitsha, the most
expressed need was for projects relating to the creation of employment together with
skills training (38%). A similar need was recorded in Mitchells Plain (34%).
5.3 The URP in a crime-prevention context
“… in the early years of the programme there was a strong emphasis on crime
reduction as an indicator of successful development" (CoGTA, 2009: 18).
It is accepted that urban renewal is as much about the renewal of urban environments as it
is about community renewal. In this regard, the urban renewal projects offer an
unprecedented opportunity for innovation and learning in many aspects of crime
prevention and fear reduction (Rauch, 2002).
The broken windows paradigm relates directly to the existence of disorderly urban
environments. Disorder can be broadly defined as “incivility, boorish and threatening
behaviour that disturbs life, especially urban life. Urban life is characterised by the
presence of many strangers, and, in such circumstances, citizens need minimum levels of
order" (Kelling & Coles quoted in Rauch, 2002: 14 - 15). The thesis of broken windows
was tested by criminologist Wesley Skogan and produced three major findings. First,
community members generally know what constitutes disorder and how much of it is
present in their area. Second disorder and crime go together. Disorder was found to be
more strongly linked to crime (in the minds of residents) than crime was linked with any
other characteristic of the area, e.g. poverty. Third, disorder played an important role in
neighbourhood decline. By lowering community morale and giving the neighbourhood a
bad reputation, disorder and crime contributed to fear, flight and atomisation (Rauch
2002).
Although the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) (1997) placed environmental
design firmly on the urban agenda, crime prevention through environmental design
(CPTED) and its emphasis on victims of crime was an unknown concept in policy circles
(Rauch, 2002). CPTED has recently emerged as a socio-physical perspective on urban
renewal and it rests on four key strategies: territoriality, natural surveillance, activity
support, and access control. In addition, greater emphasis is placed on the “effective and
continuous maintenance and management of urban space that is actively being utilised
and discouraging the underuse of such space (e.g. dereliction and vacancy)” (Cozens,
2002:129). The CSIR (2000: 1) defines CPTED as “the implementation of measures to
reduce the causes of, and the opportunities for, criminal events, and to address the fear of
crime through the application of sound design and management principles to built
environments.”
The key concept is territoriality and it is assumed that “people protect space that they
define as their own and possess a developed respect for the territory of others. Fences,
pavement treatments, beautifying gardens, art, signs, good maintenance and landscaping
are examples of physical design which may visibly express active ownership. The
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identification of intruders and potential offenders, it is argued, is therefore easier in such
well-defined spaces” (Cozens, 2002: 129). In this way, the configuration of physical
features, activities and people maximise opportunities for surveillance and it is
proclaimed to discourage crime. Barriers making observations difficult include features
such as bushes, sheds or shadows. Well-planned landscaping and lighting can be
designed to promote natural surveillance from the interior of a home or building and from
the exterior by neighbours and passers-by. Just as design and use of urban space can
affect criminality, so can the maintenance and management of such space influence crime
and the fear of crime. Cozens (2001: 131) proposes a three-stage review process (the socalled Three-D Approach) to incorporate CPTED principles in community development
and renovation:
“‘Designation’ is concerned with establishing the intended use of the area and
those behaviours that will be permitted. ‘Definition’ is related to the physical
limits of the area, the borders between public and private space, the activities that
are encouraged and planning for potential risks and misuse and abuse of space.
‘Design’ can be utilised to support the intended use of the space in a safe and
efficient manner. Indeed, if a space has no clearly intended or designated purpose,
is poorly defined, or is not properly designed to support and control the intended
function, that space may not serve to impede the opportunities for criminality”
(Cozens, 2001: 131).
CPTED is largely based on defensible space theory which focusses on design solutions in
reducing or preventing property crimes. The CPTED theory postulates that crime events
are associated with the opportunities created by environmental design. Therefore, the
CPTED approach aims to manipulate the built environment to reduce the opportunity for
crime. In theory, this can lead to a reduction in fear of crime and enhance quality of life
(Marzbali et al., 2011). The four strategies employed in this approach are: natural
surveillance, natural access control, territorial reinforcement, and maintenance (Cozens,
2002). The first two are mainly “geared towards promoting the offenders’ risk perception
by keeping users and outsiders under observation and denying access to potential targets.
On the other hand, territorial reinforcement and maintenance are based on the assumption
that the design and management2 of the environment can help the user of a property to
feel a sense of ownership over a territory” (Marzbali et al., 2011: 161). In addition, socalled street furniture can be very effective in creating a human scale. Well-designed
benches, light fittings, bus shelters, rubbish bins, trees and general landscaping will
improve the image of an area and increase feelings of safety (Kruger & Landman, 2007).
The CSIR recommends that the basic principles for fundamental restructuring are based
on surveillance and visibility, territoriality and defensible space, access and escape routes,
target hardening, and image and aesthetics. Box 3 summarises the latter aspect which is
most relevant to the URP’s area-based approach to renewal.
Box 3: CSIR’s suggested image and aesthetics principles for restructuring for crime
prevention
2
Spatial management includes the maintenance of infrastructure, by-law enforcement, implementing crime prevention strategies and
initiatives, and providing basic servies. According to Kruger & Landman (2007) lack of maintenance could very well be the reason
why certain crimes occur in specific areas or why people feel vulnerable in a particular area. For example, if carefully designed
lighting has been provided to increase the safety of a pedestrian route taxi rank, the crime prevention effect will be rendered useless if
the lights are not maintained.
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Image and aesthetics
“The image projected by buildings or public areas in the city has been clearly linked to levels of crime and
particularly to the fear of crime. This link is often referred to as “crime and grime”. Urban decay and the
resultant degradation make people using these areas feel unsafe. The design and the management of spaces
in the city are both important if precincts are not to become actual or perceived “hot spots” for crime.
Vacant land, especially if not maintained, and unoccupied buildings particularly, contribute to decay as do
uncleared litter and the breakdown of services. The image of spaces can be improved by ensuring human
scale in design, using attractive colours or materials, providing adequate lighting, and designing for high
levels of activity. The following are some recommendations that address the issues of image and aesthetics.
• Ensure effective maintenance if environmental design interventions are to be successful in reducing
crime.
The functioning and maintenance of streetlights and roads, as well as cleaning of the roads and care of the
landscape, all have major implications for crime prevention. Maintenance directly impacts on visibility and
access, as well as preventing places from becoming locations for criminal activity.
• Toilet blocks in parks should be clearly visible from all sides, designed as an attractive feature, well
maintained and preferably near busy areas of the open space.
The positioning of buildings in relation to the street and the choice of materials create an image that
contributes to, or detracts from, the character of the street and ultimately the character of the area. A more
friendly face projected towards the street or city square (hard open spaces) can encourage a sense of safety
for pedestrians and, therefore, promote more activity in the street, square or other public open space in front
of it. It can also create a more human scale and contribute to a specific environmental character. Together,
these aspects can then increase a sense of belonging and security in users.
• Design and manage buildings and public spaces so that they can be easily maintained and kept “grime
free”.
International research has shown that the appearance of a public place affects perceptions of safety. Areas
which are badly maintained and dirty increase the fear of crime. They may also encourage criminal activity,
because such places show no clear ownership and a disinterested management unlikely to provide
surveillance or security. The slogan “no grime, no crime” refers to the positive impact of a clean
environment.”
Source: CSIR, 2000: 6-7
Situational crime prevention is a general approach in reducing opportunities for any kind
of crime occurring in any kind of setting which contributes to social welfare where it
unifies other law-enforcement and crime-prevention strategies in an attempt to focus on
place-specific crime problems (Marzbali et al., 2011). In the South African context, the
relationship between crime and the physical environment is particularly distinct with
respect to public transport. A key spatial legacy of apartheid planning has been the
dislocation of residential areas for blacks and coloureds, relying mostly on public
transport to commute to work and “provision is often not made for pedestrian traffic in
the form of, for instance, walkways, pedestrian bridges, or adequate lighting, thus
exposing the poor in particular to situations where they are vulnerable to victimisation”
(Kruger & Landman, 2007, s.p.).
Before the start of the URP the 1998/9 National Crime Prevention Centre, in the
Department of Safety and Security’s review, identified three primary features of South
Africa's crime problem. First is youth violence (most violent crime involves young men
as both perpetrators and victims). Second is alcohol abuse and the easy availability of
guns (a large proportion of violent crime is associated with alcohol and involves guns).
Third is poverty and deprivation (young people in single-parent households were thought
to be most at risk of involvement in crime or of victimisation, these households also
experience the most severe poverty and deprivation) (Rauch, 2002). Consolidating these
three social factors in an integrated manner through a nationally prioritised programme
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such as the URP resulted in the programme being depicted as an economic, social and
psychological regeneration project realising that the main challenges for urban
regeneration lie in the 'soft' and 'social' spheres, in other words outside the context of
delivering houses, infrastructure and ‘hard spaces’ improvements to the physical
environment. However, Rauch (2002: s.p.) argues that “similarly, in respect of crime
prevention dimensions of the urban renewal programme, there is a growing realisation at
the nodes that once the police stations are built, the planned streetlights and cameras
installed and the parks upgraded, as envisaged in the 'hard' side of the crime prevention
plans, the youthfulness of urban populations, and the prevalence of alcohol abuse, violent
masculinities and broken families will still combine to generate high levels of violent
crime.”
5.4 Investment in hard infrastructure and soft social interventions in KMP
From the range of projects initiated in the KMP, node common elements of the URPs'
approaches to reducing crime include the following:
Encourage community participation and partnerships for crime reduction,
community education and mobilisation.
Provide improved services for victims of crime.
Improve the physical environment to improve safety and surveillance
Provide soft services and activities, especially for young people, to build
resilience and social capital (Rauch, 2002).
Examples of hard infrastructure are:
Khayelitsha business district and Mitchells Plain town centre
Transport: Rail extension, roads, bridges, pedestrian routes, public transport
interchanges, etc
District hospital and other clinics
Housing projects: private, CTCHC and public
Various infrastructural and facility upgrades.
Soft infrastructure is high-quality urban design and public spaces necessary to create distinctive,
attractive places which facilitate social integration and attract investment (Turok & Watson,
2002).
Examples of soft infrastructure are:
Bush clearing and beautification programmes
Community safety and environmental education programmes
Skills development courses
Youth and family centre operations (Urban-Econ, 2011).
On the CoGTA website a causal link is drawn between crime reduction over a seven-year
period (2001 to 2007) and the implementation of the URP in the KMP nodes. The
achievements in the urban nodes concerning reduction in crime, it is argued, is partly
attributed to “(i) the large-scale investment in socio-economic infrastructure such as
roads, electricity; public transport interchanges upgrades, market upgrades and settlement
upgrades, (ii) an improvement in the collaboration between the policing and justice role
players; and (iii) improved trust and working relationships between the community and
- 20 -
the police” (www.CoGTA.gov.za). Overall crime reduction during this period was,
however, not positive in Mitchells Plain and Khayelitsha, but a number of specific crime
categories showed an improvement.
In the 2006 study of QSJ Consultants and Unit for Religion and Development Research,
90% of the surveyed respondents in KMP indicated that they had not been a victim of
crime over the past year (in 2005/6), 50% and 14% had not felt safe to move around at
day-time, 94% and 44% had not felt safe to move around at nighttime and 74% and 39%
said that safety had not improved over the previous 12 months in Khayelitsha and
Mitchells Plain respectively.
5.5 Crime prevention and the URP
The general perception exists that URP officials have little or no expertise in crime
prevention, especially regarding the social types of crime prevention proposed in the
1998 White Paper on Safety and Security as the key role for local government. URP
managers had to solicit the assistance of NGOs or specialist consultants to develop their
public safety strategies. At the onset this entrenched a partnership between URP project
teams and independent experts as in the case of Khayelitsha where a Violence Prevention
through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) was established. The URP could have been a useful
avenue to build its own expertise in crime prevention in the context of the 1998 White
Paper. Rauch (2002: s.p.) claimed that the sustainability of effective crime-prevention
projects in South African cities “depends on capacity being built within city
administrations, and the urban renewal projects could provide a useful training ground for
a new generation of crime prevention practitioners.” The Cape Town URP exemplifies a
missed opportunity in this regard. Instead, from discussions with various stakeholders, it
seems as if the VPUU “grabbed the initiative and ran with it, unlike the URP unit.”
Essentially what transpired is the functioning of two entities both geared towards one
goal, but this duplication has not translated into collaboration.
The URP unit’s anti-crime thrust assists with coordination and alignment of various
relevant security agencies and forums (on institutional and community level), and this
unit is closely involved with law-enforcement volunteer programmes and visible policing.
The URP crime initiative apparently enjoys good cooperation with the safety and security
directorate of CoCT (Exec Director Mr Richard Bosman). This line department is the
main point of contact between the URP and the CoCT directorates. The (draft) Integrated
Safety Plan is meant to reinforce the work of SAPS and Metro Police, and it must still be
approved by the URP and endorsed by the relevant heads of security agencies. The
proper functioning of the unit is inhibited by the very small budget on which the anticrime initiative of the URP operates.
6.
Institutional arrangements
6.1 Background
The World Bank has identified the phrase ‘institutions matter’ as one of the four key
lessons learned in the last fifty years of development experience (Skinner, 2000). How
successful has the presence of a single office been in driving the integration of services
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between all the departments and different spheres of government in accelerating renewal,
delivery, crime prevention and reduction in poverty?
The announcement of the URP came shortly after South Africa had completed a
structural reform process at the subnational level, which resulted in the creation of nine
provinces and 284 local governments, followed soon after in 2000 with the municipal
elections (DPLG, 2006). All these events had an impact on the institutional psyche at the
time of having to deal with yet another nationally imposed institutional structure. The
institutional arrangements of the URP unit evolved over three main time periods: (1) with
the national inception of the programme in 2001 the Democratic Alliance (DA) was in
power in the CoCT and there was little coordination between the CoCT and the
provincial and national government. Both were under ANC rule at the time. There was
also no commitment for URP in CoCT; (2) in late 2002 the NNP/ANC coalition was
formed to govern and the unit appointed a manager and finalised a business and
marketing plan so that the unit appeared through a political lens to have a lot of clout; and
(3) when the DA coalition came to power in 2006 the URP unit’s status was seemingly
initially institutionally orphaned and viewed with distrust by city officials. However,
once the then mayor, Helen Zille, understood what the URP was about the working
relations were eased and the unit could facilitate their projects without political animosity
or distrust.
6.2 Perceptions of the institutional positioning
After the DA acceded to power in Cape Town, they embarked on a process of
rationalisation and restructuring. Between 2006 and 2009 the URP was located in the
Service Delivery Integration (SDI) Directorate, and after another round of restructuring
was relocated under the housing directorate (since 2009). According to those interviewed
this was an unwise move as some officials feel that the housing directorate is only
concerned with housing issues and this is reflected in the agenda items for meetings. The
URP unit seems to sit uneasily within this directorate. Similar to this study’s observations,
an Urban-Econ study found that stakeholders revealed strained relationships between
some departments since this change and that there was a “need for ongoing internal
marketing of special projects to ensure buy-in and cooperation from, and coordination
with, the various departmental role players, but that re-branding for the sake of rebranding can be more damaging than good. A deliberate marketing and communications
strategy may be suitable for programmes such as the URP which aim to integrate and
coordinate different departments with diverse interests and functions” (Urban-Econ,
2011: 67). Some interviewees are of the opinion that even if they lifted their image and
profile it would be meaningless because they would still not be “a dynamic team” and
that the seriousness of the URP had been “lost early on and never got off the ground they
were intended to”. One interviewee commented that the URP “went nowhere in a hurry”.
It must be noted that these opinions are not necessarily reflective of CoCT officials as a
whole. These are merely opinions of some line managers and others interviewed.
According some interviewees, this was necessary because the unit was “all over the show
and out of control” and “needed to be contained” within a directorate. No doubt, whoever
is in political control of the city, there will always be a perception of this unit as being
politically aligned if it were to be a stand-alone unit as was the case under ANC
governance where it was stand-alone and linked only to the city manager's office (a
similar institutional arrangement has been place at all but one of the other URP nodes
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nationally). Perceptions of the institutional positioning of such a unit have to be tested
before casting it in stone.
Moreover, Urban-Econ (2011) affirms that “special initiatives can have benefits, but
there is also a risk involved in keeping an area or programme ‘special’, thus allowing
business-as-usual approaches to continue in other areas without transferral of lessons,
technologies and so forth…. How people react to the outcomes of programmes is also
key. There is always a risk involved in (politically) running away from projects and
programmes that have fallen out of favour, for example.” Other reactions include inmigration of people seeking the benefits of the programme, unrealistically raised
community expectations, and market distortions.
The main lessons learnt on where the URP should fit into the city organisational structure
are crucial for its long-term survival and its gaining the respect of other line departments.
Aligning such a unit to the office of the city manager is fatal as that creates an
expectation and perception of it being untouchable.
6.3 ‘Claiming turf’: Improve communication
The independent assessment report of the URP unit of MCA Africa (2007: 13) states that
closely related to the unit’s authoritarian approach “is the ability of unit to ‘sell their
ideas’ to line functions through engagement. An important point to note is that a sound
business plan on its own will not result in effective implementation of the URP, it is
critical that it is presented to line function departments in a way that gets them interested
and secured their trust and buy-in. This requires strong interpersonal, negotiation and
marketing skills. Examples of where this has been successfully undertaken indicate that
relationship building is a key facet of successfully implementing any URP strategy.”
However, a recurring lesson learnt by almost all the stakeholders interviewed is that
communication between the URP and line departments must improve. The fact that the
URP is located in the Directorate of Housing and with many projects being in the ambit
of other line departments probably contribute to the unsuccessful finalisation of some
projects. It is known that officials and managers within one directorate of the CoCT
hardly take ‘instructions’ from managers from another directorate. Requests and
negotiated cooperation have a better chance of acquiring buy-in and accomplishing a
successful project. Some line managers indicated a reluctance to making use of URP
funds in the future.
6.4 Stable workforce
Among the many challenges facing municipalities is to attract and retain skilled
personnel. The stability in the manager portfolio in KMP appears to be a success story. It
became evident from the interviews that stability in managing nodes led to stable
working relations (wherever applicable) between the URP, officials and councillors and it
improved communication, understanding and appreciation among them. Considering
future stability more certainty has to be ensured regarding the employment security of
officials working in the URP unit of the CoCT, since about half of the 21 officials are
employed on nonpermanent contracts. There is merit in the entreaties that the experience
and expertise of these officials must not be forfeited when the URP is rolled out into new
areas.
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6.5 Brushstroke mentality
In a KMP URP report to the national URP office in July 2002, five strategic themes
(priorities) were identified for the urban-renewal approaches in both Khayelitsha and
Mitchells Plain, despite the significant differences between the two areas. They are safety
and security, local economic development (LED), social development, physical
development, and governance. Everything needed to be done in the nodes was suddenly
elevated to URP status through a 'brushstroke'. Although this might have marketed the
URP a great deal, it has also left the backdoor open to criticism and questioning of the
actual contribution the URP is making in their own right.
In the early stages of the programme, a number of projects were implemented in KMP
under the auspices of the URP, despite the lack of well-planned urban renewal strategies
for these two nodes within the context of the national programme.
6.6 NGOs, the workhorses for the people
It is apparent from the interviews that the role played by NGOs, for example Abalimi
Bezekhaya in Khayelitsha, is hugely underestimated and undervalued by the URP. The
good work done by NGOs could have been on better aligned to and coordinated with the
URP and the relevant line departments to tap into existing skills, expertise, and successes
to avoid duplication, frustration, and competition.
6.7 Community participation structures: Disabling institutional structures?
No doubt, the findings of the 2011 national census will yield valuable information for the
planning of urban renewal strategies in URP nodes. The absence of good quality and
reliable data on socio-economic needs has hampered the URP since its inception.
Because questionnaire surveys are an expensive research procedure, engaging with socalled representative groups can be a more cost-effective way of determining the needs,
opinions and realities of the local community. However, as Urban-Econ (2011) rightly
points out, selecting structures to engage with can have a significant influence on the type
of information used in planning. There is a risk in engaging only with so-called
representative groups who can act as gatekeepers to investment, as opposed to being
enablers of investment.
For the URP to be a success, a cornerstone had to be an effective institutional
arrangement that incorporates public participation and representative consultation. Useful
insights into the IDP and community participation process and case study relevant
discussion of Williams (2008) are provided in Box 4. How has the political see-saw
impacted the URP? According to Williams (2008: 186) “community participation in
relation to IDP is largely a ceremonial exercise and not a systematic engagement of
communities that is structurally aligned to the development and service delivery
programmes of the City of Cape Town.” He further argued that especially “during the
Mayor’s Listening Campaigns in historically neglected areas, councillors and officials
failed to explain the current state of service delivery to communities or the purpose of the
IDP process, how the IDP process would evolve, the benefits the integrated development
plan offered communities and the consequences if they did not participate in the statutory
planning process.
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Box 4: Conflicts between the IDP and community participation
Williams (2008: 188 - 189) pointed out that while the “Transformation Office in Cape Town claims
responsibility and accountability for community participation, it lacks the requisite facilitation or coordination infrastructure and skills to execute this statutory task. In fact, the two public participation
practitioners are unskilled, lacking the required training and knowledge base in public and development
management methodologies to function optimally. This explains the obvious lack of communication and
co-ordination of logistics during the IDP participation sessions from 2001 till 2004. Community
participation processes, for example, were arranged at the Mayoral Office, yet not a single community
organisation or individual member of the community was actively involved in arranging meetings or
providing input as to how the IDP process should be conducted. Also, not a single community organisation
or non-governmental organisation participated in the assessment of the form of public participation, the
community needs analysis or the planning of the way forward regarding budgetary alignments. While
popular participation was supposed to be the main planning approach, the City of Cape Town simply
expected communities to support pre-designed IDP programmes without explaining to them the substantive
processes informing such programmes. For example, right from the inception of the post-apartheid
municipal government in Cape Town after December 2000, and especially during the Mayor’s Listening
Campaigns in historically neglected areas, councillors and officials failed to explain the current state of
service delivery to communities or the purpose of the IDP process, how the IDP process would evolve, the
benefits the integrated development plan offered communities and the consequences if they did not
participate in the statutory planning process. Consequently, communities attend these supposedly
participatory meetings (Mayor’s Listening Campaigns) as ill-informed or non-informed spectators. Hence,
there has been a notable decrease in attendance by communities at the public participation meetings since
2001. It could be that the decreasing number of community representatives at such IDP meetings suggests
that communities do not trust council. Such distrust could very well be related to the fact that,
institutionally, the public participation process does not seem to receive the necessary co-operation from
the City of Cape Town Financial Directorate, as it was not prepared to explain the draft IDP budget to
communities during the 2001/02 and 2002/03 budgetary periods. Also, this directorate did not change its
traditional management style to the new participatory style of budgetary planning for the budgetary periods
2001/02 and 2002/03. For example, in the case of the communities of Mitchell’s Plain and Kraaifontein,
serious questions were raised about the scrapping of rent arrears and problems pertaining to service
payments, yet these questions were not answered by the City of Cape Town Finance Department. This
means distrust arises as a result of empty promises and the fact that the priorities that are listed by
communities at the meetings are not addressed or go unnoticed by council. Indeed, very few community
expectations are met during communities’ participation in the IDP processes. Also, feedback is seldom, if
ever given to communities after workshops such as the Mayor’s Listening Campaign of June 2003. There
appears to be a great deal of disunity among the communities of the City of Cape Town, as they generally
lack an understanding of the IDP process and its interrelated dimensions and institutional processes,
rendering them profoundly vulnerable during the formal community participation meetings (scheduled by
council). Also, often council members do not lead development processes in their constituencies (the areas
they represent) and very seldom provide any feedback on development issues to resident communities.
Consequently, IDP processes frequently lack transparency, as council members too readily act as ‘gatekeepers’ by not sharing pertinent information with their particular communities, apparently for personal
political gain, such as not causing unnecessary conflict with the predesigned format, dimensions and
substance of an existing integrated development plan.”
Source: Williams, 2008: 188-189
Consequently, communities attend these supposedly participatory meetings (Mayor’s
Listening Campaigns) as ill-informed or non-informed spectators. Hence, there has been
a notable decrease in attendance by communities at the public participation meetings
since 2001” (Williams, 2008: 188). In addition, area coordinating teams (ACTs) as a
mode of engagement by the City of Cape Town to ‘foster’ community participation in
development planning at the grassroots level create in theory, an “institutional space and
opportunities where individuals, community organisations, council administrations and
elected representatives can sit and discuss issues affecting their lives, whether it be
improvement of infrastructure, housing, health, or any other service that is provided by
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local government, should be encouraged and sustained. In practice, though, ACTs are a
structural failure” (Williams, 2008: 185).
The ‘wishes’ of the community never seem to reach the director of a particular line
department. It is perhaps wishful thinking that line managers must have knowledge of all
issues raised by the community but it is likely that development proposals do not enjoy
the necessary consideration at CoCT. According to Williams (2008: 186), CoCT does not
institutionally have the necessary structural and logistical support base in place to collate,
analyse and integrate the various proposals into its planning programmes because
“community participation is not driven or facilitated by the IDP Directorate, but by the
largely dysfunctional Transformation Directorate, the nebulous Social Development
Directorate and the nominal Sub-Councils Directorate. The IDP Directorate, in terms of
the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, is supposed to ensure effective community
participation in the planning progamme of a particular municipality. Yet, in the case of
Cape Town, the specific directorate in question does not seem to have either the logistic
capacity or the human resources to comply with this statutory requirement. Consequently,
community participation in relation to IDP is largely a ceremonial exercise and not a
systematic engagement of communities that is structurally aligned to the development
and service delivery programmes of the City of Cape Town. Equally important, in Cape
Town, there are no real institutional structures to co-ordinate, evaluate and monitor
community participation in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of IDP” and
apparently the same to apply to the URP process of public participation.
At its inception, the management framework made provision for local structures (a
Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF) and a Mitchells Plain Development Forum
(MPDF)) that would have had the responsibility of developing the local vision and
strategy, directing project objectives and integration, building local partnerships and
community-based initiatives, ensuring effective community involvement, monitoring and
evaluating the progress of the programme, and reporting needs and issues to the
government sponsors. These structures were represented by Sub-Councils which have
jurisdiction in the area, civil society structures at area and local level, NGOs and local
business interests (CoCT, File T/CO-18/2/1/5/1, URP Khayelitsha office).
In this regard, the Khayelitsha experience proved to be highly successful with a strong
community involvement through the KDF. The same cannot be said for the MPDF. The
political cohesion in Khayelitsha (a strong-base for a single political party support, the
ANC) as opposed to Mitchells Plain’s fragmented and highly contested political terrain
(ANC, NNP, DA, ID) is perhaps the main reason for this level of institutional
disintegration. Whereas the focus of these structures was not to be political or for
personal gain, it appears to be the case in Mitchells Plain. In the words of one
interviewee: “personal interest of Mitchells Plain Development Forum (MPDF) members
overtook a focus on the people” and the phrase “you must feel the URP it is in your
pocket” seemed to have become the mantra for greedy members from local business and
civil society to be part of the process. Once the MPDF became defunct, numerous
attempts subsequent attempts to establish another forum failed. Effectively, the public
participation process as part of the SDF process fulfilled the role of public participation in
the Mitchells Plain area. It was during this process that communities again had an
- 26 -
opportunity to identify anchor and other projects via the consultants employed to do the
SDF.
A key lesson learnt from this is that other line departments with skills and expertise in
facilitating community participation, such as community and social development, should
have a greater role to play to setup and maintain structures of community participation
and leave the work to the URP to sustain. Another important lesson learnt here is that
when institutional conflicts at the CoCT in relation to community participation are
prevalent, it will be difficult to have any form of successful public participation at nodal
level, especially if the node is highly stratified. Whether the URP community
participation had to be facilitated through the IDP process or not is questionable (refer to
Box 4).
6.8 Benefits and pitfalls of broad based community participation
It is generally recognised that wide-ranging and intensive consultation with affected
communities is required to ensure the successful implementation of urban renewal
initiatives. Interviews with a range of stakeholders during the assessment process,
together with documented results of earlier evaluation processes indicated that, although
forming an essential component of the URP programme, the inherent dangers and pitfalls
of this process should also be recognised. Lessons learnt are elaborated below regarding
establishment, role and functions, rivalries and political agendas, and long-term
sustainability.
(i) Establishment
The experience with the establishment of the original MPDF (and the subsequent
Mitchells Plain Peoples Forum) and the KDF highlights a number of important points
regarding the process of establishment of community structures:
• The establishment of new community forums carries with it the danger of
upsetting existing power relations and networks. The 2006 MCA Africa study
also concluded that working with existing well-established structures (if
present) would present less scope for conflict, and where non-existent, it may
be preferable to adopt a cautious approach to forming new structures. A
further consideration is that it may be preferable to work with communities
and existing structures on an area-and-project basis rather than attempt to
create new ‘mega-structures’ to engage around broader processes (MCA
Africa, 2006).
•
The experience with the KDF seems to support this notion. The KDF has a
history dating from its emergence from the community in 1994 and drawing
membership from a wide range of organisations and institutions. Although not
without its fair share of challenges, it has become firmly established as the
representative body in the area. The absence of land-invasion problems in the
Khayelitsha project is generally attributed to the acceptance and legitimacy of
the KDF.
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(ii) Role and functions
The role and function of a representative community development forum should be
clearly spelt out at the outset of the process. From the various interviews it is clear that
there is consensus regarding the importance of these structures in the identification of
potential projects. Well-organised community structures can also play an important
supportive role in the lobbying for funding for projects.
As a point of caution, it should be noted that the 2006 evaluation of the URP found that
certain members of the MPDF had the impression that the community would run urban
renewal. It was also reported that certain members were of the view that they could
replace the municipality and that they should prioritise, implement and project manage
projects as well as play a role in influencing the appointment of contractors (MCA
Africa, 2006: 23-24).
The issue of communication was also highlighted. Any efforts to create new
organisations (which should be thoroughly considered before the public sector initiates
such a process) or engage with existing structures should be very clear about the role of
such organisations in the urban renewal process. Greater clarity is also required on
communicating the role of ward committees and clarifying the relationship between ward
committees and other community structures to foster a positive working relationship
around the URP (MCA Africa, 2006).
(iii) Rivalries and political agendas
It is inevitable that a programme of the magnitude and duration of the URP will result in
some rivalry between various interest groups and active positioning of different political
agendas. It is claimed that certain members of the MPDF used the forum as a mechanism
for furthering their own agendas and for personal gain. The roles and responsibilities of
democratically elected municipal councillors, and those of members of community
development forums, must be clearly established to limit possible tensions and rivalries.
(iv) Long-term sustainability
In view of the longer-term nature of urban renewal programmes, the continued
participation and longer-term sustainability of community structures over the entire
duration of the programme are important points for consideration. For example, the
lessons-learnt document of the CoGTA (undated: 37) states that “sustained community
capacity building over many years is necessary to prepare the community to engage with
opportunities and the impact of a major development node.” It is reported that part of the
long-term success of the KDF resulted from the support and training provided by the
Foundation for Contemporary Research. A major contributing factor to the success of
civil society structures in Khayelitsha, including the KDF, is that the energy existing
prior to 1994 has been retained as many of the leaders have remained in Khayelitsha and
some are still active after hours in community structures such as the KDF. Despite the
problems experienced by the MPDF which led to its eventual dysfunctionality, the
capacity built during its existence and the period of the URP programme has not been lost
and a number of former delegates have become active in ward committees or as ward
councillors (MCA Africa, 2006: 23).
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6.9 Vested interest and agendas
The opinion was expressed that the business sector in the case of MPDF is seen to have
hijacked the process to some extent by positioning themselves through the identification
and privatisation of projects. Other related challenges which have been identified in the
2006 evaluation include:
•
Infighting and self-serving agendas on the part of some members and their
viewing the structure as an opportunity for individuals to position
themselves in an attempt to satisfy political aspirations.
•
Tensions between and within political parties with issues and conflicts
arising from political caucuses being extended to impact on MPDF
meetings.
On the other hand, a number of factors have been identified as contributors to the
experience of less internal and external strife in the KDF:
•
The KDF understands its role and does not see itself as an alternative to
ward committees.
•
Councillors support the KDF and it is not seen as a competing structure.
It was also reported that some organisations have expressed dissatisfaction at not being
well represented in the KDF (including SANCO, Khayelitsha Business Forum, and
NAFCQC) (MCA Africa, 2006: 24).
6.10 Capacity and capacitation of community structures
There is a widely held opinion that greater capacitation of community forum structures in
terms of resourcing could greatly enhance the successful ongoing functioning of these
structures. However, the contrary view holds that capacity-building workshops for
communities have had only limited value because the participants have not been
appropriately selected. There is consensus that capacity building and skills development
of community structures should not be viewed as a once-off event but as a continuous
process linked to specific projects and interventions.
6.11 Local presence
The establishment of local project offices is an essential element of effective and ongoing
interaction between government structures and the affected communities. This view is
also expressed in the CGTA national URP study which states that “the building and
maintenance of stakeholder networks through trust and transparency is largely contingent
upon the physical presence of a project office within the community” (CGTA, undated:
48). The opening of Red Door (enterprise development support from provincial
government) offices in Khayelitsha is particularly successful as a link to the unemployed.
Red Door had been an anchor tenant of the URP offices, however, unfortunately the Red
Door programme will cease to exist in 2011.
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6.12 Learning by doing
URP has assisted in building learning networks between the pilot cities, with councillors
and officials regularly having learning exchanges between the nodal cities to learn about
how to accelerate township renewal.
6.13 Public-private partnerships
Apart from the Khayelitsha CBD, the establishment of successful public-private
partnerships for the implementation and management of URP projects has been limited.
The interviews made it clear that numerous stakeholders believe that the Public Finance
Management Act (PFMA) requirements, despite their undoubtedly positive intentions and
impacts from a financial management and control perspective, now prohibit the
establishment of certain types of structures such as community trusts that were very
successful in the case of the Khayelitsha CBD.
The 2006 MCA evaluation report also concluded that without innovative public-private
partnerships there is a risk of limiting the benefits to the local community of such a
development beyond access to a new retail centre. It is recommended that a variety of
mechanisms be considered to ensure that the spin-offs of private investment accrue to
local communities to a greater extent (MCA Africa, 2006: 31).
6.14 Role clarification and internal coordination
Although varying opinions on the composition, overall location within the organisation,
and skills profile of the URP unit emerged during the interviews, there is widespread
recognition that the URP office has a potentially important role to play. There is a widely
held view that limited technical expertise hampers the impact of their initiatives, and that
the ability to manage complex multidimensional projects is an important prerequisite.
The important role of the URP unit concerning technical interface with politicians
regarding components of the URP programme in particular is recognised. There is
consensus that for the URP to be successfully implemented, a clear distinction and
description of the division of roles and responsibilities of politicians, provincial and
national officials, and officials of the CoCT regarding their roles and involvement in the
URP programme and projects are required.
Seen from an internal coordination perspective, the monthly nodal meetings between all
nodal managers and line department representatives proved to be a good mechanism to
achieve some coordination between the URP and other departments.
The 2006 URP evaluation also identified a number of issues worth emphasising:
• Line departments are not viewing urban renewal as their task, but rather
that of the URP unit. In turn, the URP managers view line managers as
being ‘spoilt’ because they did not have to budget for projects that would
eventually fall under their responsibility, but seemingly they never took
responsibility for the operations of a project once completed. The feeling
is that line managers are not skilled in project management and that they
need to be trained and monitored.
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•
Misinterpretation of the role of the URP unit. While the unit focusses on a
coordinating role, it is viewed in some quarters as playing an
implementing role.
6.15 Regime change: Political instability at metro level as institutional paralysis
Although the ANC is the governing party at national level, it is the formal opposition
party in the multiparty Cape Town Metropolitan Council (from 2006 to date). These
political dynamics impact profoundly on intergovernmental relations, local governance
and political interactions. Significantly, the local state cannot be separated from national
forces and economic and political processes that affect the actions of the local state and
the nature of development policies. Therefore, political actors have the power to shape
the urban environment through the alliances they make, the policies they implement and
through their linkages with national forces. There are several core elements of urban
regime theory. First, it involves an understanding of how particular regimes come into
being, that is, the historical details; second, that governing coalitions are formed around
important issues; third, an understanding of how local communities are governed; fourth,
that urban politics is linked to social and economic inequalities; and finally, it offers a
model of how governing arrangements operate (the agenda, key actors and resource
adequacy). The political tussles for control of Cape Town brought about constant
political regime changes within the Unicity administration from 2000 to 2008 (Okecha,
2010).
At the start of the programme, many politically-related problems in the CoCT
administration have hindered progress. In the first three years of the existence (2000 to
2003) of the CoCT there was three different mayors. Naturally, each new leader and
his/her executive committee had some influence on regime politics and service delivery
in Cape Town and they influenced the policy direction of the CoCT government. At the
time of the announcement of the URP, the NNP and coalition were in power and they did
not outright accept the role as local municipal political champion. The programme was
perceived as just another ANC-led ‘policy’ imposed on them in government. The
restructuring of the city administration also contributed to delays in developing a
comprehensive URP at the KMP nodes, and in late 2002 more local government energy
was being expended in developing models for management structures for urban renewal
than to planning the renewal projects themselves (Rauch, 2002).
There has been a dual approach to spatial planning under the ANC and the DA regimes.
Under the former the focus was pro-poor whereas under the DA it was market-driven.
These contradictory political ideals caused the URP engine to start, stall and stutter
according one official interviewed. In addition, the URP had to weather the Cape storms
in many respects, most notably the political transformation that first the city and then the
province experienced regarding regime change. The impact of institutional instability
within the CoCT on the success of the URP programme, especially during its early years,
is extensively documented in the 2006 evaluation report. It concluded that institutional
instability within the city during the course of the URP has impeded the possibilities for
gaining the level of stability required to achieve both greater strategy coherence and
project-based alignment internally and between spheres of government. Associated with
the instability, there has been a flux around the prioritisation of the URP. Furthermore,
the opinion has been expressed that this period of instability has resulted in a lack of
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focus on innovation and being proactive (MCA Africa, 2006: 20). It is argued that the
processes of achieving greater alignment between and within spheres around the URP
cannot be divorced from macroinstitutional processes such as city restructuring.
6.16 Government communication regarding URP
The 2006 evaluation report (MCA Africa, 2006) noted that the possibilities for aligning
initiatives often rest on clear communication. A number of points were raised in this
regard:
• Communication and thinking at the national level does not always reach
the appropriate individuals responsible for the URP within other spheres
of government.
• Communication of the URP within the CoCT is a challenge, which may in
part explain why line departments, in some instances, have been slow or
reluctant to internalise the URP.
• Whilst a number of line functions have been involved in coordinating
structures, it does not seem that relevant information always reaches the
necessary individuals within line departments. In some cases individuals
have not engaged to a significant extent with the programme and
considered how synergies between URP and departmental programmes
may be achieved.
7.
Integrated project planning and implementation
From the onset, holistic nodal development plans were required in each node to ensure
that issues of social development and economic growth are adequately catered for. The
URP required an appropriate balance between local needs and national policy imperatives
and it was reasoned that this would be best managed via a fully participative IDP process,
coupled with rigorous monitoring, evaluation and reporting (DPLG & IDT: 2004).
7.1 Need for a comprehensive strategy and business plan for integration and
alignment
A comprehensive project and business plan is generally regarded as a prerequisite for
successful implementation of multidimensional and multiyear programmes. Such a
business plan should be prepared pro-actively at the outset of the programme rather than
the apparent reactive process that characterised the URP. This can also alleviate the
problem of integration of projects funded by different spheres of government through a
multiyear project-area business plan. The URP case study report of CoGTA (undated)
also emphasised this express need for a local business plan as a key instrument for
securing intergovernment cooperation. The apparent lack of a long-term vision, clearly
defined programme objectives, and a comprehensive business plan for the URP has been
noted by a number of interviewees. Some respondents were of the opinion that the
municipal IDP process and URP programme did not mutually inform one another in
terms of overall strategies and multiyear budgeting processes.
The original 2003 URP business plan represented an important effort to provide a joint
strategy base for achieving greater alignment, but to a large degree it has not achieved the
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level of coordinated and targeted budgeting hoped for. The fact that a revised and
updated business plan has only been finalised shortly before completion of the ten-year
timespan of the URP suggests that this aspect remains one of the key shortcomings
during the lifespan of the programme. The DPLG (mid-2000s) report on lessons learnt
bemoaned the fact that crisis management is not part of project management. The report
reflects on several instances in Mitchells Plain CBD where there was not adequate
funding for electricity upgrading and this situation is indicative of a lack of timeous
planning. It is argued that “the key to timeous and comprehensive project management is
a thorough development of a business plan ahead of time, with all stages and costs
thought through prior to implementation. But project management also requires the
ongoing eye of the project champion” (DPLG, n.d: 45).
It is noteworthy that, as indicated throughout this document, there is a range of factors
influencing and hampering the achievement of improved alignment of projects and
initiatives. The preparation and existence of a detailed strategy and business plan alone
not necessarily ensures that all these challenges are adequately addressed. The MCA
2006 evaluation study also questioned whether the formulation of a comprehensive
revised URP development strategy and MTEF will in create the necessary conditions for
alignment.
7.2 Project identification and prioritisation
The DPLG (undated: 12) report on lessons learnt (mid-2000s) was decisive on the
selection of projects on the basis of real need and it stated that “effective upfront research
and consultation increases the potential of a coherent plan and implementation strategy
that can then roll out without significant changes or delays that may result from
opposition towards projects.” Ideally, within an area-based approach the focus should be
on dedicated zones within the area as opposed to projects (especially the quick-wins)
being scattered. In this way the real needs, pre-project research, community engagement
and proper structuring of an implementation plan can be achieved. According to the
CoCT URP (undated) Communications & Marketing Strategy for the Urban Renewal
Programme the selection of URP projects is based on various criteria, with particular
emphasis on the key areas listed below.
• “Partnerships: The ideal situation is for projects to be funded on a partnership
basis. Various possibilities can be explored on how these partnerships can
function, typically municipal infrastructure projects such as the installation of
bulk services.
• Community contributions: Community-based projects could also include a
contribution by the community either as revenue (i.e. through savings) or sweat
equity. This contribution must be properly measured and quantified.
• Multi-sectoral impact: Preference should be given to multi-sectoral projects, e.g.
development of a cultural village which has infrastructure, housing, economic and
social development aspects likely to be funded by different agencies and
departments. These projects have the benefit of contributing to and improving
different aspects of human life and of piloting approaches to inter-sectoral and
inter-sphere planning, budgeting and implementation.
• Representation: The projects should seek to contribute to as wide a spectrum of
the community as possible. In selecting anchor projects, consideration should be
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•
•
•
given to the range and mix of projects selected (type, location, duration,
outcome/impact, etc). Projects should therefore indicate the percentage and scope
and reflect on the number of vulnerable groups of the community that will benefit
from the project.
Sustainability: Projects must be sustainable. It must also achieve economic
development and social and environmental issues. Sustainability (meeting our
needs without compromising future generations’ ability to meet their needs)
through localised institutions will also enable sustainability of long-term projects.
Innovation: In those projects that are not multi-sectoral, innovation and ingenuity
(in design, implementation, financing, and management) must be demonstrated.
Communities must be mobilised to become active participants in the development
of their areas. Inter-governmental fiscal re-engineering should be borne in mind.
Ease of implementation: Preference should also be given to those projects where
concerns such as land release, legal matters and services (unless these are the
object of the project) have been resolved” (CoCT, undated: 9-10).
To what extent this has been achieved is outside the scope of this study and it is
recommended that a future analysis of the URP focus on this issue in more depth.
However, elaborations of the process and involvement of role players, quick-win projects,
and the focus between hard and soft projects, are presented next.
7.3 Process and involvement of role players
The involvement of community structures such as the MPDF (initially) and the KDF to
identify and prioritise projects jointly with technical officials, ensured widespread
support and buy-in during the initial stages of the programme. The approach of sectoral
identification of projects within the community development forums to ensure a
comprehensive initial project list is generally viewed as one of the early successes of the
URP programme. One of the points of critique against this approach is that it placed too
much emphasis on smaller localised projects which are viewed as less sustainable in the
longer term. The opinion has also been expressed that some of the more prominent
projects of the URP programme have been conceived and initialised prior to the existence
of the URP have subsequently been “hijacked” under the banner of the URP programme.
In these instances, projects did not emerge due to the urban renewal process itself, but
were the result of momentum generated by other processes which were emerging at the
time.
7.4 Does size matter? Quick wins versus longer-term projects
It has been argued that so-called quick-win projects while having a level of merit have
been conceived largely as a reaction to the Mayor's Listening Campaign and that these
projects have diverted the focus away from building solid foundations for the programme
and pursuing longer-term strategic initiatives. An approach of ward allocations (whereby
funding is allocated to specific wards) has also been identified as problematic as this
generally resulted in spending that is not strategic in nature (MCA Africa, 2006).
According to Graham (undated: 6) “the 12,000 contributions to the Mayor’s Listening
Campaign were politically interpreted into a list of eight priorities for the City, one of
which is the need for land and housing. How this need is to be addressed is to be
determined technocratically: the people have spoken, a plan must be devised and houses
- 34 -
must be delivered.” He further states that “This model of governance opens a space for
officials to determine the form of settlement intervention without requiring any further
community input, so long as it fulfils the political mandate. As officials perceive
participation to inherently slow down service delivery (NGO member 1, interview), this
model allows for rapid service delivery, which in turn satisfies the politicians but
succeeds in perpetuating the legacy of top-down service delivery in South Africa.” Gutas
(2005) concluded that the campaign was not an authentic and sustainable public
participatory strategy to empower the public and seemingly did not benefit the URP as it
should have.
The general experience with the URP programme revealed that community
representatives prefer quick-win short-term projects over longer-term projects with
potentially greater impacts. This inherent tension between long-term strategic goals and
short-term (often politically motivated) visible delivery has also been noted in the 2006
evaluation report which identified the risk of financial spending taking on an ad hoc
nature if not carefully managed (MCA Africa, 2006). There is an apparent contradictory
sentiment regarding quick-win projects. On the one hand, there are officials (mostly those
in the civic centre) who think these are merely to show that the URP is doing something
whereas, on the other hand, others (mostly those working in the nodes) argue that the
beautification, parks, gardens, and landscaping are important to urban renewal practices
and must not be regarded as unimportant or considered fringe projects. Not only do these
provide livelihoods to many people (job creation) but they also provide a sense of pride,
history and loyalty, and also contribute directly to CPTED. They are adamant that these
projects can help to positively change the very character of communities and life
experience in previously downtrodden areas of Cape Town. From this experience it is
evident that all relevant stakeholders involved in a project that spans different line
departments are informed about the actual value, aesthetically, psychologically,
economically, socially and politically of a particular project. It is as much community
awareness process as a process of capacitating CoCT officials.
The CoGTA (2009: 19) summarises the issue of quick-wins appropriately:
“Unfortunately the desire to create jobs and the creation of sustainable businesses are difficult to
achieve successfully within short time frames, and the attempt to create jobs as a ‘quick win’ that
could be communicated as a project success, were in many instances not sustainable. One of the
lessons is that, generally speaking, the state is best placed to provide the infrastructure and
services, such as roads, water and sanitation and electricity, which enable the market to create jobs
and economic development. Attempts by municipalities in particular to create jobs directly, or to
fund SMMEs, have not delivered a good return on investment, and jobs have not been sustained.”
Two examples that best illustrate the above assertion is the market-trading area in Kuyasa
and the Khayelitsha driving range clubhouse. In the DPLG report on lessons learnt dating
to the mid-2000s a picture caption stated “A new market trading area: waiting for
business” (Photo 1). Photo 2 taken in May 2011 shows that the market area is still
waiting for business, but it has also been severely vandalised. Photo 3 shows the
vandalised clubhouse of the uncompleted golf driving range project in 2011.
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Photo 1: Kuyasa market trading area mid 2006
(Source: DPLG, undated: 45)
Photo 2: Kuyasa market trading area, 2011
(Photo: Authors)
Photo 3: Vandalised clubhouse at the uncompleted Khayelitsha golf driving range project, 2011 (Photo:
Authors)
7.5 Hard versus soft focus for political gain
The successful turning around of the Cape Town CBD through the city improvement
district and inner city partnership during the 2000s actually became the face of urban
renewal in the city as a whole, and not the URP as one would have expected. As the city
was positioning and re-imaging itself as a major global city in the making, the IDP
process should have given more attention to the URP nodes. Instead, the gap between the
first and second economies and the duality of renewal in the city were reinforced.
According to one interviewee, social infrastructure provision in the URP nodes became
higher on the agenda of the CoCT because the economic focus was firmly in the CBD.
With national and local elections scheduled to take place within the project’s lifespan, it
is only natural to anticipate pressures to deliver on the aims of the URP. Hard
infrastructure is significantly easier to show than, say, improved quality of family
relationships. Political opportunism surfaced recently during the 2011 local government
election campaign period. With their slogan “we deliver services to all”, the DA
reportedly claimed the accolades for the URP successes in Khayelitsha. A quote from a
Sunday Times article reads:
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“Delegated by his party to lead a separate tour to demonstrate that the DA is
delivering services, Pringle [DA chairperson of the contentious Sub-Council 10
that incorporates sections of both Mitchells Plain and Khayelitsha] focused on the
infrastructural improvements that could underpin economic development and lay
a foundation for a more stable life for residents with better healthcare and
education. The DA strategy, he said, was to build partnerships between the city
and the people and to promote a sense of ownership that would encourage
communities to take charge of their own circumstances and then leverage city
revenue with outside sources. The DA claims credit for developments in
Khayelitsha, ranging from the 300-bed hospital that is about to open to the
extension of the railway line by 4.5km to Kuyasa, but Pringle stresses that most of
the large-scale delivery was co-funded by the provincial and national government,
by business or by nongovernmental organisations…The City of Cape Town
claims credit for extensive improvements to infrastructure in Khayelitsha,
including a programme to install solar water heaters, such as in Harare. The
previously crime ridden district is now the focus of an upgrade designed to fight
crime by improving living conditions” (Sunday Times, 2011: 10).
How much clout have the so-called soft or non-anchor projects been given? Rauch (2002:
s.p.) reminds us of the key lessons in a review of government-funded crime prevention
programmes in the United States:
“Communities are the central institution for crime prevention, the stage on which
all other institutions perform. Families, schools, labor markets, retail
establishments, police and corrections must all confront the consequences of
community life. Much of the success or failure of these other institutions is
affected by the community context in which they operate. Our nation's ability to
prevent serious violent crime may depend heavily on our ability to help reshape
community life, at least in our most troubled communities.”
Many of the interviewees contended that the identification of potential projects has been
dominated by a focus on infrastructure provision with direct economic benefits. The
implied need for a balanced approach between hard-core infrastructural projects and
other departments with a softer service focus has also been identified in the 2006 study as
potentially hampering the possibilities for greater coordination and alignment. The 2006
study identified two important aspects in this regard (MCA Africa, 2006):
“Investment in infrastructure resulting in development of the built environment is
strongly linked to social and economic conditions of people. For instance,
investment in well designed public buildings and active spaces can convert areas
from being prone to crime and general lack of safety to vibrant, safe and
economically active areas; and investment in engineering services can improve
communities’ level of health. The second is that issues in the urban renewal node
are clearly dominated by social and economic challenges and there needs to be a
stronger joint focus on developing people as well as places.”
7.6 Operation and maintenance
One of the most notable features of the URP programme in the Cape Town is the
apparent lack of consideration of operational and maintenance issues during the initial
stages of project conceptualisation and planning. This resulted in the underuse of high- 37 -
level facilities created through the URP programme (e.g. Swartklip multipurpose sport
complex) and the lack of maintenance at certain facilities that are beginning to emerge at
some components of the Khayelitsha CBD. It is claimed that the absence of municipal
facility management committees resulted in limited or no operational and management
capacity for newly created facilities (e.g. Swartklip multipurpose sport complex). This
aspect is of particular concern in view of the recommendations outlined in the CoGTA
URP case study report (CGTA, undated) that proposed the application of a management
partnership model to manage, maintain and operate the public environment and public
facilities in and around anchor projects.
7.7 Availability of information, and monitoring and evaluation
One of the challenges of an integrated and multisectoral programme such as the URP is
to ensure better monitoring and evaluation so that learning and achievements can be
better recognised and strategically guided to initiate a more self‐sustained and less
state‐driven approach (Küsel, 2009). Over the past ten years a range of knowledge
products has seen the light, such as:
(1) URP Knowledge Management Framework;
(2) Mainstreaming Guide to Urban Renewal;
(3) Monitoring Guide for multisector programmes like the URP; and
(4) Creating Competence for Urban Renewal training module.
Information and recordkeeping are key to successful project management and
implementation. Evidence from Lekgotla reports indicate that the URP manager
requested information from all URP managers on a range of issues for the compilation of
the Lekgotla reports, such as completed projects and total budgets; jobs created per
project; value of total costs for jobs created per project; BEE/HDI component and value
of the project; jobs created according to gender, age, disabled, permanent or temporary
status; sources of funding the project; implementation challenges of each project; and
steps taken or to be taken to overcome the challenges. A matrix-style reporting is ideal
for such data keeping, especially for tracking progress over time and space. Apparently,
no such matrix of information exists, making post-project investigations extremely
difficult to judge in terms of selected indicator outcomes. Typically a matrix would
include basic information such as: GPS coordinates of site, date of commencement, date
of completion, amount spend and break-down of funding source(s), number of jobs
created (temporary and full-time), etc.
The recurrent story resonating from the interviews is that the implementation of a project
failed due to insufficient planning and that planning fails mainly due to a lack of buy-in
by the line department and the lack of feasibility studies being conducted. In some cases
no beneficiaries are identified and in many there is no capacity in project management.
Moreover, there is no monitoring and adjustments by the URP or line department to
rectify situations. It becomes a story of the URP funds being spent but no concrete
evidence of a project, hence no value for the community or for the city. Such projects
become wasteful expenditure. This is where a monitoring process would be key to
minimising wasteful expenditure and holding those responsible for their actions or
inaction. A key aspect of integrated project planning is monitoring progress through a set
of indicators. The URP application in Cape Town had no monitoring process to track the
- 38 -
extent to which the strategic objectives or results are achieved. No indicators appeared to
have been defined for the strategic objectives overall nor for individual projects. Broadly
stated outcome indicators were however provided for the seven identified outcomes of
urban renewal. These were however not to measure the successful implementation of the
URP.
The lack of appropriate monitoring and evaluation systems became glaringly apparent
during the assessment process. This ranges from the absence of an overall rigorous
monitoring and evaluation framework aligned with the performance management system
of the city, down to the lack of documented monitoring and evaluation at project level.
This resulted in the absence of a programme-wide system to enable the monitoring of
quantitative and/or qualitative indicators as useful measures of the impact of the overall
programme. Surprisingly, a formal monitoring and evaluation framework was only
formulated in 2011 for Cape Town. The framework prescribes that “each indicator has a
performance baseline (basically the value of the indicator at the beginning of the planning
or performance period), and one or more performance targets (the expected value of the
indicator at a specific time in the future). Data on actual performance that are collected
over time are compared to targets to assess progress” (CoCT, 2011:13). This framework
identified the following important components (CoCT, 2011:13):
(i) Integrated service delivery
Integration of the delivery of services, infrastructure and other elements of the
development in a coordinated manner across the spheres of government, the private
sector and other organs of society.
(ii) Institutional arrangements and capacity
The responsibility for driving development lies in the ambit of local structures,
institutional capacity, especially at local level, is of paramount importance. Building this
capacity to fulfill the responsibility of local development is a key deliverable of the URP
(iii) Long-range planning
The objectives of the URP can only be achieved within realistic time frames. Planning for
the long term in the URP will follow a rationale of sustained progress and the gradual
spatial expansion of the programme from the centre of the most poverty-stricken areas
outward.
(iv) Championship
Championship by key stakeholders in both technical and political arenas operating at
local, provincial and national levels, is of paramount importance in achieving the
objective and outcomes of the URP.
(v) Budget alignment
The URP does not have a budget of its own. It is a programmatic mechanism initiated to
achieve synergy across existing budgets. The most important aspect of the URP in this
regard is alignment of local, provincial and national budgets with the IDP priorities. The
URP is reliant on existing intergovernmental fiscal allocation processes. The goal is
demand-driven delivery where budgets are aligned to match the priorities set out in the
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IDPs after full participation by all three spheres of government and beneficiary
communities.
Despite the duration and the extent of resources invested in the URP programme, serious
gaps remain in the basic information required for successful planning and monitoring.
Most notable of these are the absence of any detailed population figures and trends
(which in most reports and planning studies are of the 2001-census vintage), as well as
the absence of any mapping or spatial database of the URP projects. The deficiency
problem was also highlighted in the 2006 evaluation report which noted that a “lack of
centralised source of information for the multitude of planners working on individual
projects in the KBD has led to technical difficulties and delays in terms of sourcing the
correct information and has created issues in terms of proposals for the location of certain
infrastructure in the area” (MCA Africa, 2006).
In another context, inappropriate and scientifically flawed research has been used in the
decision-making process. In the Khayelitsha CBD node, the proposed Gap-housing
project was cancelled because a consultancy market-research report was not “worth the
paper it is written on” according to one senior interviewee. The consultants were also not
in a position to review the value of the report as it could not obtained from the
Khayelitsha URP office, the KDF, or the URP research and knowledge management
coordinator (who is supposed to have a record of this report). The vague arguments
offered why the ‘Breaking New Ground’ (BNG) principle to housing would be followed
in the said area are highly suspect and one must conclude that political motives for the
decision overshadowed the making of a rational decision. It is crucial that a node of
wealthier residential space grow amidst the CBD to sustain the precinct in the long term,
and to inculcate a sense of investor confidence, both private residential and private
business. The Mitchells Plain Gap-housing case studies showed the great need for this
category of homeowner and to claim through the so-called market research that there is
no market for this housing type in Khayelitsha verges on the preposterous.
7.8 Spatial and environmental planning
The spatial integration of urban renewal projects was significantly enhanced through the
preparation of a detailed spatial development framework in 2006 for the nodal areas. This
local SDF ensured that the nodal projects and initiatives are aligned with the broader
metropolitan-level initiatives such as the municipal SDF. An important lesson is that this
comprehensive SDF played a crucial role in the preparation of funding applications and
motivations for URP projects from other spheres of government and should ideally be
replicated in new URP nodes.
An important point of departure in the preparation of such a SDF is the identification of
all potentially available land resources and an evaluation of the optimal use of this land.
The comprehensive land audit of the study area proved to be key in this regard. The
process of the alienation of publicly owned land should also be fully transparent to ensure
continued community support for projects. Blanket privatisation of public space is not
ideal. The example of Watergate’s land is a case in point.
Some respondents intimated that the issue of environmental sensitivity is sometimes used
as an excuse to limit particular types of development within the nodal areas. The
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involvement of community members in the process of preparing the Environmental
Management Framework (EMF) and subsequent communication of the results could
dispel such perceptions.
It was noted that the implementation time frames of projects during the early stages of the
URP were affected by the required Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process for
acquiring the necessary environmental authorisation. The time frames required for these
processes have also initially been underestimated. The environmental management
framework prepared for the URP area with input from the relevant provincial department
was a valuable initiative to expedite the environmental authorisation process and time
frames of individual projects. At this stage there is no concrete evidence that this EMF
had any meaningful impact on excluding listed activities in the project areas or
expediting EIA processes.
7.9 Integration with city-wide spatial planning
In the draft Cape Flats District Plan: Spatial Development Plan and Environmental
Management Framework, Technical Report of the CoCT (2009) the district Spatial
Development Plan (SDP is presented as a medium-term plan (developed on a plus or
minus 10-year planning frame) that will guide spatial development processes within the
district to achieve several strategic actions. Among these are to align the plan with and
facilitate the implementation of the National Spatial Development Perspective (NSDP),
the Provincial Growth and Development Strategy (PGDS), the Provincial Spatial
Development Framework (PSDF), Cape Town’s Integrated Development Plan (IDP) and
the City SDF within the district. Although only a small section of Mitchells Plain is
included in the district plan there is no mentioning of URP.
Contradictions exist in the metropolitan SDF which advocates corridor development and
inner-city densification and the concept of nodal development of peripheral township
areas. These contradiction has had a direct impact on investor interest and confidence in
URP nodal areas, and the lack of incentives to invest there was non-existent.
7.10 Safety and security
The improvement of safety and security at nodal level was one of the primary driving
forces behind the establishment of the national urban renewal programme. The approach
of the URP in Cape Town was on treating the underlying causes through a range of social
interventions, rather than addressing the symptomatic effects only (through the provision
of hard infrastructure such as new police stations). The use of CCTV cameras in the
CBDs of both Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain proved to be very successful. There is also
consensus that the active involvement of neighbourhood watches is essential for the
sustainability of the safety and security component of the programme.
The security and protection of facilities is a major concern to many of those interviewed.
Vandalism is rife at a number of the URP project sites (see photos 2 & 3). The Swartklip
multipurpose sports complex (see section 16 for a case study) is perhaps the prime
example. It is unclear whether volunteer law enforcement programmes can be used in
such cases and whether the URP has the necessary capacity to deal with this aspect of
project implementation. The VPUU is regarded by most interviewees as a model unit of
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professionalism in what they do and that better working relations between the URP and
the VPUU should be negotiated.
It must be said though that the vast majority of project sites are well maintained, neat and
projecting an image of renewal.
7.11 Involve private sector in planning
The perception exists that in many projects the private sector should be incorporated from
the start and those projects where facilities are neglected and under-used, the private
sector should be co-opted to run them. For example, how should the golf driving range in
Khayelitsha involve the private sector to ensure sustainability? At present the clubhouse
is half built and the project seems to be going nowhere. The proposition is that publicowned facilities be integrated with private sector initiatives, either privatised or in
partnership in order to ensure vibrancy of usage, as opposed to the scarcely used public
facilities “that stand alone somewhere in the cold (only used at 20% of its capacity)”
according to one interviewee. Lobbying for support among black business will be crucial
to foster confidence – Soweto is successfully attracting black investment, why not Cape
Town’s townships?
7.12 Knowledge management is part of project planning and implementation
The URP has identified the need for knowledge management (KM) interventions as
follows:
(i) Knowledge sharing: As the URP is a groundbreaking initiative, it is important that its
lessons be shared both within the communities of Mitchells Plain and Khayelitsha and in
relation to other communities facing developmental challenges. Likewise, it is important that
government officials, NGOs and international development agencies are aware of the
programme’s objectives and experiences so that they can learn from them and make
appropriate contributions. At the inception of the URP, there was no unified strategy to
document and capture intellectual and knowledge-based assets that flow from the activities,
initiatives and projects of the URP. This has however changed since then.
(ii) Performance monitoring: To market the programme it is essential to have credible and
usable information about what has been achieved. It is important that measurement be made
of inputs (resources invested and activities undertaken), outputs (successful projects
completed) and outcomes (changes to levels of employment, crime and health). For the
programme to retain credibility and be useful to other stakeholders, it will be essential to
identify successes and failures. This will help to create an atmosphere of learning and proactiveness.
(iii) Marketing channels: The URP, as a subject of public interest, can command a vast
amount of media attention at little or no cost. It is vital, therefore, to seek the widest range of
cost-effective marketing channels, namely national radio and television (news broadcasts and
documentaries); local radio (Khayelitsha has its own radio station) which could feature daily
URP slots; development journals (published research articles help to attract foreign partners
in the development field); a website (which also provide links to the various partners);
presentations and road shows aimed at relevant and interested groups; special events and
competitions; project billboards; and a special URP newsletter (InfoWizz Information
Services & Business Data Solutions, 2006).
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In response to this need in 2006, the Information and Knowledge Management
department (IKM) at the City of Cape Town coordinated knowledge management
projects for the URP that included the compilation of a literature review and a catalogue
of documents relating to the City of Cape Town Urban Renewal Programme (URP). The
report of InfoWizz Information Services & Business Data Solutions (2006) however
charged that “it would appear that, although there are pockets of effective knowledge
management practices, the City Of Cape Town is fairly immature in terms of knowledge
management awareness and behaviour. If one were to evaluate the City Of Cape Town
URP alone, using the Gartner Knowledge Management Maturity Model, it would
probably rate a 1 on a score ranging from 0-6, i.e. 1 being defined as ‘The company
recognizes the opportunity in KM’. There are some initial applications that are locally
built and supported. There is no real organization around KM.” The report further
reported that “there is a lack of recorded documentation within the URP” and that the
most glaring gaps are the “people identified as content owners or creators, interviewed by
the project team, who did not contribute to the catalogue by the close of this project.” The
work of the URP cuts across most City Of Cape Town directorates implying there are
other City Of Cape Town departments who either work closely with the URP or should
be working closely with the URP who should have been approached. The report
recommended or pointed out the need for creating of an online database; whether
decisions to be taken on hard copy versus electronic copies; that several gaps occurred in
the catalogue; and that a marketing drive be mounted in the URP to encourage staff to use
the database and to keep contributing documents to it so that it is continuously updated,
thereby ensuring it relevance and usefulness (InfoWizz Information Services & Business
Data Solutions, 2006).
7.13 Reliable data for successful project completion
In the Cape Town Civic Centre’s foyer a banner proclaims the importance of acces to
information (Photo 4). The interviews as well as direct observation made it quite clear
that decisions were frequently made with inadequate information and unsatisfactory
backing from political champions and communities. Similarly, the Urban-Econ (2011)
study found limitations regarding data availability, particularly for some of the quick win
objectives of the URP. They recommended that future phases of the URP and/or similar
programmes ensure that when setting objectives they are matched to measurable
indicators and that data are collected to support planning, monitoring and evaluation
work. A central and accessible repository for all data and information must be at hand.
Photo 4: “Access to information”: The mantra of the CoCT (Source: Authors)
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7.14 Raising the bar for innovative projects
Over the past two decades there have been numerous attempts to experiment with
architecturally designed projects in the townships of South Africa. Although some may
have contributed to changing the sense of place of areas, they were not necessarily
innovative. The URP office has, however, seen three eminently innovative projects
emanating from within; namely, Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU),
Watergate Estate Housing, and Kuyasa Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) project
(the latter two are case studied in sections 14 & 15 respectively). Future nodal
developments should strive for innovation as opposed to replication.
7.15 An adequately staffed unit with high morale?
To successfully run an urban renewal unit, officials skilled in the broad understanding of
project management, urban renewal and community development are indispensable.
Above all, job security and adequate staffing are essential for a maintaining the high
morale of staff. The profile of the URP unit is reflected in Table 4 where it is clear from
the position levels that inordinate emphasis is placed on the coordinating roles of
positions and very little on managing projects. One interviewee stated that “the current
structure is not appropriate for the nature of work in Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain,
hence the URP director negotiated with DBSA for assistance in engineering. What is
lacking is built-environment skills as we focus on infrastructural projects. Lastly, we need
a person with communications and marketing skills to communicate and market our
projects internally and externally.” With only nine staff members being employed fulltime and a few vacancies existing, the staffing situation is hardly conducive to a
productive working environment (Table 4). One staff member commented that “staff
morale currently I can say its low because the future of URP is not certain.”
Table 4: URP staff profile
Position level
Director
Strategic integration and coordination
URP manager Mitchells Plain
URP manager Khayelitsha
Head: administration and finance
Research and knowledge management coordinator
Skills development and empowerment coordinator
Project consolidate manager
Social crime prevention coordinator
LED coordinator Mitchells Plain
LED coordinator Khayelitsha
Community development coordinator Khayelitsha
Community development coordinator Mitchells Plain
Environment and tourism coordinator Khayelitsha
Environment and tourism coordinator Mitchells Plain
Administration clerk
Secretary head office
Sectretary Wale street office
Secretary Mitchells Plain
Secretary Khayelitsha
Project support and coordination coordinator Khayelitsha
Project support and coordination Mitchells Plain
Communications and marketing coordinator
Source: CoCT, URP office
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The report on lessons learnt by the DPLG (undated: 48) asserted that “in Khayelitsha and
Mitchells Plain project managers and senior staff were extremely overworked and
stressed, given the high volume of work and few staff members to take on responsibility.
Current staff is thus overwhelmed.” It is a catch-22 situation: take on many projects and
perform to convince authorities to employ staff full-time, in the process running into
management problems, or take on fewer projects and perform better causing authorities
may argue they need not employ more staff nor formalise appointments permanently.
8.
Programme and project financing
8.1 Background
Two main aspects pertaining to project financing have stood out over the past ten years.
First, there was no substantial dedicated funding source allocated to the URP at inception,
causing initial frustration, panic and uncertainty. The funding philosophy was based on
the premise of an integrated approach that allows financial and technical resources from
all three spheres of government to be channelled to nodes for development. Second, is the
counterpoint to the first, namely that once the programme got going a basket of finance
options opened up.
The funding for nodal projects and programmes has been aligned, budgeted, re-prioritised
and linked to the IDP processes and the national budgeting and planning processes to
ensure linkages and create synergies between the budgets and outputs of the three spheres.
(http://www.thedplg.gov.za/urp/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=92&Ite
mid=28). The URP’s ability to access funding empowered it to “make their presence felt
within the fiercely contested space of provincial and local government” (DPLG, undated:
71). This ability has become the trademark of the URP in Cape Town over the past
decade and it is a strength the unit must exploit and strengthen perhaps even becoming
the core function of the unit in the next phase of URP.
Over the past ten years many funding opportunities were created through the URP (see
Box 5 for a sample of the main funding sources).
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Box 5: Overview of national funding mechanisms
GRANT TYPE
Municipal
Infrastructure
Grant (MIG)
Neighbourhood
Development
Partnership Grant
(NDPG)
Infrastructure
Grant
Equitable
allocation
share
Municipal budgets
GRANT CHARACTERISTICS AND EXAMPLES
A funding lever used to contribute towards development of the physical infrastructure. The MIG grant is
allocated to the municipalities within which these nodes are found. It combines all the existing capital
grants for municipal infrastructure into a single grant. MIG allocation is distributed to the municipality
through this formula. The MIG serves as the key mechanism through which national resources are
distributed to local governments for the specific purposes of incorporating national priorities in
municipal budgets and addressing backlogs and regional disparities in municipal infrastructure.
A core focus to stimulate and accelerate investment in poor, underserved residential neighbourhoods
such as townships by providing technical assistance and grant financing for municipal projects that have
a distinct private sector element in the project. The NDPG is driven by the notion that public investment
and funding can be used creatively to attract private and community investment to unlock the social and
economic potential within neglected townships and neighbourhoods and that this in turn will contribute
to South Africa’s macro-economic performance and improve quality of life among its citizens. “A
stronger focus on support for economic development in the nodes, resulting in early signs of an increase
in private sector support for the nodes (both in terms of investment and technical support). Through the
nodal economic profiling project, more than 25 investment opportunities were identified in the urban
nodes mainly in residential and commercial property development within the townships, and other
sectors within the broader city economy. These investment opportunities are not intended to be a
comprehensive list of opportunities in the nodes, but provide a basis for focused and targeted public and
private sector intervention to kick-start the nodal economies. Building on these early successes, the
national treasury has put in place a Neighborhood Development Partnership Grant (NDPG – aimed at
leveraging public-private partnerships in townships. The URP nodes, due to the high level of readiness
in terms of planning, project packaging and basic infrastructure, are all early recipients of this grant.”
The Infrastructure Grant to provinces supplements the funding of infrastructure programmes funded
from provincial budgets to enable provinces to address backlogs in provincial infrastructure The grant is
used to fund the construction, maintenance, upgrading and rehabilitation of new and existing
infrastructure in education, roads health and agriculture.
The Equitable Share consists of unconditional transfer made to provinces and municipalities. The
Equitable Share of revenue for local government is determined pursuant to the Division of Revenue Act,
which is modified annually to take account of the current fiscal situation. The Act determines the
vertical division of nationally raised revenue among the three spheres of government. The local
government's Equitable Share is then distributed to individual municipalities by the Department of
Provincial and Local Government based on a formula that ensures an equitable and predictable system
of transfers. The Equitable Share for local government will enable municipalities to provide basic
services to low-income households and ensure basic services are provided. It is the responsibility of
municipalities to establish appropriate targeting mechanisms for passing this subsidy to the poor. The
Department has issued guidelines to assist municipalities in targeting poor households in the provision
of basic municipal services.
The municipality within which the nodes are geographically located uses their own budgets to address
the underdevelopment and poverty in these nodes.
Donor funding
Since the inception of the programme in 2001, a growing number of donors have been investing in these
nodes for a variety of objectives. Objectives range from crime prevention programmes, community
participation and policy support programmes to strengthening local governance programmes. The
VPUU programme is the donor-funded initiative by the German Development Bank (KFW). The
initiative aims at creating safe nodes in Khayelitsha which provide a variety of social and commercial
services as well as a safe community space with recreational facilities. These safe nodes are Harare,
Kuyasa, Site C and Site B, and are to be owned and managed by the community, with the operational
budget coming from the rental of the facilities. GTZ is running the Peace and Development Projects
initiative parented with the Department of Community Safety in Khayelitsha as part of community
participation as a pilot programme.
Private
Good results of the crowding in of public investment to the nodes has triggered the private sector to
invest in these nodal environments. Khayelitsha: R378-million. Mitchells Plain: R1.3-billion (greater
because of existing sophisticated infrastructure and residential economic base compared to
Khayelitsha). Due to a lag time between infrastructure upgrades and private investment, the efficacy of
investments in Khayelitsha to attract private investment remains to be seen
Sources: adapted from:
http://www.thedplg.gov.za/urp/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=92&Itemid=28,
(2006: 12-13), and Urban-Econ (2011)
DPLG
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Financing remains one of the most complex and problematic aspects of the URP. The
RDP Fund Model was not replicated, instead the funding approach was based on the
concept of reprioritisation within existing budgets at national, provincial and local levels
(Rauch, 2002). It was expected that local authorities and line departments prioritised
allocations to the urban renewal nodes. The stakeholder interviews affirmed that
numerous problems surfaced, including different budget cycles used by national,
provincial and local governments, inadequate reprioritisation by national and provincial
departments, and a lack of discretionary programme budgets.
The URP impact assessment report by Urban-Econ (2011) usefully overviews the
funding of projects. Whereas private sector funding investment was higher in Mitchells
Plain, public sector investment was greater in Khayelitsha. The logic of this is to improve
readiness for private investor attraction, as well as uplift the general quality of life
through basic services and housing delivery. The study revealed that the total public
expenditure from various sources in 2002/3 to 2009/10 amounted to:
• Khayelitsha R1.2 billion
• Mitchells Plain R610 million.
Figure 6 compares the allocation of funds in Mitchells Plain and Khayelitsha for capital
and operating expenditures.
Figure 6: Comparative capital and operating expenditure (Source: Compiled from URP
unit, 2011)
Public sector investment was directed at the following activities:
• Soft projects - infrastructure, quick wins and secondary projects;
• Research consultancy and planning work; and
• Hard projects - capital infrastructure and buildings.
Significant impacts have resulted from this investment regarding temporary and sustained
economic impacts, as well as net increases in key quality of life indicators. However, this
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has not necessarily translated into local economic growth and proportionate increases in
key quality-of-life indicators, suggesting intervention by extraneous variables (UrbanEcon, 2011).
The proportional distribution of funds between Mitchells Plain and Khayelitsha is shown
in Figure 7. Mitchells Plain received more funding from the URP Grant fund and other
sources than Khayelitsha which received more from the NPDG, MIG and EFF.
Public funding distribution
12%
14%
NDPG
4%
MIG
8%
11%
13%
EFF
5%
4%
URP Grant fund
68%
Other
61%
0%
10%
20%
30%
Khayelitsha
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Mitchell's Plain
Figure 7: Distribution of public funds to Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain (Source:
Compiled from Urban-Econ, 2011)
8.2 Grant monitoring
South Africa’s municipal monitoring strategy aims to progressively improve the quality
and coverage of data on the inputs, processes, outputs, and impact in grant programmes;
and to report these data in a manner that is increasingly accountable to both transferring
departments and local decisionmakers (through public reporting and benchmarking
arrangements). The MFMA requires local performance reporting, such as performance of
grants, on a quarterly basis. As the local government system matures, municipalities
require the capacity to respond to a range of demands including financial management
and reporting, human resource management, implementation, procurement and
contracting, monitoring and evaluation, as well as a range of other local-level processes.
From a grant monitoring perspective, it is important to design reporting and monitoring
systems in a manner fitted to the capacity constraints in municipalities (DPLG, 2006).
8.3 Funding: A bottomless pit
At the start of the URP it was evident that projects would be provided an unprecedented
opportunity to access a range of government funds for a variety of projects. Most of this
funding did not go through the CoCT’s accounting system but was invested directly by
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national and provincial departments (in particular those of Transport and Health). The
URP has earned the reputation as a unit where line departments can quickly and relatively
easily secure funding for projects. Funding is sometimes allocated late which complicates
planning at line department level. However, alignment must be sought between the URP
funds allocation processes and the annual budget processes of line departments.
The URP not having a budget of its own has been problematic from the start. Some argue
that this privilege is viewed with envy by line departments. URP is a programmatic
mechanism instituted to achieve synergy across existing budgets at three tiers of
governance. The most important function of the URP is alignment of local, provincial
and national budgets with IDP priorities. The URP is reliant on existing
intergovernmental fiscal allocation processes. The goal is demand-driven delivery where
budgets are aligned to match the priorities set out in the IDPs after full participation by all
three levels of government and beneficiary communities (CoCT 2011:18).
8.4 Spending funds wisely or unwisely
Whether funding was spent wisely on relevant projects is open to debate. Many examples
of soft and quick-win projects have been named by interviewees as projects really
unnecessary and that the funds could have been more appropriately spent. In one case, the
URP budget was used to erect a fence and sink a borehole for an urban farming project in
Mitchells Plain. Although the project had no financial burden on the line department,
time was spent doing working on a project that seemed unsuccessful.
Then there is the issue of unspent funding. Generally considered a weakness in public
governance, unspent funds is a poor reflection on ability to manage projects. Figures
show that, with the exception of two financial years, in Mitchells Plain there has been
gross underspending in both nodes over the past ten years (Figures 8a and 8b).
Apparently, the unspent funds have been ‘stored away’ for cross-subsidising future
projects although this claim could not be verified by the finance department.
Figures 8a & 8b: Funds received and spent in Khayelitsha (a) and Mitchells Plain (b)
(Source: Compiled from URP project summary, URP office 2011)
An interesting anomaly identified at the city of Cape Town URP LED workshop in 2007
is that national funds relevant for specific LED-related projects or programmes were not
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applied for nor that efforts to use these funds failed due to shortcomings of the applicants.
This implies that:
• Those currently involved in such applications have to be better prepared or
equipped to master the application and implementation procedures.
• More local stakeholders and development agents have to get involved in the
process of tapping into potential support.
In this particular instance, the real challenge is developing or mobilising the capacity to
take advantage of available resources and not the issue of inadequate funding (CoGTA &
CoCT, 2010).
8.5 Budgeting for and funding of operational requirements: Whose funding to
sustain maintenance?
The general impression gained is that the funding of ongoing operational and
maintenance aspects of projects has received little, if any, attention in the initial project
planning and budgeting phases. This resulted in examples where facilities created through
the initial capital investment are not operated and maintained at the expected levels. It
transpires that interdepartmental meetings led by the URP have primarily dealt with
progress reporting of project implementation, with limited attention given to postconstruction management and operational aspects. In some instances, the funding or staff
required for operation and maintenance purposes of specific facilities are not planned for
nor available.
Once projects have been signed off and completed, assurance of ongoing running costs of
these structures was not secure, leaving the sustainability of these infrastructures at risk.
Cleaning, maintenance and providing security appear to be problematic areas of
sustaining projects. No line department seems to want to take responsibility for these
functions and the URP office does not have a mandate to oversee a strategy that would
align the functions of departments. Consistent operational budgets for maintenance and
soft projects will also improve the perception of consistency of government commitment,
as well as minimise unnecessary costs resulting from maintenance backlogs.
8.6 Financially justifying soft projects
It is difficult to assess the outcomes and benefits of soft projects. Capacity building of
political champions may have taken place but how successful these were are unknown.
Also the multiple projects directly linked to youth and training is unknown and can only
be assessed through case studies. Monitoring strategies for each of these soft projects
should ideally have been in place but apparently this is not the case.
8.7 Fragmented funding sources require a coordinated mechanism
One of the underlying premises of the URP programme has always been the notion of
funding contributions by all three spheres of government. This implies the use of funding
from various sources such as equitable share allocations, municipal infrastructure grants,
ring-fenced funding from specific programmes in national and provincial departments,
funding from the various line departments within municipalities, and, more recently
funding available through the national NDPG.
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Arising from the intergovernmental coordination challenges outlined above is the point
that successful coordination of budgeting and planning from various spheres of
government has only achieved marginal success. A particular matter of concern for many
interviewees is the process of internal funding allocations from line department budgets
which were viewed by some as ‘top slicing’ departmental budgets to fund URP projects.
The internal budgeting processes also need to be coordinated through various internal
mechanisms of the municipality, including its annual IDP revision process forming part
of the IDP cycle, the overall city budgeting processes, and the linkages with the
municipal performance management system. Without the overall vision of objectives and
strategies of the URP programme being embedded in all these components, it is hardly
possible to achieve coordination and alignment of budgeting processes and funding
sources. This lack of a coordinated approach to budgeting and funding processes
necessarily resulted in a characteristically ‘shotgun’ approach in the URP nodes where
resources are thrown at the nodes without the guidance of a clearly defined multi-year
strategy and budget.
It appears as that funding across spheres and sectors, and the ability to attract external
funding, have been primarily achieved through the concerted efforts of individuals at a
project level, and not necessarily from a coordinated programme-level budgeting
approach.
Some of the most notable challenges regarding the coordination of budgeting and funding
of URP projects have been in the cases of large-scale long-term projects (e.g. Khayelitsha
CBD). The scale and magnitude of resources required stretches beyond a single or even
multi-year MTEF budget period. Because funding sources were fragmented, a strong
coordination and integration role for nodal municipalities was envisaged using
intergovernmental coordination mechanisms.
8.8 False perceptions about NDPG target areas
According to National Treasury (2007), NDPG target areas included the following:
townships; new post-1994 (generally) RDP housing and low-income housing estates
which seemed to have repeated the same planning and locational patterns of the
dormitory townships and which have not had the time and/or resources to develop their
status as fully-functional neighbourhoods; areas and town centres which, although
previously demarcated homeland areas under apartheid, are populated mainly by black
people and low-income communities; and informal settlements. Furthermore, all NDPG
target areas are characterised by low levels of community facilities and commercial
investment, high unemployment, and low household incomes and poverty. A perception
exists among certain stakeholders that the URP received preferential treatment in
securing NDPG grants, hence placing the URP higher on the developmental agenda citywide.
8.9 Keeping track of spending
The study of Urban-Econ (2011: 13-14) revealed that:
“Investment data by source was made available in differing formats, and as such
differing levels of detail are available for the different funding sources. Funds that
flowed through the CoCT’s accounting system include the EFF, MIG, NDPG and
URP Equitable Share Grant funds. This data was available in detail – per
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functional area, ward (spatial) and year. For other sources – such as private
investment and other Provincial (PGWC) and National funds – investment
information is largely on a project basis. Attributing flows of funds to the
existence of URP is difficult to do, but in URP reports and documents such as the
URP Lekgotla the captured investment flows are attributed to the existence of
URP. The decision was taken by the project team to look at all flows into the two
nodes under a national programme that encourages all spheres and Departments
of government to invest in URP nodes in a purposeful and coordinated manner.”
It is evident from the 2011 review that the effectiveness of the CoCT URP department in
dealing with information flow is seriously inadequate. Institutional memory regarding
projects is seemingly engraved in the memories of selected individuals. Record keeping
of projects and budget spending is haphazard and incomplete.
8.10 Value of investing in research
The availability of funding for research is recognised by stakeholders for the value
research adds to strategic thinking, planning and effective management of the URP as a
whole. However, others have reservations about the actual follow-up of suggestions and
lessons-learnt findings of consultancy research. The feeling persists that consultancy and
other research reports are seen as end-products instead of them being viewed as starting
points for strategic planning.
8.11 Invest correctly
Infrastructure and safety are investment areas that attract private investment; while
market distortions remain a deterrent to private investors. The highest sustained economic
impact investments resulted from retail developments. There is a need to diversify and
expand this via investment in industrial and office projects. Sustained investments in
improving quality of life (services, housing, etc.) are needed to ensure ongoing traction to
reduce the gap between supply and demand of services (Urban-Econ, 2011).
The spending of URP funds on unsuccessful projects is controversial. This is not only the
perception of some officials but it (unsuccessful projects) is tacitly evident when visiting
some of the sites. The URP must ensure that its funds are not allocated and spent if the
necessary project management mandates and capacities are not established. For example,
to have a post-construction facility management plan in place, or to ensure there is
necessary buy-in from all roleplayers that facilities will be used for what it was planned
for. For example, the vendor stalls at the Kuyasa railway interchange are still vacant
(Photo 5).
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Photo 5: Vacant stalls at Kuyasa station (Photo: Authors)
8.12 Funding and investment: URP does not provide sustained jobs
Infrastructure investment results in outstanding temporary impacts while sustained
impacts are still to be fully realised. The Urban-Econ (2011) report identified a number of
lessons pertaining to funding and investment. The study verified that there is very little
consistency from year to year in funds for quick-win investments and operational needs.
Apart from hindering internal planning processes (such as the allocation of capacity
within departments), this can have detrimental effects for public perceptions and the
willingness of private, public and civic stakeholders to partner with programmes because
there is little confidence in a programme run for more than one financial year. A further
four aspects of funding and investment have been identified.
(i) Benefits for other nodal areas
According to Urban-Econ (2011) URP-sourced funds are intended to be ‘top-up’ or
‘additional’ to ‘ordinary’ or standard departmental spending in various sub-places. In
other words, departments should budget for these areas and use URP-sourced funds to
provide additional services to the URP nodes. In practice, some City of Cape Town
departments have budgeted lower initial budget amounts for URP nodes on the
assumption that URP-sourced funds will cover the work in URP nodes. This essentially
translates to URP funds being diluted across departmental budgets and effectively
boosting expenditure in other, non-URP node areas. This practice can be averted in future
through marketing and communicating the purpose of URP-sourced funds to all
departments and monitoring the budgeting processes of departments
(ii) Intervening variables
Investments and projected investment impacts have not resulted in proportional
improvements in quality of life. Intervening variables that may have influenced this
include economic leakage (i.e. high leakage of economic benefits); population
growth; leakage (e.g. those climbing the social and economic ladder relocate and take
their income and skills with them); and injections (usual in-migration from other areas as
well as HIV-positive people, the homeless and unemployed relocating to prioritised areas
in the hope of benefiting from URP). These assumptions are speculative and not
supported by findings of empirical research.
- 53 -
(iii) Unintended consequences
Unintended consequences of investments and special programmes may also have
influenced the proportionate changes of key indicators.
(iv) Doing the wrong thing at the right place
Anecdotal evidence of high operational and maintenance costs associated with cheap,
inappropriate and sub-standard infrastructure imply that more careful attention be given
to standards in both planning and implementation. In some instances the URP unit will
for example request a line department to provide a borehole for an urban agriculture
project but then the project does not take off. It is crucial that better use be made of
skilled and experienced technocrats in the planning and design, as well as implementation
phases and careful selection of contractors be implemented (Urban-Econ, 2011). Some
lessons concerning investment are listed in Box 6.
Box 6: Investment lessons learnt from URP experience
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Studies and planning work were recognised by stakeholders for the value added to strategic
direction, funding applications and so forth.
Infrastructure and safety are investment areas that attract private investment; while market
distortions remain a deterrent to private investors.
Infrastructure investment results in high temporary impacts; while sustained impacts are still to
be fully realised.
The greatest sustained economic impacts resulted from investments in retail developments.
There is a need to diversify and expand this, via investment in industrial and office projects, for
example.
Sustained quality-of-life enhancing investments (services, housing etc) are needed to ensure
ongoing traction to reduce the gap between supply and demand of services.
Consistent operational budgets for maintenance and soft projects will also improve the
perception of consistency of government commitment, as well as minimise unnecessary costs
resulting from maintenance backlogs.
Various points of leakage exist that result in full economic impacts not being retained within the
nodes. Some of these points are identified and matched with possible mitigations.
Source: Urban-Econ, 2011: 6
8.13 Funding complexities
Financing has been one of the most complex and problematic aspects of the URP. The
funding approach for the URP is based on the concept of reprioritisation within existing
budgets, at national, provincial and local levels. Local authorities and line departments
are required to prioritise allocations to the urban renewal nodes and this was more often
than not met with resentment. Problems with this approach are the different budget cycles
used by national, provincial and local governments, inadequate reprioritisation by
national and provincial departments, and a lack of discretionary programme budgets.
Despite the many and varied grants available most of the URPs experienced difficulties
in accessing these grants to fund activities at the nodes. These snags relate to the lack of
local government capacity to access and manage grants, the stringent criteria applied to
grantmaking by national government, and uncertainty about the amounts available
(Rauch, 2002).
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8.14 Private sector funding and investment
From the start the URP has aimed to involve the private sector in the renewal process.
Apart from the successes achieved in the Khayelitsha CBD (Photo 6) and Watergate
housing anchor project (Photo 7), it is unclear whether the levels of public investment in
the URP nodes have had much success as catalysts to attracting major new investments
from the private sector. One of the primary objectives of public sector funding in these
nodes has been to reduce the levels of risk for private sector investment. A valid question
raised is how far the city and public sector have to go to accommodate the private sector
which is most likely to gain the most from these investments. It remains an open question
who will be willing to invest in the perceived risky parts of the city.
Photo 6: Private investment in Khayelitsha CBD (Photo: Authors)
Photo 7: Watergate Estate housing development (Source: CoCT, URP unit)
- 55 -
The 2006 study has noted limited ability and commitment on the part of the CoCT to
effectively leverage additional finance outside the ‘normal’ funding streams, and that the
CoCT has allocated significant budgets to the nodes without exhausting all means to
leverage serious funding from other sources (MCA Africa, 2006).
On a more positive note, it is recognised that in cases where external funding has indeed
been secured, it presented the opportunity for line departments to focus investment in
other areas which may not have been the case under normal circumstances.
9.
Intergovernmental relations
“….overall effective integration and coordination has not been uniformly
achieved, with strong and robust co-ordination evident in some areas, while coordination and integration are non-existent in others” (CoGTA, 2009: 13).
9.1 Background
In early 2000 the City of Cape Town was recovering from the failed Wetton-Lansdowne
Corridor Project which attempted to integrate planning and implementation in this part of
the city. The project benefited from official backing by the national Department of
Transport but lacked wider support from central or provincial government, and “once the
Transport Department’s funds tailed off, the local authority’s commitment also waned. It
has come to be seen as the property of the planning department rather than a corporate
effort, progress has slowed, several staff have left and it currently lacks the resources and
political support to achieve its intended effects” (Turok & Watson, 2002: 136). City
managers should have learnt much about managing intergovernmental relations from this
incident.
Coordination and integration of the activities of the three spheres of government is a
major challenge for the URP. In 2001, the then Minister of Provincial and Local
Government announced that his department would establish a special unit to coordinate
implementation of both the ISRDS and the URS. An urban renewal unit was
subsequently established in the governance and development branch of the then
Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG), staffed by three professionals
and one advisor. An Urban Renewal Forum (URF) was established in 2001, comprising
representatives of all the nodes, municipalities, provincial and national departments
relevant to the URP. The forum members meet approximately monthly where the
managers share their experiences gained from other nodes.
Institutional arrangements are complex and differ among the many institutional types,
namely intra- and intergovernmental partnerships; local government-led multidisciplinary
coordination often through corporatised government units; public housing authorities;
private housing developers; housing associations and cooperative housing institutions;
community banking institutions; and community-based organisations. Based on the
international experience in both developed and developing countries, Table 5 identifies
three building blocks of an intergovernmental monitoring system and key institutional
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quality factors that should be considered when elaborating monitoring objectives and
systems.
Table 5: Building blocks of an intergovernmental monitoring system
Salient Design Features
Institutional Quality Factors
* Predictability, adequacy, and simplicity of fiscal flows
Intergovernmental transfer
* Balance between conditional and unconditional transfers
system
* Coordination between national departments
* Coverage, reliability, quality, timeliness, and accuracy of
Data carrying capacity of
financial, input, process, and output data
system
* Safeguards against non-compliance
* Clarity of roles and responsibilities in line with mandates
Vertical and local
* Commitment to public reporting at the local level
accountability
* Feedback to and learning by transferring departments,
provinces, and local governments
Source: Girishankar, DeGroot & Pillay (2006:7)
The report A Nodal Approach to Development (2009) found that there is a mixture of
intergovernmental coordination and integration among the URP nodes (Box 7). The study
concluded that “overall effective integration and coordination has not been uniformly
achieved, with strong and robust coordination evident in some areas, while coordination
and integration are non-existent in others” (CoGTA, 2009: 13). The findings by the above
study closely resemble those of the Cape Town experience.
Box 7: Intergovernmental cooperation experiences at national URP nodes
“For the most part nodal municipalities have been able to develop good working relationships with particular sector
departments, most often the provincial departments of local government and at a national level with dplg, the national
department mandated to lead the programme, and the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF). Departments
in the social sector, notably health, welfare and social development, particularly at provincial level, have on the whole
not developed an integrated way of working with municipalities in order to tackle the challenges identified by the URP
and the ISRDP. Given that many of the challenges facing nodes and nodal municipalities pertain to the social fabric of
local areas, it is noticeable that stronger relationships have not been developed with the provincial departments of
education, social welfare and health. Similarly, relations with the South African Police Services as a core development
partner in combating crime, have not been a focus for IGR co-ordination and integration. From a national government
perspective, the co-ordinating mechanism has been through an Interdepartmental Task Team of the Social Sector
Cluster, which is chaired by dplg and which meets quarterly. However, as the January 2009 Cabinet report states,
departments like Trade and Industry, Public Works, Science and Technology, Sports and Recreation, Public Enterprise,
and Housing are not represented and ‘hence they do not participate in activities aimed at co-ordinating the
implementation of the programme’. The report also said that participation of some departments, such as Minerals and
Energy and Education, were inconsistent.”
Source: CoGTa (2009: 12)
The key hypothesis underlying the nodal description of Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain
nodes is that attempts to improve intergovernmental relations (IGR) “were abundant in
the history of nodal delivery. If delivery has to improve in terms of entrenching local
ownership, the traditional mode of governance based on IGR needs to be balanced with
greater focus on creating massive opportunities for community contracting and
community empowerment (shareholding) and maintaining the physical assets built in the
nodal areas”, and on the other hand, the nodal description explores “indications where the
programme is becoming owned by the host municipalities, i.e. what are the obvious signs
that some of the principles for improving the managerial and operational efficiencies are
- 57 -
taking place in order to enable scale delivery” (CoGTA, 2009: 25). Table 6 details the
current status and future intergovernmental relations relating to the Khayelitsha and
Mitchells Plain urban renewal programme.
Table 6: Intergovernmental relations concerning KMP urban renewal programme
MAINSTREAMING
CRITERIA
Is there a
vision for the
future
CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE
Tools and
Is the
Will the
models created programme
programme
locally owned? deliver on the
URP outcomes
by 2011?
No clear
KMURP
KMURP has
evidence of
community is
strong potential
model or
very articulate,
to deepen
agenda-setting
hence they
community
tool developed
influence
ownership by
decision
2011. Urban
making quite
renewal as a
substantively.
function is also
more integrated
within CoCT.
WHAT
SHOULD BE
EXPLORED
BEYOND 2011
Develop a
system for local
area budgeting
as a way of
completing the
scope of
KMURP
mainstreaming
in IDP & SDF
and introduce it
in other
envisaged
township
renewal
initiatives across
CoCT.
Explore how
Khayelitsha
Development
Forum and
Community
Trust can
become
incubators of
community
enterprise for
public space
maintenance and
local
development in
the node.
AGENDA-SETTING
(Reflection of the
nodal programme in
key policy statements,
IDP and SDF,
executive reports,
reflection of nodal
budget allocations in
policy statements State of the City
address, etc.)
KMURP
(Khayelitsha
Mitchells Plain
URP) enjoys
mayoral
support, but it
remains unclear
what the
programme has
triggered for
CoCT as a
whole in terms
of development
visioning for
poverty areas.
SYSTEMS (Planning,
budgeting,
procurement, Spatial
Development
Frameworks)
KMP is fully
aligned with
IDP and SDF,
but challenges
still persist with
regard to its
influence on
internal
budgeting
processes.
KMURP has
strong evidence
of local spatial
development
framework used
as a means of
attracting
public-private
investment
The high level
of selforganization in
the KMURP
community
affords them to
influence
planning
decisions as a
basis for longterm ownership.
Integration with
IDP and SDF is
achieved but no
significant
changes are
expected with
regard to
budgeting for
local areas.
COORDINATION
STRUCTURES
(organogram,
implementation
structures - agency
based, unit based,
BPO) AND SKILLS
DEPLOYMENT
KMP URP unit
is well
embedded in
the Metro
organisation
(directorate
status), but the
future mode of
coordination
remains
unclear.
Replication is
envisaged in
other
townships, but
the underlying
model of
coordination
and skills
deployment
remains
unclear.
The
Khayelitsha
Development
Forum and the
Khayelitsha
Community
Trust represent
a solid basis for
long-term
community
ownership.
A robust
horizontal
coordination
exists within the
municipality.
However, there
is room for
improvement in
vertical
coordination.
Ensure that
KMURP and
VPUU are
jointly
championed
politically and
administratively
by CoCT
authority.
Table continues on page 59
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GOVERNANCE
(Horizontal and
vertical coordination,
institutional
arrangements
(compacts, MOUs),
community
mobilisation,
community
contracting and
community
shareholding)
It is not yet
clear whether
the main trust to
be followed in
future will be
communitydriven ABM or
state-managed
township
renewal.
Multistakeholder
forums are the
main platform
to balance the
interests of
various
stakeholders
(solid records in
public-private
partnerships).
There is strong
evidence that
the
community’s
interests are
well articulated
and captured as
a basis for
greater
ownership.
KMURP has
promising
governance
structures in
place which
represent a key
asset to
consolidate
solid delivery
achieved thus
far.
THE KEY
INDICATORS FOR
RATING KMURP
MAINSTREAMING
AS SUCCESSFUL
BY 2011
Evidence that
the CoCT’s
District
Services Model
and the Subcouncil mode of
governance are
integrated with
township
renewal
interventions.
Evidence of
greater
integration of
VPUU
experience with
KMURP
experience in
future
interventions
Greater
evidence of
KMURP
community
undertaking
own
development
initiatives and
engaging CoCT
for additional
support
An increased
number of
investment
commitments
are being
implemented in
line with the
KMURP spatial
development
framework.
Balance the
strong PPP
record with
more community
ownership, e.g.
via a massive
supplier
development
initiative for
communitybased
maintenance of
public space and
facilities built in
the node.
Greater evidence
that Khayelitsha
and Mitchells
Plain are
becoming safer
places to live,
work and invest.
Source: CoGTA (2009: 32-33)
9.2 Commonly experienced institutional problems
Forster et al. (2006) identified four commonly experienced institutional problems, all of
which have been echoed by the interviewees in this study.
(i) Role confusion/contestation over who does what between the URP units and
mainstream line/functional departments. A set of four specific management roles possible
in nodal management recommends (1) strategic and programme planning for the node;
(2) identification, mobilisation and institutionalisation of implementation partnerships
and capacities; (3) strengthening the enabling environment for development action in the
URP node; and (4) establishing and operating the nodal programme and project
management systems.
(ii) Inadequate or overambitious programme targeting and expectations. As a result of
initial policy ambiguities and communication gaps and initial lack of clarity on funding
availability Forster et al (2006) outlines an approach and methodology to select and
pursue a narrow band of outcomes and objectives, develop focussed strategic plans and
introduce methods for testing the feasibility of strategies within the context of resource
and time and limitations. The differentiation between plans for mobilising
resources/acquiring funding (shopping lists) and plans for managing implementation is
made.
(iii) Problems of system integration between nodal and municipal/provincial systems.
Because the URP management instruments (plans, monitoring and reporting systems)
have not been able to integrate fully with the mainstream instruments of municipal
management, municipalities typically adopt a functional management system (hence
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sector plans, divisionalising of IDPs, and KPIs). URP nodal implementation hinges, in
the absence of significant dedicated funds, on the resources allocated through the
line/functional systems. This generates an ongoing systemic challenge to connect area
planning to functional/line planning and budgeting processes.
(iv) Insufficient capacity mobilisation. How the URP Operational Guide assisted nodal
practitioners in addressing the inadequate capacity mobilisation problem is unclear.
Specific guidelines on mobilising and structuring multiagency partnerships at the project
level, as well as on the procurement of high-level private sector services into urban
renewal management processes are provided. An assessment of URP practitioners every
five years would go a long way in evaluating the successful management of the process.
9.3 Coordination between various spheres of government
Apart from the internal coordination between line departments within the City of Cape
Town as described above in the section on integrated project planning and
implementation, a number of prominent challenges relating to coordination among
various spheres of government relating to the URP programme have been identified.
These include:
• The absence of a comprehensive multiyear business plan for most of the
duration of the URP programme which compromised the ability to achieve
coordination between the activities of the various spheres of government
concerning timing, budgeting and location of individual interventions.
•
Prior to the preparation of a detailed spatial development framework for the
URP nodes, there was a lack of spatial focus and coordination between
initiatives of national, provincial and local government. The preparation of a
detailed spatial development framework for the URP node has successfully
addressed this challenge.
•
During the earlier years of the URP programme, there may have been a
perception in some quarters that national government imposed their
development agendas on local government regarding the selection with
limited consultation of specific nodes.
9.4 Structure and procedures for alignment
A number of factors have been identified as potential contributors to the success (or lack
thereof) of intergovernmental structures in achieving alignment of planning and resource
allocation for the URP programme. In some circles it has been noted that there is an
absence of the necessary level of senior personnel from national and provincial
departments at meetings of the various coordinating structures. This contributed to
problems in executing decisions taken at those meetings. The opinion has been expressed
that the depth and intensity of engagement at the coordinating meetings is insufficient to
ensure improved coordination and alignment. It has also been submitted that the audience
has not always been wide or appropriate enough (MCA Africa, 2006).
Notwithstanding these challenges, it has been acknowledged that the formation of a
number of intergovernmental structures has had significant positive impacts on the URP
programme. These include the Multistakeholder Forum (MSF) and Nodal Steering
- 60 -
Committee which had been initiated and established well before the promulgation of the
Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (IGRFA).
The bi-monthly national nodal coordinator meetings have been singled out as providing a
good platform for sharing of experiences among the representative officials of different
cities. The deployment of dedicated officials from national departments such as DEAT to
assist officials at municipal level with the preparation of business plans is consoidered a
very successful initiative.
9.5 Connecting social and physical renewal?
The denominational segregation of public institutions and organisations hinders the link
between social aspects and physical renewal and regeneration (Hulsbergen & Stouten,
2001). The solutions to social problems relating to quality of life are separated from
investments for the physical quality of the URP areas. Who is to take ‘ownership’ of the
social component (e.g. capacity building, sport training, HIV support, health awareness,
etc.) in a coherent manner, is unknown. The URP unit merely facilitates the projects
(social and physical), but the responsibility of the social component is left to line and
government departments where there is no full understanding of the overall integrating
role the URP is meant to perform.
The interviews made it clear that integrated planning properly applied intergovernmentally, is lacking. The modification of the physical space of nodal areas is (for
example state-of-the-art buildings and facilities - Photos 7 to 9), in practice, more easily
considered as successful than the accomplishment of other social goals. The social costs
of the renewal projects are usually seen as a troublesome and imprecise budget item, to
be handled by welfare institutions (Hulsbergen & Stouten, 2001). According to
interviewees, insofar as hard infrastructure development is concerned, such as roads and
railways where there are shared responsibilities between national, provincial and local
government, a strong coordination existed. However, at local-government level
“cooperation fell short”.
Photo 7: Khayelitsha CBD
swimming pool (Photo: Authors)
Photo 8: Synthetic mini-soccer field
(Photo: Authors)
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Photos 9: Lookout Hill (Photo: Authors)
9.6 Benefits of dealing with local government
Concerning intergovernmental cooperation, URP nodes are the sites where many national
and provincial sector governments first experienced what it means to support and be
actively involved with local government. Fortunately, they use those experiences gained
in the nodes to improve the way in which they support local government in general. The
first collaboration between related sector departments to cluster their investments for
improved access by communities was the magistrate’s court in Khayelitsha.
9.7 Intergovernmental cooperation the platform for private enticement
Clustered public investment into multi-use nodes (public services, recreation, transport
interchange, retail) has succeeded in building a solid platform to attract private sector
investment nationally in the URP nodes. Coordinating the presence of a range of
government departments and state infrastructure (magistrate’s courts) laid the platform
for the first significant private sector investment in large townships after apartheid. These
nodes were successfully developed through the building of networks and closer working
relationships between the three spheres of government. The NDPG of National Treasury
assisted
greatly
to
accelerate
the
pace
of
development
(http://www.thedplg.gov.za/urp/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&hidemainmenu=1&id=127).
- 62 -
9.8 Capacity building through partnerships and intergovernmental cooperation
The development of local institutional capacity based on strengthening local institutions
and creating partnerships between local government, public entities, NGOs and the
private sector appears to have been a major capacity-building exercise. Where the
capacity built via partnerships was done correctly (as has been the case in the two nodal
CBD developments, as well as the various housing developments in Mitchells Plain) it
appears that planning, prioritising, packaging and managing the delivery of projects and
initiatives is possible in the defined areas.
Working together and in close cooperation is an underlying principle of the URP. In
some areas there is a good progress. National and provincial inputs are standing items on
the agenda of URP Multi-Stakeholder meetings. Institutional structures, such as the
National URP Forum, Multi-Stakeholders’ bi-monthly meetings and monthly Nodal
Project Management meetings are functioning well. Regrettably, the inter-governmental
relations (IGR) URP working group is not working well.
9.9 The us and them syndrome
Some officials acknowledged that there may be a perception in line departments of the
CoCT that the URP is an ANC-inclined initiative because the URP budget originates
from the national government. Such political issues sometimes complicate delivery and
roll-out of the programme.
9.10 IDPs as integrative tool?
Municipalities are by law (Local Government Municipal Systems Act, 2001) compelled
to compile an Integrated Development Plan (IDP) annually. The act further states that no
other sphere of government has to participate in or abide by the municipality’s IDP. IDPs
are supposed to interface with the provincial growth and development plans and the
NSDP. Notwithstanding that the participation of other governmental spheres is voluntary
in the IDP process, the act “obliges a municipality, in section 24(1), to align its planning
with and complement, the plans and strategies of other affected municipalities and other
organs of state’, there is no similar obligation on other spheres of government, obliging
them to align their planning with that of municipalities” (CoGTA, 2009: 14).
Interviewees at provincial level confirmed that the CoCT does involve them in the IDP
process but involvement is limited to their providing comments on the IDP as part of an
assessment-and-review team. Their input opportunities are similar to those of the general
public. They also noted that the IDP is essentially a ringfencing of local autonomy and
“they do not listen to what we advise them on”. They contended that should the process
of intergovernmental cooperation be entrenched, the IDP would become a very reliable
tool for enhancing intergovernemtal relations.
9.11 Stemming the mainstreaming tide
In the mainstreaming conceptual basis lies the notion that the magnitude and pace of
township transformation is viewed as a significant challenge and opportunity for the
country. It is acknowledged that this challenge and opportunity “compels local
governments to improve their capacity for scale delivery within and outside the URP
piloting areas. The magnitude of the challenge dictates that such capacity must go beyond
the in-government dimension of IGR to include stronger partnerships with business and
civil society” (CoGTA, 2009: 6). The Mainstreaming Guide to Urban Renewal, CoGTA
- 63 -
(2009: 6) defines mainstreaming as “The total pattern of behavioural trends and
associated institutional reforms testifying that the principles of URP [area and
community-based integration] are becoming a general practice within the organization”
where mainstreaming “embodies all endeavours and reform processes that seek to (i)
elevate township transformation in the policy agenda, (ii) create pathways for wider
community ownership of township renewal measures (iii) convert emerging lessons and
proven practice from their experimental or insular status into conventional ways of doing
things, in order to improve capacity for paced and scale delivery.”
Elaborating on mainstreaming, CoGTA (2009: 13-14) argue that:
“In retrospect, mainstreaming in the nodal municipalities has been highly
dependent on the attitude of each host municipality towards its nodal programme.
Mainstreaming has only received a more structured attention in cases where the
URP was seen as an opportunity for change and thus, ownership of the
programme was taken like in INK and Alexandra. The latter are clear illustrations
that their host provinces and municipalities have used the nodal programmes to
practice mainstreaming by design, i.e. to chart a decisive course on how to
integrate townships with the mainstream urban fabric. Indeed there is lots of
evidence suggesting that the latter have imagined their own way and thus do no
longer have to rely on the national level to determine their future. The remaining
nodes (MURPs, GURP, KMURP) are illustrations of a mix between little
ownership by the host municipalities and over-reliance on national to help
determine their future. The latter interpretation is a matter of concern as it
indicates that the URP is still being seen as the programme of national
government, which is less an opportunity than a burden placed on them by
national government. The behaviours of these municipalities suggest that the
nodal programmes are being tolerated until the end of piloting. They are also
trapped in the belief and expectation that national government is the one to think
about the future of the node. Yet some of them have brought about a few
innovations that remained occasional and insular because their leadership did not
elevate these initiatives to inform the strategic direction of the municipality
towards acknowledging the value of localized planning and budgeting for urban
integration (mainstreaming by default). Accordingly, this latter category is the one
that needs greater guidance and support from national government.”
10. URP as an area-based (ABA) approach for
crowding in
“One of the dangers involved in creating separate local organisations responsible for delivering specific
policies [such as an URP unit] is the potential for neglect of the need to connect with and reform
mainstream programmes. Special initiatives have a habit of acquiring and maintaining an independent
existence without much bearing upon the core policies of local and national government, or indeed wider
economic and social developments. Without effective arrangements to ensure local accountability and
participation, they may also become somewhat detached from their residential communities” (Turok, 2004:
6).
- 64 -
10.1 Background
An area-based approach (ABA) to urban renewal and regeneration became a very popular
policy option internationally during the 1990s, although its origin in the UK dates to the
1970s. Surprisingly, the concept ABA has nowhere been defined in the early years of the
URP. Turok’s (2004: 1-2) definition provides a useful understanding of the approach:
“measures explicitly designed on an area basis, rather than national or provincial
sectoral policies on issues such as health and crime, or universal welfare
programmes targeted at individuals in particular circumstances, such as people on
low incomes, pensioners or children. Area-based planning (ABP) is intended to
change the nature of a geographical area and in the process to involve the
residential community and other interest groups with a stake in its future.
Depending on the character of local problems and opportunities available, it
typically embraces a range of social, economic and physical development
objectives cutting across the functional responsibilities of government in fields
such as education, housing, transport and economic development. ABP can take
different institutional forms, ranging from large partnership structures involving
diverse stakeholders to special-purpose agencies with narrow responsibilities and
short time frames.”
Turok argues that in highly economically polarised societies, such as South Africa, area
effects will be significant and therefore an ABA to renewal should be supported in this
context. According to him place affects economic and social processes and by targeting
an area as a whole by means of strategic environmental and infrastructural improvements
and enhanced security (all these were characteristics of the Cape Town URP) “a strong
signal can be given of public sector commitment to renewal and revitalisation” (Turok,
2004: 3). In doing so area-wide action, if applied correctly, may counter negative
perceptions of decision makers and help turn the misfortunes of an area around. Creating
a new sense of place is thus key to successful ABA renewal (Photo 10).
Photo 10: Beautification contributes to creation of a new sense of place (Source: Authors)
- 65 -
Area-based approaches differ from site-specific redevelopment regarding objectives,
methods and evaluative criteria as set out in Table 7:
Table 7: Comparison of site-specific and area-based approaches to development
Objectives, methods and evaluative criteria for site-specific and area-based approaches to development
Objectives
Site-specific approach
Area-based approach
Environmental
Reduced human health risks,
Better regional environmental
liabilities
considerations
Economic
Tax base increase; job creation onImproved area-wide attractiveness to
site
capital
Community
Removal of eyesores and
Reduced community disamenities
abandonment; possibly local- and
and specific economic improvements
home-ownership
Actual
consultation
on
local Minimal; as required by law with
Potentially extensive; (although
community objectives
respect to community notice and
development agency may listen but
consultation
not act on local concerns)
Methods
Lead actor
Private developers
Public agencies and quasi-public
authorities
Public site assembly, preparation
Minimum necessary
Potentially extensive – to achieve
area change
Public support mechanism
Direct subsidies, site rezoning
Complementary investments,
planning changes
Evaluation criteria
Time horizon
Short – completion of onsite
Long-allowing time for expected
development
spillover effect
Policy efficiency
Sales for cleanup and reuse
New capital flows into area; increase
generated, impact on site values and
in area economic activity, incomes
tax revenues
and property values
Public efficiency
Minimum public sector expenditure
Maximum leverage on public funds
Public effectiveness
Rate at which private landowners
Increase in area’s economic activity,
market sites for reuse successfully
household incomes; reduction in area
disamenities
Source: Meyer (1998)
As a laboratory for innovative ideas and flexibility, ABA is seen as an experimental
policy, trying out new things and providing alternative policy ideas. Being seen as pilots
provides ABAs the flexibility of being risky and if successful being rolled out more
widely, but according to international experiences this is rare. The lack of “formal
mechanisms for generalising local successes or incorporating the lessons into the main
functional departments of local and national government” (Turok, 2004: 5) is mainly to
be blamed for inaction. International evidence of mainstreaming ABA from pilot status to
rolling out in wider areas is mixed.
The ultimate success of an ABA lies in the establishment of an intermediary organisation
similar to the URP nodal units with a flexible package of resources. Turok (2004: 5)
commends ABA thus:
“If this arrangement is structured carefully, with an appropriate balance of incentives
and controls, it may give the local organisation [e.g. URP unit] the scope and
wherewithal to be highly innovative in its approach to problem solving and energetic
in the pursuit of opportunities for growth and development. It may become a valuable
catalyst for change by providing the technical expertise and negotiating skills to
influence wider public and private investment decisions. It can represent and
advocate local interests in wider arenas, raise the area’s profile and generally act as a
‘champion’ for the locality.”
- 66 -
ABA is said to be only “really appropriate when deprivation and disadvantage can be
addressed, in part, within the boundaries of a target area” (Smith, 1999: 36). It was
crucial for an ABA to balance social and physical renewal. Research in Europe has
shown that though urban renewal policies have been distinctly successful regarding
improving and modernising the physical structure and environment, social and economic
problems (unemployment, difficult living circumstances, changing social standards, etc.)
persisted. The European study bemoaned the fact that the “experiences of 20 years of
urban renewal show the need of connecting the physical-technical aspects to juridical,
management and social aspects. It seems also necessary to connect lower- and higherscale levels and different sector policies…and that the present problem definition of
urban renewal is too limited, as it does not pay attention to the connection of the physical,
spatial and social aspects in order to tackle the complex problem” (Hulsbergen &
Stouten, 2001: 325). Three main themes from the international literature on ABA pertain
to the role of the community in the process, partnership and interagency cooperation, and
the question of complexity - i.e. a more diverse approach and comprehensive approach
dealing with a “commensurately complex interplay of social, economic, and
environmental problems” (Lawless, 2004: 384).
Why was it decided to run the URP along an ABA? According to Forster et al (2006)
there were typically four rationales for implementing URP in an ABA. First, to ‘crowd
in’, prioritise and integrate investment and effort in the area to solve a priority problem or
capitalise on a special opportunity. Second, to mobilise partnerships with locally
orientated partners, i.e. to use territory as a mobilising force. Third, to deepen the
participation of groups of an area in the democratic life of the city. Last, to develop or
test new approaches in a ‘hot house’ for subsequent broad-scale application. While it is
possible to pursue all simultaneously, trade-offs in terms of time, capacity and impact are
inevitably implied. The URP seeks to achieve all four of these base objectives. The URP
is founded on the principle concept of nodal development in specified municipalities.
Two principal structuring mechanisms are used to drive the programme: spatial focus,
and targeting of funding and resource allocation from the three spheres of government
and strategic partners in response to indicators of both poverty and economic opportunity.
Sharing a local development perspective and strategy, as well as creating legitimacy for
development choices through participation and ownership, can be considered the core of
the area‐based development approach and principle to establish sustainable human
settlements (Küsel 2009).
10.2 Lessons learnt for and against ABA
Regarding coordination and integration, an ABA can give sectoral policies a valuable
strategic and spatial context, but the challenge to get different line departments to think
spatially and about poverty is an “uphill struggle” (Turok, 2004: 8). This is clearly
evident from the CoCT case. This study contends that the CoCT failed the UPR as there
was pessimism, lack of innovation, and definite resistance from within against the URPs
complexity. It is vividly clear from the interviews that line departments were not open to
new ideas and this inability to adapt to new things sunk the URP at its inception.
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The perception cannot be dismissed that an ABA was decided on to create political
visibility, more so in the biggest and most populous coloured residential area in South
Africa where the ANC has struggled to win the majority vote.
The above exposition covers a number of the arguments for and against an ABA. A range
of lessons from international experience of ABA are detailed in Table 8, all of which are
relevant to the Cape Town case.
Table 8: Arguments and lessons learnt for and against ABA
Lessons learnt for ABA
There are identifiable geographical areas that suffer
disproportionately from problems. This places
mainstream programmes under pressure so that they
operate less effectively than in other, more affluent areas
and something ‘extra’ is therefore needed.
Problems overlap in geographical areas and they are often
made worse when they all co-exist together; the sheer
scale of the difficulties means that extra action is needed.
An increased polarisation between deprived and more
affluent areas means it is important for social and political
reasons to be seen to be doing something extra for people
living in deprived areas.
Because problems are concentrated, a greater number of
deprived people are captured if resources are
geographically targeted than if they are spread more
evenly.
Focussing activity on small areas within tight boundaries
can, potentially, make more of an impact than if resources
are dissipated.
Unlike national mainstream programmes, area-targeted
programmes are often characterised by a ‘bottom-up’
approach which is underpinned by partnership working.
This can result in more effective identification of
problems and delivery of solutions.
Local programmes may lead to increased confidence and
capacity to participate in the community.
Successful area-based programmes may act as pilots and
ultimately lead to changes in the delivery of mainstream
policies.
Lessons learnt against ABA
Most deprived people do not live in the most deprived
areas and will be missed by most of the targeted
programmes – it has been argued that people rather than
areas should be targeted.
Area-targeted policies are unfair on those areas which are
not covered by these programmes, despite sometimes
having similar needs.
There are political problems associated with targeting
some areas and not others.
Area-based approaches may simply displace ‘the
problem’ (e.g. unemployment, crime), to somewhere else.
The problems are generated at the national level –
therefore action needs to be at this level.
Following on from this, area programmes may detract
from the need to do more at a national level through
mainstream policies.
Area interventions interfere with the market – areas
should be left to decline or recover since interfering with
these processes may do more harm than good.
It has been argued that small-area data and intelligence on
deprivation is not good enough to back up targeting
decisions.
Source: Compiled from Smith (1999: 4-5)
10.3 Danger of ABA stigmatisation
It must be cautioned that ABAs are not viewed as quick-fix solutions to areas with major
socio-economic problems and abject poverty. Stigmas attached to areas labelled a priority
area can do harm in the longterm as the area is viewed with resentment.
10.4 URP as inward- or outward-looking ABA approach?
The fear of an ABA is that special funding can dry-up (Smith, 1999). In the case in
inward looking URP projects; these may become unsustainable in the short to medium
term, especially, if appropriate forward strategies for mainstream services to take over
functions were not put in place. Interviewee responses affirmed that in most URP projects
this is the case, more so in the so-called quick-fix projects. These are commonly referred
to as sticking-plaster solutions – short-term solutions which patch up the manifestations
of problems rather than addressing the underlying causes (Smith, 1999: 37).
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An outward-looking approach “involves linking deprived areas to wider opportunities
provided in the context of the city, making strategic linkages between different initiatives
for jobs and services, adapting whichever strategic connection seems the most
appropriate” (Smith, 1999: 37). In this way an entire city may benefit. However, in this
approach the most needy areas may not be sufficiently targeted and community
participation may become diluted.
10.5 Space matters
An analogy can be drawn between the observations of Turok & Watson’s (2002)
criticism of the MSDF on a city-wide scale and that of the space-economy created by
URP planning. They hold that the MSDF was based on an outdated understanding of the
operation of the space-economy of Cape Town and that it did not “take into account the
new locational dynamics driving private investment or the growing north-south
movement patterns, which are responding to the spatial shift of economic activity to the
northern suburbs” (Turok & Watson, 2002: 132). Linked to this has been the concern that
spatial planning and economic planning in the city have been pursued in relative isolation
from each other. The line-function organisation of the CoCT has encouraged planning in
various departments to take place without proper coordination. Moreover, they submit
that spatial planning was viewed as a sectoral activity, or specialisation and as a result
spatial planning was pursued in some isolation from forward thinking in other
departments, and “the need to think in a co-ordinated, spatially-sensitive way about
economic development, poverty alleviation or the environment has not occurred to the
extent that it should” (Turok & Watson, 2002: 132).
10.6 Doing your homework first
It has become apparent in the interviews that for URP projects of a larger scale to be
successful, processes such as EIAs have to be fast-tracked and that this can only be done
if SDFs and EMPs are in place at nodal level. Consequently, for any new URP node it is
advisable to have these institutional processes be established first.
10.7 Strategies and programmes all over the show
Different programmes and strategies focussing on the same issues within the same
geographic areas are apparently causing confusion. Where the MSDF had a specific
vision of developing the nodes, the URP completely overshadowed these since its
announcement. The Provincial Administration of the Western Cape launched a Cape
Renewal Strategy (CRS) in February 2001, aiming to deal with the underlying causes of
crime and criminality in seven targeted sites in the City of Cape Town. Two of these are
located in the KMP nodes Khayelitsha Site B and Tafelsig. The Cape Renewal Strategy
(CRS) differed from the URP in that the former is more focussed on reducing crime and
improving safety through a comprehensive urban renewal approach, whereas the URP
aimed at urban renewal, with urban safety being just one sub-component (Rauch, 2002).
10.8 Sectoral versus area approach
Projects with a broader regional focus (such as the False Bay coast upgrading initiative)
have a better chance of success for obtaining NDPG funding than localised projects.
Despite the prominence of the two URP nodes, line departments still seem to be more
strongly influenced in their decision making by sector priorities than by an area-based
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approach. A preliminary impact assessment of the Cape Town URP programme in 2006
found that the urban renewal status of the node has impacted on the delivery of housing
in a relatively limited manner, despite housing being an anchor project. It also concluded
that although the focus has been on the construction of higher-order sports facilities,
levels of access to these facilities have been limited in Khayelitsha. It also found that the
specific and direct impacts of the URP on levels of crime in the nodal areas are difficult
to quantify (MCA Africa, 2006).
10.9 Evaluation system to monitor area approach
Although the area-based approach undoubtedly had a significant positive impact in these
two areas, the absence of a comprehensive evaluation and monitoring system hampers the
ability to quantify the levels of success of the area-based management approach. An
important finding of the URP case study report on lessons learned by the Department of
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CGTA, undated) is that this approach
requires a dedicated team of specialists focussed on ensuring synergy in governance,
planning and implementation in a specific geographical area. Given the management
complexity of ABA, it is only effective if adequately resourced with experienced officials.
10.10 Striking a balance between the people and place dimension of urban renewal
From international experience (Küsel, 2009) it is seen that ABA as applied in South
Africa (and Cape Town specifically) has three core features. First, they are focussed,
area-orientated institutional mechanisms. Second, they address a range of sectors. Third,
they encourage ‘joining up’ mechanisms to get things done. In this context outcomes are
aimed at two categories. First, ‘for place’ outcomes target improved neighbourhoods and
residential areas, public environments, new property investments and second, ‘for people’
outcomes target the residents of an area and seek to enhance education levels, skills,
ability to compete for jobs and so on. The URP ABA philosophy is therefore firmly
rooted lessons learnt from the international evidence. However, in the context of national
policy, such as the NSDP, the URP had to finely balance the ‘for people’ and ‘for place’
philosophies (see Box 8).
Box 8: ABA in the context of national spatial policy
“The National Spatial Development Perspective (NSDP), adopted in 2003 and updated in 2006, is South Africa’s first
set of national spatial guidelines. It analyses South Africa’s spatial realities, and proposes principles to coordinate and
guide policy implementation across government. The NSDP emphasises that the focus of public fixed (capital)
investment, beyond the obligation to provide basic services, should be in areas of economic potential. While identifying
such potential is not a simple matter and can be somewhat subjective, critical analysis of localities and the comparative
advantages they offer need to inform intervention and investment in townships. Areas of potential should be focal
points for public investment that serve as a catalyst for broader growth and opportunity. Many township areas have
limited potential for economic development. Some settlements, for example, are in obvious decline, and it would be
counterproductive to pour public capital into these areas. However, such areas cannot be ignored: investment in human
capital can be catalytic in its own right, and infrastructure is needed to support delivery of social services. Relatively
minor but well-planned adjustments in the way services are provided and located can unlock local economic
opportunities without significant capital investment. This application of the NSDP principles is mirrored in the
conceptual distinction between the targeting of ‘for place’ and ‘for people’ outcomes. The conditions in any given
township need to be carefully assessed for maximum developmental impact. Given that many townships are very large
and internally differentiated in terms of economic opportunities, township renewal practitioners may need to apply
different mixes of ‘for place’ and ‘for people’ interventions to different parts of a single township.”
Source: Küsel (2009: 8)
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10.11 Mainstreaming
The Mainstreaming Guide of 2009 warns that too much emphasis on people at the neglect
of the built environment may not favour the emergence of the bonding capital required to
create a sense of place for residents and may cause leakage of economic potential that
exists within the local area as a result of its limited infrastructural base. On the contrary,
over-emphasising the built-environment measures without a proportionate level of
attention to people’s dimensions may render the measures unsustainable because they
exacerbate dependency of resident communities on the local state since they were not
afforded real participation in the operation and maintenance of the built environment.
Mainstreaming in CoCT is highly dependent on the attitude of the municipality towards
the nodal programme. As mentioned already, mainstreaming has not received structured
attention and was not seen as an opportunity for change by city officials, especially at
line-managerial level. CoCT was unable to use the URP to practice mainstreaming by
design, i.e. to chart a decisive course on how to integrate townships with the mainstream
urban fabric. KMP reveals a mix between little ownership by the host municipalities and
overreliance on national government to help determine their future. The latter
interpretation is a “matter of concern as it indicates that the URP is still being seen as the
programme of national government, which is less an opportunity than a burden placed on
them by national government. The behaviours of these municipalities suggest that the
nodal programmes are being tolerated until the end of piloting. They are also trapped in
the belief and expectation that national government is the one to think about the future of
the node. Yet some of them have brought about a few innovations that remained
occasional and insular because their leadership did not elevate these initiatives to inform
the strategic direction of the municipality towards acknowledging the value of localized
planning and budgeting for urban integration (mainstreaming by default). Accordingly,
this latter category is the one that needs greater guidance and support from national
government” (CoGTA, 2009: 16-17).
11. Political champions
“Participation and leadership in the form of political champions at national, provincial
and local levels would grease the co-ordination machinery, unlock sources of investment,
provide support and unblock obstacles” (CoGTA, 2009: 12).
11.1 Background
The case for political champions it is argued, is that sometimes all it takes for something
to be done about development in an area is to find a political champion able to influence
both the relevant government department and the private sector to take action. The
primary mandate of the political champions as stipulated in the guidelines for political
champions at national level was “the promotion of the vision and mission of the
programmes as well as to remove blockages or impediments to the successful
implementation of the programmes” (DPLG, undated: 3). The guidelines further states
that because of the complex nature of achieving integrated development vertically and
horizontally in government, it was necessary to outline and institutionalise the roles,
responsibilities and relationships to ensure clear areas of focus. The hierarchy of political
champions as envisaged in the guideline document is summarised in Table 9.
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Table 9: Political champion role differentiation across the three spheres of government
Level of political champions
Role
National sphere
• The Presidency
• The Cabinet
• The President’s Coordinating Council
• The Ministry of Provincial and Local Government
• Local Government MINMEC;
• The Ministry for Finance
Matters related to policy, which involves issues
regarding urban development legislation, national
financial and fiscal matters, the management of the
national programme according to key outcomes and
indicators and their monitoring and evaluation are
the responsibilities at the national level.
Provincial sphere
• Provincial Premiers
• Local Government (Minister of Local Government
and members of executive councils)
• Provincial Cabinets
• MECs for Local Government and Housing
• MECs for Social, Economic, Infrastructure and
Development;
• MECs for Finance
Local spheres
• District or metro executive mayors
• Municipal mayors or mayoral councils
• Portfolio committees; and
• Ward committees
The role of managing functional policies, including
institutional
arrangements,
programme
management, project planning, coordinating
provincial investment in infrastructural and social
investment, monitoring and evaluating more
detailed outcomes and key performance indicators
and overseeing the implementation of projects
by line departments at provincial level.
In terms of governance and delivery, the role of
local government is central to the transformation of
doing things differently. Key issues that arise at this
level and require attention of the local political and
technical champions are project implementation, coordination of local investment at both the public and
private levels, management of social dynamics and
facilitation of social processes and most
importantly, using the statutory planning tools that
lead to integrated development.
Source: Compiled from various Lekgotla reports
The introduction of the political championing concept can be traced to the initial
selection of urban renewal nodes. It appeared to have been both highly political and
quasi-scientific. Political considerations, not necessarily strategic planning, clearly played
an important part in the selection of nodes and this has created some irrationality and a
lack of similarity across the sites, making some aspects of programme design and
management difficult. It is, however, not the responsibility of politicians to please their
officials, but to please their electorate and deliver on their election promises. It is naïve to
assume that the Urban Renewal Programme would be unaffected by political imperatives
(Rauch, 2002).
It has been the experience at most URP nodes in the country, and more so in KMP, that
the institution of political championship was largely ceremonial in nature. Table 10
records the officially recorded visits of national champions to their assigned nodes
between 2005 and 2008. This is the period when the URP had gained most momentum
nationally and the national political champions were expected to be most visible to
champion the concept of URP in the nodes. The national political champions to the KMP
nodes shone in their absence - neither Ministers Manual nor Nqakula visited the nodes
over the said period. Mdantsane was the only nodes visited by their champion in each of
the four years.
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Table 10: Political champion visits in the urban nodes between 2005 and 2008
Node
Visits in 2005
Visit in 2006
Visit in 2007
Visit in 2008
National political champions
Motherwell
07 May to 04 October
22 February
No visit
Deputy Minister
Mluleki George
Deputy Minister
Nomatjala Hangana
26 October
Deputy Minister: Mluleki
George
Minister Mandisi Mpahlwa
Minister Lindiwe Sisulu
Minister Ngconde Balfour
Deputy Minister Mluleki
George
Deputy Minister Ntombazana
Botha
30 November
01 and 02 December
Deputy Minister
Ntombazana Botha
Minister Mandisi Mpahlwa
Minister Lindiwe Sisulu
Minister Ngconde Balfour
Deputy Minister Mluleki
George
Deputy Minister Ntombazana
Botha
04 July
Deputy Minister
Ntombazana Botha
Deputy Minister
Mluleki George
Khayelitsha
and Mitchells
Plain
No visit
No visit
No visit
09 June, the focus
was on progress made
on the MOU signed in
Galeshewe on the 07
September 2007
(Deputy Minister
Ntombazana Botha;
Deputy Minister Jean
Swanson Jacons)
No visit
Alexandra
01 April
Minister Naledi Pandor
Minister Mosibudi
Mangena
No visit
No visit
No visit
Minister Naledi Pandor
Minister Mosibudi Mangena
Deputy Minister Aziz Pahad
INK
15 March
07 November
No visit
Minister Alec Erwin
Minister Marthinus van
Schalkwyk
Deputy Minister Radhakrishna
Padayachie
Deputy Minister Malusi
Gigaba
Minister Ngconde Balfour
Deputy Minister Johnny de
Lange
Deputy Minister Jean
Swanson Jacobs
Mdantsane
April
Deputy Minister
Ntombazana Botha
05 July
Deputy Minister
Ntombazana Botha
Deputy Minister
Mluleki George
Minister Charles Nqakula
Minister Trevor Manuel
17 October
Galeshewe
Minister Alec Erwin
Minister Alec Erwin
No visit
10 and 11 August
Deputy Minister Jean
Swanson-Jacobs
Minister Alec Erwin
Deputy Minister Malusi
Gigaba)
07 September
Signing of MOU by three
Mayors (Galeshewe,
Mdantsane and
Motherwell)
Deputy Minister
Ntombazana Botha and
Deputy Minister Jean
Swanson Jacobs supported
the event
No visit
Source: CoCTA website
If politicians are the political champions of the URP, it was argued the URP unit’s staff
should, in addition to being the line managers and other key role players in the
development of a project, be considered the technical champions. The URP unit makes
provision for a complement of 23 staff members (four posts are currently vacant) of
whom only nine are appointed on a full-time basis.
Project champions at project level are also crucial. Very few line mangers or departments
are, according to the interviews, willing to take the responsibility of making an integrated
project successful. The Khayelitsha CBD’s project manager at the time seemed to be one
such project champion (DPLG, undated).
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11.2 Failure of political champions
The support and facilitation expected from political champions (national, provincial, city
and councillors) varied. Generally the national support was, with the exception of an
occasional drive through the node, non-existent (as shown in Table 10). Contrary, the
DPLG (undated: 37) report on lessons learnt points out that the “local URPs have not
necessarily kept political champions abreast of development in their areas, and have not
called on them for support”, a sentiment echoed by some interviewees.
It is our contention that the political championing of projects is not a good idea. In a
highly politicised environment such as Cape Town, unlike the other URP nodes in the
country, an apolitical approach to championing projects would perhaps have had a better
outcome.
11.3 Rooting out favouritism
The role of political champions at local level is contentious because of perceived
favouritism in handling the databases of unemployed people to be employed via the jobcreation programmes. Political complicity can occur when, for instance, DA or ANC
councillors wish to see certain people employed via the CoCT programmes (whether the
URP is a stakeholder) in a specific project or not. This is a recurring issue raised by many
interviewees. A suggestion was made that irrespective of where a person resides, any
unemployed resident of the city can be employed in a URP node on a particular project,
as long as s/he is on the official city database. Persons should also be selected randomly
from the list and not numerically from the top. Projects that are only beneficial to a
specific community grouping, such as street cleaning or tree planting, should be handled
by only employing residents from that area.
11.4 Taking pride in projects: technical champions
It is evident from the interviews that some, certainly not all, line-department officials
(technical champions) who have been involved in URP projects have taken pride in their
projects. Their meticulous documentation and image record keeping (collage of
photographs) of before and after, as well as spending their budgets with no roll-over of
funds into a next financial year are commendable. Their examples should be followed by
with other departments and project managers of all URP projects, both anchor or quickwin. The URP unit should establish a strategy of showcasing successful projects with
visual and documentary material.
11.5 Unrealistic political championing concepts
The 2009 URP Cabinet Lekgotla report declared that in for the URP to fast-track service
delivery and have positive impacts and outcomes, active political and administrative
support is required (Cabinet Lekgotla Report; 2009). During the 2011 consultation
process it became apparent that the creation of unrealistic expectations by politicians has
been identified as the major negative element associated with the concept of political
championing to support the URP programme. It has also been commented that political
championing and priority-setting initiatives are mainly focussed on housing projects, with
limited support for other components of the URP programme.
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11.6 Absence of technical and project champions in horizontal coordination
Although the vertical dimension of intergovernmental relationships has not been too
successful, at least it has been in place. What is needed is to add another championing
dimension, namely vertical relationships between the line departments and the nodal units.
In this context, CoGTA (2009: 20) suggested
“thematic or project-level champions should be nominated amongst line
departments according to their areas of mandate. For instance, the Land and
Housing Department could be designated to champion the EU key result areas on
Human Settlements, and be allocated the necessary funds from the EU budget that
will be used to fulfil the agreed performance indicators related to that key result
area. The URP unit would play the role as convener of coordination and joint
reporting sessions whereby the combined contribution of all champions is tabled
for joint review and endorsement. This recommendation also has validity for the
manner in which the municipality could conduct its business on cross-cutting
area-based programme beyond the URP’s term of piloting.”
12. Selected key lessons learned
In stark contrast to the opinions voiced by many stakeholders on the successes of the
URP unit, namely that they played a valuable role in facilitating funding from external
sources, the URP unit has made it clear that their aims and successes are more than
sourcing. Selected lessons and achievements of the URP are listed below.
The URP brought novel thinking on developmental issues (something most line
managers still grapple with).
Active involvement and making the programme a community-driven process was
achieved (some case studies testified to the contrary but generally the community
involvement was successful).
Being a legitimate project, it was clear to communities that beneficial things
would happen and this stemmed the tide of illegal invasions as residents took
ownership of projects.
The URP introduced integrated planning and project management by reducing
duplication of sources. Who the driver is and who is to take ownership in the
before, during and post-construction phases is said to be very clear in an
integrated approach. Whether this has been the case in all the projects is debatable.
The URP pilot provided a solid foundation for the long-term sustainability of
urban renewal.
It achieved the shedding of professional egos once the endproduct was in sight.
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By understanding the bigger picture of urban renewal, the URP became skilled
(almost professional) in how to mobilise resources from the state and private
sectors (although donor sourcing and private sector sourcing could have been
better).
By providing projects, anchor status assumes that all mandates must happen.
The programme can essentially be viewed as pro-poor development and it speaks
to the process of urbanisation.
The programme has dramatically changed the face of the two nodes (but much
more remains to be done).
Networking has almost become practice in the URP.
A key challenge is to elevate the programme to strategic level.
To establish a unit mandated from the highest level of authority in the country in
an unstable and highly contested political environment requires creative planning
and thinking outside the box. Nominating political champions to steer the cause of
the mandate was deemed to fail from the start.
Launching a programme at this scale without a budget, strategic framework and
clear policy directives was a major failure at national level and the failure of some
URP initiatives is to be directly blamed on this level of governance.
A parallel can be drawn between the way in which the two nodes’ community
forums performed and that of the URP establishment. In one node success was
grown organically (KDF) with a solid foundation, whereas in the other (MPDF) it
was ‘forced’ and subsequently disintegrated. Imposing a unit such as the URP on
a municipality experiencing regime change is problematic. Ideally, such a unit
should have grown organically from within existing structures. No unit should be
directly aligned to a municipal manager’s office only. The perception of
favouritism created from this institutional arrangement had damaging
consequences for the unit in the long term of the programme and for the unit in
the way it is perceived by various line departments.
The city management must carry the blame for the way in which the URP unit
was managed. There was resistance to the unit at the time of its establishment,
turning later to resentment and finally to relief as the disbandment of the unit was
anticipated. However, this attitude is contrary to the official DA political mandate.
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Cheap politicking has sounded a death knell for the URP throughout the pilot
period. Various governments in authority used the URP to showcase their political
prowess with very little understanding of the actual workings of the programme or
the philosophy behind urban renewal. There was scant regard for the difficult
circumstances in which the unit had to work, such as lack of job security and
inadequate policy and strategic direction from the CoCT, provincial and national
governments.
The reprioritisation funding model is not ideal for URP nodes. A dedicated budget
for the unit has to provide the foundation from which to work. All line managers
must undergo compulsory training in integrated planning, integrated relations and
on the philosophy behind urban renewal in a postmodern urbanism context.
Archaic ways of thinking about urban renewal by line managers and not having a
clear understanding of the actual purpose and role of the URP unit proved to be
counterproductive to achieving the aims of the URP.
It is crucial for future URP nodal roll-outs to have established a SDFs and EMFs.
Having these legislated frameworks in place serves as de facto expedition of
public participation and the meeting of all environmental considerations.
A general URP lessons learnt summary is provided in Table 11 below. The lessons are
drawn from the study of Wessels et al. (2010).
Table 11: Summary of lessons learnt
Lessons
Aspects
Suggestions/recommendations
Timeframe pressures
One can’t fix everything in a short time.
Realistic timeframes are required. Short term interventions
only put a plaster on the larger problem. The root of the
problem and its challenges need to be identified and
addressed.
Put in place mechanisms which will exceed the project
lifetime.
Be realistic and communicate that properly. Political
populism can jeopardize development. Expectations are
realistic from the start.
All roles technical, managerial, administrative need to be
clear to all.
Focus on the project within an URP node mustn’t detract
from the ability of the municipality to continue its core
services provision and functions.
Proper data required on a node. What worked before? Why
is it not working any longer? What is enterprise base? What
entrepreneurial capacities and leadership is available?
Which value chains is linking or by-passing the node?
This can be achieved through public private partnership
Using existing forums to ensure commitment,
examples include IDP forum, IGR, Private sector, social
sector, funding administrators.
There must be political buy in but the projects and programs
must not be affected negatively by political interference
When taking on new projects a small town needs to specify
roles and establish how much capacity will be required to
implement projects and planning.
There is a difference in the different drivers and an emphasis
placed on inclusion of community in initiating projects and
an understanding that there still has to be inputs from project
units in the Municipality.
Catalysts for long term spin- offs.
Knowing which outcomes
Matter
Outcomes need to be determined at the start.
Complexity in implementation is achieving multiple
aims.
Project managers need to satisfy multiple outcomes
which detract from the focus – delivery of services.
Area based management – an
area
wide
institutional
response
Binding commitment
Identification of unique potentials or challenges per
area or project
High levels of technical and management skills
Combined contractual, political and
institutional mechanisms are required to enforce the
commitment of all.
Political buy in.
Coordination takes time and
money
Additional burdens placed on municipal officials over
and above existing tasks.
State driven or community
driven development
Understanding of whether projects are state driven or
community driven.
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Small is big!: Each small
project
involves
many
stakeholders
Stakeholder involvement in even the smallest project
is required. A relatively small project can have
multiple spinoffs.
Effective implementation
requires spatial planning
Integration between the URP and IDP was not
enough to ensure successful development
Integrated planning and
coordination actions
There is a danger that activities happen in silos and
that co-ordination between so many different sector
departments is not achieved.
The programme manager is a key leadership figure.
There is a range of skills, aptitudes and experience
that separates strong project managers from others.
While the project managers that have stood out as
leaders in the URP programs to date have combined
technical and political skill with strong strategic and
visionary abilities, there are also cases of a successful
twinning of skills. In these cases, a project manager
has twinned effectively with a technically skilled
expert.
Each project needs to be tailored according to local
conditions. An absolute standard across the nodes is
not conducive to adapting projects for local
conditions.
Role of leadership
One size only fits one
Effective participation
requires capacitating
Funding
Mechanisms
Balancing project outcomes
Promoting
civic pride
The need to build capacity amongst community
leadership is critical. This includes political
representatives within local government. The
developmental implications of decisions taken may
not be fully appreciated.
One of the most powerful lessons that has emerged
regarding funding is that having access to funding
provides urban renewal programmes (e.g. the
Neighbourhood Partnership Grants from Treasury)
with an opportunity to make its presence felt.
The importance of housing provision in the eyes of
both councillors and the beneficiary communities was
underlined in an interview with a ward councillor in
Khayelitsha, who noted his constituents regarded the
provision of housing as an example of urban renewal,
whereas the provision of social services could not be
accorded the same status.
Some of the projects had unfortunately experienced
vandalism and the deliberate destruction of
infrastructure.
Consult wide up front, but when a project is formulated,
operate with a dedicated local steering committee: if you do
not have a specific project related task and delivering on
that, don’t interfere with those that proceed.
Multiplier impact comes from innovative application.
Projects depend on successful management of land-use
issues in the locality. Many municipalities are:
failing to plan for land release for residential and other
purposes;
not operating control over their own land use regulations
and mismanage thereby the interface between formal and
informal business;
failing to implement properly local land and improvement
valuation rolls and thereby undermine their own income
base;
Contribute to urban sprawl because of failing to be a
prudent land use manager.
Decisions on location of facilities and amenities placemaking instead of low income environments can be agreed.
That is a clear indication of unexpected outcomes due to a
silo approach.
Project championing is more important than political
championing.
Guard against a single nodal renewal approach. There will
be for clusters of nodes displaying similarities, certain
generic interventions. But the locality characteristics should
be considered properly: what is the extent and potential of
local leadership, linkages with value-chains, etc?
Working through the ward-system has to be improved (it is
after all the legislated route for community participation).
Investigating the workings of the ward system prior to
project commencement is crucial.
Expanding on existing funding models asw ell as tap into
donor funding.
There has been scant attention at local level to sustainable
economic returns: the social needs of housing and
infrastructure roll-out, whilst important in addressing backlogs and meeting basic rights, do not in itself contribute to
sustainable economic outcomes. In some cases they have
contributed to counter-economic outcomes, e.g. provision of
subsidy houses that now stand empty with beneficiaries
renting a shack in an informal settlement in a city.
Community participation and so-called community
ownership is no guarantee against vandalism. Proper
management structures are required. Not taking clear action
with charges about vandalism, contribute to public space
decay and thereby undermining of regeneration.
Source: After Wessels, et al (2011: 166-169)
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13. Selected recommendations
13.1 Introduction
The recommendations outlined in this section focus on a number of critical crosscutting
issues to the six main components of the urban renewal programme analysed in part A of
the report, as well as the lessons learnt from the various case studies described in Part B.
The lessons learnt and recommendations in Part A of the report were described and
documented according to the following format:
• Institutional arrangements: Section 6
• Integrated project planning and implementation: Section 7
• Programme and project financing: Section 8
• Intergovernmental relations: Section 9
• Area-based approach: Section 10
• Political championing: Section 11.
The lessons learnt and associated recommendations within these six main themes
comprise more than 60 individual components, each described and documented with
lessons learned and recommendations. In addition, a number of lessons learned and bestpractice proposals have been identified from the various case studies outlined in section
B of the main report. Those recommendations are not repeated in this summary.
13.2 Crime prevention
Crime prevention was elevated to a priority in urban renewal in the original mandate of
the URP when announced in 2001, and has since reaped many rewards. A definite decline
in crime statistics is testimony to this. Some promising suggestions and recommendations
were made by numerous stakeholders interviewed during the research process and these
include the following:
• Consideration must be given to rolling out law-enforcement volunteer
programmes (where unemployed community members receive training,
and are given work opportunities) on a much larger scale. Such an
intervention will have to receive a significant budget allocation. Not only
will such an initiative curb crime and enhance quality of life, but also
enrich the lives and life-skills competencies of those hundreds of
volunteers possibly employed in such a URP development programme.
• The good work done and lessons learnt regarding visible law enforcement
during the FIFA 2010 World Cup must be developed further and possibly
be expanded into other spheres and sectors such as security at schools,
hospitals, community centres, sports facilities (schools and community),
neighbourhood watches and trains. Policy development is required.
• The concept of using community safety volunteers for visibility and law
enforcement at ‘problematic’ schools must be officially explored and
investigated by instituting a formal study to test feasibility and to create a
framework for implementation of such a programme.
• Planning documentation (Integrated Safety Plan) developed by the URP –
with a view to enhance sharing of information and joint approaches to
fighting crime and improve community life – must be formally accepted
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•
•
by the URP as a strategy document, and it be advocated that all the
participating agencies (e.g. SAPS, Metro Police, neighbourhood watches,
community police forums) formally endorse these ‘cooperation plans’ to
give more status, authority and weight to this important work.
Much needs to be done by the Crime Unit within the URP with the
implementation and monitoring of the Integrated Safety Plan, and it is
likely that additional skilled capacity will be required to execute this work.
Designers of community facilities and centres must take into account the
nature of gang violence in certain areas.
13.3 Communication about the URP
The URP has established itself as a well-known brand in the two nodes, with URP
signboards dotted all over the Cape Flats proudly marketing completed projects. Within
the CoCT the perceptions of the URP are nevertheless varied. All previous reports and
assessments on the URP unit were qualitative in nature and key roleplayers interviewed
in these studies were mostly line managers of departments which had working relations
with the URP. This study followed the same methodology, but in addition interviews
were conducted with a number of other stakeholders. Once again, the opinions and
perceptions are varied in nature with both positive and negative aspects being mentioned.
As indicated in the Part A of the report, many of these perceptions held by officials and
stakeholders both within the CoCT and in other organisations may be the result of
insufficient knowledge and information regarding the function and outcomes of the URP.
A recommendation for marketing the URP is that it be done through a monthly column in
local daily newspapers. In this way, citizens elsewhere in the city as well as local officials
and political roleplayers can take note of happenings in the nodes. The Cape Times used
to have a dedicated forum where urban issues were debated. Perhaps the URP can carve a
space for urban projects in the media.
13.4 Expanding URP skills boundaries to the province
According to complexity theory, it is argued that “complex organizations cannot thrive
when there is too much central control” and although this does not mean no control is
necessary, it implies that “control should be distributed throughout the system” (Cilliers,
2000: 26). A complex system does not have a strict hierarchical structure, instead it is
postulated that there is structure on all scales and there is much interaction between
different structural components (Cilliers, 2000). The functions of the URP (both within
the CoCT and across various spheres of government) are complex in nature. The way in
which the unit has functioned for most of its existence, namely in a relatively
‘uncontrolled’ environment can, on the one hand be viewed as a huge success story
regarding the way it managed to interact on different scales (community level, line
department, city-wide, provincial and national levels). On the other hand, the view has
also been expressed that the URP acts too independently from the rest of the organisation
and creates a sense of resentment in certain quarters. Thus dynamism should not be
smothered within a restructured working environment. It is recommended that the unit
lobbies its experience with the provincial government (intergovernmental relations) to
expand its mandate to incorporate and align its expertise in pilots in the so-called leader
towns (as per the 2004 small-town growth potential study- Van der Merwe et al., 2004)
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and the towns with very high development potential (as per 2010 small-town growth
potential study – Van Niekerk et al., 2010) of the Western Cape. The roll-out of a URP
on a provincial level fits neatly in the paradigm of the NSDP as well as the National
Urban Development Framework. The NUDF (2009: 36) specifically calls for “regional
inter-governmental co-operation. Increased co-operation and accountability across
jurisdictional boundaries is required to address the economic, social and ecological
challenges facing urban areas and their functional hinterlands. This does not require
additional layers of government or bureaucracy but more collaborative planning,
coordination and cooperation.” The URP unit has established valuable capacity to deal in
both these types of investments as facilitator. Convincing the different political
structures to buy into such a methodology could be a major achievement for the unit.
13.5 The URP in a changing urban policy context
Policy instruments for inclusive spatial development as proposed in the newly released
National Urban Development Framework (2009) argues for a reframing of policy debates
on spatial targeting (of which the area-based approach is an example) and urbanisation.
The framework is on the application of a “menu of alternative policy instruments (which
might include spatial targeting)” (NUDF, 2009: 16). The international experience
suggests that “the key policy instruments and imperatives relate to the judicious and
sequenced application of spatially-blind institutions, spatially connected infrastructure
and spatially targeted incentives” (NUDF, 2009: 16). The NUDF explain these
instruments clearly:
“1. Policy should recognise the importance of ‘spatially blind’ rather than
spatially targeted policy interventions. Within the domain of spatially blind
policies would be included national policies such as the income tax system,
intergovernmental fiscal relations, and the governance of land and housing
markets as well as education, health care, basic water and sanitation. In contrast to
spatially targeted interventions, it is argued that spatially blind interventions
which involve universal and progressive income taxation, social security and
unemployment benefits “work less noisily” and should be the bedrock of public
policies to integrate countries spatially and help them benefit from (economic)
concentration and convergence.
2. Policy must acknowledge the importance of ‘spatially connective’ policies
that link together places through infrastructural improvements, such as roads,
airports or communication systems. Such spatially connective policies through
infrastructure are considered essential in order to improve access to markets of
lagging regions thus integrating them into national (and international) markets.
3. There remains a role for spatially focussed interventions but these should be
applied only in certain circumstances and in combination with rather than as a
substitute for spatially blind and spatially connected policies. Prior to using
incentives national governments should better seek to understand why certain
areas are being by-passed by the market as the success of any incentive
programme will ultimately hinge on how well the problem is diagnosed.”
It is recommended that the URP unit familiarises itself first on the changing national
urban policy context and second plan on the changing political context within which the
policy context manifests.
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13.6 Knowledge is power: Showcasing improvements of urban social outcomes
through research
The NUDF (2009) acknowledges urban renewal as a piloted integrated intergovernmental
approach and concludes that the impact of these initiatives has been uneven but major
lessons have been learnt for the further development of urban regeneration tools and
instruments. The framework does not provide any guidelines on how urban renewal
should be enhanced and formalized on a policy level. It does acknowledged that the
South African urban system remains ineffective in enabling people to escape poverty and
they propose “more targeted action to improve social outcomes.” Key areas for attention
in achieving this outcome will include measures to promote the following: “Improving
job creation and second economy support; reducing urban crime and related social
problems such as drug and alcohol abuse; improving the quality of education and skills
development outcomes particularly for poor communities; improving the effectiveness of
health initiatives particularly with regard to HIV/AIDS and TB” (NUDF, 2009: 38).
These areas of targeted action are nothing new to the URP nodes. Most of these action
types formed were anchor projects, while others were quick-wins. Although the URP unit
has a great track record in building up an information bank for which dedicated funding
was made available for the compilation of an SDF, EMF, nodal profiling research,
assessments and reviews of the programme as a whole, it is imperative that the
‘knowledge-factory’ does not stop documenting these.
It is recommended that a small but dedicated budget be made available for an ongoing
assessment of all projects on an annual basis and that this research be conducted by
postgraduate students, mainly from the neighbouring institution the University of the
Western Cape, but also the other three universities in the province. It is important for the
public-sector institutional bodies such as the URP unit which is very people-driven to
collaborate and establish partnerships with research-orientated institutions such as
universities. Making available a small research grant (between R5000 and R10 000 per
project) to students enrolled in honours or masters programmes in public management,
politics, economics, sociology, health, planning, social work and geography to name but
a few disciplines related to what the URP stands for will go a long way in getting quality
qualitative and quantitative research findings on a range of projects in the URP at
minimal cost. These studies would be retrospective because of the timelines of academia
but they can be extremely valuable as lessons learnt for the future roll-out of similar
projects in other parts of the city and province. Establishing a partnership with the
existing university provincial consortium will not be difficult to facilitate, given the
expertise available in this regard.
13.7 Reviewing and reprioritising the city’s commitment to urban renewal of
deprived areas (URP nodes, original and new)
The CoCT has experienced three major public-sector financial investment thrusts after
2000. In chronological order these were the URP, the FIFA 2010 World Cup and the
integrated rapid transport (BRT) system. While the latter two are major infrastructural
investments intended to be sustainable once completed (e.g. the stadium and the IRT), the
URP speaks to both hard and soft issues. Addressing poverty and crime, uplifting socioeconomic standards of living of the poor, rolling the programme out to new nodes will
essentially have to be tackled from a different governmental perspective than hard
infrastructural projects. Nationally, the NUDF (2009) is comitted to inclusive pro-poor
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urban development. The framework recommended that policy will “actively seek to
ensure that the urban development process is inclusive and pro-poor. Increased
investments in infrastructure and basic services for the poor that have been effective,
internationally and in South Africa, in reducing urban poverty and mitigating urban
income inequalities, will be emphasized (NUDF, 2009: 35). The opinion has been
expressed that there is a perception of the financial commitments of the CoCT being
biased towards the infrastructural support of the latter two developments and the city
improvement districts (most notably the CBD), while the pro-poor approach remains in
the shadow with very little private-sector involvement.
The newly appointed mayor De Lille has acknowledged the importance of focussing on
the poor, however, these noble claims have to be backed up by concrete policy directives
that would be matched by finances and allocation of skilled personnel to work on projects
in all the URP nodes. It is recommended that the URP unit actively lobby for prioritising
these areas as part of the city IDP and budgeting processes and ensuring that the planned
redevelopment of these areas be established as part of the planning doctrine in the CoCT.
13.8 Skills development of the URP team
The URP has experienced an exodus of key trained and highly-skilled personnel after
2005. The original pioneers of URP vacated their offices, and the Khayelitsha office in
particular was hardest hit. Notwithstanding this setback, the URP succeeded in finalising
a range of quick-win projects as well as the completion of the anchor projects. Most
noteworthy are the Kuyasa CMD, the transport interchanges in KMP, and the Khayelitsha
CBD. There is a widely held belief that CoCT has not deployed senior and key personnel
(line departments involved) with the required skills in project management to work on
URP projects in KMP. These are perceived to be not ‘nice’ projects and not ‘nice areas’
to work in. Instead, lesser experienced persons are involved in the work, creating an
impression that these nodes and projects are not important, at least from a policy and
political point of view.
This study’s overall conclusion regarding an institutional framework for the URP
resembles that of the Urban-Econ (2011) study. The existence of an URP unit is not
questioned. However, the way in which it is institutionally structured and aligned at
present is questioned, especially in view of the anticipated roll-out of the URP to another
18 nodes identified in the city. The solution seems to lie in a unit comprising a
multidisciplinary team with the authority and capacity to truly integrate the various
departments involved in urban development, infrastructure, service provision, community
participation and intergovernmental linkages. It is not suggested that the existing body of
bureaucrats be increased, but rather a redeploying of skills and expertise into crossdepartmental project teams. These experts should have a clear understanding of their
roles, and the roles of others, in planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.
13.9 Pointers for integrated project planning and implementation
Regarding integrated project planning and implementation it is clear that the major
lessons learnt from stakeholder interviews and the numerous reports of the URP point
towards the following:
Ensure clearer objectives at the outset of programmes, matched with suitable
indicators for monitoring and evaluation purposes: “Indicators are as good as
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objectives.” Integrated project teams with clear roles and responsibilities and
briefs are desired.
An early focus on mapping and baseline profiles to aid planning, as well as
subsequent monitoring and evaluation are essential.
Integrated data and information, and knowledge management are required.
Identify quick-win projects that attract private-sector attention and boost the
confidence of the community as well as other departments and partners in
development.
Medium-term project identification should focus on consistent funding over the
medium term for both soft and hard investments that meet the objectives set out at
the outset.
Long-term programme identification should focus on long-term visions (such as
for the coastal areas in the case of Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain) and the time
frames for these should be communicated to avoid raising unrealistic expectations.
The projects should be implemented via the establishment of suitable teams for
projects and programmes.
Monitoring and evaluation should occur on an ongoing basis to ensure that
objectives remain suitable, projects are on track and communities are satisfied
with the progress.
Reviews of project outcomes and city-wide trends e.g. the financial distribution of
different types of finance funds.
(Primarily drawn from: Urban-Econ, 2011: 73)
13.10 Lobbying for funding and organisational support
The future national funding for URP nodal projects remains unclear. The national URP
office is seemingly in a process of restructuring, with a severely understaffed department
that has seen many experienced staff members transferred or resigned as the ten-year
period approached its zenith. Uncertainty regarding the national status of URP remains.
The NUDF (2009: 35) states that “South Africa’s urban areas are its drivers of economic
growth, its primary sites of population growth as well as being the points where many of
its poverty, social and ecological challenges are concentrated. They are thus of national
strategic importance and require particular and focused national attention and support to
supplement local effort and innovation.” Despite these sentiments the ongoing funding
from national level for the URP remains unclear.
It is recommended that the URP embark on a process of more actively seeking external
funding, specifically from donor funding agencies internationally. Improved coordination
of internal funding and budgeting processes, and integration with provincial programmes
and initiatives should be an area of high priority.
In addition, the potential role that NGOs can play in all facets of the URP has to date
been mainly overlooked, perhaps underestimated. Establishing partnerships with NGOs
operative in the metropolitan area has to become an imperative in the next phase of URP.
13.11 Rethinking of the championing role
The political championing concept has not been successful throughout the programme. It
is recommended that non-political leaders be identified as ‘political champions’ to act as
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the face of new projects. Key community members, sport stars, musicians, etc. would
ideally fall in this category. Their role should be aimed at profiling the project at the early
stages.
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Part B: Case studies
Watergate Estate Housing
Kuyasa Clean Development Mechanism Project
Swartklip multipurpose sports complex
Khayelitsha CBD
kuyasa
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14. Watergate Estate Housing
Images from the Watergate housing development
(Source: http://www.capetown.gov.za/en/urbanrenewal/Pages/Gallery.aspx
14.1 Background
This section is a case study of the Watergate Estate housing development in Mitchells
Plain. The purpose is to learn lessons from the project for application to future
developments of similar nature in the city.
The land on which the Watergate Estate is situated was previously bought by a private
developer for development purposes, but this development never materialised. The land
was subsequently purchased on auction by the current developer, New Age Property
Group, in 2006. The new developer contacted Mr George Penxa (Director: URP) to
request assistance with the rezoning process. Mr Penxa informed the developer, Mr
Anver Essop, that the land in question was located in the URP area and that the URP
could assist with the municipal processes and use the URP logo (which has become a
strong and recognisable brand in the city) in its communication strategy. A public-private
partnership was born and the Watergate Estate was afforded URP status. The link with
the URP was important as it highlighted the prestige and credibility of the proposed
development and the seriousness of the developer in developing the Watergate Estate.
The developer acknowledges that the partnership with the URP has assisted him greatly
to successfully deliver the Watergate Estate. The public-private partnership extends to the
CoCT for maintaining public spaces and social facilities within the development upon
completion.
The Watergate Estate development, launched in August 2009, is a privately-funded R1.2
billion affordable-housing development aimed at a specific section of the first-time
homeowners market. It is envisaged that the development will on completion consist of 3
368 properties on 22 hectares. Phase A comprises 2 436 sectional title units and phases B,
C and D 932 freestanding dwellings (Figure 9). The development over four phases will
offer various housing types priced from R299 900 to R409 000. It is the first privatelyfunded affordable housing project in the Western Cape.
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Figure 9: Four sections of the Watergate Estate development (Source:
Alwyn Laubser and Associates, 2010 - Online)
14.2 Project selection
The Watergate Estate development is billed as the pilot project for affordable housing in
Cape Town and an anchor project for the URP. An anchor project is a multitiered project
that attracts a large proportion of URP investment, has the potential to impact on a
significant number of people, enables private sector investment, and fulfils the social,
economic and environmental ideals of the triple bottom-line approach (CoCT, 2011). The
Watergate development is a mixed-use, integrated human settlement development which
speaks to the core principles of the URP.
14.3 Project objectives
The Watergate Estate housing development aims at the gap housing market. This market
is essentially people who earn too much to qualify for state-provided subsidised housing
(commonly referred to as Reconstruction and Development Programme – RDP - housing)
but whose financial position does not allow them to afford the high prices of private
homes on the open housing market, that is they do not qualify for a house bond from a
financial institution. They earn a monthly income of between R7 500 and R12 000
(Figure 10). The development is geared towards them.
Gap housing and social mobility
1994
state subsidy market
today
gap market
R100,000 to
R400,000
open market
R4 00,000 and up
R0 to R100,000
[circu la r or reg ress iv e s ocial
m obility patterns in the
a bsence of s trong gap policy]
R3,500
R12,000
Figure 10: Gap housing and social mobility linkages (Ragland, Toyosaw &
Villalba, 2011: 2)
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The CoCT has a three-pillar policy for non-subsidy housing support schemes: (1)
individual plots for individual developers (accompanied by specific requirements to
obtain the subsidised land). City plots are between 100 and 150m² in size. Over the last
two years, about 350 such plots were sold; (2) land for registered social housing
development projects (i.e. West Cape Villas in Mitchells Plain) and other private
contractors (i.e. Leo Mews in Elsies River); (3) cross-sector facilitation where
government provides discounted land and acts as manager for collaborative projects with
banks and developers (i.e. Scottsdene). In a recent study conducted by Ragland, Toyosaw
& Villalba (2011) on gap housing projects in Cape Town, they identified a range of
lessons to be learnt. Some of these may be applicable to projects in the URP node of
Mitchells Plain (see Box 9).
Box 9: Lessons learnt from other gap housing projects in Cape Town
“The first problem we have found is the problem in GOVERNMENTAL POLICY AND POLITICS. There is a lack of a national
definition of gap housing and policy. In the national housing plan entitled Breaking New Ground (BNG), statements
that define the parameters and solution to the low-income/subsidy housing problem shape the way sub-national
governments can define and subsequently design their plans to address challenges with other types of housing, most
notably gap housing. Furthermore, the income bands and the cost of subsidy houses were calculated in 1994 and have
still not changed, which puts additional financial burden on developers and residents. Subsidy housing is also
preventing the gap market from being a more attractive prospective because the many gap-eligible residents whose
salaries sit near the “subsidy line” would clearly prefer to acquire a house for free.
There is a dearth of coordination policies between national, provincial and local governments. Little to no
communication or planning takes place, even though they work on the same or similar issues. The national government
constrains funding of Provincial Housing Departments by providing budgets on a year-to-year basis, rather than on a
multi-year basis. This prevents these departments from being able to plan and use funds over the long term. The only
tool available to sub-national governments in the national policy are large plots of publicly-owned land. Province and
City can both discount their land, but in the end, land is not the most important aspect for developers as it only accounts
for about 5% of their costs. They would prefer better funding or policies to improve the financial conditions of potential
customers. The second problem we identified concerns FINANCIAL REGULATION. The conservative New Credit Act
(NCA) of 2007 limits the amount of credit that banks can loan to the gap housing market. The new regulation will
improve the capacity of banks to avoid loan defaulting and consolidate loan debt; however the new capital
requirements make loans more costly. Of special concern is the income band of families who earn under R15,000 per
month. Defaulting rates, high interest rates and the rise in housing values make it impossible to reach lower-income
populations. It is necessary to educate the people about financial management. It is also difficult to finance gap market
projects because they take too long to complete (average 6 years), and profits are low.
The third problem is about CREDIT RISK AND FINANCIAL ACCESS. In South Africa, there are some particularities in
measuring credit risk. Some measurements are so strict that many future residents have difficulties meeting the
requirements. In his 2010 State of the Nation speech, President Jacob Zuma instituted a R1bn Guarantee Fund to insure
credit-lending institutions against defaulting from people in the gap income bracket, however it has yet to be tested &
still only exists in theory. The fourth problem is about the DEVELOPERS’ CONSTRAINTS. Some developers lack
management and engineering skills even though specialized skills are necessary for these projects. Financing the
projects is difficult for them because they are costly and there are often not enough clients, especially after the financial
crisis. This “crowds out” smaller companies in the market who have minimal levels of capital and assets, and the
increased competition results in decreased trust and information sharing. Social housing companies had very specific
constraints. Since they are government-sponsored institutions, they don’t have problems of funding or profitability, but
there is a risk of political interference. The CTCHC, for example, had media problems. Some residents complained
about the quality of the Phase 1 buildings blocking access to the complex resulting in the company having to fight a
court battle. Additionally, there were problems with squatters who invaded empty properties. The companies also had
problems evicting residents who defaulted on their payments, as community organizations tried to stop authorities from
taking back the houses. The fifth problem relates to the CONSTRAINTS OF RESIDENTS THEMSELVES. Some gap housing
projects require income or financial conditions with which some potential tenants simply cannot comply, even if they
are part of the target population. Part of the target population works in the informal sector and does not have the
required documentation to obtain a loan even if they have the necessary income. Another case is that many potential
residents are blacklisted in the financial system due to overburdened credit. Preferences also play a role as the location
and quality of the buildings are sometimes sub-optimal. Lastly, the potential residents need to compete with people in
the City’s subsidy housing waiting list who receive preferential access to gap houses if they want one.”
Source: Ragland, Toyosawa and Villalba (2011: 3-4)
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The Watergate Estate development is situated alongside the recently-upgraded R300
Cape Flats freeway, and next to A.Z. Berman Drive, one of the entrances to Mitchells
Plain. Thus, the development is seen as providing a ‘Gateway to Mitchells Plain’ from
the R300 expressway. Previously the sites were undeveloped, and covered by Port
Jackson trees and bush.
The construction of the development is said to provide about 500 jobs during this phase
with 250 permanent positions available after completion (Saturday Argus, 2009). The
permanent jobs will be created by the long-term maintenance needs of the development
as well as the commercial shopping centre in Phase A.
14.4 Project preparation and design
The Watergate Estate was specifically designed to accommodate higher building
densities, with an emphasis on the use of public transport and reduced private-vehicle
ownership. The development is within walking distance of two commuter railway
stations, namely Mandalay and Phillipi. In addition, the development is situated adjacent
to existing bus and taxi routes. The design and layout of the buildings, coupled with an
emphasis on public transport and pedestrianisation, is reported to promote community
living and a better quality of life, and to be integrated with the surrounding urban fabric.
The development is divided into three sections, with phases B and C, scheduled for
completion by June 2011. Phase A and then phase D will follow.
The public-private partnership is primarily focussed on phase A (Figure 11), with minor
URP involvement in Phase B and Phase C. Phase A of the development consists of 186
free-standing units and 2 246 lock-up-and-go apartments in three-storey walk-up blocks.
The size of the units is between 34 m² and 74 m² and has one to three bedrooms. The
developers’ project team has set a number of clear design principles. The design of the
largest section of the development, Phase A, has been informed by a number or urban
design principles; namely
Integration: the development is closely linked with the surrounding urban fabric
and externally-derived pedestrian flows will be directed through the site along its
main boulevard.
Mixed use: residential functions will be combined with a commercial function on
the site.
Choice: there is a variety of housing types with various levels of public and
private settings.
Public space: an emphasis is placed on public space through a system of courts
and landscaped green space.
Convenience: includes easy access to private and public transport systems, higher
densities allow for a larger client base for commercial enterprises and social
facilities within the development, the central boulevard allows for externally- and
internally-generated pedestrian flows and two social facilities are envisaged for
the site.
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Figure
11: Phase A of the Watergate Estate (Source: Alwyn Laubser and Associates (2010 –
Online)
Municipal officials have confirmed that the capacity of the existing municipal
infrastructure is sufficient for the proposed development. The environmental Record of
Decision was granted on 23 April 2010 by the Department of Environmental Affairs and
Development Planning, while the planning approvals application has been submitted.
The development is located opposite the Mitchells Plain General Hospital which is
currently under construction to the south of the phase A site. It is envisaged that
employees of this large district hospital will become homeowners in the development.
The Chief Executive Officer of the hospital is reported to have purchased a dwelling in
the development. A commercial area, a soccer field, public facilities, places of worship,
day-care facilities and public parks within the development and a secure undercover
walkway between the development and Mandalay Station, should effectively serve the
needs of residents and those living outside the development.
Phase B (Figure 12) consists of 227 residential erven, with a combination of free-standing
and semi-detached dwellings. The size of the erven is between 114 m² and 160 m² and is
in accordance with the provincial policies of densification. It also merges with the singleresidential environment surrounding this phase of the development.
Figure 12: Phase B of the Watergate Estate (Source: Alwyn Laubser and
Associate (2010 – online)
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A park and recreation space is situated near the entrance of Phase B. The necessary
environmental and planning approvals have been obtained, construction has been
completed and homeowners have taken possession of their homes.
Phase C (Figure 13) consists of 130 residential erven, with the bulk being free-standing
homes and a few semi-detached units. The size of the erven is between 114 m² and 160
m². The same planning approach as phase B was adopted in Phase C with the necessary
approvals in place. Construction work on Phase C is currently underway.
Figure 13: Phase C of the Watergate Estate (Source: Alwyn Laubser and
Associates, 2010 - Online)
Only scant information is available on phase D because the idea was that after the
completion of phases B and C, phase A would be developed. However, phase A has been
subject to delays. Consequently, the developer has instructed his consulting team to
commence with the rezoning of phase D. A full environmental impact assessment is not
required for phase D. Approvals are expected towards the end of July 2011. Phase D will
consist of approximately 300 houses, similar in design to those of phases B and C.
14.5 Institutional arrangements
The URP facilitates the development by resource support and assistance with various
policy processes in the municipal line departments. The URP has completed the Spatial
Development Framework and Environmental Management Plan for the Mitchells Plain
area enabling developers to know what development is suitable in which area of
Mitchells Plain. Without these strategic documents, the development process would take
much longer. Assistance with policy processes is the fast-tracking of various applications
in the development process and the facilitation of relief should any blockages occur in the
red-tape process. It is noteworthy that certain development applications have fixed time
spans dictated by law and that fast-tracking application did not entail cutting any corners
or taking any shortcuts. The URP assisted with the approvals of planning protocols, final
designs, environmental impact assessments, and the acquisition of land (Penxa, 2009).
The URP facilitated the creation of a multidisciplinary municipal and provincial projectmanagement team that dealt with various aspects of the development. Furthermore, the
municipal project team met with the development consulting team on which occasion the
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development was presented to municipal and provincial officials. The meeting gave the
developer an opportunity to identify officials who would be responsible for approving
and monitoring various aspects of the development. Thus, in the event of a problem
occurring, the development consulting team knew exactly which municipal official(s) to
contact. Also, the development timeline gave officials an idea when their specific
component of the proposed development would commence. Consequently, when a
specific request regarding the development landed on an official’s desk, the matter was
given priority treatment. The arrangement was to do things speedily and efficiently as it
was recognised that ‘time is money’ for the developer.
The URP has a facilitating role between the city and the developer. An example of URPs
involvement in solving problems was the irrigation system for the public space being
fitted without a water meter, resulting in the disconnection of the water supply. The
situation was resolved and it was agreed that City Parks applied for and installed water
meters in phase A, whilst the developer would do so for phase A, C and D.
The Watergate Estate has public facilities and public spaces that the city has agreed to
maintain after the developer has constructed them. A service level exists in this regard.
Public facilities and spaces must be in accordance with municipal norms and standards.
The handover of such facilities and spaces on certain dates allows the city to do the
necessary budgetary planning to provide for their maintenance and upkeep. These
facilities and spaces are not only open for Watergate Estate residents, but for broader
community use.
Homeowners in the development, many of whom are first-time homeowners, have been
given training regarding the finer details of homeownership, finance, maintenance, etc. A
package deal has been negotiated with a financial institution to provide 100% home loans
for first-time buyers (SA Affordable Housing, 2009). Upon completion, each of the four
phases of the development would be managed by a homeowners’ association (HOA)
which are in the process of being formed. The HOA will decide on security matters,
handling of illegal structures within the development, and provide assistance with the
maintenance of the park and open spaces.
The URP has undertaken to leverage funds from national government for the link road for
phase A of the development. In terms of the memorandum of understanding, the
developer covers the costs of all the investigations, specifications and assessments
regarding the proposed link road. A contractor will be appointed following a tender
process and the URP will cover the construction costs. The link road is vital as the site is
‘landlocked’ and urgently requires an access road. The link road is indicated on the Draft
Urban Renewal Spatial Development Framework (Figure 14).
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Link road
Hospital
Figure 14: Illustration of the draft Urban Renewal Spatial Development
Framework (CoCT, 2006)
Unfortunately, the location of the link road that appears on the City’s Draft Urban
Renewal Spatial Development Framework was not taken into consideration when
authorisation for the construction of the Mitchells Plain General Hospital was granted.
Consequently, no provision was made in the hospital planning for a link road to phase A
of the Watergate Estate development. The only access to phase A from A.Z. Berman
Drive would be from the link road to the hospital (Figure 15) as road planning principles
and stipulations does not allow for an access road along AZ Berman Drive with 800
metres of a Class 1 road (the R300).
Figure 15: Aerial photograph indicating phase A, the hospital location (orange dot), the
link road and surrounds (Source: Supplied by Mr Andre Beukes, First Plan)
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Thus far it has taken 18 months of negotiation between the developer, the province
(hospital) and city to reach an agreement on the extension of the link road on the
hospital’s property to serve phase A of the Watergate Estate. The impasse has slowed
progress of the development. The developer had to reach an agreement with the province
(hospital) before the CoCT would grant authorisation for the link road. The access road
links with a boulevard in the development. This boulevard is crucial to providing access
to the hospital from Mandalay Station and the area to the east and south-east of the
Watergate Estate. The hospital thus stands to benefit greatly from the accessibility to the
boulevard.
14.6 Project management arrangements and implementation
The Watergate Estate development is a public-private partnership. The developer
established a development consulting team and Alwyn Laubser and Associates (AL&A)
are the project managers and development facilitators. AL&A manage all aspects of the
project and they are the contact between the developer and the URP. When challenges
arise regarding municipal approvals or delays, or issues of clarification, AL&A liaise
with officials in the various municipal line departments.
When matters cannot be resolved timeously, the URP is approached for assistance in
unblocking delays. An important first step in the interface between the consulting team
and the multidisciplinary municipal team was the scheduling of a liaison meeting. The
meeting assisted in identifying the contact persons dealing with various aspects of the
development. All stakeholders involved in the development at one stage or another were
present at the meeting. Table 12 lists the municipal line functions represented as well as
the attendees from the consulting team.
Table 12: Consulting team and the municipal line function representatives for Watergate
Estate development
City of Cape Town representative
Development consulting team
Ivan Anthony
URP
Alwyn Laubser and
Associates
Project management and
development facilitation
Alexander Forbes
Environmental
First Plan
Town planning and
urban design
David Cedras
Manager:
Subcouncil 12
New Age Property
Developments
Developer
Gerhard Hanekom
Planning
Doug Jeffrey
Environmental
Environmental
assessment specialist
Joseph Nhose
Parks
K. A. Hodge
Land surveyor
Malville Swanson
Roads
NWE Consulting
Engineers
Civil engineer
Riaan van Eeden
Spatial planning
MWP Architects
Architect
Housing
CnDV Africa
Landscaper
George Penxa
Alida Kotzee
Marlize Odendal
Source: Alwyn Laubser and Associates (2008)
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Monthly reports on the physical progress of construction activities at phase B were
compiled by Alwyn Laubser and Associates. The reports cover progress in all matters
relating to the construction at the site. This includes an environmental monitoring report
and an occupational health and safety report as annexures. A photographic record of the
progress of construction is also contained in the report. In addition, while the progress
report does not focus on financial expenditure, it does provide a monthly expenditure
breakdown as background to the progress of construction.
14.7 Lessons learnt and best-practice proposals
Respondents from the CoCT who were involved in aspects of the development, as well as
members of the consulting team agreed that it was a learning process for all parties
because the Watergate Estate development was the first public-private project of its kind
in the city. This shared learning experience raised a number of issues requiring attention
should a similar project be initiated in the city. These issues are:
There must be definitive principles in place regarding lines of communication
between the URP and the developer and how aspects of a development are to be
communicated to various interested and affected parties.
The subcontracting of work should be facilitated by the URP. Subcontractors
should not approach the developer directly, but through he URP office. This helps
the URP office to ensure that subcontractors, and those employed by them, are
based in Mitchells Plain and the surrounding suburbs. Proper community
participative goals should be established based on the array of skills available in
the community. It is proposed that consortia of businesses or joint ventures from
the area would allow more subcontractors to benefit from a development. There is
a pressing need for a business empowerment strategy.
Respondents cited the need to follow proper municipal procedures and due
process regarding various stages of the construction process. The necessary plans
must be approved before building commences, otherwise a developer is in
contravention of municipal procedures. Penalties must be imposed should a
developer not follow municipal prescriptions and procedures and continue with
unauthorised on-site activities. The timeous submission of the necessary
applications to the city would assist in the approvals process being finalised as a
priority.
The initial meetings between the multidisciplinary municipal and provincial
project management team and the developer consulting team greatly assisted in
presenting the development to officials and providing them with a ‘heads-up’.
The City issued a new circular on 2 September 2010 that prevented building plans
from being approved without Section 31 clearances. By February 2011 the
programme for building-plan approvals had been concluded whereby 122 plans
were approved and the dwellings constructed. However, further construction has
been halted because building-plan approval is required for additional dwellings. It
was expected that construction would start on 1 April 2011 (Alwyn Loubser and
Associates, 2011). The approval of building plans can only commence once the
erf has been registered to the owner. Once the bulk services had been laid in phase
B, houses were erected before approval of building plans and this led to
considerable tension between the developer and the CoCT.
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Respondents cited the need for a change in policy to allow the commencement of
the building of gap houses as soon as the bulk services are in place – the approval
process must be streamlined. The change in policy is urgent for areas where
housing is desperately required and the conviction is that the City needs to be
flexible in this regard. It is recommended that once the site development plan is
approved the developer can construct the bulk services, but within this period the
developer can submit the building plans so that once the bulk services are
available, construction of dwellings may commence. The current policy causes a
few months delay between finalisation of the construction of bulk services and the
start of the construction of dwellings. This puts a financial strain on the developer
and potential homebuyers. The financial margins on the construction of gap
housing are slim and every delay adds to the cost of erecting the dwelling and
consequently increased price to the buyer. In addition, commercial banks review
potential homebuyers every three months after their initial loan approval, making
it important for the dwelling to be constructed within three months of bond
approval.
A project champion from the CoCT needs to be appointed to drive all aspect of
the development. Such a person solely should be involved with the development
and should not have functions and duties in addition to the task of project
champion. A project champion must be familiar with bureaucratic processes and
able to engage with a variety of role players, including municipal officials. The
project champion is the interface between URP and the developer.
There is a stand that a firmer commitment must be made by the City of Cape
Town, including the setting of time frames and a solid financial liability over a
number of years. The goodwill and talk about the possibilities of the proposed
development must be followed with action. These obligations should be agreed at
an early stage of the public-private partnership.
A ‘package of plans approach’ has been advocated. The private-public partnership
must start with a high-level buy-in and signed agreement of the broad concept of a
development. Thereafter, the focus must zoom in on different precincts and parts
of the development, with each level containing more detail that the previous one.
Partnership and buy-in should continue throughout this layered approach to the
development.
Liaison meetings between the multidisciplinary municipal and provincial project
management team and the consulting team should be held more frequently than
has been the case.
Meetings with specific line department officials are crucial. Respondents maintain
that while project-team meetings between a consulting team and the
multidisciplinary municipal project team are helpful, follow-up meetings with
specific line department officials would assist in clarifying specific project issues.
The developer has to pay bulk services levies to the City for every unit that it
constructs. While the levies for gap housing have been reduced, respondents
contend that a further reduction would stimulate the construction and provision of
gap housing in urban renewal nodes.
Thorough integrated planning and application of all spatial development
frameworks is crucial to ensure compatibility with current and future
developments.
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The dispersion of different line functions across the city adds time to the
approvals process as documents need to travel from one official to the next. A
‘one-stop shop’ where all officials dealing with various steps of a process are
centralised in one location has been proposed.
The financial margins for a developer are low and the risks high. The publicprivate partnership could be improved if government provides a social housing
subsidy to a developer or the gap housing recipients. This would be an incentive
for more developers to enter into such partnerships for the provision of affordable
housing.
14.8 Conclusion
The Watergate Estate development is a trailblazer in the provision of affordable housing
in Cape Town. The hurdles it faced have been overcome so that it should be easier for the
developer of a similar project, learnt lessons from the Watergate Estate experience. The
URP has a number of selection criteria for projects. The degree to which the Watergate
Estate project meets these criteria is provided in Table 13.
Table 13: Degree of fulfilment of URP selection criteria by the Watergate Estate
development
Selection criteria
Watergate Estate development scorecard
for URP projects
Partnerships
The development is the first public-private affordable housing development
in the City of Cape Town. The URP provides municipal process assistance
and can leverage funds from the national URP fund for items in the
development. The developer constructs the development and hands over the
public spaces and facilities to the City.
Community
contributions
The construction of the development has created 500 jobs. Certain
subcontracting operations have been awarded to companies from Mitchells
Plain. However, it has been identified that, in future, a larger component of
sweat equity should be from the local community. It is also envisaged that
the development would create approximately 250 permanent jobs in the
commercial precinct and in the maintenance of the development.
Multi-sectoral impact
The Watergate Estate development addresses housing, social and economic
needs. It delivers affordable gap housing, provides public facilities for
residents of Mitchells Plain and creates job opportunities through the mixeduse development which includes a commercial precinct.
Representation
The development contributes to housing requirements in the gap housing
market. The public facilities are not for the exclusive use of the residents but
are open to all. The boulevard through Phase A of the development allows
for access to the Mitchells Plain District Hospital.
Sustainability
The sustainability of the development would be determined by the residents’
participation in the homeowners association (HOA). This is a challenge as
HOAs are new to the gap housing segment. It is envisaged that the URP
would play a facilitating role in the HOA.
Table 13 continues on next page
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Innovation
The high-density development has a focus on public transport and
pedestrianisation, which in itself is an innovative idea for gap housing in
Cape Town. The residents will have the opportunity to become active
participants in the affairs of the development through the HOA.
Ease of implementation
The URP has assisted the developer in identifying challenges in the
development process and has facilitated problem-solving of issues. There are
two problems that need attention: the finalisation of the access road and the
process of approval of building plans.
It is feasible that the Watergate Estate development will become a benchmark in housing
developments for first-time homeowners, but this would requires full commitment and
dedication from all participants in the development.
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15. Kuyasa Housing Clean
Development Mechanism Project
Photos: Authors
15.1 Background
Kuyasa is located approximately 30 km south-east of the Cape Town CBD and is a
newly-formalised part of the Khayelitsha area. Originally an informal settlement, the area
was upgraded through the provision of a number of low cost housing units and basic
services. The Kuyasa Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) pilot project involves the
retrofitting of 2300 of these low-cost homes with solar water geysers (SWGs), insulated
ceilings and energy-efficient lighting. The project has seen an immediate and significant
impact on the social, health and economic well-being of the targeted residents. This is
South Africa’s first internationally-registered CDM project under the Kyoto Protocol on
climate change. It is also the first Gold Standard Project to be registered in the world. The
Kuyasa project has generated significant interest locally and internationally as a pilot for
the energy-efficient adaptation and retrofitting of South African low-cost housing. The
CDM “allows emission-reduction projects in developing countries to earn certified
emission reduction (CER) credits, each equivalent to one tonne of CO2. These CERs can
be traded and sold, and used by industrialized countries to a meet a part of their emission
reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol. The mechanism stimulates sustainable
development and emission reductions, while giving industrialized countries some
flexibility in how they meet their emission reduction limitation targets. The CDM is the
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main source of income for the UNFCCC adaptation fund was established to finance
adaptation projects and programmes in developing country Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. The Adaptation
Fund is financed by a 2% levy on CERs issued by the CDM”
(http://www.cdmupdate.com/cdmglossary.asp).
15.2 Overview of the project
Steve Thorne of South South North (SSN) considered the Clean Development
Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol and wondered whether he and his colleagues could
develop a project that addressed sustainable development and a reduction in emissions.
Through Thorne’s conversations with colleagues and with Sustainable Energy Africa he
met Monwabisi Booi, a City of Cape Town official in the URP office. Thorne suggested
that they initiate a CDM project in Kuyasa.
From 1999 to 2002 Thorne and the SSN team developed a proposal for the Kuyasa CDM
project for the City of Cape Town. They then presented the concept to the Kuyasa
residents through community meetings. The aim was to retrofit the 2309 RDP houses in
Kuyasa SWGs, insulated ceilings and compact fluorescent light (CFL) bulbs. This would
improve the thermal and energy efficiency of the existing low-cost houses. At one of
these meetings Zuko Ndamane volunteered to be the community facilitator to steer local
implementation. Ten houses were piloted in 2003 to allow submission of the project for
UNFCCC registration. Between 2003 and 2006 Thorn secured funds for the development
and the registration of the project as a CDM project. Mr Osman Asmal (Director: ERM,
CoCT) secured approximately R24 million (US$3.2 million) in public funding from the
national Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) through positioning
the project as part of the national government’s Expanded Public Works Programme
(EPWP) and from the Provincial Department of Housing. The Department of
Environmental Affairs and Development Planning was responsible for directing EPWP
funding which targets the reduction and alleviation of unemployment, towards
environmental projects. The department invited proposals from interested projects and
organisations.
DEAT selected Agama Energy as the implementer for the project in August 2006 and
DEAT paid Agama to produce a business plan. The draft plan was rejected as it did not
take the 30% work-creation requirement of the EPWP into account. It was also criticized
for being based on a conservative civil engineering approach which could not deliver the
2309 installations within the allocated budget (Goldman, 2010). A revised plan was
tabled which met the 30% requirement through the reduction of the number of homes to
around 680. But no implementer was appointed for the project.
Carl and Pieter Wesselink of the South African Export Development Fund (SAEDF)
were becoming increasingly interested in climate change. As friends of Steve Thorne, the
Wesselinks had become aware of the Kuyasa CDM project. The Wesselinks and Thorne
reworked the Kuyasa CDM project implementation business plan and presented it to the
City of Cape Town and the DEAT. Significant decreases in administration and transport
budget lines were presented as well as the reallocation of some costs, such as value added
tax (VAT) (Goldman, 2010). They proposed a reduction in the capital costs per unit and
suggested the use of local Kuyasa residents for installation and administration roles. The
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SAEDF offered to underwrite any cost over the R24 million DEAT grant and to recover
it over time from future income from the Kuyasa residents and the carbon credits. Carbon
credits is a “generic term to assign a value to a reduction or offset of greenhouse gas
emissions. A carbon credit is usually equivalent to one tonne of carbon dioxide
equivalent (CO2-e). A carbon credit can be used by a business or individual to reduce
their carbon footprint by investing in an activity that has reduced or sequestered
greenhouse
gases
at
another
site”
(http://www.epa.vic.gov.au/climatechange/glossary.asp#CAM). Their business plan was accepted and SAEDF were
appointed as the implementer.
15.3 Project selection
Steve Thorne met Monwabisi Booi through the work of SSN and SEA. As an URP
official, Booi was to become the technical champion of the project. Boos suggested that
they create a CDM project in Kuyasa as community access was relatively easy and the
area was clearly defined through the recently-developed RDP housing scheme. From
1999 to 2002 Thorne and the SSN team developed the project idea for the City of Cape
Town and began presenting the concept to the Kuyasa residents. This was billed as a pilot
project to be expanded throughout low-cost housing development in Khayelitsha.
15.4 Project objectives
The project’s main objective was to implement the retrofitting of the 2309 existing lowcost RDP houses with SWGs, insulated ceilings and compact fluorescent light bulbs,
within the revised budget of approximately R33 million. Thirty percent of this budget is
to be used for local job creation and skills development. The training was a combination
of in-house skills transfer, where an insourced technical expert would spend time with the
local team until they were competent to complete the installations by themselves, and
outsourced accredited training (to gain certificates in their specific skill). This was also a
clear requirement of the EPWP. In addition, training was provided to one person from
each house in Kuyasa. This included training on the use and safety of the SWGs and
compact fluorescent light bulbs and employment-focused life skills.
15.5 Project preparation and design
The Wesselinks and Thorne reworked the original Kuyasa CDM project implementation
business plan and presented this to the City and the DEAT. The implementation plan
made provisions for a light inside each house and another outside, accompanied by the
wiring and plug points for safe use of electricity. The focus was on installing the most
appropriate technology that was affordable. The project struggled to acquire a SWG
within the approximately R3000 (US$400) budget. An imported ‘Genergy’ solar water
geyser was sourced from a new local importer (with the required approval from the South
African Bureau of Standards (SABS)). Regular meetings facilitated by Mr Ndamane,
were held with the community and its leaders.
The focus on job creation and skills transfer was imperative. A number of training
sessions were held and local labour was used. Difficulties arouse in using local
contractors and suppliers due to small stockholdings and the high prices charged for
supplies. A community liaison officer was appointed from the community through an
interview process conducted by Carl Wesselink and Zuko Ndamane. A project advisory
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committee was also set up to meet regularly at the City of Cape Town. Unfortunately
these were poorly attended.
15.6 Institutional arrangements
The Kuyasa CDM project is a collaborative partnership between the City of Cape Town,
the national Department of Water and Environmental Affairs (DEAT (now DWEA), the
provincial Department of Housing and Local Government, the SAEDF and the
community of Kuyasa (Figure 16). These partners were brought together through the
private efforts of a driven technical champion, Steve Thorne. Although the CoCT has
input on the project, they see themselves in observer and advisory roles. DWEA requires
that maintenance and monitoring be undertaken and paid for by the City of Cape Town
from the income derived from the sale of carbon credits. The Kuyasa project was
developed by the NGO South South North (SSN) for the City of Cape Town’s
Environmental Resource Management department and URP. The Department of
Environment and Tourism's (DEAT's), Social Responsibility Programme and provincial
government’s Department of Housing provided the funding for retrofitting of 2300
houses in Kuyasa. This started in August 2008 and was completed in October 2010. Zuko
Mdamane, who works out of the CDM project office in Kuyasa, managed the relationship
between the community and SAEDF. The relationship between the SAEDF and the City
is collaborative.
Figure 16: Project participants (SAEDF: Proposed structural relationship
(Goldman, 2010)
15.7 Project management arrangements and implementation
The project was managed by the implementer SAEDF with funds provided by the EPWP
which required that the project ensure skills transfers, and the development and provision
of jobs for the local community. The project is owned by the City of Cape Town. A key
to the project management was the joint decision to make sure that implementation was
done prior to trading the certified emission reductions (CERs). This was done to
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minimize the risk. The project managed to secure funding from a number of partners,
namely amounts from the Provincial Government of the Western Cape (PGWC) and
ICLEI (~R4.7 million) and the National Department of Environment and Tourism
(DEAT) through its Poverty Alleviation Funding (provisional amount of approximately
R25 million including VAT). Much of this funding was sourced to leverage job creation
opportunities through environmental or tourism-related project implementation.
The DEAT funding was insufficient to support the technology-intensive nature of the
project so that fewer houses were retrofitted. The City of Cape Town is in partnership
with the DEAT currently looking into the institutional requirements (i.e. community
development trust) that will ensure the further sustainable maintenance of the project, as
well as future funding options. This will include the possible forward trading of CERs for
sustainable and manageable implementation for the remaining houses in the project.
15.8 Lesson learnt and best-practice proposals
A number of lessons have emerged from this pilot project. Those respondents
interviewed who were involved in aspects of the project, as well as members of the
development implementing team, agreed that it was a learning process for all involved.
This project was a first of its kind and it engendered a number of shared learning
experiences. Some of the issues raised could be addressed to help guide similar projects
initiated in the city. Twenty three lessons are recounted below in six rubrics.
Nodal selection
• Project selection in other instances has tended to be more political than
competitive. In this case the selection of Kuyasa as project area came about
through a number of meetings of interested parties and by virtue of the area’s ease
of access and defined boundaries.
Defining project objectives
• A comprehensive business plan must be developed to help secure support from all
levels of government. The business plan must involve objectives that meet the
needs of the community and these objectives must be communicated to the
community in public forums.
• The City of Cape Town has no clear mandate for projects of this nature and
therefore the institutional and project championing processes were difficult. The
City needs a clear vision and mandate for projects of this nature.
Project preparation and design
• This project must be orientated towards social and local economic development as
well as infrastructure development. This allows for delivery, community
satisfaction and capacity building.
• The location of a project office within the community and the use of a community
liaison are crucial to the success of the project as they provide a sense of
ownership and involvement.
• The community’s needs have to be embraced in formal agreements - from the
preliminary visionary phase to the maintenance phase of the project.
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Institutional arrangements
• The use of local leaders and the Khayelitsha Development Forum played a
significant role from the outset. This helped to sustain community capacity
building over the lifespan of the project. It is important to prepare communities to
engage with the opportunities and impacts of the project.
• There were difficulties with intergovernmental transfers as a result of inflexible
legislation. The use of the EPWP however meant that funds were able to be
transferred more readily to the implementers. The CoCT pays only on delivery
whilst the DEAT pays upfront. This made a significant difference to the project as
very little work was undertaken at risk. The CoCT still owned the project but it
was funded and developed by the DEAT and managed by the implementer.
• Having a dedicated URP team within the City of Cape Town privides for a
community link to the City and adequate staffing to be allocated to the project.
• The different approaches of the partners provoked tension one needs to be aware
of and which needs to be managed carefully.
Project management arrangements
• The ownership of the project by the City with leveraging of funds through the
EPWP meant that the community received training and skills-based work and
funding was available for the project.
• The use of CDM and CERs promoted for international recognition and the
sustainability of the project through the ultimate sale of the CERs.
• The pace of delivery was slow and the community became frustrated at some
stages with the project process. What is ‘government speed; is not necessarily the
community’s speed.
• Sustained community capacity building was key to engagement with the Kuyasa
residents and provided a sense of ownership and responsibility among residents.
• The use of an implementer was key as this provided for accountability and for the
adequate implementation of the project.
• Ownership must be maximised fully from the beginning of the project.
• Building human capacity around certain aspects of project design, most notably
energy efficiency and renewable energy and the development of a social
awareness and an understanding of the link between the environment and energy
consumption, were central to project implementation but could be broadend.
• Having an internal project manager (in this case through Kader Meyer at DEAT)
to monitor expenditure, and an external implementer (SAEDF) to project manage
daily implementation and public participation was vital.
Broadening of economic ownership
• The project was a collaborative partnership between the City of Cape Town, the
national Department of Water and Environmental Affairs (DEAT (now DEA), the
provincial Department of Housing and Local Government, the SAEDF and the
community of Kuyasa. Involving the community as a partner and through
harnessing the strengths of all involved, the project was strengthened. This also
enhanced intergovernmental integration and coordination.
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•
•
•
•
Unlike Special Presidential Projects on Urban Renewal (SIPPs), URP projects are
not located within a clear policy or programmatic framework in the beginning
(resulting in an absence of clear criteria). This was a concern in this case.
This project sought to contribute to as wide a spectrum of the community as
possible, however this was limited by budget restrictions. Budgets need to be
structured and focussed.
Community ownership is key. The community pays a small fee each month for
the solar water geyser. This fee was set through negotiation with the community
leaders and residents.
A maintenance budget is essential for sustainability. This has been tackled by the
use of CERs and fees from the community, but further funding will be needed.
15.9 Summary
The Kuyasa development is acclaimed as an innovative and groundbreaking project in
Cape Town. The lessons learnt from this project will assist execution of similar projects.
The URP has a number of project selection criteria and the degree to which the Kuyasa
project fulfils these criteria is provided in Table 14.
Table 14: Fulfilment of URP selection criteria by the Kuyasa Housing CDM project
Selection criteria
Kuyasa development scorecard
for URP projects
Partnerships
Community
contributions
Multi-sectoral
impact
Representation
Sustainability
Innovation
The project was a collaborative partnership between the City of Cape Town, the
national Department of Water and Environmental Affairs (DEAT (now DEA),
the Provincial Department of Housing and Local Government, the SAEDF and
the community of Kuyasa. Involving the community as a partner was a key to
the success of this project. The URP offices at the City of Cape Town also
provided assistance on the ground and served at the community’s direct link to
the City.
The energy-efficient technology training, targeting 2309 people, was delivered
by Ndamane and his project team. Life skills training for this same group are
facilitated through full-time trainers. To date, 50 of the Kuyasa residents have
been sent on specific employment-related training (Goldman, 2010). The Kuyasa
CDM project head office in Cape Town has employed six people on its staff.
The project has created 87 job opportunities for local community members in
Kuyasa, The community has also been able to save on energy costs.
The Kuyasa project addresses environmental, social and economic needs. It
delivers energy-efficient and energy saving systems to the community and has
provided skills training, awareness raising and job opportunities for the
community.
All members of the community were represented regardless of financial or
economic situations, gender or age.
The sale of the carbon credits has allowed for monitoring and continued support
for the project. The Gold Standard certification and CER certification require
that maintenance is provided for the installations. The national and international
acclaim for this project has also allowed for its sustainability. The CDM office in
Kuyasa ensured continued support and communication within the project.
The use of a CDM model and the registration of this project with the UNFCC
have been an innovative moves on the part of the developers. This caters for
sustainability and for ongoing support and acclaim. The focus on the community
and continued participation has taken on an innovative approach with the use of
local economic forums, community liaison officers and local community
representation.
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Ease of
implementation
The URP has assisted the developer in identifying challenges in the development
process and has facilitated problem solving of issues. This process has had a
number of setbacks, particularly in terms of financial spending and sustainability
as well as the differences in approach between the partners. This has been a pilot
project and a number of lessons emerged. These lessons were experienced with
the community and its partners and that will strengthen further roll-out.
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16. Swartklip Multipurpose Sports
Complex (MSC)
A R65 Million White Elephant?
The Swartklip MSC during and after construction
(Photos source: http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=531108)
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16.1 Background
The rationale for the development of sport complexes in URP nodes in poor communities
is neatly encapsulated within the following quotation: “Culture and leisure have become
part of the neighbourhood renewal process [and] if having nowhere to go and nothing
constructive to do is as much a part of living in a distressed community as poor housing
or high crime levels, culture and sport provide a good part of the answer to rebuilding a
decent quality of life there’ (Percy & Abbott, 2001). Sport and recreation are basic human
needs for having a sustainable life. The manifest value of multisports complexes for daily
use is shown in Figure 17.
VALUE OF MULTIPURPOSE SPORTS COMPLEXES FOR DAILY USE
FUNCTIONAL ATTRIBUTE
(It allows people to know that places are
available for leisure/recreational activities)
Individual
leisure/
recreational
activities
Group leisure/
recreational
activities
Public leisure/
recreational
activities
AESTHETIC ATTRIBUTE
(It allows residents to feel comfortable and
to take pride in a community facility)
Visual amenity
Natural scenery and architectural styles
Aural amenity
Human voice, sound of wind, rain and
creatures
Tactual amenity
Sunshine, wind, material senses
Olfactory amenity
Fresh air, aromas and smells
Health amenity
Breaking continuous building patterns,
enhancing quality of life, better mental
health, stress relief, self-confidence,
relaxation, independence, therapeutic
benefits (gives people a hobby) and forms a
relationship between people
Economic amenity
Property values nearby complexes will
increase
SUSTAINABL ECOLOGICAL
DESIGNS
(Ensures that the environment is
protected through sustainable green
planning)
Improves microclimate
Water retention
Environmental quality
and function
Biodiversity protection
Protecting wildlife
habitats
Traffic control – through
providing ‘greenway
transportation systems’
Fire-hazard reduction
Figure 17: The value of multipurpose sports complexes according to functional, aesthetic
and ecological attributes (Adapted from Willemse, 2010)
As far as public facilities are concerned, the Urban Renewal SDF identifies some key
challenges:
• how to ensure more accessible facilities and improve their contribution to safer,
quality public environments;
• the potential for reinforcement of existing public-facility clusters; and
• the possibilities for integration between facilities and open space.
The aim, according to the Urban Renewal SDF’s public facilities and spaces strategic
focus is to contribute to:
• a safer urban environment;
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•
•
a structure of facilities and spaces that is socially equitable ensuring improved
access to services and amenities; and
an urban structure that supports the agglomeration of economic activity at
accessible places.
Several strategies for public facilities and spaces are proposed to inform intervention.
These relate to:
• The form and location of provision (reinforcing the main structuring elements of
activity nodes, activity routes and metropolitan open space system (MOSS).
• The way in which facilities are managed. Two sets of criteria obtain in this regard.
- Social facility clusters: Rather than providing numerous single facilities, social
facilities should be clustered at activity nodes, near associated public transport
hubs and strong corridors of pedestrian movement. The Swartklip facility meets
the criteria.
- Clustering social facilities is promoted as it improves the accessibility of facilities
and opportunities; it increases the opportunity for facility sharing; and it
contributes to efficient delivery of services. Also, the order of facility provision
should be informed by the conceptual framework and the hierarchy of activity
nodes and routes (MCA Africa, 2006.). The Swartklip facility meets partially the
criteria.
16.2 Project objectives
As one of the URP presidential anchor projects, the development of a multipurpose
regional sports complex in Mitchells Plain is in the ambit of social cohesion that seeks to
build resilient communities where the facility serves to integrate Mitchells Plain and
Khayelitsha (URP Cabinet Lekgotla report, 2010). The site, Swartklip, is located on the
corner of Spine and Swartklip Roads, adjacent to the Tafelsig suburb in Mitchells Plain.
It is aimed that the complex would have:
• The best possible location within the Mitchells Plain and Khayelitsha
communities to ensure accessibility. (The facility is located on the major taxi and
bus routes linking the two communities).
• The best possible location within the two communities to ensure integration
through participation in sport and recreation.
• To promote sport in the Urban Renewal Programme as one of the measures to
uplift communities, especially vulnerable groups such as the youth.
• To provide a safe and secure regional sports complex to serve the communities of
Mitchells Plain and Khayelitsha
(http://www.capetown.gov.za/en/MediaReleases/Pages/SODTurnForR15Million.aspx).
Further ambitious objectives of the complex were to:
• Create employment through identifying certain skill levels within the pool of
unemployed.
• Create an environment that is conducive as tourist attraction.
• Minimise crime.
• Unify the different sports codes through effective communication.
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•
Uplift the standards of the community through ‘building bridges’ by installing
proper integrated infrastructure and providing effective service delivery.
Initially it was aimed that the complex be completed to host the South African Games in
2005. The target completion date was not achieved so that the aim was reset to use the
facility as a public viewing area and training ground for teams attending the 2010 FIFA
World Cup. The latter did not materialise.
16.3 The Swartklip MSC in the context of the greater Swartklip area
The greater Swartklip area – the open space between Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain –
was identified as an “exploration area” in the MP SDF (2006). Spatially, the Swartklip
area serves as a potential and useful strategic integrative space given its location between
Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain. Thus, development of this area would be an exercise in
social engineering of socially integrating segregated black and coloured communities.
Given the highly politicised and volatile race-space dynamics of these two areas such an
approach had to be carefully managed and the SDF recommended that it was critical that
a ‘high-level’ political driver be identified to champion this initiative. Engagement is
required at this level to ensure that decisions regarding future use are considered jointly
and result in mutually-satisfactory outcomes both for the landowners and the city.
Integration, according to the SDF, can occur by means of the development of physical
linkages through the site which could improve east-west connectivity between
Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain, unlocking new energies and economic opportunities.
The site also holds the potential to accommodate uses serving the needs of both areas and
other surrounding areas. These uses would promote the site as a functionally more
integrated part of the urban renewal nodes. To promote this vision of integration it was
envisaged that the MSC would accommodate a mix of uses, including a significant new
housing component and public facilities; new commercial and light industrial activity;
and a higher-order recreational amenity serving the significantly large surrounding
population. A key challenge to urban renewal SDF is how to provide equitable access to
public facilities in a cost-efficient manner while recognising the limits to public resources
(MCA Africa, 2006).
Some useful lessons issue from the above anticipated planning developments of the
broader Swartklip area for consideration in the Swartklip MSC context. Creating an
integrative space requires a full-time commitment from a political champion or
champions. In a dual-natured area such as Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain a neutral
political champion would have been hard to find. Perhaps someone openly non-aligned to
any political party but potentially allied to sport, for example Danny Jordaan or a soccer
star such as Lucas Radebe, would have been a sensible choice as ‘political champion’.
Although the complex is located along a major road network, a special transport-linkage
facility between the site and Khayelitsha was needed to entice residents to use the facility.
The mixing of uses at the complex required thoughtful planning and a well-advised
selection of the specific uses really needed. It is noteworthy that the Swartklip MSC,
located on the south-western fringe of Mitchells Plain, is not recommended in the SDF as
the core of socio-spatial integration through a public facility and recreational amenity.
Hence it loses its original intended aim of being an integrative public sports and
recreational space.
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16.4 Project preparation and design
The project provides for a major sports complex in a ‘well-located area’ that is accessible
from Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain, but more so for the latter. According to the URP,
the facility complements the integration initiative of the two nodes but how this is to be
achieved is open for debate. Similarly, in the application for MIG funding the following
justification for additional funding was made:
“It has become apparent that community building and integration at all
levels can be effectively achieved through the development of sports
facilities and programmes and this has become a key aspect of the
Presidential Urban Renewal programme. In terms of the increased
focus on sports facilities and programmes, this project has taken on far
greater significance and requires additional funding” (Alistor Graham,
20043).
Concerning costs, various budget amounts had been submitted in a range of sources
(minutes of meetings, documentation of the URP office, official documentation), but the
most reliable source (Cabinet Lekgotla Report, 2010) estimated the project to cost about
R63 million which included the construction of the 1000-seating stadium. The project
commenced in 2003/4 and was completed in 2010. However, due to vandalism and theft,
numerous revamping projects have taken place since 2006.
There were five phases to the development.
Phase 1 - commenced 2003/4
Erection of palisade fencing, gates and entrances.
Phase 2
This entailed the installation of automated irrigation system for the hockey fields, sinking
of two boreholes to feed the irrigation system, construction of berms with tree planting,
re-alignment of fields and accommodation of different sporting codes on the fields
(soccer, rugby, hockey, cricket, baseball, softball), and the development of multipurpose
hard-surface courts.
The first two phases were funded by the Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure
Programme (R7 million). A delay in securing additional funding for phase 3 caused the
project to be stalled for ten months. The director of sport and recreation services recorded
that the delay in the awarding of the contract was the CoCT’s fault because they had to
source the funding for the project. It was feared that the project as originally envisaged
was to be put on hold for an undetermined period. At that stage there were no public
ablution facilities (other than those directly linked to the player’s dressing rooms), no
formalised meeting space(s) for community gatherings and no additional spaces for
extramural sports events, all of which were to be incorporated in the sports hall.
The project architect suggested a phased approach in anticipation of additional funding
being secured. This proposal was rejected by the community steering committee as well
as the councillors. The architects had in the interim rationalised the design to effect cost
3
Application form for additional MIG funding for Swartklip Regional Sports Complex, 15 November 2004.
- 112 -
savings without compromising quality. Apparently, the decision to redesign was never
reverted leading to the Tafelsig Sports and Recreation Council to voice their resentment
at the building structure that did not conform to the original design and that most of the
essential community facilities were omitted. MIG funds to the tune of R15 million were
approved in January 2005 for phase three. A public sector amount of R8.2 million was
granted at the time. The first two phases cost R24 million.
Phase two was marred by numerous cases of theft (e.g. fencing, water taps and poles
were stolen), construction stoppages by local subcontractors occurred, vandalism (sand
and oil thrown into engines of building machinery) was rife, high-level of intimidation by
community residents took place and, uncontrolled access points provided easy access by
unwanted persons and even grazing cows!
Phase 3 - construction of the multipurpose indoor sport facility
This phase included the creation of a conference and boardroom facility. The total cost of
the phase was said to be R33 million. The brief for the Swartklip indoor sports complex
made provision for a range of state-of-the-art facilities, and all the concomitant facilities
of a complex of this nature, namely
• a main hall to accommodate two basketball courts side by side with spectator
seating;
• an activity room for meetings and karate and table tennis;
• a kitchen and tuckshop;
• men’s and women’s toilets with special facilities for the disabled;
• men’s and women’s dressing rooms;
• outdoor courts for basketball, tennis and netball;
• storerooms for equipment;
• a public foyer;
• offices for the manager, a staffroom, a community office, a first-aid room and a
gymnasium; and
• utility rooms.
A positive about the project is the fact that strong emphasis was placed on the facility
conforming to sustainable ‘green’ design principles by enhancing the use of natural light,
passive-active heating and cooling systems that would ensure energy and resource
efficiency.
Phase 4 - commenced in October 2009
This included the construction of 1000-s’eat soccer stadium that served as ‘fan jol’
(public viewing area) during the 2010 FIFA World Cup.
Phase 5- construction of the ablution facilities, landscaping, and synthetic-surfaced
soccer field.
The overall estimated budget for the completed project amounted to R65 million (Cabinet
Lekgotla Report, 2010).
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16.5 Project management arrangements and implementation
The URP played a prominent role in setting-up a project steering committee after
conception of the MSC. The committee was to have been operationalised until
construction ceased, but this did not happen. The committee’s role was to identify and
prioritise projects, compile the list of contract labourers, ensure that people employed
hailed from the community (Tafelsig, Beacon Valley and Eastridge), and monitor
construction. Specific partners identified for the project were the national Department of
Sport and Recreation, the provincial Department of Sport and Recreation, CoCT, Sports
Trust (for provision of equipment), and the South African Sport Commission (responsible
for training). The extent to which these partners participated in the process is unclear and
the interviews pointed to their being involved in name only, little more than window
dressing to give the project the necessary clout to be continued.
Key actors in the process were:
• Tafelsig Steering Committee (Tafelsig sport and recreation council)
• Director: Development Integration and Support (Baku Safiodin)
• Jacobs Wolters & Associates, architects and urban planners
• Boshard Construction
• Health and safety agent – Kayad Consulting Engineers
• Engineers – Axis Engineers
• Quantity surveyors – LdV Qs
• Mitchells Plain Development Forum
• Greater MP Sport and Recreation Council
• Sports Trust
16.6 Lessons learnt
Decisions made in a sports project context, particularly those related to facility location,
design and financing, are little different from those made in business enterprises. Once a
commitment to a sports facility is made, changes are difficult to implement.
Understanding cultural changes which influence the way people live and play is
necessary in making sound decisions about facility design, location and financing. In
retrospect the decisionmaking, planning and (lack of) implementation of Swartklip MSC
were found to be myopic.
Given time constraints and limited access to documentation and persons willing to
engage with the consultants on the development, some lessons to be learnt from the
project’s execution are discussed below under 14 headings.
•
A fragmented and uncoordinated management system characterises the Swartklip
MSC case study concerning the capacity of the city to manage and maintain vital
elements of public facilities such as multipurpose centres, markets and stalls.
From interviewees it became clear that there was never an operational plan nor a
facility development framework formulated for this development. The SDF
warned that “Issues regarding the lack of management and maintenance of
facilities and spaces could jeopardise the value of new capital investments and
thus is a critical aspect to consider when developing facilities. Whilst constraints
exist, the urban renewal strategy could view the need to improve management and
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maintenance of public resources as an opportunity to promote local skills
development and job creation through partnerships with local organizations”
(MCA Africa, 2006: 77). The most important lesson to be taken from this project
is that the proper and full management and communities’ use of sports and
community facilities are just as significant as the establishment (construction) of
the facilities.
•
‘Crisis management is not project management’. It was negotiated upfront,
through the existing institutional public-stakeholder structures, that the contract’s
participation goal of employing labourers be increased to 30% and that local
labour and participation by small businesses had to be included. The construction
tender was awarded to Boshard Construction Pty Ltd. In 2005 the contractor met
with the Mitchells Plain Emerging Business Consortium which was not part of the
negotiation phase through the MPDF. Consortium members were aggrieved that
none of their members was appointed as subcontractors. They charged that
because Boshard did not advertise in local newspapers they were not informed
about MSC-related work opportunities. Boshard used a database from which they
selected employees but none of the consortium members was on the ‘incomplete’
database. The members requested disclosure of the BEE status of Boshard, proof
that the 30% allocation to local subcontractors not only be labour, and that the
wage rates for the different trades which were offered to the already-appointed
contractors be tabled. In June 2005 Boshard informed the project managers that,
in compliance with the provision of clause 43.1 (1) of the general conditions of
contract for civil engineering and building works, there would be a delay in
completing the project. The emerging business consortium demanded that
Boshard undertake no further on-site work until their requests had been met. In
addition, if their demands were ignored they would not guarantee the safety of
any worker on site. The key lesson here is that it should not be the task of URP
mangers to manage crises such as strikes and protests. Dealing with disgruntled
community forums and representatives as part of project management is
unavoidable, but if the MPDF was constituted for the right reasons with the right
intentions, situations such as the above could have been avoided.
•
Co-location of facilities can substantially cut the costs of providing services and
bulk infrastructure, such as roads, water and electricity. Multipurpose centres, or
‘one-stop shops’, are widely regarded as an important means of offering a broad
range of services to communities and they can be a key delivery mechanism for
addressing service delivery in areas of need. Furthermore, aligning such centres
along the primary public transport system offers the dual advantage of improving
access to services and enhancing the viability of the public transport system
(Green, Morojele & De Jong, 2007). However, in the case of Swartklip this is still
to materialise because there is no post-construction operational plan in place for
the facility.
•
The Swartklip MSC can be considered an orphaned organisational structure
where no single line department really wants to commit to making the facility
work successfully. Some interviewees lay the blame at the door of the department
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of Sport and Recreation, others blame the URP nodal manager and others point to
the community structures. In this regard, the project lost momentum from a
community involvement point of view once the MPDF collapsed, enforcing the
sentiments that those wanting to be part of the process were only there for their
own benefit and self-interest. No community organisation has since taken
‘ownership’ of the process, resulting in an operational vacuum.
•
Artificial social and spatial engineering. A primary objective of the Swartklip
MSC has been the provision of an accessible facility mainly for the communities
of Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain, and the promotion of sport within the URP as
one of the measures for uplifting the community. In the words of the then mayor
Mfeketo “this facility is proof of our City government’s commitment to remove
the artificial barriers which divided Cape Town and its people. The Swartklip
Regional Sports Complex will assist in bonding the communities of Tafelsig and
Khayelitsha”
(http://www.capetown.gov.za/en/MediaReleases/Pages/MayorInspectsProgress.as
px).
An artificial process of forging a bond between two highly-segregated
communities through the creation of a facility without establishing any social
development programme for social integration, was a thoughtless effort. The
various sporting codes and clubs that could benefit from the facility were never
summoned to negotiate with the two community representative structures. In
documentation studied, more specifically the application for MIG funding, it is
stated that the benefitting community is that of Mitchells Plain. To expect the
facility to spatially integrate Khayelistha and Mitchells Plain was overambitious
because the complex’s location within Mitchells Plain would inevitably be
perceived as a facility created for Mitchells Plain residents.
There is also a discernable lack of buy-in from Khayelitsha. The official stance on
the Swartklip MSC is that the development falls in the ambit of social cohesion
that seeks to build resilient communities with the facility serving to integrate
Mitchells Plain and Khayelitsha (URP Cabinet Lekgotla report, 2010). Spatially,
however the Swartklip MSC is located within the confines of Mitchells Plain and
so engenders a geopolitical sense of owner- and usership. There was no buy-in
from Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF) from the start of the project.
Numerous invitations were sent to the KDF to attend meetings but the minutes of
the Swartklip Project Steering Committee of 1 April 2004 stated that the KDF
made a choice not to be present at the meetings. KDF was subsequently invited to
Mitchells Plain Nodal Steering Committee meetings and requested to nominate
representatives to serve on the committee. This never materialised.
•
Providing direction, alignment and coordination of plans and investment
priorities. The need to provide better alignment between bulk utility infrastructure
spending and planning for a new development such the Swartklip MSC is crucial.
The provision, running and maintenance of this public facility resulted in
stretched operating budgets and the inability of authorities to ensure appropriate
service levels. Surprisingly, the recently-released Khayelitsha Mitchells Plain
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District Plan (2011) makes no mention of establishing a management framework
for the facility.
•
No action plan. The drawing up of an action plan with targets to maximise the
impact of sport and leisure policies in contributing to neighbourhood regeneration
and increasing local participation was never done. Principles that may help to
exploit the potential of sport in community regeneration include valuing diversity,
embedding local control, supporting local commitment, and connecting with the
mainstream of sports activities.
•
Ill-informed decisionmaking. Little research has been done on the regenerative
potential of investment in sport, or the long-term benefits to local communities of
sports-led investment strategies. Through research into this aspect of urban
renewal is crucial for successful project execution.
•
Understanding short-and long-term benefits. The short-term benefits of
multisport complexes are well known but international evidence points towards
little evidence of the medium- and long-term economic effects of sports event-led
economic regeneration strategies. Certainly, the building of a multipurpose sports
centre does lead to physical improvements to the appearance of neglected areas,
raised confidence in the surrounding community – which previously had a ‘bad
reputation’ – and significant employment benefits in the management of the
facility (Sport England, 2001). Unfortunately this is not the case in Swartklip.
•
Cheap political gains from project. Claiming kudos for the construction and
execution of anchor projects, such as Swartklip MSC has been a major lesson in
cheap politicking. The current political party in power, the DA, claimed in their
2011 local government election manifesto that they have been proud to be
involved in improving the environments of the KMP communities to build a more
inclusive city. Including people means, in part, making sure that they have the
facilities to enjoy the areas in which they live and thus their city. The construction
of the Swartklip sports facility is boasted as a prime example of this achievement.
The DA further proclaim to continue to dedicate resources for the building of
community centres and sports facilities. Evidently, the DA does not know that the
facility is considered by its technical and local champions to be a white elephant
and that it is flagrantly vandalised and lamentably underused with no operational
plan in place.
•
Better marketing of the idea of an integrative facility. In the perception survey
conducted in 2006 among a representative sample of KMP residents, the lack of
knowledge about the URP does not correspond with the level of knowledge
regarding the individual projects. Except for the Swartklip sports facility and
Colorado multipurpose centre, the majority of respondents was aware of the other
projects tested in the questionnaire. This finding is testimony to the failed
marketing of the complex as a ‘regional complex’ and ‘integrative space’.
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•
Tapping into the 2010 FIFA World Cup success. Four fan-park and publicviewing areas were used in Cape Town during the megaevent - Tygervalley
(Bellville Velodrome), Khayelitsha (Oliver Tambo), Athlone (Athlone Civic) and
Mitchells Plain (Swartklip Sports Complex). The Swartklip fan jol (Photo 11) had
an internal capacity of 850 and could accommodate 5000 outside. Both areas had
giant screens telecasting the event. The site played host to all manner of
entertainment, such as performances by well-known musicians (e.g. headline act
JR, of ‘Make the circle bigger’ fame, had supporters rocking on one of the event
days). Karaoke competitions also took place. As part of the commitment to
making sure that everybody was part of the world cup, the Fan Jol Committee
delivered free balls and vuvuzelas to Dengan and Ebenezer crèches. The outreach
programme extended to Lentegeur hospital, where Swartklip fan jol staff handed
out vuvuzelas and soccer balls to patients on Tuesday 22 June. Numbers of fans
at the fan jol increased as the tournament progressed and ended on a high note
with large numbers of excited fans gathering at the FIFA fan jols to watch the
closing ceremony and final match of the month-long tournament. where at
Swartklip the highest number of visitors for the day. On the latter occasion 9948
entered the gates. It is important that the capacity developed in facilitating these
activities during the World Cup serves as a platform for appointing a full
management team for the facility.
Photo 11: Swartklip MSC as fan jol during 2010 World Cup
•
Successful exercise in safety and security. Building on the lessons learned about
safety and security during the fan jol of the 2010 World Cup is crucial. The Urban
Renewal Programme partnership with the department of Community Safety
(DOCS), South African Police Services (SAPS) and the Community Police
Forums (CPFs), deployed Neighbourhood Watch (NHW) members at the
Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain public viewing areas (PVAs) during the 2010
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FIFA World Cup. The aim of the project was to increase the visibility of lawenforcement agencies so ensuring the safety of local soccer fans and visitors
entering Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain. It was envisaged that the PVAs would
not only attract the residents of Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain but also visitors
from outside the nodes, so that it was essential that everyone’s safety was ensured.
The URP, through its Social Crime Prevention project, facilitated the deployment
of NHW members to patrol in and around the PVAs. The objectives of the project
were:
- To re-enforce police visibility and deter crime; and
- To ensure that NHW members continue to participate actively in the prevention
of crime in their areas and become part of the World Cup legacy as citizens of the
country.
The project deployed 150 NHW members, with special focus on the 13 matches
played in Cape Town. URP managed the overall implementation of the project
which involved stakeholder engagement, providing selected resources, monitoring
and evaluation. The DOCS, CPFs and the NHW members took responsibility for
the development of the criteria for recruitment, the actual recruitment and the
appointment of NHW members in the two nodes. SAPS was responsible for the
provision of safety training in line with FIFA regulations, the deployment
schedule and transporting the NHW members home after late-night shifts. The
presence of NHW members increased the visibility of law enforcement and the
event has strengthened the partnership between NHW and the police. The event
has left a very positive legacy for Cape Town as a whole. The success was in part
due to both visitors and local fans feeling safe. No major crime incidents were
reported over the period in either Khayelitsha or Mitchells Plain. Stakeholders
interviewed unanimously agreed that feelings of safety were attributable to the
increased visibility of law enforcement and the presence of other City of Cape
Town departments such as Social Development and Disaster Management. All
departments worked together to make sure that the PVAs operated smoothly
(http://www.capetown.gov.za/en/urbanrenewal/Pages/DeploymentofVolunteersat
KhayelitshaandMitchellsPlainPublicViewingAreasduringthe2010FIFAWorldCup.
aspx). Now that the event is over, the successes in crime prevention must not lose
momentum.
•
Unforeseen environmental problems. The sports centre is located on the site of a
six-metre deep rubbish fill so that the foundations had to be designed accordingly
(a piled foundation system was used). Issues on the possible build-up of methane
gas produced by the dump’s garbage had to be investigated. Obtaining proper
environmental clearance upfront is therefore crucial in the construction phase of
similar projects.
16.7 Conclusion
In the most recent IDP (2007/8–2011/2012), the CoCT (2007/8) stated that they remain
committed to the URP and the upliftment of living conditions in the Mitchells Plain and
Khayelitsha areas though interventions such as the development of public places. In the
event of the URP continuing its work it is recommended that the shortcomings of the
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Swartklip multipurpose sports complex be addressed. To do this, a dedicated effort to
involve all relevant line departments (facility management, sport and recreation, spatial
planning, social development, URP, etc.) in formalising an operational plan, maintenance
framework, and social integration programme has to be afforded priority. The extent of
fulfilling the URP mandate at Swartklip MSC is summarised in Table 15.
Table 15: Swartklip MSC fulfilment of URP selection
Selection criteria
Swartklip development scorecard
for URP projects
Partnerships
Community
contributions
Multisectoral impact
Representation
Sustainability
Innovation
Partnerships fiddled away over time and there is no clear track record of
ownership.
Data on actual jobs created is unknown but it is clear that local labour did benefit
from the construction of the complex where certain subcontracting operations
were awarded to companies from Mitchells Plain.
As a mixed-use site, the impact has been minimal so far because of the lack of a
facility implementation strategy.
Although the aim of the project was to integrate the communities of Mitchells
Plain and Khayelitsha, this clearly has not happened. The site is viewed as being
representative of the Mitchells Plain community and to change these perceptions
will take considerable effort, planning and identifying a champion to steer the
process.
The sustainability of the complex is not doubted, but it will depend mainly on
the implementation of a facility implementation and operations plan that would
seek the necessary buy-in from sports bodies, clubs, organisations, schools and
communities to make this a viable sporting space.
There is clearly a lack of innovation as far as the management of the complex is
concerned.
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17. Khayelitsha Central Business District
(KCBD)
Photos: Authors
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17.1 Background and overview
Khayelitsha Central Business District (KCBD) is a unique development in South Africa.
The involvement of the Khayelitsha Community Trust (KCT) and its various subsidiary
companies as the major equity holder on behalf of the Khayelitsha community, in
particular, presents numerous learning opportunities.
Prior to 1990 the Khayelitsha node received very little public and hardly any private
investment. During this period the administration of Khayelitsha was shared between
Lingelethu West Black Local Authority and the Western Cape Provincial Government
(CoGTA, undated). The City of Tygerberg was established in 1996 and an Area
Management cluster was established in 1998 that included senior managers in the
disciplines of planning and economic development, engineering services, and
administration.
The historical development of the KCBD can be summarised as follows according to
MCA Africa (2006: 1); namely
1999-2001: Preparing for development
The process was initiated in 1999 when a development plan, undertaken by council, was
compiled for the CBD. A process of engagement between the community and council
was initiated and culminated in a stakeholders’ framework agreement which made
provision for an entity representing the community. Development principles were
identified as basis for the KCBD development and, amongst others, included partnership
and risk sharing (private and public sector and the community), equity and empowerment.
In 2001 a collaboration and cooperation agreement was signed between the City and
RMB and a joint operational team was established.
2002-2003: Toward partnership agreements
With the KCBD becoming an anchor project of the URP, a further round of planning was
undertaken over the period 2002 to 2003, including the following components:
• an urban development framework;
• an endorsed (first phase) financial plan, which identified funding arrangements
including private-sector debt funding;
• an approved institutional framework which made provision for the Khayelitsha
Community Trust (KCT) to exercise control over the process.
The responsibilities of the KCT included the acquisition of KCBD and other land,
procuring access to and use of land through a land availability agreement, and the
establishment of development entities to undertake developments.
2004-2005: Development of the Retail Centre
The development of the retail centre was enabled by a number of institutional and
financial arrangements building on those established during the earlier phases of the KBD
development. Through these arrangements, the KBD Management (Pty) Ltd (KManco)
was established by the KCT to act as the developer. KManco entered into a land lease
with the KCT, who in turn had entered into a land availability agreement with the City in
August 2004. KManco also entered into development and management agreements with
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Future Growth (the developer of the retail centre) and a loan agreement with RMB.
Furthermore, Future Growth entered into a turnkey-construction agreement with WBHO.
The majority of the elements of this phase were identified and planned as part of the
initial consultations with members of the Khayelitsha community, particularly those
councillors who later became core members of the KCT
Phase 2
This phase of the development will include extensions and improvements to the retail
centre and the transport interchange, a private academy, a mixed-use office complex,
offices for the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the South African Police
Services (SAPS) and the further development of the railway-station area, including
informal trading facilities and a transport interchange (National Treasury, 2010).
The proposed land use of the KCBD is shown in Figure 18.
Figure 18: Land use map of Khayelitsha CBD (GAPP Architects and Urban Designers,
2002)
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17.2 Project selection and objectives
The KBD was conceived and developed specifically to achieve township urban renewal
and to reverse underdevelopment of the apartheid era (CoGTA, undated). The project was
initiated at a time when many township areas were regarded as risky for commercial
development. By the late 1990s, the KBD consisted of a 73 ha of vacant land located
west of the Khayelitsha station. The project became the main anchor project for
Khayelitsha with its primary aim of establishing a vibrant and viable CBD in the area.
The private sector has also invested in the area in the form of a retail centre of 17 500 m².
Planned development occurring through private funding includes a new residential
development of between 1200 and 2500 units initially aimed at the gap housing market
(R180 000 – R250 000), a service station and municipal offices (MCA Africa, 2006: 59).
17.3 Project preparation and planning
Phase 1 of the KCBD project included a variety of components as summarised in Table
16. The retail centre was completed in December 2006 at a total capital cost of R86,5
million. Due to the high demand for trading space, a further 2 000 m² were developed
(CoGTA, undated).
Table 16: Phase 1 of KCBD
Element
Identified / originated by
Bulk services and road infrastructure
Regional magistrates court
CoCT framework plan
National government policy decision – readiness on
both sides to accommodate facility within KCBD
Need identified by provincial government. CoCT
directly involved in location within KCBD
National government policy decision – readiness on
both sides to accommodate facility within KCBD
Donation to CoCT, decision to use large open park
area by CoCT with councillors
Need for multi-use facility identified by CoCT and
councillors, partly funded by United Cricket Board
CoT initiative funded by provincial government
Identified by CoCT and private-sector planners,
traders occupied vacant area unplanned, but they
were accommodated. To be moved into designated
informal trading spaces after management
arrangements have been formalised
CoCT in collaboration with private sector (RMB,
Future Growth)
Provincial government initiative. Placement within
KCBD and close to planned municipal offices of
the COCT initiative
Provincial initiative. CoCT and province did
regional analysis, identified present site, consulted
councillors
Offices for the Department of Social Welfare
Offices for the Department of Home Affairs
Swimming-pool complex
Khayelitsha cricket oval and club-house facility
Transport interchange (taxi rank)
Informal trading facilities
KCBD retail centre
KCBD multipurpose centre
Khayelitsha Hospital (230-bed hospital)
Source: After National Treasury (2010)
The KCT entered into a land-availability agreement with the city in 2004 for the use of
the KBD land as approved in the Development Framework. Rights for the development
of all undeveloped land within the KBD precinct were given to KCT. All the developed
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land (e.g. the shopping centre) is transferred to the KCT as soon as it is packaged for
development so that there is no burden of holding costs.
Public-land improvements (e.g. the shopping centre) remain in a community trust and
permits the community to gain the value added to the land by the development. KCT also
owns the buildings and is paying off the RMB loan using rental income from the business
owner, Khayelitsha Retail Company (K-Retail). This retail centre ownership model,
which is unusual in South Africa, ensures that the Khayelitsha community benefits
directly from the development (National Treasury, 2010:7-8). It is estimated that the
shopping centre has appreciated by about R140-million in value and this value is retained
in the Community Trust (CoGTA, undated: 31).
17.4 Institutional arrangements
From the outset the Khayelitsha Development Forum played a vital role in the
development process. The KBD was launched in 2000 after intensive consultation with
the Khayelitsha community and other role players. The result of this consultation was the
drafting of a stakeholders’ forum agreement in which the community identified a number
of proposals regarding community involvement and participation in the project.
It has been reported that the Trust has been instrumental in facilitating and assisting local
contractors and labourers to procure contracts and employment in retail construction. In
total, 16 local companies were engaged in the construction of the retail centre providing
employment to more than 160 local people (CoGTA, undated).
The KCT is the principal equity holder in the development. The KCT was established
before the Municipal Systems Amendment Act of 2003 (MSAA). With the promulgation
of the Local Government Municipal Systems Amendment Act (Act 44 of 2003), the
Khayelitsha Community Trust became a municipal entity. This required the KCT to
operate within a set of conditions and requirements stipulated in the Municipal Finance
Management Act (MFMA) (Act 56 of 2003). One of the implications of the legislation
was that the trustees had to be changed, since councillors and officials are not allowed to
serve as directors or trustees in a municipal entity. Five new trustees were nominated to
the Trust in June 2004.
KCT then established further structures as part of its overall management and operations
functions. Various companies were set up to manage the different entities within KBD
(KManco, K-Retail, Khayelitsha Housing Company). They were set up as separate
entities to spread risk and to make management within each entity less complex. This has
resulted in a fairly high level of organisational complexity (Figure 19). Some role players
have called for greater simplicity, for example that all management functions be vested in
KManco (National Treasury, 2010).
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Figure 19: KBD organogram (2001 – 2009) (Source: National Treasury, 2010)
KManco and K-Retail lease the retail property from the Trust (which purchased it from
the City in August 2004) and appointed Future Growth to act as developer for the retail
centre. WBHO was the major building contractor in the turnkey development. Future
Growth Asset Management originally undertook the leasing and management
responsibilities of the centre. One of the funding requirements of this project was a
minimum 70% occupancy by national tenants. The centre is currently running at 97%
occupation (CoGTA, undated).
17.5 Project financing
Cooperation with the private sector was a critical success factor in this project. Future
Growth and Rand Merchant Bank (RMB) provided the KCT with a loan facility of
R102m, which is repayable over 15 years. There is provision for the community of
Khayelitsha to purchase a R21-million stake in the project. A “Collaboration and Cooperation” agreement was entered into between the city and Rand Merchant Bank (RMB),
whereby the bank assisted the city in sourcing and securing private-sector funding. Credit
approval for the private-sector funding portion (R265 million) was obtained from the
RMB Credit Committee in September 2003 (CoGTA, undated).
The adoption of the MFMA during the implementation of the project placed an additional
financial and administrative burden on the Khayelitsha Community Trust. Compliance
with MFMA regulations demanded the allocation of scarce resources to the development
of further capacity. In this regard, the KCT has received R10-million in City support. An
amount of R4-million has been retained to fund the operations of KCT, and R6-million
has been spent on upgrading the bulk electrical supply to KCBD.
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17.6 Operations and maintenance
In August 2010, property management services were handed over from Advent Asset
Management to KManco and a retail centre Chief Operating Officer (COO) was
appointed. KManco has a steady revenue stream from the retail tenants. This is used to
pay contractors and service providers. For the remainder of the precinct, the requirements
for public services such as security, cleansing and maintenance are clear, but the way
they are carried exhibits some confusion regarding roles and responsibilities. Operations
and maintenance in the precinct (not the retail area) are the responsibility of KManco, but
they are restricted by the current inadequate funds and management staff. Consequently,
the CoCT is currently providing these services. The intention is that KManco will over
time take over these functions (in terms of KCT’s founding statements and mandate) and
that CoCT will subsidise K-Manco for these public services (National Treasury, 2010).
18.
Lessons learnt and best practice
Project preparation and planning
(i)
Land-use regulations
The zoning process for the KCBD established a system of regulation described as
‘resource intensive to administer’ and regarded as inflexible (MCA Africa, 2006). The
practical implications are that when elements of the proposed development do not
conform to the particular requirements of the scheme instituted for the KCBD, a process
of rezoning needs to take place. This resulted in demands on the public sector concerning
administration and it has slowed down the process of securing development rights. A
more flexible system of land-use management may be more desirable in a URP node of
this nature, particularly when dealing with private investment and a range of different
public investments in a single project area.
(ii)
Planning for informal enterprises
The initial planning for the KCBD did not make provision for informal trade. Traders are
tolerated rather than encouraged, as the area is considered inappropriate for informal
trade. URP nodal development should ideally also make provision for business
enterprises that are not part of the precinct, by avoiding damage to existing local
businesses and planning for informal and downstream enterprises. According to National
Treasury (2010), provisions required for informal and downstream enterprises could
include elements such as suitable space, storage and cleansing services, and smallbusiness development training.
Institutional arrangements
(i)
Sustainability requires community trust and involvement
Agreements were required to reduce both the burden on the Community Trust by creating
a management company, while at the same time facilitating the flow of benefits back to
the community. Without this effort there is a risk of limiting the benefits for the local
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community of such a development beyond access to new retail centre. There is thus a
need to consider a variety of mechanisms to ensure that the spin-offs of private
investment accrue to local communities to the greatest extent possible (MCA Africa,
2006).
The KCT was established at an early stage as a non-profit body representing the interests
of the people of Khayelitsha. They became an important contact point between the major
stakeholders. In the KBD case, the large area allocated for housing (which has been
vacant for a number of years) has never been threatened by land invasions. This is clear
evidence of good relationships, local community understanding and acceptance of the
development plans for the area.
(ii)
Need for human-resources capacity
KCT was originally set up primarily as a community-representative body, and it had a
number of local government councillors serving as trustees. The arrangement served the
purpose of consultation and representation very well. However, when KCT became a
municipal entity, the MSAA required these councillors to resign and independent trustees
to be appointed. KCT is the overall precinct manager, but lacks the capacity and budget
to undertake this function effectively. This was addressed by a service-level agreement
with the CoCT which included the appointment of a COO for the retail centre, employed
by K-Retail and acting on behalf of KCT (National Treasury, 2010: 13)
(iii) Meeting social development objectives
Expectations of employment and skills development are certainly present in Khayelitsha,
and in some instances the view has been expressed that these expectations have not been
met. There is also some concern that the social mandate might not be viewed as equally
important by all role players. All the role players need to share the same commitment to
community development. For example, commercially-orientated role players need to
fully support community development mandates, and community structures need to
understand the limits experienced by commercially orientated role players in this regard.
Procurement of local supplies and services must favour local suppliers wherever possible.
Project management and implementation
(i)
Need for a dedicated project champion
It is clear that the KCBD initiative has required substantial input from the City of Cape
Town to ensure its success. There is no doubt that projects of this scale require dedicated
project management resources and a project champion who is familiar with the
bureaucratic processes (development and funding) and who can engage with a variety of
external role players.
(ii)
Area-based management model (ABM)
The ABM model can be an effective mechanism to integrate and coordinate the functions
of various line departments to serve one geographical area. This approach requires a
dedicated team of specialists focused on ensuring synergy in governance, planning and
implementation in a specific geographical area. Given the management complexity of
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ABM, it is only effective if adequately resourced with experienced officials. The ABM
unit in Khayelitsha (1998-2004) played an important role in integrating local services,
lobbying for local government finance and integrating public sector investment generally.
However, the lack of clarity of the roles of the URP unit, the ABM unit and the local
government line departments did overlap and create confusion, culminated in the collapse
of the ABM functions (CoGTA, undated).
Project financing
(i)
Public investment and commitment is required to leverage private
investment and development
Experience gained during the KCBD process (involving private-sector role players RMB
and Future Growth) has to some extent reinforced the notion that the private sector is risk
averse. According to the findings of the MCA Africa assessment conducted in 2006,
reducing this risk is critical in areas where the private sector perceives it to exist.
The KCBD process has also indicated that the process of packaging private-sector
finance is costly and needs to be budgeted for. The collaboration and cooperation
agreement between the implementing agency and financial partners commits the latter to
providing assistance in the sourcing and securing of private-sector funding. The creation
of a community landowning trust as well as the opportunities for community equity
participation creates a sustainable long-term vehicle for social-capital enhancement.
Public land improvements should be kept in a community trust (through a landavailability agreement), and the community should be allowed to gain from the value
added to land by the development (CoGTA, undated).
(ii)
Tax implications
A specific restriction experienced by KCT was that it was taxed by SARS on its grant
income from the CoCT. This took significant effort and time to address. The national
Treasury report (2010:17) recommends that in future similar projects should engage
SARS through suitable tax-law specialists.
(iii)
Financial sustainability
Based on available information, the KCBD retail centre is the only one in South African
townships that is not commercially owned. The more common model for a township
retail centre is for external parties to own, develop and manage the retail component, and
in some instances with a percentage equity allocated to a community trust. This option
almost entirely directs revenue streams externally and diminishes the opportunities to
fulfil a social mandate. On the positive side, the benefits of this approach include a
single-focus mandate, commercial strength and sustainability, higher levels of skills and
management capacity, and the likelihood of more robust operations and maintenance
systems. According to National Treasury (2010: 19) this option is not preferred or
recommended for township nodal developments where a multifocus mandate is
considered very important.
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(iv)
Avoid unforeseen impacts to the local economy
An unintended consequence of establishing a retail centre such as in KCBD is that it can
have negative impacts on existing local retailers. While URP nodal developments need to
be planned in an integrated way within the precinct, they also need to consider their
impacts outside the precinct and attempt to minimise their impacts among the very
community they are intended to benefit. An integrated planning approach which not only
includes the node, but also considers surrounding areas can address this issue (National
Treasury, 2010).
(v)
Impact of MFMA
The view has been expressed (CoGTA, undated: 35-36) that the viability of future URP
projects could be stifled by the provisions of this legislation, which was designed to
combat corruption and financial mismanagement in small, resource-constrained
municipalities. The private sector however does not respond well to open tendering
processes, where information and trust are limited.
Operations and maintenance
The efficiency of the operations and maintenance aspects can significantly influence the
attractiveness of a business area and have serious long-term consequences for its
sustainability. The KCT’s founding statement includes responsibility for procuring
operations and maintenance services, which it is doing through K-Manco. However,
neither KCT nor K-Manco is presently in a position to fulfil this mandate due to its lack
of a revenue stream, and the CoCT is currently providing basic maintenance and cleaning
outside the retail area.
Role players must have clearly defined areas of responsibility, and budgets must allow
for basic services such as security, cleaning and maintenance. Such procedures must be
worked out with great clarity early in the process. Gaps in the provision of services need
to be identified and dealt with at the beginning, not responsively when problems arise or
complaints are made (National Treasury, 2010).
19. Conclusion
Testing of the perceptions of awareness of the Khayelitsha CBD indicated that
approximately 89% of Khayelitsha respondents were aware of the Khayelitsha CBD
anchor project. Testing respondents’ (those who were aware of the projects) perceptions
of the impact on their quality of life indicated that 88% of Khayelitsha respondents
believed the CBD development was beneficial to their quality of life. The extent to which
the URP mandate over Khayelitsha CBD is being fulfilled is summarised in Table 17.
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Table 17: Fulfilment of KCBD mandates
Selection criteria for Khayelitsha Central Business District (KCBD)
URP projects
Partnerships
Community contributions
Multisectoral impact
Representation
Sustainability
The CBD provides an excellent example of partnerships between the
community, various spheres of government and the private sector. Agreements
were put in place to reduce both the burden on the community trust by creating
a management company, whilst at the same time facilitating the flow of benefits
back to the community. The KCT was established at an early stage as a nonprofit body representing the interests of the people of Khayelitsha. They became
an important contact point between the major stakeholders. The KCT is the
principal equity holder in the development and various companies were set up
to manage the different entities within KCBD (K-Manco, K-Retail, Khayelitsha
Housing Company).
From the outset, the KDF played a critical role in the development process. The
KBD was launched in 2000 after intensive consultation with the Khayelitsha
community and other role players. The result of this consultation was the
drafting of a “Stakeholders’ Forum Agreement” in which the community
identified a number of proposals regarding the community involvement and
participation in the project. KCT owns the buildings and is paying off the loan
using rental income from the business owner, K-Retail. This retail centre
ownership model ensures that the Khayelitsha community benefits directly
from the development. It is estimated that the shopping centre has appreciated
by approximately R140-million in value and this value is retained in the
Community Trust. It has been reported that the Trust has been instrumental in
facilitating and assisting local contractors and labourers to procure contracts
and employment in retail construction. In total, 16 local companies were
engaged in the construction of the retail centre providing employment to more
than 160 local people.
The KCBD had a very strong multisectoral impact and includes various
economic elements such as the retail centre, social development elements (e.g.
new Khayelitsha hospital, regional magistrate’s court, offices for the
departments of social welfare and home affairs) and community facilities such
as the sport complex.
The KCT was established at an early stage as a non-profit body representing the
interests of the people of Khayelitsha. They became an important contact point
between the major stakeholders. From the outset, the Khayelitsha Development
Forum played a critical role in the development process. The KBD was
launched in 2000 after intensive consultation with the Khayelitsha community
and other role players. The result of this consultation was the drafting of a
“stakeholders’ forum agreement” in which the community identified a number
of proposals regarding the community involvement and participation in the
project.
In the KCBD case, the large area allocated for housing (which has been vacant
for a number of years) has never been threatened by land invasions. This is
evidence of good relationships, local community understanding and acceptance
of the development plans for the area.
Neither KCT nor KManco is presently in a position to fulfil its mandate to
procure operations and maintenance services due to its lack of a revenue stream,
and the CoCT is currently providing basic maintenance and cleaning outside of
the retail area. The efficiency of the operations and maintenance aspects can
significantly influence the attractiveness of the business area, and could have
long-term consequences for its sustainability.
Table continues on next page
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Innovation
Ease of implementation
Based on available information, the KCBD retail centre is the only one in South
African townships that is not owned commercially. The creation of a
community landowning trust as well as the opportunities for community equity
participation creates a sustainable long-term vehicle for social capital
enhancement. Public land improvements should be kept in a community trust
(through a land availability agreement), and the community should be allowed
to gain the value added to land by the development. This retail centre ownership
model, which is unusual in South Africa, ensures that the Khayelitsha
community benefits directly from the development. It is estimated that the
shopping centre has appreciated by about R140-million and this value is
retained in the Community Trust
The KCBD initiative has required substantial input from the City of Cape Town
to ensure its success. There is no doubt that projects of this scale require
dedicated project management resources and a project champion who is familiar
with the bureaucratic processes (development and funding) and who can engage
with a variety of external role players. The KCBD process has also indicated
that the process of packaging private-sector finance is costly and needs to be
budgeted for.
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