Driving Democracy 2 Structure Recap: constitutional choices Recap: electoral systems 1. Regime Institutions 2. What are the consequences? Types of executives 3 3. Choices and consequences What are the choices? What are the consequences? Conclusions 4. What institutions would you recommend for postconflict peace –settlements? Driving Democracy 4 Do institutions matter? Lijphart’s theory of consociationalism: 1. Recap Constitutional choices Power-sharing rules essential for divided societies Power-concentrating regimes may work in homogeneous societies Key features: Executive power-sharing, minority veto, PR, cultural autonomy Defining power-sharing democracies 1. 2. 3. Ref: Arend Lijphart Patterns of Democracy 1999 ‘Majoritarian’ Model Power-concentrating Effective and accountable Driving Democracy ‘Consensus’ Model5 Power-sharing Inclusive &representative Exec-Parties One-party cabinet Coalition government Parliament Executive dominant Balanced exec-legislature Party system Two-party Multi-party Electoral system Majoritarian Proportional Representation Interest groups Pluralist Corporatist Electoral systems Decentralized states Type of executive Typology of DemocraciesDriving Democracy 6 Ref: Lijphart Patterns of Democracy 1999 3 Consensual GER US 2 Government Centralized-unitary Decentralized-federal Parliament Unicameral Balanced Bicameral Constitution Flexible More Rigid Judiciary Parlt. sovereign Judicial review Central Bank Dependent Independent AUL SWI Unitary-F Federal Federal-Unitary CAN AUT 1 SPA JPN VEN 0 BAHTRI JAM BARBOT FRA MAL CR IRE POR GRE -1 PNGNET BEL ITA MAU FIN ISR ICE UK DEN NOR SWE NZ -2 Majoritarian -2.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 Executive-Parties 1 Driving Democracy 8 Figure 5.2: Classification of contemporary electoral systems, worldwide 2004 Nation States 191 Majoritarian 75 2. Electoral systems Majority 26 AV 4 2nd Ballot 22 FPTP 36 PR 68 Combined 39 Plurality 49 Independent 30 Bloc Vote 9 SNTV 4 Dependent 9 STV 2 No direct elections 9 Party List 66 Closed 35 Open 31 Consensual democracy and Parliamentary Inclusiveness Adversarial Democracy and Government Accountability nd Notes: FPTP First Past the Post; 2 Ballot; Block Vote; AV Alternative Vote; SNTV Single Non-Transferable Vote; STV Single Transferable Vote. Systems are classified in May 1997 based on Appendix A in Andrew Reynolds and Ben Reilly. Eds. The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. For more details see http://www.aceproject.org/and Pippa Norris. 2004. Electoral Engineering. New York: Cambridge University Press. Driving Democracy 9 Driving Democracy 10 Figure 5.4: Contemporary levels of democracy by type of electoral system in heterogeneous Example of cross-national results and homogeneous society, 2000 Figure 5.3: Levels of democracy by type of electoral system, 2000 90 Low << D Democracy >> High 78 77 80 Low<<Democracy>>High 71 70 60 83 67 65 58 57 49 50 42 40 35 32 30 25 20 70 81 79 80 90 75 69 74 70 64 59 60 59 50 46 50 40 30 20 10 10 0 FH 0 FH Polity Majoritarian Vanhanen Combined Cheibub Polity FH Homogeneous Polity Heterogeneous PR Majoritarian Note: The standardized 100-point scales of democracy are described in Table 3.1. The four scales measure Liberal Democracy (Freedom House 2000), Constitutional Democracy (Polity IV 2000), Participatory Democracy (Vanhanen 2000), and Contested Democracy (Cheibub and Gandhi 2000). When tested by ANOVA, the difference between mean scores are significant (at the p=.001 level). Contemporary electoral systems are classified in 191 nations worldwide based on Appendix A in Andrew Reynolds, Ben Reilly and Andrew Ellis. 2005. Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. The type of electoral system was classified into three categories: Majoritarian/plurality (Single member plurality, nd 2 Ballot, Block Vote, Alternative Vote, and Single Non-Transferable Vote), Proportional Representation (Party List and STV) and Combined (using more than one type of ballot in simultaneous elections for the same body). Combined PR Note: For the classification of electoral systems, see Figure 5.3.The types of heterogeneous or homogeneous society are classified by the dichotomized Alesina index of ethnic fractionalization. Driving Democracy 11 Table 5.2: Electoral systems and democracy, all societies worldwide Liberal democracy Freedom House b Driving Democracy 12 Table 5.3: Electoral systems and democracy, plural societies only Liberal democracy Freedom House Constitutional democracy Polity IV (pcse) p -2.33 (.454) *** b (pcse) p Proportional representation .904 (.619) N/s 3.85 (.561) *** Positive action strategies 4.13 (.466) *** 11.41 (.777) *** Log GDP/Capita Ex-British colony Middle East Regional diffusion Ethnic fractionalization Population size Area size 13.90 12.35 -10.99 .632 -8.45 .001 .001 (.832) (.962) (1.16) (.036) (.878) (.001) (.001) *** *** *** *** *** N/s *** 11.91 12.36 -16.79 .883 -1.98 .000 .001 (1.01) (1.36) (1.40) (.049) (1.56) (.001) (.001) *** *** *** *** N/s *** *** Constant N. observations N. of countries 2 Adjusted R -21.96 4768 174 .487 Constitutional democracy Polity IV b (pcse) -4.27 (.625) *** p b -3.30 (pcse) (1.16) p Proportional representation 4.81 (.966) *** 10.68 (.915) *** Positive action strategies .424 (.676) N/s 13.96 (1.52) *** Log GDP/Capita Ex-British colony Middle East Regional diffusion Ethnic fractionalization Population size Area size 10.21 8.35 -8.39 .739 14.97 -.001 .001 (.519) (.744) (.974) (.027) (3.18) (.000) (.001) *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 7.26 8.20 -20.72 1.04 26.51 -.001 .001 (1.21) (1.10) (3.13) (.055) (4.27) (.001) (.001) *** *** *** *** *** *** *** Constant N. observations N. of countries 2 Adjusted R -30.9 2116 76 .545 INSTITUTIONAL RULES INSTITUTIONAL RULES Majoritarian -7.64 (.949) *** CONTROLS Majoritarian *** CONTROLS -38.45 3946 145 .533 Note: Entries for Liberal Democracy, Constitutional Democracy and Participatory Democracy 100point scales are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients (with their panel corrected standard errors) and the significance (p) of the coefficients for the pooled time-series cross-national analysis obtained using Stata’s xtpcse command. The entries for Contested Democracy are logistic regression. For the measures of democracy, see Chapter 2. For the classification of the type of electoral system, see Figure 5.1. The default (comparison) is mixed electoral systems. For details of all the variables, see Technical Appendix A. Significant at * the 0.10 level, ** the 0.05 level, and *** the 0.01 level. -54.9 1851 66 .477 Note: Entries for Liberal Democracy, Constitutional Democracy and Participatory Democracy 100point scales are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients (with their panel corrected standard errors) and the significance (p) of the coefficients for the pooled time-series cross-national analysis obtained using Stata’s xtpcse command. The entries for Contested Democracy are logistic regression. For the measures of democracy, see Chapter 2. For the classification of the type of electoral system, see Figure 5.1. The default (comparison) is mixed electoral systems. For details of all the variables, see Technical Appendix A. Significant at * the 0.10 level, ** the 0.05 level, and *** the 0.01 level. 2 Driving Democracy 14 Table 6.1: Classification criteria for types of executives Military states Ruling monarchies There is a unified executive: the head of state and the head of government are fused in a single monarchical office The monarch is a hereditary ruler for life, following conventional rules of succession. The monarch appoints the head of government and the monarch may also appoint ministers and legislators. Presidential republics There is a unified executive: the head of state and the head of government are fused in a single presidential office The president is a nonhereditary fixed-term office. Presidents enter office through nonelective routes, indirect election, or direct election. Mixed republics There is a dual executive: the president and the prime minister are separate posts; either office may be predominant. Parliamentary monarchies There is a dual executive: the monarch is a ceremonial head of state and the prime minister leads the government. The posts of the president and prime minister are filled by various forms of indirect election, direct election, and appointment. For as long as the military exert control. The monarch cannot be removed from office except through retirement and succession, or through extraconstitutional means (a coup d’etat). The president serves for a fixed term of office, unless removed by an exceptional process of impeachment or through extra constitutional means (a coup d’etat). There are varied forms of tenure; some prime ministers can be replaced by the president, others are directly elected. There may be a military council of senior officers, or a separate civilian group of advisers Cabinet structures are highly hierarchical; the cabinet (and parliament) act in an advisory capacity to serve the monarch. Cabinet structures are usually hierarchical with the president at the apex, members are appointed to serve the leader, cabinet Cabinet structures may be hierarchical (following the model described for presidential republics) or collegial (following the The leader of the party with an absolute parliamentary majority forms the government. Where no party has an absolute majority, conventionally the leader of the largest parliamentary party seeks to form a governing coalition. The monarch cannot be removed from office except through retirement and succession. The government (including the prime minister and members of cabinet) can fall by defeat at a general election or by a non-confidence motion passed by a majority of the legislature. Cabinet organization is usually collegial and composed of senior policymakers. The prime minister is conventionally regarded as Unified or dual executive There is a unified executive: the head of state is also head of the government Accession process Usually a coup d’etat. The ruler who seizes power is a senior officer or group of officers from the military or a figure-head leader strongly backed by the armed forces. Tenure in office Power within the executive 3. Types of Executives Driving Democracy 15 Driving Democracy 16 Classification of executives Type of executives by region Figure 6.1: Types of executives (with the number of contemporary states falling into each category) Table 6.3: Classification of type of executives by region, 2003 Military state (3) Parliamenta ry Monarchy Presidential republic Mixed republic Monarchy Military state Other Total Sub-Saharan Africa 1 17 27 1 1 2 49 10 8 14 4 1 0 37 Ruling monarchy (13) Asia-Pacific Unified executive (71) Presidential republic (45) Central & Eastern Europe 0 0 26 0 0 1 27 Non-elective president (6) Indirectly-elected president (10) Middle East 0 1 8 7 1 2 19 Directly-elected president (29) North America 1 2 0 0 0 0 3 Central and South America 9 16 7 0 0 0 32 Mixed republic (92) (President + prime minister) Dual executive (123) Parliamentary monarchy (31) Scandinavia 3 0 2 0 0 0 5 Western Europe 7 1 8 1 0 2 19 31 45 92 13 3 7 191 Total (Monarch + Prime minister) Note: The number of states falling into each category in 2003. Source: Coded from Arthur S. Banks Cross-national Time-series Data Archive. Driving Democracy 17 Driving Democracy 18 Table 6.4: Types of executive and democracy, all societies worldwide Trends in types of executive Liberal democracy Freedom House b 120 Constitutional democracy Polity IV p b (pcse) p INSTITUTIONAL RULES Presidential republics 100 Number of states worldwide (pcse) 80 -5.79 .873 *** -9.80 1.38 *** Mixed republics -10.77 .803 *** -14.25 1.26 *** Ruling monarchies -15.13 1.43 *** -44.50 2.31 *** Military states -24.19 1.37 *** -34.12 2.06 *** Log GDP/Capita Ex-British colony Middle East Regional diffusion Ethnic fractionalization Population size Area size PR electoral system for lower house 12.91 9.35 -7.57 .556 -7.91 .000 .001 2.71 .589 .616 1.19 .020 1.14 .000 .000 .596 *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 10.1 10.7 -2.69 .582 -1.86 .000 .002 6.32 .886 .968 1.79 .020 1.80 .000 .000 .886 *** *** Constant N. observations 2 Adjusted R -6.70 4766 .620 CONTROLS 60 40 20 0 1972 1977 1982 1987 Parliamentary Monarchies Presidential republics Ruling Monarchies Military states Note: Coded from Arthur S. Banks Cross-national Time-series Data Archive. 1992 1997 Mixed republics *** *** *** *** 5.17 3939 .585 2002 Note: The default (comparison) is Parliamentary Monarchies. Entries for Liberal Democracy, Constitutional Democracy and Participatory Democracy 100-point scales are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients (with their panel corrected standard errors) and the significance (p) of the coefficients for the pooled time-series cross-national analysis obtained using Stata’s xtpcse command. The entries for Contested Democracy are logistic regression. For the measures of democracy, see Chapter 2. For the classification of the type of executives, see Figure 6.1. For details of all the variables, see Technical Appendix A. Significant at * the 0.10 level, ** the 0.05 level, and *** the 0.01 level. 3 Driving Democracy 19 Political crisis by types of executives Driving Democracy 20 Executives and crisis Table 6.5: Types of executive and the indicators of political crisis, all societies worldwide Political crisis scale Freedom House Military state 2.71 b (pcse) p INSTITUTIONAL RULES Presidential republics Presidential republic 2.02 1.77 Mixed republic .656 .174 *** N/s Mixed republics .246 .160 Ruling monarchies -616 616 .286 * Military states 1.67 .272 *** Log GDP/Capita Ex-British colony Middle East Ethnic fractionalization Population size Area size PR electoral system for lower house -.289 -.321 .731 -.793 .000 .000 .606 .098 .124 .215 .222 .000 .000 .119 *** *** *** *** *** *** *** Constant N. observations Adjusted R2 2.04 4719 .114 CONTROLS 0.91 Parliamentary Monarchy Monarchy 0.00 0.48 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 Note: The political crisis scale is constructed from events recorded in the Banks dataset including the number of coups d’etat, major constitutional changes, political assassinations, general strikes, cases of guerrilla warfare, government crisis, purges of opposition, riots, revolutions, and anti-government demonstrations. The measure is constructed for every regime-year as a simple additive scale without any weighting. Source: Coded from Arthur S. Banks Cross-national Time-series Data Archive 1972-2003. Note: The default (comparison) is Parliamentary Monarchies. Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients (with their panel corrected standard errors) and the significance (p) of the coefficients for the pooled time-series cross-national analysis obtained using Stata’s xtpcse command. For the classification of the type of executives, see Figure 6.1. For details of all the variables, including the political crisis scale, see Technical Appendix A. Significant at * the 0.10 level, ** the 0.05 level, and *** the 0.01 level. 4. Conclusions 4