Personalistic Rule and Corruption

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Personalistic Rule and Corruption
Political Economy of the Global South
Prof. Tyson Roberts
Principal-Agent Model
• Principal: `A chief actor or doer; the chief
person engaged in some transaction or
function, esp. in relation to one employed or
acting for him (deputy, agent, etc.); the person
for whom and by whose authority another
acts’ (see Brooker p. 41)
Presidential democracies
Voters
President
Cabinet
Bureaucracy
Global South Examples of
Presidential Democracies
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Mexico
Brazil
Argentina
Benin
Ghana
South Korea
Philippines
Indonesia
Parliamentary democracies
Voters
Parliament
Prime Minister
Cabinet
Bureaucracy
Global South Examples of
Parliamentary Democracies
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India
Mauritius
Turkey
(Malaysia?)
(Botswana?)
(South Africa?)
Weber’s tripartite typology of
legitimate rule
• Traditional legitimacy
– Patrimonial
– Patriarchal
– Gerontocracy
• Charismatic
• Legal-Rational
Monarchies & Weber’s typology
• Charismatic leadership can become “routinized”
and hereditary
• Hereditary charisma can become traditional
legitimacy, usually patrimonial
– Patrimonial leaders rule over subjects
– All property and offices controlled by leader
• Legal-rational legitimacy in monarchies:
– King has defined legal roles
– King (or PM) head of cabinet & modern bureaucracy
Traditional Ruling Monarchies
(Dynastic family)
Monarch
Royal Family
Subjects
If “dynastic monarchy”
Ruling Monarchies w/ modern bureaucracy
(Dynastic family)
If “dynastic monarchy”
Monarch
(Prime Minister)
Cabinet
Bureaucracy
In dynastic regimes, the
PM and Cabinet are often
family members
Motives differ across regime types
• Democratic leaders seek to stay in office by
satisfying a majority of active voters
• Military regimes seek corporate goal of a strong
& unified military
• Party regimes seek to keep the party in power by
satisfying party members
• Monarchies seek to enrich the family and keep it
in power
• Personalist leaders seek to enrich themselves
(and family/clique) and stay in power
Because Military Regimes favor corporate goals over political power (& have
guns to enforce agreements), military governments tend to step down in
response to economic downturns
In Party Regimes, the party is the principal,
and the executive is its agent
China (Communist Party)
Vietnam (Communist Party)
Tanzania, 1966-1995 (CCM Party)
Kenya, 1965-1992 (KANU Party)
Party Regimes (and personalist-military with strong parties) have a broader
political foundation and place more value in holding political power, leading
to greater durability than military regimes
Neopatrimonialism
• The trappings of a Weberian rational-legal
system
– Distinction between public and private realm
– Written laws & constitutional order
• Official order subverted by patrimonial logic
– Officeholders systematically appropriate public
resources for own uses
– Political authority largely based on clientelistic
practices
What are three (informal) political institutions
common in neopatrimonial regimes?
Bratton & Van de Walle:
• Presidentialism
– Systematic concentration of power in hands of
one individual
• Clientelism
– Strongmen rely on award of personal favors
• State Resources
– Leaders make little distinction between public and
private coffers
Neopatrimonial practices
• Clientelism: distribution of public services &
resources for political support
– Prebendalism: use of public offices to generate
benefits for officeholder and his constituents or
kin group
– Patronage: distribution of benefits based on
political support
– Rent-seeking: manipulating the political
environment in which economic activities occur
for personal gain
Personal Regimes
Ruler
(Party, Military,
Relatives, Friends)
Cabinet
Bureaucracy
Some indicators of personal rule
(Geddes Appendix A)
• Did party exist prior to leaders election campaign or
accession to power?
– No
• Was party organized to fight for independence?
– No
• Did first leader’s successor hold, or does leader’s heir
apparent hold, a high party position?
– No
• Does leader lack support of a party?
– Yes
• Does leader personally control the security apparatus?
– Yes
Origins of Dictatorship
• Did Mobutu come to power through a
revolution, a coup, an election, or a regular
succession within an existing dictatorship?
– Coup
• Did Mobutu personalize power? If so, how?
– Suspend constitution, suspend legislature, outlaw
opposition parties, etc.
Weber’s tripartite typology of
legitimate rule
• Through which form of legitimacy/authority
does Mobutu rule?
– Traditional
– Charismatic
– Legal-Rational
– Neo-patrimonial (traditional with veneer of legalrational)
• Does this change over time?
Examples of Neopatrimonialism
• Did Mobutu show evidence of
neopatrimonialism?
– Presidentialism (concentrated power)
– Clientelism (political awards)
– State Resources (mix of public and private)
Neopatrimonialism and Growth
• Why do neopatrimonial institutions
undermine growth?
• What are some different types of corruption?
• What type of corruption has a greater
tendency to undermine growth? Why?
• What type of corruption did Zaire suffer
during Mobutu’s rule? How did this affect
economic performance?
• Centralized vs. Decentralized
• Looters vs. Rent-scrapers vs. Dividend
Collectors
Medium growth is more common in honest
countries, but rapid growth is actually more
common in corrupt countries
• Mobutu’s Zaire: Looting – devastating for
growth
• Park, Chun and Roh’s South Korea: Dividendcollecting – pro-growth (stationary bandit)
• Marcos’s Philippines: Rent-scraping –
undermines growth over time
Midterm
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Open book
Choice of questions
Explain your logic
Support your assertions (with quotes and/or
page numbers, if possible)
• Provide examples, if possible
• Acknowledge opposing arguments/evidence
Sample Questions
• How do geographic endowments affect economic
growth?
– Include variety of endowments such as location (e.g.,
tropical) and resources (e.g., oil)
– Include direct and indirect (e.g., institutions) mechanisms
• How does colonial history affect economic growth?
• How does state-led development affect economic
growth?
• What are some causes and effects of state capacity?
• What are some causes and effects of military coups?
Sample Questions
• What is neopatrimonialism, and what are some
of its causes and effects?
• Why is Congo-Zaire an economic disaster while
countries such as Botswana and South Korea are
economic successes?
• What are the political and economic costs and
benefits of oil wealth and foreign aid?
• How does corruption affect economic growth?
• What are the sources of political legitimacy, and
what are the economic consequences of (lack of)
legitimacy?
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