PLATO’S
DEFENSE OF JUSTICE
ARISTOTLE, MAGNA MORALIA I.1
“[Next] came Socrates, who spoke better and further about this
subject, but even he was not successful. For he used to make
the virtues sciences, and this is impossible. For the sciences
all involve reason, and reason is to be found in the intellectual
part of the soul. So that all the virtues, according to him, are to
be found in the rational part of the soul. The result is that in
making the virtues sciences he is doing away with the non rational part of the soul, and is thereby doing away also both
with passion and character; so that he has not been successful
in this respect in his treatment of virtues. After this Plato
divided the soul into the rational and the non -rational part—and
in this he was right—assigning appropriate excellences to each.
So far so good. But after this he went astray …”
THE STRUCTURE OF SOCRATES’
MORAL THEORY
(a) Socrates’ thesis about desire
(b) denial of weakness of will
(C) virtue as knowledge
PLATO’S STRATEGY IN BOOK IV
(1) Show that Socrates’ thesis about desire is false via
counterexamples.
(2) Move from these counterexamples to a view of the mind that
acknowledges enough psychical complexity to accommodate
the possibility of weakness.
(3) Provide a novel approach to virtue that improves on the idea
that virtue is knowledge.
(4) Provide a novel defense of the just life as preferable to the
unjust life.
THE COUNTEREXAMPLES
Most of Plato’s counterexamples to Socrates’ thesis about
desire all involve cases of mental conflict. Ultimately, we will
look at six alleged counterexamples:
Book IV
1. The thirsty non-drinker
2. Odysseus
3. Young children & non-human animals
Book X
1. Partially deceptive illusions
2. The restrained mourner
Euripides
1. Medea
THE TRIPARTITE SOUL
REASON
APPETITE
SPIRIT
THE TRIPARTITE SOUL
REASON
thirsty non-drinker
APPETITE
SPIRIT
THE THIRST Y NON-DRINKER
Plato does not tell us much about his thirsty non -drinker, but he
takes it to be a powerful objection to the Socratic theory.
Activity instructions . Fill out the details regarding the
circumstances of the thirst non -drinker in such a way that the
case raises doubts about Socrates’ thesis about desire. Why, in
the circumstances you have described, does it seem wrong to
think of the thirst as a function of the non-drinker’s values?
How might Socrates respond to the alleged counterexample?
THE THIRST Y NON-DRINKER
“Doesn’t that which forbids in such cases come into play —if it
comes into play at all—as a result of rational calculation, while
what drives and drags them to drink is a result of af fections and
diseases?” (439c9-d2)
Our appetitive desires are products of physiological changes —
bodily af fections and diseases —whereas our rational desires are
due to reasoning/calculating. Rational desires are acquired
through deliberation aimed at attaining the best available
option. By contrast, we do not have appetites for drink, food, or
sex because these things are taken to be good . Indeed, in
having appetites, we do not desire food, drink, and sex as good
things at all.
IRRATIONAL VS. NON-RATIONAL
The want/desire opposed to one’s appetite can be praised as
rational or condemned as irrational, but no one counts as
reasonable or unreasonable in virtue of being thirsty. What
accounts for this dif ference?
Rational/irrational. In rejecting one’s appetite for drink, one
has a goal relative to which this inclination to refrain from
drinking can be assessed, namely, the goal of attaining the best
available outcome. One can pursue this end by means that are
generally ef fective or one can do so by means that are generally
inef fective. In the former case the resulting want is rational; in
the latter the desire is irrational.
Non-rational. Our appetites come about through physiological
changes, not through pursuit of any goals. Accordingly, they
cannot be similarly assessed.
WHAT WOULD SOCRATES SAY?
If Socrates wants to hold on to his thesis about desire, he
should insist that thirst is a feeling rather than a desire. In
feeling thirst we are sensing a state of the body. Since the state
is uncomfortable/unpleasant, we come to desire drink as a
means to the goal of removing the unpleasant condition of the
body.
Appetitive desires are not a direct product of physiological
changes. Rather, these changes bring about sensations or
feelings. Our desires arise through reflection on how to attain
the best outcome (among available options).
THE TRIPARTITE SOUL
REASON
thirsty non-drinker
APPETITE
Odysseus/children/animals
SPIRIT
THE CASE OF ODYSSEUS
 How might Odysseus’ anger at the maidservants make trouble
for Socrates’ thesis about desire?
THE RECALCITRANCE OF ANGER
Even when one knows that everything speaks against
retaliation, the desire for retaliation can linger.
 Does this consideration suggest that anger (understood as a
desire for retaliation) is an independent source of motivation,
one distinct from reason?
YOUNG CHILDREN & ANIMALS
“Even in small children, one can see that they are full of spirit
right from birth, while as far as rational calculation is
concerned, some never seem to get a share of it, while the
majority do so quite late… And in animals too one can see [the
same].”
 What is Plato’s point in this passage about spirit vs. reason?
THE CASE OF MEDEA
Epictetus (a Socratic/Stoic) and Galen (a Platonist) disagree
about how to interpret Medea’s internal struggle.
Epictetus: In her struggle to do the right thing, Medea
determines that gratifying her feelings of anger & getting
revenge is best.
Galen: After a struggle between passion and better judgment,
she knowingly acts against her better judgment (weakness).
 Does either reading of the text seem more natural? How do
these readings af fect our sympathy for the character, Medea?
Which view of anger (the Socratic or Platonic) do you fine
more attractive?
THE TRIPARTITE SOUL
REASON
thirsty non-drinker
Odysseus/children/animals
(Medea)
APPETITE
SPIRIT
Leontius
THE CASE OF LEONTIUS
“Leontius, the son of Aglaion, was going up from the Piraeus
along the outside of the North Wall when he saw some corpses
lying at the executioner’s feet. He had an appetite to look at
them but at the same time he was disgusted and turned away.
For a time he struggled with himself and covered his face, but,
finally, overpowered by the appetite, he pushed his eyes wide
open and rushed towards the corpses, saying, ‘look for
yourselves, you evil wretches, take your fill of the beautiful
sight!’”
 What sort of desire do you think Leontius is struggling with?
How is this mental conflict supposed to show that appetite is
distinct from spirit?
THE CASE OF LEONTIUS
Leontius is overcome by sexual appetite and acts against his
better judgment. He becomes ashamed & angry with himself.
Plato makes room for the possibility of weakness by allowing
that we sometimes desire more what we value less. That is not
to say that we always act in accord with our strongest desire.
Plato will acknowledge a role of self -control.
THE TRIPARTITE SOUL
REASON
thirsty non-drinker
Odysseus/children/animals
(Medea)
APPETITE
SPIRIT
Leontius
WHERE WE ARE SO FAR
(a) Socrates’ thesis about desire
(b) denial of weakness of will
(C) virtue as knowledge
THE NATURE OF COURAGE
Plato tells us that a person is courageous in virtue of their
spirited part of the soul: “And it is because of the spirited part, I
suppose, that we call a single individual courageous, namely,
when it preserves through pains and pleasures the declarations
of reason about what is to be feared and what isn’t.” (442bc)
One plausible reading: Plato allows for the possibility of
exaggerated fear. While having the right judgment is required
for courage, it isn’t enough by itself. One also needs self-control
to endure in the face of not -so-rational impulses.
THE NATURE OF TEMPERANCE
"Moderation is surely a kind of order, the mastery of certain kinds
of pleasures and desires. People indicate as much when they use
the phrase “self-control”… Yet isn’t the expression “self-control”
ridiculous? The stronger self that does the controlling is the same
as the weaker self that gets controlled, so that only one person is
referred to in all such expressions … Nonetheless, the expression is
apparently trying to indicate that, in the soul of that very person,
there is a better part and a worse one and that, whenever the
naturally better part is in control of the worse, this is expressed by
saying that the person is self -controlled or master of himself . At
any rate, one praises someone by calling him self -controlled. But
when, on the other hand, the smaller and better part is
overpowered by the larger, because of bad upbringing or bad
company, this is called self -defeated or licentious and is a
reproach.” (431ab)
THE NATURE OF TEMPERANCE
According to Plato, temperance is a kind of harmony between
the parts of the soul, a lack of conflict among the parts due to
an agreement about which part should rule. He explicitly
mentions a role for self-control.
Weakness of will can occur because one’s rational part can be
overpowered by appetite.
VIRTUE AS TEACHABLE THROUGH
TRAINING
“And isn’t it, as we were saying, a mixture of music and poetry,
on the one hand, and physical training, on the other, that makes
the two parts [reason & spirit] harmonious, stretching and
nurturing the rational part with fine words and learning,
relaxing the other part through soothing stories, and making it
gentle by means of harmony and rhythm?... And these two,
having been nurtured in this way, and having truly learned their
own roles and been educated in them, will govern the appetitive
part, which is the largest part in each person’s soul and is by
nature most insatiable for money. They’ll watch over it to see
that it isn’t filled with the so-called pleasures of the body and
that it doesn’t become so big and strong that it no longer does
its own work but attempts to enslave and rule over the classes
it isn’t fitted to rule, thereby overturning everyone’s whole life.”
(442ab)
THE NATURE OF JUSTICE
Being just is a matter of each part of the soul doing its own
proper work:
reason → to rule
spirit → to serve as auxiliary
appetite → ?
THE NATURE OF VIRTUE?
What is virtue?
Courage, temperance, and justice all require wisdom (about
good & evil). They also require training of the non -rational
parts. Plausibly Plato is thinking of virtue as something like:
wisdom + self-control.
THE UNIT Y OF VIRTUE?
Can someone be wise but intemperate or cowardly?
This question is not explicitly addressed. It might seem the
answer is obviously YES, but the issue is complex. The non rational parts have cognitive states as well as motivational
states. If the non-rational parts are out of control, the individual
is likely to have many false judgments in addition to misguided
urges.
DEFENSE OF THE JUST LIFE: BOOK IV
Just as body parts have functions, so too do psychical parts.
Failure to perform a bodily function just is lack of health, and
same goes for psychical function. And since health is in our
interest, it is in our interest to be just!
DEFENSE OF THE JUST LIFE: BOOK IX
(588C-589A)
“…fashion a single kind of multicolored beast with a ring of many
heads that it can grow and change at will —some from gentle, some
from savage animals… Then fashion one other kind, that of a lion,
and another of a human being. But make the first much the largest
and the other second to it in size… Now join the three of them into
one, so that they somehow grow together naturally… Then, fashion
around them the image of one of them, that of a human being so
that anyone who sees only the outer covering…will think it’s a
single creature, a human being… Then, if someone maintains that
injustice profits this human being and that doing just things brings
no advantage,…he is simply saying that it is beneficial for him,
first, to feed the multiform beast well and make it strong, and also
the lion…; second, to starve and weaken the human being within,
so that he is dragged along wherever either of the other two leads;
and, third, to leave the parts to bite and kill one another rather
than accustoming them to each other and making them friendly.”
DEFENSE OF THE JUST LIFE: BOOK IX
One’s true self (the person) is one’s values/convictions. To live
an unjust life is to let the self be crushed and overrun by things
external to the self.
A WORRY?
What about an unjust individual who is disciplined & self controlled?
Why can’t a person of this sort be at least moderately happy —at
any rate happier than the just person sketched in the
comparison of lives?