People v. Johnson - State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor




Chapter 1: Fourth Amendment

Who may contest a search under the Fourth Amendment


People v. Johnson

, 237 Ill. 2d 81, 927 N.E. 2d 1179 (2010). When passenger was detained pursuant to a valid traffic stop, he did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle in order to contest the search of the vehicle. Good discussion of the factors to consider when determining whether a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy.

Investigatory Stops/ Automobiles


United States v. Jones

, 132 S. Ct. 945, 181 L. Ed. 2d 911 (2012).

Attachment of a GPS device to a vehicle constitutes a search under the

Fourth Amendment and a search warrant is required.


People v. Hackett

, 2012 IL 111781, 971 N.E. 2d 1058. Traffic Stop for Improper Lane Usage, 625 ILCS 5/11-709. Police officer had a reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle for improper lane usage.

Good discussion of the distinction between probable cause to arrest and reasonable suspicion to stop standards.


Arizona v. Gant

, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. 3d. 3d 485

(2009). Search-incident-to-arrest exception. Court narrows the reading of

New York v. Belton

, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). Court determined that search-incident-to-arrest exception did not justify the search because arrestees were already handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars.

People v. Bridgewater

, 235 Ill. 2d 85, 918 N.E.

2d 553 (2009). Il. S. Ct. follows


. Court indicates that it would be a “rare case” when an officer cannot effectuate an arrest in a manner eliminating any real possibility of access to the vehicle by the arrestee.


People v. Bailey

, 232 Ill. 2d 285, 903 N.E. 2d 409 (2009). Following a traffic stop for a seat belt violation, police officers have the right to


conduct a warrant check on the driver and the passenger. The warrant check is not a search under the Fourth Amendment.


People v. Harris

, 228 Ill. 2d 822, 886 N.E. 2d 947 (2008). When a passenger in a car is lawfully seized, the police officers may request that the person provide identification and then use that information to conduct a warrant check so long as it does not unreasonably prolong the duration of the stop. The Court follows the reasoning in

Illinois v



, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed. 2d 842 (2005), and partially overrules its prior decision in

People v. Gonzales

, 204 Ill. 2d

220 (2003).


Arizona v. Johnson

, 555 U.S. 323, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L. Ed. 2d 694,

(2009). Traffic stop. The detention and questioning of the passenger was reasonable under the circumstances. The Supreme Court provides an in depth analysis supporting the detention and search of drivers and passengers following a legitimate traffic stop. See, also

People v. Close

, 238 Ill. 2d 497, 939 N.E. 2d 463 (2010).


People v. Hopkins

, 235 Ill. 2d 453, 922 N.E. 2d 1042 (2009).

Reasonable suspicion/Probable Cause. Good discussion of the steps/facts necessary to proceed from reasonable suspicion to probable cause.


People v. Maxey

, 2011 IL App (1 st

) 100011, 949 N.E. 2d 755. Terry

Stop. Good discussion of the type of evidence the police may use in establishing reasonable suspicion to detain. The court also held that is was proper for the police to briefly detain the suspect and transport him to the crime scene for purposes of immediate identification.



Davis v. United States

, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 180 L. Ed. 2d 285 (2011).

Good Faith Exception. Searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent that is later overturned, are not subject to the exclusionary rule.


Kentucky v. King

, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 179 L. Ed. 2d 865 (2011). Exigent

Circumstances. When police officers do not create the exigency by engaging in or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the 4th


Amendment, the warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence is reasonable and allowed.


Safford v. Redding

, 557 U.S. 364, 129 S.Ct. 2633, 174 L.Ed. 2d 354

(2009). Juveniles. Strip search of student violated student’s 4th

Amendment rights. However, Court held school officials were protected by qualified immunity because clearly established law did not show the search violated the 4th Amendment.


Herring v. United States

, 555 U.S. 135, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed. 2d

496 (2009). Invalid Warrant. Police officers stop the defendant and search him based on an arrest warrant that is later found to be invalid.

The Supreme Court held that when police mistakes leading to an unlawful search are the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the search, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, the exclusionary rule does not apply.


People v. Absher

, 242 Ill. 2d 77, 950 N.E. 2d 659 (2011).

Probationer. The warrantless search of probationer’s home was upheld. Defendant was sentenced to IPS and agreed to suspicionless searches as a written condition of his probation. The Supreme Court limits its holding to the facts of this case.


People v. Wilson

, 228 Ill. 2d 35, 885 N.E. 2d 1033 (2008). Parolee.

The warrantless and suspicionless search of a parolee is upheld where the defendant signs a consent-to-search of his person, property, or residence as part of his MSR agreement.


People v. Lopez

, 229 Ill. 2d 322, 892 N.E. 2d 1047 (2008). Voluntary

Accompaniment. Although the Court found the suspect voluntarily went to the police station, circumstances at the police station would lead a reasonable juvenile to believe that he was under arrest.


People v. Glorioso

, 398 Ill. App. 3d 975, 924 N.E. 2d 1153 (2010).

Knock and Announce. Court follows the reasoning in

Hudson v.


, 547 U.S. 586, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 165 L. Ed. 2d 56 (2006).

Failure to comply with knock and announce requirement is not grounds for suppression under the 4th Amendment.


People v. McDonough

, 239 Ill. 2d 260, 940 N.E. 2d 1100 (2010).

Good discussion regarding the police officers’ community caretaking function and the difference between the community caretaking and the


third tier consensual encounters discussed in

People v. Luedemann


222 Ill. 2d 530, 857 N.E. 2d 187 (2006).


People v. Johnson

, 237 Ill. 2d 81, 927 N.E. 2d 1179 (2010).

Attenuation. Good discussion of factors the court should look at in determining whether a statement is attenuated from the 4th

Amendment violation. See, also People v. Salgado, 396 Ill. App. 3d

856, 920 N.E. 2d 1194 (1st Dist. 2009); People v. Scott, 366 Ill. App.

3d 38, 852 N.E. 2d 531 (2006).

Chapter 2: Identification Procedures


Perry v. New Hampshire

, 132 S. Ct. 716, 181 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2012).

Identification/Judicial Screening Prior to Trial. The Due Process Clause does not require a preliminary judicial inquiry into the reliability of eyewitness identification when the identification was not procured under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances arranged by law enforcement.


People v. White

, 395 Ill. App. 3d 797, 917 N.E. 2d 1018 (2009). Good discussion regarding the distinction between the 5th and 6th Amendment right to have an attorney present at a line-up.

Chapter 3: Statements by the Accused


Howes v. Fields

, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 182 L. Ed. 2d 17 (2012). Miranda

Custody. The Supreme Court rejected a lower court’s reasoning that questioning a prisoner is always custodial when the prisoner is removed from general population and questioned about events that occurred outside the prison. The Court provides an in-depth discussion of what “in custody” means for purposes of Miranda.


J. D. B. v. North Carolina

, 564 U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 2394, 180 L. Ed. 2d 310

(2011). Miranda Custody. A child’s age is a proper factor to take into account when determining if a defendant was in custody for purposes of



People v. Jordan

, 2011 IL App (4 th

) 100629, 960 N.E. 2d 1253. Miranda

Custody. Passenger in a vehicle was “in custody” for Miranda purposes when she was detained for 27 minutes in a squad car after a traffic stop for


seat belt violations. Good discussion of how a temporary questioning during a traffic stop can develop into a custodial interrogation under Miranda.


Berghuis v. Thompkins

, 560 U.S. , 130 S. Ct. 2250, 176 L. Ed. 2d 1098

(2010). Miranda. A suspect who wishes to invoke his right to remain silent must do so unambiguously. A suspect’s silence after being given his

Miranda warnings is not an unambiguous invocation of his right to remain silent.


People v. Polk

, 407 Ill. App. 3d 80, 942 N.E. 2d 44 (2010). Good discussion of


. The Court held defendant did not unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent or his right to an attorney. Also, the trial court properly excluded testimony of a defense expert on the issue of suggestibility and false confessions.


Maryland v. Shatzer

, 559 U.S. , 130 S.Ct. 1213, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1045

(2010). Miranda. Supreme Court places a 14-day limit on questioning when a defendant invokes his right to an attorney after Miranda.


Florida v. Powell

, 559 U.S. , 130 S.Ct. 1195, 175 L.Ed. 2d 1009 (2010).

Miranda. Precise recitation of Miranda warnings is unnecessary. The warnings in this case adequately informed the defendant of his rights. Court follows its previous holding in

California v. Prysock

, 453 U.S. 355 (1981).


Montejo v. Louisiana

, 556 U.S. , 129 S.Ct. 2079, 173 L.Ed. 2d 955

(2009). Supreme Court overrules

Michigan v. Jackson

, 475 U.S. 625 (1986)

(police prohibited from initiating interrogation of defendant once he has invoked his right to counsel at an arraignment or similar proceeding).

Question of whether defendant waived his right to an attorney after attorney was appointed for him by the court is now governed by the 5th Amendment rules.


People v. Hunt

, 2012 IL 111089, 969 N.E. 2d 819. Miranda/Invocation of

Right to Attorney. Defendant’s statements to a confidential informant after defendant previously invoked his right to an attorney upon police questioning, were admissible. Defendant’s statements to a confidential informant did not implicate the 5 th

Amendment. The Court also distinguished its’ holding in

People v. McAuley

, 163 Ill. 2d 414 (1994).



right to an immediately available attorney arises only during police custodial interrogation. Since the defendant was not subjected to police custodial interrogation when he had the conversation with the


undercover informant, Miranda and


were inapplicable. 2012 IL

111089, para. 41.


People v. Slater

, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 886 N.E. 2d 986 (2008). Miranda.

Defendant who gave statements at a child advocacy center was not in custody for purposes of the 5th Amendment.


People v. Miller

, 393 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 916 N.E. 2d 10 (2009). Trial court reversed. Appellate Court finds defendant initiated conversation after he had previously invoked his right to an attorney. Police officer’s response reminding defendant he had previously invoked his right to an attorney and re-advising defendant of his Miranda warnings proper. Good discussion of

Edwards v. Arizona

, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) and

People v. Olivera

, 164 Ill. 2d

382 (1995). See, also

People v. Outlaw

, 388 Ill. App. 3d 1072 (2009). App.

Ct. finds defendant initiated conversation after previously invoking right to an attorney.


People v. Clarke

, 391 Ill. App. 3d 596, 915 N.E. 2d 1 (2009). Good discussion of when polygraph evidence may be used to rebut defendant’s claim of coercion. See also,

People v. Anderson

, 395 Ill. App. 3d 241, 917

N.E. 2d 18 (2009).


People v. Daniels

, 391 Ill. App. 3d 750, 908 N.E. 2d 1104 (2009). App. Ct. reversed trial court’s findings that mentally handicapped defendant knowingly understood and waived Miranda. Court discusses






People v. Armstrong

, 395 Ill. App. 3d 606, 919 N.E. 2d 57 (2009). The trial court properly held that an exception to the statute requiring videotaping of murder suspects statement (735 ILCS 5/103-2.1) applied in that the statement was given at a time when the police were unaware that a death occurred.


People v. Harper

, 2012 IL App (4 th

) 110880, 959 N.E. 2d 703. Trial court erred in suppressing defendant’s statement, based on a violation of 725 ILCS

5/103-2.1, because of inadvertent and unintentional malfunction of audio portion of recorded.


People v. Richardson

, 234 Ill. 2d 233, 917 N.E. 2d 501 (2009).

Voluntariness/Physical Coercion. Under the 5th Amendment, where evidence is presented, or where it is conceded defendant was injured while in police custody, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence


that the statement was not a product of coercion. In this case, although it was undisputed that the defendant received a bruise on his face while in police custody, the State met its burden of proving the statement was not the product of coercion.


People v. Wrice

, 2012 IL 11820, 962 N.E. 2d 934. Voluntariness/Physical

Coercion. The Illinois Supreme Court modifies its holding in


. Use of defendant’s


coerced confession as substantive evidence of his guilt is never harmless error.


People v. Santiago

, 236 Ill. 2d 417, 925 N.E. 2d 1122 (2010). Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 (prohibits a lawyer from communicating on the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer) does not preclude an ASA from speaking with a suspect who is represented by counsel in a civil matter. Should read.


People v. Crenshaw

, 2011 IL App (4th) 090908, 969 N.E. 2d 703.

Miranda. Waiver of Miranda was voluntary even though defendant claims to have ingested drugs to commit suicide. Good discussion of when intoxication will render a Miranda waiver involuntary.