Conference “The EU as a driving force for armaments”
Organised by GUE/NGL, Brussels, 9/11/2011
“The EU military-industrial complex: Sources, Actors, Outcomes”
Iraklis Oikonomou
iraklis.oikonomou@gmail.com
Dear friends and comrades,
I am delighted to attend this conference, not only because it addresses the right
topic, but also because it is organized by the right people. So, please allow me to
thank the European United Left / Green Nordic Left group for inviting me and
for organizing this important event.
Why is this conference an important event? Because, to my knowledge, it
constitutes one of the very few and rare attempts by the Left to examine the
involvement of the European Union in the field of armaments. There is a reason
behind the hesitation, if not inability, of the Left to grasp this involvement: the
image of the EU as a civilian power, an image shared not only by mainstream
political forces, but also by a large segment of the European Left. It is about time
to kiss good bye to this image; the EU, through both its member states and its
own institutional toolbox, has been enmeshed in an irreversible process of
strengthening its military arm and the production of armaments. The primary
mechanism for the promotion of armaments as a policy field at the EU level is the
EU military-industrial complex.
The term “military-industrial complex” is an extremely contested term, and one
would be a fool to use it and apply it uncritically and mechanistically. In the case
of the EU, critics have pointed to, among others, the term’s politicized nature;
privately, I have had scholars telling me that they see red flags waving around,
each time they hear or read this term. For many, the idea of a complex implies the
existence of a dark conspiracy, while others highlight the difference between
benefiting from - and initiating - a policy. A more nuanced criticism points to the
largely national base of prime contractors, and to the fact that the EU is not a
state, but rather a grouping of national military complexes.
Despite these objections, I wish to argue that the use of the term “militaryindustrial complex” is in fact justified in the case of the EU. The idea of a
complex is not hinting at any conspiracy, but is rather the conclusion of detailed
and well-documented empirical analysis. For a convincing sample of such an
analysis, one may turn to the work of researchers, such as Frank Slijper or Ben
Hayes.1 The idea of an EU complex does not exclude the parallel function of
national complexes, nor does it presume a single, fully transnationalised and
Europeanised arms industry; in fact, my perception of the EU MIC is certainly
one of a contradictory and highly “complex” complex.
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Conference “The EU as a driving force for armaments”
Organised by GUE/NGL, Brussels, 9/11/2011
But how can the EU MIC be defined? Here is my own definition: The EU militaryindustrial complex is a relatively cohesive, yet contradictory, bloc of socio-economic, politicoinstitutional, military and ideological forces operating at the EU level, aiming at the promotion of
the interests of internationalised European military-industrial capital and the strengthening of the
Union's power projection capacity through armaments policy integration.
In the case of the EU MIC, one finds the three essential elements of any MIC:
sources, actors, and outcomes. In terms of sources, there are two key distinct but
interrelated processes: the internationalization of the European arms industry, and
the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy. The first one,
primarily economic in nature, culminated in the late 1990s with the formation of
truly multinational European arms manufacturers, such as EADS. Its roots are to
be found in the privatization wave of the 1980s, and in the subsequent national
and international concentration and centralization of capital. The need for
industrial consolidation was primarily driven by falling military budgets after the
Cold War, competition from outside the EU, and the rising costs of R&D for
armaments. Eventually, ever larger companies with ever larger market shares
began forming a dense web of international linkages and interconnections through
mergers, acquisitions and other forms of industrial collaboration. This was the
process that produced a powerful socio-economic subject whose interests required
a management of its affairs at the EU level.
Yet, this subject also required a veil of legitimacy for its actions; a veil that was
soon to be found in the European Security and Defence Policy, initiated in the
late-1990s through the Anglo-French consensus at St. Malo. Subsequent
developments, such as the completion of multiple military missions and the
drafting of the European Security Strategy, covered the actions of the industry and
its allies with an aura of emergency and technocratic necessity. The emphasis of
ESDP on power projection opened up endless opportunities for legitimizing the
production of more and better weapons, as well as the homogenization of national
requirements and markets. Add to this the quest for European autonomy vis-à-vis
the US, plus the notion of the unity of external and internal security, and you get a
very broad range of arguments in favour of the armaments agenda, which helped
legitimize some politically ambiguous measures and decisions.
Let’s move from sources to actors. As you may have already guessed, I regard the
European, internationalised military-industrial capital as the primary agency in the
EU MIC. Why? Because the military-industrial capital lies closest to the
production of armaments; and, given its position within the social production of
the means of violence, it is a class subject whose economic power is systematically
translated into political power. Indeed, economic consolidation fuelled a process
of political consolidation of the European arms industry, which led to the settingup of the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) in
2004. The decision of the three sectoral lobbying groups (European Defence
Industries Group - EDIG, European Association of Aerospace Manufacturers AECMA, and Association of European Space Industry - EUROSPACE) to merge
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Conference “The EU as a driving force for armaments”
Organised by GUE/NGL, Brussels, 9/11/2011
into one integrated scheme would have never been realized without the prior wave
of international and inter-sectoral mergers and acquisitions.
The depth and density of the involvement of the industry in co-authoring EU
armaments policy and in setting its agenda cannot be seen as simply an act of
lobbying. Philosopher Istvan Mészáros has noted that ‘the expression “militaryindustrial complex”…clearly indicates that what we are concerned with is
something much more firmly grounded and tenacious than some direct
political/military determinations (and manipulations) which could be in principle
reversed at that level’. What we are dealing with here is a much more in-depth,
structural involvement, regularized, normalized and prioritized by a set of EU
institutions. The European Commission and its DG Enterprise and Industry stand
out as the politico-institutional nucleus of the complex; they form its state-like
command centre in the absence of an EU state, producing the ‘general interest’ as
a long-term vision. Such an interest needs to receive an intergovernmental
confirmation via the Council of the European Union, as well as via the European
Defence Agency, an intergovernmental agency formally in charge of EU
armaments affairs. Its role in capabilities development is increasingly coupled by
its role in funding research and technology projects, enhancing armaments
cooperation and delineating strategies for maintaining a strong European Defence
Technological and Industrial Base - an euphemism for military-industrial
corporate profitability. The European Parliament with its unquestionable, bipartisan support for the EU MIC’s cause provides a flair of popular support,
strengthened by key individuals in the Security and Defence Subcommittee.
However, there can be no military-industrial complex without the military.
Through their participation in ESDP-related military committees, such as EUMC,
the military has been deciding upon requirements and addressing capability gaps
to be filled by the manufacturers. Finally, the EU Institute for Security Studies has
been producing state-of-the-art analyses of ESDP and its estimated requirements,
as well as forecasts for industrial profitability.
A final set of actors comprises elements of a “civil society”, such as private think
tanks (Security & Defence Agenda) and informal political groupings (The
Kangaroo Group). To a great extent, “civil society” consists of initiatives funded
by the industry itself. On another note, organised labour has been a faithful
supporter of the armaments agenda, via the positions taken by the European
Metalworkers’ Federation. The mobilization of labour aristocracy highlights the
magnitude of the complex and the hegemony enjoyed by arms manufacturers, in
class terms. Needless to say that next to the “civil society” stands the state, in the
form of the national military-industrial complexes of arms-producing states. These
operate parallel to the EU MIC; the latter complements the former, rather than
substituting them.
In terms of outcomes, the EU MIC can first and foremost boast of introducing
new lines of funding, such as the Commission-inspired European Security
Research Program and its precursor, the Preparatory Action for Security Research.
The European Defence Agency is also a source of funding for military R&D,
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Conference “The EU as a driving force for armaments”
Organised by GUE/NGL, Brussels, 9/11/2011
while the European Commission has been feeding the development of major
space programs with military applications, such as Galileo and GMES. In fact,
there is a trend of transferring civil funding into military funding, as shown by the
case of Galileo and the collapse of the public-private partnership. In the absence
of a pan-European procurement agency - apart from the European Space Agency
and its procurement of satellites - most of the funding concerns research and
technology, rather than procurement of equipment.
However, the outcome cannot be grasped purely in quantitative, funding terms.
There is a qualitative dimension of outcomes that facilitate military-industrial
interests, even if they do not always have a direct financial impact. One such
outcome is the reform of the European market landscape for armaments through
the Commission’s Defence Package. Another qualitative aspect is the formal
participation of the industry in EU policy-making through novel channels; take
the case of ASD Committees in the context of the EDA, or the numerous
“experts’ reports” (STAR21, Group of Personalities, LeaderSHIP 2015) drafted
under the close supervision of industrialists and the aegis of the Commission.
Note also the impact EU projects have on industrial consolidation. By actively
promoting collaborative projects, EU also promotes further mergers and
acquisitions, contributing to stronger and larger arms manufacturers.
That said, one should be cautious to not over-emphasize the effectiveness and
linearity of the complex. The lack of an EU state and of a single, transnational
military-industrial subject means that national divergences are persisting. The lack
of financial resources in times of crisis is also all-encompassing. The EU militaryindustrial complex is real, involving institutions of different intergovernmental and
supranational forms; yet, it is extremely contradictory as well, especially when
compared to the function of national MICs, such as the US one. On the one hand,
European capitalism is systematically reproducing militarization; on the other
hand, financial constraints and multiple national state/capital preferences limit the
impact and effectiveness of the complex. Essentially, we are faced with a
divergence between the global scope of capital and the limited scope of the
nation-state; it is, as Ellen Wood frames it, a problem of the ‘non-correspondence
between capitalism’s economic and political forms’. While economic-industrial
developments necessitate supranational, state-like institutional arrangements, the
nation-state remains indispensable for the reproduction of the national militaryindustrial complexes, and the political preconditions of capitalist hegemony.
Any decent political analysis must come with a proposal, so they say. Here is one:
there is an urgent need for the establishment of a Brussels-based research hub,
addressing issues relating to the security and military dimensions of the EU. So, I
submit the idea of establishing a center for the study of EU security and
armaments policy and of processes of militarization in Europe. Such a center
would collect vital data and documentation, encourage critical research, stimulate
public debates and inform alternative policy proposals both inside and outside the
European Parliament; in other words, it would strengthen resistance to
militarization. The story of the EU MIC highlights the importance of ideas. Ideas
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Conference “The EU as a driving force for armaments”
Organised by GUE/NGL, Brussels, 9/11/2011
matter, and the arms industry and its allies has understood this very well; take the
numerous experts’ organizations, conferences, publications and research programs
funded by arms manufacturers. Counter-hegemonic forces need to follow this
‘example’. Do not ask me who would be willing to support and fund such an
initiative, how and why; as the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre once said,
“when people ask you for directions, you simply tell them where the street is; you
do not take the strangers outside the home they are going to”.
To end, let me add one more quotation, by MEP Sabine Lösing: ‘What we need is
not more military, what we need is a change, an end to the European Union’s
neoliberal orientation”. The external orientation of the EU towards power
projection and militarization, and the internal orientation towards neoliberalism
and social exploitation are two interconnected processes, and the battle against the
one needs to incorporate the battle against the other.
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