Impact of Crime on Business and the Investment Climate in Jamaica January 22, 2004 Overview of Presentation Motivation for study Business victimization survey Quantifying economic costs of crime Policy options Why Estimate the Impact of Crime? Most frequent issue in business and individual discourse Third highest homicide rate in world (33 per 100,000) Negative impact on investment climate: Security costs, diverts investment, less than optimal operating strategy Losses from looting, arson, theft, extortion and fraud Why Estimate the Impact of Crime? (cont.) Negative impact on investment climate (cont.): loss of output (nightshifts, workdays lost) loss of output from injury/murder of labor shut-down or relocation of firms Also, erodes development of human and social capital, and diverts public resources away from productive uses High Crime– a Drag on Development Jamaica' International Ranking, Selected Governance Indicators 2002/2003, Average Rank (80 countries) =100 200 150 100 50 0 Bureaucracy Quality Law and Order Jamaica Dominican Republic Crime Costs Infrastructure Trinidad & Tobago U.S. Selected Dimensions of Crime Young males (14-24 yrs) most likely victims as well as perpetrators of violent crime In 2001, of those arrested for major crimes, 98% were males, and 53% were 16-25 years old Parish of Kingston and St. Andrew accounted for 57% of total murders over 1984-2001, yet formed only 27% of total population Selected Dimensions of Crime (cont.) High and increasing level of homicides, especially over 1990s, driven by increasing drug trans-shipment and distribution of drugs, leading to “gang wars” Contrasting evolution with NY of murder rate (per 100,000) Jamaica NY Ratio 1970 8.2 7.9 1.0 2000 33.7 5.0 6.7 Estimating the Impact of Crime Approach: Business Victimization Survey of 400 firms Quantifying the economic costs of crime Econometric analysis (determinants of crime) Case studies of firms Business Victimization Survey Methodology: Face-to-face interviews with 400 Jamaican firms (2002) Firms chosen by economic activity (12 types) and size, based on quota sample Survival bias in sample 92 items in questionnaire, some based on UN Inter-regional Crime Research Institute Business Victimization Survey (cont.) Patterns of Victimization 65% of firms in sample experienced criminal victimization in 2001 27% face theft on quarterly basis, 9% weekly 22% experience fraud and 9% violent victimization on quarterly basis 5% of firms paid extortionists, 8% paid for protection in 2001 (under-reporting) Business Victimization Survey (cont.) Sectoral patterns: Tourism: 72% of hotels reported theft in 2001 Agriculture: 81% of farms experienced theft Financial services: 65% reported fraud Size: small firms appear to be more vulnerable – barrier to entry for potential entrants? Business Victimization Survey (cont.) Perceptions of Risk 42% of managers perceived a risk of being murdered at the workplace 66% perceived that their firms were likely to be robbed Coping Strategies Protective measures; adjusting the organization of business activity to reduce opportunities for crime; and striking an accommodation with criminal networks Business Victimization Survey (cont.) Coping Strategies (cont.) 37% of firms surveyed opted to close before dark, thereby reducing effective productive capacity and capital productivity 20% would increase hours of operation if crime was lower; on average these firms would remain open an additional 3.6 hours per days if located in safer area Some key methodological issues in the measurement of the cost of crime Estimate of cost of crime is lower bound Value of human life is more than its contribution to the economy Ignores value of property damaged or destroyed during violence Static analysis, does not include: impact on structure of economic activity potential investment foregone Some key methodological issues in the measurement of the cost of crime (cont.) Static analysis, does not include (cont.): loss of potential future earnings of those murdered/disabled high transactions cost of replacing skilled and experienced workers Value of stolen goods is considered social loss in our approach Annual Economic Impact of Crime Cost of crime as % of GDP: Medical expenses on crime related injuries by government and individuals Loss of output arising from death and injury Public expenditure on security Annual Economic Impact of Crime (cont.) Additional costs of crime: Private expenditure on security Direct business losses of firms e.g. extortion, fraud, theft and looting Impact on investment, expansion, lifespan of firms Cost of Crime as % of GDP, 2001 1. 2. 3. 4. Healthcare costs J$ 1.3bn (0.4% of GDP) 1. Public health system J$ 996mn 2. Private Citizens J$ 255mn Lost Production J$ 0.5bn (0.2% of GDP) 1. Mortality J$ 194mn 2. Injury J$ 337mn Public expenditure on security J$10.5bn (3.1% of GDP) Total 1+2+3 J$12.4bn (3.7% of GDP) Additional Costs of Crime Private expenditure on security, % of annual revenue: Micro firms (< J$5mn revenue) Medium firms (J$10-20mn rev.) V.large firms (> J$100mn revenue) 17% 7.6% 0.7% Average 2% Additional Costs of Crime (cont.) Extortion, fraud, robbery/burglary, arson Micro firms/ firms rev. J$20-50mn = 9% of revenue Other categories = less than or equal to 2% of revenue Additional Costs of Crime (cont.) Losses from looting (70 firms) 57% of firms <J$100,000 19% of firms J$100,000-500,000 4% of firms J$1mn – 5mn Avg. losses due to temporary firm closures 2001 J$ 1 mn 2000 J$400,000 Impact of Crime on Business Planning and Prospects 51% of firms stated that increased costs of security significantly impacted business practice 39% of firms indicated that plans for business expansion were adversely affected Impact of Crime on Business Planning and Prospects (cont.) 37% of firms reported that plans to invest in productivity improvement were negatively impacted 6% of firms expected to close-down in the next three years (concentrated in sectors important in GDP), 19% uncertain of prospects, if current level of crime persisted Policy Options Survey: only 12% of managers support increased corporate taxes to fund crime control, but are more supportive to provide financial support for specific collective solutions that directly affect them and over which there is some direct accountability Policy Options (cont.) Identifying and measuring the crime problem Strengthen official data collection on crime Conduct frequent victimization surveys Improving law enforcement for crime deterrence Upgrade investigative capacity of police Policy Options (cont.) Improving social and collective action Improve the quality of the school experience Form effective partnerships between police, business and local communities Build Social Capital Applying focused interventions Target high crime urban areas Target youth at risk