Virginia Review of Asian Studies
CHINA’S ANGRY RIVER: ARE THE SUBALTERN SPEAKING?
EMILY RUDLING
UNIVERSITY OF TASMANIA
Abstract:
What are the social implications for the proposed damming of China’s Nu River? Can
the Chinese residents whose livelihoods depend upon the Nu River be classified as
subaltern? If so, what are their forms of resistance and can we hear their protest? This
paper argues that the damming of the Nu River marginalises and renders unconscious
the ethnic minorities that inhabit the region. It explores tensions within subaltern
studies to confirm that Nu locals are muted by dominant social and legal narratives. It
applies this to the greater framework of power and resistance with examples of
Chinese political protest in both subaltern contexts and normative narratives.
Secondly, this paper applies these theories to the case study of the damming of the Nu
River to explore nature of the affected subaltern groups.
Keywords: China, Nujiang, Nu River, protest, resistance, consciousness, environment,
damming, dams, subaltern.
Contemporary China is riddled with tensions between economic development, the
preservation of natural resources and the transformation of a largely agrarian population into
an urbanised, educated people. Metropolitan centres require agricultural goods, resources and
hard labour in the endeavour for wealth and prestige. An obvious cost of this is
environmental. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) does not seem able, or even interested,
in ensuring the prosperity of the country-side. While the CCP have heavily invested in the
economic development of rural China, as exemplified by ‘The Great Development of the
West’ campaign of the 1990s aimed at urbanising the rural population, problems in rural
areas persist. As a consequence, many rural settings remain under-developed. Often, farmers
resort to temporary migrant work in the urban centres to create income, thus leaving the
vulnerable, elderly, youth and disabled in the villages to tend the land. These people,
including the migrant workers, are China’s subaltern. They exist outside of the normative
social organisations of education, permanent employment and healthcare services. They are
unable to fully access these structures and are incapable of engaging with overarching
political narratives. This leaves them the most exposed to legal and economic exploitation.
The lack of interest in human, food and environmental security problems pertaining to
rural subjects exhibited by the CCP has given rise to protests against CCP policy: farmers are
fighting for environmental protection to secure their livelihoods. This is exemplified by
protests against damming along China’s Angry River; the Nujiang. The Nujiang is China’s
largest undammed river and flows freely through several nations. In desperation to secure a
hydro-electric supply to solve energy security fears, the CCP have lobbied to tame the river
by way of thirteen dams. Local farmers, who were later joined by other actors, have created a
movement which has managed to temporarily stop the CCP and protect the Nujiang.
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This paper analyses the role of the farmers throughout this process. The premise of
this paper is that the concept of subaltern is most productive for analysing the protest actions
of the farmers. It begins with discussion of the origins of subaltern studies and evaluates the
tensions within the ability of subaltern groups to have an awakened consciousness yet remain
marginalised. Secondly, this paper explores three ways in which subaltern groups are
understood to communicate and organise protest: rumour, communal solidarity and
resistance. These themes are applied to the case study of the protest and resistance
surrounding China’s Angry River.
Analyses of power and resistance often focuses upon ‘what happened’ as opposed to
engaging with theoretical perspectives of ‘why’ and subsequently enriching the investigation.
As a consequence, this paper focuses upon the theory that contextualises and attempts to
explain subaltern groups. By doing so, it is hoped that this analysis will provide a sound
understanding of subaltern groups and how they act.
Studying subaltern groups is to engage with the unawakened consciousness of mass
groups that are incoherent to normative structures of law, politics and the economy. It is a
study conducted upon objects of suppression by the mediators of their domination. As Leela
Ghandi suggests, subaltern studies are an attempt to allow the ‘people…to sound the muted
voices…’ of the masses who have unconsciously shaped history yet remained outside of the
major decision making processes. Karl Marx first ignites discussion surrounding subaltern
groups. In The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx encapsulates the meaning of
‘subaltern’ and the representation of such groups: ‘They cannot represent themselves; they
must be represented’. Marx recognises the lack of class consciousness in their ‘mode of
production’, absence of communication and subsequent separation from society. The concept
is further developed by Antonio Gramsci who evaluates the workings of cultural hegemony,
oppression and power. Gramsci argues that a society is controlled by the elite minority who
elicit the cultural hegemony, thus dictating the appropriate norms, religion, ethnicity,
sexuality and employment. Those who do not fit into the normative system are excluded from
legal and political narratives and are socially marginalised. Importantly, these groups are also
economically dispossessed. Therefore, due to the imposed cultural hegemony, subaltern
groups do not have the ability to protest within the accepted languages of law and reason and
are thus rendered unconscious.
Subaltern studies were expanded when the Subaltern Studies Group (SSG) began to
engage with theory and literature to try and hear these muted voices. The scope of their study
is limited to post-colonial and post-imperial nations as these nations had suffered the
imposition of a Western cultural hegemony and the subsequent marginalisation of their
identities and voices. Although the SSG largely focuses upon Indian decolonisation and
nationalism, the themes are applicable to China as a post-imperial nation who, in the
contemporary context, is defined by an exclusive cultural hegemony. Subaltern groups were
(found in) ‘the demographic difference between the total Indian population and all those
whom we have described as the “elite,”’ therefore determining that subaltern studies seek to
find the ‘culture that informs the condition’ and how that hegemony can be deconstructed
argues Guha. A consequence of this is the difficulty of investigating subaltern groups and
using their own narratives of power and resistance. Therefore, the investigator must engage
with subaltern modes of communication such as rumour.
When Spivak infamously questions whether the subaltern could speak, she reveals the
difficulties of representation in subaltern studies. Errors in representations arise primarily
from a West-East dichotomy. Traditionally, scholars have studied groups that have
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conformed to normative structures such as law and politics; narratives that can be reasoned
with. Subaltern groups, however, do not exist within these frameworks and thus cannot be
understood through the traditional lenses. The failure of the SSG was that subaltern groups
could only be understood when they engaged with the prescribed narratives. Spivak
exemplifies this with the Indian practise sati. Sati involves a widow burning herself upon her
husbands’ funeral pyre. The motivation for immolation is subjective, however, it was not
interpreted this way and the British Raj banned sati claiming it symbolised female
oppression. Spivak describes this as ‘white men saving brown women from brown men’ to
demonstrate how the “voice” of the female was constructed as an instrument of either
indigenous male patriarchy or British rule. The Raj maintained what they were doing
reflected the desires of the native population and that the legal protection of females
symbolises the modernity of a nation. The banning of female immolation demonstrates the
dangers in representation of subaltern groups. The Raj incorrectly identified sati and, as a
consequence, further separated Indian widows from legal and political structures to further
divide the Indian community under the British Raj.
Spivak contends the hazard of subaltern studies exists in the unknowing and complicit
reinforcement of colonial attitudes and understandings. The SSG are linked to post-colonial
studies which, Spivak argues, irreversibly ties the area to colonisation and the economic,
social and political domination that was originally conducted. Spivak questions whether postcolonial studies reaffirm the colonial classification of the East by observing practises from
Western, privileged positions and consequently failing to properly dismantle preconceived
interpretations of post-colonial nations. This implicit deconstruction of the subaltern that
occurs in the study of their expression is known as epistemic violence. Edward Said’s work
supports Spivak’s position, arguing that the investigator is strongly institutionalised to view
subaltern groups as ‘other’ and therefore objects of examination. As a consequence subaltern
groups must be studied in relation to socio-political realities.
Misunderstandings of subaltern groups can be explained by the theory of essentialism.
On a superficial level, essentialism is understood as the recognition of the essence of things
and the core mechanism that defines it as an individual entity. Essentialism is defined in
opposition to difference and can consequently be helpful in recognising the complex and
unique interplays of culture, history and religion and therefore does not create a set of
preconceived universal norms and values. The realisation of essentialism and difference,
however, can be obstructive insofar as it can allow the denial of differences within
essentialism. In a post-colonial context, essentialism enables the reduction of an essentialist
idea to be summarised into what it means to be female, Chinese or Indian which Rushdie
argues is similar to exoticism. The problem, argues Morris, is in what escapes the essentialist
narrative. These interpretations further label and define subaltern groups to an essential
notion of “Other” to prevent scholars from engaging with the consciousness of subaltern
groups.
Spivak prescribes a strategic approach to essentialism to allow the voices of the
subaltern to be reviewed and unmuted. Spivak’s methodology entails deconstructing the ways
in which subaltern groups are presented by analysing each facet of the motivation behind the
actions of that group to uncover the ‘true voice’ of that subaltern: ‘[“Deconstruction”] is not
the exposure of error. It is constantly and persistently looking into how truths are produced.’
Strategic essentialism is a method that uses group identity as the basis of a struggle but also
recognises and debates issues related to that group identity and the individuals within the
group. While this appears theoretically engaging, strategic essentialism has been regularly
misinterpreted. Primarily, essentialist theory and deconstruction are often understood to be
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incompatible and there is difficulty in putting strategic essentialism into practise. As a
consequence, the concept is subjective and inadequate to provide a benchmark for
investigation. This problematises the ability of scholars to listen for subaltern groups.
The representation of subaltern groups is therefore a key tension within post-colonial
studies. The question posed by Marx in the 19th Century has proven central to realising
Eastern and Western differences and the understanding of the ‘Other’ in the shaping of and
validity of subaltern and elitist identities. As Spivak demonstrates, there is significant
difficulty in overcoming preconceived ideas of normative structures and narration to properly
engage with the consciousness of subaltern groups. This logo-centric dependence on the West
prevents subaltern groups from speaking independently and resultantly, the outcome of postcolonial studies becomes almost contradictory of its aims. While strategic essentialism may
enable some groups to enter the fray, the subaltern remain subjects of investigation and
consequently, are disempowered.
A study conducted on the translation of the grievances of subaltern groups in China
demonstrates how subaltern groups are disempowered. The study investigates an altercation
in Taishi Village in 2005 regarding corrupt distribution of welfare benefits in the area.
Village elders argued funds for collective welfare had been illegally taken by local cadres.
The protests in Taishi Village quickly drew national attention and lawyers and legal
representatives flocked into the village to aid the protesters and provide them with a
conscious, recognisable voice that would resonate with the national political agenda. This
removed the resistance from the control of the subaltern group and translated it into a legal
narration: a language that the original protesters were incapable of reaching or understanding.
The protest became part of the national agenda and synonymous with the fight for democracy
and integral to the campaigning of the rights defence movement. External actors interpreted
the protest as part of a larger, homogenous idea of empowering the exploited farmers. It was
believed that by joining the issues of Taishi Village with other rural battles, it would create an
empowering solidarity across China and influence CCP policy. The inhabitants of Taishi
Village were not in want of this. The lawyers demonstrated a poor interpretation and
translation of the grievances of the villagers thus rendering Taishi Village a tool in their
construction of the framework of normative protest and resistance argues Woodman. Taishi
Village exemplifies the pitfalls in representing subaltern groups.
The fiasco at Taishi Village questions whether subaltern groups can speak and
simultaneously remain subaltern: do unmuted subaltern groups merge into the greater
consciousness of class struggle? Utilising strategic essentialism, Spivak concludes subaltern
groups cannot speak thus determining they remain unconscious. Subaltern resistance cannot
be translated into another narrative without being changed which, as Woodman exemplifies,
is not uncommon. Thus, for subaltern groups to consciously engage with other actors is to
recognise the accepted modes of communication and to cease being subaltern. Guha disputes
this and argues that the premise of subaltern studies is to engage with what consciousness is
awakened in oppressed groups. Guha, therefore, questions what mechanisms subaltern groups
use to protest and resist and whether these shaped or impacted on the political agendas of
their time.
This is illustrated by the origins of what the British title the "Indian Mutiny” or, for
the Indians, the First War of Independence (1857). Indian soldiers were employed by British
Raj as sepoys to help the crush Indian uprisings. The sepoys were deployed across India with
modern weaponry, the Enfield Rifled Musket. This ensured greater accuracy and distance
than its predecessors. To load the rifle, sepoys bit open the cartridge and poured gunpowder
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into the muzzle. The cartridge was waterproofed with grease and used as wadding. The
mutiny began when rumour circulated that the cartridges were dipped in animal fat; namely
lard from the pig and tallow of the cow. In reaction, Muslim sepoys refused to open
cartridges for fear of breaking taboos regarding pork and the Hindu sepoys were admonished
at the possibility of being lowered in caste for consuming the sacred cow. The rumours
sparked the sepoys’ refusal to fight and thus caused the ‘Indian mutiny’.
Rumour is not a traditional narrative used to effect political change; however, in this
case, rumour irreversibly affected the socio-political construction of British India. Rumour
was the principal means of communication used by the soldiers of the War of Independence
to mobilise insurgents and evoke comradeship. Spivak asserts the importance of oral
traditions which conveys ideas, hopes and protest to unite subaltern groups. In the Indian
Independence, these customs of song, story and myth gave rumour the greatest authority. It is
evident the culture of the spoken word was utilised as a framework for protest to effect
political change. This determined that the affected were in control of the conversation and
their grievances were not forcefully translated into a separate narrative as had occurred in
Taishi village. The “Indian Mutiny” is historically important because subaltern culture
informed the protest. This is important insofar as culture has historically developed in
juxtaposition with reason, contends Dirlik. Rationality, however, is premised on both culture
and reason if it is to at all be tied to the living world. Accordingly, to avoid ideas regarding
the influence of culture is to remain imprisoned in rational ways of seeing. Unconsciousness
must be the departure point for critical analysis and radical activity. This is arguably what
was achieved through rumour during the “Indian Mutiny”.
The Jasmine Revolutions that occurred in China early 2011 (19th February 2011 – 21st
March 2011) illustrate the power of rumour in a modern context. The revolutions were
sparked by the Arab Spring where protesters were fighting for democracy, human rights and
transparent governance. Peculiarly, the Jasmine Revolution began outside China on social
networking websites, Twitter and Boxun.com where anonymous users encouraged Chinese to
meet on Sundays at various places around China to peacefully protest for change. On the
arranged dates, thousands of Chinese gathered expectant of protest yet nothing actually
happened and nothing was actually changed. The “revolutions”, however, demonstrate the
impact and authority of rumour to unite groups through a common belief. While the men and
women involved do not fit the traditional description of subaltern, their involvement and
desire for change illustrates a feeling of frustration in their ability to shape the political
agenda.
The use of rumour is underpinned by notions of identity and identification with
communities. Marx explains a community, or social class, is formed by its relation to the
means of production. Therefore, there exists a community of owners and in opposition exist a
community of workers. Hence for Marx, a shared economic position constitutes a
community. Subaltern literature suggests community is an abstract, fluid concept consisting
of social, ancestral, economic and ideological ties. For example, in secluded Chinese villages
such as Gao, kinship and the surname Gao, define who resides in that community and also
who is excluded from identifying with Gao. Shared interests and awareness are central to
holding a community together. As a result, it is commonly believed that as the sense of
community dissolves the importance and sometimes volatile expression of identity rises.
Guha’s studies on subaltern resistance explore the connections between identity and
communities. Guha recognises six elementary aspects that must form in the consciousness of
a group so as to create a community: negation, ambiguity, modality, solidarity, transmission
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and territoriality. Importantly, Guha argues these components are further essential to
determining what encourages a community to rebel against or acquiesce with the cultural
hegemon. The identity of the seditious community is expressed and defined by its opposition
which consequently places the adversary at the opposite end of the spectrum. Notions of
community are important in the unification of subaltern groups and in expressing grievances
in a communal framework of solidarity; ‘This principle enables us to read…the actions…the
total constitutive character of a peasant consciousness…’
Subaltern studies are underpinned by the greater framework of power and resistance.
Foucault argues power is synonymous with domination. This premise can be readily
interpreted by post-colonial theory. Central to Foucauldian theories of power is the
acknowledgement that power is not an entity in itself but rather an act that must be exercised
in order to exist. Power is a facility. As a consequence, Foucault argues power exists in
relations that expedite the transferral of power to or from actors. Individuals are both subjects
and objects of power and ‘are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and
exercising…power.’ In Orientalist thought Said illustrates this notion with the West sending
cartographers and linguists to classify and control the knowledge and exercise power over the
East. Subaltern studies are premised upon the exercise of power either in recognising colonial
discourses or in guiding information.
The problem with this approach, however, is the assumption that the exercise of
power is intentional. Paradoxically, Foucault does not suggest that intent is implicit in power:
‘power relations are both intentional and non-subjective’. This asserts that, while Foucault
recognises power is evident in all interactions between people and non-human objects, he
believes it is more insidious than what traditional theories of power infer. This argument is
predicated on the recognition that power is never controlled by an individual but ‘[Power] is
employed and exercised through a net-like organization.’ Accordingly, Foucault suggests that
every day in almost every interaction, people exercise power toward, against, and upon other
individuals and groups - often unconsciously. This is exemplified by formal education. In
modern Western countries, formal education is accepted as a necessary aspect of life but in
reflection of Foucauldian power theories, the question arises as to who determines that formal
education is required. Existing without education, however, would be almost impossible
when accounting for work, socialising and healthcare thus determining that formal education
is integral to successful living. Education exemplifies how power is exercised by many
different actors in various processes.
Resistance is implicit to subaltern studies and Foucauldian power theories. The area is
predicated upon unmuting the voices of actors whose resistance has been repeatedly made
unintelligible to the normative structures of power. Said infers this in his assumption that
despite the ‘pervasiveness’ of the cultural hegemony, ‘there are always going to be
parts…that it does not…control.’ Subaltern studies itself can be understood as resisting
traditional elitist historiographies. Conversely, O’Hanlon suggests the major flaw in subaltern
studies is the focus upon grand gestures of resistance. This fails to recognise and empower
every-day forms of resistance. The emphasis on dramatic expression of struggle creates
another level of elitism within subaltern studies by recognising only impressive movements,
such as the Indian First War of Independence, that are comparatively privileged due to their
vast solidarity. This reiterates problem within essentialism insofar as what escapes the
accepted narratives: large rebellions can be viewed as resulting from homogenous groups.
The utilisation of essentialism in conjunction with O’Hanlon’s critique enables scholars to
realise that within subaltern groups exist those who are doubly oppressed such as women and
children. To this end, power and resistance are central to unpacking subaltern studies.
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Case Study:
The Nujiang (Salween, Salawin) is China’s Angry River. It hurtles west from the
Tibetan plateau for several hundred kilometres and then bends east across China into Yunnan
Province at the three parallel rivers protected area. Here, the Angry River gives life to one of
the most ecologically diverse areas on the planet and sustains endangered flora and fauna. It
then travels in a southward arc across the Tibetan and Yunnan-Guizhou Plateaus before
dropping into a 4000m deep gorge and swerving south to form the Thai-Burmese border. It
continues and dips through the Myanmar Mountains and 250kilometres from the Indian
Ocean, breaks from the gorge to form a deeper, faster current that weaves through Myanmar
before becoming a delta and merging with the Indian Ocean. The Nujiang supports between
seven and ten million people, many indigenous tribes and extensive natural resources. It is
one of only two rivers in China that remain undammed. Civilisation has long sought and
failed to tame the Nujiang, but the CCP have renewed their vision to vanquish it. Informed by
a nuanced understanding of the theoretical issues and debates underpinning subaltern studies,
this case study seeks to unravel the resistance toward the proposed dams and whether
subaltern voices have affected decision making processes.
The CCP strive to construct the largest cascading dam on the globe. It would make the
controversial and largely failed Three Gorges Dam comparatively tiny and generate an extra
21.32 million kilowatts of power. The proposal, which was originally released in 2003, is
predicated upon relieving problems regarding the scarcity of natural resources and growing
populations throughout the region. Currently, only one dam exists on the Nu at Baluchaung
yet, since the 1970s, hydro-electric companies from Thailand, Burma, China and Japan have
expressed strong interest in farming the Nu’s energy. The cascading dams would provide
China with extra electricity to support rapid urbanisation and divert irrigation water into
Thailand and Burma. The original proposal was passed in 2003 and quickly became
controversial. Initially, Chinese activists were angered at the lack of transparency of the
policy. Under the Administration Permissions Law and the Guidelines of Full
Implementation Law, environmental tenders must be released to the public for scrutiny. This,
however, was not extended to Chinese citizens.
Environmental activists were quick to express their resistance to the proposal. In
2005, 61 Chinese environmental non-governmental organisations signed a letter addressed to
the World Heritage Centre and also to the CCP asking for proper scientific investigation and
the release of the proposal to the public. Their argument was founded on the fact that the
basin in Yunnan forms part of the three parallel rivers world heritage protected area which
UNESCO claimed ‘(It) may be the most biologically diverse temperate region on earth’.
Hundreds of villages would require flooding, thousands of farmers would be relocated and
rare flora and fauna destroyed. Further, it is an active seismic area making landslides,
flooding and earthquake likely. For a cascading dam structure, this could be fatal. In 2004, in
response to mandates from intellectuals and environmental organisations, then Premier Wen
Jibao cancelled the dams on the premise that China must seek sustainable development and
the potential destruction to the region had not been properly accounted for. This claim has
since been revoked. Early 2011, the CCP renewed their vow to develop hydro-electric power
on the Nujiang. In February 2011, the twelfth Five Year Plan was released and central to it is
the construction of dams and the subsequent production of hydro-electric power in South
West China. This is in conjunction with aims to increase urbanisation, control the population
and raise living standards across the nation. Energy security is therefore vital to the success of
the plan.
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Central to the controversy surrounding the proposed dam site is the role and treatment
of the ethnic minorities who reside there. The region is culturally diverse with various
indigenous communities coexisting and surviving off the Nu’s tributaries and extensive flora
and fauna. The majority of the villages consist of rural, illiterate farmers whose geographical
distance from urban centres determines they live outside of normative social, legal and
economic structures. Further, ethnicity throughout the 20th Century in China has often
equated with political marginalisation. The majority of Chinese, approximately 90%, identify
as Han ethnicity. The remaining 10% consist of over 200 mainly unrecognised ethnic groups
(fifty-six are officially recognised). During the 20th Century, the CCP sought to integrate
large ethnic groups into the greater kinship identity of Han Chinese. This escalated during the
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Although the Cultural Revolution was a long time ago, the
recent protests in Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia autonomous regions, demonstrate that
the marginalisation of ethnic minorities continues in Post Cultural Revolution China. Ethnic
minorities along the Nujiang are therefore rendered subaltern not only by their geographical
distance from political epicentres, but also due to their ethnicity.
A lack of transparency in damming policies has excluded the affected villages from
influencing or accessing the appropriate political discussions. Journalist and environmental
activist Wang Yongchen travelled to remote villages along the Nujiang to interview locals
about the proposed cascade dam. His findings are important to this study. First, Wang
recognises an almost infallible trust in the CCP. This is exemplified by the confusion
experienced by villagers who heard rumours of the proposed dam, watched engineers
surveying and drilling nearby, yet did not received confirmation of the dams. Wang’s
interviewees, however, expressed anger toward corrupt regional officials, not the CCP. The
struggle here reflects the recent uprisings in Wukan, Guangdong province (December 2011).
Infuriated by corrupt officials squandering money, farmers rallied together to eject the local
government and implement a locally elected democratic, communist government.
Participants, however, were clear that they did not oppose the CCP, but wanted to be rid of
corrupt local officials.
The events in Wukan are contrasted with Wang’s second finding from the people
along the Nujiang: a feeling of inferiority. Wang argues that the low political and legal
participation of Nu locals was compounded by feelings of inadequacy. This is illustrated by
interviewee “Lu Jian” who reported that while he was a delegate to the county Peoples’
Congress, his lack of education prevented him from resisting: ‘Because I can’t write…there’s
little point in just speaking about it’. This reveals an important tension in the relationship
between farmers, cadres and the communist party. O’Brien and Li argue that modern protest
in China has been of ‘rightful’ resistance against corrupt local officials and cadres where
marginalised groups gain access to hard law to collectively petition to central government for
the eradication of corruption and enforcement of communism. This process has a double
effect. First, it demonstrates a strong belief in communism and against corruption. In terms of
the Nujiang damming policies, locals were angered by the lack of transparency from cadres,
and, in the case of Lu Jian, did not have the skills to overcome this. The problems exist when
lawyers, such as in Taishi Village, attempt to mould the protest into a national movement.
This reveals what O’Brien and Li contend is an infallible trust in central government.
The interviews conducted by Wang reveal how rumours have affected the farmers and
altered the limited information available. Chinese are entitled to access information as
enshrined in the constitution; however, Wang’s findings determine that although the proposal
is legally required to be publicly released, the Nu locals remain completely uninformed.
Farmers relied upon comparing rumours from neighbouring villagers and the presence of
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engineers and journalists to reach an ad hoc understanding of the proposal and how it will
affect them. The inadequate communication was further evident in the assumptions
proponents of the dam had created. This is exemplified by a discussion with interviewee “Xu
Zhaoyang” who was deeply shocked at the CCP’s belief that farmers would prefer to be
moved away from their homelands into urban centres. The subaltern groups were being
spoken for and marginalised. Central to this problem are the differences in interpretation as to
what the dams would bring. The CCP contends the dams would alleviate the severe poverty
of villages along the Nujiang as the hydropower sites would provide better employment and
wages to locals however, the mainly illiterate villagers contend that the benefits would be
filtered through companies and officials. The peasantry contend they would be further
subjugated and disenfranchised.
Unclear policy has pushed the villages further away from political and legal
narratives. Due to circulating rumours, farmers are largely concerned about compensation,
adequate housing and employment following the imminent demolition and flooding of their
land. A consequence of this is that, in the interim, villagers are required to live in terrible
conditions. They are unable to fix their homes as building has been banned and the
uncertainty of planting crops endangers their livelihood. Further, stories of worse poverty in
the urban centres have created more anxiety.
Wang’s report raises several issues regarding the representation of the subaltern
groups affected by the dam. Primarily, as it is an unpublished source, the report demonstrates
how regular frameworks fail to encompass the grievances of the farmer. Popular media such
as newspapers for example, commonly describe the villagers as weak, uneducated and to be
pitied. This illustrates the problems within the hierarchical, top-down power distribution from
the CCP to the farmers and further, between mainstream society and the subaltern groups.
Wang, O’Brien and Li, however, argue a bottom up approach to power is honoured by the
farmers. This is exemplified by the interviewees who demonstrated feelings of inferiority,
marginalisation and frustration at the role the CCP had assumed for them which were
incorrectly enforced by local cadres.
The majority of available resources and research reflects the marginalisation of
Chinese farmers in policy and society. Information is mostly available from international
organisations. An examination of the International Rivers campaign that has a special section
dedicated to protecting the Nujiang exemplifies the problems with representation and
marginalisation. First, the International Rivers campaign seeks to protect the Nujiang from
damming. It claims its purpose is to empower the ethnic minorities that reside there and
protect those who cannot engage with normative narratives including flora and fauna. There
are significant problems with communication between the peasants and the organisation. The
organisation can be accessed through the internet, the telephone and/or reaching their
headquarters but many ethnic minorities along the Nujiang claim to be unable to afford
electricity, let alone a computer or telephone. This raises questions of legitimacy regarding
how the organisation collects information about the people they assert to be representing.
This problem is compounded by analysis of the leaders of the Nujiang campaign. The
synopses of the leading organisers reveal that it is run by mainly Western, highly educated
men and women who have a vague connection to China and Nu locals. While several of the
members are Chinese in origin, they are wealthy, well-educated and urban elite who may not
have a good understanding of power, resistance and subalternity and could in fact only serve
to damage the representation of the subaltern group. The problems embedded within external
representation of subaltern groups are evidenced by Taishi Village. Woodman recorded that
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several of the lawyers who involved themselves in the protests to self-validate careers to
engage with a larger campaign. As Marx clarifies in The 18th Brumiare of Louis Bonaparte,
however, subaltern groups cannot represent themselves because in doing so, they cease to be
subaltern.
The debate underscoring the proposed damming of China’s Angry River refers to a
history of dependence on waterways and a desire to control their flow. The controversy that
surrounded the construction of the Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River (completed
2008) demonstrates the significance of controlling the waterways in China’s national psyche
along with the mediums open to farmers who oppose damming policy. Historically, China’s
success as an empire was predicated upon controlling the flow and direction of the waterways
for communication, trade and defence purposes. In the early twentieth century, the nation
building vision of political leader Sun Yat-Sen included the damming of the Yangtze. Sun
Yat-Sen’s plan bound hundreds of years of dreams and prestige in attempt to use the dam as a
physical and mental strengthening of China and to gain control of the lifeblood of China: the
water ways. The Three Gorges Dam is therefore synonymous with the rebirth of China as a
nation and is central to fundamental notions of nation building and modernity. The damming
of the Nujiang is also reminiscent of this. Damming the Nujiang asserts the prominence of
China as a modern, powerful Asian nation. The Nujiang flows through several nations of
lesser economic and political power than China. The cascade dam will dramatically affect the
water flow into these areas. It is an international concern. The success of creating and
maintaining the dam will signify the control China has over the rivers and nature and further
influence China can proclaim across borders. The Nujiang is synonymous with the greater
argument surrounding Chinese modernity and the regional and international might of the
CCP.
The construction of the Three Gorges Dam sparked significant protest. The dams,
situated in succession in three parts of the Yangtze River are some of the largest in the world
and mediate the thunder of a great river. The dams required the flooding of 62,000 acres of
farmland, 13 major and 140 minor cities and over 1.5 million people were forced to relocate.
Moreover, the damming endangered important flora and fauna. There were significant
protests staged by farmers against the construction of the dam. Namely low relocation
allowances, a lack of accessibility to legal explanations and the drawn out process of fifteen
years of construction and uncertainty infuriated locals. In retaliation to forced migration and
the destruction of their homes, farmers violently protested the construction of the Three
Gorges Dam. The protests were particularly volatile in Chongqing where farmers upturned
cars and many protesters were injured or arrested. The protests attracted international
attention which fuelled international concerns over Chinese human rights. Regardless, the
dams were completed in 2008. The aftermath, however, is a severely damaged ecology.
Algae blooms, flooding and alterations in flora and fauna in the dams have caused
environmentalists to label the Three Gorges Dam an ‘environmental disaster’. The problems
pertaining to the ‘success’ of the Three Gorges Dam thus makes one query the damming of
the Nujiang with trepidation.
Wang’s report reveals crucial feelings of solidarity, resistance and the confusion felt
by the locals whose lives will be forever changed by the plight to secure hydro-electricity.
Further, the report reveals the villagers exist outside of normative social frameworks such as
education, law, politics and the economy. Their marginalisation is intensified by their
ethnicity, geographical distance and social preconceptions of ‘peasants’. To observe them in
an essentialist way, however, would be to negate the purpose of this study. Therefore, the
benefit of Wang’s report is that it exemplifies differences between villages, individuals and
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also, interpretations of the dam and has illustrated the heterogeneous nature of subaltern
groups.
Central to Wang’s report is the geographical distance between the farmers and the
major political hubs. Although the farmers demonstrate an unfailing trust in the CCP, their
location strengthens ethnic identities and resultantly, some farmers may feel they have little
in common with the agenda of Beijing leadership. Social geographer James C. Scott argues
that in South East Asia exists an area called ‘Zomia.’ In Zomia live many scattered ethnic
minorities who are refugees from modernisation and have chosen to live independent of
internationally recognised nations. Although these groups live within national borders they do
not share a national solidarity or identity with their fellow citizens. Wang’s report
demonstrates that the villagers along the Nujiang do feel connected to the CCP but, their
daily values and habits may be more compatible with other ethnic groups who reside along
the Nujiang. The damming of the Nujiang, however, will affect the people of ‘Zomia’ as it
will affect those in Burma, Thailand and Beijing which gives rise to problems pertaining to
the treatment of international ethnic groups, and, the question of who owns a river.
This study has evaluated the theories of the SSG and explored the difficulties in the
representation of such groups. Primarily, the tension rests in the contradictions of whether
subalterns can engage with normative frameworks and if so, whether this means they cease
being subaltern. Misrepresentation is not uncommon. The rebellion in Taishi Village and the
International Rivers campaign to protect the Nujiang and its inhabitants demonstrate how
subaltern grievances are often forcefully translated into a dialogue that cannot be understood
by the original protesters. Consequently, Guha’s studies on ways in which the subaltern do
speak, such as rumour and solidarity, are important narratives to engage with in order to
awaken the consciousness of subaltern groups. Guha’s theory is illustrated in the
contemporary era by the Jasmine Revolutions and again, by how information trickles down to
villagers along the Nujiang. Subaltern studies are therefore essential to deconstructing the
social, economic and political notions of ‘right and wrong’, ‘able and unable’ and ‘rich and
poor’ that are dictated by the cultural hegemony. Spivak provides the methodology of
strategic essentialism to aid investigation of subaltern groups and ensure subaltern studies do
not inadvertently further silence subaltern groups. Along the Nujiang, the subaltern groups
are awake and listening to the rumours foretelling change and destruction to their homeland:
they are seeking to resist.
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