U.S. Welfare Policy Effects on Domestic Abuse: Evidence from Random Assignment Studies Lisa Gennetian MDRC Research in collaboration with: Virginia Knox, Cynthia Miller, Gayle Hamilton, Christina Gibson, Katherine Magnuson, Greg Duncan and Jared Smith Presentation at The Development Implications of Gender-Based Violence World Bank November 2004 1 MDRC is a non partisan research organization dedicated to building knowledge to improve social policy Over 60 studies informing major issues in U.S. welfare, workforce, and education policy A mission to provide reliable evidence on what works (and does not work) to improve the wellbeing of low-income families and children An interdisciplinary research staff A commitment to sharing findings and lessons with policymakers at all levels 2 MDRC’s specialty is random assignment research studies Arrive at financial assistance office to apply or re-apply for welfare benefits Assigned to treatment group (T) Assigned to control group (C) New program benefits or requirements Existing welfare programs Effects of new policy Outcome T – Outcome C 3 Illustrative example of evaluating program effects on employment (%) New program Existing welfare system Impact 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1 -10 Year prior to RA 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Quarters of Employment Note: Quarter 2 represents the first quarter after random assignment. 4 MDRC played a key role in evaluating U.S. welfare programs in the 1980s and early 1990s Tests of policies using random assignment design: “Make work pay” policies Mandatory employment services Time limits 5 How might welfare policies affect domestic abuse? Welfare and employment programs affect economic outcomes Changes in employment, earnings and income can affect other aspects of family well-being • Increased abuse due to backlash to women’s increased economic independence • Decreased abuse due to increased empowerment High rates of reported domestic abuse among low income women in the U.S. • The Family Violence Option is one response in the context of welfare policy 6 Welfare or workforce evaluation data collection Baseline information Unemployment Insurance and public assistance administrative records Follow-up interviews with survey subsample: • • • • employment histories family composition domestic abuse (collected via CASI methods) children’s outcomes 7 The Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP) Model and Evaluation The first test of two key policy components: An enhanced income disregard with mandatory employment services Welfare waiver evaluation implemented in 3 urban and 4 rural counties from 1994 to 1998 Single parent families Random assignment research design 8 Characteristics of single parent long-term recipient families in MFIP Age in years 28.6 Number of children 2.3 Less than high school education or GED Black 30% Ever previously married Employed prior to study entry 30% 41% 43% 9 MFIP’s effects on economic outcomes among single parent long term recipients Over the first two years of follow-up, MFIP: Increased the amount of employment Increased earnings by $986 Increased income from earnings and welfare benefits by $2,430 (and, reduced the proportion of families living below the poverty line) 10 MFIP reduced reports of domestic abuse among single parent long term recipients AFDC - Single parent long term recipients in urban counties MFIP - Single parent long term recipients in urban counties (%) 50 40 39.9 44.2 * *** 31.4 30 35.5 30.8 * 23.9 23.7 19.4 20 10 0 Abuse by partner Abuse by other Any emotional abuse Any physical abuse Note: Client reports of domestic abuse measured in year prior to interview. Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < .01 11 How did MFIP reduce reports of domestic abuse? Nonexperimental techniques suggest that: • Increased employment reduces domestic abuse • Increased income has a possible role • There is little relationship between domestic abuse and marital status 12 There is no consistent evidence to date from welfare programs to support the “backlash” theory Programs with mandatory employment services that increased employment and earnings (but not income) show decreases in domestic abuse. Programs with time limits that increased employment and income in the short term show generally neutral effects on domestic abuse. Some programs show increased domestic abuse only among particular subpopulations. 13 Welfare policy responses in the U.S. Family Violence Option might strike the right balance: • Some women might benefit from being encouraged or required to increase employment • Other women, especially those who are experiencing severe or persistent abuse, might not We need to learn more about the type of abuse, and the context in which it takes place, to better understand potential effects of welfare and employment policies 14