Reforming Welfare and Rewarding Work:

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U.S. Welfare Policy Effects on
Domestic Abuse: Evidence from
Random Assignment Studies
Lisa Gennetian
MDRC
Research in collaboration with: Virginia Knox, Cynthia Miller, Gayle
Hamilton, Christina Gibson, Katherine Magnuson, Greg Duncan and
Jared Smith
Presentation at The Development Implications of Gender-Based Violence
World Bank
November 2004
1
MDRC is a non partisan research
organization dedicated to building knowledge
to improve social policy
 Over 60 studies informing major issues in U.S.
welfare, workforce, and education policy
 A mission to provide reliable evidence on what
works (and does not work) to improve the wellbeing of low-income families and children
 An interdisciplinary research staff
 A commitment to sharing findings and lessons with
policymakers at all levels
2
MDRC’s specialty is random assignment research studies
Arrive at financial assistance office to
apply or re-apply for welfare benefits
Assigned to
treatment
group (T)
Assigned to
control group
(C)
New
program
benefits or
requirements
Existing
welfare
programs
Effects of new policy
Outcome T – Outcome C
3
Illustrative example of evaluating program
effects on employment
(%)
New program
Existing welfare system
Impact
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1
-10
Year prior
to RA
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Quarters of Employment
Note: Quarter 2 represents the first quarter after random assignment.
4
MDRC played a key role in evaluating
U.S. welfare programs in the 1980s and
early 1990s
Tests of policies using random assignment design:
 “Make work pay” policies
 Mandatory employment services
 Time limits
5
How might welfare policies affect
domestic abuse?
 Welfare and employment programs affect
economic outcomes
 Changes in employment, earnings and income
can affect other aspects of family well-being
• Increased abuse due to backlash to women’s
increased economic independence
• Decreased abuse due to increased
empowerment
 High rates of reported domestic abuse among
low income women in the U.S.
• The Family Violence Option is one response
in the context of welfare policy
6
Welfare or workforce evaluation data
collection
 Baseline information
 Unemployment Insurance and public assistance
administrative records
 Follow-up interviews with survey subsample:
•
•
•
•
employment histories
family composition
domestic abuse (collected via CASI methods)
children’s outcomes
7
The Minnesota Family Investment
Program (MFIP) Model and Evaluation
 The first test of two key policy components: An
enhanced income disregard with mandatory
employment services
 Welfare waiver evaluation implemented in 3
urban and 4 rural counties from 1994 to 1998
 Single parent families
 Random assignment research design
8
Characteristics of single parent long-term
recipient families in MFIP
Age in years
28.6
Number of children
2.3
Less than high school
education or GED
Black
30%
Ever previously
married
Employed prior to
study entry
30%
41%
43%
9
MFIP’s effects on economic outcomes
among single parent long term recipients
Over the first two years of follow-up, MFIP:

Increased the amount of employment

Increased earnings by $986

Increased income from earnings and
welfare benefits by $2,430 (and, reduced
the proportion of families living below the
poverty line)
10
MFIP reduced reports of domestic abuse
among single parent long term recipients
AFDC - Single parent long term recipients in urban counties
MFIP - Single parent long term recipients in urban counties
(%)
50
40
39.9
44.2 *
***
31.4
30
35.5
30.8
*
23.9
23.7
19.4
20
10
0
Abuse by partner
Abuse by other
Any emotional abuse
Any physical abuse
Note: Client reports of domestic abuse measured in year prior to interview. Statistical significance levels are
indicated as: *p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < .01
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How did MFIP reduce reports of domestic
abuse?
Nonexperimental techniques suggest that:
• Increased employment reduces domestic
abuse
• Increased income has a possible role
• There is little relationship between domestic
abuse and marital status
12
There is no consistent evidence to date
from welfare programs to support the
“backlash” theory
 Programs with mandatory employment services
that increased employment and earnings (but
not income) show decreases in domestic abuse.
 Programs with time limits that increased
employment and income in the short term show
generally neutral effects on domestic abuse.
 Some programs show increased domestic
abuse only among particular subpopulations.
13
Welfare policy responses in the U.S.
 Family Violence Option might strike the right
balance:
• Some women might benefit from being encouraged or
required to increase employment
• Other women, especially those who are experiencing
severe or persistent abuse, might not
 We need to learn more about the type of abuse, and
the context in which it takes place, to better understand
potential effects of welfare and employment policies
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