Today’s Lecture
• A comment about your Third Assignment
and final Paper
• Preliminary comments on James
• William James
A comment about your Third
Assignment and final Paper
• I’m going to take the long weekend to grade your
Third Assignments. As you will get them back three
days before the paper is due, this will not give you
any less days before the paper due date to look over
my comments than you have had for the previous
assignments.
A comment about your Third
Assignment and final Paper
• In saying this, my guess is that you will be even more tired
then than you are now. So I propose to give you a bonus day
of grace to get your final Paper in to me.
• Three things to note about this proposal:
• (1) It means that IF you get your paper to me, or the
assignment drop box, by 4:00 p.m. on August 11th, THEN
you will not receive any late penalties for your paper.
• (2) This extra day of grace only applies to your Paper.
• (3) Technically, this does not change the due date for the
paper (which remains August 8th).
Preliminary comments on James
• One of the important foils for William James is
evidentialism, particularly the evidentialism of W.K.
Clifford.
• Remember, Clifford contends that “it is wrong always,
everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon
insufficient evidence” (CP, p.4). The wrong committed,
according to Clifford, is moral in nature.
• Also remember that evidentialism need not commit itself to
the view that believing on insufficient evidence is morally
wrong. It can simply argue (1) that to believe on insufficient
evidence is to acquire beliefs with negative epistemic value,
and (2) that we have an epistemic duty to acquire beliefs
with positive epistemic value.
Preliminary comments on James
• The Ontological, Cosmological and Teleological Arguments
for the existence of the God or Goddess reflect evidentialist
sympathies. I.e. philosophers who use these arguments
typically believe that we should ensure that (all of) our
beliefs have appropriate justificatory support or grounding,
and that belief in God(’s existence) can be shown to be
either demonstrably, or probably, true.
• Remember that evidentialism is a form of Strong
Rationalism (i.e. the view that a religious system of belief
can only be rightly believed to be true if it can be
convincingly shown to be true [to any reasonable person]).
William James
• William James was one of the more famous
of the Twentieth Century American
philosophers.
• He was born in 1842 and died in 1910.
• Though he wrote about and studied
religious phenomena, he is perhaps most
famous for his work in psychology (he is
the author of the classic Principles of
Psychology).
William James
• He is famously connected to the American
philosophical school known as Pragmatism.
• Putting it crudely, Pragmatists are, in an important
sense, radical empiricists.
• For Pragmatists, the epistemic value of a belief lies
in its usefulness (broadly construed) to the
organisms that hold it.
• They also typically think that we ought only to
concern ourselves with those beliefs that have
experiential import (i.e. rightly lead us to expect,
and successfully interact with, future observables or
experience).
William James
• James’ essay “The Will to Believe” is often regarded
as one of the best contemporary expressions of
Fideism.
• Remember Fideism is the view that religious
systems of belief are not open to rational evaluation
(even if this view of religious systems of belief is a
rational one to take).
• The question is: Is William James properly regarded
as a Fideist?
William James
• Consider this quote from your readings:
• James describes this essay as “a defense of
our right to adopt a believing attitude in
religious matters, in spite of the fact that our
merely logical intellect may not have been
coerced” (FP, p.121).
• What do you think? Is he a Fideist? Do we
know enough yet to judge?
“The Will to Believe”: I
• Hypothesis: anything which may be proffered for belief
(FP, p.121).
• Live hypothesis: a hypothesis which is, to the believer, a
real possibility (i.e. it is something that possesses some
degree of prima facie credibility).
• Note that to be a live hypothesis a hypothesis must have
(some) appeal to the epistemic sensibilities of the relevant
epistemic subject. This means that a hypothesis could be
both live and dead, though not to the same epistemic subject
at time t (FP, p.121).
• Option: the decision between two hypotheses (FP, p.121).
“The Will to Believe”: I
• Living (versus dead) option: A decision in which
each competing hypothesis for belief is a live
hypothesis to (i.e. is a real or genuine candidate for
belief to) the relevant epistemic subject (FP, p.121).
“The Will to Believe”: I
• Forced (versus avoidable) option: The believer must
choose between competing hypotheses for belief (FP,
p.122).
• “Every dilemma based on a complete logical disjunction,
with no possibility of not choosing, is an option of this
forced kind” (FP, p.122).
• A logical disjunction is a compound sentence in which the
simpler (complete) sentences are linked by an ‘either … or’
logical operator.
• ‘Either this action is right or this action is wrong’ is an
example of a logical disjunction. Note this example is not a
genuine option because it is not forced…the action under
consideration may be morally neutral.
“The Will to Believe”: I
• Momentous (versus trivial) option: An
option which, when taken, is unique,
significant or irreversible (FP, p.122).
• Genuine Option: An option which is
forced, living and momentous (FP, p.121).
“The Will to Believe”: II
• James opens this section with a distinction between beliefs
on the basis of which are under our control to believe or not
to believe.
• There are some beliefs we find ourselves incapable of not
believing, or incapable of believing. These, according to
James, typically concern matters of fact or analytic (i.e. a
priori) truths, or known falsehoods (FP, p.122).
• Disagreement in philosophy of religion has been partially
over whether this is true for religious belief (i.e. whether we
find ourselves incapable of not believing or believing in,
say, the existence of the Goddess).
“The Will to Believe”: II
• James introduces you to Pascal’s Wager (Blaise Pascal was
a Seventeenth Century mathematician and philosopher).
Pascal held the view that we could choose to believe in the
existence of God.
• (1) You must either believe that God exists or believe that
He does not.
• (2) The decision cannot be decided on rational grounds (i.e.
on the basis of a priori, or even a posteriori, truths).
• (3) It is more reasonable to risk a finite loss (even certain
finite loss) in the face of (even just the possibility of)
infinite gain, than to risk losing the possibility of infinite
gain because of certain finite loss.
“The Will to Believe”: II
• (4) If you choose to believe that God exists,
and He doesn’t, then you lose nothing.
• (5) If you choose to believe that God exists,
and He does, then you gain eternal
life/happiness/peace.
• (6) So you should choose to believe that
God exists (FP, pp.122-23).
“The Will to Believe”: II
• It would seem, James thinks, that this Fideistic argument is
unpersuasive on several grounds:
• (1) This kind of argument smacks of desperation.
• (2) A religious belief based on such grounds hardly qualifies
as ‘faith-full’.
• (3) No Deity is going to take seriously this kind of
commitment, nor should they.
• (4) Most importantly, such a option is not a live one. No
Muslim or Protestant Christian is going to find themselves
adopting Catholic Christianity on these grounds, and
reasonably so.
“The Will to Believe”: II
• (5) If we change the religious context to
another World Faith Tradition not currently
well represented in the room (e.g.
Hinduism), we will not increase its religious
or epistemic appeal simply or merely by
appealing to Pascal’s considerations. Yet the
argument would be relevantly similar to the
one offered by Pascal for belief in Catholic
Christianity (FP, p.123).
“The Will to Believe”: II
• James does think that this can be pushed too
far.
• Though there are beliefs that we are clearly
incapable of not believing or of believing
based on considerations of logic or fact, this
does not mean that all beliefs fall into this
category nor do we do any wrong in
believing such (other) beliefs on grounds
other than logic or fact (FP, p.123).
“The Will to Believe”: III
• James, in this section, suggest some candidates for belief
that we do not believe because we have sufficient, never
mind inescapable, evidence.
• (1) Certain basic scientific beliefs are held on no more than
the testimony of others (and a faith in their trustworthiness).
• (2) We have faith that there are truths (about the world and
ourselves) to be discovered and that we possess the relevant
ability to discover them, but we cannot decisively defend
these claims in the face of epistemological skepticism.
• (3) We have faith in the progress of science and scientific
knowledge, but, again, we cannot decisively defend such a
view in the face of epistemological skepticism.
“The Will to Believe”: III
• (4) Some beliefs we even believe on no more
grounds than their current respectability, or their
prestige in certain belief communities (FP, p.124).
• It would seem, then, that there is room for
“passional tendencies and volitions” (FP, p.125) in
our belief choices (and our narrative about how we
go about forming our beliefs) (FP, p.125).
• But are we right in these beliefs (or is it
epistemically permissible to form our beliefs in this
way)?
“The Will to Believe”: IV
• This is James’ thesis:
• “Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but
must, decide an option between propositions,
whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its
nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say,
under such circumstances, ‘Do not decide, but leave
the question open,’ is itself a passional decision ...
and is attended with the same risk of losing the
truth” (FP, p.125).
“The Will to Believe”: V-VI
• Do note James’ rejection of absolutism, or
infallibilism, as an approach to philosophy.
• James rejects the idea that there are self-evident
truths, save perhaps that “the present
phenomenon of consciousness exists” (FP,
p.126). Note he makes no claim about a self or
thinker.
• James claims that what we regard as knowledge
almost always involve claims that we take to be
true, but could in fact be false (FP, pp.125,
127).
“The Will to Believe”: VII
• James points out two fundamental duties - “our first and
great commandments as would-be knowers” (FP, p.128):
• (1) “We must know the truth” (FP, p.128),
• and (2) “We must avoid error” (FP, p.128).
• It is important to note that these do not amount to the same
prescription/commandment (FP, p.128).
• If you hold (1) to the exclusion of (2), you will likely form
many beliefs in the hopes of forming true ones.
• If you hold (2) to the exclusion of (1), you will likely form
few beliefs in the hopes of avoiding forming false ones (FP,
p.128).
“The Will to Believe”: VII
• We can choose to order our intellectual lives
around one, the other, or both duties.
• Clifford endorses living around the second duty.
• James endorses both.
• He sees the difference over this issue which
exists between himself and Clifford as arising,
fundamentally, from differences in passion or
feeling (e.g. the “horror of being duped”) (FP,
p.128).
“The Will to Believe”: VIII
• When the option is not forced (or when not forced and
trivial), James prescribes the use of disinterested reason.
There is nothing to be gained in risking believing falsehoods
in contexts where the evidence is not in and we need not
decide for the moment (FP, pp.128-29).
• In science, it is not mere truth that is pursued, but truths
which conform to the relevant epistemic values (for James,
those which can be “technically verified” [FP, p.129]).
• In the context of justifying views or claiming knowledge
this is, for James, as it should be.
• In the context of making discoveries, or ‘pushing envelopes’
to follow up a hunch, James thinks a more passional
approach will serve science best (FP, p.129).
“The Will to Believe”: IX
• James now suggests examples of forced
options (i.e. where we must make a choice
one way or another) which may require
passional decisions, and legitimately so.
• (1) On the question of moral facts or truth:
your overall moral outlook, moral realism
versus antirealism, depends not on decisive
argument but on your willingness or
unwillingness to entertain either perspective
(FP, p.130).
“The Will to Believe”: IX
• “Moral skepticism can be no more refuted
or proved by logic than intellectual
skepticism can. When we stick to it that
there is truth (be it of either kind), we do so
with our whole nature, and resolve to stand
or fall by the results” (FP, p.130).
“The Will to Believe”: IX
(2) Epistemological skepticism: you overall
epistemological outlook, whether it is
skeptical or anti-skeptical, depends not on
decisive argument but on your willingness
or unwillingness to entertain either
perspective (FP, p.130).
“The Will to Believe”: IX
(3) Social relations: your stance towards others,
whether friendly or unfriendly (or the like), if
predicated upon decisive argument or sufficient
evidence will, in all likelihood, undermine your
present and future relations with them (FP, p.130).
“Who gains promotions, boons, appointments, but
the man in whose life they are seen to play the part
of live hypotheses, who discounts them, sacrifices
other things for their sake before they have come,
and takes risks for them in advance?” (FP, p.130).
“The Will to Believe”: IX
• A certain leap of faith can often bring about
the object of faith in our social
environment. Where this is the case, and
doubt will preclude that object from
obtaining (at a greater cost to you than is
entailed by leaping in faith), you ought to so
leap (FP, p.131).
• Think of James’ ‘train robbing’ or ‘efficient
society’ examples (see FP, pp.130-31).
“The Will to Believe”: X
Religious systems of belief typically share
the following in common:
(1) Those matters which have eternal
significance are better than those of a more
temporal nature.
(2) We are better off now if we believe (1)
(FP, p.131).
“The Will to Believe”: X
• Is the religious option a genuine one?
• Is it live? That depends on where you currently stand
on matters pertaining to spirituality. For some the
answer will be ‘yes’ and for others ‘no’ (FP, p.131).
• Is it momentous? Yes, there is a vital good, and great
cost, associated with religious belief, or unbelief
(FP, p.131).
• Is it forced? Yes, we preclude reaping the benefit of
religious commitment if we remain neutral to the
relevant hypothesis, just as surely as if we had
adopted a denial of the relevant belief or set of
beliefs (FP, p.131).
“The Will to Believe”: X
• We are supposed to see that the religious skeptic is
placing more emphasis on the avoidance of error
than on the acquisition of truth.
• The religious person is, on the other hand, placing
more emphasis on the acquisition of truth than on
the avoidance of error.
• The difference of approach is, again, fundamentally
passional not intellectual (FP, p.131).
“The Will to Believe”: X
• “To preach skepticism to us as a duty until
‘sufficient evidence’ for religion be found,
is tantamount therefore to telling us, when
in presence of the religious hypothesis, that
to yield to our fear of its being error is wiser
and better than to yield to our hope that it
may be true. It is not intellect against
passions, then; it is only intellect with one
passion laying down its law” (FP, p.131).
“The Will to Believe”: X
Is it reasonable to adopt religious belief?
(1) To most of us religion is a live
hypothesis, and stands as a genuine option.
Given that a wrong choice may be
profoundly detrimental to our future
welfare, and we must in the end choose
(with passion) the type of risk we take, it
would be reasonable for us to choose
religion (FP, p.131).
“The Will to Believe”: X
(2) Essential to the religious hypothesis,
according to James, is the belief that we
must meet That Which Is “half-way” (FP,
p.132), by ordering ourselves towards It as
if It exists and is concerned for us. Given
(1), and the possibility that we cut ourselves
off from this Other if we adopt irreligion,
the choice for James is clear (FP, p.132).
“The Will to Believe”: X
Remember that, in James words, “ the
freedom to believe can only cover living
options which the intellect of the individual
cannot by itself resolve” (FP, p.132).
“The Will to Believe”: X
“No one of us ought to issue vetoes to the other, nor
should we bandy words of abuse. We ought, on the
contrary, delicately and profoundly to respect one
another’s mental freedom: then only shall we bring
about the intellectual republic; then only shall we
have that spirit of inner tolerance without which all
our outer tolerance is soulless, and which is
empiricism’s glory; then only shall we live and let
live, in speculative as well as in practical things”
(FP, p.133).