Before (and after) 9/11
What didn’t happen, and
what was going on elsewhere?
1
Three main “Before” threads
• What the U.S. saw as its interests in the
Mideast
• The activities surrounding the alleged
hijackers in the U.S.
– What were they doing here?
– The (non) investigations
– Osama bin Laden (OBL or UBL)
• Warnings and Foreknowledge
2
U. S. Interests
in the Mideast
dominance, oil & gas
3
U.S. Interests
Project for New American Century
(PNAC)
• Devoted to matters of “maintaining US pre-eminence,
thwarting rival powers and shaping the global security system
according to US interests.”
• Consistent position: regime change in Iraq
• Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategies, Forces, and
Resources For a New Century (2000)
– Massive modernization, transformation, expansion of military
– Will take massive infusion of money [from entitlements]
– Because of public and institutional resistance, "the process of
transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to
be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event –
like a new Pearl Harbor.”
• Clip: Everybody’s Gotta Learn Sometime (6:37-12:17)
4
U.S. Interests: PNAC
QuickTime™ and a
Motion JPEG A decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
5
U.S. Interests: PNAC in Bush Admin
6
U.S. Interests
Union Oil Company of California
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
1890: founded
1995: cooperating with CIA, turning over information gained on
Central Asian negotiating trips (part of larger CIA use of business)
1996: opens office in Kandahar during Taliban take-over
1996: anti-Taliban Massoud claims Unocal and CIA gave Taliban the
money needed to take over Kandahar; later CIA and Unocal said to
give Taliban weapons and instructors
1997: agrees to pay ~$1M to set up facility (near Bin Laden
compound) to train Pashtuns for building pipeline
1998-2005: discussed later
2005: China tries to buy, stymied by U.S. government “national
security” concerns; merged into Chevron
7
U.S. Interests
Central Asia
Cheney (CEO Halliburton): "I cannot think of a time when we
have had a region emerge as suddenly to become as
strategically significant as the Caspian.”
8
U.S. Interests
Petroleum
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa48119.000/hfa48119_0.HTM
1998: Congressional testimony by Unocal
• Caspian/Central Asia rich in untapped petroleum
• Area is isolated
• Most pipelines were built during Russian Afghanistan era,
head north, none south & east
• Europe and former Soviet republics slow demand growth
• Asia is where big demand expected, where pipelines should
go
• One main pipeline option is across Afghanistan, requiring a
stable government having the confidence of governments,
leaders, and our company
9
U.S. Interests
Unocal India Pipeline
10
U.S. Interests
History 79-91
Based mostly on http://www.ringnebula.com/Oil/Timeline.htm
• 7/79: Carter orders aid to anti-govt forces in
Afghanistan to induce Soviet invasion (ZbigBrz)
• 12/79: Soviets comply, after initial resistance
• mid/late 80’s: CIA works with Saudis to create an
army to inject into Afghanistan
– Saudis pick OBL (wealthy construction family, close ties
to royal family)
• 1989: Soviets leave Afghanistan
• 12/91: Soviet Union collapses
– Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan formed
11
U.S. Interests
History 93-96
• 1993: Oil companies start moving for the oil (200
billion barrel estimate); also natural gas
• 1995: Unocal signs oil & gas pipeline agreements
with Turkmenistan
– Rt: Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, to Indian Ocean
• 1995-97: Bridas (Argentine oil co.) in competing
negotiations w/Turkmenistan/Taliban/Pakistan
• 8/96: Unocal & Delta/Saudi sign memorandum of
understanding with Russian & Turkmen gas
companies for building pipeline (same route)
12
U.S. Interests
History 97
• 1997: Congress declares Caspian/Caucasus
a “zone of vital American interest”
• 10/97: Unocal & others form Central Asia
Gas Pipeline Ltd (CentGas) to build Afghan
pipeline
• 12/97: Unocal invites Taliban reps to its
Texas headquarters
13
U.S. Interests
History
• 1/98: Unocal and Pak/Turkmenistan/Taliban
sign agreement on gas pipeline financing,
with Unocal also considering an oil pipeline
• 1/98: Bridas wins the competition (?????)
• 2/98: Unocal VP tells Congress Taliban
should be removed, replaced w/govt
acceptable to Unocal
• 3/98: Unocal announces delay in finalizing
project due to ongoing civil war
14
U.S. Interests
History
• 8/98: OBL-linked terrorists bomb African
embassies
• 8/98: Clinton calls in 75-80 cruise missiles
on Afghanistan and Sudan;
Unocal suspends pipeline development
• 11/98: Trade & Development Agency
commissions Enron to investigate another
route to Turkish coast (~$1bil more
expensive)
• 12/98: Unocal cites “business reasons,”
withdraws from the agreement
15
U.S. Interests
History
• 4/99: Pak/Turkmen/Afghan reactivate
agreement without the U.S. interests
• 7/99: Clinton freezes Afghan assets, prohibits
trade and other transactions
• 10/99: 1st UN Security Council Res 1267
sanctions Taliban, demands OBL turnover
without delay
• 10/00: USS Cole attacked
• 12/00: 2nd UN Security Council Res 1333:
more sanctions on Taliban, demands 1267
compliance
16
U.S. Interests
History 2001
1-2/01: Bush administration (BA)
– Cheney, Condoleeza Rice and Secy’s of Commerce,
Interior, and Army are all previous oil-related execs
– Secy of Energy rec’d more oil $ as senator than all
but 3 others
– BA immediately engages in active negotiations
w/Taliban
– Taliban hires long-time Mujaheddin ally Laila Helms
(niece of Richard Helms (former CIA head & Iran
ambassador) as go-between
17
U.S. Interests
History 2001
• 5/01: BA to Taliban on pipeline placement:
"Either you accept our offer of a carpet of gold,
or we bury you under a carpet of bombs.”
• 6/01: Ambassador to Yemen prevents FBI’s
John O’Neill from entering Yemen to
investigate aQ/Cole
• 7/01: Senior US officials tell former Pak foreign
secretary that US military action against
Afghanistan would start by mid-October [BBC]
• 9/11/01: .................................
18
U.S. Interests
History 2001
• 9/01: 3rd UN Security Council Resolution
1373: more sanctions
• 10/7/01: Aerial bombardment of Afghanistan
begins, allegedly to get OBL and 9/11
accomplices
• 10/14/01: Taliban offers to turn over OBL to
neutral country if US stops bombing and
gives evidence of 9/11 guilt; Bush rejects:
“We know he’s guilty.”
• 10/16/01: Taliban moderate drops demand for
proof; but U.S. wants Taliban hard-liners out19
U.S. Interests
History: interlude
• 11/01: Bush order -- sitting or previous
president (or family) can seal all presidential
and/or vice-presidential records, including
those of previous administrations; does so
for Reagan/Bush1 (also Clinton?)
• 1/02: Bush asks Daschle to limit
Congressional 9/11 investigations
20
U.S. Interests
History 2001-02
• 12/01: US-backed government takes over, under
Hamid Karzai (former Unocal consultant)
• 12/01: Bush appoints Zalmay Khalilzad as special
envoy to Afghanistan (former Unocal consultant in
talks with Taliban in 1997)
• 2/02: Karzai and Pakistan pres agree to revive pipeline; Turkmenistan says it hopes will soon be built
• 5/02/02: Karzai and Turkmenistan/Pakistan
counterparts hold talks on pipeline;
Afghan minister for Mines and Industries says
Unocal is “the lead company” for building it.
• 5/30/02: Afghanistan,Turkmenistan and Pakistan
agree to build the pipeline
21
U.S. Interests
History - later
• 4/10: Afghan, Pakistan, and India sign agreement to
buy gas from Turkmenistan
• 12/10: Gas pipeline agreement signed
• 5/30/02: Afghanistan,Turkmenistan and Pakistan
agree to build the pipeline
• 04/12: Failure to agree on gas transit fees
– India/Afghanistan re: Afghan segment
– India/Pakistan: re Pakistan segment
• 05/12: Afghan parliament approves pipeline;
India signs gas purchase agreement w/Turkmenistan
22
The Hijackers
•
•
•
•
Did they even exist?
What were they doing here?
The (non)investigations
Osama Bin Laden
23
The Hijackers
Where did FBI get IDs?
• Head of Customs & Boarder Protection testifies
before 9/11 Commission
• On the morning of 9/11, they pulled manifests
from airlines, noticed several suspicious
• Ran through lookout list
• In 45 minutes, they forwarded list of hijackers
and passengers to FBI
• By 11AM, saw list with all 19 hijackers, all of
whom turned out to be correct.
• Note: original list had only 18 hijackers
24
The Hijackers (per FBI on 9/14)
Flight 11
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Amir Bukhari 9/13 (died in small plane crash in 2000)
Waleed al-Shehri
Adnan Bukhari 9/13 (alive in FL, passed polygraph)
Wail al-Shehri (Saudi pilot, contacted officials to deny
Abdulrahman al-Omari 9/13 (Saudi Air pilot,
complained)
Abdul Aziz al-Omari (confirmed name & DoB, Saudi
embassy says passport stolen in 1996)
Amer Kamfar 9/13
Satam al-Suqami (passport found before (FBI) or after
(911C) North tower collapse)
Mohamed Atta
25
The Hijackers (per FBI on 9/14)
Flight 175
•
•
•
•
•
Marwan al-Shehhi
Faez Banihammad [FBI: “Ahmed”]
Mohand [FBI: “Mohald”] al-Shehri
Ahmed al-Ghamdi
Hamza al-Ghamdi (also booked flights
in Saudi Arabia for end of September)
26
The Hijackers (per FBI on 9/14)
Flight 77
• Salem al-Hazmi (says never been to U.S., not out of
Saudi Arabia in 2 years)
• Nawaf [FBI: “Nawaq”] al-Hazmi
• Majed Moqed
• Khalid al-Midhar
• “Mosead Caned” (9/14 morning DoJ unreleased list)
• Hani Hanjour (not on passenger manifest)
27
The Hijackers (per FBI on 9/14)
Flight 93
• Saeed al-Ghamdi (Saudi pilot; name, residence, DoB,
occupation match; “shocked and furious”)
• Ahmed al-Nami
• Ahmad al-Haznawi
• Ziad Jarrah [FBI: “Jarrahi” -- correct on later versions
of “original” manifests that were supposedly basis for
identification]
28
The Hijackers
The Atta Story - 9/11 Comm
• Atta and al-Omari drive to Portland in rented blue
Nissan
• Stay overnight
• Catch commuter flight to Boston
• Arrives at 6:45, an hour before Flight 11 departure
• Atta’s bags don’t make the transfer, though everyone
else’s do (though Atta was flagged by CAPPS -Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening)
29
The Hijackers
The Atta Story - Problems
• Portland trip -- ringleader risks delay forcing
postponement or cancellation of operation
• Atta’s bags -- why didn’t they make the
transfer (and why was there a will in them?)
30
The Hijackers
The Atta Story develops
• CNN (9/12)
– Bukharis involved
– 2 individuals photographed going through Portland
security
– Arabic flight training manuals found in car at
Logan
• CNN (early 9/13, according to law-enforcement):
– Bukharis rent silver blue Nissan Altima in Boston
– Drive to Portland 9/10, drive back next morning
– Mitsubishi sedan found at Logan w/Arabic flight
manuals, rented by Atta
31
The Hijackers
The Atta Story develops
• CNN (later 9/13)
– Apology for Bukhari mistake (based on multiple lawenforcement reports)
– Still say flight manuals in Boston car w/references pointing to
Atta and al-Shehhi
• CNN (9/14) -- “Arabic language manuals” in car
• CNN (later 9/14; per Portland Police)
– Atta one of two who boarded flight to Boston
– Nissan rented from same place as Boston car used by
“additional suspects”
• WashPost (9/16) -- incriminating materials found in
Atta’s luggage
32
The Hijackers
The Atta Story -- FBI 10/5
• Photo from Portland Jetport gas station
– Atta & al-Omari (A&O) at 8:28 PM (date cropped)
– “same picture” at Moussaoui trial (2006) -- date
shows as 11-10-01 (Saturday) though stamped MON
• Timeline has other pictures of A&O at other places at
8:31 and 8:41, getting to Jetport at 9:15
33
The Hijackers
The Atta Story -- FBI Affidavit
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Signed by FBI agent and US magistrate judge
Dated 9/12, 9:53 AM
Blue Nissan Altima rented by Atta
A&O on AA flight 11
AA personnel found A’s two bags
Magistrate authorized search
Found incriminating evidence, including A’s will
So why all the misinformation on 9/13-14?
34
Hijackers -- what were they doing?
Entry into US
• 91: Hanni Hanjour comes to Arizona
35
Hijackers -- what were they doing?
Entry into US
• 1/00: Khaled Almihdhar & Nawaf Alhazmi to LA
– Passports flagged as terror-related by Saudis
– CIA knows them, puts them on NSA watch list (for intercepts)
but not State Dept watch list (to prevent entry) until 8/01,
claims lost them in Bangkok after Malaysia aQ summit
– But Almihdhar tells KSM they were followed
– Thailand cables CIA about them in March, CIA claims no one
saw this until May
– Settle in San Diego w/help from al-Bayoumi (called “Saudi or
other foreign intel” by FBI’s best source in the area)
– Live openly (in phone book, cell phone registered, etc.)
– Almihdhar leaves 6/00, returns to Yemen communication hub
36
Hijackers -- what were they doing?
Entry into US
• 6/00: Ziad Jarrah arrives in Georgia
– Tourist visa from Berlin
– Stopped in Dubai
• UAE officials say stop was requested by
CIA, question him for 4 hours, inform US, US
says to let him go, they’ll track him
• US denies knowing (but appears unlikely)
– Flies to Venice, FL, settles there
37
Hijackers -- what were they doing?
Entry into US
http://newsmine.org/content.php?ol=9-11/suspects/hijackers-visa-expressprogram-started-3-months-before-911.txt (original WP article gone)
• Visa Express program -- started June 2001
– Only at the U.S. Embassy in Saudi Arabia, to cut long lines,
frees staff time to more thoroughly check suspicious ones
– No interviews or background checks -- data checks done by
travel agencies (but 12 of 15 Saudi hijackers interviewed)
• Richard Armitage (PNAC) rejects requests from the
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) to deny
some visas (in July 2002)
– “The information we have received from the FTTTF so far
has been insufficient to permit a consular office to deny a
visa. The information we have received states only that the
FTTF believes the applicants may pose a threat to national
security.”
38
Hijackers -- what were they doing?
Flying
• Ziad Jarrah
– Florida Flight Training Center (FFTC), Jun-? 2000
– Aiming for multi-engine license
39
Hijackers -- what were they doing?
Flying
• Mohammed Atta & Marwan Alshehhi
–
–
–
–
–
Huffman Aviation (Venice), Jul-Dec 2000
aiming for commercial licenses
Atta already has private license
Soloing by July
Obnoxious: attitude/authority problem, instructor wants to
expell, owner Dekker talks to them, they improve
– Rent planes, gone for days at a time
– Go to Sarasota School (Sept), thrown out, return to Huffman
– Dekker says they leave after paying in Dec, but reportedly
practice night-landing Huffman planes at another airport in
Jan/Feb
40
Hijackers -- what were they doing?
Flying
QuickTime™ and a
Motion JPEG A decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
41
Hijackers -- what were they doing?
Devout?
• Atta and Alshehhi
– Venice: frequent two pubs, drink beer
– Atta never visits mosques or associates with
Muslims
– Coral Springs: Atta chain smoking
• Lots more (Las Vegas lap dancers, etc.)
42
Hijackers -- what were they doing?
Living openly
• Nawaf Alhamzi and Ziad Jarrah
– Living in motel a few miles from NSA
headquarters during Aug/early-Sept
2011
43
Hijackers -- what were they doing?
Living Openly
QuickTime™ and a
Motion JPEG A decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
44
Hijackers -- How did they get here?
U.S. Saudi visa office
QuickTime™ and a
Motion JPEG A decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
45
Hijackers -- the (non) investigations
2002 Congressional Inquiry
[Before 9/11, the] “intelligence
community possessed no intelligence or
law enforcement information linking 16
of the 19 hijackers [including Atta] to
terrorism or terrorist groups.”
Well....
46
Hijackers -- the (non) investigations
The Yemen Comm Hub 1
• 96?: NSA monitoring OBL phone picks up
Yemen number, later turns out to be a hub
• 8/98: East Africa embassy bombing
• 8/98: That investigation id’s Yemen alQaeda communication hub (run by
Almihdhar’s father-in law; wife there)
• NSA & CIA plant bugs, tap phones,
satellite-watch visitors
• “Intelligence bonanza” -- counter-terrorism
officials
47
Hijackers -- the (non) investigations
The Yemen Comm Hub 2
• 12/99: major info review to prevent
Millennium attacks
– turns up two HJs connected to Yemen
hub (& heading to Malaysia aQ summit)
also connected to East Africa bombing;
– NSA identifies a number of HJs, fails to
pass some of the info to CIA
– NSA report at the time shows clear
knowledge of HJs’ connection to OBL
48
Hijackers -- the (non) investigations
The Yemen Comm Hub 3
• 00-01 -- many calls to/from hijackers
• 9/11 Commission: NSA shared some but
not all info w/CIA and FBI
• FBI agents working on aQ/Yemen said
they never heard of the calls
• NSA says it didn’t share Almihdhar-in-US
info because didn’t know he was there
(obviously false from other evidence)
49
Hijackers -- the (non) investigations
Malaysia aQ Summit (1/00) 1
• Many of OBL’s close associates there
• CIA tracks Khalid Almihdhar from Dubai
(where they copied his passport, which had
a U.S. multi-entry visa)
• KA presence at summit provided to FBI (in
an odd way), but existence of the visa NOT!
• CIA notifies Malaysia authorities about the
summit, but doesn’t tell them what to look
for, so Malaysians concentrate on locals
50
Hijackers -- the (non) investigations
Malaysia aQ Summit (1/00) 2
• Much surveillance, videotaping,
photographing, cafe hard-drive checking
• No audio taping was done (inexplicably)
• Plans for Cole bombing and 9/11 allegedly
discussed (how know if no audio taping?)
• Large number of hi-quality photos taken,
not clear how many passed to CIA, or why
only 2 or 3 circulated in U.S. intelligence
• Some attendees captured in Mideast, US
declines custody or doesn’t interrogate
51
Hijackers -- the (non) investigations
Malaysia aQ Summit (1/00) 3
Knowledge of the presence of Nawaf Alhazmi
and Khalid Almihdhar provided many future
opportunities to foil the 9/11 plot, none taken.
52
Hijackers -- the (non) investigations
CIA doesn’t tell FBI 1
• 1/00: FBI Strategic Info Op Center (SIOC) to deal with
CIA/FBI communication problems
• CIA “James” tells FBI SIOC agent (who isn’t a contact
for this) about Malaysia summit and Almihdhar
• Then emails CIA people “exactly” what he told the FBI;
no mention of Almihdhar visa (dest NYC, 3-month stay)
• New info arrives, does exactly the same thing with
another SIOC agent, mentions suspicious activity but
not criminal enterprise or impending attack (FBI matter)
• Later refuses to talk to Justice Dept, tells CIA Inspector
General he has no recollection of any of this
53
Hijackers -- the (non) investigations
CIA doesn’t tell FBI 2
• 1/00: FBI agent Doug Miller (assigned to CIA OBL unit) reads CIA
cables about Almihdar US visa with NY destination and 3 month
stay
• Drafts cable to FBI about it
• CIA person “Michelle” sees it, notifies deputy station chief, Tom
Wilshire, who blocks it as “not info for the FBI”
• Michelle sends cable to CIA (but not FBI) saying info was shared
w/FBI
• No one at CIA checks that FBI received info (standard practice)
• 9/11 Commission buries it, doesn’t mention Wilshire
• Michelle apparently lies to CIA Inspector General, who reports that
the block was due to wrong format or need for editing
54
Hijackers -- the (non) investigations
CIA doesn’t tell FBI 3
• 1/00: Another FBI agent in CIA’s OBL unit protests, but
his superiors won’t let him pass the visa info to the FBI
• Michelle insists next attack will be in SE Asia, will tell
FBI when something comes up affecting them (i.e., US)
• Tom Wilshire sends [CYA?] email prior to 9/11
expressing fear of Malaysia attack
• Post 9/11 allegation: CIA trying to prevent FBI from
interfering in (illegal, w/ Saudi intel) attempt to recruit
Almihdhar and Alhamzi to monitor highjackers in U.S.
• (CIA says it stopped monitoring Atta in Germany, but
German experts suspected this continued in US)
55
Hijackers -- the (non) investigations
Able Danger 1, Jan 2000
• Secret U.S. Army Intelligence unit
• Uses computer analysis of
connections between people
• identifies 5 aQ cells
• “Brooklyn” cell related to Brooklyn
– includes Atta, Alshehhi, Almihdhar,
Nawaf Alhazmi
– not necessarily living in Brooklyn (or US)
56
Hijackers -- the (non) investigations
Able Danger 2
• Identifies Atta/Sheikh Omar AbdulRahman (WTC ‘93) connection
• 2’x3’ chart with 5 clusters of names
around OBL in the center
• Chart disappears
• 2.4 Terabytes of data destroyed by a
captain on pain of losing his job
57
Hijackers -- the (non) investigations
Able Danger 3
QuickTime™ and a
Motion JPEG A decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
58
Hijackers -- the (non) investigations
Able Danger 4
• 9/11 Commission ignores Able Danger in
spite of testimony by Col. Anthony Shaffer
• Defense Department Inspector General
investigates
– Asks leading questions
– Browbeats Philpott, asking him again and again
over several weeks until he apparently gets the
picture and changes his story to say Shaffer
probably talked him into thinking Atta was
mentioned.
– Does not interview the perpetrators
59
Hijackers -- the (non) investigations
John O’Neill
• FBI Deputy DIrector, leading authority on aQ,
investigator of WTC 93
• Repeated obstruction of his aQ investigations
– “The main obstacles to investigate Islamic terrorism were
US oil corporate interests, and the role played by Saudi
Arabia in it.”
– Said the Bush administration slowed down aQ/terrorism
investigations related Afghanistan because of
negotiations with Taliban over an oil pipeline
• Resigns from FBI on August 22
• Offered job as security head of WTC (34th fl office)
• Dies in attack -- called son and friend to say fine,
called the FBI, went back into the building to help
60
Hijackers -- the (non) investigations
Robert Wright, FBI Chicago
• 12 years w/FBI, partner John Vincent, 27 years w/FBI
• Following 1998 embassy bombing, part of terrorism task
force, investigating connection between Chicago cell and
financial kingpin Yassim al-Kadi in Chicago
• Could follow suspects and file reports, but "The supervisor
who was there from headquarters was right straight across
from me and started yelling at me: 'You will not open criminal
investigations'”
• In response to repeated efforts: "I think it's just better to let
sleeping dogs lie.” (1/01)
• Federal prosecutor Mark Flessner assigned to build the
cases: "There were powers bigger than I was in the Justice
Department and within the FBI that simply were not going to
let it [the criminal case] happen.”
• Wright eventually sued the FBI over their obstruction.
61
Hijackers -- the (non) investigations
Robert Wright, FBI Chicago
QuickTime™ and a
Motion JPEG A decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
62
Hijackers -- the (non) investigations
Phoenix Memo, July 10, 2001
•
•
•
Phoenix FBI office became concerned about possible flight training
by terrorist suspects
Agent Kenneth Williams wrote memo to FBI HQ about this
– http://www.thememoryhole.org/911/phoenix-memo/01.htm (jpg)
– “The purpose of this communication, is to advise the bureau
and New York of the possibility of a coordinated effort by
Osama bin Laden to send students to the United States to
attend civil aviation universities and colleges. Phoenix has
observed an inordinate number of individuals of investigative
interest who are attending or who have attended civil aviation
universities and colleges in the State of Arizona....”
– The memo recommends the FBI compile a list of all flight
training schools and assign liaisons to start watching them, and
interagency sharing of info
– Published copy had much redacted material, raising suspicions
that it contained names of some of the hijackers
63
It was ignored (?) by FBI HQ
Hijackers -- the (non) investigations
Coleen Rowley, Aug 2001
• Chief attorney for Minneapolis FBI, famous 5/02 memo:
http://www.time.com/time/covers/1101020603/memo.html
• Investigating Moussaoui (“20th hijacker”), suspicion that he
was going to try to fly something into the WTC, confiscated
his laptop, tried to get permission to examine it, FBI HQ
refused to get permission, finally obtained on 9/11
• FBI HQ never told Minneapolis of the Phoenix pilot memo
• In the weeks leading up to 9/11, frustrated field agents in
Minneapolis bitterly joked that key officials in Washington
"had to be spies or moles ... working for Osama bin Laden."
• Office head, Marion “Spike” Bowman, given award for
“exceptional performance” by FBI Director Mueller, 12/01
• Mueller continued to state FBI had no prior knowledge after
repeated attempts by Rowley to disabuse him of that fact.
• No one in FBI was ever investigated about all this
64
Hijackers -- the (non) investigations
Coleen Rowley, Aug 2001
QuickTime™ and a
Motion JPEG A decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
65
Hijackers -- the (non) investigations
Harry Samet, Aug 2001
• http://www.reason.com/news/show/36676.html
• Minneapolis FBI investigating Moussaoui
– Moussaoui wanted to hijack a plane and had the weapons
with which to do it, “believes it is acceptable to kill
civilians” and approves of martyrdom.
– Training on 747 simulator (“just wanted to do it”)
suspicious of terrorism
– Suspected connection to terrorist camp
• Filed over 70 reports, ignored
– Supervisor Mike Maltbie blocked Aug 31 letter to FAA
– Maltbie and David Frasca (radical fundamentalist head) said
only wanted facts on connection to foreign power for FISA
court, but suspicions were enough for criminal search
– Samet told pressing to hard for warrant would hurt career
66
Hijackers -- the (non) investigations
Harry Samet, Aug 2001
QuickTime™ and a
Motion JPEG A decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
67
Hijackers -- the (non) investigations
Sibel Edmonds, 2002
• Hired by FBI Language Services Section (high security) as
translator in Sept 01 for detainee interrogations
• Dec 01 - March 02: Complaints to superiors about things she
uncovered -- many, including
– FBI, State Department, and Pentagon infiltrated by a
Turkish & Israeli-run intelligence network that paid high
American officials to steal nuclear weapons secrets
– FBI received information in April 2001, from a reliable
Iranian intelligence asset, that Osama Bin Laden was
planning attacks on 4-5 cities with planes, some of the
people were already in the country and the attacks would
happen in a few months
• Retaliation -- access cut, computer taken, polygraph, fired
• Subsequently became most gagged person in U.S. history
• 9/11 Commission relegated her to a small irrelevant footnote
68
Hijackers -- the (non) investigations
Sibel Edmonds, 2002
QuickTime™ and a
Motion JPEG A decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
69
Hijackers -- Osama bin Laden
So, was OBL guilty?
70
Hijackers -- Osama bin Laden
In his own words 1
• September 16, read by himself
“I stress that I have not carried out this act, which
appears to have been carried out by individuals
with their own motivations.”
• Broadcast around the world, except in the
U.S.: Bush administration told media it
might contain secret signals to aQ
terrorists
71
Hijackers -- Osama bin Laden
In his own words 2
• September 28, in Pakistani newspaper
"I have already said that I am not involved in the 11 September
attacks in the United States. As a Muslim, I try my best to avoid
telling a lie. I had no knowledge of these attacks, nor do I
consider the killing of innocent women, children, and other
humans as an appreciable act. Islam strictly forbids causing
harm to innocent women, children and other people...
• "There exists a government within the government of the United
States. That secret government must be asked as to who
carried out the attacks.ll The United States should trace the
perpetrators of these attacks to those person who want to make
the present century a century of conflict between Islam and
Christianity so that their own nation could survive."
• Bush administration: same response
72
Hijackers -- Osama bin Laden
In his own (?) words 3
• December 13: videotape found in a house in Jalalabad during
Afghanistan invasion
• Pentagon re-sequence for release, but available in both forms:
http://www.npr.org/news/specials/response/investigation/011213.binladen.tape.html
• So-called smoking gun
• Spoken by face very different from OBL in face analysis
• Duke University OBL expert Bruce Lawrence: this is not OBL,
and a January tape threatening the US is doubtfully OBL
• Muslim world didn’t buy it
• Bush: “It’s preposterous for anybody to think this tape is
doctored. That’s just a feeble excuse to provide weak support
for an incredibly evil man.”
73
Hijackers -- Osama bin Laden
In his own (?) words 3
"The brothers, who conducted the operation, all they knew was that
they have a martyrdom operation and we asked each of them to go
to America, but they didn't know anything about the operation, not
even one letter. But they were trained and we did not reveal the
operation to them until they are there and just before they boarded
the planes.... Those who were trained to fly didn't know the others.
One group of people did not know the other group."
"....we calculated in advance the number of casualties from the
enemy, who would be killed based on the position of the tower. We
calculated that the floors that would be hit would be three or four
floors. I was the most optimistic of them all [inaudible] due to my
experience in this field I was thinking that the fire from the gas in
the plane would melt the iron structure of the building and collapse
the area where the plane hit and all the floors above it. This is all
that we had hoped for."
74
Hijackers -- Osama bin Laden
Which doesn’t fit?
Thanks to Steven Jones, 9/11 Revisited
75
Hijackers -- Osama bin Laden
Facial Analysis
76
Hijackers -- Osama bin Laden
Guilty of 9/11?
FBI Website for OBL as most wanted:
http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/terrorists/terbinladen.htm
Usama Bin Laden is wanted in connection with the
August 7, 1998, bombings of the United States
Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi,
Kenya. These attacks killed over 200 people. In
addition, Bin Laden is a suspect in other terrorist
attacks throughout the world.
77
Hijackers -- Osama bin Laden
No hard evidence?
http://www.teamliberty.net/id267.html
On June 5, 2006, the Muckraker Report contacted the FBI Headquarters, (202)
324-3000, to learn why Bin Laden’s Most Wanted poster did not indicate that
Usama was also wanted in connection with 9/11. The Muckraker Report spoke
with Rex Tomb, Chief of Investigative Publicity for the FBI. When asked why
there is no mention of 9/11 on Bin Laden’s Most Wanted web page, Tomb said,
“The reason why 9/11 is not mentioned on Usama Bin Laden’s Most Wanted
page is because the FBI has no hard evidence connecting Bin Laden to 9/11.”
Surprised by the ease in which this FBI spokesman made such an astonishing
statement, I asked, “How this was possible?” Tomb continued, “Bin Laden has
not been formally charged in connection to 9/11.” I asked, “How does that
work?” Tomb continued, “The FBI gathers evidence. Once evidence is
gathered, it is turned over to the Department of Justice. The Department of
Justice than decides whether it has enough evidence to present to a federal
grand jury. In the case of the 1998 United States Embassies being bombed, Bin
Laden has been formally indicted and charged by a grand jury. He has not been
formally indicted and charged in connection with 9/11 because the FBI has no
78
hard evidence connected Bin Laden to 9/11.”
Hijackers -- Osama bin Laden
The White Paper?
QuickTime™ and a
Motion JPEG A decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
79
Hijackers -- Osama bin Laden
After 9/11
Invasion and escape from Afghanistan
QuickTime™ and a
Motion JPEG A decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
80
Hijackers -- Osama bin Laden
After 9/11
• FBI Director Robert Mueller, April 19, 2002 at
the Commonwealth Club
"The hijackers also left no paper trail. In our
investigation, we have not uncovered a single piece
of paper either here or in the U.S. or in the treasure
trove of information that has turned up in
Afghanistan and elsewhere that mentioned any
aspect of the September 11th plot.
81
Warnings and
Foreknowledge
Sometimes they are hard to
separate....
82
Warnings /Foreknowledge 2001
Foreign Governments 2001
• 23 warnings from 11 foreign
governments
• many specifically mentioning planes
and symbolic urban targets
83
Warnings /Foreknowledge 2001
U.S. Intelligence
• June: George Tenet briefing Rice on threat of aQ
attack is described by Richard Clarke as having
his hair on fire
• July 5: CIA briefs Ashcroft: a significant aQ attack
is imminent and could occur at any time
• July 5: Acting FBI director Tom Pickard briefs
Ashcroft about terror threat in U.S.
Ashcroft: “I do not want to hear about this any
more” (Pickard, under oath)
• July: Ashcroft stops flying commercial [CBS]
84
Warnings /Foreknowledge 2001
Foreign Governments 2001
• Germany, June: The BND (German intelligence)
warns the CIA and Israelis that Mideast terrorist
plan to hijack commercial aircraft to use as
weapons against American and Israeli cultural
symbols
• Jordan, Summer: intercepts communication on
attacks planned for WTC, passes to Washington
• France, Aug-Sept: French intelligence repeatedly
warns of imminent attacks
• Cayman Islands, week before: caller to talk show
reports imminent OBL attack on US
85
Warnings /Foreknowledge 2001
Foreign Governments 2001
• Russia, August
– Moscow knew about the perpetrators, and
warned Washington about their preparations
for the attacks two weeks beforehand [Izvestia,
9/12]
– Putin says he ordered intel service to warn the
US government "in the strongest possible
terms" of imminent assaults on airports and
government buildings [MSNBC interview, 9/15
– Bizarre case: Mike Vreeland (Naval intelligence
spy) has letter in Russian detailing Iraqi plans
to attack WTC, 3-Mile Island, Pentagon with
planes, tries to warn US government, rebuffed86
Warnings/Foreknowledge 2001
Insider trading on put options
The trades
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
American Airlines: 9/10 -- 60x
United Airlines: 9/6-10 -- 90x (9/6: 285x)
No other airlines
Morgan Stanley: 9/7-10 -- 27x
Merrill Lynch: 9/5?-10 -- 12x
Worldwide: Japan, North America, Europe
regulators will "certainly be able to track down
every trade.” SEC enforcement chief William Lucas
• UK Financial Services Authority clears OBL et al
87
Warnings/Foreknowledge 2001
Insider trading on put options
9/11 Commission response:
The trades were all investigated and led
to investors who had no connection to
terrorists.
Ummm....
88
Warnings /Foreknowledge 2001
Insider trading on put options
Relation to Intelligence
• First report: Israeli Institute on Counterterrorism
• PROMIS software
– Incorporates data from variety of databases in
different languages into one readable format
– Used by FBI to monitor transactions in a virtual
real-time environment
89
The 9/11 Commission
How it was delayed,
how it started,
how it was compromised
90
The 9/11 Commission
QuickTime™ and a
Motion JPEG A decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
91