Military Cryptographic
Systems
Information Assurance
Module 3
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-2
Objectives
Students will learn about commonly used military
cryptographic systems (ie. KG-84, KIV-7, KIV-19,
STE, KG-75), including data rates, connection and
fill requirements, and practical applications.
Provide an Overview of the DOD Cryptographic
Modernization Initiative with Focus on the Army
CM Program.
Be able to describe the EKMS/AKMS Programs.
At the conclusion of this block, students will be able
to choose a cryptographic device to encrypt a link
given the data rate, terminal equipment and
transmission medium.
They will be able to explain the CM, EKMS and
AKMS Programs.
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-3
Outline
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Cryptographic Standards
NSA Cryptographic Types
Black/Red Signals
Military Cryptographic Equipment
(Layers 1 – 3)
Telephony Cryptographic Equipment
Fill Devices
Key Generators
Cryptographic Modernization Program
Electronic/Army Key Management
Systems
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-4
Cryptographic Standards
(1 of 2)
1. National Security Agency (NSA)
– Secret and above
– Type 1 encryption required
– Classified Algorithms
2. National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST)
– Set standards for Sensitive traffic
– de facto standards organization for
commercial businesses
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-5
Cryptographic Standards
(2 of 2)
3. American National Standards
Institute (ANSI)
– Cryptographic standards organization for
the U.S.
– ANSI X9 series closely mirrors NIST’s
Federal Information Processing Standard
(FIPS)
4. International Organization of
Standards (ISO)
– X.509 and Common Criteria
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-6
Approved Cryptosystems
for the US Army are either:
1. Produced by NSA
2. Commercial Off the Shelf Systems
approved by NSA for local purchase
3. Electronically generated and distributed
using NSA approved key generating
equipment and procedures IAW NAG 16
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-7
NSA Cryptographic Types
1. Products
– US government/military for Classified Info
– Only approved commercial users are defense
contractors for US classified projects
2. Products
– US government for sensitive info
– Requires US government agency sponsorship
3. Algorithms
– Exportable only to US corporations abroad, and
remain under the control of US citizen.
4. Algorithms
– Exportable to any country and/or organization,
except those prohibited by the US government
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-8
Black/Red Signals
Black/Cipher Text
Red/Plain Text
Router
Red patch
panel
Router
Red patch
panel
KIV-7
KIV-7
Black patch
panel
CSU/DSU
Black patch
panel
CSU/DSU
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-9
Red/Black Installation (1 of 2)
• Separation of 1 m b/w RED processor and:
– BLACK equipment
– BLACK wire lines that exit the inspectable
space or are connected to an RF transmitter
– BLACK power lines
– Conductors that exit the inspectable space
• Separation of 5 cm b/w RED wire line and:
– BLACK wire lines that exit the inspectable
space or are connected to an RF transmitter
– BLACK power lines
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-10
Red/Black Installation (2 of 2)
• RED and BLACK wire lines will not use a common
distribution vehicle unless the power lines exiting
the space are equipped with powerline filters.
• Patch Panels
– Jack fields should have incompatible connectors to
prevent inadvertent RED to BLACK patching
– Separate RED and BLACK by 1 m
• 1 m separation required b/w different
classifications (i.e. SIPRNET and JWICS, SIPRNET
and SECRET – Coalition)
• SCIFs require separate red and black ground
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-11
Cryptographic Equipment
Layer 1 (Physical) Layer 2 (Data link)
– KG-84
– KIV-7
– KG-194
– KIV-19
– KG-95
– KG-189
– KG-75
– KG-175 (2 and 3)
– KIV-21
Layer 3 (Network)
– KG-175 (2 and 3)
– Network Encryption
System (NES)
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-12
KG-84
•
•
•
•
KG-84A -- 256 kbps
KG-84C -- 64 kbps
Military standard DS-101 fill plug
Operates from 50 to 9600 Mbps
asynchronous
• Process up to 32 Kbps using
internal clock
• Built-in wireline modem
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-13
KIV-7
• Four models
– KIV-7
– KIV-7HS
– KIV-7HSA/B
512 Kbps
1.544 Mbps
2.048 Mbps
• Interoperable with KG-84
• Serial Data Interfaces
– EIA-530, EIA-449, EIA-232
• Removable CIK
• No internal strappings
• Optional Wireline Module
for Tactical
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-14
KG-194
•
•
•
•
KG-94/94A/194/194A
Operates from 9.6 kbps to 13 Mbps
Uses traditional or firefly key
Two versions -- tactical and fixed plant
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-15
KIV-19
•
•
•
•
Operates from 9.6 kbps to 13 Mbps
Use traditional or firefly key
Compatible with KG-194
Newest version KIV-19A
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-16
KG-95
• DS3 encryptor
• Bulk Encryption
• Three models:
– KG-95-1 operates from 10-50 Mbs
– KG-95-2 operates only at DS-3 rate
– KG-95R two KG-95-2s together
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-17
KG-189
•
•
•
•
•
SONET Encryptor
Operates at OC-3, OC-12 and OC-48
Type I encryption
Firefly key
DS-101/KSD-64
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-18
KG-75 (FASTLANE)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
ATM encryptor
KG-75 - up to OC-12
KG-75A - up to OC-192
Supports up to 4094 simultaneous,
cryptographically isolated ATM channels
Supports DS1, DS3, OC3C and OC12C
Supports PNNI 1.0, UNI 4.0 and SNMP
Firefly and traditional key
CYZ-10/DTD fill device
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-19
KG-175 (TACLANE)
• ATM Encryption -- 45 Mbps
– DS3 BNC connector
– 253 cryptographically isolated channels
• IP Encryption -- 7.2 Mbps
– RJ-45 and AUI connector
•
•
•
•
UNI 4.0 and SNMPv1
Firefly and traditional key
Uses CYZ-10/DTD
E-100 version provides IP encryption
up to 100 Mbps
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-20
KIV-21
• Converts black EIA-422, DB37 HDLC
into red IEEE 802.3 ethernet
• Replaces KIV-7/KG-84/KG-194 and
CSU/DSU for a single site
• Throughput - 8 Kbps to 3 Mbps
• Frame relay
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-21
Network Encryption System
(NES)
•
•
•
•
•
IP Encryption
NES 4001 supports up to 3.4 Mbps
NES 4001A throughput is 4.3 Mbps
Required black and red IP addresses
FIREFLY key distribution
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-22
NES - Virtual Private Network
permits traffic from one network to tunnel
through another network of a dissimilar
security classification
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-23
Telephony Equipment
•
•
•
•
•
•
STU-III
STE
Omni
Secure Cell Phones
KY-68
FNBDT
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-24
STU-III and SDD
• Secure Data Device
• Operate at 2.4 or 4.8 kbps code-excited line
prediction (CELP)
• Data transmitted at 2.4, 4.8 and 9.6 kbps
• Supports the ITU-T standards
– V.26bit
– V.26ter
– V.32
• KSD-64A
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-25
STE
• Replaces STU-III and KY-68
• Key is Fortezza Plus (KOV-14)
• Interoperable with:
–
–
–
–
STU-III
DNVT
ISDN: NI-1, NI-2, 5ESS, DMS-100, DEFINITY
Euro ISDN
• Network Interface
–
–
–
–
ISDN S/T BRI – 1B+D or 2B+D – RJ-45
PSTN – RJ-11
TRI-TAC/MSE – 4 wire line modem
EIA-232/530A
• Host Interface
– EIA-232/530A
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-26
Omni
• Secure Terminal provides Type-1
security for voice and data
• Analog and Digital network
• FNBDT compliant
• Compatible with POTs
and STU-III
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-27
Secure Cell Phones (1 of 2)
Motorola Cipher-Tac 2000
• STU-III and STE compatible
• Type 1 analog cellular security
• sleeve slides between battery and
phone to operate in secure mode
Qualcomm Qsec 800
• Secure voice and data (CMDA)
• Type 1 analog cellular security
• requires no add-on module
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-28
Secure Cell Phones (2 of 2)
General Dynamics
• Tri-band (GSM 900/1800/1900)
• Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
• Clip-in security module
• Type 1 security
Motorola Satellite Series 9505
• satellite and cellular service
• type 1 end-to-end security
• Iridium security module attaches to it
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-29
KY-68
• TRI-TAC and MSE
• Operates at 16/32 Kbps with
CVSD (wideband)
• Provides encryption of voice
or data traffic on switched
links to a circuit switch
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-30
Future Narrow Band Digital
Terminal (FNBDT)
• Designed primarily for low-bandwidth, error
prone networks such as cell phones
• Secure global interoperability
• FNBDT is an open standard
• Satisfies both NATO and individual nation
objectives
• Uses MELP and Forward Error Correction
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-31
Fill and Storage Devices
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
KYK-13
KOI-18
KYX-15
CYZ-10
KG-83
KGX-93
Fortezza Card
KOV-14
KSD-64A
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-32
KYK-13
• Receive, store and load
key in electronic form
• Can hold six 128 bit keys
• CCI is unclassified when
empty -- takes on highest
classification of key in
memory
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-33
KOI-18
• Used to read/transform paper key into
electronic key
• Can directly fill crypto equipment or load
another fill device
• Unclassified
• No memory
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-34
KYX-15
• Can store sixteen 128 bit keys
• Unclassified when empty - takes on the
highest classification of the key in memory
• Used to perform OTAR
• Can generate key locally when used with
KG-84, KIV-7 or KY-68
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-35
AN/CYZ-10
• Data Transfer Device
(DTD) can emulate other
fill devices
• Receives, audits and
transfers 128 bit keys with
identification information
• CCI and is unclassified
when empty or when the
CIK is removed
• Referred to as an ANCD
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-36
Simple Key Loader (SKL)
Processor 32-bit Intel® XScale™ CPU (400 MHz)
O/S
Win CE.NET (4.1)
RAM
128 MB of SDRAM
ROM
64 MB of Flash Memory
Graphics
2-D Accelerator
Size
7” x 3.5” x 1.8”
Weight
Approx 18 oz. 504 gms.
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-37
Fortezza Card (1 of 2)
•
•
•
•
•
Used with DMS to encrypt/decrypt
1.5 MBs processing rate
Tamper proof/ultrasonically welded
Exportable with State Department approval
Includes RISC based processor
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-38
Fortezza Card (2 of 2)
• Provides Cryptographic Functions
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Public Key Exchange
Message Encryption
Digital Signature
Hashing
Timestamp
Password
Certificate
• Algorithms used
– KEA, Skipjack, DSA, SHA-1
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-39
KOV-14 (Fortezza Plus)
• Special PCMCIA card - provides encryption and
other security services
• Used to enable STE
• Classified to level of keying material
• Unclassified when separated from STE
• Stays with COMSEC Material Control System
(CMCS) until destroyed
• With operational key – classified
• With seed key -- unclassified
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-40
KSD-64A
• Contains electronic fill info for STU-III
• May contain classified operational key or
unclassified seed key
• Can operate in three modes
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-41
KSD-64A Modes
1. Operational Key
– Load STU-III to make direct secure calls to other
STU-IIIs
– Fill Device
2. Seed Key
– Load STU-III to electronically obtain its operational
key during a rekey phone call
– Fill Device
3. Crypto Ignition Key (CIK)
– Stores an electronic "password."
– CIK is used in STU-III that shares this password to
unlock the terminal's secure transmission features
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-42
Key Generators
• KG-83
• KGX-93
• LMD/KP (KOK-22)
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-43
KG-83
• TRI-TAC and stand alone
applications
• Generates 128 bit TEK
up to Top Secret
• Compatible with most
COMSEC equipment that
accepts 128 bit keys
• Requires initial/annual
certification
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-44
KGX-93
• MSE and TRI-TAC switches
• Generates 128 bit key up to
Top Secret
• Can also store key
• Requires initial/annual
certification
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-45
Local Management Device/Key
Processor (LMD/KP)
• 128 bit key
• Key Processor
– KOK-22A
– Key Generation
• Local key generation,
distribution, auditing and
reconciliation
• Access to ACCOR
• Tier 2 of EKMS
• Can load 1000 keys at once
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-46
Cryptographic Modernization
Program
• Replacement of DOD’s aging
Cryptographic Equipment Inventory to
meet Current and Objective Capability
Needs.
• Intent is to achieve more robust
security, network adaptability (NetworkCentric) and performance enhanced
equipment solutions.
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-47
Background (1 of 2)
FY 99/00 MCEB and NSA Studies Concluded:
• Technologically Obsolete 20-30 years old
• Cannot Support Network-Centric Architectures
• Inventory Becoming Logistically Unsupportable
Feb 01 ASD(C3I) Arthur Money memo directs:
• Road Map for Crypto Systems
Upgrade/Replacement/Retirement
• Services Procure Modernized Crypto in FY0309 POM
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-48
Background (2 of 2)
Sep 02 JRB
• 9 Crypto Systems as near term Modernization efforts
• Approved Joint Forces Command as CRD Sponsor
• Directed Joint Staffing of CM MNS and Completion of
CM Implementation Plan
Nov 03 SIGCEN
• BG Hicks, signed the Charter establishing the CM
ICT
• ICT process serves to shorten the requirements
determination event of the acquisition process by
employing the team approach to requirements
determination.
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-49
Existing Deficiencies
• Equipment Obsolescence
• Incompatibilities with new architectures/technologies
• Interoperability/Releasability problems
• Restrictions on key management pose major
challenges
• Affects ability to support dynamic
communications
• Lack of programmability/flexibility
• Incompatibility with modernized DOD KMI
• Lack direct interfaces
• Cryptographic equipment shortages
• Readiness and surge capabilities affected
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-50
Cryptographic Inventory Posture
Unsupportable within
10 years
Supportable beyond
10 years
2%
2%
Unsupportable
within 5 years
15%
43%
38%
Currently
Unsupportable
Programmed
Replacements
 Current inventory 1.2 Million Items (Sources: ISSP Database,
ATAV, MYNSN, UIT, CMCS)
 Programmed Replacements JTRS, WIN-T, FCS and Other Major
Programs.
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-51
Threat
Continuing trends reflect significantly increased
risks of C4ISR, IT, and weapons systems to
attacks on cryptography
•
•
•
•
•
Increases in computing power
Increasing reliance upon COTS systems
Service/Allied/Coalition use
Availability of Electronic Warfare Systems
Widespread distribution of Computer Network
Attack (CNA) and Computer Network Exploitation
(CNE) Tools
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-52
CM Concept
• Leverage Latest Technology
• Develop Multi-Functional Components that Replace
Entire Families of Crypto Equipment
• NSA Partnership with Services on Program Development
NSA will:
- Retain Crypto Certification Approval
- Fund Services for Program Development R&D
Services will:
- Program Funding for Procurement and Fielding
- Conduct Program Development Process
- Develop Equipment Shortage/Supportability Lists
- Prepare Fielding and Transition Plans
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-53
CM Core Capabilities
• Programmable/Reprogrammable Algorithms
• Capable of Receiving an Algorithm
• Scalable Components
• Embedded Modules (Whenever Possible)
• EKMS/KMI Compliant/Capable
• Network-Centric Functionality
• Assured control of DOD networks
• Interoperability
• Physical - Form and Fit
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-54
Priority Nine Systems
PROGRAM
SERVICE LEAD
UTILIZATION
IFF Mode V
Navy
AVN/GND-Air/Water Craft
KG-30 (NC2)
Air Force
Joint Interface
KI-22 (Air Force Only)
Air Force
N/A
KG-40 (LINK 11)
Navy
ADA/Joint Interface
CTIC/CDH
Air Force
Integrated Modules
KG-94 (Family)
NSA
Trunk Encryptors
NES (INE)
NSA
Inline Network Encryptors
STU III Replacement
NSA
Secure Voice/Data
KY-68/78
Army
Tactical DSVT
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-55
EKMS and AKMS
• EKMS Architecture and Concepts
• AKMS Description and Operational
Concepts
• Doctrinal Impacts
• Roles/Responsibilities
• Issues
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-56
Electronic Key Mgt System
• DOD initiative to modernize management/distribution
of COMSEC to support the warfighter and non-military
government users.
• Replaces slow cumbersome paper and manpower
intensive processes of management and distribution of
COMSEC material.
• Increase security of key management processes
• Increase responsiveness to user needs
• Provide for interoperability
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-57
EKMS Tier Levels
0. National Security Agency (NSA)
1. Central Office of Record (COR)
2. LCMS COMSEC User Accounts
3. Common Fill Devices
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-58
EKMS Operations
TIER 0: POLICIES, MODERN KEY
CF
COR
EKMS ID
COR
TIER 1: COR, RA, PCM,OPM
AKMS
AKMS
EKMS ID
ACCOUNT
EKMS ID
ACCOUNT
LOCAL ELEMENT
EKMS ID
TIER 2: ACCOUNTS
LOCAL ELEMENT
LOCAL ELEMENT
•
NO SUBACCOUNTS
•
ONLY ACCOUNTS AND
LOCAL ELEMENTS
LOCAL ELEMENT
LOCAL ELEMENT
TIER 3: DTD/SKL (HAND
RECEIPT HOLDERS)
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-59
Tier 0 – NSA Central Facility
Provides for production, management, and
distribution of specialized electronic
cryptographic key and associated materials.
MODEM key
National Security Agency (NSA)
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-60
Tier 1 - Central Office of Record
• CORs are focal points for production,
management, auditing, and distribution of ServiceUnique electronic cryptographic key and materials
• Supports joint operations at theater and strategic
levels
• Act as alternates to the other in cases of degraded
operations, activity, and geographic location
• Major functional areas:
– Central Office of Record (COR)
– Registration Authority (RA)
– Privilege Certificate Manager (PCM)
– Ordering Privilege Manager (OPM)
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-61
Extension Tier 1
COR – Ft. Huachuca
EXTENSION TIER 1
-
COR – Kelly AFB
Facilities replicate Tier 1
- Does not provide COR capability for users
- Installed geographically CONUS/OCONUS
in area containing concentrations of accounts
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-62
Tier 2 – LCMS User Accounts
•
Represents individual EKMS user accounts
•
Developed by NSA
•
Used by all services
•
Individual service policies and procedures
•
AKMS – Army Tier 2
outlines Army policies and
procedures
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-63
AKMS
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Replaces slow, cumbersome paper and manpower
intensive processes
Provides a reliable, responsive and secure system
Implements an electronic key strategy w/in the
Army
Provides Tier 0 and Tier 1 electronic interoperability
Provides COMSEC and communications planning
capabilities
Provides real time key generation and distribution
To make AKMS work as a system, all three
components (LCMS, ACES, DTD) are required
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-64
LCMS Workstation
• NSA and Army produced
and distributed
• Automated account
management
• Local key generation,
distribution, auditing,
reconciliation
• Access to CF and COR
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-65
ACES Workstation
• Army produced and distributed
• Designed for Cryptonet planning and
management
• Includes SOI/ EP planning and
management
• Employs ACES-specific application
functions
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-66
Fill Device
• Receive, distribute, store,
DTD
and manage key
• Receive, transfer, and
display SOI
SKL
• Perform Audit
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-67
ACES Scenario
U.S. MILITARY IS NEEDED SOMEWHERE
ACES
ACES
OPERATOR
COMMUNICATIONS PLAN
S-3
KEY REQUIREMENTS
LCMS
OPERATOR
(TIER 2)
SHORT TITLE INFORMATION
DTD/SKL
(TIER 3)
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-68
Doctrinal Impacts
•
•
•
•
Accounts no longer manual
Acclaims no longer in effect
Sub-accounts no longer authorized
Key produced locally and distribution process
streamlined
• Electronic key transfer increased; physical
key transfer decreased
• Modern key ordering incorporated to
mainstream
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-69
Roles/Responsibilities
• CIO/G-6: EKMS/AKMS oversight; IA system
integrator
• G-2: COMSEC Policy
• G-8: Program Funding
• PEO C3T: Responsible PEO; DAA
• PM TRCS: PM for LCMS, ACES, and DTD, under
PM WIN-T
• CSLA: Primary service authority role; primary Tier 1
segment (COR); EKMS subject matter experts and
support to IA directorate
• CECOM: Tier 1 software support activity; Tier 2 lifecycle support (minus SW)
• SIGCEN: AKMS requirements and operational
concepts; sustainment training
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-70
IA Directorate (DCD) Role
• Provides EKMS/AKMS oversight
• Provides representation to:
– KMI Committee (KMI EC)
– Joint Key Management Infrastructure Working
Group EKMS Transition Team (ETT)
– Tier 1 System Management Board (TSMB)
– Other working groups and boards
• Chairs AKM Infrastructure Working Group
(AKMIWG)
• Facilitates exchange of info/coordination
among Army Orgs (G-8, G-2, CIO/G-6,
SIGCEN, CSLA, PM WIN-T)
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-71
E/AKMS Issues
• Simple Key Loader (SKL) Testing
• Tier 1 & Tier 2 phase 4 certification and
accreditation
• Software Support Activity (SSA)
• merging of EKMS, KMI, and COMSEC
modernization programs
• ACES Fielding
FA24 TSEC
24-Mar-16 Mod 6-HO-72