AirThread Connections Presentation Discussion Materials For Additional Coverage of the Topics Please See Me Or E-mail me at jheilprin@fas.harvard.edu Harvard University Extension School Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Overview: Let’s begin by considering both American Cable and AirThread Then we can summarize the industry and competitive environment Decide if there might be a fit between American Cable and AirThread Finally conduct a valuation exercise on AirThread Harvard University Extension School Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Overview of American Cable: American Cable is a large national provider of cable, high-speed internet, and VoIP They compete with most/all of the large national communications providers Customers are primarily retail consumers and home offices ־Systems pass ≈ 48.5 million homes Company has a large cable-fiber network, but does not have wireless telephony capabilities Harvard University Extension School Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Overview of AirThread: One of the largest regional cellular providers in the nation Operates in 200 markets in 5 distinct regions covering approximately 80 million people Customers are predominantly retail Has an operating cost disadvantage relative to its main rivals In order to maintain its market share the company has had to offer large handset incentives, and has spent more on customer acquisition ־ ־ Average revenue per minute has declined from ¢6.71/minute to ¢5.95/minute Cost of acquiring a customer has gone from $372 to $487 However, the company does have valuable spectrum rights and an established market position Harvard University Extension School Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Industry Dynamics: Broadly speaking, both companies are communications network providers subject to many of the same market and technological forces Industry is evolving toward bundled services offerings as a means of attracting and maintaining customers Technological convergence of voice, data, and video is further blurring the lines among industry sectors Building and maintaining a communications network requires significant investment in fixed assets, and is driven by network utilization rates ־ This is one of the reasons behind industry consolidation Harvard University Extension School Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Acquisition Rationale: For ACC, most of the rationale is based on cross-selling bundled services Benefits American Cable Cellular telephony Mobile Internet in the future Access to spectrum Broader appeal with bundled offerings Reach business customers Only if cellular offerings translates into cable subscribers Benefits AirThread Fixed-line Telephony High-Speed Internet Wire into the home Broader appeal with bundled offerings Reach business customers Only if cable offerings translates into cellular subscribers Other Operating Cost Savings None Backhaul savings from cell towers to central offices Customer Acquisition Costs Predicated on appeal of bundled services Predicated on appeal of bundled services Potential Synergies Expand Product Offerings Customer Reach Network Utilization Harvard University Extension School Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Acquisition Rationale: For ACC, the biggest worry is getting sucked into paying to solve someone else’s problem Potential Problems Expanded Product Offerings Operating Cost Savings Customer Reach Customer Service American Cable Changing wireless standards and volatility in value of spectrum Could end up spending money to solve someone else’s problem Benefit of offering bundled services may be competed away quickly Business clients have more demanding customer service requirements Harvard University Extension School AirThread Advances in mobile technology may make wires obsolete among core customers Mobile WiMAX may ultimately provide a cheaper backhaul solution Benefit of offering bundled services may be competed away quickly Business clients have more demanding customer service requirements Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections AirThread Perspective: Does AirThread need American Cable or some other suitor? What are their options? If they put themselves up for sale, are they likely to demand a high price? Harvard University Extension School Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections AirThread Perspective: Need for American Cable or some other suitor The most immediate need is to address their operating cost disadvantage ־ Remember, in a commodity industry, the low cost producer always wins However, AirThread does have the option to delay ־ ־ The same WiMAX technology that can deliver 4G to customers, can also be used to move traffic from towers to central switching offices This, of course, does not address the problem of acquiring and retaining customers due to a lack of bundled services In an industry characterized by rapidly moving technology, large fixed investments, and dominated by much larger competitors, waiting carries a huge risk Harvard University Extension School Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections AirThread Perspective: Company options As previously stated, they can wait for a technological solution to their backhaul problems ־If they can implement a technical solution, it could also solve their need to offer internet service They could look for a company to acquire ־A regional provider that could give them national presence ־A regional ISP with overlapping geographies They could put themselves up for sale Harvard University Extension School Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections AirThread Perspective: Attractiveness of AirThread as an acquisition target If AirThread offers a value proposition to ACC, they likely can offer the same value to other national cable network operators Similarly, they could also offer value to another wireless carrier in the form of higher network capacity utilization ־Not to mention, control over valuable spectrum Thus, if an auction were held, a number of bidders would likely emerge Harvard University Extension School Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Valuation Overview: As a starting point, lets assemble the facts: American Cable uses an LBO style approach ־ ־ Purchase with significant debt limiting the initial equity Then paying down the debt over time to some sustainable long-term level Investment bankers are suggesting that AirThread could support an interest coverage ratio of 5.0x EBITDA In addition to wireless assets, AirThread has significant nonoperating assets ־ ־ Investments in affiliates by there very nature are not financial assets No information about the cash they generate Harvard University Extension School Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Valuation Approach: Focusing on operations, value can be defined as: 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝐸(𝐹𝐶𝐹1 ) 𝐸(𝐹𝐶𝐹2 ) 𝐸(𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑛 ) + + ⋯ + + (1 + 𝑟)1 (1 + 𝑟)2 (1 + 𝑟)𝑛 Explicitly forecast period where the debt balances are highly predictable 𝐸(𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑛 (1 + 𝑔) (𝑟 − 𝑔) (1 + 𝑟)𝑛 Terminal value, or going concern, where debt is targeted as a ratio of firm value Given American Cable’s intentions, the explicitly forecast period seems conform to the APV approach Likewise, TV seems to fit well with the WACC approach Harvard University Extension School Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Valuation Approach: Given the aforementioned facts and assumptions, the operations appear to be well suited to a bifurcated approach 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝐸(𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑛 ) + (1 + 𝑟𝑎 )𝑛 𝐸(𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑛 )(1 + 𝑔) (𝑟𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔) (1 + 𝑟𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 )𝑛 + 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑛 (1 + 𝑟𝑑 )𝑛 Using APV for the intermediate period and WACC for the terminal value This methodology is valuing operation and financing effect, but is ignoring the non-operating assets Harvard University Extension School Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Valuation Approach: Taking into account non-operating assets and minority interest With respect to the equity investments, we have no way of knowing the cash they generate, or whether they could be easily sold ־ The case, therefore, suggests using a market multiple approach As for the minority interest, at this point, we are only interested in the enterprise value, so we don’t need to know which shareholders are claiming what ־ The underlying consideration is that the minority interest likely relates to specific assets, not the firm as a whole Harvard University Extension School Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Valuation Approach: Summarizing the constituent parts Un-levered intermediate term cash flow + Intermediate term tax shields + TV CF representing going concern + Value of non-operating assets Value of the enterprise Harvard University Extension School Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Valuing Operations: Since most of the heavy lifting related to determining FCF was part of the case facts, this is an easy place to begin Putting the issue of synergies aside for the moment, we can see that there are no “tricky” adjustments to be made (i.e. operating leases, non-cash compensation, etc.) Thus, we can use our basic FCF recipe EBIAT Plus: Depreciation Less: ∆Working Capital Less: Capital Expenditures Un-Levered Free Cash Flow Harvard University Extension School EBIT(1-t) - ∆NOA = FCF Joel L. Heilprin ∆Operating Assets Less: ∆Operating Liabilities ∆Net Operating Assets © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Valuing Operations: Operating income before synergies: Operating Results: Service Revenue Plus: Equipment Sales Plus: Synergy Related Revenue Total Revenue Less: System Operating Expenses Plus: Backhaul Synergy Savings Less: Cost of Equipment Sold Less: Selling, General & Administrative EBITDA Less: Depreciation & Amortization EBIT Harvard University Extension School 2008 4,194.3 314.8 0.0 4,509.1 838.9 0.0 755.5 1,803.6 1,111.1 705.2 405.9 2009 4,781.5 358.8 0.0 5,140.4 956.3 0.0 861.2 2,056.2 1,266.7 804.0 462.7 2010 5,379.2 403.7 0.0 5,782.9 1,075.8 0.0 968.9 2,313.2 1,425.0 867.4 557.6 Joel L. Heilprin 2011 5,917.2 444.1 0.0 6,361.2 1,183.4 0.0 1,065.8 2,544.5 1,567.5 922.4 645.2 2012 6,331.4 475.2 0.0 6,806.5 1,266.3 0.0 1,140.4 2,722.6 1,677.3 952.9 724.4 These are nothing more than Jennifer’s assumptions presented as an operating statement © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Valuing Operations: Moving from EBIT to FCF (pre-synergies) Unlike Apollo, the case takes a straight forward approach to net reinvestment ־There are no changes in net operating assets and liabilities other than cap-x, depreciation, and working capital Since Zhang provided estimates of cap-x and depreciation, the only thing to compute are the working capital balances based on the ratios she provided Harvard University Extension School Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Valuing Operations: Determining pre-synergy net working capital: Net Working Capital: Accounts Receivable Plus: Inventory Plus: Prepaid Expenses Less: Deferred Revenue Less: Accounts Payable Less: Accrued Liabilities Net Working Capital 2007 435.5 101.0 41.6 143.4 260.8 59.2 114.6 Working Capital Assumptions (1): Accounts Receivable Days Sales Equip. Rev. Prepaid Expenses Accounts Payable Deferred Serv. Revenue Accrued Liabilities 2008 521.9 135.0 46.9 163.3 335.4 64.6 140.5 2009 595.0 153.9 53.5 186.1 382.4 73.7 160.2 2010 669.3 173.1 60.2 209.4 430.2 82.9 180.2 2011 736.3 190.4 66.2 230.3 473.2 91.1 198.2 2012 787.8 203.7 70.8 246.4 506.3 97.5 212.1 41.7x 154.4x 1.38% 35.5x 14.0x 6.8x 41.7x 154.4x 1.38% 35.5x 14.0x 6.8x 41.7x 154.4x 1.38% 35.5x 14.0x 6.8x 41.7x 154.4x 1.38% 35.5x 14.0x 6.8x 41.7x 154.4x 1.38% 35.5x 14.0x 6.8x Note that working capital ratios are a function of revenues and operating expenses; therefore, synergies that affect revenue or operating expense will also affect working capital 1) Ratios are based on a 360-day year. Harvard University Extension School Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Valuing Operations: Putting it all together to derive pre-synergy FCF Un-Levered Free Cash Flows: EBIAT Plus: Depreciation & Amortization Less: Changes in Working Capital Less: Capital Expenditures Un-Levered Free Cash Flow 2008 243.5 705.2 25.9 631.3 291.6 2009 277.6 804.0 19.7 719.7 342.3 2010 334.6 867.4 20.0 867.4 314.5 2011 387.1 922.4 18.0 970.1 321.4 2012 434.6 952.9 13.9 1,055.0 318.6 Will this cover the proposed debt burden? Hmmm…. Harvard University Extension School Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Initial Debt Capacity: Since we know the 2007 EBITDA, the required interest coverage ratio, and the interest rate, we can work backward to determine the initial debt Pre-Synergy Est. 2007 EBIT DA Interest Coverage Ratio Maximum Interest Expense Interest Rate Est. Debt Capacity AirThread Debt Capacity: 1,033.3 T otal Borrowing 5.00x Amortization Period 206.7 Payments Per Year 5.50% Monthly Payment 3,757.5 3,757.5 10 Years 12 40.8 Note: This equates to ≈ $490 million of debt service annually (before considering the benefit of the tax shields); so, AirThread would need to throw off a lot more cash than the pre-synergy forecast Assuming American Cable was intent on $3.75 Bn of initial debt, what could they do to help ameliorate this problem? Harvard University Extension School Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Debt Servicing: Obviously, the synergies will have to go a long way toward plugging the gap Pre-Synergy Un-Levered Free Cash Flows: EBIAT Plus: Depreciation & Amortization Less: Changes in Working Capital Less: Capital Expenditures Un-Levered Free Cash Flow 2008 243.5 705.2 25.9 631.3 291.6 2009 277.6 804.0 19.7 719.7 342.3 Un-Levered Free Cash Flows: EBIAT Plus: Depreciation & Amortization Less: Changes in Working Capital Less: Capital Expenditures Un-Levered Free Cash Flow 2008 285.2 729.7 37.5 653.2 324.2 2009 357.2 846.0 29.4 757.3 416.5 2010 334.6 867.4 20.0 867.4 314.5 2011 387.1 922.4 18.0 970.1 321.4 2012 434.6 952.9 13.9 1,055.0 318.6 2011 574.2 1,005.0 34.3 1,057.0 487.9 2012 674.6 1,051.5 26.3 1,164.2 535.7 Post-Synergy Harvard University Extension School 2010 454.6 925.5 30.1 925.5 424.5 Joel L. Heilprin As it turns out, AirThread’s balance sheet had ≈ $205 million of initial cash, and the initial payments contain more interest than principal. As a result, the after-tax debt burden in 2008 is ≈ $410 million and never goes beyond $430 million See the accompanying spreadsheet © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Cost of Capital: As a starting point, let’s consider our end goal(s) in light of our preferred methodology Since the outstanding debt will be paid down based on a predetermined schedule over the intermediate term, the APV method is well suited over this period ־ As a result, the intermediate FCF will be discounted at ra However, for the long-term, the intention is to employ a target D/V based on the industry average ־ This type of constant capital structure scenario is ideally suited for rWACC Thus, we need two discount rates for two distinct settings Harvard University Extension School Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Cost of Capital: Un-levering the equity beta If you assume the comparable companies are employing a target capital structure 𝛽𝑎 = 𝛽𝑒 𝐸 𝐷 + 𝛽𝑑 𝑉 𝑉 Conversely, if you assume the comparable companies use a fixed debt schedule 𝛽𝑎 = 𝐷 𝛽𝑒 + 𝛽𝑑 𝐸 1+ Harvard University Extension School 𝐷 𝐸 Joel L. Heilprin 1−𝜏 1−𝜏 © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Cost of Capital: Un-levered βa based on constant D/V Comparable Companies: Universal Mobile Neuberger Wireless Agile Connections Big Country Communications Rocky Mountain Wireless Average Equity Value 118,497 189,470 21,079 26,285 7,360 Net Debt 69,130 79,351 5,080 8,335 3,268 Debt/ Value 36.8% 29.5% 19.4% 24.1% 30.7% 28.1% Debt/ Equity 58.3% 41.9% 24.1% 31.7% 44.4% 40.1% Equity Beta 0.86 0.89 1.17 0.97 1.13 1.00 Asset Beta 0.60 0.67 0.97 0.77 0.83 0.77 Un-levered βa with a known debt schedule Comparable Companies: Universal Mobile Neuberger Wireless Agile Connections Big Country Communications Rocky Mountain Wireless Average Equity Value 118,497 189,470 21,079 26,285 7,360 Harvard University Extension School Net Debt 69,130 79,351 5,080 8,335 3,268 Debt/ Value 36.8% 29.5% 19.4% 24.1% 30.7% 28.1% Debt/ Equity 58.3% 41.9% 24.1% 31.7% 44.4% 40.1% Joel L. Heilprin Equity Beta 0.86 0.89 1.17 0.97 1.13 1.00 Asset Beta 0.68 0.74 1.04 0.84 0.92 0.84 © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Cost of Capital: Using CAPM, the required return on assets will be 𝑟𝑎 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑎 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 → .0425 + .77 . 05 = 8.09% Or 𝑟𝑎 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑎 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 → .0425 + .84 . 05 = 8.47% Harvard University Extension School Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Cost of Capital: Now that we have a discount rate for the intermediate term, attention can be turned to the long-term WACC Given the industry average D/V of ≈ 28%, the asset beta can be re-levered using this target Since WACC is being employed; and hence a constant capital structure is assumed, the equity beta will be determined as follows: 𝛽𝑒 = 𝛽𝑎 Harvard University Extension School 𝑉 𝐷 − 𝛽𝑑 𝐸 𝐸 Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Cost of Capital: Non-Constant Capital Structure Debt/ Value 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 25.0% 28.1% 35.0% 40.0% 45.0% 47.0% 50.0% Debt/ Equity 0.0% 5.3% 11.1% 17.6% 25.0% 33.3% 39.1% 53.8% 66.7% 81.8% 88.7% 100.0% Asset Beta 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 Equity Beta 0.84 0.88 0.92 0.97 1.02 1.08 1.12 1.22 1.31 1.41 1.46 1.54 Cost of Equity 8.47% 8.65% 8.86% 9.08% 9.34% 9.63% 9.83% 10.34% 10.79% 11.31% 11.55% 11.94% Constant Capital Structure Cost of Debt 5.50% 5.50% 5.50% 5.50% 5.50% 5.50% 5.50% 5.50% 5.50% 5.50% 5.50% 5.50% 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = Harvard University Extension School WACC 8.47% 8.39% 8.30% 8.22% 8.13% 8.05% 7.99% 7.88% 7.79% 7.71% 7.67% 7.62% Debt/ Value 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 25.0% 28.1% 35.0% 40.0% 45.0% 47.0% 50.0% Debt/ Equity 0.0% 5.3% 11.1% 17.6% 25.0% 33.3% 39.1% 53.8% 66.7% 81.8% 88.7% 100.0% Asset Beta 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 Equity Beta 0.77 0.80 0.84 0.88 0.92 0.97 1.01 1.10 1.18 1.27 1.32 1.39 Cost of Equity 8.09% 8.26% 8.44% 8.64% 8.87% 9.12% 9.30% 9.76% 10.16% 10.62% 10.84% 11.19% Cost of Debt 5.50% 5.50% 5.50% 5.50% 5.50% 5.50% 5.50% 5.50% 5.50% 5.50% 5.50% 5.50% WACC 8.09% 8.01% 7.92% 7.84% 7.75% 7.67% 7.62% 7.50% 7.41% 7.33% 7.29% 7.24% 𝐸 𝐷 𝑟𝑒 + 𝑟 1−𝜏 𝑉 𝑉 𝑑 Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Interest Tax Shields: Since the terminal value is being determined based on WACC, the TV tax shield is imputed Thus, our main concern is with the intermediate interest tax shields 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 = 𝐷 𝑟𝑑 𝜏 To determine the debt balance and interest expense, we need to create a debt pay-down schedule Fortunately, this is just a simple mortgage schedule ־See the accompanying spreadsheet for the schedule Harvard University Extension School Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Long-Term Growth Rates: To begin, let’s establish the notion of a floor and ceiling for long-term growth The floor should be zero ־ A long-term growth rate < 0, would implied a long-term liquidation, not a going concern Also, it should be noted that a growth rate equal to zero implies negative real growth if inflation is positive Turning to the ceiling, long-term growth should never be greater than the long-term growth rate of the macro economy – Why… The answer requires us to think about what we learned in estimating required rates of return ־ Recall that virtually every methodology for estimating discount rates is based on investors requiring the risk-free rate plus some premium for taking on additional risk (consider the CAPM below) 𝐸 𝑟𝑖 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 ־ Further, since risk-free rates are based on macroeconomic expectations of growth and inflation, and since the discount rate of a risky asset must be greater than the risk-free rate, it stands to reason that sustainable growth rates cannot exceed discount rates Harvard University Extension School Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Long-Term Growth Rates: With a potential range established, a more refined estimate can be made by considering the company’s fundamentals As a starting point, any going concern must reinvest in its operations in order to continue its existence From a fundamental standpoint, growth in operating income will be a function of the amount reinvested in the business and the profitability of the business 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 = 𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑥 𝑅𝑂𝐶 ־ Reinvestment rate is 𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 = ־ Return on capital is 𝑅𝑂𝐶 = Harvard University Extension School Joel L. Heilprin ∆𝑁𝑂𝐴 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝐴𝑇 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝐴𝑇 𝑁𝑂𝐴 Looking at this collectively, long-term growth is amount of reinvestment relative to the existing capital base © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Long-Term Growth Rates: Turning our attention back to AirThread With Synergies Long-Term Growth Rate: EBIAT Invested Capital RO C Net Reinvestment EBIAT Re inve stme nt Rate Est. EBIAT Growth Rate Net Operating Assets 2012: T otal Operating Assets Less: T otal Operating Liabilities Ne t O pe rating Asse ts Without Synergies 2012 674.6 3,976.9 17.0% 139.0 674.6 20.6% 3.5% 5,801.4 1,824.5 3,976.9 Harvard University Extension School Long-Term Growth Rate: EBIAT Invested Capital RO C Net Reinvestment EBIAT Re inve stme nt Rate Est. EBIAT Growth Rate Net Operating Assets 2012: T otal Operating Assets Less: T otal Operating Liabilities Ne t O pe rating Asse ts Joel L. Heilprin 2012 434.6 3,908.9 11.1% 116.0 434.6 26.7% 3.0% 5,709.1 1,800.2 3,908.9 Note: in order to estimate NOA and long-term growth, a reconciling balance sheet needed to be constructed © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Assembling the Pieces: We now have everything we need for a complete valuation Un-levered free cash flows Initial debt estimate and a debt schedule providing intermediate interest expense and tax shields Un-levered cost of capital and a WACC for calculating the terminal value Long-term growth rate Earnings multiple and earnings of affiliates to estimate the value of the non-operating assets Harvard University Extension School Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC AirThread Connections Un-Levered Free Cash Flows: EBIAT Plus: Depreciation & Amortization Less: Changes in Working Capital Less: Capital Expenditures Un-Levered Free Cash Flow Interest T ax Shields Un-Levered Cost of Capital Cost of Debt Long-T erm WACC Long-T erm Growth Rate PV of Intermediate FCF PV of Intermediate T ax Shields Total Intermediate Value T erminal Value Total Value of O perations Earnings of Affilates 2007 Average P/E Multiple Value of Non-O perating Assets Total Value 2008 285.2 729.7 37.5 653.2 324.2 2009 357.2 846.0 29.4 757.3 416.5 2010 454.6 925.5 30.1 925.5 424.5 2011 574.2 1,005.0 34.3 1,057.0 487.9 2012 674.6 1,051.5 26.3 1,164.2 535.7 79.8 73.2 66.3 59.0 51.3 300.0 75.6 356.5 65.8 336.1 56.5 357.4 47.6 363.0 39.3 8.09% 5.50% 7.62% 3.49% 1,712.9 284.8 1,997.7 9,320.5 11,318.2 13,453 90.0 19.0x 1,710.6 13,028.9 Harvard University Extension School Joel L. Heilprin © 59th Street Partners LLC