Why do Public Firms Issue Private and Public Securities? Gordon Phillips Robert H. Smith School of Business University of Maryland Presentation based on recent research papers Available on my web site: www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/gphillips October 2005 Private and Public Security Issues Questions of Interest Where do firms raise money and why? How does the stock market respond? How do firms fare after issuing private equity? October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 2 Private and Public Security Issues Case Study 1 GOOGLE Public Seasoned Equity Offering On Aug 17th, 2005 (after close of stock market) Google announced it would sell 14.1 million shares in the stock market. Price at close of day on Google was $285.10. This offer would raise over 4 Billion in cash for the company at this stock price. This compares to the 1.161 Billion (net) it raised at its IPO on Aug. 19, 2004. ( 14.1 million shares sold by company at the time of the IPO, 8 million by other investors.) Google’s situation today: Had 2.9 Billion in cash end of June, 2005. Increased from 1.3 Billion from end of June, 2004. Net income in previous 6 months was 918 million on sales of 2,641 million = 34.8% operating margin. Paid taxes of 239 million. In past year Google went up over 300% from its IPO price of $85. Stock price reaction after the SEO was announced? -$5.11 or -1.8% WHY? October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 3 Private and Public Security Issues Case Study 2 Interwave Communications (IWAV) Private Placement On Nov.13th 2003, Interwave Communications announced it would sell 1.350 million shares in the stock market in a private placement. (PIPE offering). Existing shares of stock: 6,872,542 shares. Dilution therefore was 17.7%. Stock was offered at $3.93 – a discount of 17.7% versus the previous closing price. Gross offer proceeds was $5,299,965 Cash Position: Began 2002 with 46.8 million in cash. Ended 2002 with 15.68. Ended 2003 with 4.4 million in cash. Firm’s operating cash flow for 2002 was -37 million, in 2003 – 19 million (sales were 29.9 million in 2003.) Stock price reaction on the day of the PIPE? +15.14% Stock price reaction over a 3-day window( +1, 0, +1 )? +21.0% WHY? October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 4 Private and Public Security Issues Conclusions (In advance) Where do firms raise money and why? Firms issue in the private markets when: Analysts disagree about their prospects (high asymmetric information) They have negative to low cash flow from current operations Firms issue in the public market to “time” favorable view of the company. October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 5 Private and Public Security Issues Conclusions (In advance) How does the external stock market view firms’ decisions? Positively for private securities – especially when there is high disagreement about company prospects Investors view investment by more informed private investors as a good signal (confidence) about the future prospects of the company. October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 6 Private and Public Security Issues The Importance of Private Markets Table 1 Number and Gross Proceeds of Securities Public Public Public 144-A Private Private Private Debt Convertibles Equity Debt Convertibles Debt Convertibles Equity Year 1995-'03 N 1,820 $MM 636,245 %FV 7% %FV (med) 3% 201 72,357 14% 9% 1,642 1,017 163,762 320,968 22% 27% 15% 16% 597 159,477 17% 13% 5,609 1,493,159 33% 22% 1,156 30,686 15% 9% Total 1,377 13,419 25,601 2,902,255 15% 23% 9% 13% Private markets are important for public firms. 62% of convertibles and equity issues are issued in private markets (57.8% without 144A mkt.) For firms in lowest size quartile of issuing firms, 81% of convertibles and equity issues are issued in private markets October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 7 Private and Public Security Issues Private Placements: The Regulations Securities cannot be issued unless they are Registered (i.e. the company files a registration statement with the SEC that is declared effective) Or there is a statutory exemption for the sale - securities not registered are restricted securities October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 8 Private and Public Security Issues Private Placements: The Regulations - 2 Statutory exemptions for restricted securities Private placements are generally conducted in accordance with the “safe harbor” provisions of Regulation D of the 1933 Securities Act – Basically there can be no more than 35 non-accredited investors and an unlimited number of accredited investors Restricted securities cannot be resold or traded in the public markets (exchange) before they are registered (Rule 144) They may however be traded privately to qualified institutional buyers (QIB) at any time under Rule 144A. Firm can disclose “material, non-public information” to investors. This exemption remains under Reg. FD. October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 9 Private and Public Security Issues Data Used in Our Study Securities issued from 1/1995 to 12/2003 by publicly traded corporations Private issues: Convertible and Common stock PIPE deals from PlacementTracker database Private debt from Dealscan Database. Public issues of equity and convertibles: SDC new issue database Data linked to analyst data (IBES), stock price and Firm Data. In CRSP and Compustat (for one year before issue) Excluding financials (6000-6999) and regulated utilities (4900-4999) October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 10 Private and Public Security Issues Some Facts First fact, the average PIPE deal is sold at a 11.6% average discount. Second fact, the average public SEO is sold at an average of 5.6% average discount relative to the current share price. – i.e. Price prior to issue of $100, issue new stock at $94.60 – and also pay 7% to investment bankers netting the company $87.98. (12% “Cost”) October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 11 Private and Public Security Issues Market Reaction to Security Issuance Decisions? Given the discount, does the market react unfavorably, and more unfavorably to private deals? – Given that these companies are all publicly traded, we can measure the stock price reaction to these issue decisions – on existing stock already trading. – We examine the reaction net of the overall market reaction for different windows of time. October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 12 Private and Public Security Issues Stock Price Market Reaction to "Typical" Deal Excess Returns (Days -1 to +1) Source: CRSP; Sagient Research Systems; Thomson Financial 4.0% 3.0% Public SEOs (1369 deals) PIPE Issues (2008 deals) 2.0% 2.75% 1.0% 0.33% 0.0% -1.0% -2.90% -3.09% -2.0% -3.0% -4.0% October 2005 Average Excess Reaction Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Median Excess Reaction Page 13 Private and Public Security Issues Stock Price Market Reaction to "Typical" Deal Excess Returns (Days -5 to +5) Source: CRSP; Sagient Research Systems; Thomson Financial 6.0% 4.0% Public SEOs (1369 deals) PIPE Issues (2008 deals) 5.14% 2.0% 0.91% 0.0% -2.0% -3.88% -4.26% -4.0% -6.0% October 2005 Average Excess Reaction Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Median Excess Reaction Page 14 Private and Public Security Issues Stock Price Market Reaction to "Typical" Deal Excess Returns (Days -10 to +10) Source: CRSP; Sagient Research Systems; Thomson Financial 8.0% 6.0% Public SEOs (1369 deals) PIPE Issues (2008 deals) 4.0% 6.77% 2.0% 1.05% 0.0% -2.0% -4.64% -4.95% -4.0% -6.0% October 2005 Average Excess Reaction Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Median Excess Reaction Page 15 Private and Public Security Issues Excess Return Distribution (Days -10 to +10) Source: CRSP; Sagient Research Systems Frequency 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 -100 200 -1 - -0.9-80 -0.8 -0.7-60 -0.6 -0.5-40 -0.4 -0.3-20 -0.2 -0.1 00 - 0.1200.2 0.3 40 0.4 0.5600.6 0.7 80 0.8 0.9 100 1 - 1.1 120 1.2 1.3140 1.4 1.5160 1.6 1.7180 1.8 1.9 -0.9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 0.1 - - 1 1.1 - -2 Excess Return (%) 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 Note: Five companies had a (-10,+10) announcement return of less than -100%. Two companies had a (-10,+10) announcement return greater than 200%. October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 16 Private and Public Security Issues Characteristics of Private and Public Stock Offerings Public SEOs PIPE issues Average 5.6% 11.6% Median 5.4% 12.1% 20.0% 70.2% Offering Discount Maximum Issue Size relative to existing floatation (Dilution) Average 18.7% 21.2% Median 12.7% 13.1% 600.0% 1260.0% 1331.2M 268.3M 364.0M 73.4 M Maximum Firm Size (Market Capitalization) Average Median October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 17 Private and Public Security Issues Regression Coefficient Estimates Prediction of 10 Day Announcement Excess Returns (-10 to +10) Robust Regression Results Variable PIPE Indicator 0.062 a Dilution 0.029 a Discount -0.012 Discount x Dilution -0.025 log (Market Capitalization) Constant Number of Deals 0.008 b -0.089 a 2728 a, (b): significant at the one (five) percent significance level. October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 18 Private and Public Security Issues Extensions to the Basic Model Look at all security types. Examine impact of: “Analyst uncertainty” / asymmetric information Taxes Profitability Financial Distress October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 19 Private and Public Security Issues Table 3 Market Reaction to Security Issuance Table presents regression of 10 trading-day cumulative abnormal returns around security issues on the variables defined in Table 2A. The earnings surprise variable appears interacted with the public and private market dummy. We include industry fixed effe Equity Issues (1) (2) Public Market -1.62% b -2.54 Private Market 2.77% 2.16 Measures of Asymmetric Information Earnings Surprise*Public Market Investment Opportunities Measures R&D / lagged PPE Tobin's q October 2005 -1.60% c -2.31% a -2.53% Debt Issues (5) (6) a -0.89% b -0.95% -1.82 -2.65 -2.65 -1.97 -1.83 1.76% -0.35% 1.83% -0.07% -0.02% 1.29 -0.24 1.14 -0.19 -0.06 -3.60% -1.25 Earnings Surprise*Private Market Risk Measure Cash Flow Volatility b Convertible Issues (3) (4) 0.96% 1.80 -3.68% -4.15 c a -0.22% -0.20 -0.81% -1.10 1.10% 1.25 0.06% 0.11 0.26% 0.50 -0.19% -0.21 -0.68% -0.69 0.65% 1.31 0.72% 1.32 0.49% 0.94 0.12% 0.20 0.81% 1.09 1.12% 1.25 -1.14% -1.36 -1.11% -1.25 -0.18% -0.30 -0.27% -0.48 0.57% 0.76 0.06% 0.08 -0.54% -1.42 -0.48% -1.22 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland c Page 20 Private and Public Security Issues Initial Conclusions Stock market responds favorably to PRIVATE issues DESPITE the fact that they are sold at a large discount to the existing company stock price. This reaction to issuing private equity is more positive when: analysts disagree more about the company’s future earnings (there is high asymmetric information about the company’s future). Firms are unprofitable and have indications of financial distress Firms stock price has fallen recently. October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 21 Private and Public Security Issues Impact of Strategic Private Investors? We examine block private purchases of equity by other related corporations (strategic investors). Examples include: Compaq Computers buying a 20% block in Conner Peripherals Eastman Kodak investing $20 million in Immunex Corp. DuPont purchasing a stake in Biotech Research Labs. Stock market response to these types of deals? Overall + 6.9% What happens if these deals are combined with specific product market alliances or joint ventures? October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 22 Private and Public Security Issues Stock Price Reaction to Strategic Investors’ Deals 12% Average Stock Market Excess Returns (days -10 to +10) 10% Private Placement + Alliance or JV 8% Private Placement with no Alliance or JV 6% 10.10% 4% 5.90% 2% 0% October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 23 Private and Public Security Issues How do Firms Fare AFTER their Private Equity Sale? Source: Allen and Phillps (2000) October 2005 Year -1 to +1 Year -1 to +2 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Industry Just Block Ownership Industry Alliances+Ownership in High Ad./R&D Ind. Year -1 to +3 Industry 160% 140% 120% 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Alliances + Ownership Percentage Change Change in Sales After Equity Sale Page 24 Private and Public Security Issues Investment after Private Equity Sale October 2005 Year -1 to +1 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Industry Just Block Ownership Industry Alliances+Ownership in High Ad./R&D Ind. Year -1 to +2 Year -1 to +3 Industry 140% 120% 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Alliances + Ownership Percentage Change Source: Allen and Phillps (2000) Page 25 Private and Public Security Issues Operating Cash Flow (Pre-tax Profits) After Private Equity Sale October 2005 Year -1 to +1 Year -1 to +2 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Industry Just Block Ownership Industry Alliances+Ownership in High Ad./R&D Ind. Year -1 to +3 Industry 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Alliances + Ownership Percentage Change Source: Allen and Phillps (2000) Page 26 Private and Public Security Issues How do firms’ choose security type? We next examine what drives firms to choose different markets (public vs. private) and different securities (debt, convertibles or equity). This is related to a firm’s choice of capital structure BUT we do not limit the firm to choose equity and debt. October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 27 Private and Public Security Issues Factors Impacting Choice of Security and Market Reaction Profitability and Taxes (Marginal tax rate) vs. Financial Distress (Trade-off Theory of Capital Structure). Measures of asymmetric information Analyst earnings surprise: Abs(actual earnings – median(estimate)) Dispersion (sd) of analyst estimates. Risk: sd of quarterly cash flow Market timing: Pre-Issue cumulative abnormal stock price return. October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 28 Private and Public Security Issues Profitability (OCF/laggged assets) Source: Gomes and Phillps (2005) 25.0% 20.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 0.0% -5.0% -10.0% Public Debt Public Convert. Public Equity Private Debt Private Convert. Private Equity -15.0% -20.0% -25.0% -30.0% October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 29 Private and Public Security Issues Marginal Tax Rate 30.0% 25.0% 20.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 0.0% Public Public Debt Convert. Public Equity Private Private Private Debt Convert. Equity Security Type October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 30 Private and Public Security Issues Asymmetric Information Average Analyst Earnings Surprise [Abs(actual earnings-estimate)] 18.0% 16.0% 14.0% 12.0% 10.0% 8.0% 6.0% 4.0% 2.0% 0.0% Public Debt Public Convert. Public Equity Private Debt Private Convert. Private Equity Security Type October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 31 Private and Public Security Issues Analyst Earnings Estimate Dispersion (averages) 7.0% 6.0% 5.0% 4.0% 3.0% 2.0% 1.0% 0.0% Public Debt Public Convert. Public Equity Private Debt Private Convert. Private Equity Security Type October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 32 Private and Public Security Issues Average Pre-Issue Cumulative Abnormal Stock Return 90.0% 80.0% 70.0% 60.0% 50.0% 40.0% 30.0% 20.0% 10.0% 0.0% Public Debt Public Convert. Public Equity Private Debt Private Convert. Private Equity Security Type October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 33 Private and Public Security Issues Model of Security Issuance We estimate several Models of Security Issuance: Modelling Security and Market Choice. Our economic model examines the probability of the firm decisions based on firm characteristics: October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 34 Private and Public Security Issues Our Main Findings The probability of a firm issuing equity (both public and private) increases when: Firm risk increases R&D increases Firm investment opportunities increase More likely to issue public equity when stock price has risen recently – Market timing i.e. Google.. October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 35 Private and Public Security Issues Our Main Findings Firms are more like to issue PIPEs, when: Asymmetric information (uncertainty about the future) increases. Indications of good investment opportunities and also financial distress increase Consistent with investment by private investors certifying firms future prospects. October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 36 Private and Public Security Issues Conclusions The stock market reacts positively (*except for convertible “death spirals”) to private equity and negatively to public equity issues – despite private equity issues being sold at a much higher discount. Firm investment, sales and operating cash flow increase on average after they issue equity to other corporations (strategic investors). October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 37 Private and Public Security Issues Conclusions - 2 Firms are more likely to issue private securities and PIPEs (verses public equity and debt) when: Analysts disagree more about the company’s future earnings (there is high asymmetric information about the company’s future). (OPPOSITE for public equity markets.) Firms have indications of good investment opportunities in the future Firms have indications of financial distress (Interwave Communications) October 2005 Gordon Phillips, University of Maryland Page 38