Virtual Private Networks Ng Tock Hiong Systems Engineering Manager thng@cisco.com Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 1 Agenda Remote Access VPN – IPSec – SSL Site to Site VPN – Problem Statement – Site to Site VPN Technologies – GETVPN Summary Q&A Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 2 Remote Access VPN Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 3 SSL VPN and IPSec Connectivity Profiles SSL VPN IPSEC VPN Uses a standard web browser to access the corporate network Uses purpose-built client software for network access SSL encryption native to browser provides transport security Client provides encryption and desktop security Applications accessed through browser portal Client establishes seamless connection to network Limited client/server applications accessed using applets All applications are accessible through their native interface Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 4 SSL VPN and IPSec Solution Characteristics SSL VPN IPSEC VPN Using a web browser for remote access enables: Using an IPSec client for remote access enables: Anywhere access Access to any application Access from non-corporate machines Native application interfaces Customized user portals Embedded security, such as personal firewall Granular access control Consistent user experience Easy firewall traversal from any location Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 5 Comprehensive Secure Connectivity VPN Services for Any Access Scenario Partner Access Requires “locked-down” access to specific extranet resources and applications Client-based SSL or IPSec VPN Clientless SSL VPN Company Managed Desktop Remote access users require seamless, easy to use, access to corporate network resources Public Internet Clientless SSL VPN ASA 5500 Client-based SSL or IPSec VPN Public Kiosk Company Managed Desktops at Home Remote users may require lightweight access to e-mail and web-based applications from a public machine Day extenders and mobile employees require consistent LAN-like, full-network access, to corporate resources and applications Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 6 Cisco ASA 5500 Series: Threat Protected VPN Services Leveraging On-Board Security to Protect the VPN Threat Vector Remote Access VPN User Application Firewall and Access Control Threat Mitigation Application Inspection/Control Granular, Per-User/Group Access Control Protocol Anomaly Detection Stateful Traffic Filtering Incident Control Virus Detection Worm Mitigation Spyware Detection Worm/ Virus Spyware Unwanted Application Exploit Illegal Access ASA 5500 Comprehensive Endpoint Security Accurate Enforcement Pre-Connection Posture Assessment Malware Mitigation Session/Data Security Post-Session Clean-Up Real-Time Correlation Risk Rating Attack Drop Session Removal and Resets Leverages Depth of Threat Defense Features to Stop Malicious Worms, Viruses, and More…and Without External Devices or Performance Loss! Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 7 Cisco ASA 5500 Software v8.0 Introduces Significant Enhancements in Clientless Access Precise, granular access control to specific resources Enhanced Portal Design Localizable RSS feeds Personal bookmarks AnyConnect Client access New in 8.0! Drag and Drop file access and webified file transport Transformation enhancements including Flash support Head-end deployed applets for telnet, SSH, RDP, and VNC, framework supports add’l plug-ins Advanced port-forwarder for Windows (Smart Tunnel) accesses TCP applications without admin privileges on Client PC Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 8 Cisco AnyConnect Client New! Next generation VPN client, available on many platforms including: Windows Vista 32- and 64-bitt, Windows XP 32- and 64-bit, and Windows 2000 Mac OS X 10.4 (Intel and PPC) Intel-based Linux Windows Mobile 5 Pocket PC Edition Stand-alone, Web Launch, and Portal Connection Modes Start before Login (SBL) and DTLS support Windows 2000 and XP only Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 9 Comprehensive EndPoint Security Cisco Secure Desktop (CSD) now supports hundreds of pre-defined products, New updated frequently in 8.0! Anti-virus, anti-spyware, personal firewall, and more Administrators can define custom checks including running processes CSD posture policy presented visually to simplify configuration and troubleshooting Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 10 Enhanced Remote Access Security New in 8.0! Enhanced authorization using policies and group information Embedded Certificate Authority (CA) Virtual keyboard option Group/User-to-VLAN mapping support Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 11 Site to Site VPN Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 12 Problem Statement Today’s Enterprise WAN technologies force a trade-off between QoS-enabled branch interconnectivity and transport security –Networked applications such as voice, video and web-based applications drive the need for instantaneous, branch interconnected, QoS-enabled WANs –Distributed nature of network applications result in increased demands for scalable branch to branch interconnectivity –Increased network security risks and regulatory compliance have driven the need for WAN transport security –Need for balanced control of security management between enterprises and service providers Service providers want to deliver security services on top of WANs such as MPLS without compromising their SLAs Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 13 S-S VPN Technology Positioning & Differentiators When to Use? DMVPN GET VPN IPSec (P2P/GRE) Easy VPN with VTI Replacement for/Existing Traditional FR/ATM WAN Existing Private WAN (FR/ATM) Replacement for/Existing Traditional FR/ATM WAN Replacement for/Existing Traditional FR/ATM WAN Alternative/Backup WAN Alternative/Backup WAN Encryption of pipe Simplifies configuration for hub & spoke VPNs High Scale Hub/Spoke for IPsec (Low Scale for GRE) High Scale Hub/Spoke Alternative/Backup WAN What it Does? Encryption on IP VPN w/o Tunnels Virtualize WAN infrastructure Virtualize WAN infrastructure Simplifies configuration for hub & spoke VPNs Provide scalable, full-time anyany secure connectivity Provides low-scale, ondemand meshing Enable participation of smaller routers in large meshed networks Simplified key management High Scale Hub/Spoke Any Scale Hub/Spoke Low Scale Meshing Any Scale Mesh Native Multicast No – treats like unicast traffic by tunneling it Yes No – treats like unicast traffic by tunneling it No – treats like unicast traffic by tunneling it DynamicR outing Yes—Overlay Routing Yes– No overlay Routing Yes for GRE (Overlay routing) No – not supported by BU Failover Method Routing based Routing, Stateful (?) Stateful Failover Stateful Failover QoS Yes Yes Yes Yes Keys Peer-based Group-based Peer-based Peer-based Scale Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 14 DMVPN – How it Works DMVPN is a Cisco IOS Software solution for building IPsec+GRE VPNs in an easy and scalable manner Relies on two proven Cisco technologies Next Hop Resolution Protocol (NHRP) Hub maintains a (NHRP) database of all the spoke’s real (public interface) addresses Each spoke registers its real address when it boots Spokes query NHRP database for real addresses of destination spokes to build direct tunnels Multipoint GRE Tunnel Interface Allows single GRE interface to support multiple IPsec tunnels Simplifies size and complexity of configuration DMVPN does not alter the standards-based IPsec VPN tunnels, but it changes their configuration Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 15 DMVPN – How it works (Cont.) Spokes have a permanent IPsec tunnel to the hub, but not to the spokes. They register as clients of the NHRP server When a spoke needs to send a packet to a destination (private) subnet on another spoke, he queries the NHRP server for the real (outside) address of the destination spoke Now the originating spoke can initiate a dynamic ipsec tunnel to the target spoke (because he knows the peer address). The spoke-to-spoke tunnel is built over the mGRE interface Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 16 Mesh VPN issues 1. In a tunneled IPsec network (e.g., hub-and-spoke) system administrators can accurately predict which VPN gateways will setup VPN connections with which other VPN gateways But this isn’t true in a partial or full mesh of IPsec connections! Connections are built in an ad-hoc basis depending on application traffic (e.g., VoIP, video) flows. 2. In a hub-and-spoke topology system administrators can accurately predict the cryptographic capacity needed at each VPN gateway. But this isn’t true in a partial or full mesh! The system administrators are faced with either: Making an educated guess (which potentially affects reliability of the VPN), or Outfitting the the entire system with costly high-capacity VPN gateways. 3. Management & synchronization of IKE/IPsec state on 100s or 1000s of VPN gateways is problematic. Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 17 Mesh VPN issues 4. Native IP multicast may be available across the provider network, but traditional VPN technologies protect it with tunneling, which destroys the efficiency of using IP multicast! 5. In a hub-and-spoke topology VoIP packets are not optimally sent between spokes Packets sent through the hub suffer from added latency The hub takes an unnecessary load If packets do also start flowing directly between spokes, the packets can be delivered out of order, which affects the voice quality Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 18 Pair-wise Tunnel Issues Pair-wise authentication Before the tunnel can be setup, the VPN Gateways must authenticate each other with IKE. IKE is a cryptographically expensive protocol and there are limits to the number of simultaneous IPsec sessions that can be setup at a VPN gateway protecting a large enterprise network. Note: Such a VPN Gateway must be sized not according to the maximum bandwidth load but to the number of IKE peers that it can handle! Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 19 Pair-wise Tunnel Issues Tunneled data packets VPN Gateways use IP tunnel mode, with new addresses that are routed differently: New IP Header ESP Original IP Header Data IPsec does include a transport mode: IP Header ESP Data But it is inadvisable for IPsec gateways to use transport mode to protect data packets between themselves. This can require fragment reassembly which can overly tax the route processor. Use of ESP transport mode is risky for group traffic since the receiver cannot detect a 3rd party changing the source and/or dest. address Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 20 Using Group Security to avoid the barriers Use a new type of IPsec tunnel mode Recall that routers cannot use IPsec transport mode for this application. But we can use a new tunnel mode type which uses the original source and destination addresses in the outer header. This allows IPsec gateways to encapsulate both packets and fragments, but still create packets that are routable using the host source and destination addresses Original Src/Dst ESP Original IP Header Data This is called “tunnel mode with address preservation”. Note: Tunnel mode with preservation is required for protecting native IP multicast packets. GET VPN also applies it to unicast packets. Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 21 Cisco Group Encrypted Transport (GET) VPN – Solution for Tunnel-less VPNs Cisco GET VPN delivers a revolutionary solution for tunnel-less, anyto-any branch confidential communications Any-to-Any Any-to-Any Connectivity Connectivity Scalable Presentation_ID Cisco GET VPN Real Time © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential Large-scale any-to-any encrypted communications Native routing without tunnel overlay Optimal for QoS and Multicast support - improves application performance Transport agnostic - private LAN/WAN, FR/AATM, IP, MPLS Offers flexible span of control among subscribers and providers Available on Cisco Integrated Services Routers; Cisco 7200 and Cisco 7301 with Cisco IOS 12.4(11)T 22 Basic GET VPN Architecture GW1 Two Roles: VPN Gateways (a.k.a. “group members”) Group Controller/Key Server (GCKS) (a.k.a. “key server”) GW3 Step 1: VPN Gateways “register” with the GCKS GCKS authenticates & authorizes the GW © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. GW4 GW2 GW5 GW1 GCKS returns a set of IPsec SAs for the VPN Gateways to use Presentation_ID GCKS Cisco Confidential GW6 GCKS GW9 GW8 GW7 23 Basic GET VPN Architecture GW3 Step 2: VPN Gateways exchange encrypted traffic using the group keys. The traffic uses the “address preservation” tunnel mode. GW3 GW2 GW5 GW1 GW6 GW8 GW4 GW5 GW1 GW6 GCKS GW9 Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. GCKS GW9 GW2 GW8 GW4 GW7 Step 3: GCKS pushed out replacement IPsec keys when before current IPsec keys expire. This is called a “rekey”. GW7 Cisco Confidential 24 GET VPN is a new Security Paradigm: Introducing new Category Tunnel-less VPNs Tunnel Based VPN Tunnel-less VPN Bolted on Built in Complex architecture Seamless integration Wasted capital Investment protection Rigid design Flexible design Simple transport Intelligent transport Fueled by demand for agility within a security framework Presentation_ID © 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 25 25 Tunnel-less VPN - A New Security Model Any-to-Any encryption: Before and After GET VPN Before: IPsec P2P Tunnels After: Tunnel-less VPN WAN Multicast • • • • • Scalability—an issue (N^2 problem) Overlay routing Any-to-any instant connectivity can’t be done to scale Limited advanced QoS Multicast replication inefficient Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential • • • • • Scalable architecture for any-to-any connectivity and encryption No overlays – native routing Any-to-any instant connectivity Advanced QoS Efficient Multicast replication 26 GET VPN Concepts and Relationship Key Distribution GDOI--Key distribution mechanism (RFC3547) – Group Keys/Keys between Peer – Encrypted Control Plane Routing Continuity No overlay Routing Data Protection Secure Multicast - IP Header Preservation Multicast Data Protection – Encrypt Multicast, Retain IP Header of Original packet with IP Address preservation – Replication in the core based on (S,G) Key Distribution Group Domain Of Interpretation Routing IP Header Preservation Unicast Data Protection IPSec is a well-known RFC (RFC2401) - Encrypt Unicast with IPsec - IP Header Preservation Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential Data Protection Secure Unicast 27 Routing Continuity: IPsec Tunnel Mode with IP Header IP header Routing IP Header Preservation Preservation IP Payload IPSec Tunnel Mode New hdr with Original IP hdr encapsulated Original IP Packet Original source and destination IP address encapsulated in tunnel mode IP Payload IP Header Preservation Original hdr preserved ESP header IP IP Payload IPSec packet This mode is already necessary when encrypting IP multicast packets in order to preserve the (S,G). Mitigates the requirement for a routing overlay network Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 28 Summary Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 29 Mesh VPN issues Applying existing Site-to-Site VPN Technologies Standard IPsec VPN Not intended for large-scale VPNs, so management of high numbers is challenging. Cisco Easy VPN Hub-and-spoke technology, doesn’t support routing. Cisco GRE-based VPN Management of tunnels in high numbers is challenging. Spoke-tospoke tunnels must be setup manually. Cisco DMVPN Hub-and-spoke technology, but has easier configuration and management. Supports spoke-to-spoke tunnels, but initial traffic flows through the hub. Uses GRE, which adds to the packet size. Will not scale to 1000s in full mesh mode Our observation: Pair-wise Tunnels are not going to solve this problem! Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 30 Motivation for GET VPN Solving the Mesh VPN problem GW3 GW4 GW2 GW5 GW1 GW6 GW9 GW8 GW7 Enterprises are increasingly finding the need to setup a set of VPN gateways surrounding a service provider network (e.g., RFC 2547 (BGP/MPLS) networks. In many cases, this is prompted by regulatory requirements such as HIPAA and SO. With the inclusion of VoIP and video over IP multicast they are tending toward being a mesh rather than a traditional hub and spoke configuration The number of VPN gateways is on the order of 100s and 1000s! Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 31 Benefits of Cisco GET VPN Previous Limitations New Feature and Benefits Multicast traffic encryption through Encryption supported for Native Multicast and IPsec tunnels: Unicast traffic with GDOI – Not scalable – Allows higher scalability – Difficult to troubleshoot – Simplifies Troubleshooting – Extensible standards-based framework Overlay VPN Network – Overlay Routing – Sub-optimal Multicast replication – Lack of Advanced QoS No Overlay – Leverages Core network for Multicast replication via IP Header preservation – Optimal Routing introduced in VPN – Advanced QoS for encrypted traffic Full Mesh Connectivity – Hub and Spoke primary support – Spoke to Spoke not scalable Any to Any Instant Enterprise Connectivity – Leverages core for instant communication – Optimal for Voice over VPN deployments Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 32 Q&A Presentation_ID © 2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 33