DIR 412/DPS 412
KENYA’S FOREIGN POLICY/RELATIONS
Ms. Cyprine Oduogo’s Lecture Notes
The course will look at the determinants of Kenya’s foreign policy and foreign relations, the
formulation of Kenya’s foreign policy, the influence of domestic actors on Kenya’s foreign policy
behavior (the constitution, the executive, the legislature, the judiciary and civil society). The
influence of external actors on Kenya’s foreign policy behavior (international law, international
organizations, bilateral and multilateral donors and the international public
As a combined course, this course will also take analysis of Kenya’s relations including the
country’s interaction with other countries, issues in Kenya’s relations with her neighbours
(Kenya and Africa affairs, Kenya as an actor in the international system and interactions with
countries other than its neighbours, the continuity and change in Kenya’s foreign policy.
Kenya: A Historical Background
The republic of Kenya occupies an area of about 583,000 square kilometers and can be
described as a low income country. The republic is located on the Indian Ocean sea board. It’s
bordered by Tanzania in the south, Uganda in the west, Sudan and Ethiopia in the north and
Somalia in the east.
The external boundaries of Kenya on the other hand are a result of a series of international
agreements promulgated in the late 19th and early 20th century. Kenya’s boundary with Ethiopia
was for example agreed upon in 1907 and was amended as recently as 1963-64, while Sudan
and Kenya reached an accord on a northern boundary in 1930 and the eastern boundary with
Somalia dates from 1924.
Before its occupation by Britain, Kenya was the habitat of African tribes some practicing settled
agriculture and others pastoral nomads. All had but the slightest of contact with the outside
world. Arabs in search of slaves and ivory provided the first of outside contacts. In 1885, the
Berlin Act by which the great powers agreed on a general code of behavior to be followed in
annexation of African territories set the stage for the ensuing “scramble”
Britain was however not interested in acquisition of territories at first. In 1888, Sir William
Mackinnon’s East Africa Association secured a charter to administer the interior of the British
spheres and began work at the coast and in the interior as the Imperial East African Company (I.
E. A. C). The company later found itself unable to administer the country successfully. The
British government then stepped in and declared a protectorate over Uganda.
The reason to the change of the policy was to be found in Britain’s strategic interest in the area
of the upper Nile. To the British statesmen the route to India remained all important. By a
logical extension the country controlling the head waters of the Nile became a key piece in the
jig saw puzzle of international diplomacy and that country was Uganda. This came to be seen as
an essential part of Britain’s overall strategy.
Once Uganda was held, it was relatively a simple step to set up further protectorate over the
territory between Uganda and the coast. The British government declared a protectorate over
Kenya in July 1895. The European occupation was however met with much resistance. The most
violent resistance was that of Mau Mau rebellion. Although, Kenyatta disassociated himself
from Mau Mau, he was not trusted by the British authorities and imprisoned in 1953. The
terrorist campaign however ended in 1956 and the state of emergency which had been
imposed was lifted and Kenyatta released. Kenya was granted internal self government in 1963
and Kenyatta who had been the leader of the Kenya African national union-KANU became the
prime minister and then the president after full attainment of the independence in 1964. He
continued as the president until his death in 1978.
Kenyatta was succeeded by the then vice-president Daniel T. Arap Moi who built on the
achievements of his predecessor launching an impressive four year development plan. An
attempted coup by junior air force officers in 1982 was foiled and resulted for a while in
political detentions and press censorship. After the coup, the national assembly declared Kenya
as a one party state. Moi ruled the country for 24 years and was succeeded president Kibaki in
2002.
DEFINING THE TERM FOREIGN POLICY
Like other nation states, Kenya has foreign policy that guides its interactions in the international
system. While it cannot be specifically defined, foreign policy is said to refer to those actions of
a state that are meant to achieve particular objectives involving other actors beyond the state’s
own boundary. They are the cords of international relations.
Although this definition of the term foreign policy can be termed as the generally accepted
definition, what must be emphasized is that different people define foreign policy differently.
Joshua S. Goldstein (1999) for example defines foreign policy as strategies used by governments
to guide their actions in the international system. According to Goldstein, foreign policies are
what spell out the objectives state leaders have decided to pursue in a given relationship or
situation as well as the general means by which they intended to pursue those objectives. He
concludes that the day-day decisions made by various arms of government are guided by the
goal to implementing foreign policies.
The nature of Kenya’s foreign policy
John J. Okumu argues that, Kenya’s relations with the external world have been handled with a
great deal of caution uncharacteristic of many African governments whose activities in the
external affairs have been aggressive on issues concerning decolonization, non-alignment and
liberation of African territories under the racists regimes. During the first years of
independence. Okumu argues Kenya adopted an extremely moderate and indeed a cautious
stance in handling her external affairs. She has effectively maintained a “low profile” on many
African burning issues and elsewhere, a style of diplomacy that is best described as quiet
diplomacy. It is a style that avoids radical aggressiveness which she cannot defend or promote.
Determinants: The basic of post independent Kenya’s foreign policy is however found in the
KANU manifesto of 1961 and 1963. In these documents Kenya’s foreign policies include:

The need to protect her territory or territorial integrity against the
threat of Somali secessionists in the Northern Frontier District
today known as the North Eastern province.

Need for economic development.

Need to be non-aligned

Need to promote good neighborliness
According to John J. Okumu the interest of secessionists in Kenya’s North Eastern province
alerted her to the primary need to consolidate her boundaries. Secondly, Kenya realized that a
good neighbor policy based on mutual understanding was a logical step for the security of both
her people and territory. Thirdly a policy of vigorous economic development at home and
economic co-operation and cultural exchange with her neighbors would strengthen her
position in Africa and help in improving her economy.
Samuel M. Makinda adds that, from the beginning, Kenya’s foreign policy was shaped by the
need to attract more foreign capital, maintain commercial links with neighboring states, ensure
the security of her neighbors and consolidate the domestic political power base. In pursuance
of those goals, he argues Kenya maintained her independence in two different ways. First there
was a dependence on the wider East African market. Secondly, there was a security
dependence maintained in a defense agreement with Britain.
Vincent B. Khapoya on the other hand probes Kenya’s foreign policy by analyzing its
relationship with the west particularly with the United States of America and by trying to
determine the extent to which the relationship has mediated the Kenya’s foreign policy
behavior. He emphasizes that Kenya’s concern has been to protect her borders and to improve
the state of her economy.
John Howell who is perhaps the first scholar to undertake a serious look at Kenya’s foreign
policy in 1963 however, argues that two distinct policies have been guiding Kenya’s actions in
the international system. In global terms he argues external policy has been characterized by a
strong sense of morality and idealism, while in East African affairs, Kenya’s policy has been
governed by a rather more conservative and legitimist thinking. Economic development and
protection of her borders have been a concern to the country. He notes that, Kenya’s
conservatism came to be reflected most forcibly in her display of determined nationalism
towards Somalia. The border or territorial issues have also emerged between Kenya and
Uganda in the past.
1. The need to protect her territory.
Kenya’s need to protect her territorial integrity against the threat of Somali secessionists in the
Northern Frontier District was the result of Kenyan-Somalis’ determination to reunite
themselves with the Somali republic. The secessionists movement was started by the KenyanSomalis who regarded themselves as a different race and therefore demanded either a
separate Somali state or integration into the republic of Somalia.
Those who supported secession argued that, the Somali people are a kinship group that share a
common ancestor, religion and speak the same language. According to them, identity does not
prevent strife between cousins, but it does distinguish such strife from war against neighbors’
attempts at domination (Zartman 1985). As a result of the partition of the horn of Africa, the
Somalis were divided among five different political units/entities namely: Somalia (Italian
Somaliland), British Somaliland, French Somaliland and the Ogaden Somalis in Ethiopia and
Kenyan Somalis in North Eastern Frontier District today known as North Eastern province. This
division was however not acceptable to the Somali nationalists who began to claim the right to
form a Somali state or a “greater Somalia” through the unification of Italian Somaliland and the
other four branches. The idea was started by Sheik Mohammed Abdullah Hassan (1900-1920).
The Somalia republic thus claims self-determination for Somalis living outside Somalia namely
the Ogaden Somalis in Ethiopia, the North Eastern province Somalis and the Somalis in Djibouti.
Yousuf Juma for example writes that, the term Somali include all Somalis whether in Somalia or
in disputed territories of Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti.
The Somali nationalists in Kenya thus claimed that the North Eastern province ought to be
detached from Kenya and annexed to the Somali republic. Their claim is centered on the
principle of self-determination. The area in question comprises approximately a fifth of the
territory of Kenya.
Article 6 (4) of Somalia constitution adopted in July 1960 under Osman Shermake’s regime for
example stipulated that, “the Somali republic shall promote by legal and peaceful means the
union of Somali territories.” The principle was continued by Osman-Hussein’s administration
1964-1967, Sharmeken Egal administration and even Siad Barre’s regime 1969.
Kenya however rejects the Somalis’ claims. The country from the time before independence
was determined to safeguard its territorial integrity. It stands by the principle of territorial
integrity which is based on the assumption that each state has fixed and safe boundaries which
are not subject to any external violation. Article 2 (4) of the United Nations for example states
that “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat of or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. For the African states whose boundaries
were artificially drawn by the Europeans to serve European power policies therefore, the
principle of territorial integrity is to be respected.
They have for example inscribed the Organization of African Unity Charter, Article 3 which
stipulates that: “member states solemnly affirm and declare their respect for the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of each state for its unalienable right to independence.” They argue that
boundaries acquired at independence are to remain unchanged. Their acceptance of the
artificial boundaries is largely based on a domino effect. It is assumed that allowing changes of
boundaries of states or a state through conflict or otherwise no matter how legitimate would
lead to similar demands among other contested boundaries in Africa.
Kenya as a country has thus been very sensitive towards the demands for changes in its
boundaries. It is against the so called wars of liberation if it is directed against it. Kenya thus has
maintained her respect for legitimacy of the boundaries at independence. In 1962 for example,
Jomo Kenyatta visited Somalia just before the country’s independence to square things out
with the Somalia government. He made Kenya’s position clear and said that: “we and especially
KANU feel and we have put it clearly before the Somali government that we regard the NFD as
part of Kenya. We also regard Somalis who live in the NFD and elsewhere in Kenya as our
brothers. They are part and parcel of Kenya in that fashion. This is a question which we can
discuss with the Somalis in the NFD, this being a domestic affair of Kenya.” Any claim on the
NFD in Kenyatta’s view thus constituted a violation of Kenya’s territorial integrity.
The same theme was expressed during the OAU inaugural summit conference in Addis Ababa in
May 1963. The Kenyan delegation for example warned that Somalia’s territorial claims were
against Pan-Africanism and a most dangerous weapon for destroying African solidarity. They
argued that Kenyan Somalis should either integrate with the rest of African Kenyans or they
were perfectly free to leave Kenyans and their territory and cross the border with their camels
to Somalia. According to the delegation, that was the best way Somalis in Kenya could exercise
their legal rights of self-determination. They added that, if every territory to which people of
the Somali tribe migrated had to become part of Somali republic then the world map would
have to be redrawn. Korwa G. Adar therefore concludes that since independence, the
protection of her territorial integrity has been the key model determinant of Kenya’s foreign
policy toward Somalia.
2. The Need For Economic Development
Another determinant of Kenya’s foreign policy in the post independence era was the need for
economic development at home. At independence, Kenya’s economy by African standards
though dependent, was a fairly developing economy. It had sizeable manufactured goods for
export particularly to East African countries. The economy mostly relied on the export of coffee
and tea. Lack of indigenous managerial and technical skills as well as technology and lack of
adequate capital for investment was negated by these factors and the field for the penetration
of external dependency wide open.
Kenyan policy makers therefore pursued open policy through which Kenya externally made
relations and sources of foreign aid could be diversified. Kenya also hoped to attract private
investors who would stimulate rapid economic development. It was also believed that foreign
aid or capital from abroad as well as increased borrowing from international financial
institutions such as the World Bank would enhance development. In Kenyatta’s administration
therefore, economic self interest was as important as territorial integrity.
For purposes of economic development also, regional commerce became a major factor in
Kenya’s foreign policy. Kenyan nationalists thus did not anticipate a major restructuring of the
economy. After independence, they sought to preserve regional economic structures together
with all the benefits that had been accrued before independence. The call therefore was for the
preservation of the pre- independence regional system. The preservation was necessitated by
the apparent precarious position in which Kenya found herself upon the attainment of
statehood in 1963.
Kenya’s special economic position in east Africa risked being challenged by Tanzania and
Uganda following the departure of British colonialists who had created a dependency
relationship among the East African states. Kenya by independence had developed into an East
African metropol and Tanzania and Uganda constituted her periphery. . In turn Kenya formed
the periphery that linked Tanzania and Uganda with metropolitan Europe and North America.
Through such institutions as the East African Common Services Organization, the East African
Currency Board and the East African Common Market, with a more or less uniform external
tariff and a virtually free-trade system in the region Kenya completed the linkage. The
headquarters of the Common Services including East African Post and Telecommunications
were however in Nairobi, Kenya. Thus, Nairobi became the centre of economic and
communication activities in post Second World War British East Africa.
Foreign investors responded well investing their capital in Nairobi where industries’
manufactured goods for a protected East African market were. Consequently Nairobi became
the centre for international capitalist penetration of East Africa. The inflow of capital into Kenya
at the expense of her neighbors enabled Kenya to develop ahead of her neighbors. Tanzania
and Uganda thus grew to form the peripheral that supplied the raw materials for use in the
Kenya- based industries. They also constituted the principal markets for Kenya’s manufactured
goods.
In addition, foreign firms based in Kenya acted as middle men for major exports from Uganda.
As Tanzania and Uganda developed to dependencies of Kenya, Kenya also became inextricably
tied to external capital.
After independence therefore, it was expected that Tanzania and Uganda would seek to redress
the imbalance by adopting policies that would lead to regional economic re-organizations.
Kenya’s policy of good neighborliness thus rose out of the recognition of this fact. Kenyan
leaders quickly realized that a reckless foreign policy could endanger the economy which by any
measure depended on the East African market, regional and internal stability and the continued
inflow of western foreign private capital. Kenya thus decided that the status quo must not be
changed. This decision soon led to the formation of the old East African Community for the
purposes of promoting trade and good neighborliness in East Africa. Good neighborliness
basically meant the maintenance of pre-independence status quo. Kenya therefore chose to
dwell on peace, unity and liberty. The intention is to receive political good-will from the
neighbors so that “plenty be found within our borders”.
In terms of external trade, Kenya’s major trading partner since independence has been the
European Economic Community, which absorbed 1/3 of Kenya’s exports which included coffee,
tea, pineapples, cashew nuts, hides and skins, pyrethrum extract, fresh and processed
horticultural produce, flowers etc.
After independence also, Kenya aimed at attracting foreign investors. Since Kenya had opted
for an open capitalist economy when it attained independence foreign investment was
encouraged especially in priority industries. Both the British and Americans became the major
investors. By 1986 for example, Britain had the largest stake in Kenya.
In an endeavor to develop also, the Kenyan leaders emphasized the need to attract more
foreign capital. Having been ruled by the British, most of Kenya’s foreign capital came from the
United Kingdom in form of grants or aid. The British financial assistance to Kenya for example
began immediately after independence. In 1963, the U.K aid program consisted of a mixture of
loans and grants. In broad terms, this assistance can be divided into two phases with the first
phase concerning the period 1963-1977 and the second phase starting from 1977-to date. The
first phase mainly concentrated on the land transfer program and the assistance was used to
buy out those British farmers who chose to go back to Britain after independence.
In 1978, Britain decided to write off all outstanding loans to Kenya plus accrued interests. As a
result of an assessment of Kenya’s per capita which had shown that Kenyan majority were living
below the ‘poverty line’, Britain decided that all assistance to Kenya would be in form of grants
effective 1975 and hence the writing off of the loans.
Most of the British assistance to Kenya comes in form of project aid and trade provision,
technical assistance, balance of payment, support and sector aid. Apart from Britain, Kenya has
also since independence gotten her capital from the USA, Japan, China and other European and
Middle East countries. The need to attract foreign capital thus has determined Kenya’s foreign
policies towards those countries.
From the time of independence therefore, Kenyan leaders believed that the country should
borrow from any country technology and economic methods without commitment. It would
also accept financial assistance from any source without any strings.
3. Need to promote good neighborliness
It is another factor that determined Kenya’s foreign policy after independence. This policy was
promoted by Kenya’s geo-political location around the Indian Ocean. The position became a
stabilizing factor and influenced its relations with the land locked neighbors in particular
Uganda.
According to Kenyan leaders, good neighborliness would help in settling border issues with
Somalia, Uganda and Sudan. By forging a military alliance with Ethiopia also, Kenya hoped to
maintain a balance of power around the Horn of Africa. The objective of maintaining a balance
of power became visible in the way Kenya related to Idi Amin of Uganda despite his claims on
Kenya’s territory. It is also evidenced in how Kenya handled relations with Ethiopia after the
death of Emperor Haile Selassie, who was a personal friend of Kenyatta. Kenya for example
maintained diplomatic and economic ties with Uganda throughout Amin’s reign of terror.
Kenyatta especially goes to record for remaining silent on the internal affairs of Uganda except
when the security of Kenyans in Uganda was involved and when claims were made on its
territory stretching from Western Kenya to Rift Valley by Amin. Reacting to Amin’s claims, the
Kenyan leader made it clear that Kenya would effectively defend itself even though Amin’s
claims did not interfere with commercial interactions between Kampala and Nairobi.
Kenya’s policy of good neighborliness was accompanied with the need to promote and
consolidate international peace. Globally, Kenyatta’s administration undertook to promote
international peace and cooperation through the United Nations and the Organization of
African Unity. Within Africa therefore the guiding policy was African solidarity and unity of
action within the framework of the Organization of African Unity. Kenya thus adopted an anticolonialist posture and opposed the apartheid policy in South Africa though not consistently.
Due to the need to promote peace, Kenya also committed itself to support the liberation
movements in parts of Africa. Kenyatta through his speeches promised to work together with
other African states towards the gradual realization of continental unity.
1. The Need To Be Non-Aligned
In the Cold War era it is another factor that determined post independence Kenya’s foreign
policy. In its global relations Kenya chose to offer friendship to every country that would return
it. But the policy of non-alignment would not mean neutrality in world affairs. Far from it,
Kenya planned to participate fully in international development, supporting what the country
believed was right and judging each case on its merits. In order to achieve this policy, Kenya
would not permit the existence of foreign military bases on its soil. The country however,
continued to commit itself to supporting world efforts for universal disarmament.
Kenya’s adoption of non-alignment as the basis of her international policy thus experienced a
sense of conservatism and uncertainty in a bipolar international system. The perceived threat
of neo-colonialism which in the 1960s was thought to constitute a potential danger to formal
political independence called for a posture that could protect the formal political independence
especially when there was a doubt about the ability of the new states to defend their
independence and sovereignty with military force.
For Kenya therefore, non-alignment came to denote a policy as well as a strategy designed to
avoid entanglement in the Cold War which characterized this bipolar structure of the new
international system. Non-alignment sought to enable the new state to be an actor in the
international system without losing her identity. As a part of collectivity, Kenya hoped to
effectively pursue her international interests. The collective strength was however to derive
from a moral force rather than military power.
Rapid economic development also required diversification of both sources of trade and foreign
aid. But such diversification meant increased politico-economic independence and security as it
would enable the state to skirt the super powers camps. Thus Kenya saw non-alignment as a
strategy to protect the nation’s independence and sovereignty from extra threat.
Speaking at Makerere University on 17th August 1964, the late Tom Mboya objected to the
policy of isolation or neutrality in international politics. Since Kenya belonged to the growing
third World which believed in the policy of positive non-alignment, Mboya noted that her policy
was also one of positive non-alignment.
Kenya’s choice of non-alignment policy would thus ensure that it was not used as a tool of any
of the rich nations nor would it be expected to align herself permanently and automatically
with either the Western bloc or the Eastern bloc. Under the non-alignment policy also, Kenya
promised that other elements of neo-colonialism and imperialism such as foreign military bases
would not be. Non – alignment policy was in other words meant to achieve two basic
international economic objectives.
1) The avoidance of economic imperialist
2) The facilitation of the diversification of both the market for our exports and sources of
income whether of goods, capital or manpower.
Positive non – alignment however required that Kenya’s relations with the major powers be
carefully balanced so that the country’s ability to act in international affairs was not hampered
mostly by the cold war.
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN KENYA’S FOREIGN POLICY
Kenyatta died in 1978 still believing in the above policies. His successor Daniel T. Arap Moi then
came to power as kenya’s second president. The president declared that he would follow
Kenyatta footsteps or Nyayo. He admired some of kenyatta’s legacy which according to him
included love, peace, unity, justice, freedom and non – interference in domestic affairs and
integrity of other states. In terms of foreign policy therefore Moi’s views came to be similar to
those of Kenyatta. He for example became weary of policies that sought to adjust national
boundaries. He thus condemned inter – African wars based on territorial claims.
Under Moi also, Kenya’s posture of non – alignment remained the same. He for example gave
support to NAM’s objectives while simultaneously intensifying relations with the west. Nairobi’s
support for African liberations movements also remained strong. In fact it was graded to
include inviting freedom fighters to national day celebrations and military pass – out
ceremonies. Like Kenyatta also Moi became involved in direct efforts to mediate internal
conflicts in the African sub – region.
One feature that differentiated president Moi’s policies from Kenyatta’s however was
presidential personal diplomacy. While Kenyatta had maintained a low profile in the
management of foreign policy, Moi has been at the …………….25 of the management of foreign
policy and visited many countries to kenya’s national interests. Moi broke a record in kenya’s
diplomacy when he visited Russia and china. During kenyatta’s regime no visits were made to
the two countries.
Kenya’s objectives in eastern Africa equally remained traditional under Moi’s regime or
administration. Emphases continued to be made on the preservation of territorial integrity and
the creation of a regional environment that would enhance national economic development
and political stability.
Even though the old east African community had collapsed during the Kenyatta’s era, the
impacts of its collapse became manifested mainly in “Nyayo” era. Kenya suffered a substantial
loss in it’s inter – regional trade as a result of the border closures. All the same kenya under
president Moi continued to put emphases on the need for good neighborliness and the need
for
promoting
economic
development
through
regional
trade.
As
a
result……………………………………………………………………………….26/27 (not clear)
THE DOMESTIC ACTORS IN KENYA’S FOREIGN POLICY
There are different actors in Kenya’s foreign policy namely domestic and external actors. The
domestic actors include: the executive, the legislative, the judiciary, the constitution and civil
society. The external actors include: international law, international organizations and
multilateral donors together with international public opinion. These actors do influence
kenyas’ policy behavior. What is to note however is that, the degree of influence of each of
these actors vary depending on which institution wields much power than the other and on the
personalities that head them from time to time. According to Godana (former foreign affairs
Minister), the method or style of formulating and articulating foreign policy may vary from one
country to another – in one case there may be a highly institutionalized and somewhat
predictable system, while in another the system may be highly personalized and less
predictable. In m any countries for example the executive arm of the government has the
highest say in foreign policy matters.
THE EXECUTIVE
In Kenya, and elsewhere, the executive arm of the government is the chief actor in foreign
policy making process and implementation. This arm of the government has the highest say
when it comes to matters of foreign policy and what becomes foreign policy.
The constitution of Kenya for example says that the Cabinet, which is consisting of the
President (Chief Executive) and his ministers is collectively responsible to the national
assembly…….for all things done by or under the authority of the president, vice-president or
any other ministers in the execution of his office. The government’s job in other words is to
determine the national interests in particular, the circumstances that they need to promote and
that becomes foreign policy.
Specifically however, the conduct of foreign affairs is the prerogative of the Chief Executive, the
President of the Republic of Kenya. The independent government of Kenya therefore inherited
all the prerogative powers that the Queen of England could exercise in relation to Kenya in
1964 via Section 16 of the old Constitution of Kenya, Amendment Act No. 28 of that year. Even
under the new Constitution, the foreign affairs of Kenyan people is the prerogative of the chief
executive i.e. the president of the Republic of Kenya. The power to conduct foreign affairs is
thus part of the executive powers vested in the president.
In the foreign policy making process also, the government of the day has the exclusive authority
to manage the foreign affairs of the state subject to the laws made by and the control of the
parliament and needs the criticism of parliament as much or as little as it thinks fit. What this
means is that, the conduct of foreign policy in Kenya is exclusively the responsibility of the
Executive which is answerable to parliament. Parliament however can only seek explanations
from the governments about what it is doing and why. In addition, parliament as a
representative organ of the people can only urge and recommend to the executive to meet
certain obligations in its foreign policy making, but the executive is not under any compulsion to
respect such recommendations.
According to Kenya’s constitution also, the chief executive is the initiator, articulator and
director of foreign policy. This requirement however applies universally and not only to Kenya.
The president however does not usually make the foreign policies directly or alone but involves
different departments of the government and his friends together with those whom he trusts
hence foreign policies are not made by the person or the president, but in the office of the
president. According to Maria Nzomo (1981) for example, the locus of decision making in
general and foreign policy in particular did not reside in Kenyatta as a person but in the
elaborate power structure which had been built around him to perpetuate the myth of his
power and authority.
Kenyatta according to Nzomo did not personalize foreign policy making, but instead involved
people who were very close to him, and various departments of government. These people,
Nzomo calls “The Palace Advisors” and they included cabinet ministers, prominent public
servants, relatives and friends and most of them hailed from his ethnic community, The Kikuyu.
The group comprised of individuals who the president trusted and with whom he had direct
contact. This group usurped the role of the cabinet and performed the responsibilities of a
formal cabinet.
Throughout the 1960s therefore, the personalities who had the greatest influence in the foreign
policy of Kenya were:

Trusted Kikuyu ministers such as Njoroge Mungai, Mbiyu Koinange, Mwai Kibaki, James
Gichuru, Charles Njonjo and Julius Gikonyo Kiano.

Trusted non-Kikuyu ministers such as Daniel T. Arap Moi, Tom Mboya, Joseph Murumbi,
Oginga Odinga and Bruce McKenzie and

Trusted non-ministers such as Kariithi, the then head of public service and security to
the cabinet.
When Moi came to power in 1978 following President Kenyatta’s death, he became the main
actor in both foreign policy making process and its execution. According to Maria Nzomo
(1981), Moi seemed determined to put his personal mark on Kenya’s foreign policy. The
president, she wrote, was at the center-stage in foreign policy management and under his
regime, there was a shift to personal presidential diplomacy. Moi for example made a number
of visits to overseas countries since taking office. He visited countries in several continents such
as Asia, Western Europe, Africa and North America. The presidential diplomacy during this
period was geared towards Kenya’s national interests such as pursuit of economic growth and
promotion of regional peace and security (Okoth p.158). One of the major regional foreign
policy initiatives undertaken by the president upon coming to power was the mediation in the
Ugandan conflict between General Tito Okello and Yoweri K. Museveni in 1985.
According to P.G. Okoth (2010), there were a number of reasons why Moi agreed to mediate in
the Ugandan conflict and all of them were related to Kenya's national interests. First, there
were economic reasons. In its trading transactions with Uganda, Kenya had for a long time
enjoyed a favorable balance of trade. Kenya therefore wanted this to continue and this could
be realized if peace prevailed in Uganda.
Secondly, in undertaking to mediate in the conflict, Moi (and by extension, Kenya), wanted to
balance the power and influence Tanzania enjoyed in East Africa. Tanzania’s image had been
boosted by its involvement in conflict in other parts of Africa such as Mozambique, Namibia,
South Africa and Angola. Kenya therefore felt that it was being sidelined in the region (158)
hence, it wanted to correct the imbalance.
Third, Moi decided to mediate in the conflict because he wanted to correct the damage to
Kenya’s reputation in international circles. The most notable case is that of the country’s stand
on the issue of the Apartheid regime in South Africa. Kenya, like many other countries the
world over supported international sanctions imposed on South Africa by the international
community. However, Kenya allowed planes going to South Africa to stop and refuel in Nairobi
and Mombasa. This was in contravention of the resolutions passed by OAU. The Ugandan
mediation therefore provided Kenya with an opportunity to correct its image internationally.
These reasons explain why Moi undertook to mediate the Ugandan conflict.
Moi’s involvement in the foreign policy process in Kenya and outside underscores the fact that
the president was an important actor in the country’s foreign policy during the period under
consideration. During the 1st decade of Moi’s rule therefore, the president remained the
dominant actor in Kenya’s foreign policy as he personally conducted foreign policy on a number
of occasions. In most cases therefore, the way Kenya established relations with other countries
depended on Moi’s personal wishes.
In its foreign policy activities, it must be noted that the president also works with different
government departments and ministries to make policies and to ensure the implementation of
the same. Foreign affairs ministry is particularly core and has the responsibility to advice the
executive especially the president. The foreign affairs ministry’s responsibility is also the
execution ministry in consultation with the president. The ministry may for example defend and
articulate different policies and represent the president at various forums where foreign issues
are discussed and debated and a stand taken on issues although the ultimate prerogative and
privilege of initiating, directing and shaping foreign policy remains with the Chief Executive i.e.
The President.
Through foreign affairs ministry in conjunction with the approval of the president for example,
the government of Kenya is free to negotiate treaties and other relations with foreign nations,
subject only to the rule of incorporation into domestic law, where such incorporation is
necessary. Save in such cases of incorporation into domestic law, there are wide and important
areas in foreign affairs where the government is free of legal as opposed to political controls.
These includes the declaration of war, the dispatch of armed forces, the annexation of territory,
the conclusion of treaties, the accrediting and the reception of diplomats and the recognition of
new states and revolutionary governments. All such acts sometimes called “Acts of States” fall
within the scope of the prerogative to conduct foreign affairs and are assertions of state
sovereignty in International Relations.
The foreign affairs ministers who go on record to have played a prominent role during the
Kenyatta regime in foreign issues are Njoroge Mungai and Munyua Waiyaki. Njoroge was
appointed to the post in 1969 and was instrumental in the promotion of Kenya’s image in the
western press. The country was viewed as being moderate and pro-Western and this earned
plenty of foreign capital inflows by the end of the 1960s. Even though there may have been
other aspects, this image may also have contributed to the location of the United Nations
Environmental Programme (UNEP) secretariat in Nairobi, Kenya. This was the first time when
the headquarters of a major UN agency was located in Africa. It was also around this time
(1974) that Kenya was elected as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC).
When Munyua Waiyaki succeeded Mungai after the 1974 general elections in Kenya, his
approach was a complete departure from the previous conditions and moderate policy pursued
by his predecessor. Waiyaki’s policy was more radical. In April 1975 for example, at a special
OAU meeting on the future of Southern Africa, Waiyaki’s stance placed Kenya among the
radical African states which abhorred dialogue with South Africa. In August 1975 also, Waiyaki
showed the power that foreign affairs ministry can have in influencing foreign policy especially
when there is approval of the chief executive. In this year, Waiyaki recalled Kenya’s
ambassadors and high commissioners for a review of the country’s foreign policy. Even though
this is a bi-annual event, the fact that it happened at a time when some new trends of events
were emerging in international relations could be interpreted to mean that Waiyaki felt the
need to review the country’s foreign policy so as to keep abreast with the changing world
events.
The new circumstances that came up included the call by the less developed countries (LDCs)
for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), the energy crisis, the diminishing role and
presence of the USA in the Far East and the state of calmer relations (detente) that was
developed between the United States and the Soviet Union. Even though the review exercised
did not culminate in a radical foreign policy shift, it demonstrated that Waiyaki was determined
to see that Kenya’s role in international affairs was revitalized.
It also demonstrated a sense of independent mindedness in the articulation of foreign policy,
hence this is one case where a foreign minister acting through the power bestowed on him by
virtue of his office, made efforts to re-orientate the country’s foreign policy as he deemed
necessary. The other ministries known to influence Kenya’s foreign policy are External Affairs
ministry, ministry of trade, ministry of agriculture, communication e.t.c.
What is important to note however is that, despite the role that the ministry of foreign affairs
together with the above named play in influencing foreign policy and despite the significant
role played by significant individuals such as Waiyaki, the president remains the chief
prerogative of Kenya’s foreign policy. He is the chief initiator, articulator and director of foreign
policy at any forum or platform of his choice. The minister of foreign affairs, like any other
minister of state may defend or articulate such a policy and represent the president in various
forums where foreign policy issues are discussed and debated and a stand taken on issues, but
the ultimate prerogative and privilege of initiating, directing and shaping foreign policy remains
with His Excellency the President. The president especially has an upper hand also with the
Kenyan public of explaining what the next Kenyan foreign policy will be; he is more likely to be
listened to by the people because he is the officially countrywide elected fellow, nationwide
consensus is thus more likely to be achieved through the chief executive president.
What is to note further is that, the executive alone is placed to secure a national mandate for
the country’s foreign policy. This is because the executive, founded on an electoral mandate is
the organ which can claim to be responsible to a nation-wide electorate, which is capable of
basing policy upon the widest possible agreement or consensus in the nation, and above all,
which has its disposal the organization and information necessary for rational action amidst the
tremendous complexities of international politics. The ideas of foreign affairs ministry alone or
the statements made by the foreign minister without the approval of the chief executive can
easily backfire on the said minister. In a situation where the minister articulates foreign policy
that contradicts the president’s position for example, such a policy is likely to be frustrated. In
1965 for example, Mr. Murumbi, then Kenya’s foreign minister voted along with other foreign
ministers in favor of Kenya and all other African states cutting diplomatic ties with the United
Kingdom over the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Smith regime in Rhodesia. This
was done without consultation with Kenyatta and it also happened that it did not reflect the
president’s position. As a result, the foreign minister was compelled to retract his position.
In the same year, Murumbi also happened to address the UN General Assembly and accused
the United States of America of using Vietnam as a ground for testing newly made weapons and
also of being hypocritical when talking about peace while in practice it engaged in military
aggression which was a threat to international peace and security. The minister’s speech
contradicted an earlier one made by the head of state to diplomatic corps in Nairobi in which
he hailed the steps president Johnson had taken to bring the Vietnam question before the UN.
Minister Murumbi was then instructed by Kenyatta to call the then U.S Secretary of State, Dean
Rusk and make Kenya’s official stand clear.
What the above situations show is that, even though the president can delegate the foreign
policy making role to the foreign affairs minister and other senior government personalities, he
still has the final say over foreign policy. The above analysis however reveals that, the main
actor in Kenya’s foreign policy is the president and the other actors within the executive arm
are the office of the president composed of the cabinet ministers, high ranking government
officials, the president’s relatives and friends and more importantly, the minister of foreign
affairs.With the president’s approval or full participation for example, the executive arm can
make foreign policy decisions on behalf of the Kenyans. The government or the executive in
other words can perfectly and single-handedly determine the direction the policy of Kenya
takes. Kenyatta and Murumbi for example go on record for recognizing the People’s Republic of
China as the bearer of the seat at the United Nations Security Council and moved ahead to
establish cooperative relations with the USSR and her other allies.
The executive also has the discretion to act on foreign policy decision, implementation and
evaluation process, being believed to be a rational actor, and sometimes can act rationally, or
irrationally therefore changing or influencing otherwise the behavior Kenya’s foreign policy
might take.
THE LEGISLATURE INFLUENCE ON FOREIGN POLICY
The legislature is the law making arm of the government. It is a form of deliberative assembly
with the power to pass, amend and respect laws. The law created by the legislature is known as
the legislature or rather the statutory law. In the parliament form of government, the
legislature is considered supreme and appoints a member from its house as the prime minister
which acts the executive.
The legislature in a presidential system of government is considered a power branch is coequal
to independent of both the judiciary and the executive. In addition to enacting laws, the
legislature has got exclusive power to raise taxes and adopt the budget and other money bills.
The primary components of a legislature are one or more chamber or house assemblies that
debate and vote upon bills
The legislature also do play important role in the constitution dispensation to ensure better
foreign policies. The legislature also is the key organ in foreign policy formulation process, in
that it facilitates the formulation process of policy by allowing debates over the kind of policy to
be adopted by a country and by the minister of the foreign affairs in particular
In many countries also, it is the legislature that, the prescribes in modern days, the foreign
policy jurisdiction through carrying out various legislatures, constitutional amendments and at
time interpretation including the standing orders
The legislature also controls what becomes policy by having controls over the budgetary
allocation auditing of funds and though parliament debates.
Bugdetory: the legislature is the main arm responsible for the allocation of funds to various
departments including the foreign affairs ministry. The legal procedure is that all public
expenditure must be authorized by the legislature or its equivalence for example American
congress. Before authorization of the use of public funds, the legislature requires that a
proposal to be written by the executive on what he/she requires which comes in form of a
budget. The budget is thus used as a working document to facilitate debate on public
expenditure. In the debate therefore, the legislature can refuse to allocate funds for
implementing certain foreign policies.
Auditing of funds: The legislature also audit the funds. Once authority is given to utilize public
funds, it has to be utilized in the manner provided for by the same legislature i.e funds are
located for a specific function and before use it has to be sanctioned by a specific authority. In
auditing there is an appointed official in charge of investigating as to whether the expenditure
was in line with the objectives of the intended functions. Then he compiles a report of
expenditure and presents it to the legislature. The money allocated for specific activities can
thus not be diverted by the executive aim to implement foreign policies that are not supported
by the legislature and possibility the public.
Parliamentary Debates: Through parliamentary debates also, the legislature can question
certain policies that the executive wants to undertake. There are several occasions that can
bring about public debates. These occasions include: the presidential opening of the legislature
or parliament where his speech will contain public and even foreign policies.
Another occasion is the budget speech, which provides the services that the government
intends to undertake and its expenditure. Besides the speeches, a member of legislature can
also contribute on matters of public concerned foreign policy. This gives members an
opportunity to support or go against a foreign policy that the state is about to undertake.
THE JUDICIARY AS AN ACTOR
The judiciary also known as the judicial system or the judicature is the legal system of courts
which executes the law in the name of sovereign states. The judiciary also provides for
mechanism for the resolution of disputes. Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the
judiciary does not actually makes laws which is the responsibility of the legislature, neither does
it enforce law which is the responsibility justice is guaranteed to the people.
The judiciary also interprets the constitution of country and due to this, what might have easily
passed as foreign policy subject the judiciary interpretation might be barred especially if not
constitutionally recognized.
Many members of the united nation have for example ratified the UN convention against
corruption; the UN convention corruption contains an explicit reference to the important
relationship between judiciary independence and accountability. It stipulates that “bearing In
mind the independence of the judiciary and its crucial role in combating corruption, each state
party shall in accordance with the fundamental legal principles of its system and with prejudice
to judicial independence, take measures to strengthen integrity and prevent opportunity for
corruption among members of the judiciary. Such measures may include rules with respect to
the conduct of members of the judiciary
These UN conventions got to be interpreted by each country’s judiciary that ensures that they
become law. This means that to a large extent these interpretations can impact also on what
becomes that country’s foreign policy. As nation states relate with each other therefore they
must know how to fight these UN demands into their foreign policies
Sometimes also the nation states might try to make foreign policy that contradict the united
nation’s convention, when such dilemma occurs then it is the judiciary that is called upon to
solve the dilemma
The Kenya –Uganda relations
Kenya-Uganda relation goes back to the period of colonialism, after independence however the
two countries relations like most African countries relations have been marked by conflict and
cooperation. Domestically the two countries have been pre-occupied with issues pertaining to
national unity, national building the establishment and maintenance of viable economies,
political stability and peace. In other quest to achieve the above factors, however the two
countries relations have been characterisized by conflict and cooperation
The two countries relation are however the result of the following factors economic, political
geopolitics geographical, ideological and chaotic political environment in Uganda
Economic factor: Kenya –Uganda relation hinge strongly on economics. The economic factors
behind the two countries cooperation and conflictual include:
1) Ready markets: Uganda provides Kenya with ready market for its products. Uganda aim for a
long time however has been reduce, If not overcome its status of being the economic backyard
of Kenya. Economically both Uganda and Tanganyika had long complained about the regional
economic imbalance which was heavily weighted in Kenya’s favour following colonialism of the
three east African countries.
The British colonial policy had deliberately stunted industrial development in Uganda and
Tanganyika in order to develop Kenya as an east Africa’s industrial center. Kenya therefore
formed the periphery that linked Uganda and Tanganyika with metropolitan Europe and north
America (katete orwa 1989).the result was that by 1958 of 474 companies registered in east
Africa 404 were in Kenya .Uganda thus provided the market that Kenya need for sell most of its
products. That market promoted the cooperation Kenya –Uganda relation, although in other
occasions it made Uganda jealous, an attitude that promoted conflict
The Uganda market was also the result of the chaotic situation in the country. Before Obote
was overthrown Uganda was in good economic shape between 1960 and 1965 for example it
had the highest rate of growing of income per head in east Africa. This healthy economy
collapsed during Idi Amin’s regime. The gross mismanagement of Uganda economy was
however beneficial to Kenya .Kenya capitalized on that economy to run stupendous trade
balances against Uganda, in addition to using the economic weapon more frequently in order to
solve political problems between the two countries, Kenya especially was making so much
profit from Uganda that closing the border could not be done for a long time and would be
tantamount to killing the proverbial goose that was laying the golden egg
The collapse of Uganda vibrant economy did not happen overnight. It was the result of
extravagance and a series of blunders which Amin executed in spite of advice. By around 1974
the economy was so bad that the state marketing boarder could not pay promptly for cash
crops which led former to loss enthusiasm which in turn set motion a distinct slump in
agriculture product on which the state depended. By 1977, all key agro-based, manufacturing
and copper industries were producing far below expectations. By 1977 also tourism which in
1972 attracted 100000 visitors had no visitors at all. Even more marked was the reduction in
industrial output. The cumulative effect of this run down of Uganda economy was first the
emergence in random of spiraling inflation and a chronic shortage of consumer goods such that
during the 1979 OAU heads of states summit in Kampala, Uganda had to import from Kenya
such basic items as toilet paper, soap, dental cream dry cell batteries, shoe polish and even
razor blades because Uganda had stopped all significant export to Kenya while increasing its
import from that country, the two countries trade patterns made a dramatic shift in Kenya’s
favour. According to katete orwas( 1989)Uganda economy increasingly become hostage of
Kenya
Despite promoting cooperation with Uganda the need for market also created conflict between
the two countries, the shortage of consumer goods in Uganda engendered a flourishing black
market and stupendous smuggling of Uganda coffee by both Kenya and Uganda high official
.although Kenya does not grow Robusta coffee for example the available data on Kenya show
that country recorded the export of 16000 tons of Robusta coffee in by 1978.
The conflict between the two countries was also a result of the nationalization of many
companies in Uganda. Amin for example expelled the Asian in 1972 from Uganda, some of
whom were Kenyan nationality. Amin also nationalized several foreign companies which
included a Kenya enterprise, car and general. The other nationalized companies were
consolidated holdings limited which were also Kenyan and had majority shares. Uganda argus
news paper ltd and print pale Uganda limited .No amount of Kenya representation, however
highly placed could make amin reconsider his decision
Need for cooperation/merger: another factor that has contributed to the conflictual
cooperative relation between Kenya and Uganda is need for cooperation/merger. Even before
1962 and 1963 when Uganda and Kenya got their independence respectively, both countries
had already clashed over British attempts to merge them. As far as back 1899, the British
government had instructed sir harry Jonhson the special commission to Uganda to survey the
possibilities of federation. Again after World War 1 the undersecretary for colonies, L.S Amery
had pushed hard for the union of the two countries because of Uganda’s worry of possible
Kenyan dominance. both instances of efforts to merge the two countries failed.
There commissions were even formed to help explain why the two countries were at loggerheads. The commission were the ormsby,Gore commission of 1925,the Hilton young
commission of 1927. All the three commissions, concluded that although the settler community
in Kenya and the European constitutional association in Tanganyika were in favour of the
federation. the Africans in Kenya and Uganda were strongly opposed to the ideas Uganda was
particularly worried that the radical segregation so suspicion in Kenya could spill over as a result
of the union even the parliamentary select committee which Whitehall established could not
resolve the impasse
The main reason behind the impasse there was the fear in Uganda and Tanganyika that Kenya
might subsequently dominate them in the proposed merger part of the controversy hinged on
the fact that having grown at the expense of Uganda to a subordinate status for example in
1902 the entire eastern province of Uganda containing large chunks of the “white highlands
and extending to include lakes Naivasha, Elememtaita, Nakuru and Baringo had been transfer
to Kenya allegedly to centralize the administration of the Uganda railway.
In other areas also an amalgamation process involving several activities in both territories had
also started postal services (1909)defense(1902),custom(1917).postal and telegraph services
(1932)and a joint air services (1937). To top it up, Nairobi was being developed as east Africa’s
commercial and industrial center. The favours that Kenya was receiving on behalf of the other
two east African countries angered Uganda and even Tanzania. According to Okoth (2010), it
become clear to Uganda that the disequilibrium that had been built into the east African
economic system could not be merely glossed over by political totalism
Distribution of power/ resources: The need for cooperation was further affected by the
wrangling over the distribution of power and Kenya’s resources following the amount of
investment that the British made in Kenya. The conflict between the two countries started on
the issues of distribution of power and resources when finally the three east Africa countries
agreed to form the east African community. Before British had set the exact date for Kenya’s
independence, the three east Africa leaders namely Milton Obote, Julius Nyarere and Jomo
Kenyatta declared in Nairobi on June 5th 1963 that would federate the east Africa states by the
end of that year.
They set up a working party to draft the federal constitution and after meeting for only two
days it announced on every issues. Two months later one of its members, a Ugandan by the
name Mr Adoko --------- stated publicly that there was disagreement on the composition and
distribution of power in the proposed bi-cameral legislature on citizenship, control of foreign
affairs the civil services, the site of the federal capital, ministerial. Agriculture and residual
power that is just about everything that was agreed upon by the three leaders
In this struggle, Kenya and Tanzania wanted the center to hold more power than the
constituent units on the other hand, Uganda wanted a loose decentralized arrangement
because of the fear that as the smallest of the three countries it stood the greater risk of being
swamped by the others
Uganda selfishness also added salt to the wound of the three east Africa countries; Uganda was
in the best financial position. Additional its budget was balanced and its high standard of living
had already attracted an influence of Kenya immigration worker Uganda was apprehensive that
federation could actually unbalance its economy since the ‘spill-over effect so that would
allegedly accurate to it and Tanganyika were more imagined than real
The position of Kenya’s economy following the European investment in the country was also at
the continued contention, Uganda felt that Kenya had been favoured by the British. The two
countries complaints had earlier prompted commission under sir Jeremy Riesman to
recommend in 1961 the establishment of a distributable pool of revenue to be founded from “a
fixed percentage of customs and exercise duties and corate income taxes collected by each of
the countries which would supposedly allow some redistribution of income the offset in some
degree the benefits derived by Kenya from the common market
This proposition was however not fully accepted by Kenya, but in order to please its two
neighbours and the international community, the Kenyan leadership reluctantly accepted the
redistribution of its colonial investments to patch up matters. Obote, Nyerere and Kenyatta met
in Kampala –Uganda in April 1964 and again in Mbale 1965. They agreed that certain major
industries should be distributed within the three east Africa countries manufacturer of tyres,
radios, Lorries and tracks going to Tanzania. Bicycles and fertilizer went to Uganda while Kenya
retained light bulbs. secondly Uganda and Tanzania were permitted to place quotes on several
agreed Kenya products (beer, cigarettes, galvanized iron, shoes etc) to protect their nascent
industries (Roinchild(ed)1968)
Kenya dissatisfaction with the distribution of its investment was not hidden making the
euphoria that accompanied the signing of the Kampala-Mbale agreement to be short lived. First
Kenya was so bitter at the restriction on inter territorial trade implied in the agreements that it
refused to ratify them. In addition and contrary to the letter and spirit of the agreements it
announced plans to build its own tyre factory which prompted Tanzania to unilateral slap in
port restriction on 14 products of which Kenya manufactured ten. Even more serious,
psychologically the three countries made simultaneous decision in June 1965 to establish
separate national currencies by now the federation ideas had actually been abandoned
Despite the wrangles between the three countries the need for cooperation was not
completely abandoned. In order to prevent a total breakdown of the idea of common market
the three leaders (Obote, Nyerere, Kenyatta) set up another commission under Kield Philip to
suggest new meaningful avenues of economic cooperation. On the basis of in the report of the
commission , the three leaders signed the treaty of east African cooperation on June 6 th 1967,
whose main feature was the transformation into publics corporation of several services which
had hither to been concentrated in Nairobi
The headquarters were districted with Kenya retaining east Africa railway and east African
airways, Uganda came off with the east Africa posts and telecommunication and the east
African development bank while Tanzania took the community headquarter and secretariat and
the east African harbor corporation. In addition Uganda and Tanzania were permitted to apply
a pre-determinant transfer tax on certain Kenya goods to encourage location of new industries
in these countries. Despite the establishment of east African community treaty however, the
community benefits continued to be disproportionately shared, Kenya was still accumulating
large trade balance against Uganda and Tanzania making the conflict to continue.
From the beginning therefore, Kenya knew that treaty would breed problems hence when the
provisions of the treaty seemed to conflict with Kenya’s development objectives they were
violated altogether by 1970 therefore relations between Kenya and Uganda had cooled
considerably.
Uganda territorial claims on Kenya: This is another factor that here contributed to the
conflictual relation between Kenya and Uganda. In the year 1975 the conflictual relation
between Kenya and Uganda were strongly brewing over Idi Amin’s claim on Kenya territory. In
that year Kenya press continued its relentless attack on Idi Amin. To get out of this difficult
Amin decision on a confrontation with Kenya. In February 1976, Amin pointed out in
deliberately proactive radio broadcast to that large tract of land in Kenya form western Kenya
to rift valley and loudly wondering whether people living in that region would want to remain
part of Kenya, a statement that made Kenya’s president Mzee Jomo Kenyatta very angry.
Kenyans were so alarmed that they closed the border on February 23rd stopped the handling
and transporting of Uganda goods and gave Amin 48 hours to apologize. to the Kenyan people’s
surprise Amin relented almost immediately and urgently sought for normalization of relations
with Kenya. Even more surprising, Kenya quickly reopened the border on February 30th and
ended the boycott on March 3rd. according to Okoth Kenya’s guide to respond to reopen the
border was influenced by the amount of profit the country was making out of Uganda and
closing of the border was tantamount to killing the proverbial goose that laying the golden egg.
Migingo: more territorial claims by the Uganda government have been over the Kenya island of
Migingo. The controversy over the ownership of this island came to the fore no march 2009.
Both Kenya and Uganda claimed the rocky island of no more than a hectare. There were
reckless talks especially by politician both in Kenya and Uganda which amounted to a call for
war between the two countries over the ownership of the Migingo Island. The demands made
by some Kenyan politician include the mobilization of the Kenya navy to take over the island
and defend it from Uganda invasion.
Various factors explain the Uganda claim over Migingo. According to P.G okoth (2010), Migingo
is not a mere rock, wealth abounds around it in the form of fish. It is therefore clear that control
of this bounty is at the heart of the international exchange of verbal artillery. Moreover, in case
of confrontation , the island itself can serve as Gibrator has done for Spain and England
providing exceedingly handy as landing place a place for loading , unloading and reloading
combatants as the war progresses if in case it broke out
President Museveni angered the Kenya mps when in an interview with the British Broadcasing
Corporation (BBC), made a reference to “mad jaluos” and appeared to concede that whereas
the island might be in Kenya the surrounding waters were in Uganda.
Despite the conflict, Kenya leadership quickly worked on improving the relation with Uganda
and verse versa. The east Africa community is important to the two countries, making both
Kenya and Uganda to be able to gain more from united region than picking unreasonable fight
in the name of protecting territorial integrity. According to Okoth Kenya and Uganda realized
that the Migingo dispute would be too costly for both Kenya and Uganda.
CHAOTIC POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IN UGANDA
Despite the conflict characterizes Kenya Uganda relation especially on the issue of economic
cooperation. Things improved when Idi Amin took power in Uganda. According to P.G Okoth
(2010) while Tanzania had refused to recognize Amin’s regime and chose to give asylum to
obote habour train and arm anti-Amin rebels, Kenya kept clear of the quarrel claiming that it
recognized states and not governments
Kenya and Uganda, thus had a good start when general idi Amin came to power. Through Kenya
therefore Amin got regional recognition he coveted so much and the Kenyans got Obote off
their mind given the nature of conflict that characterized the two countries’ relation when
Obote was Uganda’s president for about two years therefore after Amin took the leadership of
Uganda the two countries had cordial relations.
The temporary warm relation between Kenya and Uganda were however the result of the
following factors
(1) Uganda vulnerability: Uganda was conscious of the vulnerability to a possible blockage
by Kenya if Uganda tried to antagonize Kenya
(2) Kenya realized that it was also depending on Uganda as Uganda provide a vital outlet for
Kenya export and ______.in 1971 for example Kenya exported kshs 19.1 million worth
of goods to Uganda compared with kshs 78.8 million to extra east African markets (D.W
Nadudere(1981)
(3) For a long time also Kenya had been dependent on Uganda for one third of its total
electricity power consumption. In the year 1970 for example available data on Kenya
shows that out of total consumption of 760.163.00 kwh of electricity 512943 kwh were
domestically generated and 220,000 kwh were imported from Uganda(Kenya economic
survey 1971 pg 166)
(4) For more than two years after Amin coup, there were at least 100,000 Kenya migrants’
workers predominantly of the luo origin in Uganda. These workers could either expelled
or held hostage in event of a serious conflict with Kenya. According to Samuel Makinda
the dependence between Kenya and Uganda was complementary, the two countries
needed each other especially in terms of economic development
Tension between Kenya and Uganda following the chaos in Uganda first surfaced in 1973
after the security situation broke down. The tension was brought about by
(1) The disappearance of Kenyans in uganda
(2) Expulsion of Kenya immigrants from Uganda
(3) Nationalization of Kenya related companies/industries
Several Kenyan employees of the east Africa community had disappeared. Amin response to
the concern in Nairobi was to accuse the luos in Uganda of colluding with Obote to
destabilize Uganda almost of the same time, Uganda foreign minister Wanume Kibedi flew
to Kenya with a special message for president Kenyatta and Amin met luo representatives in
Kampala to assure them of their safety. After the diplomatic visit and exchange the two
countries relations become cozy again
Following the humiliation Amin suffered following his territorial claims on Kenya’s land
deliberates harassment of Kenyans started culminating in the death of a Kenyan student at
Makerere University. The following month Uganda troops killed 5 Kenyans at Kapenguria,
inside Kenya and escaped back to Uganda with herd of cattle. More seriously in may two
Ugandan helicopters carrying 17 solders landed inside Kenya, the pilot claiming they had
run out of fuel. The Kenya became suspicious, particularly after a military spokesman in
Kampala said that the real reason was bad weather. After this a services of accusation led to
readily rising tempers until June when a Uganda police post at the border was attacked
probably as Kenya said by cattle rustlers. The military convinced otherwise and they
announced that henceforth Uganda troops had been instructed to destroy complexly any
aggression from Kenya.
Expulsion of Kenya migrants: the security situation in Uganda continued to worsen to the
extent that , by 1975 thousand of Ugandan had on ready fled into exile, including Wanume
Kibedi himself and the minister for finance Emmanuel Wakweya. Obote however, annoyed
the Kenyan leadership by scuttling the federation talks in 1963, expelling thousand of Kenya
migrant workers in Uganda in 1966 and 1970. The president of Uganda also nationalized
several companies, some of which were Kenyan based in his socialist drive of 1969 -1970 or
what is commonly referred to as the common man’s charter. It is hardly surprising therefore
that Idi Amin’s coup of January 25th 1971 as received in Kenya and Kenyan government
preventing Obote from getting back into Uganda from Singapore, to recognize his troops for
a counter- coup
The Entebbe raid by Israelis: the conflictual between Kenya and Uganda was also worsen by
Uganda’s accusation that Kenya had given support to the Israelis’ who raided Entebbe.
Amin suspected Kenya of complicity with the Israelis’. The fact that fuel and medical
facilities where readily available for the Israelis in Kenya at Embakasi airport made the
Kenyan protestation of innocence highly suspicious. Uganda immediately action was to
accuse Kenya of conspiracy at the united nation and the organization of African unity
(OAU)and to mobilize and ring the alarm bells in Washington D.C. whining days Libya and
Somalia announced that they would support Uganda in case of attack. In response, the
United States of America sent a frigate to Mombasa ordered six of the 7 th fleet battleships
into the Indian Ocean and provide at least reconnaissance a substantial contingent of arms
to Kenya. By the late 1970’s therefore the conflict between Kenya and Uganda had been
internationalized
Blockades: To Kenya’s surprise, without a warning, Amin sent a telegram to Kenyatta on
July 21st asking for normalization of relations. This call was due to the fact that Kenya had
affected the blockade and road links with Uganda had been cut and supplies especially of
fuel could not get through Uganda’s transport system was dislocated to the extent that it
was promoted to seize 30 oil tanks in transit to Rwanda Zaire and Sudan.
Although the OAU intervened and secretary general Mr. William Etelsi took personal charge
of the mediation efforts, Kenya set even stiff conditions which Uganda had to satisfy,
including payment in cash for all products and purchased from Kenya, early in august,
Uganda signed” a memorandum of understanding “in Nairobi virtually accepted all of the
Kenyan demands and condition for doing business with Uganda
Sales of weapon: more conflict between Kenya and Uganda was triggered by the weapon
sold to Uganda by the Soviet Union. In September 1975, Uganda signed a new agreement
with the USSR for the purchase of wide range of military hardware and some long-range
military aircrafts prompting Kenya to express concern to the Soviet Union’s embassy in
Nairobi. When in October 1975, Uganda commissioned two new squadrons of soviet
supplies mig-17s and mig 21s fighter aircrafts, Kenya panicked and requested to United
States to urgently supply it with jet fighter and interceptors. President jimmy carter agreed
and announced in Washington D.C in March, that the USA would provide Kenya with f-s
fighter aircrafts and because the USSR had supplied arms to other African countries a
regional arms race which had started several years, now went into top gear.
Amin’s overthrown: the relationship between Kenya and Uganda however improved when
Idi Amin was overthrown. Even though Kenya had managed to have both cooperative and
conflictual relations with Uganda under Idi AMin’s rule, Okoth notes that things changed
immediately Anim was overthrown. On the very day Tanzania captured Kampala on April
11th 1979 ---------- vessel “a stor” carrying 10 Soviets tanks and 150 tons of ammunitions
destined for Kampala was blocked. Kenya refused the consignment to proceed claiming that
it was strictly observed the international law of neutrality. The “stor” then proceeded to
Durban where the South African government confiscated the cargo.
This bold steps that Kenya made after Idi Amin, made it to start well with Y.K Lule’s
government. Shortly after becoming the prime minister the Lule’s government Oteno
Alimadi traveled to Nairobi for talks on reviving the bilateral relations. Kenya responded
favorably by providing Uganda with generous economic assistance and by accepting to
extradite several fugitives of Amin’s government wanted in Uganda. This new accord from
Nairobi was based on the assumption that lule and many of his cabinet ministers were antiTanzanian socialism and anti Obote. Two months later however lule was toppled and
replaced by Godfrey Bineisa, whose government was not so welcomed by Nairobi bringing
about a sharp exchange between Kampala and Nairobi, after when using the pretox of an
armed robbery in Nairobi suburb, Kenya rounded up 4000 Ugandans and dumped them at
the border.
Tension between Kenya and Uganda build further leading to a temporary closure of the
border in October 1979. Buneisa did not last long either he was overthrown by pro-Obote
government led by Paul Muwanga. Conflict rose between Kenya and Uganda government
with Muwanga claiming that Kenya was secretly training some Uganda in guerrilla warfare.
This prompted Kenya to close its border holding up Uganda bond Vail tanker and preventing
Uganda coffee from crossing into Kenya
When Museveni come to power, his regime was at first hostile Kenya. The two governments
started on December 10th 1987 with armed shooting at Busia. Addressing diplomats and
journalist at the state house –Entebe over the Uganda /Kenya border violence, Museveni
warned that Uganda would take appropriate measures if Kenyan security force did not stop
firing at Ugandan troops, civilians and territory
On Moi’s part, he accused Uganda of “interfering in Kenya’s internal affairs. He also alleged
that 20000 so Kenyan children had been taken to Libya for military training through Uganda
where they were issued with passports. Moi further claimed that Uganda was engaging in
destabilizing Kenya and concluded by calling the Kenyan people to be ready to fight the
enemy. The tense border situation had fuel rationing in Uganda, to Kenya sealing off its
border and to food shortage on both sides of the border. It was not until the two presidents
went on December 28th at Malaba that the conflict was resolved with the launch of the east
African community. However Kenya-Uganda relations improved until Uganda claim on
Migingo in 2009.
Geopolitics/geographical location: Geopolitical location of Kenya and Uganda also
influenced the nature of their relations. Due to the fact that Uganda is landlocked and
therefore has to depend on Kenya for its international trade out, let Kenya had for a long
time taken advantage of this to constantly threaten Uganda with economic blockade.
Uganda has thus attempted to find an alternative outlet, but with difficult. Even if Uganda
was to find a paramount alternative root, Kenya would not be happy because this would
mean losing a substantial amount of charge on the handling and transportation of Uganda
goods. Kenya thus closes its border conflict only if its security is seriously compromised.
Even during the chaotic years in Uganda, Kenya hardly closed the border and when it did it
never lasted long. Most of Kenya’s goods to the rest of eastern region, Rwanda, Burundi and
even to central Africa mostly pass through Uganda. Hence even Kenya cannot afford to lose
trade in those regions. The conflicts thus, worsen when each of the countries tries to close
the border, but at time the threat to close also improves the two countries relations.
Ideological differences: another factor that explains the conflict relations between Kenya
and Uganda is ideology. The late 1960s saw increasing ideological rift between Kenya and
Uganda and also with Tanzania. The same period also witnessed leftist developments in
Somalia and Sudan. This ideological change in eastern Africa convinced the Kenyan
leadership that the Kenyan state was in constant danger of socialist encroachment. Because
Kenya and Tanzania had for a long time been competitors for regional dominance, the
coming closer of Uganda and Tanzania often displeased Kenya in two major ways
(1) In Kenya’s eyes this would complete the so called east African “socialist circuit”
(2) Such a development has both economic and military implications which would tilt east
African balance of power in favour of Tanzania
This explains the constant alarm I Nairobi whenever Uganda and Tanzania appeared to be
moving closer to each other especially under Obote and Nyarere’s leadership.with the end
of cold war and the changes that have taken place in Tanzania (both of Nyerere turn to the
capitalist system) however ideological differences between Kenya and Uganda and even
Tanzania no longer exists and hence not key in determining the nature of the two countries’
relations