華東師範大學 教育管理學系
教育管理与教育治理的实践基础 工作坊
第五、六講
權力：教育管理与治理的实践基础（二）
Power: Practical Foundation of
Educational Management & Governance (2)
1
Max Weber’s Definitions of Power:
The Origin of the Inquiry
 Max Weber’s formal definition of power
"In general, we understand by 'power' the chance of
a man or of a number of men to realize their own will
in a communal action even against the resistance of
others who are participating in the action" (Weber,
1948, p.180)
 The constituents of the concept of power
A and B in interaction
A’s will
B acts in compliance with A’s will even it is
against B’s own will
2
3
Formal Definition of Power
Actor B
Actor A
Realization of A’s will
Against B’s
4
Different Perspectives of Power
Robert Dahl’s behavioralistic and
pluralistic definition of power
Dahl’s definition of power:
"A has power over B to the extent that he can
get B to do something B would not otherwise
do" (Dahl, 1957, p. 203)
The analogy of billiard ball and example of traffic
policeman
Dahl’s conception of political community as
polyarchy and pluralism
5
Different Perspectives of Power
Denis Wrong’s conception of power of
intention
Wrong defines power as “the capacity of
some persons to produce intended and
foreseen effects on others.” (Wrong,
1979, p.2)
Additional constituents Wrong inserted
in the concept of power
Intentionality in power
Effectiveness of power
6
Different Perspectives of Power
Denis Wrong’s conception of power of
intention
Wrong’s distinction between intended and
unintended influences
Dominant and overprotective mother does not
intend to feminize the character of her son
A boss does not mean to plunge an employee
into despair by greeting him somewhat
distractedly
A woman does not mean to arouse a man’s
sexual interest by paying polite attention to his
conversation in a cocktail party
7
Different Perspectives of Power
Bachrach & Baratz’s thesis on Two
Faces of Power (1962)
Criticism on Dahl pluralistic decision –making
thesis
Distinction between power of decision making
and “non-decision making”
A non-decision making situation refers to "A devotes
his energies to creating or reinforcing social and
political process to public consideration of only those
issues which are comparatively innocuous to A.” In
this way, they suggest, B is hindered in raising issues
which may be detrimental to A’s preferences. (Clegg,
1989, p. 76)
8
Different Perspectives of Power
Bachrach & Baratz’s thesis on Two
Faces of Power (1962)
Mechanism of non-decision making in
organization
Mobilization of bias and non-issue
Rule of Anticipated reaction
Negative decision-making
9
Potential cause for B to formulate a grievance
Not formulated
Mobilization
of bias
Formulated
Not articulated
Articulated
Anticipated
reaction
Not resolved
Negative
Decision-making
Resolved
Decision
Refused Accepted
10
Different Perspectives of Power
 Steven Lukes defines “the concept of power by
saying that A exercises power over B when A
affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests.” In
this definition “the notion of interests” is given a
significant and evaluative position. (Lukes, 2005, p.
37) Accordingly Lukes differentiates power into
three dimensions.
11
Different Perspectives of Power
 Lukes’ three dimensions of power and the radical
approach
1st dimension of power: It involves "a focus on behaviour
in the making of decisions on issues over which there is
an observable conflict of interest, seen as express policy
preferences, revealed by political participation" (Lukes,
2005, p.19). This dimension of power assumes a liberal
ontological position, which "takes man as they are and
applies want-regarding principles to them, relating their
interests to what they actually want or prefer, to their
policy preferences as manifested by their political
participation." (2005, p.37)
12
Different Perspectives of Power
 Lukes’ three dimensions of power and the radical
approach
2nd dimension of power: It involves "consideration of the
ways in which decisions are prevented from being taken
on potential issues over which there is an observable
conflict of interests, seen as express policy preferences
and sub-political grievances." (p. 25) This dimension of
power assumes a reformist ontological position in "seeing
and deploring that not all men's wants are given equal
weight by the political system, also relates their interest to
what they want or prefer, but allows that this may be
revealed in more indirect and sub-political ways – in the
form of deflected, submerged or concealed wants and
preferences." (p.37)
13
Different Perspectives of Power
Lukes’ three dimensions of power and
the radical approach
3rd dimension of power: It assumes a radical ontological
position, in which people in subordination and their real
interest hampered or “may not express or even be
conscious of their interest.” (p. 28) That is because
“people's wants may themselves be a product of a system
which works against their interests, and in such cases,
relates the latter to what they would want and prefer, were
they able to make the choice." (p. 37) Hence, this
dimension of power set out to theorize and evaluate actual
behavior by revealing models of what people would do if
they knew what their real interests were.
14
Different Perspectives of Power
 Debates on Lukes' three-dimensional conception of
power
Debate on the notion of real interest
Bradshaw suggests that Lukes has confused “choices of
preferences of autonomous individuals with 'real
interests'” (1976, quoted in Clegg, 1989, p.94). It is
difficult to distinctively differentiate the two, especially in
cases of substantiating individual’s autonomous choice
is not of her “real interest” or her non-preference is of her
“real interest”.
Wall's example of heroin addicts’ choice to continue
taking the drug (1975, quoted, Clegg, 1989, p.95) or
smokers, etc.
15
Different Perspectives of Power
 Debates on Lukes' three-dimensional conception of
power
Ted Benton’s criticism on Luke’s conception of the
unconscious real interest of the dominated
Benton queries that “the judgment as to which class of
wants, preferences, choices, etc. do constitute the
interests of an actor who is subjects to an exercise of
power has to be made by the external observer, or
analyst on behalf of the actor. The judgment that has to
be made is how the actor would feel or behave under
conditions which do not now hold, and may be never
have, nor ever will hold. No matter how well-intentioned
the observer, this is still other-ascription of interest and
not self-ascription.” (1981, p. 167)
16
Different Perspectives of Power
Ted Benton’s criticism on Luke’s conception of the
unconscious real interest of the dominated
Benton's concept of paradox of emancipation
“In its simplest form this is the problem of how to
reconcile a conception of socialist practice as a form of
collective self-emancipation with a critique of the
established order which holds that the consciousness of
those from whom collective self-emancipation is to be
expected is systematically manipulated, distorted and
falsified by essential features of the order. If the autonomy
of subordinate groups (classes) is to be respected then
emancipation is out of the question; whereas if
emancipation is to be brought about, it cannot be selfemancipation. I shall refer to this problem as the ‘paradox
of emancipation’.” (Benton 1981, p.162)
17
Different Perspectives of Power
 Debates on Lukes' three-dimensional conception of
power
Gaventa’s mechanism of the 3rd dimension of power
Apathy or fatalism
Underdevelopemnt of political consciousness
Political consciousness having been disorganized
chronically and/or systemically
18
Summary of conceptions of Power
A
B
Max Weber
A’s will prevails over B’s
Robert Dahl
A makes B to do something
Denis Wong
A’s intended influence on B
Bachrach & Baratz
Steven Lukes
A hinders B from voicing her grievance
B’s real interest is sacrificed in effect of A’s
coercions or influence
19
Foucault’s Studies of Power
(1926-1984)
20
Foucault’s Studies of Power
 Foucault’s conception of power
“Power must be understood in the first instance (1) as the
multiplicity of force relations immanent in sphere in which they
operate and which constitute their own organization; (2) as the
process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations,
transforms, strengthens, or reverse them; (3) as the support
which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a
chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and
contradictions which isolate them form one another; and lastly,
(4) as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general
design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state
apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social
hegemonies.” (1978/90, Pp. 92-93)
Technology of Power
21
Foucault’s Studies of Power
 The “general theme” of Foucault’s studies of power:
The subject
“I would like to say, first of all, what has been the goal of
my work during the last twenty years. It has not been to
analyze the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the
foundations of such an analysis. My objective, instead,
has been to create a history of the different mode by
which, in our culture, human being are made subjects...
Thus it is not power, but the subject, which is the
general them of my research.” (1982, 208-209)
22
23
Foucault’s Studies of Power
 The “general theme” of Foucault’s studies of power:
The subject
“My work has dealt with three modes of objectification
which transform human being into subjects.” (1982, p. 208)
“The first of the modes of inquiry which try to give
themselves the status of sciences for example,
• the objectification of the speaking subject in grammaire
generale, philology and linguistics;....
• the objectification of the productive subject, the subject who
labors, in the analysis of wealth and economics;.....
• the objectification of the sheer fact of being alive in natural
history and biology.” (p. 208)
(The most representative work is The Order of Things: An
Archaeology of Human Sciences, 1966)
24
Foucault’s Studies of Power
25
Foucault’s Studies of Power
 The “general theme” of Foucault’s studies of power:
The subject
“My work has dealt with three modes of objectification
which transform human being into subjects.” (1982, p.
208)
“In the second part of my work, I have studied the
objectivizing of the subject in what I shall call ‘dividing
practices’. ...Examples are the mad and the sane, the sick
and the healthy, the criminals and the ‘good boys.” (p.
208)
(The representative works are Madness and civilization: A
History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, 1961; The Birth
of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perspective,
1963; Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 1975)
26
Foucault’s Studies of Power
27
Foucault’s Studies of Power
 The “general theme” of Foucault’s studies of power:
The subject
“My work has dealt with three modes of objectification
which transform human being into subjects.” (1982, p. 208)
“Finally, I have sought to study...the way a human being
turns him or herself into a subject. ...I have chosen the
domain of sexuality - how men have learn to recognize
themselves as subjects of ‘sexuality’.” (p. 208)
(History of Sexuality, vol. 1-3, 1982-1-84 are of course the
representative works)
28
Foucault’s Studies of Power
29
Foucault’s Studies of Power
 Foucault’s typology of power: In Foucault’s studies
of power, four conceptions of power may be found:
Disciplinary power
Biopower
Pastoral power
Sovereign power
30
Foucault’s Studies of Power
 Disciplinary Power: Technology of the body and
power (Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison,
1977/75)
The project of docility: “In every society, the body was
in the grip of very strict power, which imposed on it
constraints, prohibition or obligations.”
“Docility …joins the analyzable body (intelligible body)
with the manipulatable body (useful body).” (1979/75,
p. 136)
31
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Disciplinary Power:
Disciplinary power as techniques on “manipulatable and
useful body”: Foucault has specified a list of techniques
of disciplinary power, “which made possible the
meticulous control of the operations of body, which
assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed
upon then a relation of docility-utility.” (1979/75, p. 137)
32
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Disciplinary Power:
Disciplinary power as techniques on “manipulatable
and useful body”: They include
The art of distributions
The control of activity
The organization of geneses
Composition of forces
“To sum up, it might be said that discipline creates out of
the bodies it controls four types of individuality: …it is
cellular (by the play of spatial distribution), it is organic
(by the coding of activities), it is genetic (by the
accumulation of time), it is combinatory (by the
composition of forces).” (Foucault, 1977, p.167)
33
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Disciplinary Power:
Disciplinary power as training on analyzable and
intelligible body
“The chief function of disciplinary power is to
‘train’. …Instead of bending all its subjects into a
single uniform mass, it separates, analyses,
differentiates, carries its procedures of decomposition
to the point of necessary and sufficient single units. It
‘trains’ the moving, confused, useless multitude of
bodies and forces into a multiplicity of individual
elements ─ small, separate cells, organic autonomies,
genetic identities and continuities, combinatory
segments. Discipline ‘makes’ individuals.” (Foucault,
1977, p.170)
34
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Disciplinary Power:
Disciplinary power as training on analyzable and
intelligible body
“The success of disciplinary power derives …from the
use of simple instruments: (1) hierarchical observation;
(2) normalizing judgement and their combination in a
procedure that is specific to it, (3) examination.”
(Foucault, 1977, p.170; my numbering)
35
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Disciplinary Power:
Disciplinary power in the Panoptic on: The self-surveillant body
“Bentham's Panopticon is the architectural figure ….. We know the
principle on which is was based: at the periphery, an annular
building; at the centre, a tower; this tower is pierced with wide
windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; peripheric
building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width
of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside,
corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on the outside,
allows the light to cross the cell from one end to the other. All that is
needed, then is to place a supervisor in the central tower and to shut
up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man a worker or a
schoolboys. By the effect of blacklighting, one can observe from the
tower, standing out precisely against the light, the small captive
showers in the cells of the periphery. …. Visibility is a trap."
(Foucault, 1977, p. 200)
36
37
38
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Disciplinary Power:
Disciplinary power in the Panoptic on: The self-surveillant
body
“The major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a
state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the
automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the
surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is
discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power should
tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that is
architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and
sustaining a power relation independent of the person who
exercises it; in short, that the inmate should be caught up in a
power situation of which they are themselves the bearers.” (, p.
201)
Distinction between A and B practically vanished
39
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Biopower: Power/Knowledge on Life (History of
Sexuality, Vol. 1, 1978/76)
The institutionalization of biopower
• "Starting in the seventeenth century, this power over
life involved in two basic forms:
– One of these poles …centered on the body as a
machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its
capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel
increase of its usefulness and its docility, its
integration into systems of efficient and economic
controls, all this was ensured by the procedures of
power that characterized the disciplines: an anatomopolitics of the human body.
40
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Biopower:
The institutionalization of biopower
• "Starting in the seventeenth century, this power over
life involved in two basic forms:…
– The second, somewhat later, focused on the species
body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and
serving as the basis of the biological processes:
propagation, birth and mortality, the level of health, life
expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that
can cause these to vary. Their supervision was effected
through an entire series of interventions and regulatory
controls: a bio-politics of the population." (Foucault,
1978, p.139)
41
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Biopower:
The institutionalization of biopower
 "During the classical period (i.e. 17th century)…there
was the emergence in the field of political practices and
economic observation, of the problems of birthrate,
longevity, public health, housing, and migration. Hence,
there was an explosion of numerous and diverse
techniques for subjugation of bodies and the control of
populations, marking the beginning of an era of
'biopower'". (Foucault, 1978, p. 140)
42
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Biopower:
The institutionalization of biopower
The concept of biopower: "Power would no longer be dealing
simply with legal subjects over whom the ultimate
domination was death, but with living beings, and the
mastery it would be able to exercise over them would have to
be applied at the level of life itself; it was the taking charge of
life, more than the threat of death, that gave power its access
even to the body. If one can apply the term bio-history to the
pressure through which the movement of life and the
processes of history interfere with one another, one would
have to speak of bio-power to designate what brought life
and its mechanism into the realm of explicit calculations and
made knowledge/power an agent of transformation of human
life." (Foucault, 1978, p. 142-433, original italic)
43
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Biopower:
The constitution of sexuality and the power/knowledge
on life
Sex become a political issue and subject to power: It is
within the historical context of the institutionalization of
biopower, it "enable us to understand the importance
assumed by sex as a political issue." (Foucault, 1978, p.145)
That is because "sex was a means of access both to life of
the body and the life of the species." (Foucault, 1978, p. 146)
"At the juncture of the 'body' and the 'population', sex
became a crucial target of a power organized around the
management of life rather that the menace of death."
(Foucault, 1978, p.147)
44
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Biopower:
The constitution of sexuality and the power/knowledge
on life
The constitution of sexuality: "Through the themes of
health, progeny, race, the future of the species, the vitality
of the social body, power spoke of sexuality and to sexuality;
the latter was not a mark or a symbol, it is an object and a
target." (Foucault, 1978, p. 147) As a result, sexuality has
gradually developed into the norm, knowledge, life, meaning,
the disciplines and the regulations." (Foucault, 1978, p. 148)
It is in this conjunction of power and knowledge (i.e.
power/knowledge) that sexuality can be understood as "the
correlative of that slowly developed discursive practice
which constitutes the scientia sexualis." (Foucault, 1978,
p.68)
45
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Pastoral power: From confessional to modern-state
apparatuses
“Since the Middle Ages at least, Western societies have
established the confession as one of the main ritual we rely
on for the production of truth, …with the resulting
development of confessional techniques. …The confession
became one of the West’s most highly valued techniques for
producing truth. …Western man has become a
confessing animal.” (Foucault, 1978, p. 58-59)
46
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Pastoral power:
“The confession is a ritual of discourse in which the speaking
subject is also the subject of the statement; it is also a ritual that
unfold within a power relationship, for one does not confess
without the presence (or virtual presence) of a partner who is not
simply the interlocutor but the authority who requires the
confession, prescribe and appreciates it, and intervenes in order to
judge, punish, forgive, console, and reconcile. … By virtue of the
power structure immanent in it, the confessional discourse cannot
come from above, …through the sovereign will of a master, but
rather from below, as obligatory act of speech which under some
imperious compulsion, break the bonds of discretion or
forgetfulness. … The agency of domination does not reside in the
one speak, but in the one who listens and says nothing, not in the
one who knows and answers, but in the one who questions and is
not supposed to know.” (Foucault, 1978, 61-62)
47
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Pastoral power:
The concept of pastoral power: Confessional
discourse as part of the institution of Christianity, it
has espoused "a very special form of power", which
Foucault called "pastoral power."
48
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Pastoral power:
The concept of pastoral power: It is made up of the
following features. (Foucault, 1982, P. 214)
"It is a form of power whose ultimate aim is to assure
individual salvation in the next world."
"Pastoral power is not merely a form of power which
commands; it must also be prepared to sacrifice itself for the
life and salvation of the flock."
"It is a form of power which does not look after just the
whole community, but each individual in particular, during
his entire life."
Finally, this form of power cannot be exercised without
knowing the inside of people's mind, without exploring their
souls, without making them reveal their innermost secrets. It
49
implies a knowledge of the individual himself."
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Pastoral power:
Two aspect of pastoral power:
The ecclesiastical institutionalization aspect: This aspect
of pastoral power, according to Foucault's analysis, "has
ceased or at least lost its vitality since the eighteenth
century." (Foucault, 1982, p. 214)
The functional aspect: Foucault contends that the
function of pastoral power, has spread and multiplied
outside the ecclesiastical institution." Foucault underlines
that it is the state, which has become "a new form of
pastoral power." (Foucault, 1982, p. 215)
50
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Pastoral power:
Institutionalization of pastoral power in the modern state: Since
the eighteenth century, functions of pastoral power have
gradually been transferred from the Church to the state.
Therefore, "we can see the state as a modern matrix of
indiviudalization, or a new form of pastoral power.” (1982, p. 215)
In the context of this new form of pastoral power of the state,
"the word salvation takes on different meanings, health, wellbeing (that is, sufficient wealth, standard of living), security,
protection against accident. A series of 'worldly' aims took the
place of the religious aims of the traditional pastorate."
(Foucault, 1982, p. 215) As in the state project of establishment
of mass education for all its future citizens, it can be construed
as a new form of salvation to literacy, civil army and productive
labor force.
51
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Pastoral power:
Institutionalization of pastoral power in the modern state:
"Concurrently the officials of pastoral power increased. Some
times this form of power was exerted by state apparatus or, in
any case, by a public institution such as the police." (Foucault,
1982, p. 215) In the case of education, it is evidenced in the
development of public schooling systems and implementation of
compulsory education policy in European countries in the
eighteenth to nineteenth centuries.
52
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Pastoral power:
Institutionalization of pastoral power in the modern state:
"Finally, the multiplication of the aims and agents of pastoral
power focused the development of knowledge of man around two
roles: one, globalizing and quantitative, concerning the population;
the other, analytical, concerning the individual." (Foucault, 1982, p.
215) The establishment of the knowledge and field of study of
education since the eighteenth century signified the emergence
and development of the knowledge/power (i.e. discourse) around
the pastoral power of education. Furthermore, the field of
education has accordingly differentiated, as Foucault indicated,
into areas of studies focusing on knowledge globalizing aspect of
pastoral power, such as education policy and planning, economics
of education, etc.; and areas of studies emphasizing the analytical
and individualizing aspect of pastoral power, such as psychology
of education, curriculum and instruction, etc.
53
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Sovereign power and the subject of rights and liberty
(Two Lectures, 1994/77; and The Final Foucault, 1988)
Two approaches to power: Disciplinary power vs.
sovereignty power (power of law)
54
55
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Sovereign power
Two approaches to power:
“I believe that the process which has really rendered the
discourse of the human sciences possible is the juxtaposition,
the encounter between two lines of approach, two mechanisms,
two absolutely heterogeneous types of discourse: on the one
hand there is the reorganization of right that invests sovereignty,
and on the other, the mechanics of the coercive forces whose
exercise takes a disciplinary form. And I believe that in our own
times power is exercise simultaneously through these courses,
to which the disciplines give rise, invade the area of right so that
the procedure of normalization come to be ever more constantly
engaged in the colonization of those of law. I believe that all this
can explain the global functioning of what I would call a society
of normalization.” (1994/76, p.44)
56
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Sovereign power
The historical development of the juridical-political
theory of sovereignty and the rule of rights in Western
societies
Sovereign power of feudal monarchy and the rights of the
King: “In Western societies since medieval times it has been
royal power that has provided the essential focus around
which legal thought has been elaborated. It is in response to
the demands of royal power, for its profit and to serve as its
instrument or justification, that the juridical edifice of our
own society has been developed. Right in the West is the
King’s right. ...
57
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Sovereign power
The historical development of the juridical-political
theory of sovereignty and the rule of rights in Western
societies
...And when this legal edifice escapes in latter century from
the control of the monarch, when, more accurately, it is
turned against that control, it is always the limits of this
sovereign power that are put in question, its prerogatives
that are challenged. ...When it comes to the general
organization of the legal system in the West, it is essentially
with the King, his rights, his power and its eventual
limitations, that one is dealing.” (1994/76, p. 32-33)
58
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Sovereign power
Democratized sovereign power and the rights of the
public: This mechanism of power and theory of rights,
according to Foucault, were invoked along two lines of
developments undertaken in Western societies.
"It has been, in the eighteenth and again in the
nineteenth century, a permanent instrument of criticism
of the monarchy and of all the obstacles that can thwart
the development of disciplinary society” (p. 42-43)
59
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Sovereign power
Democratized sovereign power and the rights of the
public:
“At the same time, the theory of sovereignty, and the
organization of a legal code centered upon it, have allowed
a system to be superimposed upon the mechanism of
discipline in such a way as to conceal its actual
procedures, the element of domination inherent in its
techniques, and to guarantee to everyone, by virtue of the
sovereignty of the State, the exercise of his proper
sovereign rights.” (p. 43)
60
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Sovereign power
Foucault’s final words on the relationship between power
and freedom
The inherent relationship between power and freedom: “In order to
exercise a relation of power, there must be on both sides at least a
certain form of liberty. Even though the relation of power may be
completely unbalanced or when one can truly say that he has ‘all
power’ over the other, a power can only be exercised over another
to the extent that the latter still has the possibility of committing
suicide, of jumping out of the window or of killing the other. That
means that in the relations of power, there is necessarily the
possibility of resistance, for if there were no possibility of
resistance ...there would be no resistance of power. ...If there are
relations of power throughout every social field it is because there
is freedom everywhere.” (1988, p. 12)
61
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Sovereign power
Foucault’s final words on the relationship between power
and freedom
The liberating-dominating nature of power:
“Power is not an evil. Power is strategic games. ...Let us ...take
something that has been the object of criticism, often justified: the
pedagogical institution. I don’t see where evil is in the practice of
someone who, in a given game of truth, knowing more than another,
tells him what he must do, teaches him, transmits knowledge to him,
communicates skills to him. The problem is rather to know how you
are to avoid in these practices －where power cannot not play and
where it is no evil in itself－the effects of domination which will
make a child subject to the arbitrary and useless authority of a
teacher, or put a student under the power of an abusively
authoritarian professor, and so forth. ...
62
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Sovereign power
Foucault’s final words on the relationship between power
and freedom
The liberating-dominating nature of power:
"...We must distinguish the relationships of power as strategic
game between liberties－strategic games that result in the fact that
some people try to determine the conduct of others－and the states
of domination, which are what we ordinary call power. And between
the two, between the games of power and the states of domination,
you have governmental technologies.” (Pp. 18-19)
63
Foucault’s Studies of Power
Sovereign power
Foucault’s final words on the relationship between power
and freedom
The notion of governmentality: “In the idea of governmentality, I am
aiming at the totality of practices, by which one can constitute,
define, organize, institutionalize the strategies which individuals in
their liberty can have in regard to each other. It is free individuals
who try to control, to determine, to delimit the liberty of others, and
in order to do that, they dispose of certain instruments to govern
others. That rests indeed on freedom, on the relationship of self to
self and the relationship to the other. But if you try to analyze power
not from the point of view of liberty, of strategies and of
governmentality but from the point of view of a political institution,
you cannot consider the subject as a subject of rights.” (1988, Pp.
19-20)
64
Recent Revisions of Conception of Power:
Dialectic nature of Power Relation
In recent years a number of scholars have redefined the
A-over-B conception of power in a number of fashions.
65
66
Recent Revisions of Conception of Power:
Dialectic nature of Power Relation
Steven Lukes’ revision of his radical view on power:
Lukes admits that “the definition of ‘the underlying concept of
power’ offered in PRV (Power: A Radical View, 1974) is, plainly,
entirely unsatisfactory in several respects.” One of these
respect is that “it equates such dependence-inducing power
with domination, assuming that ‘A affects B in a manner
contrary to B’s interest’. thereby neglecting what we have seen
to be the manifold ways in which power over others can be
productive, transformative, authoritative and compatible with
dignity.” (Lukes, 2005, p. 109)
67
Recent Revisions of Conception of Power:
Dialectic nature of Power Relation
Steven Lukes revision of his radical view on power:
Lukes specifically quoted Charles Taylor to substantiate his
assertion. “Charles Taylor has helped to clarify this essential
point. ‘If some external agency or situation wreaks some
change in me that in no way lies athwart some such
desire/purpose/aspiration/interest, then there is no call to
speak of an exercise of power/domination. Take the
phenomenon of imprinting. In human life, it also exist after a
fashion. We generally come to like the foods that have
assuaged our hunger, those we are fed as children in our
culture. Is this an index of the domination of our culture over
us? The world would lose all useful profile, would have no
more distinctiveness, if we let it roam this wide.’” (Lukes, 2005,
Pp. 113-4)
68
Recent Revisions of Conception of Power:
Dialectic nature of Power Relation
John Scott’s conception of signification and
legitimation bases of power (2001)
Scott indicates that apart from coercive force or political
manipulation, power can be constituted by means of
“persuasive influence”, which “depends on arguments,
appeals and reasons that cause subaltern (in a power
relation) to believe that it is appropriate to act in one way
rather than another. ...This may involve a commitment to or
recognition of ideas or values that are accepted as beyond
question, as providing intrinsically appropriate reasons for
acting.”
69
Recent Revisions of Conception of Power:
Dialectic nature of Power Relation
John Scott’s conception of signification and
legitimation bases of power (2001)
Bases of this form of power have been differentiated by
Scott into
Signification: The compliance of B (i.e. the subaltern) in a
power relation is induced by the fact that a subaltern accepts
the expertise of the system of knowledge or cognitive symbol
of A.
Legitimation: B’s compliance is subscribed to the value and/or
normative systems of a particular social or cultural context in
which B has identified with.
70
71
Habermas’ Concept of Communicative
Power
The legacy of Weber’s conception of power: For a
century, the theoretical discourse of power (as
discussed above) has been dominated by Weber’s
coercive concept of power, i.e. the chance and capacity
of fulfilling one’s will in a social relationship against
the opposition of one’s partners.
72
Habermas’ Concept of Communicative
Power
 Habermas distinction between coercive and
communicative power: In a review essay on “Hannah
Arendt’s communicative concept of power”(Habermas,
1977), Habermas suggests
“Max Weber takes the teleological model of action as his point of
departure: an individual subject ( or a group that can be regard as
an individual) chooses the appropriate means to realize a goal that
it has set for itself. Goal-attainment or success consists in
bringing about a state in the world that fulfills the goal in question.
To the extent that his success depends on the behavior of another
subject, the actor must have at his disposal the means to instigate
the other to the desired behavior. Weber calls his disposition over
means to influence the will of another ‘power’. …As Weber puts it:
‘Power means every chance within a social relationship to assert
one’s will even against opposition’.” (Habermas, 1977, P. 3-4) 73
Habermas’ Concept of Communicative
Power
 Habermas distinction between coercive and
communicative power: …Habermas suggests …
“Hannah Arendt starts from another model of action, the
communicative: ‘Power corresponds to the human ability not
just act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an
individual; it belongs to a group and remain in existence only
so long as the group keeps together. When we say of
somebody that he is ‘in power’ we actually refer to his being
empowered by a certain number of people to act in their
name.’ The fundamental phenomenon of power is not the
instrumentalization of another’s will, but the formation of a
common will in a communication directed to reach
agreement.” (Habermas, 1977, P. 4)
74
Habermas’ Concept of Communicative
Power
 Relationship between communicative power and
communicative rationality
Habermas further asserts that the condition for the
constitution of communicative power rests only on the
undistorted communicative-rational actions. In his own words,
“A communicative power…can develop only in undeformed
public spheres: it can issue only form structures of
undamaged intersubjectivity found in undistorted
communication. It arises where opinion- and will-formation
instantiate the productive force of the ‘enlarged mentality’
given with the unhindered communicative freedom each one
has ‘to make public use of one’s reason at every point’. This
enlargement is accomplished by ‘comparing our judgment
with the possible rather than the actual judgments of others
and by putting ourselves in the place of any other man.’”
75
(Habermas, 1996, P. 148)
Habermas’ Concept of Communicative
Power
 Relationship between communicative power and
communicative rationality
By locating communicative power within his theoretical
framework of communicative action, communicative
rationality, public sphere, and lifeworld (1984; 1987; 1989; and
1996); Habermas has given the concept of communicative
power a much wider scope. Communicative power can then
be conceived as one of the organic components of the theory
of communicative action.
76
77
Habermas’ Concept of Communicative
Power
 Relationship between communicative power and
communicative rationality
….The three concepts: Communicative rationality,
communicative action and communicative power form a tripod,
within which action and power can be communicatively
rationalized, rationality and power can be communicatively
activated, and in turn both action and rationality can be
communicatively empowered.
78
Communicative
Rationality
Communicative
Action
Empowering
Activating
Communicative
Power
Habermas’s Conceptual Framework
of Power
In 1996, Habermas published another master
piece of his, Between Facts and Norms:
Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law
and Democracy, in which he presents his
comprehensive framework of power.
80
81
Habermas’s Conceptual Framework
of Power
The conception of social power:
“I use the term ‘social power’ as a measure for
the possibilities an actor has in social
relationships to assert his own will and
interests, even against the opposition of
others. Social power can both facilitate and
restrict the formation of communicative power,
though it does so differently than
administrative power.” Habermas, 1996, P.
175)
82
Habermas’s Conceptual Framework
of Power
The conception of social power:
Accordingly the functions of social power may
be differentiated into:
“As facilitative, the disposition over social power
means that the necessary material conditions for an
autonomous exercise of equal liberties and
communicative freedoms are satisfied. In political
bargaining, for example, the involved parties must
be able to make their threats or promises credible in
light of their social power.” (1996, P. 175)
83
Habermas’s Conceptual Framework
of Power
The conception of social power:
Accordingly the functions of social power may
be differentiated into: ….
“As restrictive, the disposition over social power
provides some parties with a privileged opportunity
to influence the political process in such a way that
their interests acquire a priority not in accord with
equal civil rights. Businesses, organizations, and
pressure groups can, for example, transform their
social power into political power by way of such
interventions, whether they do so directly by
influencing the administration or directly by
84
manipulation public opinion.” (1996, P. 175)
Habermas’s Conceptual Framework
of Power
Conceptions of political power, coercive power,
administrative power & communicative power:
Habermas’ theory of the uncoupling of system and
lifeworld
“The lifewold concept of society finds its strongest
empirical foothold in archaic societies, where structures of
linguistically mediated, normatively guided interaction
immediately constitute the supporting social structure.”
(Habermas, 1987, p. 156) In this simple society, social
coordination and integration are attained by social power,
which are based on linguistically mediated communicative
actions and values and norms constituted through
communicative rationality.
85
Habermas’s Conceptual Framework
of Power
Conceptions of political power, coercive power,
administrative power & communicative power:
Habermas’ theory of the uncoupling of system and
lifeworld
As human societies evolved from simple tribal societies to
traditional societies, state mechanism first differentiated
from linguistically medicated lifeworld and institutionalized
into power-steered system. (Habermas, 1987, p. 153-4) At
the beginning, the state power constituted in tribal societies
could only be based on coercive power. By coercive power
of the state, it refers to the constitution of “the monopoly of
the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”
(Weber, 1948, P.78). It basically institutionalized one of the
most fundamental conditions of the power-steering system
86
of the state.
Habermas’s Conceptual Framework
of Power
From coercive power to administrative power: In
traditional societies, the coercive power of the state
were mainly built on sacred believes and traditions,
such as the Church in Middle-Age Europe and the
believe of “power entrusted from heavenly order” (君
權神授、天子、天命) in ancient China. As the power
holders of the traditional state began to “calculate
from strategic points of view and deploy a purposiverational way”, “the new administrative power” started
to emerge. (Habermas, 1996, P. 137) In China, it
witnessed the constitution of the huge and resilient
bureaucracy of the literati or the mandarins, which
operated on “legal-rational” base and secular
87
tradition of Confucianism. (Weber, 1964)
Habermas’s Conceptual Framework
of Power
 Popular sovereignty and communicative power: As the
sovereignty of the state of the monarch gave way to
the popular sovereignty, the history of the past
centuries witnessed the shift of the power bases of the
modern state from coercive and administrative powers
to communicative power. Habermas has built his
thesis by the following four interlocking principles:
88
Habermas’s Conceptual Framework
of Power
 Popular sovereignty and communicative power: …..
Habermas has built his thesis by the following four
interlocking principles:
Principle of popular sovereignty: “The principle of popular
sovereignty states that all political power derives from the
communicative power of citizens. The exercise of public
authority is oriented and legitimated by the laws citizens give
themselves in a discursively structured opinion- and willformation.” (Habermas, 1996, P. 170)
89
Habermas’s Conceptual Framework
of Power
 Popular sovereignty and communicative power: …..
Principle of guarantee comprehensive legal protection for
each individual: Though communicative power provides the
fundamental bases for the law-making (legislative) power of
the modern state; in return it is the independent judiciary
branch of the modern government in performing the law
application and jurisdiction function of the modern state, that
provides that legal protection of all citizen in exercising their
communicative power. (Habermas, 1996, P. 171-173)
90
Habermas’s Conceptual Framework
of Power
 Popular sovereignty and communicative power: …..
The principle of the legality of administration: The principle
requires that the administrative power of the modern state has
to be “subject to law and judicial review (as well as to
parliamentary oversight).” (Habermas, 1996, P. 169) This
principle is once again relied on the communicative power of
the public. In Habermas’ own words, “in the system of public
administration, there is concentrated power that must be
always regenerated itself anew out of communicative power.
Thus the law is not only constitutive for the power code that a
steers administrative process. It represents at the same time
the medium for transforming communicative power into
administrative power. The idea of the constitutional state can
therefore be expounded with the aid of principles according to
which legitimate law is generated from communicative power
and the latter in turn is converted into administrative power via
91
legitimately enacted law.” (Habermas, 1996, P. 169)
Habermas’s Conceptual Framework
of Power
 Popular sovereignty and communicative power: …..
The principle of separation of the state and society: The
principle “is intended to prevent social power from being
converted directly into administrative power, that is, without
first passing through the sluices of communicative power
formation.” (1996, P. 170) These direct conversions of social
power into administrative power could take the forms of the
prestigious and/or preferential treatments provided by the
public officials and administrators to the prestigious classes in
other social spheres, such as the business sector.
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Social Power in the Lifeworld
Uncoupling of the Lifeworld
Constitution of
the State & Political
Power
Administrative Power
of the Executive
Branch
Judiciary Power of
the Court
Constitution of
the Market & Economic
Power
Constitution of the Public
Sphere & Communicative
Power
Communicative power as sluice
guides against the direct
conversion of economic power
into administrative power
Communicative power as monitor against
arbitrary and abusive use of administrative
power
Judicial Review act as mediator between
Administrative Power of the State & the
Communicative power of citizens
Independent Jurisdiction provides Legal Protection
for the Communicative Power of Individual Citizens
Legislative Power of
the Parliament
Communicative power of the electorate
as legitimate bases for legislative power
93
Locating the Power Foundation for the
Practices of Educational Management &
Educational Governance
To recapitulate the approaches to the concept
of power
94
Power as ability to dominate and to
suppress others’ will
A’s will prevails over B’s (Weber)
A makes B to do or not to do
according to A’s will (Dahl)
A’s ability to assert his intended
influence on B (Wong)
A’s ability to prevent B’s to voice his
grievance (Bachrach & Baratz)
A’s ability to encroach on B’s interest
(Luke)
- Direct encroachment
- Preventing B to assert claim on his
interest
- deluding B from conscious of his
interest
A subjugating B (Foucault)
- Subjecting the physical body
(Disciplinary power)
- Subjecting the biological state of
the body (Biopower)
- Subjecting the mind and soul
(Pastoral power)
Power as potentials to attain one’s will
and to excel
A’s inner potentials and capability to
attain the thing he has reason to value
(A. Sen’s concept of capability)
A and B communicate and then
consent to jointly attain their common
will and/or common good (Arendt &
Habermas)
1st Order
Hierarchy
Market
Network
Capacities of delivering mean-end rational
effectiveness & efficiency
Community Network
Professional Network
Intergovernmental
Network
Producer Network
Issue Network
Power as ability to dominate and to
suppress others’ will
A’s will prevails over B’s (Weber)
A makes B to do or not to do
according to A’s will (Dahl)
A’s ability to assert his intended
influence on B (Wong)
A’s ability to prevent B’s to voice his
grievance (Bachrach & Baratz)
Metagovernance
A’s ability to encroach on B’s interest
(Luke)
- Direct encroachment
- Preventing B to assert claim on his
interest
- deluding B from conscious of his
interest
Interactive
Governance
Polycentric
Governance
New Public Service
A subjugating B (Foucault)
- Subjecting the physical body
(Disciplinary power)
- Subjecting the biological state of the
body (Biopower)
- Subjecting the mind and soul
(Pastoral power)
Power as potentials to attain one’s will
and to excel
A’s inner potentials and capability to
attain the thing he has reason to value
(A. Sen’s concept of capability)
A and B communicate and then
consent to jointly attain their common
will and/or common good (Arendt &
Habermas)
96
Locating the Power Foundation for the
Practices of Educational Management &
Educational Governance
Defining who is A and Who is B in the
educational contexts
Government officials and teaching
professionals
School heads and schoolteachers
Teachers and fellow teachers
Teachers and students
Teachers and parents
97
Locating the Power Foundation for the
Practices of Educational Management &
Educational Governance
Which conceptions of power to be used?
Which specific conception of power?
Which configuration of conceptions?
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第五、六講
權力：教育管理与治理的实践基础（二）
END