Today’s Lecture
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A comment about your final Paper
Grade spreadsheet
Turnitin.com
Plato
Preliminary comments on Kant
Immanuel Kant
A comment about your final Paper
• You have a bonus day of grace to get your final Paper in to
me.
• Three things to note about this extra day of grace:
• (1) It means that IF you get your paper to me, or the
assignment drop box, by 4:00 p.m. on August 11th, THEN
you will not receive any late penalties for your paper.
• (2) This extra day of grace only applies to your Paper.
• (3) Technically, this does not change the due date for the
paper (which remained August 8th).
• (4) If you have any extra day s of grace remaining you can
add them to this bonus day.
Third in-class quiz and grade
spreadsheet
• I will be placing an undated grade spreadsheet on
the course website by Wednesday. Please check to
ensure that the data matches what you have (this will
be the last chance to do so before the exam).
• If there are any discrepancies, come and see me.
Turnitin.com
• Remember that if your assignments are not
in Turnitin.com by Friday you will receive a
zero on the relevant assignment.
• There is no negotiation on this one, so don’t
leave this task to the last minute.
Plato
• Our readings will be primarily concerned
with the motivations for being moral (i.e.
with the question ‘Why be moral?’).
• It was Plato’s view that the moral life was
the best life, most conducive to happiness,
and the one in which the individual could
express their highest, or greatest, humanity
(FP, pp.600-601). (Confucius thought much
the same thing.)
Republic: Book II
• The interlocutors in this section of the dialogue are
Glaucon, Adeimantus and Socrates. Glaucon will be
Socrates primary interlocutor in our readings.
• Socrates is narrating this story, so he is the one using the
first-person pronoun.
• Both Glaucon and Adeimantus were, in real life, brothers of
Plato.
• This dialogue is not historical, nor did Plato intend to
convey that view.
• Though we can’t, at this stage, know this to be the case, this
text may well have been a way to attract students to study at
Plato’s Academy.
Republic: Book II
• Glaucon opens the discussion in this Book with the
challenge that Socrates persuade him and Adeimantus of the
greater value of the just life over the unjust life (FP, p.606).
• He now sets up how he wants Socrates to go about this
challenge.
• He introduces three ways in which a property, event, or
object (broadly construed) can be valued.
• A property, event, or object (broadly construed) can be
intrinsically valued, or valued “for its own sake” (FP,
p.606). Glaucon suggests joy as an example of this (FP,
p.606).
Republic: Book II
• A property, event, or object (broadly construed) can
be extrinsically and intrinsically valued, or valued
both “for its own sake and also for the sake of what
comes from it” (FP, p.606). Knowledge and health
are suggested as examples of this (FP, p.606).
• A property, event, or object (broadly construed) can
be extrinsically valued, or valued “for the sake of
the rewards and other things that come from them”
(FP, p.606).
• Extrinsically valued properties, events or objects are
so valued despite their onerous character (FP,
p.606).
Republic: Book II
• Now the greatest of all valued properties, events or
objects are, according to Socrates, valued both
extrinsically and intrinsically. Justice being among
them (FP, p.606).
• Glaucon and Adeimantus want to see this view of
justice properly defended, as they want to believe it
themselves without any reservations. So they go
about providing reasons for thinking that the unjust
life is better than the just life in the hopes that
Socrates will later find fault with their arguments
(FP, p.606).
Republic: Book II
• First, Glaucon proffers a narrative about the nature
and origins of justice.
• Injustice is, it is commonly held, naturally good,
while suffering injustice is bad. (Natural goodness
arises from a property, event or object [broadly
construed] irrespective of the social environment in
which it finds itself. The artificial goodness of a
property, event or object [broadly construed]
depends upon the social environment in which it
finds itself [FP, p.603].)
Republic: Book II
• So the best life is the one in which we can act unjustly but
suffer no consequences of that or someone else’s injustice.
• Because this is not an option for most people, suggests
Glaucon, a social contract is struck under the express
agreement that none of the contractors will act unjustly and
none will suffer injustice. Under the laws of this contract
obedience is christened justice. This is the mean between
the best life (acting unjustly with impunity) and the worst
life (suffering from injustice and having no recourse to
escape or avenge oneself).
• Glaucon adds that it would be the height of irrationality for
the person who can both act unjustly and escape the
consequences of injustice, to agree to such a contract (FP,
p.607).
Republic: Book II
• Second, Glaucon suggests that a thought experiment will
show that those who live a just life do such “unwillingly, as
something necessary, not as something good” (FP, p.606).
• Glaucon recounts the story of the Ring of Gyges. In this
story a humble shepherd finds the grave of an ancient king
or great warrior, in which a ring can be clearly seen on one
of the fingers of the corpse. He takes this ring and wears it
to the local monthly meeting between his fellow shepherds,
himself and the king of Lydia. While there he discovers that
if he turns the ring in towards his hand he becomes invisible
(FP, p.607).
Republic: Book II
• Glaucon’s story ends in the following way:
• “When he [i.e. the shepherd] realized this,
he at once arranged to become one of the
messengers sent to report to the king. And
when he arrived there, he seduced the king’s
wife, attacked the king with her help, killed
him, and took over the kingdom” (FP,
p.607).
Republic: Book II
• Now Glaucon suggests that we imagine a just and unjust
man equipped with two such rings. We are now asked to
imagine what their lives would be like after they discover
the power of their respective rings. The rings, as has been
recounted in the story of the Ring of Gyges, allow each
individual to act as they like and with impunity.
• It is Glaucon’s contention that both of these individuals will,
if only eventually, find themselves living relevantly similar
lives, and, what’s more, lives that are unjust.
• Indeed, the individual who did not live unjustly in such
circumstances would be thought so much more the idiot for
not doing so.
Republic: Book II
• This, Glaucon suggests, shows that
individuals only live a just life when
compelled to do so, and when opportunity
arises where they can be unjust with
impunity, they act accordingly (FP, pp.60708).
Republic: Book II
• Third, Glaucon broaches the topic of why it is
(reasonably) thought that the unjust life is better
than the just.
• To do this he stipulates that we must abstract both
the unjust life and the just life away from any
contingencies that might mislead us into thinking
one is better than the other, and then consider the
best example of both kinds of life.
• “We’ll subtract nothing from the injustice of an
unjust person and nothing from the justice of a just
one, but we’ll take each to be complete in his own
way of life” (FP, p.608).
Republic: Book II
• In the life of the individual who excels at
being unjust, he must be able to be unjust in
the ‘best way’, successful in what he does,
or at least able to correct most (if not all) of
his mistakes undetected, and so able to
maintain a reputation of being just. If he is
detected he must possess the wherewithal to
persuade, or at least quiet, his critics, either
through rhetoric or force (FP, p.608).
Republic: Book II
• In the life of the individual who excels at being
just, he must be able to be just in the ‘best way’,
always doing what is just, but never receiving
recognition for it. Indeed he must have the
reputation for being unjust, otherwise “it
wouldn’t be clear whether he is just for the sake
of justice itself or for the sake of those honours
and rewards [i.e. attaching to the reputation of
being just]” (FP, p.608).
Republic: Book II
• The end of the lives of these individuals is recounted as
follows:
• “They’ll say that a just person in such circumstances will be
whipped, stretched on a rack, chained, blinded by fire, and,
at the end, impaled, and will realize then that one shouldn’t
want to be just but to be believed to be just” (FP, p.609).
• The life of the unjust person will go in the opposite
direction. He will be successful in accumulating wealth and
good reputation, able to marry and enter contracts with
whomever he likes, and always win in competition since he
has no scruples about how he does so. He will also assuage
the gods through the kinds of great sacrifices only the
wealthy can perform. For this alone he will receive the
blessings of the gods (FP, p.609).
Republic: Book II
• This side of the debate (i.e. on defending the unjust life)
does not end here. Adeimantus now jumps into the
conversation.
• It is his contention that justice, and the just life, is
commonly recommended and praised on the grounds of the
benefits it brings those who are just (rather than on its
intrinsic value). Not just in social reputation and influence,
but in the nature and extent of the blessings from the gods.
This includes blessings of wealth and good fortune in life,
and great happiness in the after-life. The unjust, on the other
hand, receive only torment and hardship in the after-life
(FP, pp.609-10).
Republic: Book II
• It gets worse, according to Adeimantus.
• It is commonly held, even among the poets (a kind
of religious authority in classical Greece), that:
• (1) The just and moderate life is, though good,
onerous and difficult, while the unjust and
immoderate life is, though shameful, are easy and
“sweet” (FP, p.610);
• (2) What’s more, Adeimantus continues, unjust
activities are more profitable than just ones, and
bring the unjust wealth, honour and happiness.The
just are, alternatively, weak, poor and dishonoured
(FP, p.610);
Republic: Book II
• (3) Finally, the injustice of the unjust need not haunt them
through the actions or judgments of the gods. (i) Due to the
action or inaction of the Deities, the lives of the just are
often harsher than the lives of the unjust. (ii) Priests and
prophets testify to the power of sacrifices and incantations
to both sway the gods to our will and appease them for any
wrong doing on our part (even if we have already died and
those who sacrifice do so on our behalf) (FP, pp.610-11).
• All of these considerations, argues Adeimantus, work
against the appeal of living the just life, and work towards
making the life of the unjust appealing (FP, p.611).
Republic: Book II
• Adeimantus considers some objections to his
account.
• Objection 1: It will be difficult to successfully
conceal our unjust actions.
• Response: (i) Nothing worth having is easy to get.
(ii) We can form secret societies to protect and
conceal ourselves. (iii) We can employ the best to
speak on our behalf in court, or forcefully silence
our critics in the public sphere (FP, p.611).
Republic: Book II
• Objection 2: We can’t conceal our actions from the gods, or
force their silence.
• Response:
• (1) We only know of the gods through poets and the laws.
• (2) If the gods do not exist, or do not care for human affairs,
we need not worry.
• (3) If they do exist and care for human affairs, we need not
worry.
• (4) According to the poets and laws (who are the sole
repository of knowledge about the gods) we can appease the
gods for any of our wrong doing.
• (5) If we are unjust, we can profit from our injustice and
assuage the gods with our spoils.
Republic: Book II
• (6) If we are just, we lose the profit from being
unjust and are not threatened punishment from the
gods.
• (7) It is better to both profit from injustice and
assuage the gods with the spoils than to be just,
poor and well regarded by the gods.
• (8) So, we should be unjust, and assuage the gods
with our spoils (FP, p.611).
Republic: Book II
• Objection 3: But what of our end in Hades
(it is in some ways the equivalent of Hell)
or the welfare of our children or their
children?
• Response: The poets, laws and prophets tell
us of the power of ritual to atone for our
misdeeds (FP, p.611).
• So, why be moral (or just)?
An argument from class discussion
• (1) There is no ought (i.e. there is no moral duty to do x)
where there is no can (i.e. where we cannot do x).
• (2) We cannot, on mass, distribute our wealth and live in
accord with our greater obligations.
• (3) We cannot live a purely (read consistently) moral life
and live in accord with our greater obligations (i.e. the
moral constraints for a purely moral life are not ultimately
realizable together in the one life).
• (4) So, we have no obligation, on mass, to distribute our
wealth.
• (5) So, we have no obligation to live a purely moral life.
• Is this argument right? Should we embrace an immoral life?
Immanuel Kant
• Immanuel Kant was a Prussian philosopher.
• He was born in 1724 and died in 1804.
• Arguably, he was the greatest of the Enlightenment
philosophers and one of the greatest of the European
philosophers.
• He was a Christian, and was raised in a Pietist home
(not Lutheran as I suggested in class [I did admit I
wasn’t at all sure]).
• He wrote on Metaphysics, Epistemology an Moral
Philosophy (FP, pp.222-23).
Preliminary comments on Kant
• Kant makes a strong distinction between reason and
emotion.
• Emotions, for Kant, are unreliable grounds for
acting. He is here contrasting himself with
philosophers like Hume, who seen certain passions
or sentiments as integral to living a moral life.
• Kant would go as far as to argue that our natural
inclinations, emotions, or sentiments lead us away
from, or interfere with, rational action.
• This is no small point for Kant as he views all moral
action as rational action.
Preliminary comments on Kant
• Kant believes that all human beings share a faculty of
reason.
• He also believes that there are objective principles of
reason. That is, Kant believes that there are principles of
reason that all rational agents (human or nonhuman) ought
to hold.
• Kant reaffirms the distinction between the descriptive (what
actually happens; or what is the case) and the normative
(what should or ought to be the case…even if it isn’t).
• Moral philosophy concerns itself with what ought to be the
case…whether or not it is or isn’t the case.
Preliminary comments on Kant
• The philosopher David Hume pointed out what has
since become known as the Naturalistic Fallacy: To
draw an ought from an is, is fallacious.
• I.e. it doesn’t follow that because something is the
case, or people approve of something, that it ought
to be the case or that people ought to approve of it.
• Kant would agree with this.
Preliminary comments on Kant
• It also doesn’t follow that because
something is not the case, or people
disapprove of something, that it ought not to
be the case or that people or ought not
approve of it.
• This should caution us from merely
appealing to common moral judgment about
x as reasonable grounds for holding said
moral judgment.
Preliminary comments on Kant
• Moral Philosophy, for Kant, has both an empirical
(a posteriori) element and a non-empirical (a
priori) element.
• The moral philosopher, according to Kant, is
concerned primarily with the a priori ground of
moral reasoning.
• A ground, principle or object counts as a priori if it
can be understood or examined independently of
past, present or future experience.
Preliminary comments on Kant
• In moral discourse, the notion of, or what it
means to be, a moral (rational) agent can be
examined, for Kant, independently of
experience. Such an examination will also
entail an examination of the will (which is
the faculty or power which gives rise to
action/agency), and the kinds of a priori
principles which may count as rational,
versus empirical.
First Section
• In this First Section, it is important to
remember that Kant is primarily concerned
with what we can deduce or infer, and
defend, from our common moral knowledge
(FP, p.634).
• He will discuss, in order of appearance, the
importance of the good will, the proper
motivation for action, and the proper form
of moral maxims or principles (FP, p.634).
First Section: Intrinsic versus extrinsic
goodness or value
• Kant begins this section by looking for an
intrinsically good ground for the moral life.
• Remember that for something to be extrinsically
good or valuable is for it to derive its goodness or
value from its relation to another good or ‘object’ of
value.
• For something to be intrinsically good or valuable is
for it to enjoy a goodness or value in itself (without
reference to any other good or valuable ‘object’).
First Section: Intrinsic versus
extrinsic goodness or value
• You can understand the beginning of this
section as assuming that the moral life is
good. This is suggested by the status
accorded those who would live morally (see
FP, p.643). The question is, Is it
extrinsically or intrinsically good?