1
GENDER K AFF ANSWERS
*****LINKS***** ......................................................................................................................................... 2
PERM ......................................................................................................................................................... 3
Epistimology N/B................................................................................................................................... 4
Gender Equality N/B ............................................................................................................................. 7
Coalitions............................................................................................................................................... 9
ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT ..................................................................................................................... 11
Trade-No link....................................................................................................................................... 12
Victimization DA .................................................................................................................................. 14
Trade Lib k2 hum rights/environment ................................................................................................ 16
Mexico................................................................................................................................................. 18
Cuba .................................................................................................................................................... 19
ECON RATIONALITY ................................................................................................................................. 20
ENVIRONMENTALISM ............................................................................................................................. 21
OIL ........................................................................................................................................................... 22
Generic ................................................................................................................................................ 23
AT Ross ................................................................................................................................................ 28
Alt cause .............................................................................................................................................. 29
L/T- Mexico ......................................................................................................................................... 30
US/LA RELATIONS.................................................................................................................................... 32
Dem Promo Good ............................................................................................................................... 33
AT Paternalism .................................................................................................................................... 34
VIEW FROM NOWHERE........................................................................................................................... 36
TECH ........................................................................................................................................................ 39
*****IMPACTS***** .................................................................................................................................. 40
EXTINCTION 1ST ...................................................................................................................................... 41
NUC WAR 1ST.......................................................................................................................................... 42
POLICY MAKING ...................................................................................................................................... 46
*****Alternative*****............................................................................................................................... 47
AT POSTCOLONIAL FEMINISM ................................................................................................................ 48
ESSENTIALISM DA ................................................................................................................................... 50
PRAGMATISM DA .................................................................................................................................... 51
NARRATIVES DA ...................................................................................................................................... 53
2
*****LINKS*****
3
PERM
4
Epistemology N/B
The choice between colonizing mentality and working with the oppressed is a false
one. Aligning with the oppressed shifts the terms of privilege. They are the ones trying
to shut out alternative voices to their own. The competition scenario makes them
unwilling to hear.
Rowe ‘5
(Aimee Carrillo: Assistant Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Iowa. “Be Longing: Toward a
Feminist Politics of Relation,” NWSA Journal, 17.2, 2005 MI.)
What is at stake in this move is to fortify the alliances across lines of difference in ways that
reconfigure the relationship between "colonizer" and "colonized" and to revolutionize belonging by
forging the insights and power of the "view from below" with the "power to speak" from above. bell
hooks' commentary at the "politics of location" forum opens up this possibility for coalitional subjectivity. She
foregrounds her critical agency as one who chooses marginality not as a site of abjection, but as one of radical critique that refuses assimilation,
even as she negotiates with power. She writes: "Within
complex and ever shifting realms of power relations do we
position ourselves on the side of colonising mentality? Or do we continue to stand in political
resistance with the oppressed, ready to offer our ways of seeing and theorising, of making culture
towards that revolutionary effort which seeks to create space where there is unlimited access to the
pleasure and power of knowing, where transformation is possible?" (15). Here hooks reveals the
contradictory hailings that constitute her location—of the "side of the colonising mentality," on one
hand, and the side of "political resistance with the oppressed," on the other. The "or" within the passage
suggests that these interpellations tug at her in contradictory ways, or that there is a forced choice for hooks between standing with the
oppressed or with the oppressor. In the following section, I work toward a "differential" mode of belonging in which such
binaries might
be disrupted to allow the cultural worker to move among and across these various positionalities and
loyalties. But for now I wish to call attention to the radical possibility that hooks sees in "standing with the oppressed." This
standpoint offers "ways of seeing and theorising" that creates space for "unlimited access to the pleasure
and power of knowing where transformation is possible." Here hooks shifts the terms of privilege,
signaling a redefinition of power and resistive belongings. If Rich seeks "a movement for change [that] lives in feelings,
actions and words," hooks's vision from her chosen location on the margins provides directions for such movement. The problem of
subalternity raised by Wallace, however, remains at loose ends. hooks points out that the
language of the oppressed is spoken
with a "broken voice" that reveals "pain contained within that brokenness—a speech of suffering;
often it's a sound nobody wants to hear" (16). Mirroring this gesture, Rich comments on [End Page 25] her inability to hear,
"How did I look without seeing, hear without listening?" (223). Placed in conversation, hooks's and Rich's texts speak to
one another. Placed in mutual belonging, such conversations hold tremendous transformative
potential for grappling with these difficult issues of speaking, listening, and being heard across lines of
difference. Yet the spatial and affective divides that constitute the production of these texts leave each voice alone and thus the visions
that they hold are not tapped to their fullest potential. The questions that remain include: (how) do alternative modes of belonging challenge
hegemonic forms of speaking/listening? Can locations be rewritten by challenging dominant modes of belonging?
5
The perm solves—integrating gender movements into the economic system solves
Perkins and Kuiper 5
(Ellie, researcher at the Department of Economics & Econometrics at the Universiteit van Amsterdam,
The Netherlands, and Edith, researcher at the faculty of Economics and Econometrics, the University of
Amsterdam, the Netherlands, EXPLORATIONS
In her discussion of Chile, and Latin America more generally, Raye´n¶ Quiroga-Martı´nez aims to conceptualize a
vision of economic development¶ that is humanist and sustainable. She points out the limits of development¶
theories for this region and shows the overall limitations of traditional¶ development thought by stressing its inherent gender inequality and¶
environmental problems. Quiroga subsequently explores
the potential of a¶ more community- and regionalbased, diversified, participatory, and¶ equitable form of economic transformation than that entailed
by¶ globalization and traditional, trade-oriented ‘‘development.’’ Terisa Turner and Leigh Brownhill provide an
account of two gendered¶ class struggles in Africa – one in Kenya and one in Nigeria. These struggles¶ center on environmental devastation
and deterioration of living conditions¶ caused by agricultural production for international trade, instead of for the¶ local market, and pollution
from oil production. Turner and Brownhill¶ describe how African women are sharing energies and strategies to counter¶ these developments
by relying on their specific experience and assets. They¶ give a vivid account of women’s use of the ‘‘curse of nakedness’’ to both¶ express and
symbolize women’s power.¶ Mary
Mellor issues a fundamental challenge to feminist economics:¶ address
ecological issues. Mellor argues that both the material physicality of¶ human existence and the inequality
and exploitation of political-economic¶ systems must occupy the forefront of what she terms ‘‘materialist¶
ecofeminist analysis.’’ She relates her claim to the recent debate in Feminist¶ Economics about ontology and critical realism, using it to
underscore the¶ importance for human existence of real (and limited) material conditions,¶ even though they are expressed within exploitative
social relations. By¶ discussing
the links between the exploitation of women’s labor and the¶ abuse of
planetary resources and systems, she is able to articulate a¶ hypothesis on the rationale of current
economic explanations of the global¶ system and its driving forces. Zdravka Todorova addresses the issue of
essentialism, or the notion that¶ biology ties women to nature, making them especially responsible and¶ knowledgeable regarding nature and
environmental issues. She also brings¶ in institutionalist theory in an interesting and fruitful attempt to deal¶ satisfactorily with the issues she
raises. The reader gains a challenging¶ conceptualization and theorization of the relationship among ecosystems, Stressing
the
importance of bringing together feminist and ecological¶ concerns, theory development, and social
and political activity, Maren¶ Jochimsen relates the history, ideas, and organization of the Versorgendes¶
Wirtschaften – a German/Swiss/Austrian network that focuses on the care¶ economy. The network was founded in 1992 by academics
and practitioners¶ who address the exploitative character of the economy in relation to¶ women and nature. Jochimsen describes
the efforts of the network to¶ integrate feminist and ecological concerns in economics against the¶
background of changing practices, in which the network is actively involved.¶ Organic agriculture and the
experiences of women farmers in this area¶ provide the basis for Martha McMahon’s contribution on the
relationship¶ between globalization and the transformative potential of subsistence centered¶ work.
She discusses the gendered nature of farming, particularly¶ organic farming. After examining different perspectives on whether organic¶
agriculture is the wave of the future or a specialized niche, she provides a¶ feminist perspective on economic localism. She
sees the
disruption of¶ generalizations and the questioning of universalities as characteristics of¶ ecological
feminist analysis. Together with the redefinition of terms and the¶ recognition of women’s contributions as ‘‘vernacular work,’’ these
are¶ important means to reclaim and transform markets and strengthen local¶ subsistence agriculture. Along with other feminist ecological
economists, the authors represented¶ here emphasize that the formal, money-denominated
economy is only one¶ aspect
of the overall economic picture, which would collapse without¶ human/social reproduction and ecological reproduction.
Instead of¶ providing final answers and political programs, these contributions reveal ¶ new
perspectives and issues of considerable political and social importance,¶ highly relevant to feminist
economic theorizing and research. Bringing¶ together concerns about gender, ecological perspectives,
and economic¶ change provides us with new avenues for research and theories that need¶ further exploration and
development.
6
All canonical Western thought contains de-colonial effects—a combination of all
philosophies is necessary for decolonizing the twenty-first century
Sandoval 2k-Associate Professor in Chicano Studies @ UC Santa Barbara, PhD in Philosophy @ UC-Santa
Cruz [Chela, Methodology of the Oppressed, 2000, Introduction, pg. 22-23,
http://caringlabor.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/methodology-of-the-oppressed-chela-sandoval.pdf,
DKP]
Methodology of the Oppressed pursues these decolonial lines of force and affinity through a selection of the so-called canon of
Western theory to demonstrate[s] the shared desire for a postcolonial twenty-first century. This study
shows that no canonical Western thought is free of de-colonial effects. Whether we read the work of Fredric
Jameson, Roland Barthes, Hayden White, Donna Haraway, Jacques Derrida, or Judith Butler, we will see how each writing
contains the decolonizing influences of what is defined in this book as postcolonial U.S. third world
feminist criticism — in other words, these works contain lines of force and affinity necessary in
matrixing a decolonizing globalization that is no longer necessarily “postmodern.” Questions such as
What is Western? What is “third world”? What is “first”? deconstruct under the weight of this analysis
— which reconstructs theory and method to create a new vision and world of thought and action, of theory and method, of alliance. But are
these still “Western” writers? Or have Western writers been so influenced by decolonizing forces during the twentieth century that they contain
a certain utopian postcoloniality — an accountability from the beginning to what I call “U.S. third world feminism”? Part IV of this study asserts
that the
work of such thinkers contains the postcolonial U.S. third world feminism necessary for
decolonizing the twenty-first century. If so, their work can be seen as partially composing the prehistory of a coming third
millennium.12
A multitude of theories are critical to emancipatory resistance—isolating one fails
Sandoval 2k-Associate Professor in Chicano Studies @ UC Santa Barbara, PhD in Philosophy @ UC-Santa Cruz [Chela, Methodology of the
Oppressed, 2000, Introduction, pg. 27, http://caringlabor.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/methodology-of-the-oppressed-chela-sandoval.pdf,
DKP]
Methodology of the Oppressed is not organized as a history that recounts stages text by text while demonstrating forms of
exchange that occur within each era. Rather, it is concerned with a general economy of consciousness in its
oppositional forms. The book ranges over feminist, postcolonial, poststructuralist, ethnic, global,
critical, and cultural theory in order to provide ways of thinking, acting, and conceptualizing under the
postmodern imperatives of globalization, with the aim of supporting the lines of engagement
necessary for the encouragement of decolonizing global forces. There are several primary projects here. The book
develops a theory and method of oppositional consciousness in the postmodern world; identifies the methodology of the oppressed; and maps
out rhetorics of resistance, domination, and coalitional consciousness. It describes how these
theoretical methods comprise a
hermeneutics for identifying and mobilizing love in the postmodern world as a category of social
analysis — an outsider methodology that makes visible a particular U.S. form of criticism developed during 1970s and 1980s
U.S. third world feminism. Moreover, the book maps the relationship of critical, poststructural, cultural,
and feminist theory to de-colonial and postcolonial theorizing in order to illustrate a model for the
decoding of cultural artifacts — including theory — through an alternative apparatus for analysis. It renders that approach in all its
specificities, locating its activity in “U.S. third world feminism,” and argues that this alternative mode of criticism can point
the way to the analysis of any theoretical, literary, aesthetic, social-movement, or psychic expression.
7
Gender Equality N/B
Preventing economic decline is key to preserving women’s rights
Mcrobie 6/6, From the war on terror to austerity: a lost decade for women and human rights,
Heather Mcrobie is a writer and PHD candidate at Oxford.
http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/heather-mcrobie/from-war-on-terror-to-austerity-lost-decadefor-women-and-human-rights
In addition to this strain, austerity has been gendered. Governments such as the British government have
utilised the
emergency-mode of ‘austerity’ to focus its cuts on those who are least invested in by their ideology.
The strain of the recession means there has been an increase in domestic violence from Britain to Spain to
Greece, just as domestic violence shelters are closing – those who are caught in dangerous and abusive situations are
now less likely to have the financial means to leave their partners. Layered on top of this, the re-emergence
of right-wing and conservative national governments since 2008 have furthered blocked women’s
interests, as cuts have fallen disproportionately on services and benefits vital for women’s safety and
development. A report by the European Women’s Lobby found women’s organisations are struggling throughout the region as a direct
result of the recession and austerity. This increase of domestic violence, loss of services and benefits for women, and the curtailing of women’s
organisations comes in
addition to the general impact of the post-2008 recession: deterioration of working conditions and
employment, underemployment for women as temping agencies capitalise on their diminished
opportunities, and public sector cuts, a sector in which women were the majority of workers. Globally,
the impact of austerity has been gendered just as poverty is gendered – this is the intersection of the austerity as a ‘war on the
poor’ and austerity as a ‘war on women’. The ‘feminisation of poverty’, which was a pressing concern before 2008, has been deepened by the
‘austerity’ era, firstly through the economic crisis itself and secondly as governments and international organisations have structured their cuts
in ways that disproportionately hurt women and other structurally disadvantaged groups.
Perm solves-policy solutions key to promote gender equality in trade relations
Berik 11
Professor of Economics @ the University of Utah, PhD and MA in Economics @ UMass-Amherst
[Günseli, International Labor Organization, Trade and Employment: From Myths to Facts, “Gender
Aspects of Trade,” pg. 171-172
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/documents/publication/wcms_162297.pdf, DKP]
This study examines the literature relating to the effect of trade liberalization¶ and subsequent trade expansion on employment and wages of
women and gender¶ inequalities. The
main question is the extent to which trade policies have enhanced¶
women’s economic and social status and reduced within-country gender inequalities.¶ The relationship
between gender and trade has been examined in the scholarly literature since the early 1980s, which has shown the gender-differentiated
effects of¶ macroeconomic policies (Çağatay and Elson, 2000). The
topic is receiving increasing¶ attention in trade policy
discussions as well, with calls for concrete policy measures¶ to gender-mainstream trade policies.
From a trade-policy perspective, the interest centres on the potential benefits of promoting gender
equality for favourable trade¶ outcomes and growth. In addition, there is desire for better anticipating the
gender-differentiated impacts of trade liberalization so as to respond to any adverse¶ impacts and
promote gender-equitable adjustments (Coche et al., 2006; Beviglia¶ Zampetti and Tran-Nguyen, 2004).
8
Perm—incorporating gender into trade reform solves the impact and the aff
Berik 11
Professor of Economics @ the University of Utah, PhD and MA in Economics @ UMass-Amherst
[Günseli, International Labor Organization, Trade and Employment: From Myths to Facts, “Gender
Aspects of Trade,” pg. 172
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/documents/publication/wcms_162297.pdf, DKP]
This chapter evaluates the state of the knowledge on this two-way relationship¶
between gender and trade. As the chapter
difficulties. Not only do gender inequalities precede trade reforms
and provide the¶ context for the trade impacts, but also it is difficult to disentangle trade impacts from¶ changes in
other macroeconomic policies. Moreover, data limitations and related research gaps constrain a comprehensive assessment of
shows, the assessment is fraught with
trade impacts that would trace¶ effects from the labour markets (macro-) and institutional, public services (meso-)¶ levels to the household
(micro-) level, and especially in the domain of unpaid reproductive or subsistence work. Nonetheless, since trade liberalization has been so
widely¶ embraced, the economic experiences of otherwise diverse economies have been similar¶ and common
gendered patterns
and trends in economic outcomes have emerged. A¶ substantial body of research has focused on the quantity and quality of
employment and income-earning opportunities generated by trade reforms, particularly in the¶ manufacturing and agricultural sectors. This
evaluation shows a variety of gender impacts of trade reforms. On the whole, trade reforms have
brought expansion of jobs¶ for women in export sectors, with some likely positive feedback effects on
women’s¶ status and autonomy in the household, but the working conditions in these jobs¶ have often fallen short of
complying with ILO Conventions. Agricultural trade liberalization has generally put women farmers at a disadvantage. With respect to policy,¶
this chapter’s argument is that in
order to make trade reforms a force for reducing¶ gender gaps and promoting
gender-equitable improvements in livelihoods, gender equity policies must be situated within a
coherent framework of gender-sensitive trade¶ and macroeconomic policies that aims to generate
employment and income¶ security.
9
Coalitions
Perm fills the blind-spots and solves their link --can't simply generalize all modernism
and "male rationality"- alt degrades into insular and fragmented politics
Best and Kellner 01
(Steven, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Humanities – University of Texas and Douglas,
Philosophy of Education Chair – UCLA, “Postmodern Politics and the Battle for the Future,”
Illuminations, http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kell28.htm)
But it
is also a mistake, we believe, to ground one's politics in either modern or postmodern theory
alone. Against one-sided positions, we advocate a version of reconstructive postmodernism that we call a politics of
alliance and solidarity that builds on both modern and postmodern traditions. Unlike Laclau and Mouffe who
believe that postmodern theory basically provides a basis for a new politics, and who tend to reject the Enlightenment per se, we believe
that the Enlightenment continues to provide resources for political struggle today and are skeptical
whether postmodern theory alone can provide sufficient assets for an emancipatory new politics. Yet
the Enlightenment has its blindspots and dark sides (such as its relentless pursuit of the domination of nature, and naive belief in
"progress," so we believe that aspects of the postmodern critique of Enlightenment are valid and force us to rethink and
reconstruct Enlightenment philosophy for the present age. And while we agree with Habermas that a reconstruction of the Enlightenment and
modernity are in order, unlike Habermas we believe that postmodern theory has important contributions to make to this project. Various forms
of postmodern
politics have been liberatory in breaking away from the abstract and ideological universalism of the Enlightenment and
the reductionist class politics of Marxism, but they tend to be insular and fragmenting, focusing solely on the experiences
and political issues of a given group, even splintering further into distinct subgroups such as divide the feminist
community. Identity politics are often structured around simplistic binary oppositions such as Us vs.
Them and Good vs. Bad that pit people against one another, making alliances, consensus, and
compromise difficult or impossible. This has been the case, for example, with tendencies within
radical feminism and ecofeminism which reproduce essentialism by stigmatizing men and "male
rationality" while exalting women as the bearers of peaceful and loving value and as being "closer to nature."[18] Elements in the black
nationalist liberation movement in the 1960s and the early politics of Malcolm X were exclusionist and racist, literally demonizing white people
as an evil and inferior race. Similarly, the sexual politics of some gay and lesbian groups tend to exclusively focus on their own interests, while
the mainstream environmental movement is notorious for resisting alliances with people of color and grass roots movements.[19]
Even
though each group needs to assert their identity as aggressively as possible, postmodern identity
politics should avoid falling into seriality and sheer fragmentation. These struggles, though independent of
one another, should be articulated within counterhegemonic alliances, and attack power formations on
both the micro- and macro-levels. Not all universalistic appeals are ideological in the sense criticized by Marx; there are common
grounds of experience, common concerns, and common forms of oppression that different groups share which should be articulated -concerns such as the degradation of the environment and common forms of oppression that stem from capitalist exploitation and alienated
labor.
10
Without this, the alternative fails and has no mechanism to translate theory into
practice
Jones 99
(Richard Wyn, Lecturer in the Department of International Politics – University of Wales, Security,
Strategy, and Critical Theory, CIAO, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/wynjones/wynjones06.html)
Because emancipatory political practice is central to the claims of critical theory, one might expect
that proponents of a critical approach
to the study of international relations
would be reflexive about the
relationship between theory and practice. Yet their thinking on this issue thus far does not seem to
have progressed much beyond grandiose statements of intent. There have been no systematic
considerations of how critical
politics beyond the
international
seminar room or
theory can help generate,
conference hotel.
support, or sustain
emancipatory
Robert Cox, for example, has described the task of critical theorists as
providing “a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order” (R. Cox 1981: 130). Although he has also gone on to identify
possible agents for change and has outlined the nature and structure of some feasible alternative orders, he has not explicitly indicated whom
he regards as the addressee of critical theory (i.e., who is being guided) and thus how the theory can hope to become a part of the political
process (see R. Cox 1981, 1983, 1996). Similarly, Andrew Linklater has argued that “a critical theory of international relations must regard the
practical project of extending community beyond the nation–state as its most important problem” (Linklater 1990b: 171). However, he has little
to say about the role of theory in the realization of this “practical project.” Indeed, his main point is to suggest that the role of critical theory “is
not to offer instructions on how to act but to reveal the existence of unrealised possibilities” (Linklater 1990b: 172). But the question still
remains, reveal to whom? Is the audience enlightened politicians? Particular social classes? Particular social movements? Or particular (and
presumably particularized) communities? In light of Linklater’s primary concern with emancipation, one might expect more guidance as to
whom he believes might do the emancipating and how critical theory can impinge upon the emancipatory process. There is, likewise, little
enlightenment to be gleaned from Mark Hoffman’s otherwise important contribution. He argues that critical international theory seeks not
simply to reproduce society via description, but to understand society and change it. It is both descriptive and constructive in its theoretical
intent: it is both an intellectual and a social act. It is not merely an expression of the concrete realities of the historical situation, but also a force
for change within those conditions. (M. Hoffman 1987: 233) Despite this very ambitious declaration, once again, Hoffman gives no suggestion
as to how this “force for change” should be operationalized and what concrete role critical theorizing might play in changing society.
Thus,
although the critical international theorists’ critique of the role that more conventional approaches to
the study of world politics play in reproducing the contemporary world order may be persuasive, their
account of the relationship between their own work and emancipatory political practice is
unconvincing. Given the centrality of practice to the claims of critical theory, this is a very significant
weakness. Without some plausible account of the mechanisms by which they hope to aid in the
achievement of their emancipatory goals, proponents of critical international theory are hardly in a position to justify the
assertion that “it represents the next stage in the development of International Relations theory” (M. Hoffman 1987: 244). Indeed, without
a more convincing conceptualization of the theory–practice nexus, one can argue that critical international theory,
by its own terms, has no way of redeeming some of its central epistemological and methodological claims and thus that it is a fatally
flawed enterprise.
11
ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT
12
Trade-No link
Can’t evaluate the connection between gender and trade—data is flawed
Ventura-Dias 10
-Director of
the Division of International trade and Integration at the Economic Commission for Latin
America of the UN, PhD in Agricultural and Resource Economics @ UC Berkeley [Vivianne, International
Institute for Sustainable Development, “Beyond Barriers: The Gender Implications of Trade
Liberalization in Latin America,” pg. 15, 2010,
http://www.iisd.org/tkn/pdf/beyond_barriers_gender_latin_america.pdf, DKP]
It is important to reiterate that women are not equal in terms of the restrictions they face when accessing ¶ productive resources, including
human capital accumulation. Although gender relations cut across class ¶ and race groups, class and race compound gender inequity relations.
Gender conflicts exist across class ¶ and other social characteristics; nonetheless, among women, the level of bargaining power is also a ¶
function of their access to assets and their level of income, which are determined by social class and race ¶ affiliation. A
proper
evaluation of trade effects would require the disaggregation of data on women ¶ according to income
levels, rural-urban activities and race whenever possible.¶ A consensus has emerged in recent economic
research that trade and gender as much as trade and ¶ poverty are multidimensional and complex topics. To
assess gender equity effects from trade liberalization ¶ requires a better understanding of the nature,
pace and scale of changes launched by trade liberalization. ¶ Macro and micro issues need to be
related, and the mediation among them through markets, policies ¶ and institutions has to be
elucidated (Bussolo & De Hoyos, 2009; Fontana, 2009; Giordano, 2009). ¶ Labour market institutions, property rights institutions, markets
and other institutions mediate the ¶ relations between trade and the final outcomes at the household level (Bardhan, 2005; Jansen & Nordås, ¶
2004). In this sense, the important role of domestic policies in alleviating the adjustment costs that result ¶ from trade liberalization and
increasing its benefits cannot be ignored. Relevant institutions and public ¶ policies can be effective in reducing adjustment costs either by
compensating the negatively affected ¶ industries, facilitating the training of displaced workers or enhancing the operation of particular
markets. ¶ There
has not been much research on institutions and public policies that have a bearing on
attenuating ¶ (or enhancing) the negative impacts of trade liberalization on gender inequalities in access to
resources ¶ and opportunities.
Even if trade hurts women in the short term, its necessary for larger improvement in
the long run
Berik 11
Professor of Economics @ the University of Utah, PhD and MA in Economics @ UMass-Amherst
[Günseli, International Labor Organization, Trade and Employment: From Myths to Facts, “Gender
Aspects of Trade,” pg. 172
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/documents/publication/wcms_162297.pdf, DKP]
Gender inequalities also affect trade and industrialization strategies and long run growth (Seguino, 2000;
Klasen, 2002; Klasen and Lamanna, 2009). While¶ policy-makers are keen on emphasizing research findings that
indicate the long-run¶ benefits of promoting gender equality in education, employment and access to
assets¶ for growth, it is also the case that major exporter countries have benefited from¶ women’ slower wages relative to men in
achieving export success, at least in the short¶ run (Seguino,2000;Busse andSpielmann,2006).Specifically, gender wage inequalities¶
have provided advantages for many developing countries to gain a foot hold in labour intensive
manufacturing exports. Some of these countries have used the proceeds of¶ growth so achieved to
finance investments in more diversified production structures¶ and to promote improvements in
women’s well-being over the long run.
13
Trade liberalization improves women’s quality of life in the long term-empirics
Berik 11
Professor of Economics @ the University of Utah, PhD and MA in Economics @ UMass-Amherst
[Günseli, International Labor Organization, Trade and Employment: From Myths to Facts, “Gender
Aspects of Trade,” pg. 172
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/documents/publication/wcms_162297.pdf, DKP]
Additionally, the
standard variables used in assessing the gender impacts of¶ trade – employment levels,
up or can obscure the absolute improvements for
women made possible by the¶ growth generated by trade policies. Specifically, most statistical studies
examine the¶ change in earnings of women relative to men. While an increase in the relative¶ earnings
of women is important for achieving gender-equitable development, attention¶ to absolute gains in
earnings of both men and women is necessary for inferring¶ changes in well-being. An historical
perspective on Asian development shows that¶ over the long run women have benefited from the
changes brought by export successes¶ of these economies (Chataignier and Kucera, 2005), even if these export successes¶
cannot be attributed to internal or external liberalization:¶ 3¶ labour force participation¶ rates and educational
attainment of women and men converged; real wages increased;¶ and child labour declined. Women’s
and children’s health and educational outcomes¶ improved(table6.1ofBerik,2008;table7.5ofDoraisami,2008).¶ 4¶ Thus,
employment segregation or gender wage gaps – may not¶ pick
it is important¶ to complement wage and employment analysis with broader gender well-being indicators in assessing gender impacts of trade
policies and to include absolute as well¶ as relative measures in evaluation.
14
Victimization DA
The link scenarios are too generalized- Women are not excluded or negatively effected
simply because they do not benefit from a trade policy. This victimizing move denies
agency and treats women as passive.
Feldman 2013
Shelley " SYMPOSIUM: WOMEN, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AND FOOD SOVEREIGNTY/SECURITY IN A
CHANGING WORLD: RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT, SUSTAINABILITY, AND GENDER RELATIONS" Cornell
Journal of Law and Public Policy Spring, 2013 International Professor of Development Sociology and
Director of the Feminist, Gender, & Sexuality Studies Program at Cornell University. She also is a Visiting
Fellow at Binghamton University. MI
Let me now briefly turn to the concept of women and gender relations to ask: how might we think about women differently from and in
relation to gender relations? What does the difference mean, and why might it matter? How might an awareness of the distinction between
women and gender relations contribute to shaping development policy and practice, as well as understandings of sustainability and food
security or food sovereignty? These questions, particularly as they relate to contemporary policy discourses, respond to the ongoing interest in
"bringing women into" the development process. While this interest recognizes women as subjects of development practice, and, in some
cases, acknowledges that women's interests, needs, and desires may differ from those of men (although one ought not assume that women
share interests or needs or have common desires), bringing women into development presumes that unless women are the direct recipients or
targets of intervention, they necessarily are "left out" of development. Such a framing also presumes that developmental interventions
primarily consist of targeting resources, programs, and new practices to particular constituents, 35 rather than to structural reforms to the
national economy or to changes related to the country's location within the world economy. To state this point differently, since
women
always reproduce themselves and their conditions of life and livelihood within a changing
development context, it is absurd to imagine that women could be left out of development simply
because they are neither the direct beneficiaries of new resources nor the targets of a specific
planned intervention.¶ These presumptions are grounded in two additional claims. First, it is only recently that the specific effects on
women of changes in the political economy, particularly those following in the wake of structural adjustment lending programs, have been
acknowledged. Worth noting here is that this acknowledgement follows the demands from broad-based international women's movements,
the U.N. General Assembly's declaration of 1975 as International Women's Year, the holding of the [*660] first World Conference on Women,
and, following the Conference's success, the affirmation of a U.N. Decade for Women (1976-1985). 36 Numerous world conferences that have
been held since then and sustained mobilizations continue to shape popular protest against financial crises and food shortages. But,
importantly, recognition
of women as victims of change does not acknowledge them as subjects of
development. For example, recognizing that the denationalization of enterprises or the privatization of
water has affected women in myriad ways suggests that development processes are always
consequential for women; yet the ways that women are active agents in change may still go
unrecognized. Thus, even when the distinctive ways that women benefit from economic reforms or
create opportunities that showcase their creditworthiness are acknowledged, they may still be
viewed as victims of development rather than as subjects of history.
15
Women’s participation in the global economy provides a basis for resisting dominating
forces of gender oppression.
Moghadam ’99
(Valentine, Prof. of Sociology @ Northeastern Univ., “Gender and Globalization: Female Labor and
Women’s Mobilization”, Journal of World Systems Research 5:2)
The above discussion highlights the ways in which women
have been incorporated into the global economy as a
source of relatively cheap labor, and the social-gender effects of economic globalization. The simultaneous emergence
and expansion of formal and informal employment among women can be explained in terms of labormarket segmentation, various management strategies to extract surplus-value or increase profitability, and (thus far) the depressed
status of unions. I have argued that the global economy is maintained by gendered labor, with definitions of skill,
allocation of resources, occupational distribution, and modes of remuneration shaped by asymmetrical gender relations and by gender
ideologies defining the roles and rights of men and women and of the relative value of their labor. But
the effects have not been
uniformly negative, for there have been unintended consequences of women’s economic
participation. Tiano (1994) and Kim (1997) provide detailed accounts of how women workers in the Mexican maquilas
and in a South Korean free export zone, respectively, accommodate and resist the dominating forces of global
capitalism and patriarchy. Others have shown that the entry of women into the labor force in such large
numbers has important implications for changes in gender relations and ideologies within the
household and the larger society, and for women’s gender consciousness and activism (Safa 1996).
16
Trade Lib k2 hum rights/environment
Turn-- Globalization is good for human rights- it creates economic conditions
necessary for rights, creates a global community that can pressure abusers, and
disincentives human rights abuse
Shelton 02 (Dinah. 2002. PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD. C hair of the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights. Former Law Professor @ George Washington University.
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review p.273. )
globalization
enhances human rights, leading to economic benefits and consequent political freedoms.91 The positive
contributions of globalization have even led to the proposal that it be accepted as a new human right.92 In general, trade theory
predicts a significant increase in global welfare stemming from globalization, indirectly enhancing the
attainment of economic conditions necessary for economic and social rights. Many thus believe that market
mechanisms and liberalized trade will lead to an improvement in the living standards of all people. Some also posit that free trade and
economic freedom are necessary conditions of political freedom, or at least contribute to the rule of
law that is an essential component of human rights.93 Certainly, globalization facilitates international
exchanges that overcome the confines of a single nation or a civilization, allowing participation in a global community.
There is also the possibility that economic power can be utilized to sanction human rights violators more
There is considerable debate over the question of whether or not globalization is good for human rights. One view is that
effectively. 94 Ease of movement of people, goods, and services are enhanced. Increased availability and more efficient
allocation of resources, more open and competitive production and improved governance could lead
to faster growth and more rights. In sum, Judith Bello argues that:¶ Trade liberalization promotes the growth
of stability-promoting middle class all over the globe; trade enhances efficiency and wealth and
thereby creates potential revenue for environmental protection. Trade creates jobs in developing as
well as developed countries, thereby reducing the pressure on both illegal immigration and illicit
drug trafficking.
¶
17
Economic openness from trade increases citizen commercial contact to the world—
that provides a contestation and challenge to hegemonic state forms.
Griswold 4
Daniel T, Director of the Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy. Studies at the Cato Institute, Trading Tyranny
for Freedom: ¶ How Open Markets Till the Soil for Democracy, Center for Trade Policy Studies, 1/6/2004)
Economic freedom and trade provide a¶ counterweight to governmental power. A free market diffuses
economic decisionmaking¶ among millions of producers and consumers¶ rather than leaving it in the hands of a few
centralized¶ government actors who could, and¶ often do, use that power to suppress or marginalize¶ political opposition. Milton
Friedman,¶ the Nobel-prize-winning economist, noted the¶ connection between economic and political¶ freedom
in his 1962 book, Capitalism and Freedom:¶ Viewed as a means to the end of political¶ freedom, economic
arrangements are¶ important because of their effect on the¶ concentration or dispersion of power.¶
The kind of economic organization that¶ provides economic freedom directly,¶ namely competitive capitalism,
also promotes¶ political freedom because it separates¶ economic power from political¶ power and in this
way enables the one to¶ offset the other.¶ This dispersion of economic control, in¶ turn, creates space for
nongovernmental organizations¶ and private-sector alternatives to¶ political leadership—in short, civil
society. A¶ thriving private economy creates sources of¶ funding for nonstate institutions, which in turn¶ can
provide ideas, influence, and leadership¶ outside the existing government. A more pluralistic¶ social and political culture
greatly¶ enhances the prospects for a more pluralistic¶ and representative political system. Privatesector¶
corporations, both domestic and foreign-¶ owned, create an alternate source of¶ wealth, influence, and leadership. Theologian¶ and social
thinker Michael Novak identified¶ this as the “Wedge Theory,” in which capitalist¶ practices “bring
contact with the ideas
and¶ practices of the free societies, generate the economic¶ growth that gives political confidence to¶ a
rising middle class, and raise up successful¶ business leaders who come to represent a political¶
alternative to military or party leaders. In¶ short, capitalist firms wedge a democratic¶ camel’s nose under the authoritarian
tent.”4
18
Mexico
Specifically for Mexico, the conversion to trade-based economic-reform promoted
gender equality and upward mobility for peasants
Aguayo-Tellez 10
( Ernesto, Professor of Economics at Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León, Did trade liberalisation
benefit women? The case of Mexico in the 1990s, VOX, http://www.voxeu.org/article/does-tradeliberalisation-empower-women-evidence-1990s-mexico)
¶ Starting in 1990, Mexico switched its opening strategy from implementing unilateral tariff reductions
to pursuing bilateral free trade agreements, which led to the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA reduced
Mexican tariffs from a maximum of 20% to zero with most of the reductions taking place immediately (Zabludovsky 2005). Owing to the bilateral nature of the agreement, US tariffs on Mexican
exports were also reduced, especially in industries such as textiles and clothing. ¶ Since more than 80% of Mexico's trade occurs with the US, the decline in tariffs on both sides of the border
resulted in dramatic increases in trade flows. Non-oil exports as a percent of Mexico’s GDP increased from 7.4% in 1990 to 25.8% in 2000. ¶ ¶ Mexico also implemented other
reforms that are likely to have amplified the effects of trade liberalisation policies. Among these:¶ ¶ Restrictions on foreign
ownership of assets were eased starting in 1989.¶ Before this change, foreign direct investment occurred exclusively through the
“maquiladoras,” the export-assembly establishments which were largely foreign-owned (Hanson 2007). With the signing of NAFTA, not only did these
firms continue to grow but foreign firms engaged in similar export assembly activity also increased. ¶ In
the agricultural sector, tariffs were reduced, price supports were eliminated, and the Mexican Constitution was amended to
allow the “ejidatarios”, peasants who had worked the land, to gain property rights and be able to sell their land
(McMillan et al. 2007).¶ The result was a dramatic change in industrial structure within a decade.¶ ¶ Table 1 shows the distribution of employment across
major industries in 1990 and 2000, as well as the share of workers in the industry who were female. Notably agriculture and fishing
declined from 15.1% in 1990 to 9.4% in 2000. Since women accounted for just 3% of the employment
in these sectors, this negatively impacted men relative to women.
¶
19
Cuba
Economic engagement promotes the democratization and economic opportunities in
Cuba—the very presence of the embargo operates as an excuse for human rights
violations
Griswold 4
Daniel T, Director of the Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy. Studies at the Cato Institute, Trading Tyranny for
Freedom: ¶ How Open Markets Till the Soil for Democracy, Center for Trade Policy Studies, 1/6/2004)
Closer to home, in Cuba, expanded trade¶ with the United States would be a far more¶ promising policy
to encourage political reform¶ than the failed four-decades-old economic¶ embargo. Since 1960, Americans
have been¶ barred from trading with, investing in, or traveling¶ to Cuba. Besides infringing on the freedom¶ of Americans,
the embargo has made life even¶ more difficult for the people of Cuba and has¶ perversely handed
Fidel Castro a convenient¶ excuse for the failures of his socialist experiment.¶ But just as importantly, the
embargo has blunted¶ the positive impact that expanding trade and¶ contact with Americans could have on Cuban¶ civil society. Cuba does
trade with Canada and¶ Western Europe, but potential trade with the¶ United States would be far
greater. Based on the¶ evidence of this study, the U.S. government¶ could more effectively promote political and¶
civil freedom in Cuba by allowing more trade¶ and travel than by maintaining the embargo .¶ The folly of
imposing trade sanctions in the¶ name of promoting human rights abroad is that¶ sanctions deprive
people in the target countries¶ of the technological tools and economic opportunities¶ that nurture
political freedom.¶ In Central America, negotiations for a free¶ trade agreement between the United
States¶ and the five members of the Central American Common Market could be completed and a¶ final agreement
considered by Congress as¶ early as 2004. The Central American Free¶ Trade Agreement will be vigorously debated¶ on its
economic merits, but the results of this¶ study argue that a free trade agreement will¶ have important and positive political and foreign-¶ policy
implications for the region. As¶ recently as the 1980s, Central
America was¶ convulsed by civil strife, internal
repression,¶ and violent communist insurgencies. Today all¶ five CAFTA countries are democracies
that¶ have progressively opened themselves to trade¶ with the United States and the rest of the¶ world. A free
trade agreement with the United¶ States would institutionalize trade reform in¶ the region and with it
reinforce the region’s¶ trend toward more stable democracy and full¶ respect for human rights and
political freedom.¶ If members of Congress reject CAFTA on¶ parochial economic grounds, they will in fact¶ be voting to undercut the region’s
trend toward¶ greater political and civil freedom, and with it¶ our national interest in a more stable and¶ democratic hemisphere.
20
ECON RATIONALITY
Starting with a critique of the rational male subject fails to capture the complexity of
women's oppression, defining it solely through exclusion. This denies women's
capacity for self affirmation and choice.
Jose 00
Jose (Jim, “Contesting Patrilineal Descent in Political Theory: James Mill and Nineteenth-Century
Feminism Author”, winter, 2k (2000), head of politics discipline, PhD in Politics, Master of Arts in Politics,
Bachelor degree in Politics and Philosophy current head of Politics Discipline at Newcastle in Australia,
Assistant Dean of Research at the Newcastle School of Business and Law)
Although sexual inequality is real, feminism is also real, and it provides a glimpse of a "shadow world" (MacKinnon 1989, 104) of possibilities for women. Women
are what they are (which is reflected in yet not exhausted by what they are said to be), but they are (or could be) something more or something else. The
evidence of women's reality beyond the reality of their experience of inequality is the awareness that
they could be more than they are allowed to be, that is, its evidence is feminism. If sexual inequality were not real,
feminism would not exist. If it were exhaustive of the real, feminism could not exist. Feminism exists at the intersection of the reality
of women's oppression and their reality as complete human beings and affirms the reality of both.
The Enlightenment epistemology that is central to liberalism-the detached, rational subject knowing
a separate, static object-is insufficient to capture this complex reality.
MacKinnon thus requires an epistemic position
that locates itself within the dynamics of the existing social system of gender in- equality (because women are never "outside" it) and yet is not wholly determined
by that system (because women are not reducible to it). Mind and world are neither detached nor collapsed but interpenetrated. The necessary intersection of the
reality of women's inequality and the reality of women as self-determining human beings is not always appreciated by MacKin- non's commentators. Often,
MacKinnon is presented as someone who seeks to sensitize her audience to women's victimization without pointing them beyond it (Brown 1996, 94; Elshtain 1997,
253; Ring 1987, 470). Consider, for example, Cornell's (1991, 128-9) charac- terization: MacKinnon is a "realist" in two senses. First, she is a "realist" in that she
argues for a descriptive methodology in which the reality of gender difference, understood as a determinate presence that determines individual identity as
sexualized, is traced and brought to consciousness. Thus, she argues against those... who have argued that social and legal reality is indeterminate. Secondly, and in
a related manner, MacKinnon is a realist in the colloquial sense that she insists that women face up to reality. We must confront what male domination has done to
us, rather than try to see the world of gender hierarchy through rose-colored glasses. Cornell suggests that MacKinnon sees women's op- pression as constitutive of
women's reality. This is partly accurate insofar as MacKinnon criticizes those who abstract from existing inequality to view women as essentially free. But what
Cornell ignores is that Mac- Kinnon herself then abstracts from that inequality in order to argue that oppression
is not exhaustive of
women's reality. If it were, radical feminism would be no more than a celebration of victimhood, a
worldview that denies women's capacity for choice and self- determination. Instead, the emancipatory potential in
women's consciousness of the existing inequality is affirmed by MacKinnon (1989, 91) as essential to the development of feminist consciousness: "Women experienced the walls that have contained them as walls- and sometimes walked through them." She may criti- cize liberals who focus their attention on protecting the
individuality of the exceptions to the rule without questioning why the rule-pervasive factual inequali- ties between the sexes-persists, but she cannot help but rely
on the existence of "exceptions" to the perva- siveness of patriarchy in order to advance her own arguments
21
ENVIRONMENTALISM
Climate crisis necessitates immediate solutions and social interpretations of human
relationships must come after that.
MacGregor 2010
Sherilyn MacGregor, “Gender and Climate Change: From Impacts to Discourses”, School of Politics,
International Relations & Philosophy
Research Centre for the Study of Politics, International Relations &
Environment Keele University, UK. 2010.
Climate change arguably represents the largest challenge humankind has ever faced. The predicted and
observable impacts of climate change are frightening. The scientific consensus about these projections, expressed by the IPCC among others,
has shifted the debate away from the question of whether or not anthropogenic climate change is happening toward debates about what is to
be done by whom, when, and how. It seems that support for ‘extreme’ and exceptional measures is growing in many quarters. We need carbon
taxes, nuclear power, GMOs and population control because we have no time
to wait for more socially complicated
alternatives. As in most crisis situations (such as in times of war), critical reflection on the unjust
human relationships that may have led to the crisis, and the intellectual tools that are used to
interpret the impacts and devise potential solutions, is dismissed as a luxury that we can’t afford.
Understanding the gender politics of climate change is clearly not an urgent enough priority for it to
be on the agenda.
22
OIL
23
Generic
Oil scarcity exacerbates structural violence and disproportionately effects women and
minorities.
Barbara 07
Santa. Joanne Santa Barbara. Professor at McMaster University. “Future Wars- Impacts of Health”. VB.
Humans have a difficult time recognizing and responding to phenomena that occur slowly by human time scales. There
are three such
phenomena occurring now, two of which are already causing wars, and the other of which can be
expected to do so soon. These are human population growth, the peaking of petroleum production, and
climate change. Wars caused by these phenomena will affect the whole population, of course, but will have
differential effects on women and children as described above. Human population, a fairly stable 10,000 — 500,000 for most
of human history, has swung upwards extremely dramatically in the last several hundred years, especially since access to cheap fossil fuel
energy increased food production potential. In some areas, competition of dense population for limited land and water has resulted in war. This
may have been one of the contributing factors to the genocide in Rwanda. Competition for scarce water and land is recognized as one of the
causes of the current ugly war in Darfur. As a cause of war, this factor can be expected to increase in importance as human population
continues to grow and meanwhile, needed resources, damaged by human activity, continue to shrink. Most frightening, the expected midcentury population plateau at 10-11 million depends on rising standards of living, which may not occur because of the following factors to be
discussed. It is likely that we have reached global peak production of oil, and the gap between demand and supply will increasingly widen. The
advancing oil scarcity has enormous implications for sudden shocks to the financial, social and
political structures of all societies that depend on oil for energy. There is reason to think that there
will be more violent political conflict in the future over access to and control of fossil fuels 1401. This is
likely to involve major powers who want oil, control over oil, or control over the currency in which oil
exchanges are made [41], as well as factions in oil-producing countries. Because of likely financial, social and political strains to all
societies those already stressed by social divisions will also be at risk of violent conflict. We are seeing
some of this now, with wars in Afghanistan and Iraq at least partly, perhaps mainly, to secure oil and gas supplies. There is also
tension with Venezuela, Uzbekistan, Mindanao in the Philippines and in Nigeria, all fossil fuel producing areas. There is now
and will be more political and military competition for dwindling oil and gas. Inequities between rich and poor
countries and between rich and poor in each country may increase; the poor are energy-poor. (ie no electric light). There is a risk of
more human rights abuse (consider Nigeria), reversing development, reduction of environmental protection, increasing the sphere of
control by governments. Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals is seriously threatened. There is possible increased
risk of use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in this setting. These problems will be
exacerbated by the projected impacts of climate change. Global ecosystems are already showing negative impacts of
global warming due to increased levels of carbon dioxide produced by human use of fossil fuels. Rising sea levels, increased desertification,
violent weather patterns and unbalanced ecosystems will have direct impacts
24
No link – There is no causation between increasing oil drilling and patriarchy.
Groh and Rothschild 12
Matthew Groh and Casey Rothschild, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2012, 7: 69–87, Oil, Islam,
Women, and Geography: A Comment on Ross (2008), (Matthew Groh specializes in impact evaluations,
microfinance, and labor markets; before joining the World Bank, he was a project associate at
Innovations for Poverty Action in Cairo, Egypt. Casey Rothschild is a professor of economics at Wellesley
College.) JU
We have argued that the empirical support for Ross’s claim that ‘‘oil, not Islam’’ is at fault for the lagging progress towards gender equality in
the Middle East is quite weak. We
find Ross’s theoretical argument that natural resource wealth could play a
role in gender equality dynamics eminently reasonable, and it seems plausible that oil plays some role
in these dynamics. Our point is simply that Ross’s empirical work does not support his underlying
theory: his data do not provide robust evidence that low rates of female labor force participation in the
Middle East are driven by a gendered Dutch Disease; they do not provide much evidence that oil is an
important driver of female labor force participation rates at all; and they provide some mild evidence
that Islam is. The relative importance of kinship ties, agricultural history, oil, Islam, and other factors, and the mechanisms through which
they affect gender equality is still an open question. Concluding that‘‘[t]he persistence of patriarchy in the Middle
East has relatively little to do with Islam, but much to do with the region’s oil-based economy’’ is
premature.
25
No link - Ross’s study is flawed and the results are due to extreme outliers.
Pippa Norris, Politics & Gender / Volume 5 / Issue 04 / December 2009, pp 553-560, Petroleum
Patriarchy? A Response to Ross (Pippa Norris is the McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and ARC Laureate Fellow and Professor of
Government at the University of Sydney) JU
First, a number of doubts arise from the case study evidence. As Mounira Charrad points out elsewhere in this special
issue, the choice of illustrative case studies is inevitably somewhat selective, and different paired comparisons of countries, such as contrasts
between Morocco and Tunisia, can generate alternative interpretations. If
the resource curse is defined more broadly than
oil and gas production —as it should be— then of course the comparison would have to account for
cases such as South Africa, an economy founded upon gold and diamonds—and yet one where
women have always made their voices felt effectively, through engagement in the antiapartheid
struggles as well as by currently representing more than 43.5% of all members of parliament.
Alternatively it might have been more persuasive to select cases from non-Muslim petroleum- and
gas-rich states outside of the Middle East, such as Venezuela or Russia, although both of these societies fail to
provide a good fit for the thesis, and energy-rich Norway and Canada (and Scotland?) are obviously even more extreme outliers. Ross’s
discussion of the Republic of Korea (South Korea), as an illustration of the way that industrialization and women’s entry into the workforce has
opened doors to political representation, is somewhat unconvincing. The country currently ranks 87th worldwide in the proportion of women
in parliament, well below the world average. Instead, a detailed discussion of particular historical cases, showing how patriarchy has been
strengthened or weakened in economies that became more or less dependent upon mineral resources, would also have greatly strengthened
the argument. Patriarchal
cultures in Arab states did not spring up overnight in the mid-nineteenth
century as the result of the discovery and commercial exploitation of refined petroleum; they have
enduring historical roots that predate the discovery and production of oil. In the extreme cases of states such as
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, where women continue to lack the legal right to vote and to stand for office, it also remains unclear
theoretically how any amount of female participation in the labor force will eventually facilitate women’s representation in decision making.
Moreover, closer scrutiny of the data presented as evidence in the descriptive Figures 3–6 contained in the Ross study quickly reveals that any
statistical relationship between oil rents and the economic and political status of women in the Middle East is due primarily to three main
outliers – Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (and, to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia). From
observing the descriptive
scatter-plots, in most other Arab states, once these countries are excluded there appears to be almost
no linear relationship between oil rents per capita and any of the dependent variables, including
female participation in the nonagricultural labor force; the year of female suffrage (where Saudi Arabia and
the United Arab Emirates are coded, curiously, as allowing women to vote, although this has not yet occurred); the proportion of
parliamentary seats held by women; and gender rights. By contrast, the scatter-grams highlight that substantial variation
needs to be explained in all of these indicators of gender equality among those Arab states that have few or no revenues from oil rents. As we
shall demonstrate later, a worldwide comparison demonstrates even weaker relationships between petroleum and patriarchy.
26
No link – Ross’s links between oil and gender problems are underdeveloped. Some oilrich states, like Canada and Norway,
Pippa Norris, Politics & Gender / Volume 5 / Issue 04 / December 2009, pp 553-560, Petroleum
Patriarchy? A Response to Ross (Pippa Norris is the McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and ARC Laureate Fellow and Professor of
Government at the University of Sydney) JU
Secondly, questions
can also be raised about the econometric models that Ross uses to account for the
proportion of women in parliament. From an institutional perspective, the suspicion remains that the controls that he
incorporates into his models may be misspecified in one important regard. As Alice Kang emphasizes (in this issue), Ross
controls for the impact of proportional representation in electoral systems with closed lists, but he
does not examine the role of different types of affirmative action used for women in elected office.
Reserved seats have long been used in Muslim-majority countries, including Pakistan and Bangladesh (Norris 2007). Researchers also need to
consider the contemporary popularity of voluntary and legal gender quotas for parliamentary candidates, as well as the interaction between
the type of electoral system and the quota system (Dahlerup 2006; International IDEA 2008; Krook 2009; Norris 2004). Elsewhere in this issue,
Kang presents clear evidence that where quotas are introduced in mineral-rich nations, the effects on
women’s representation are indeterminate. Ross theorizes that oil rents per capita should have 1) a direct role in shaping
female labor force participation, and they should thereby also have 2) an additional indirect effect on women’s representation in parliament.
This suggests that properly specified cross-national regression models should include an interaction effect in order to monitor the impact of oil
rents combined with female labor force participation on women’s representation.
It also remains unclear theoretically from
his arguments why the value of oil production is expected to have any direct impact on women’s
parliamentary representation. Some plausible reasons could always be constructed, for example, concerning the way that the
resource curse depresses the process of democratization, and as a result this may, in turn, limit the expansion of human rights, including
women’s equality. Torbin Iversen and Frances Rosenbluth (2008) present the argument that low levels of female labor force participation
contribute to female underrepresentation in democratic polities by reinforcing traditional voter attitudes toward women (a demand-side
feature) and by constraining the supply of women with professional experience and resources who are capable of mounting credible electoral
campaigns. Whatever
the precise underlying reason, the linkages in the argument presented in the Ross
study remain underdeveloped. Interms ofmeasures,there are also certain pros and cons associated with the use of oil rents per
capita to examine the impact of the resource curse. Ideally, a broader measure of nonrenewable natural resources would capture the
underlying logic of the core argument more precisely; if the oil and gas extraction industries are overwhelmingly male dominated, then so too is
the workforce mining gold, diamonds, and copper. Since the extraction and distribution of natural commodities forms a critical part of the
economy in many diverse regions of the world, a measure that reflects a more comprehensive basket of these resources would also help to
disentangle the complex effects of Muslim religious faith and oil. Moreover, the theoretical link between the value of oil rents per capita and
the structure of the labor market may also prove tenuous. In some cases, such as Trinidad and Tobago, energy production generates about 40%
of the GDP and 80% of exports, but only 5% of employment. It is also worth noting that even in economies heavily dependent on oil production
for revenue, this does not mean that manual work directly in this industry engages the largest sector of the workforce, by any means.
For example, the petroleum industry in Saudi Arabia accounts for roughly 80%of budget revenues, 45%of the GDP, and 90% of export earnings,
but nevertheless almost three-quarters of the Saudi workforce is employed in the service sector. Rather than oil revenues per capita, a stricter
test of the structural claim would therefore be to examine the relationship between the proportion of the labor force employed by this sector
of the economy and the representation of women in elected office. The Ross measure of oil rents per capita also generates some
counterintuitive patterns compared with our popular image of oil-rich states; in 2006, for example, oil rents per capita are twice as high in
Trinidad and Tobago as in Saudi Arabia. The
socially egalitarian welfare states of Norway and Canada also have
particularly high oil rents per capita by this measure, more so than Venezuela, Russia, Iraq, Iran, and
Nigeria. This clearly suggests the need for considerable caution in generalizing about patterns of
gender equality worldwide from our cultural stereotypes about oil-rich states.
27
No link- Your oil link is not true for Mexico
Ross 08. Michael L. Ross. “Oil, Islam, and Women”. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 102, No. 1 (Feb., 2008), pp. 107123.
This study also has implications for our understand ing of the "resource curse," a term that refers to the political and economic
ailments of mineral-producing states. Earlier studies found that oil-producing states tend to have more frequent civil wars (Collier and
Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003); less democ racy (Ross 2001a; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004); and possibly, slower economic
growth (Sachs and Warner 1995). This study suggests that the production of oil and gas?and potentially, other
minerals?also influences a country's social structure, a topic that has received little attention .9 Oil not
only hinders democracy; it also hinders more equitable gender relations. Of course, oil wealth does not necessarily harm
the status of women. Seven countries have produced significant quantities of oil and gas, but still
made faster progress on gender equality than we would ex pect based on their income: Norway, New Zealand,
Australia, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Syria, and Mexico. The first three countries are probably excep tions to the
general pattern because of reasons implied by the model: since women already had a large pres ence in the nontraded sector (thanks
to the size and diversification of these economies), rising oil exports did not crowd them out of the labor market. The two Central Asian
states were strongly affected by many years of Soviet rule, which promoted the role of women through administrative fiat; this may
have inoculated them against oil-induced patriarchy. Perhaps the most interesting exceptions are Syria and
Mexico: women in both states may have benefited from many years of rule by secular, left-of-center
par ties that showed an interest in women's rights. Mexico also gained from its proximity to the US.
market, which allowed it develop a large, low-wage export-oriented manufacturing sector along the
border?which pulled women into the labor market despite the flow of oil rents. These cases show that
both good fortune, and a committed government, can sometimes counteract fortune, and a
committed government, can sometimes counteract the perverse effects of oil on the status of women.
28
AT Ross
Ross’s study is incomplete in that it does not take the culture of the areas he studies
into account.
Pippa Norris, Politics & Gender / Volume 5 / Issue 04 / December 2009, pp 553-560, Petroleum
Patriarchy? A Response to Ross (Pippa Norris is the McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and ARC Laureate Fellow and Professor of
Government at the University of Sydney) JU
Lastly, leaving aside these issues for the moment, as legitimate questions where interpretations based on empirical issues of evidence,
methodology, and measures can and do differ, there is still one remaining major lacuna to the resource curse thesis, representing the “dog
which did not bark.” Although
Ross’s argument is explicitly framed theoretically to reject cultural
explanations, in fact the study does not consider any direct evidence concerning attitudes and values.
Thus, the analysis is unable to test successive rival models that monitor how the public feels about
women and men’s roles in the workforce, family and public life, moral values toward sexuality, or any
other direct measures about the strength of religiosity or religious identities and beliefs derived from
public opinion. Asaproxymeasureofculture,RosscontrolsfortheproportionofMuslim adherents in each society. This measure
(usually based on fairly crude estimates) does not take into account important variations among
Muslim societies in the type of regime, levels of human development, and the official role of religion
in the state, as well as contrasts between Sunni and Shi’a. For example, Muslims are over 90% of the population in
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Mali, and Indonesia, yet according to Freedom House (2009), Egypt and Saudi Arabia are some of the most repressive
autocracies around the world, while today Mali and Indonesia are electoral democracies. H. Rizzo, A. H. Abdel-Latif, and K. Meyer (2007) have
emphasized that the comparison of all Islamic societies may overlook important distinctions, since attitudes towards gender equality and
sexuality in Arab cultures are expected to be substantially more traditional than those of Asian Islamic cultures.
29
Alt cause
There are alt causes to patriarchy in oil-producing states.
Pippa Norris, Politics & Gender / Volume 5 / Issue 04 / December 2009, pp 553-560, Petroleum
Patriarchy? A Response to Ross (Pippa Norris is the McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and ARC Laureate Fellow and Professor of
Government at the University of Sydney) JU
Ross concludesthat “[t]he persistence of patriarchy in the Middle East has relatively little to do with Islam, but much to do with the region’s oilbased economy” (2008, 120). Without
any direct survey evidence, however, the more cautious approach
would be to remain agnostic in estimating how much the resource curse matters, compared with
alternative cultural and institutional explanations in the literature. Therefore, the research literature presents a
wealth of evidence that the resource curse can probably be blamed fora multitude of ills, from conflict and civil war to anemic economic
growth, corruption, state capture, and the contemporary push-back in Russia and Venezuela against the forces of democratization. But
it
has not yet been clearly established whether the resource curse, at least petroleum, is a major factor
at the heart of the problems concerning the continuing gender disparities in elected office among
Arab states.
30
L/T- Mexico
L/T: Oil rigs are sites of ‘un-doing’ gender in which men un-perform their masculinity
and rupture the link between their workplace and gender binaries.
Ely & Meyerson 12
(Robin, Harvard Business School; Debra, Stanford University; “An organizational approach to undoing
gender: The unlikely case of offshore oil platforms”, Research in Organizational Behavior Volume 30,
2010, Pages 3–34. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0191308510000079)//SK
The platforms of 10 years earlier were like the masculine workplaces described in the literature –
where men's behavior centered on appearing physically tough, technically infallible, and emotionally
detached – but Rex and Comus were different. These platforms, built and staffed in the new, safety-conscious era,
presented a stark contrast to the platforms on which many employees had started their careers. An OIM and 27-year veteran of the
company reflected on the differences: [Then] the field foremen were kind of like a pack of lions. The guy that was in charge was the one who
could basically out-perform and out-shout and out-intimidate all the others. That's just how it worked out here on drilling rigs and in
production. So those people went to the top, over other people's bodies in some cases. Intimidation was the name of the game…. They decided
who the driller was by fighting. If the job came open, the one that was left standing was the driller. It was that rowdy. But it's not like that at all
now. I mean we don’t even horseplay like we used to. There's no physical practical jokes anymore. Most stuff now is just good-natured joking.
An electrician offered the following reflection: Ten, twelve years ago I just couldn’t imagine sitting down with somebody like you and talking
about these kinds of things. It was way more macho then than it is now. It was like, “Hey, this is a man's world. If you can’t cut it here, boy, you
don’t need to be here.” Now
there is a little bit more of, “Let's learn what people are about,” a little bit more
about the personal and interpersonal relationships and that kind of stuff. A production operator, who described
the platform environment of the past as “macho,” noted that now “there's room for both the softer side and the other one.” He elaborated on
the change as follows. [We had to be taught] how to be more lovey-dovey and more friendly with each other and to get in touch with the more
tender side of each other type of thing. And all of us just laughed at first. It was like, man, this is never going to work, you know? But now you
can really tell the difference. Even though we kid around and joke around with each other, there's no malice in it. We are a very different group
now than we were when we first got together—kinder, gentler people. Importantly, these men did not repudiate traditionally masculine traits –
in fact, they acted on them when the work demanded it – but they did not seem focused on proving them. As one worker noted, “we know
what we’re doing, but we don’t need to prove ourselves, [whereas] guys [in other places] lift their leg and pee on everything.” Similarly,
another described “machoness” as “something I don’t worry about.” Likewise, these men did not abdicate power, but they expressed it without
bravado. A 40-year-old production operator described how he and his male coworkers had undergone a change in the way they thought about
themselves in this regard: I started working offshore when I was 17. Back then, there was much more profanity, much more posturing. If you
didn’t posture yourself in a position of power, then you set yourself up for ridicule. But over the years, with company training… people have
learned that you don’t have to present yourself in that fashion to gain power. You don’t have to use profanity to make a statement that carries
power. Everyone
– workers, managers, contractors – attributed this break from the past to the
company-wide initiative to make safety its highest priority: “macho” behavior was unsafe and
therefore simply unacceptable. We extend that analysis. Our data suggest that the company's safety initiative was indeed the
catalyst that made Rex and Comus different from their predecessors, but our data also suggest that the difference represented more than a
behavioral response to prohibitions about acting in unsafe ways: it
represented a fundamental difference in orientation
toward work, the self, and others. Our key insight is that cultural practices on Rex and Comus, largely stemming from the
organization's safety initiative, directed men away from the goal of proving masculinity and oriented
them instead toward goals that were incompatible with upholding a masculine image — the safety
and well-being of their coworkers and advancing the company's mission. The pursuit of these goals
released men from the performance of masculinity commonly associated with dangerous work: in contrast
to other dangerous workplaces, including platforms of an earlier era, platform workers readily conceded their physical limitations, publicly
revealed their mistakes and shortcomings, and openly shared their fears and anxieties while demonstrating sensitivity to others’. We call this
second set of goals “collectivistic” goals because they involve contributing to the well-being of the whole rather than garnering acceptance or
admiration for the self (Crocker and Canevello, 2008 and Crocker et al., 2009). Research shows that people regard these goals as more
meaningful than image goals because they satisfy a basic human need for relatedness and thus are inherently more rewarding to pursue
(Baumeister and Leary, 1995, Deci and Ryan, 2000 and Sheldon et al., 2004; for a review, see Podolny et al., 2005, and Rosso, Dekas, &
Wrzesniewski, in press). When people perceive that efforts to validate their self-image would compromise these goals, they are often willing to
risk their self-image – for instance they risk being seen as incompetent or weak – not out of virtue or self-sacrifice, but because they see taking
such risks as necessary in order to accomplish higher priority goals (Crocker, Niiya, & Mischkowski, 2008). A mechanic illustrated this rationale,
noting that to worry about his image would have undermined his work: “When we need to get to the root cause of a problem or to
troubleshoot something, we talk freely to each other rather than worrying about what he thinks of me.” In short, our findings suggest that
31
collectivistic goals superseded image goals in men's interactions on Rex and Comus, disrupting men's compliance with societal gender norms.
We use this case, together with 10 published field studies as a point of comparison, to develop theory about how an organization's cultural
practices bring about and sustain this disruption. We begin by describing platform workers’ interactions in order to establish in this setting the
phenomenon we seek to explain and to document it in detail. We then describe the cultural conditions that appeared to facilitate those
interactions, based on a comparison of the platforms’ culture with the organizational cultures described in the published field studies. Based on
these findings, we propose a theoretical model of how men
key sites for intervention and change.
“do” and “undo” gender, in which organizations can be
32
US/LA RELATIONS
33
Dem Promo Good
We control UX---promoting democracy in Latin America now is necessary because
inaction allows inequity and violence to continue.
Gershman 12
(Carl, President of the National Endowment for Democracy, “Latin America and the Worldwide
Movement for Democracy”, Address in the Congress of the Republic of Peru, National Endowment for
Democracy, OCT 12, 2012, http://www.ned.org/about/board/meet-our-president/archivedpresentations-and-articles/latin-america-and-the-worldwide-m)//SK
By delegative democracy, O’Donnell meant a system in which leaders are elected but the institutions needed to hold them accountable for
their performance in office are lacking, above all a strong and effective legislature. He warned that delegative
democracies would
experience an endless cycle of crisis, as presidents would be elected by making sweeping promises to save the country,
but once in office would unilaterally enact measures at variance with their promises and lacking public
support or understanding. (At the time, the new democracies in Latin America were under pressure to
negotiate unpopular “stabilization packages” with international financial institutions.) Since these policies
did not have buy-in from representative political parties and legislatures, which didn’t exist in most new democracies, the result would
be a lot of squabbling and blame-placing, a decline in the prestige and legitimacy of parties and politicians
generally, and public cynicism about democracy that populist demagogues would be able to exploit. The
deficiencies of delegative democracy described by O’Donnell have been exacerbated in Latin America by two
other problems – extremely high levels of economic inequality and alarming rates of criminal violence.
These problems, of course, are not unrelated to each other since persisting high levels of inequality create vast pools of hopeless and excluded
people who can be preyed upon by criminal networks and drug traffickers. The
result has been an alarming epidemic of
violence and killing in many Latin American countries. According to the FLACSO Secretary General Francisco Rojas
Aravena, 40% of the murders and 60% of the kidnappings in the world occur in Latin America, even though the region contains only 8% of the
world’s population. Four of the five countries in the world with homicide rates higher than 40 per 100,000 inhabitants are in Central America,
and the fifth country is Venezuela where independent observers place the current homicide rate at 70 per 100,000, the highest in the world
after Honduras.
34
AT Paternalism
US economic policies towards Latin America will not invoke paternalism but will
promote socioeconomic aid.
Sholar & Sanchez 12
(Megan A., PhD at Loyola University of Chicago; Peter M, PhD at Loyola University of Chicago; “Power
and Principle: A New US Policy for Latin America”, International Journal of Humanities and Social
Science, Vol. 2 No. 23; December 2012,
http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_2_No_23_December_2012/3.pdf)//SK
Next, the United States should introduce a socioeconomic development program for Latin America. In
1961, John F. Kennedy unveiled the Alliance for Progress, a bold, new U.S. policy initiative that called for Latin America’s socioeconomic
transformation and development. The region was delighted with the Alliance and to this date there are literally hundreds of schools in the
region named after Kennedy. The United States, via the Washington consensus, pressured the countries of the region to adopt neoliberal
economic policies in the 1980s—policies that would help the US economy by opening the region to US exports. Latin America, for the most part
although with hesitance, embraced these policies even though they were, and continue to be, disruptive politically and economically.
Washington needs to ensure that these policies yield economic benefits for the region and thus
should establish a new policy that helps the countries of the region with debt payments and to
weather economic transformation. One drawback with Kennedy’s Alliance was that it also had a dark, militaristic side. Since the
Alliance was designed principally to minimize the appeal of communism, the US government also provided large amounts of military aid to the
militaries of the region, helping to undermine democracies and to over institutionalize the region’s armed forces. Since America currently faces
no substantial threat in Latin America, a bold,
new economic policy toward the region does not require a military
dimension. Rather than instituting controversial initiatives such as Plan Colombia, the United States
should instead assist the nations of the region in developing their civilian institutions— but only if
those nations want assistance. Finally, any new economic policy for Latin America should promote
competitive capitalism rather than promote the interests of large corporations in both the United
States and Latin America.
Link turn- economic and democratic development through aid is a move away from
imperialist policy
Sholar & Sanchez 12
(Megan A., PhD at Loyola University of Chicago; Peter M, PhD at Loyola University of Chicago; “Power
and Principle: A New US Policy for Latin America”, International Journal of Humanities and Social
Science, Vol. 2 No. 23; December 2012,
http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_2_No_23_December_2012/3.pdf)//SK
As such, we argue that if it wants to preserve its hegemony in Latin America, the United States must find ways to provide the following to the
subordinate states: 1
. An international economic regime that yields greater prosperity for the subordinate
states in the system.
2. A democratic domestic political model and international political regime that promote the stated values of the American
political system—self-determination, liberty, and human rights. Only if the United States promotes and defends these models, and ensures that they yield collective
goods, will the countries in the region see America as the legitimate leader for the long term. The
most effective manner in which to
accomplish these goals is for the United States to promulgate what many would perceive as a more ethical
regional policy, or one that will promote the economic and democratic development of the countries in
the region.
US policy-makers will have to conduct a wise balancing act between US interests and regional interests, ensuring that their decisions do not
always veer toward the selfish preservation of US interests at the expense of the interests of the subordinate states and the values that it says it is trying to
promote. If key collective goods— security, democracy, self-determination, and prosperity—are not a by-product of the US hegemonic system, then the Latin
American states will be increasingly hesitant to accept America’s leadership and will look for opportunities to defect.
35
Inclusion of Brazil and Mexico into the international sphere and markets proves the
success of US policy in LA.
Guedes & Faria 10
(Ana, Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration; Alex, Getulio Vargas Foundation;
“International management, business and relations in Latin America”, critical perspectives on
international business, Vol. 6 No. 2/3, 2010, pp. 145-161,
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/journals.htm?articleid=1865451&show=abstract)//SK
The historical reason for downplaying developing countries in IR is the argument that these countries
do not possess the necessary resources to frame and tackle major international issues, especially those
related to security and warfare (Acharya and Buzan, 2007). Moreover, in accordance with (neo) realism, a key issue is that developing countries
or regions are potential threats to the great power(s). Accordingly, it is very unlikely that a critical perspective in IR from Iran and North Korea
would be endorsed by the Euro-American world. This
is not necessarily the case of Latin America for two main
reasons. First, the region has been portrayed in the USA as an example of successful domestication (see
Ayerbe, 2002) – in spite of contrary evidence. Second, is the increasing economic importance of the region in the post-Cold War. The region
makes up “a major part of the emerging market world [. . .] about 1/6 of the population of the rest of
the emerging world (discounting China and India) and a slightly larger percentage of GDP” (Grosse, 2007, p. 1);
moreover, Brazil and Mexico have been classified as emerging economies by agencies and authors (e.g.,
Aulakh et al. 2000). These issues helps explain why authors informed by IPE have partially succeeded in putting Latin America into the IR
debates (Tickner, 2003a; Tickner and Wæver, 2009).
36
VIEW FROM NOWHERE
If it's true that all knowledge is situated, feminist standpoints are no less biased and
distorted than that of experts. Given this, there is no justification to prefer one
situated epistemology over another.
Rolin 06
(Kristina is an Academy of Finland Research Fellow at Helsinki School of Economics. Her main areas of
research are philosophy of science and epistemology, with emphasis on social epistemology and
feminist epistemology. She has published articles in Philosophy of Science, Social Epistemology,
Perspectives on Science, and Hypatia. “The Bias Paradox in Feminist Standpoint Epistemology”
Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 3.1 (2006)
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/episteme/v003/3.1rolin.html)
Sandra Harding's feminist standpoint epistemology is an ambitious and controversial attempt to argue that diversity among inquirers is an epistemic advantage to a community of inquirers.
According to Harding, epistemic advantage accrues not to just any kind of diversity but to diversity with respect to the social positions of inquirers and participants in their studies. Harding's
feminist standpoint epistemology advances the claim that those who are unprivileged with respect to their social positions are likely to be
privileged with respect to gaining knowledge of social reality. According to Harding, unprivileged social positions are likely to generate
perspectives that are "less partial and less distorted" than perspectives generated by other social positions (Harding 1991, 121; see also pages 138
and 141). I call this claim the thesis of epistemic privilege. The thesis of epistemic privilege is connected to a particular conception of objectivity, "strong objectivity," which is the view that
objective research starts from the lives of unprivileged groups (Harding 1991, 150; see also page 142). Diversity with respect to social positions is beneficial for knowledge-seeking communities
because there are many ways of being unprivileged. As Harding explains, "the subject of feminist knowledge – the agent of these less partial and distorted descriptions and explanations – must
epistemic privilege has been criticized on two grounds. One
objection is that Harding's feminist standpoint epistemology does not provide any standards of epistemic
justification that enable one to judge some socially grounded perspectives as better than others. Another objection is that there is no evidence in support of the thesis of epistemic
be multiple and even contradictory" (1991, 284). The thesis of
privilege. These two objections are connected. As long as it is not [End Page 125] clear what standards of epistemic justification allow one to judge some socially grounded perspectives as
better than others, it is not clear either what kind of evidence we should expect in support of the thesis of epistemic privilege. Let me explain each objection. The first objection is raised by
Louise Antony (1993) and Helen Longino (1999). They argue that the thesis of epistemic privilege is undermined by another thesis in Harding's feminist standpoint epistemology, the thesis that
epistemic
privilege relies on the assumption that there is a standard of impartiality that enables one to judge some
socially grounded perspectives as "less partial and distorted" than others. The situated knowledge thesis seems to
undermine this assumption by suggesting that all knowledge claims are partial in virtue of being grounded on a
particular perspective on social reality. As Helen Longino explains, in order to argue that some socially grounded perspectives
are better than others, a standpoint epistemologist would have to be able to identify privileged perspectives
from a non-interested position, but according to standpoint epistemology, there is no such position
(1999, 338; see also Hekman 2000, 24). Louise Antony calls the tension between the thesis of epistemic privilege and the situated knowledge thesis a "bias paradox" (1993, 188-189). In
claiming that all knowledge is partial, feminist standpoint epistemology challenges the very notion of
impartiality. But by undermining the notion of impartiality, feminist standpoint epistemology is in danger of losing its critical edge (Antony 1993, 189).
all scientific knowledge is socially situated (Harding 1991, 11; see also pages 119 and 142). I call this the situated knowledge thesis (see also Wylie 2003, 31). The thesis of
37
Turns the alt/ Fem Epistemology requires a "view from nowhere" to justify
comparison between standpoints.
Rolin 06
(Kristina is an Academy of Finland Research Fellow at Helsinki School of Economics. Her main areas of
research are philosophy of science and epistemology, with emphasis on social epistemology and
feminist epistemology. She has published articles in Philosophy of Science, Social Epistemology,
Perspectives on Science, and Hypatia. “The Bias Paradox in Feminist Standpoint Epistemology”
Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 3.1 (2006)
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/episteme/v003/3.1rolin.html)
For a long time feminist standpoint epistemology has relied on the power of visual and spatial images such as "perspectives" and "standpoints."
The very term "standpoint" evokes an image of a position where one stands and views the object of inquiry from a particular "perspective" (Pohlhaus 2002, 288).
Even though this image has been fruitful in feminist epistemology, it is time to acknowledge that it creates more problems than it solves. One problem is that it
imports a foundationalist theory of epistemic justification into feminist epistemology. The visual and spatial
image of a "standpoint" easily leads us into thinking that we need a "view from nowhere" in order to
be able to compare different perspectives. I have argued that a contextualist theory of epistemic justification offers an alternative to a
"view from nowhere." A context of default entitlements provides a "situated" standard of impartiality that enables us to assess the relative merits of two or more
socially grounded perspectives. Another
problem generated by visual and spatial images is that it is not clear what we assess
when we assess socially grounded perspectives. I have argued that it is possible to identify and evaluate an assumption that manifests
[End Page 134] a socially grounded perspective. This requires that we specify a context of epistemic justification.
38
39
TECH
Technology isn’t inherently oppressive—it’s a fluid discursive mechanism which
people can use to either define gendered inequalities or expose prevalent stereotypes
Bray 7
(Francesca, Professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Edinburgh, Gender and Technology,
Annual Review of Anthropology, 2007, http://web.mit.edu/~shaslang/www/WGS/BrayGT.pdf)
FTS scholars use the term coproduction to¶ designate the dialectical shaping of gender and¶
technology. The concept is intended to highlight¶ the performative, processual character¶ of both gender and
technology and to avoid¶ the analytical and political pitfalls of essentializing¶ either (Grint & Gill 1995, Berg
1997,¶ Faulkner 2001). In modern societies gender is¶ constitutive of what is recognized as technology, ¶
determining whether skills are categorized¶ as important or trivial (Bowker & Star¶ 1999). An electric iron is not technology
when¶ a woman is pressing clothes, but it becomes¶ technology when her husband mends it. A¶ woman
engineer who tests microwave ovens¶ is told by her male colleagues that her job¶ is really just cooking (Cockburn & Ormrod¶ 1993). In the
1970s computers
were thought¶ of as “information technologies” and coded¶ male; it was widely assumed that
women¶ would have problems with them. By the 1990s¶ computers had also become “communication¶
technologies”; now it was presumed that¶ women would engage with them enthusiastically.¶ “New technologies
spur processes of¶ boundary work and renegotiations of what is¶ to be considered masculine and feminine” (Lie¶ 2003a, p. 21; Lohan 2001).In
terms of praxis, the overarching goal
of¶ FTS is to analyze how technology is implicated¶ in gender inequalities to
work toward¶ more democratic forms of technology. Noting¶ the relatively limited potential of consumer intervention for
democratizing technologies¶ from the outside in, some FTS scholars suggest¶ that rather than continuing to focus predominantly¶ on
consumption, identity, and¶ representation, FTS should
return to production¶ and work, or to the gendering of
design¶ processes and the gender subjectivities¶ of designers, as research sites (Oudshoorn¶ et al. 2004,
Wajcman 2004). An important¶ paper by Suchman (1999), based on an anthropological¶ consultancy for technology
design¶ in a large industrial enterprise, draws¶ on Haraway and on labor theory to propose¶ new modes of feminist objectivity, rooted in¶
densely structured and dynamic landscapes of¶ working relations that destabilize the boundaries¶ between producer and user.
Documenting¶ the masculinist ideologies of the engineering¶ world and exposing prevalent stereotypes
about women and technology may both contribute¶ to democratizing technology from the¶ inside out.
Eventually they might inflect prevailing¶ ideologies of technology. More modestly,¶ given that gender systems are more difficult¶ to change
than are material technologies,¶ they
suggest ways to encourage more women¶ to become engineers or to
reshape state or¶ industry policies of training and employment¶ (Kvande 1999, Gansmo 2003).
40
*****IMPACTS*****
41
EXTINCTION 1ST
Preventing extinction is the primary objective
Matheny 07 (Jason Gaverick, Ph.D in applied economics from John Hopkins University “Ought We Worry About Human Extinction?”
2007 http://jgmatheny.org/extinctionethics.htm DA: 2013-7-11)
This paper supports Parfit’s conclusion. Human
extinction would likely condemn all sentience of terrestrial origin
to extinction. We take extraordinary measures to protect some endangered species from extinction. It would be reasonable to
take extraordinary measures to protect humanity from the same. If we survive the next few centuries,
we will probably survive long enough to colonize space and disperse, ensuring the survival of sentient
life for perhaps trillions of years. The next few centuries could be the most critical in our past or
future.¶ ¶ The moral weight of human extinction does not mean we can ignore other moral problems. There is no conflict between helping to
delay human extinction and, for instance, boycotting animal farms or consuming fewer natural resources. We can do both. But when
instances of conflict arise, as they do in cases of public funding, we ought to prioritize projects that reduce
extinction risks. Our primary goal in the next few centuries should be to survive long enough to
colonize space.
42
NUC WAR 1ST
Nuclear war is inevitable unless we take action – every war prevented pushes the risk
closer to zero.
Hellman 85
(Professor emeritus of electronic engineering at Stanford University and cryptologist “The Probability of
Nuclear Extinction” 1985 http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/opinion/inevitability.html DA: 2013-711)
But unless we make a radical shift in our thinking about war , this time will be no different. On our current path, nuclear
war is inevitable.¶ The inevitability concept can best be understood by analogy to finance. It does not make sense to talk of an interest rate as
being high or low, for example 50 percent or 1 percent, without comparing it to specific period of time. An interest rate of 50 percent per year
is high. An interest rate of 50 percent per century is low. And the low interest rate of 1 percent per year builds up to a much larger interest rate,
say 100 percent, when compounded over a sufficiently long time.¶ In the same way, it does
not make sense to talk about the
probability of nuclear war being high or low -- for example 10 percent versus 1 percent -- without comparing it to a specific
period of time -- for example, 10 percent per decade or 1 percent per year.¶ Having gotten the units right, we might argue whether
the probability of nuclear war per year was high or low. But it would make no real difference. If the
probability is 10 percent per year, then we expect the holocaust to come in about 10 years. If it is 1
percent per year, then we expect it in about 100 years.¶ The lower probability per year changes the
time frame until we expect civilization to be destroyed, but it does not change the inevitability of the
ruin. In either scenario, nuclear war is 100 percent certain to occur.¶ This pair of examples brings out a critically
important point. Our only survival strategy is to continuously reduce the probability, driving it ever closer
to zero. In contrast, our current policies are like repeatedly playing Russian roulette with more and more
bullets in the chambers.¶ We have pulled the trigger in this macabre game more often than is
imagined. Each action on our current path has some chance of triggering the final global war. And if we keep pulling the trigger, the gun will
inevitably go off. Each "small" war -- in Iran, or Iraq, or Vietnam, or Afghanistan -- is pulling the trigger;
each threat of the use of violence -- as in the Cuban missile crisis -- is pulling the trigger; each day that
goes by in which a missile or computer can fail is pulling the trigger.¶ The only way to survive Russian roulette is to
stop playing. The only way to survive nuclear roulette is to move beyond war in the same sense that the civilized world has moved beyond
human sacrifice and slavery.¶ When it was merely moral and desirable, it might have been impossible to beat swords into plowshares. Today, it
is necessary for survival.¶ Gen. Douglas MacArthur said in his 1961 address to the Philippines Congress: "You will say at once that, although the
abolition of war has been the dream of man for centuries, every proposition to that end has been promptly discarded as impossible and
fantastic. But that was before the science of the past decade made mass destruction a reality. The argument then was along spiritual and moral
lines, and lost. But now the tremendous evolution of nuclear and other potentials of destruction has suddenly taken the problem away from its
primary consideration as a moral and spiritual question and brought it abreast of scientific realism."¶ There is potential for this to be the best of
times or the end of time, depending on which direction we take at this critical juncture in human evolution. Technology
has given a
new, global meaning to the Biblical injunction: "I have set before you life and death, blessing and
curse; therefore choose life, that you and your descendants may live."¶ To avoid extinction, we must
take action to shift from an old mode of thinking which justifies war as necessary for survival to a new
mode of thinking which recognizes war as the ultimate threat to survival.
43
If we don’t act, we cede power to the elites and the result will be extinction
Kötke 11
(William, author of The Final Empire: The Collapse of Civilization and the Seed of the Future and Garden
Planet: The Present Phase Change of the Human Species “The Mass Extinction of the Human Species”
22 October 2011 http://peakoil.com/enviroment/the-mass-extinction-of-the-human-species DA: 20137-11)
We have to remember that we live in the Culture of Empire. What do Empires do when they start to decline? Rome started wars. This is our
fate.
We live on a planet controlled by massive institutions of power who battle each other for
supremacy irrespective of living conditions or d esires of the citizens. As decline proceeds and panic
sets in with the ruling class, their solution will be war. The ruling class knows that when war comes the citizens will pull together in
patriotic fervor and stop criticizing the rulers. As we topple over into scarcity the elites of the world will fight over the last resources. This
war will ultimately become nuclear. This is extinction.
44
A single failure of nuclear deterrence leads to massive destruction
Starr 11
(Steven, senior scientist with Physicians for Social Responsibility and a NAPF Associate “Consequences of
a Single Failure of Nuclear Deterrence” 7 February 2011
http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/db_article.php?article_id=213 DA: 2013-7-11)
A Single Failure of Nuclear Deterrence could lead to:¶ The launching of 1000 U.S. and 1000 Russian strategic nuclear
weapons which remain on launch-ready, high-alert status, capable of being launched with only a few minutes warning;¶ These 2000 weapons –
each 7 to 85 times more powerful than the Hiroshima-size (15 kiloton) weapons of India and Pakistan – would detonate in the United States
and Russia, and probably throughout the member states of NATO;¶ The detonation of some fraction of the remaining 7700 deployed and
operational U.S. and Russian nuclear warheads/weapons would then follow;¶ Hundreds
of large cities in the U.S., Europe and Russia
would be engulfed in massive firestorms . . . the explosion of each weapon would instantly ignite tens or hundreds of square
miles or kilometers of the land and cities beneath it;¶ Many thousands of square miles of urban areas simultaneously
burning would produce up to 150 million tons of thick, black smoke;¶ The smoke would rise above cloud level and
form an extremely dense stratospheric layer of smoke and soot, which would quickly engulf the Earth;¶ The smoke layer would remain for at
least 10 years, and block and absorb sunlight, heating the upper atmosphere and producing Ice Age weather on Earth;¶ The
would block
smoke
sunlight from reaching the Earth's surface in the Northern Hemisphere, and up to 35% of the sunlight
in the Southern Hemisphere, producing a profound “nuclear darkness”;¶ In the absence of warming sunlight, surface
temperatures on Earth become as cold or colder than they were 18,000 years ago at the height of the last Ice
Age;¶ There would be rapid cooling of more than 20°C over large areas of North America and of more than 30°C over much of Eurasia;¶
up to 70% of the
Average global precipitation would be reduced by 45% due to the prolonged cold;¶ 150 million tons of smoke in the stratosphere would cause
minimum daily temperatures in the largest agricultural regions of the Northern Hemisphere to drop below freezing every night for 1 to 3
years;¶
Nightly killing freezes and frosts would occur, no crops could be grown ;¶ Growing seasons would be
virtually eliminated for at least a decade;¶ Massive destruction of the protective ozone layer would also occur,
allowing intense levels of dangerous UV-B light to penetrate the atmosphere and reach the surface of the Earth; as the smoke cleared, the UV-B
would grow more intense;¶ Massive amounts of radioactive fallout would be generated and spread both locally and
globally. The targeting of nuclear reactors would significantly increase global radioactive fallout of long-lived isotopes such as Cesium-137;¶
Gigantic ground-hugging clouds of toxic smoke would be released from the fires; enormous quantities of
industrial chemicals would also enter the environment;¶ It would be impossible for many living things to survive the
extreme rapidity and degree of changes in temperature and precipitation, combined with drastic
increases in UV light, massive radioactive fallout, and massive releases of toxins and industrial
chemicals;¶ Already stressed land and marine ecosystems would collapse;¶ Unable to grow food, most humans
would starve to death;¶ A mass extinction event would occur , similar to what happened 65 million years ago, when
the dinosaurs were wiped out following a large asteroid impact with Earth (70% of species became extinct, including all animals greater than 25
kilograms in weight);¶ Political and military leaders living in underground shelters equipped with many years worth of food, water, energy, and
medical supplies would probably not survive in the hostile post-war environment.
45
Allowing nuclear war is the suicide of humanity
Zepp-LaRouge 12
(Helga, journalist, founder of the Schiller Institute “No One Will Survive World War III: Prevent the
Suicide of Humanity!” http://www.larouchepub.com/hzl/2012/3906wwiii_suicide_humanity.html DA:
2013-7-11)
Feb. 4—The fuse is lit for a Third World War: According to David Ignatius of the Washington Post, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon
Panetta "believes there is a strong likelihood that Israel will strike Iran in April, May, or June." The German media, after months of scandalous
silence on this issue, reports that Berlin is afraid that the West could be drawn into a conflict with incalculable consequences. It must be stated
more clearly: If Israel carries out a strike against Iran, Iran will launch a counterstrike that, according to its own statements, will also hit
American installations; this will then, ultimately, lead to the deployment of British and American military operations against Iran. That
would be just the trigger for thermonuclear war, with the United States, Britain, and NATO on the one side, and Russia,
China, Iran, Syria, and other allies on the other. If just a fraction of the available thermonuclear weapons were used,
any form of human life on the planet would be extinguished. It is clear to any sane person that only
the insane would risk the extinction of the human species in this way.
46
POLICY MAKING
Policymaking within a macroeconomic framework is the best way to resolve gender
equity
Berik 11
Professor of Economics @ the University of Utah, PhD and MA in Economics @ UMass-Amherst
[Günseli, International Labor Organization, Trade and Employment: From Myths to Facts, “Gender
Aspects of Trade,” pg. 201
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/documents/publication/wcms_162297.pdf, DKP]
Achieving these goals requires a broad set of policy tools that go beyond compensatory schemes to address
gender inequalities in education, time- and resource-allocation. Gender-equity policies must be
situated within a coherent macroeconomic (including trade) framework, an effective regulatory
framework, and a coherent set of initiatives at the international level. Different policies must work in
a complementary and virtuous manner to pursue gender equity. In particular, it is important to avoid one set of
policies from undermining the gender-equitable effects of other policies. Thus, if trade liberalization in interaction with investment
liberalization and restrictive fiscal policy creates adverse gender effects, then these policies
must be revisited to make
adjustments so as to generate more equitable, pro-poor development. Several studies have
emphasized the imperative for developing country governments to have the policy space to manage
macroeconomic policy and the international support to pursue a development strategy that harnesses
the benefits of trade and foreign direct investment to their advantage (Heintz, 2006; Grown and Seguino, 2007).
Through productivity-enhancing investments and judicious management of foreign direct investment, these economies can then move toward
a more diverse production structure. In addition, others have raised concerns about the sustainability of relying on an export strategy of low
wages and gender wage gaps and have urged policies to move away from excessive reliance on exports (Beviglia Zampetti and Tran Nguyen,
2004; Berik and Rodgers, 2010; ILO, 2010). The concerns with this strategy centre on the decline in terms of trade when a large number of
developing countries are concentrated in producing the same set of products for the world market and the vulnerability to export market
fluctuations (Beviglia Zampetti and Tran-Nguyen,2004). In addition, persistence of low-skilled and low-value-added export activities in countries
with low levels of educational attainment is likely to have detrimental effects on economic growth and well-being of workers (Wood and RidaoCano, 1999). Given the nature of the labour demand, women, in particular, may have little incentive to seek higher levels of education (Vijaya,
2003).
47
*****Alternative*****
48
AT POSTCOLONIAL FEMINISM
Postcolonial feminism is still rooted in the abstract intellectual traditions of academia.
The alt's obsession with representation and discourse trades off with a focus the
materiality of oppression, and this historical focus cannot provide paradigms for
change.
McEwan 01
Cheryl Progress in Development Studies 1, 2 (2001) pp. 93–111, Postcolonialism, feminism and
development: intersections and dilemmas (Cheryl McEwan is a professor at School of Geography and
Environmental Sciences, University of Birmingham, UK) JU
One of the major dilemmas for postcolonialism is the charge that it has become institutionalized,
representing the interests of a western-based intellectual élite who speak the language of the
contemporary western academy, perpetuating the exclusion of the colonized and oppressed (Ahmad,
1992; McClintock, 1992; Watts, 1995; Loomba, 1998). Moreover, critics suggest that greater theoretical sophistication has created greater
obfuscation;
postcolonialism is too theoretical and not sufficiently rooted in material concerns (Ahmad, 1992;
on discourse detracts from an assessment of material ways in which colonial
power relations persist. As Dirlik (1994: 353) argues, ‘[It] is remarkable . . . that a consideration of the relationship between
Dirlik, 1994). Emphasis
postcolonialism and global capitalism should be absent from the writings of postcolonial intellectuals’. Debates about postcolonialism and
globalization have largely proceeded in relative isolation from one another, and to their mutual cost (Hall, 1996: 257). Economic
relations and their effects elude representation in much of postcolonial studies (Eagleton, 1994).
Some critics berate postcolonial theory for ignoring urgent life-or-death questions (San Juan, 1998). To have greater immediacy in critical
development studies, post-102 Postcolonialism, feminism and development colonial approaches might consider questions of inequality of
power over and control of resources, human rights, global exploitation of labour, child prostitution and genocide. With some exceptions (for
example, the writings on postdevelopment by such authors as Esteva (1987) and Escobar (1992, 1995b)), postcolonialism
cannot
easily be translated into action on the ground and its oppositional stance has not had much impact on
the power imbalances between North and South. It also tends to be preoccupied with the past and
has failed to say much about postcolonial futures. (Spivak’s (1999) attempt to describe a responsible role for the
postcolonial critic in her critique of transnational globalization is one exception.) Meanwhile, ethnocentric representations continue to
disadvantage the South, and are evident in sources ranging from popular media to World Bank reports.
49
Postcolonial feminism reproduces Eurocentric intellectual domination.
Shome 06
(Raka Shome, Communication Theory Volume 6, Issue 1, Article first published online: 17 MAR 2006,
Postcolonial Interventions in the Rhetorical Canon: An “Other” View (Shome is a professor at Arizona
State University.)
First, one
of the most significant implications of postcolonial theory and criticism for rhetorical studies
is the notion of postcolonial self-reflexivity. As I have already suggested, a postcolonial self-reflexivity entails
that as scholars practicing in the West we be aware of how our scholarly practices are often engaged
in reproducing neocolonial patterns of intellectual domination (Breckenridge & Van der Veer, 1993). This has
important implications for rhetoric. Rhetoric as a discipline is largely based on humanist theories and
speeches of white men in power and has not been adequately self-reflexive about its scholarship in
relation to issues of race and neocolonialism. In fact, as Dwight Conquergood (1 991) recently and quite directly suggested,
the limitation of rhetorical and communication scholarship is that it has ironically been “unreflexive about the rhetorical construction of its own
disciplinary authority” (p.193). Although
calls for other kinds of self-reflexivity (feminist, post- modern, ideological) have
been made, albeit all too briefly, the discipline on the whole has been disturbingly silent about its
own disciplinary position in relation to issues of race and neocolonialism. The silence that I am talking of is not
about the lack of studies on nonwhite people. (In fact, there have been some rhetorical studies, although few, on nonwhite issues and cultures.
Condit and Lucaites’s (1993) valuable work on “equality” which, among other things, examines African American public rhetoric is a recent
example.) The silence that I have in mind has to do with not rereading (and problematizing) our dominant rhetorical paradigms, our theories,
our critical tools, and our research agendas, against a larger backdrop of racial and neocolonial politics.
It has to do with not
interrogating the extent to which our white universalistic rhetorical paradigms (whether of Aristotle, Plato, or
Burke, Perelman, Toulmin, Bitzer) that we keep drawing on, as well as passing down to students without
problematizing their Eurocentric limits, inhibits alter- native racial and cultural perspectives on
rhetoric from emerging, and continues a pattern of Eurocentric intellectual domination.
50
ESSENTIALISM DA
Using gender to associate masculinity with war and femininity with peace perpetuates
dangerous stereotypes about women, reduces the chances of peace and detracts from
a broader understanding of gender IR.
Tickner ’99 (J. Ann, Distinguished Scholar @ American Univ. “Why Women Can’t Run the World:
International Politics According to Francis Fukuyama,” International Studies Review 1:3)
Most IR feminists would deny the assertion that women are morally superior to men. Indeed, many of them have claimed that
the
association of women with peace and moral superiority has a long history of keeping women out of
power, going back to the debates about the merits of female suffrage in the early part of the century. The
association of women with peace can play into unfortunate gender stereotypes that characterize men
as active, women as passive; men as agents, women as victims; men as rational, women as emotional.
Not only are these stereotypes damaging to women, particularly to their credibility as actors in matters of international
politics and national security, but they are also damaging to peace. As a concept, peace will remain a “soft”
issue, utopian and unrealistic, as long as it is associated with femininity and passivity .4 This entire
debate about aggressive men and peaceful women frequently comes up when issues about women
and world politics are on the table. Moreover, it detracts from what feminists consider to be more
pressing agendas, such as striving to uncover and understand the disadvantaged socioeconomic
position of many of the world’s women and why women are so poorly represented among the world’s
policymakers.
AT: Fukuyama - Fukuyama’s claims about peaceful women ignore the realities of
gender oppression around the world and reinforce dangerous views about war.
Tickner ’99
(J. Ann, Distinguished Scholar @ American Univ. “Why Women Can’t Run the World: International
Politics According to Francis Fukuyama,” International Studies Review 1:3)
A current version using the
claim that women are more peaceful than men to women’s disadvantage, and
the types of agenda-deflecting debates it may engender, can be found in Francis Fukuyama’s recent
article, “Women and the Evolution of World Politics,” in Foreign Affairs, as well as in the commentaries on it in the subsequent issue.5
Unlike the type of criticism mentioned above that, often mistakenly, accuses feminists of claiming the morally superior high ground for women,
Fukuyama boldly asserts that indeed women are more peaceful than men. But, as has so often been
the case, Fukuyama deploys his argument to mount a strong defense for keeping men in charge. Not
only does this type of reasoning feed into more strident forms of backlash against women in
international politics, but it also moves our attention further away from more important issues.
Hypothesizing about the merits or disadvantages of women in charge, or debating the relative
aggressiveness of men and women, does little to address the realities of a variety of oppressions faced
by women worldwide. Fukuyama’s views not only deflect from important feminist agendas, but they
also support some disturbing trends in IR more generally, which are reinforcing polarized views of the
world in terms of civilization clashes and zones of peace versus zones of turmoil.6
51
PRAGMATISM DA
Critiques of gender relations that do not pose concrete alternatives are destined to
fail.
Caprioli 4
(Mary, Professor of Political Science – University of Tennessee, “Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative
Methodology: A Critical Analysis”, International Studies Review, 42(1), March, http://www.blackwellsynergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/0020-8833.00076)
If researchers cannot add gender to an analysis, then they must necessarily use a purely female-centered
analysis, even though the utility of using a purely female centered analysis seems equally biased. Such
research would merely be gendercentric based on women rather than men, and it would thereby provide
an equally biased account of international relations as those that are male-centric. Although one might speculate that
having research done from the two opposing worldviews might more fully explain international relations, surely an integrated approach would
offer a more comprehensive analysis of world affairs. Beyond a female-centric analysis, some scholars (for example, Carver 2002) argue that
Gender categories, however, do exist and have
very real implications for individuals, social relations, and international affairs. Critiquing the social
construction of gender is important, but it fails to provide new theories of international relations or to
address the implications of gender for what happens in the world.
feminist research must offer a critique of gender as a set of power relations.
52
Rejecting traditional security analysis guarantees the sector will be dominated by the
most conservative policymakers
Knudsen 01
Olav. F. Knudsen, Prof @ Södertörn Univ College, ‘1 [Security Dialogue 32.3, “Post-Copenhagen Security
Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization,” p. 366]
A final danger in focusing on the state is that of building the illusion that states have impenetrable
walls, that they have an inside and an outside, and that nothing ever passes through. Wolfers’s billiard balls have contributed to this
misconception. But the state concepts we should use are in no need of such an illusion. Whoever
criticizes the field for such sins in the past needs to go back to the literature. Of course, we must
continue to be open to a frank and unbiased assessment of the transnational politics which significantly
in- fluence almost every issue on the domestic political agenda. The first decade of my own research was spent studying these
phenomena – and I disavow none of my conclusions about the state’s limitations. Yet I am not ashamed to talk of a domestic political agenda.
Anyone with a little knowledge of Euro- pean politics knows that Danish politics is not Swedish politics is not German politics is not British
politics. Nor would I hesitate for a moment to talk of the role of the state in transnational politics, where it is an important actor, though only
one among many other competing ones. In the
world of transnational relations, the exploitation of states by
interest groups – by their assumption of roles as representatives of states or by convincing state
representatives to argue their case and defend their narrow interests – is a significant class of
phenomena, today as much as yesterday. Towards a Renewal of the Empirical Foundation for Security Studies Fundamentally, the sum of
the foregoing list of sins blamed on the Copen- hagen school amounts to a lack of attention paid to just that ‘reality’ of security which Ole
Wæver consciously chose to leave aside a decade ago in order to pursue the politics of securitization instead. I cannot claim that he is void of
interest in the empirical aspects of security because much of the 1997 book is devoted to empirical concerns. However, the
attention to
agenda-setting – confirmed in his most recent work – draws attention away from the important issues we need
to work on more closely if we want to contribute to a better understanding of European security as it is
currently developing. That inevitably requires a more consistent interest in security policy in the
making – not just in the development of alternative security policies. The dan- ger here is that, as alternative
policies are likely to fail grandly on the political arena, crucial decisions may be made in the
‘traditional’ sector of security policymaking, unheeded by any but the most uncritical minds.
53
NARRATIVES DA
Merely listening to the voices of those who are oppressed is nothing but a betrayal of
their concerns. Your narrative arguments reflect an ethnocentric worldview.
RASKIN 99
RASKIN, PROF OF PUBLIC POLICY, 1999 (Marcus, G Wash U, Transnational Law & Contemporary
Problems, Fall)
As I have noted, world
social categories and knowledge systems have changed so that they now see the
colonized as human beings. The shifting in social categories, often by those who are the radicals and
liberals of the privileged groups, created deep divisions between reality and its description. But this
has not necessarily resulted in fundamental affirmative change.¶ For those who were consigned to the role of slave, serf and
oppressed by imperial Western nations, it may be disconcerting, but pleasantly surprising, that some leading international lawyers and
intellectuals stand with those movements that take their strength from the dispossessed, wretched
and exploited, whether in war or peace. Even though these idealists are educated in Western and imperial categories of social reality, they
have, nonetheless, taken as their task the reconstruction and transformation of international law as it is understood in the United States. The skeptical are
permitted their doubts, however. After all, what
can those who represent the pain of others, and only indirectly their own, do to
ameliorate the pain of misery sanctioned by imperial law? What do such a band of idealists dare to teach to
those who suffer, especially when that suffering is often caused, directly or indirectly, by the choices
made by the very class of which these Western intellectuals and lawyers are members? Why should the
oppressed listen to those educated in a language and thought-pattern which, beneath the honeyed
words, are the egocentric and ethnocentric doctrines of the [*524] dominator? Certainly until decolonization, the
abstract meaning of the words were employed as signifiers and killers of the culturally oppressed. The language of description and the mode of argument, the very
words themselves, were instruments of the colonizer. Their very rules, laws, precedents and citations acted as a steel-belted noose to stifle the cries of the
wretched. And yet, these were the very lessons the colonized needed to learn in order to stand up to the colonizer and survive. Not only did they survive, they
pressed on to reform nineteenth and early twentieth century imperial law using the UN, and the International Court of Justice. Most importantly, they effected the
consciousness of nations. Nevertheless, the wretched must wonder why, behind claims of universality and universal human rights, our actions and thoughts have an
often indeterminate or contradictory effect. For Americans, the reason is a complex one. Americans seek identification with the victim in their dreams, but the
reality for the American political and legal class is somewhere between carelessness and negligence of the oppressed worker, toleration for the destruction of other
people's cultures for purposes of extraction and commodification, exploiter of their lands, and executioner in counter-revolutions which rain bombs of state and
even when some in the United States stand with the victim, they must always
wonder, "Who are we that come forward with our notions that speak of human affirmation? Who are we to
tell the colonized when independence is a drag on themselves and on others as well, possibly leading to war and internecine conflict?" And the wretched
can go further and say, "You have recognized our struggle, taken away our language and substituted
your words of understanding, but now what? How is freedom to be sustained? We, the formerly
marginalized, the indigenous and the merely wretched, have come to recognize that what is
presented by the West to humanity as conventional knowledge is a betrayal." In truth, it was a
betrayal by intellectuals and all those who dared to suggest that the twentieth century could be a time of liberation and freedom. Education
and knowledge as mediated through the colonizer's strainer has left humanity in worse shape than at
the beginning of the twentieth century. For some, the god that really failed them was
education/knowledge, which, through its institutions, set itself up as the emancipator. This failure, this sense of
futility where knowledge is an instrument of domination for the few, demands recognition.
financial terror around the world. So
54
Your strategy is a lot like Kevin Carter, a photojournalist who traveled to Sudan to
cover the genocide, driven by his belief that capturing the perfect image and
representation of suffering could motivate people to action. A Sudanese woman was
bowed over in weakness, and a vulture perched on top of her waiting for death. Carter
positioned himself to get the perfect shot, but did not lift her from the ground or
prevent her from being eaten.
Kleinman and Kleinman 96
(Arthur, Prf of Anthro @ Harvard; Joan, Research Asst @ Harvard, Daedulus, Winter)
The child is hardly larger than an infant; she is naked;
bowed over
incapable
of
moving; she is unprotected. No mother, no family, no one is present to prevent her from being
attacked by the vulture, or succumbing to starvation and then being eaten.
she appears
in weakness and sickness,
, it would seem,
The image suggests that she has been abandoned. Why? The reader again is
led to imagine various scenarios of suffering: she has been lost in the chaos of forced uprooting; her family has died; she has been deserted near death in order for her mother to hold on to more viable children. The image's great success is that it causes the reader to want to know more.
Why is this innocent victim of civil war and famine unprotected? The vulture embodies danger and evil, but the greater dangers and real forces of evil are not in the "natural world"; they are in the political world, including those nearby in army uniforms or in government offices in
Khartoum. Famine has become a political strategy in the Sudan.(8) The photograph has been reprinted many times, and it has been duplicated in advertisements for a number of nongovernmental aid agencies that are raising funds to provide food to refugees. This is a classic instance of
the use of moral sentiment to mobilize support for social action. One cannot look at this picture without wanting to do something to protect the child and drive the vulture away. Or, as one aid agency puts it, to prevent other children from succumbing in the same heartlessly inhuman
. How did Carter allow the vulture to get so close without doing
something to protect the child? What did he do after the picture was taken?
Inasmuch as
Kevin Carter chose to take the time, that may have been
when she is near death, to
compose an effective picture rather than to save the child, is he complicit?
on July 29, 1994, a few months after the Pulitzer Prize announcement, The New York
Times ran an obituary for Kevin Carter, who had committed suicide at age thirty-three.
He heard
a soft, high-pitched whimpering and saw a tiny girl trying to make her way to the feeding center. As
he crouched to photograph her, a vulture landed in view. Careful not to disturb the bird, he positioned
himself for the best possible image.
he waited about 20 minutes,
way by giving a donation. The photograph calls for words to answer other questions
Was it in some sense posed?
minutes
critical at this point
Those moral questions particular to Carter's relationship (or nonrelationship)
to the dying child were only intensified when,
That shocking notice of his death, written
by Bill Keller, the Times, Johannesburg correspondent, as well as a longer article by Scott Mac Leod in Time magazine on September 12, reported Carter's clarifications about how he took the photograph and what followed:(9) ...he wandered into the open bush.
He would later say
hoping the vulture would spread its wings. It did not, and after he took his
photographs, he chased the bird away and watched as the little girl resumed her struggle. Afterwards he sat under a tree, lit a cigarette, talked to God and cried. He was depressed afterward....He kept saying he wanted to hug his daughter.(10) The Times, obituary ends with a section
entitled "The Horror of the Work," in which Jimmy Carter, Kevin's father, observes that his son "Always carried around the horror of the work he did." Keller implies that it was the burden of this "horror" that may have driven Carter to suicide. The article by Scott Mac Leod in Time shows
that Kevin Carter had lived a very troubled life, with drug abuse, a messy divorce, deep financial problems, brushes with the police, and was a manic-depressive. We also learn that he had spent much of his career photographing political repression and violence in South Africa, and that he
had been deeply affected by the shooting of his best friend and coworker, Ken Oosterbrock, for whom, he told friends, he "should have taken the bullet."(11) His suicide note, besides mentioning these other problems, comes back to the theme of the burden of horror: "I am haunted by
the vivid memories of killings and corpses and anger and pain...of starving or wounded children, of trigger-happy madmen, often police, of killer executioners...."(12) From Scott Mac Leod we also learn that Carter had been present at the execution of right-wing paramilitary men in
Bophuthatswana; much to his annoyance he had missed the master image snapped by his colleagues of a white mercenary pleading for his life before being executed--a picture that also was reprinted by newspapers around the globe. The article in Time reports that Carter was painfully
Carter wrote: "I had to think visually
"I am zooming in on a tight shot of
the dead guy and a splash of red. Going into his khaki uniform in a pool of blood in the sand. The dead
man's face is slightly grey. You are making a visual here. But inside something is screaming, `My God.'
But it is time to work. Deal with the rest later...."(
some journalists questioned Carter's
ethics: " The man adjusting his lens to take just the right frame of her suffering...might just as well be
aware of the photojournalist's dilemma:
," he said once, describing a shoot-out.
13) Time magazine's writer discovered that
a predator, another vulture on the scene .
" Scott Mac Leod notes that even some of Carter's friends "wondered aloud why he had not helped the girl."(14) THE KLEINMANS CONTINUE
One
message that comes across from viewing suffering from a distance is that for all the havoc in Western
society, we are somehow bette r
than this African society.
We gain in moral status
and some of our organizations gain financially and politically,
while those
whom we represent, or appropriate, remain where they are, moribund, surrounded by vultures . This
"consumption" of suffering in an era of so-called "disordered capitalism" is not so very different from
the late nineteenth-century view that the savage barbarism in pagan lands justified the valuing of our
own civilization at a higher level of development--a view that authorized colonial exploitation
. Both are forms of
cultural representation in which the moral, the commercial, and the political are deeply involved in each other. The point is that the image of the vulture and the child carries cultural entailments, including the brutal historical genealogy of colonialism as well as the dubious cultural
baggage of the more recent programs of "modernization" and globalization (of markets and financing), that have too often worsened human problems in sub-Saharan Africa.(21)
55