The Navy at War in
Afghanistan:
Operation Enduring Freedom
2000-2003
Learning Objectives
●The student will understand the events leading up to
the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, including
President George W. Bush’s foreign policy doctrine
before and after September 11, 2001
●The Student will understand the conduct of war in
Afghanistan, to include the coalition and command
structures, as well as the relevance of naval
components.
●The student will critically assess an interpretation of
the Afghan War as the best exercise to date of a
modern war according to Seapower 21 doctrine,
especially in in the application of Network-Centric
concepts.
Prologue: Foreign Policy of
President George W. Bush
Emphasis during 2000 presidential campaign
was to keep up with the Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA) and within budget by
modernizing the military. President Bush’s
plan included:
● Missile system
● Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of
Defense (mandated under “transformation”)
● Transformation Office
Missile Defense System
●Hostile states (Iran, N. Korea) were
developing long range missile
programs
●China challenges U.S. protection of
Taiwan
●It was suggested U.S. would not be
willing to use nuclear weapons if
challenged.
September 11, 2001
Unfortunately, it took the tragedy of 9/11 to
initiate President Bush’s call for change.
The Challenge
The administration had to bring firepower to an
area with no immediately available bases, but how?
● Sea-based carrier warfare
● Network-centric concepts (limited,
PRECISION force)
Coalition Warfare
● U.S. invokes Article 5 of NATO
treaty
● NATO governments respond
slowly to call for troops
Maritime War
● Naval aircraft flew ¾
of all sorties, dropped
1/3 of all bombs
●Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) provided principal
ground force in Southern Afghanistan
●New tanking architecture and cooperation with allied
forces provided tanking to support carrier based air strikes
Coalition Forces
●England (heavy contributor of sea and
air power, tankers, and surveillance)
●Australia, Bahrain, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Spain, Japan
(moderate sea power contributors)
●Pakistan (allowed integral covert use
of airfields)
Command
●Preexisting CENTCOM command structure makes
command relationships clear from onset, its success
prompts permanent Joint Task Force build up
●Exercise of command via satellite later blamed for
important misunderstandings in the war
●USAF Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Saudi
Arabia vital for effective air power employment
USAF Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC)
Precision Air Attack: The
New Kind of War
●Effects-based targeting
●New weapons: GPS and
Joint Defense Attack
Munitions (JDAM)
●Improved Air Tasking
Order
●Real time intelligence
streaming
Initial Strikes
Mission: Roll back Afghani Integrated Air
Defense System (IADS) and destroy land
communications
07OCT01: Attack on Taliban begins with
TLAM launches, followed by carrier strike
aircraft, USAF long-range bombers from
Diego Garcia, B-2s from United States, etc.
Taliban Response
● U.S. accused of
killing civilians
●Taliban moves
targets into civilianpopulated areas
●Shoulder-launched
Stinger missile
threat
Afghanistan
War in the North
● Northern Alliance
● Special Force
representatives
● 13NOV: Northern
Alliance take Kabul,
then Konduz (last
stronghold in the
north) with little
opposition
War in the South
● Southern Alliance (weak)
● Fifth Fleet (based in Bahrain)
responsible for most of theater
● Task Force 58 (2 MEUs minus heavy
material) allow personnel insertion far
inland with organic helicopters
Chain of Command
CENTCOM
General Tommy Franks
MacDill AFB
Tampa, FL
Fifth Fleet
VADM Charles W. Moore
NAVCENT/MARCENT
Bahrain
Task Force 57
CVBGs
P-3s, etc.
Third Army
Task Force 58
Brig. Gen. James N. Mattis
15th MEU
Pelelieu ARG
25th MEU
Bataan ARG
Task Force Sword
Maj. Gen.Dell L. Dailey
Army Special Forces
TF K-Bar
SAS, SEALs,
Canadian, Dutch, etc.
War in the South
● Task Force 57 (air support)
● Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG)
● Camp Rhino
Camp Rhino Marines
FOB Rhino
●Seized by the Marines 25NOV
● Position (“tyranny of distance”) limits rate at
which Rhino can be built up.
●Marines thrived in smaller formations.
●Initial strikes eliminated Taliban anti-air
capability.
●Rhino personnel was capped, so as not to
anger native Afghanis, raids are limited, and
conducted at night.
War in the South
19OCT: Southern campaign
commences with special forces attack
on Taliban compound outside
Khandahar
● The U.S. proves itself and learns that
Afghan fighters have limits
● Body armor keeps U.S. casualties low
during the entire war
War in the South
06DEC: Kandahar taken by Marines from
Rhino and Southern Alliance forces
Jan 2002: TF 58 relieved in place by Army’s
101st Airborne Division. The fighting did not
stop, and handover was not completed until
the end of the month.
Other Considerations
● Tribal leaders
● U.N. stabilization
force (called in to
legitimize Afghan
government without
the appearance of
American
occupation)
Map of tribal leader territories
Opposition’s Leadership
● Although major cities had fallen, none of the Taliban
or Al Quaeda leaders had been captured.
● Leaders were believed to be either hiding in the
mountains or escaping to Africa by sea.
● U.S. and allied warships set up an interception zone
in Arabian Sea, but only a few leaders were caught.
● However, new campaigns waged in the mountainous
regions of Tora Bora and Anaconda were fruitful in
providing masses of documents, computers,
personnel, and intelligence.
Tora Bora
●Large Taliban concentration,
including Osama Bin Laden
● Assault conducted by Afghan
troops and U.S. firepower
●Many key figures escaped,
perhaps due to difference in
coalition and U.S. goals
●Taliban loses 50% of force
●Al Quaeda learn U.S. can
intercept radio and cell phone
communications
Operation Anaconda
●U.S., British, Canadian forces, with Australian SOF
●Largest ground battle of the war
●Mostly Army operation, Naval support came via air
sorties
● Considered a disappointment due to joint effort
problems—lives saved mostly due to effective body
armor
The war ends with U.S. and coalition forces in nominal
control of Afghanistan, however, many Taliban are still
in place, and there is general agreement that the war
is not over, as conflict still exists.
Disposition of forces and Topography of Shahi Khot
Airstrike Footage
March 11, 2002: F/A-18
airstrike on fleeing Al
Qaeda forces attempting
to exfiltrate the
Anaconda area
March 4: F-14 airstrike on
a mortar position that was
engaging friendly forces.
A Modern War
●RMA: emphasis on network-centric war
●Initial air strategy: attack Centers of Gravity
(successful with addition of ground support,
e.g., MEUs and Northern Alliance
●SOF liaisons with Northern Alliances
●New approach to presence--reflected in
decision to form ESGs and ARGs
(Amphibious Ready Groups).
In Hindsight…
The Afghan air war was closer to
network-centric models than past wars
(Kosovo), but did not quite get there:
●Not enough sensors
●Split objectives between hunt for Bin
Laden and defeat of Taliban
Conclusion
The Afghan War demonstrated the value
of naval forces which could operate
free of bases, remote sensing assets
(satellites), and special forces
operations. Sea-basing offered
independence, and sensing facilitated
the information “backplane” necessary
for network-centric warfare. All of this
is integral to Sea Power 21.