Scriptie ter afronding van de Master
‘Religies in de Hedendaagse Samenleving: Religieus Pluralisme’
Aangeboden aan :
Dr. Lucien van Liere
Departement Religiewetenschappen en Theologie
Faculteit Geesteswetenschappen
Universiteit Utrecht
Wouter Kruithof
Studentnummer 3001571
23 Augustus, 2011

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4.
Predicting the Humane
I.
Internet, Censorship, and Choosing Cases
II.
Economic Development and Consequences to Governance
III.
Foucauldian Discipline in Developing Nations
IV.
Globalization and individualism
V.
Modernity and Broader National Changes
VI.
Developments in the Individual
VII.
Internet and the Public Sphere
VIII.
The Internet and Government Censorship
IX.
New Forms of Censorship
X.
Censorship and Open Moral Dialogues
XI.
Legitimacy in Communitarian Societies
5.
Conclusion
6.
Bibliography
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Early on in July of this year (2011) the New York Times reported on the work of a group of contemporary scientists that had done cross-cultural research into a possible connection between human evolution and an innate drive towards a basic form of equality. I was found that forms of egalitarianism are found amongst a diverse number of societies and cultures. Frank Marlowe, anthropologist at the University of Durham, reports that the Hadza foragers of northern Tanzania have their own methods to ensure the distribution of food is done in an equal manner. They hold out their hand whilst “encouraging the giver to keep giving until the giver finally draws the line”.
1 In the
United States and other Western nations a great unease has recently developed amongst large parts of the population hit hardest by lowering incomes, unemployment and the foreclosures of homes while top executives continue to enjoy multi-million dollar salaries that despite the crisis increase at a yearly rate of 12%. Evolutionary theorists have argued that although the human condition has led to some of the most extreme forms of totalitarianism and inequality, our basic egalitarian leanings remain. Research done amongst children has shown that by the age of seven, children are very insistent on the equal partitioning of goods, in this study: smarties. They were even willing to go so far as to give up their own portion of goods in order to punish the culprit. Justice thus prevailed over personal interests amongst these youngsters. Dr. Fehr from the University of Zurich explains that as children grow older, their drive for egalitarian division of goods falters slightly. A small degree of inequality is acceptable, yet if a hand is overplayed, it will still result in punishment.
2 In Sweden, psycho-biologists did research on the brain activity of subjects involved in the ‘Ultimatum’ game.
3
The experiment is one in which a group of people have to come to an agreement on how to divide a certain sum of money. The scientists scanned brain activity in the hope of finding the part of it that proved crucial to a sense of fairness, ultimately leading to agreement. It was found that the most crucial aspect in accepting or rejecting an offer was the activity in the part of the brain that causes outrage and aggression. This part of the brain is one that developed very early in the onset of humanity. As such, scientists have argued that a drive towards fairness and justice has evolutionary roots; indeed it enhances our survival. Moreover, our distaste for hierarchical extremes can be traced back to our nomadic times in prehistory when human society consisted of small groups of individuals whose survival depended above all else on group cohesion, consisting of “the belief in fairness and reciprocity, a capacity for empathy and impulse control, and a willingness to work cooperatively in
ways that even our smartest primate kin cannot match”.
4 Ironically, scientists say that our ability to throw stones over a relatively large distance explains our ability to overcome the dominance of the alpha-male in such early societies. The threat of being stoned ensured even the strongest individual would be kept in check.
1 N. Angier, ‘Thirst for Fairness’
2 E. Fehr, H. Bernhard, B. Rockenbach, ‘Egalitarianism in Young Children’, 1079-83.
3 K. Gospic, E. Mohlin, P. Fransson, P. Petrovic, M. Johannesson, M. Ingvar, ‘Limbic Justice’
4 N. Angier, ‘Thirst for Fairness’
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Progress and History
When we speak of the history of our species, the academic community largely agrees that we have evolved from other primates. It has become the dominant paradigm to believe that over large periods of time, the process of natural selection ensures only those that are best equipped for the survival of their species survive. Over longer periods of time, this can account for the evolution of an amoeba into a fully developed human being. It is a beautiful theory that we will not contest.
Nevertheless, what is striking is that while evolutionary thinking has become the dominant paradigm in the natural sciences, the social sciences and humanities seem, generally speaking, unwilling to apply it to their own fields of study. Indeed, some have tried; valiantly even, usually to be met with a great amount of criticism.
5 One example is Francis Fukuyama’s famous ‘The End of History and the
Last Man’ which he opens with the words: “The twentieth century, it is safe to say, has made us all
into deep historical pessimists.” 6 Unfortunately, he is right. The monstrosities of two world wars and the systematic extermination of a people had left everyone with the distinct feeling that events throughout history unfolded in a rather random fashion. In any case, there is no progress, and most certainly no divine providence.
Indeed there are various ways of looking at history in an evolutionary way. Some explain progress with the involvement of God. In this view, history ends with the Day of Judgment, and each historical event is ascribed meaning and significance as being part of a greater plan. Unfortunately it’s a plan we can never hope to grasp and we have to take solace in the fact that God is ultimately a benevolent being. For Fukuyama, the liberal democratic model was the end of history in terms of it being the most perfect and therefore final form of government that humanity would need, proven by the victory of liberal democracy over the communism of the Soviet empire. Immanuel Kant believed that the end of history would be achieved through a perfectly just civil constitution. This, Kant argued, was our purpose as a species.
7 A large problem however with advocating a progressive view of history is that it seems to claim to have some knowledge of human nature and purpose. By claiming liberal democracy to be the ultimate political system, we claim it to be the most perfectly suited for our purpose as a species. In Marxism, it is theorized that human history is written in terms of class struggle and that this is what we must ultimately overcome as a species, in this case, through an extreme form of egalitarianism.
8 It therefore seems to be the case that any claim of progression in the history of mankind is often connected to some form of knowledge concerning human purpose. I do not claim to have any knowledge of our purpose as a species, nor is it my intention to philosophize about that matter here. Rather, my goal is “an attempt to find a meaningful pattern in
the overall development of human societies generally.” 9 The pattern that we will be looking at is one that concerns universally shared moral values. Our aim is then to analyze developments in recent history and show that humankind is slowly moving to a situation in which these values are accepted cross-culturally. The values that we claim to be universal relate in a large degree to the concept of
5 For further examples, see: L. White, the Evolution of Culture; J. Steward, The Theory of Culture; E. Wilson,
Sociobiology: the New Synthesis
6 F. Fukuyama, The End of History, 3
7 Idem, 57 - 58
8 Idem, 65
9 Idem, 55
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Human Rights. However, since this term is often closely associated with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, I instead prefer the use of ‘Humane Government’. The exact meaning of this concept and its difference compared to traditional Human Rights will be explored and explained below.
The question that arises is whether or not we can even speak of progress if there is no clearly defined goal that we are moving towards. It will be my claim below that we have entered a moment in human history where the forces of globalization will inevitably lead every nation on the planet to adopt forms of Human Rights. Globalization in this sense refers to the onset of the ‘Modern Moral
Order’ as described by Charles Taylor (2008).
10
A Romantic’s Nostalgia
The human dress is forged iron,
The human form a fiery forge,
The human face a furnace sealed,
The human heart its hungry gorge.
William Blake 11
To claim that a universal morality based on human rights is discovered through successful economic development and industrialization is odd in many ways. As a reaction to the industrial revolution of the 18th century, romanticism became a popular movement that glorified the perceived aestheticism of a bygone age. As a work that consists of both literary and artistic works, William Blake’s Songs of
Innocence and Experience perhaps best embodies the romantic’s zeitgeist. From the beginnings of industrialization, western culture has brought forth artistic expression reminiscent of a time when man was in awe of nature, before he sought to conquer it with fire and steel. Two centuries later,
J.R.R. Tolkien’s trilogy The Lord of the Rings (1954 – 1955) is equally reminiscent of pre-industrial
Europe. The book describes the threat of Mordor which, when translated from Tolkien’s fictional language Sindarin, means Black Land. The land is ruled by Sauron who inhabits the Barad-dûr (Dark
Tower), standing at the foot of the Ered Lithui (Ash Mountains). Construction of armor and weapons occurred on the Gorgoroth plateau, in the middle of which lay the heart of Mordor, its furnace:
Mount Doom. We find similar urges to reconnect with nature in new age spiritual movements of the contemporary west. New Age Spirituality can be seen as a religious ‘bricolage’ that differs between individuals. Nevertheless, its sources of inspiration can include Hindu ideas about chakras, Chinese traditional medicine, Western psychotherapy, Taoism, crystal-healing, or Tarot cards.
12
In view of this history, ethics and industrialization are an unusual match. Certainly, industrialization has rendered humanity capable of many atrocities. The horrors of two world wars, nuclear/chemical weapons and pollution are all the results of the rapid technological advances made in the wake of industrialization. However, the effects of industrialization in the west have gone much further than
10 Taylor, C.; “A Secular Age”
11 W. Blake, Songs of Experience
12 S. Auper, D. Houtman, ‘Beyond the Spiritual Supermarket’, 201 - 222
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bring about technological advances. Entire social structures have reformed in pursuit of efficiency and capital. The critical histories of modern social institutions found in the works of Michel Foucault also point to a grave and dangerous system of control functioning for the benefit of the nation as an economic unit. American Rock Band ‘The Strokes’ (2001) explored the relationships between people in the modern metropolis of New York City, the album name is another reflection of a romantic undercurrent in popular culture in protest of a rough and cold efficient rationality: Is this it?
A belief in universal moral values can also be found to be rooted in a form of romanticism. The notion of natural rights was defended by Montesquieu through ‘the voice of nature crying out 13 ’ as a point of reference for its moral content. In his 1978 acceptance speech of the Nobel Prize for
Literature, Isaac Bashevis Singer similarly spoke of such values:
“I was brought up to believe in free will. Although I came to doubt all revelation, I can never accept the idea that the Universe is a physical or chemical accident, a result of blind evolution. Even though I learned to recognize the lies, the clichés and the idolatries of the human mind, I still cling to some truths which I think all of us might accept some day.” 14
Industry and Morality: a Match Made in… the Self.
“And was Jerusalem builded here,
Among these dark Satanic Mills?”
William Blake 15
Ironically, I believe the discovery of universal moral values, or ‘shared truths’, to be an indirect consequence of industrialization. Our primary source of inspiration for this thesis will be the Modern
Moral Order as conceived by Charles Taylor in his 2007 book A Secular Age. Combining such concepts as the Habermasian Public Sphere, the objectification of social reality and the sovereignty of a people vis-à-vis their government, Taylor writes a persuasive analysis of history in an attempt to show the far reaching effects of industrialization on social structures and our general understanding of life, our
social imaginary. A further cornerstone of this research will be self-evident nature of these universal moral concepts embodied in Human Rights. We will theorize that this self-evidence is discovered within the Modern Moral Order partly as a result of increased individualization. We will continue our endeavors by showing that globalization leads to the cross-cultural incorporation of the Modern
Moral Order in societies that open up to foreign influences and achieve successful economic integration into the global market. The discovery of universal moral values is achieved through open moral dialogues, which we will define further at a later stage. We therefore contend that the discovery of such values in any given society will cause them to be integrated into the national culture. Ultimately then, the spread of human rights in the world will be a product of cultural evolution, achieved in open moral dialogue. If such discovery and adaptation does not occur within a
13 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 92-93, quoted in: L. Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, 31
14 I. B. Singer, Nobel Acceptance Speech
15 W. Blake, Milton a Poem
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culture, it is subject to external imposition quickly leading to the argument that Human Rights are a form of moral imperialism. To my mind, imposition, especially when considered inevitable, conjures up images of powerlessness and subjugation that are incompatible with the benign nature of Human
Rights. By believing Human Rights to be self-evident universal moral values, we necessarily claim them to be superior to all systems or codes of morality that contradict them. The progress we intend to analyze below is thus dependent on seeing Human Rights as a moral foundation that is inherently good, and superior to all that contradict it. Only when we accept the moral universalism of Human
Rights can we claim their spread throughout the human species to be a true sign of progress; and only once we prove the inevitability of this spread can we truly speak of progressive history. We will make a case for the inevitable discovery of universal moral values by directly connecting them to the onset of the Modern Moral Order through open moral dialogues.
The task that awaits us is no small one, neither in size nor in implication. Nor do I believe it to be a thesis that can be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The notion that the adoption of universal moral values is inevitable can only be proven by the passing of time. Hegel, Marx and Fukuyama claimed historical progress through the analysis of historical processes. Similarly, the advent of the Modern
Moral Order will be the process that lies central to our claim. Whilst the self-evident nature of universal moral values cannot be proven, their inherency in the Modern Moral Order can.
Consequently, the inevitable spread of the Modern Moral Order entails the spread of these universal moral values. Our claim that these universal moral values are self-evident means that they cannot be based on any external proof. They are therefore ultimately convictions. Nevertheless, a conviction is a strong statement concerning perceived processes. The latter can, and will be, proven. The amount of processes and developments with relevance to our topic far surpasses the time and space we have to discuss them. We will therefore limit ourselves to those aspects and processes that seem most relevant. We will inevitably end up with a broad theory many details of which deserve more attention than we can give them here. The study of human history, ethics and human nature must necessarily be an interdisciplinary one. To borrow a term from theoretical physics, we must pursue a
unified field theory in that it explains universal moral values not only from a philosophical perspective, but indeed includes and combines everything from sociology and history, to psychology and neuroscience. It must include all things human.
Terminology
For the sake of clarity it is wise to clarify some terminology before we get started. When discussing moral universal values, one quickly comes across terms that can be considered ambiguous. We will for example, use the term secular. Definitions of this term are largely dependent on the context in which it is used. John Sommervile in a 1998 article discussed six different contexts and explains how the meaning of secularization changes in each. For example, in relation to the study of populations, secularization may refer to a decline in religiosity, or, when discussing societal institutions, secularization can refer to differentiation and the separation of church and state. Another example is the study of secularization as an aspect of psychology in which case it refers to the decline in concern for a possible afterlife.
16 To use terminology by Charles Taylor, they are more concerned with the
16 C. J. Sommerville, ’Secular Society Religious Population´, 249-54.
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profane, rather than higher times. We will indeed be using secular in the way that Taylor has used it.
Since we will be discussing the secular aspect of the Modern Moral Order at great lengths below, a short clarification will suffice. Secular is used as a term to indicate how we understand our place in space and time. A distinction is drawn between so called ‘higher times’ and the ‘profane’. Broadly speaking, higher times are those that traditional societies looked up to as something to aspire.
Usually, the foundational act of a nation was located in this time, associated with divine acts. The profane on the other hand is the ‘here and now’. A secular view of time indicates that there can be no transcendence between the two. In other words, the Divine is no longer seen as a source of direct intervention or legitimacy, and the higher times, or the events that took place in them no longer have any authority over our common actions today. Secular then, is a term used to delineate how people imagine their social existence in relation to the past.
The social imaginary, already briefly referred to is a term used by Taylor for which he gives no clearly outlined definition, rather the meaning is explained to the reader over the course of a couple of pages. Nevertheless, the following quote will give us a broad idea of what he has in mind when speaking of the social imaginary of a people:
“I am thinking rather of the ways in which they imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations which are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images which underlie these expectations” 17
Universal moral values further indicate a culture-neutrality. The fact that one or more of these values are discovered within a particular culture does not mean that they are specific to it, nor should they be interpreted as cultural values, indeed they are universal. The idea of culture-neutrality is important in this discussion as much of what has been written on the topic of Human Rights can be divided into moral universalists and cultural relativists. In their extreme forms, the former believes that Human Rights are purely Western conceptions that are superior to all others and should therefore be cross-culturally imposed. The latter on the other hand believe that moral values are specific to a culture and that we cannot and should not pass judgment on cultures and practices that are foreign to our own. Following Kant, Noam Chomsky offers a simple definition of moral universalism in a 2007 interview: “if something’s right for me, it’s right for you; if it’s wrong for you, it’s wrong for me.” 18 Moral relativism is the opposite position, namely that if something is wrong in one culture, it does not follow that it is so in another. The universalist/relativist debate will be further assessed at a later stage.
We will also speak of the ‘public sphere’. Charles Taylor bases his philosophy regarding this topic largely on Jorgen Habermas.
19 Nevertheless, we will follow Taylor’s work on the subject here as he incorporates it into the Modern Moral Order. Taylor’s interpretation of Habermas leads to the following definition of the public sphere as: “a common space in which members of society are deemed to meet through a variety of media: print, electronic, and also face-to-face encounters; to discuss matters of common interest; and thus be able to form a common mind about these” 20
17 C. Taylor, A Secular Age, 171
18 N. Chomsky, ´On responsibility, War Guilt and Intellectuals´
19 J. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere
20 C. Taylor, A Secular Age, 185
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The aspect of culture-neutrality is also something which I hold in high esteem and deserves some attention. One might say that a culture-neutral interpretation of Human Rights leads to the position that they are universal moral values capable of being independently discovered in different cultures.
That is, Human Rights do not need to be imposed. Furthermore, recent international developments in Iraq and Afghanistan have made clear that an interventionist approach to Human Rights, through
‘nation-building’, is next to impossible. That is not to say I oppose military intervention to prevent such mass atrocities as genocide, I merely contend that one cannot expect to change the culture or moral values of a nation through military conquest. War and occupation do change societies, and I am not one to downplay the role of Western imperialism on the societies of the African continent and beyond. I merely contend that Iraq and Afghanistan, and to a lesser extent Bosnia, have shown that it is extremely difficult to get a grip on these changes, let alone ensure they move in a particulardirection. Nation-building as the effort to impose democratic self-rule and the adherence to
Human Rights has failed.
21
A culture-neutral interpretation of institutional secularization, the separation of church and state, would point to the many different outcomes in countries that largely belong to the same culture.
22 The contemporary world illustrates this well. In the United States, there exists separation of church and state, yet it is the norm for a politician to identify him or herself as Christian. Moreover, it is considered normal to argue legislation from the perspective of religious conviction. Politicians can also argue to teach intelligent design in state schools. France on the other hand has developed its own version of secularism, otherwise known as laicité. In this from, secularism leads the government to always protect its citizens from religion in the public space. This can and has led to far reaching limitations set on the expression of religion. Visible religious expressions such as scarves and crosses have been banned from public schools and public spaces such as libraries.
23 In the Netherlands, there has recently been a ban on the traditional means of slaughtering animals as required under the dominant interpretations of Judaism and Islam.
24 Here, one could argue secularism has resulted in the protection of animals from the (harmful?) influence of religion. We are reminded that certain aspects of society, such as democracy, secularity and the rule of law, deemed cornerstones of
Western civilizations, are nevertheless open to different interpretations and applications. Likewise, universal moral values are the cornerstone of an ethical system that otherwise leaves room for interpretation. We might say that the shared values are the foundation on which the house of ethics is built. Architecture has always been a distinct feature of different cultures. The gradual expansion of these values through the advent of the Modern Moral Order presupposes the ability of cultures to change and adopt new and existing forms of government, economics, and morality. Each culture has proven itself capable of this in the past and there seems to be no reason to believe this has changed.
21 For an analysis of nation-building in recent history, see: A. Somit, S.A. Peterson, The Failure of Democratic
Nation-Building
22 Please note that for the sake of this example, secularization is used here in relation to social structures. This is not the type of secular spoken of by Charles Taylor in A Secular Age
23 BBC News, ´French Scarf ban comes into force´
24 B. Waterfield, ´Dutch Parliament votes to ban ritual slaughter of animals´
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Moral Universalism & Cultural Relativism
One might argue that what we have said just above has an apologetic overtone. The importance put on culture-neutrality can be said to be rooted in a deep form of cultural relativism. It seems important to shortly address that issue here so as to not allow such a perception to dominate one’s reading of the findings below. Indeed, like most raised in a western liberal democracy, I put a strong emphasis on the importance of authenticity. The imposition of norms and values (where it occurs) on another culture is unacceptable. Indeed, as most will agree, imposition in any form runs counter to our understanding of authenticity and, to use another concept closely associated to liberal democracy, self-determination. Furthermore, authenticity as it is understood in Western culture is itself constantly developing. Whether it is the authentic interpretation of institutional secularism that differs from country to country or the individual authenticity of someone changing the way they dress. Authenticity is inextricably bound together with the notion of identity. In the first example we speak of a national identity, in the second of a personal. Likewise, we suggest respecting the autonomy of cultural identity. This does not mean that we defend the right of nations to carry out the death penalty through stoning, or claim to understand, let alone have respect for, the persecution of homosexuality. Rather, we will claim that the world is moving both collectively and separately towards what which we call ‘humane government’, embodied in shared universal moral values. Furthermore, this process is inherent to the onset of the Modern Moral Order. Unfortunately it is highly problematic to try and catalyze it. Our narrative will be one of organic development of societies and an evolution of culture. In this evolutionary process, cultures will come into contact with this new order and will appropriate it through an authentic cultural interpretation. Naturally, this appropriation is a two-way road; it changes the existing value system through the incorporation of new ideas and concepts which leads to an outcome that as a whole differs from other cultures, while maintaining a universal foundation. I may be a moral universalist because I claim the Western morality as it currently exists to be superior to all other contemporary alternatives, yet this does not make me a cultural universalist, the notion of which is somewhat preposterous. Nor do I believe that cultural relativism stands in the way of moral universalism. The position that this thesis will take is one that allows for both. In effect, we will argue that there is a basic morality which is universal yet necessarily leaves space for cultural (re)interpretation. In other words, these moral values are best seen as a concept, not a blueprint. Indeed I do not believe said superior morals can be reasonably expected to take root in other cultures through imposition. On the contrary, certain Human Rights policies are likely counter-productive to the cause of universal humane government. Moreover, moral value attributed to the Western liberal-democratic model is not unique to it. It is my sincere belief that such moral praise can and will be achieved through other forms of societal organization that remain as of yet undiscovered. Moreover, Human Rights can be effectuated in non-democratic forms of government. Therefore democratization does not need to happen prior to the implementation of Human Rights. Democracy may well be the logical outcome at the end of this long march towards the Modern Moral Order, but there are many adjectives besides liberal that might one day be used to describe governments in Iran, China, or any other nation. I would agree with
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Sumner B. Twiss when he says that Human Rights are essentially theory-neutral, which I understand to mean the same as culture-neutral: 25
“Theory-neutrality does not mean moral neutrality. Human Rights obviously have significant moral content. The claim is only that this moral content implies no one distinctive moral or political theory, and that this content can be affirmed by otherwise diverse cultural moral traditions and sociopolitical systems.” 26
Progress and Human Nature
I proclaim here to see ethical progression in history, but I do not claim to see the end of history.
Through an analysis of this progression in the history of the West, we hope to distill the core elements that effectuated a move towards humane government. This will be done through the analysis offered by Taylor.A further exploration of the topic will be offered on the basis of recent work by historian Lynn Hunt.
27 While Taylor tends to emphasize broader trends and processes, Hunt focusses on changes that occurred in the human psychology. As we will see, this has in large part to do with our perception of humanity in the other, summarized in the word empathy. This word, or concept, which itself did not exist in the English language until well after the enlightenment had ended, will help us greatly in developing our theory due to its common use in the fields of psychology, ethics, biology, and the various combinations of the three. This is not to say that people were incapable of empathy merely that before being added to the dictionary, philosophers such as
Adam smith tended to use ‘sympathy’ instead. Empathy lends itself well to interdisciplinary studies.
Recent findings in fields related to human psychology tend to point to an innate sense of justice in the human psyche.
28 If this is true, than a justice-driven developments towards new forms of government is not only possible, it may even be expected as part of human nature. After all, does not every society try to better itself? There will probably be skeptics who disagree with this statement. I will concur with them to the extent that there are societies who find themselves in a stagnant position. These are often societies isolated from the international community. They may even have ended up in their current position due to an earlier drive for self-improvement. North Korea would be a good example of a country that is currently completely stagnant in relation to its development.
Yet the communist ruling party has certainly aimed at improving their nation since the armistice of
1953. The best intentions can lead us to the worst consequences, especially when policy-making is subject to totalitarian ideology. In the search for a better social contract, humanity has made many mistakes ranging from Stalinism and fascism, to monarchical absolutism. So we maintain that every society tries to better itself. Inspired by Darwinian theory of evolution, it is my firm belief that in the constant battle between the –isms of history, there are elements that have proven fittest in serving the human cause. ‘Human Rights’, which we will come to call humane government, is one of these
25 Culture-neutral and theory-neutral have the same meaning in relation to Human Rights. They are otherwise not synonymous. A political theory such as democracy may be considered culture-neutral, but not theoryneutral.
26 S. B. Twiss, ´Moral Grounds and Plural Cultures´, 274
27 L. Hunt, Discovering Human Rights
28 N. Angier, ´Thirst for Fairness May Have Helped Us Survive´
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elements that has developed and survived throughout numerous redactions in the Western mindset.
In fact, with every redaction it has been further ingrained as a core element to Western thought to the point where separating them is thought to be near-impossible. The survival of these values serves as a first indication of their inherent worth to humanity. Using the theories of Taylor and
Amitai Etzioni 29 , we will show that the advent of the Modern Moral Order leads countries to immerse themselves in open moral dialogue. These dialogues, part of Etzioni’s work, are key to the discovery of the universal moral values and therefore the proclaimed progress.
What Rights?
When discussing the historical development of Human Rights, it is useful to define what they entail.
There exists an international consensus on the validity of Human Rights. The existence of such a consensus concerning the precise contents of these rights is controversial to say the least. What remains possible, and for is our purposes more useful, is to categorize the rights according to their type. This has been done quite extensively by Sumner B. Twiss, whom we have already quoted in relation to the concept of theory-neutrality. The work of Twiss is paramount to our understanding of
Human Rights.
“…the international practice of Human Rights is compatible with a wide range of sociopolitical systems that avoid the pathological extreme of socially destructive individual freedom without solidarity (for example, an extreme libertarianism) and personally destructive communal oppression without individual freedom (for example, totalitarianism).” 30
Through the gradual adoption of rights, societies will inevitably give them an authentic cultural twist.
Although rights may be stipulated in documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the language used is still to an extent ambiguous. Twiss discusses the paradox between individualism and collectivism which he considers “as a systematic development leading to a whole new category of Human Rights”.
31 Categorizing rights by virtue of their type allows us to discuss their interdependence without denying their sometimes ambiguous nature. There are three such types: civil-political, socio-economic, and collective-developmental. According to Twiss, the first two concern the claims of individuals towards the state while the third concerns itself with the rights of groups and peoples against their government:
Civil-political rights can be divided into norms pertaining to security, both civil and personal, and may include protection from inhumane punishments, sovereignty of one’s physical body, and the equal treatment by the judiciary. Secondly, civil-political rights contain certain liberties such as the right to political participation, assembly, and thought. Socio-economic rights can be subdivided into those rights pertaining to the provision of (social) goods by the state such as healthcare and education. The second sub-type of socio-economic rights is the provision of goods necessary for an economically viable life. These may include jobs, fair wages, and (limited) social security. Lastly, collective-
29 A. Etzioni, ‘On Communitarian and Global Sources of Legitimacy’;
A. Etzioni, ‘The Normativity of Human Rights is Self-Evident’
30 S. B. Twiss, ‘Moral Grounds and Plural Cultures’, 273
31 S. B. Twiss, ‘History, Human Rights, and Globalization’, 41
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developmental rights include on the one hand provisions ensuring self-determination of peoples and groups in society, and on the other certain special rights for ethnic and religious minorities. The latter may include the freedom to educate children their own language in school, and the freedom to celebrate important cultural festivities.
32
Moreover, it is possible to see these three different types as three different historical responses to crises. In this view, Human Rights developed over time informed primarily by certain events. Civilpolitical rights are then a response to the Genocide of World War II (freedom from torture, inhumane treatment), socio-economic rights (welfare system in Europe, right to a job), and finally collectivedevelopmental rights developed alongside de-colonization (self-determination). Unfortunately, these divisions are sometimes appropriated to legitimize the focus on one type rather than another, usually accompanied by the argument that individualism is not a priority. Fortunately, Human Rights is a field not left unnoticed by the statisticians amongst us. Their work has already shown that these different types of rights did not only develop in a mutually-informative and interactive manner, they are also highly inter-dependent.
33 As an example: one cannot hope to successfully implement civilpolitical rights without access to socio-economic goods. In order to set up an election, the government will require tax-money which they can only collect if a significantly large enough part of the population has a job with a decent wage. This is but a simple case of interdependence, but put into the context of governance, institutional frameworks, and the infrastructure of an entire nation, it is not difficult to imagine that these three ‘types’ overlap on a large variety of issues.
By virtue of self-evident universal moral values, we have already claimed Human Rights to lie wholly outside any and all cultures. We might say in the words of Twiss that it holds theory-neutrality, which it achieves by not being a theory at all. In fact, he describes Human Rights as:
“an open-textured pragmatic agreement (not a theory) on humane governance that allows a spectrum of ways of balancing personal interests in self-development and intimate relations with communal interests in solidarity and the social good.” 34
It boils down to the belief that Human Rights are compatible with a wide range of socio-political systems and is not restricted to western liberal democracy. The term “humane government” allows for a range of options on the individual-communitarian spectrum. It avoids the extremes of either end by protecting solidarity and society from a destructive individualism and it protects the individual person from destructive forms of communitarian subjugation.
Universalism in a Globalizing world
We have discussed a number of things up to this point. We started by briefly discussing the various ways in which one can assess historical progress. I have further argued the culture- or theoryneutrality of Human Rights as universal moral values. Indeed we will treat them devoid of any cultural interpretation, i.e. a strong focus on the individual or community. We have furthermore seen how such an approach employs both moral universalism and cultural relativism in arguing Human
Rights. We therefore value both the cultural autonomy of different peoples as well as the universal
32 Idem, 40
33 T. B. Jabine, Human Rights and statistics
34 S. B. Twiss, ‘Moral Grounds and Plural Cultures’, 273-274
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application of Human Rights by pointing to the necessity of cultural (re)interpretation to effectuate stable change. Finally we have defined Human Rights as humane government which has certain implications that do not need to be repeated here. I have chosen to discuss all of these as part of the introduction in order to clarify certain otherwise ambiguous notions. Yet there is one crucial element missing. We have proclaimed ethical progress, that innate sense of justice, and the self-evidence of
Human Rights, we have yet to explain why this supposed progress is inevitable. Indeed, this will be the focus of most of the writings below. It will suffice to say here that we will aim to show how globalization is responsible for the homogenization of certain social structures throughout the world.
Most importantly, these lead to an increase in individualization even in cultures that are traditionally rather communitarian, such as China. One of the most visible proofs of this is the advent of social networking sites such as facebook and twitter, as well as an increased interest in fashion designs from the runways of Paris, Milan and Tokyo 35 .
The globalization of the Modern Moral Order seems to inevitably lead to a greater focus on the autonomy of the individual. As we will see in the pages below, it is the discovery of the autonomous self in others (empathy) that played a fundamental role in the development of humane government in the west. This shift in the nature of inter-personal relations is a product of modernization. This, then, will finally allow us to formulate our thesis:
“The forces of globalization will inevitably lead to a universal discovery of the self-evident nature of humane government through the onset of the Modern Moral Order”
35 CAO, Jia-Xue, ‘The Analysis of Tendency of Transition’
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Human Rights lie at the center of the global community’s agenda of this century. In Human Rights the two most dominant paradigms are those of cultural relativism and universalism. Within these two constructs, a large portion of academic effort goes into explaining the foundations of moral systems.
Cultural relativists consider Human Rights to be a purely Western invention that they should not be allowed to impose on other cultures. Academics of this kind such as Bertrand Russel and Richard
Rorty often still believe in the principle of Human Rights but accept a different emphasis in different cultures. This type of argument was first put forward by Protagoras: “The way things appear to me , in that way they exist for me and the way things appear to you, in that way they exist for you.” 36 An example of this would be the Asian values as proclaimed by the Chinese government to legitimize a focus on community and society rather than the individual. Indeed, it was a coalition of China, Iran and Syria that claimed Human Rights to be inherently western at the 1993 UN conference in Vienna.
This was the first time a group of nations publicly expressed such sentiments at an international conference. On the other side of the picture there are those who believe Human Rights are and should be universally accepted and implemented without leeway; they should retain their individualistic nature. Yet in recent times a new option has found itself into the debate. Amitai
Etzioni published an article in early 2010 entitled “The Normativity of Human Rights is Self-Evident”.
He borrows this idea from a book by Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights (1990). Finally, Lynn Hunt has also argued the self-evidence of Human Rights in her recent book: Inventing Human Rights (2007).
By discussing Human Rights as self-evident we omit any particular truth claim. Human Rights are then not a complete moral construct, but a specific set of moral guidelines that could theoretically be integrated into any other system of thought. We will show below that Human Rights as formulated by Twiss stand outside of what some would describe as Judeo-Christian, Islamic, or Asian values. It wipes off the table once and for all the argument that Human Rights are a modern day form of
Western imperialism. Indeed, we will argue that these rights are self-evident to all of mankind, across all nations and cultures.
The Meaning of ‘Self-Evident’
Self-evident does not mean self-enforcing or self-implementing. Ideological shifts throughout human history have usually occurred as a result of a buildup of momentum; they do not change simply from one day to another. Similarly individuals do not simply discover the self-evident nature from one day to another. Societies don’t either, and it is unreasonable to expect that they ever will. The selfevidence of Human Rights is something that individuals and societies alike need to discover, or perhaps uncover. To illustrate, no one who believes in this self-evidence will expect a North Korean citizen to argue for freedom of religion the day after a peace treaty is signed with the South. The mind needs to be convinced through open moral dialogue. Furthermore, self-evidence does not make the concept absolute. We may still reason about Human Rights. Humans reason because we
36 Plato, Theaetetus, 152a
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are aware of consequences. Whether it is better to let ten guilty men walk rather than lock one innocent person up is dependent to an extent on what these guilty people will do with their freedom.
Likewise, Human Rights are not absolute in that given the right circumstances, one right may be deemed to have precedence over another. The Chinese government can be said to have deemed lifting its population out of poverty a more important right than the individual’s rights to property.
We are not saying that the Chinese government has consciously chosen one right over another. What we can say, is that it has chosen to pursue rapid economic development. Perhaps this is purely in the interest of the ruling elite, but in relation to the advancement of Human Rights, motivation seems unimportant. Groups such as Amnesty International will point out that freedom of expression barely exists, and that capital punishment is applied more than anywhere else in the world. Amnesty is right, but these types of articles seldom mention the vast amount of people that have been raised out of poverty.
37 Reasoning about HR, they chose one right over another. The point that needs to be made however, is that oftentimes Human Rights activists, passionate as they are, tend to focus on what is going wrong, leaving improvements the topic of a much smaller part of their reports. The traditional media then select the parts of the report (if any) that they find to be news-worthy.
Unfortunately, the criteria employed in such a selection tend to favor the critical, emphasizing continuing violations more than improvements. Alongside freedom of speech, Human Rights also include the rights to shelter, food, and education; all of which have greatly improved in China over the years.
However, the development of Human Rights is the topic of later discussion. The very fact that different nations are able to implement Human Rights along different paths and with different priorities in mind shows us that we are capable of reasoning about Human Rights; even if their nature is considered to be self-evident. Etzioni compares the self-evidence of HR to revelation in religion. A (or the) source for a moral life is, in religious terms, revealed to humanity. The vast majority of the faithful that populate our planet will however agree that discussion on the meaning of these texts is entirely possible; indeed, religions often find themselves divided internally along the lines of scriptural interpretation.
38
Describing Human Rights as self-evident further points towards their being a primary concept. That is, their justification is not dependent on one or more premises. They are primary in that they serve as the foundation for other concepts, such as the system of international law. Whether religious or secular, even moral constructions need such a primary concept; something that serves as the true foundation for the ethical system. Judeo-Christian values are predicated on the existence of God and the revelation of his message in scripture. Those not inclined to accept a divine foundation for their morality may look towards nature or reason as alternative foundations: “every sustainable moral construction builds on a self-evident foundation” 39
Before Human Rights became a part of our everyday vocabulary, French enlightenment thinker
Diderot wrote of natural rights that “the use of this term is so familiar that there is almost no one
37 For examples of Amnesty International’s reporting on China, visit the Amnesty website. Some articles that I have personally read include: ‘Against the Law’, ‘Chinese Activist at Risk of Torture’, ‘Human Rights Activist
Facing Trial’
38 A. Etzioni, ‘The Normativity of Human Rights’, 192
39 Idem, 193
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who would not be convinced inside himself that the thing is obviously known to him.” 40 And while
droit naturel may not encompass as wide a scope of rights as Human Rights do, Diderot’s point on inner conviction is essential. The thing inside ourselves that is obviously known to us: it is selfevident. He added further that true self-evidence would be proven by many people adopting this same conviction. Importantly, it had to be shared throughout all classes of society, not just the philosophers 41 Citizens of all virtues, professions, and educational backgrounds need to be able to hear what Montesquieu referred to as “the voice of nature crying out”.
42 Self-evidence is based on an inner conviction, an emotion in each individual according to Diderot. We therefore cannot prove beyond doubt that we are right in treating Human Rights as self-evident. We can only be individually convinced by what Montesquieu called “the voice of nature”. Yet the step from an inner feeling to the conviction that self-evidence is indeed universal and relevant to humanity as a whole, requires quite a step. We may even call it a leap of faith. The advocates of this approach, such as Henkin,
Hunt, and Etzioni, must be humble enough to admit their arrogance in the face of history. Conflict, violence, and death have been part of human history since the dawn of time. In essence, these advocates are claiming a self-evidence that our species has apparently failed to see over the course of thousands of years, indeed throughout all of our existence. Humanity has seen many philosophies, moral codes, political movements, academic paradigms, come and go as regularly as do the seasons.
To say that we ‘hear the inner voice of nature’ calling on us to accept Human Rights without objective proof or evidence of the scientific kind is remarkable. Arguing further, as we will, that the spread of Human Rights is inevitable precisely because of its self-evident nature is based on the assumption that every human being is capable of hearing that ‘voice of nature’, of developing that deep-seated conviction. The closest we can get to a proof of self-evidence is acceptance. The normalization of Human Rights throughout the globe would, and will, be the ultimate proof of its self-evidence. To clarify, I have used ‘the voice of nature’ here simply as a way of expressing how selfevidence felt to Montesquieu. That inner conviction is personal, and each individual is likely to experience it differently, but all would be able to agree on its moral value. Hunt summarizes this point well:
“Human Rights are not just a doctrine formulated in documents; they rest on a disposition toward other people, a set of convictions about what people are like and how they know right and wrong in the secular world. Philosophical ideas, legal traditions, and revolutionary politics had to have this kind of inner emotional reference point for them to be truly ‘self-evident’. And, as Diderot insisted, these feelings had to be felt by many people, not just the philosophers who wrote about them” 43
International Consensus
Consensus based arguments are sometimes used to support Human Rights. They are judged to be justifiable by countries because there exists a large international consensus among nations through
United Nations conferences, documents, declarations, and treaties. Of course, using consensus as a moral foundation is ambiguous. Throughout history, and even today, large groups of people agree on matters that are considered morally wrong by many others. It is on this issue that Etzioni suggests
40 D. Diderot, Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné, 115 – 116; quoted in: L. Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, 26
41 L. Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, 19
42 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 92-93; quoted in: L. Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, 31
43 L. Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, 27
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that a mere century ago, international consensus was that women were at best second class citizens.
44 No self-respecting academic in our age would argue that this consensus legitimized the practice. Yet consensus based arguments become relevant to us when we don’t use them as a de facto moral legitimation. They are relevant when we use them as examples of the spread of the idea of self-evidence. Human Rights champion and International law scholar Louis Henkin notes that the consensus between nations, established in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is significant because of the norm it has set. The implementation of Human Rights may leave much to be desired in most parts of the world. It is because of the normalization of Human Rights in the international realm of politics that governments can no longer argue that which they practice if it does not conform to Human Rights. In fact, governments that violate the 1948 declaration often try to hide those policies; they claim to be innocent of any wrongdoing.
“Even if half or more of the world lives in a state of emergency with rights suspended, that situation is conceded, indeed proclaimed, to be abnormal, and the suspension of rights is the touchstone and measure of abnormality.” 45
Henkin argues that Human Rights consensus may not exist on a practical level. Yet through treaties and the international framework of institutions there exists a consensus that is nominal, formal, perhaps even hypocritical and cynical. Yet its significance holds, not least because Human Rights thinking is the only idea that has become universally accepted, even if only nominally. A feat not accomplished by ideas such as socialism, the supreme rule of the philosopher-king, or the inferiority of women. The fact that Human Rights have attained this, albeit nominal, universal acceptance therefore speaks in favor of them being self-evident. Not as a foundational argument, not even as a direct reason, but as a historical development that seems to confirm the fortitude and significance of the inner conviction of Human Rights.
Competition Between Moral Systems
Western nations are often blamed for using Human Rights as a foreign policy tool. We have already mentioned the stigma of modern day moral imperialism that exists surrounding this discussion. Yet imperialism is based on a feeling of superiority; a veni vidi vici mentality that we can’t in all honesty ascribe to Human Rights. Yet to undermine the imperialist argument we must show in what form or fashion Human Rights thinking spreads through the world. For if (foreign) policy is the primary factor, the word imperialism may be justified. Clearly, this is not our argument. Individuals can be blinded from self-evidence if they live in closed societies. Etzioni uses the latter distinction to refer to societies unengaged in so called open moral dialogues. What these dialogues entail is something we will get to shortly. To illustrate closed societies, let us use as an example an imaginary society ruled by a totalitarian regime, subject to intense propaganda and oppression, and sealed off from the rest of the world. An individual in such circumstances will be severely hindered in the development of alternative ideas. Without access to the outside world, and indoctrinated with false information, this totalitarian environment becomes an insurmountable hurdle to the discovery of that self-evident truth. Our access to it is essentially cut off.
44 A. Etzioni, ‘The Normativity of Human Rights’, 190
45 L. Henkin, The Age of Rights, xviii
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Etzioni suggests that Human Rights spread throughout the world by means of ‘open moral dialogues’.
It entails submerging oneself in what we might call a value vacuum. Similar to the Rawlsian ‘Original
Position’ 46 , Etzioni prefers pointing to the work of Martin Buber. Self-evidence, it is claimed, will present itself as such to any human being engaged in a true moral dialogue, free from any and all concepts, notions, ideas, convictions, revelations, or other modes of thinking. In Rawls’ work, individuals hypothetically discuss their ideal form of society before knowing how they are born into it. In other words, they are unaware of their talents, their social class, family situation, and all else.
Rawls argues that people in such a situation will argue for a society in which everyone has an equal opportunity to fulfill their ambitions. Rawls presents the hypothetical individuals with a list of principles from which they have to choose. Each represents a different way of organizing a society.
Even though Rawls has endured a lot of criticism on his somewhat limited list, he still raises an interesting point on how he thinks people will choose in such a situation. Rawls preferred option is the principal of ‘justice as fairness’. We may understand his reasons by regarding the two principles
“as the maximin solution to the problem of social justice”.
47 The maximin method categorizes options by virtue of their worst possible outcome. By being completely unaware of the position one will take in the society of choice, Rawls argues that individuals will choose the option whose worst outcome is still better than all others (worst outcomes). A non-maximin strategy could lead to “outcomes one can hardly accept”, such as aristocratic rule. Furthermore, Rawls believes that:
“…the person choosing has a conception of the good such as he cares very little, if anything, for what he might gain above the minimum stipend that he can, in fact, be sure of by following the maximin rule. It is not worthwhile for him to take a chance for the sake of further advantage” 48
Similarly, Martin Buber writes in his book I and Thou 49 of moral dialogues in which participants deliberate values. During the process, they truly open up to each other and become susceptible to self-evident moral precepts. Naturally, the term ‘open moral dialogues’ describes an ideal type situation. In practice, the discovery of the self-evident nature of Human Rights is not something that happens through a single conversation. Rather, it is a process in which new elements and circumstances in an individual’s life lead them to discover these values on his or her own. Peoples may be blinded from accepting a normative moral cause because of the circumstances they live in.
These blinding factors can be obvious, like forms of government found in North Korea or Myanmar.
These nations have a totalitarian political system, that is to say government holds a monopoly on the spread of information. Yet even those living in supposedly open societies such as the United States or the Netherlands may have their vision obscured. In closed societies, this can be due to peer pressure or political indoctrination (totalitarian). In open societies, individuals may be blinded due to a variety of factors including, drugs, alcohol, mental handicap, various forms of popular culture, or adherence to an extreme ideology. Additionally, we must not forget those that live in heavily closed of communities, often religious, otherwise known as enclaves 50 . Examples of the latter may include certain communities in the Dutch ‘bible-belt’, religious sects, or the Amish communities in the United
46 The term Original Position comes from: J. Rawls, A theory of Justice
47 J. Rawls, A theory of Justice, 152
48 Idem, 154
49 M. Buber, I and Thou
50 For an in-depth analysis of how enclaves separate themselves from the rest of society, I highly recommend:
P. Herriot, Religious Fundamentalism
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States. Of course the factors mentioned in relation to open-societies are applicable to closed societies as well, but not vice versa.
Regardless of how we define human beings along these lines, it is argued that even the most blinded individuals, in other words those furthest removed from open moral dialogue, can discover those universal moral values embodied in Human Rights. So long as they engage in open moral dialogue.
Open societies within which open moral dialogues take place are thus characterized by their open access to sources of information.
Truth
We have mentioned above the similarity between religious revelation and the self-evidence of HR.
We have consciously omitted to use the word ‘truth’ in relation to Human Rights because of the philosophical weight this terms brings with it. In the contemporary world, truth is something that needs to be scientifically approached. Oftentimes we attempt to find it through experiments. It is a goal that we reach through objective analysis and empirical assessment. If we count a thousand doves and find them all to be white, we can assume the statement ‘all doves are white’ to be truthful, that is, until the theory is disproven by a black dove, a possibility we can never really rule out. What is considered true differs from ‘the truth’ in that the former is our best possible analysis of the latter but ultimately they are not synonymous. Indeed, the US court system maintains the saying
‘proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt’, in other words: ‘we feel confident enough about our perception of the truth to act on it.’ Self-evidence is not often accepted. We often need a truth to be proven outside itself. In other words, the sun isn’t yellow because it is yellow, but because we can see that it is yellow. The objective foundation for the truth that the sun is yellow is found outside the sun itself, it is based on the sight of one or more people. To take the courts as an example, one’s guilt is never considered to be self-evident. Everyone has the right to a fair trial in which the prosecutor presents evidence that is then reviewed by a ‘jury of peers’ who are considered objective. While judicial and scientific truth are not the same, their approach to finding is very similar. They both use observation to prove something beyond reasonable doubt. When new facts or information presents itself, the earlier judgment is reconsidered. This is true even for horrendous crimes committed by a self-confessed criminal. It is fairly clear that Anders Breivik is responsible for the double attack in
Norway in July of 2011 that left 77 people dead; yet the evidence still needs to be presented in front of a court. A truth, in this sense, requires an objective foundation, whether it’s a jury in the American legal system, or a hypothesis based experiment in a laboratory. Yet we have described HR as selfevident, their truth claim so far as it exists can be said to be inherent to itself. By declaring the selfevidence of HR we scrap the need for any objective foundation. They are in themselves only an objective foundation for other truths and constructs, such as the international legal system. The selfevident nature is based on an inner conviction and therefore ultimately subjective.
Etzioni’s “…article deliberately avoids invoking the term ‘truth’. That term implies, at least in a contemporary context, a logical, empirical, objective, or scientific validity that differs from the axiomatic nature of self-evident precepts. “Truth” concerns “is” statements, while this article deals
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with “ought” statements. This article avoids the term “moral truth” because it evokes efforts, like those of David Hume, that seek to base morality on objective foundations.” 51
Etzioni argues above that a truth-claim is concerned with what ‘is’ whereas his endeavor consists of showing not what ‘is’ but what ‘ought to be’. Therefore the term ‘truth’ is irrelevant for his discussion. This is a rather weak defense. By saying something ‘ought to be’, one is really saying that the situation that ‘is’ in one place (or the mind, in the form on an idea) should spread to others. The moral truth accepted in one place (the west) is considered ‘right’, whereas that of other regions is considered ‘false’, or at the very least ‘incomplete’ or ‘less than optimal’. If truth claims always discuss what ‘is’, than discussing what ‘ought to be’ carries an inherent truth claim. Nevertheless, we are still in agreement with Etzioni that the normativity of HR is self-evident, that it is inherently appealing, and that consequently they need not be based on the type of external judgment found in
Hume’s philosophy. Historian Lynn Hunt analyzes Thomas Jefferson’s claim of self-evidence in the
American declaration of independence. She notes that a same sense of self-evidence can be found in the French declaration of the rights of man and citizen: “ignorance, neglect or contempt of the rights
of man are the sole causes of public misfortunes and governmental corruption.” 52 Furthermore, the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights preamble reads: “whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family…” 53 As Lynn effectively shows, ‘whereas’ really means ‘it being the fact that’ and therefore also asserts selfevidence. Self-evidence is therefore a concept that has pervaded Human Rights thinking for at least the last 250 years and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Unfortunately for those that hold Human Rights to be self-evident in the face of those who don’t, arguing their case nullifies their claim. Yet the claim exists, and has existed since Jefferson’s famous words.
54
Process, not Event
We have already shortly mentioned that to emerge from a situation of blindness, individuals need to be involved in open moral dialogues. These are discussions through which the participants are lifted from the darkness and become susceptible to the self-evident nature of the question at hand.
55
However, such open moral dialogues are an ideal-type situation, not one we can reasonably expect every, if any, individual to partake in. It seems more likely that individuals will have encounters, conversations and other experiences that carry with them in part an open moral dialogue. Bits and pieces of the self-evidence of Human Rights are revealed through such experiences. It is in every sense of the word a development. Yet this is not the first time that we can observe such changes. It is precisely because of the sum of all the experiences, encounters and conversations that many white
Americans came to gradually accept the fundamental equality between all races in 1960’s and beyond. Watching a speech by Martin Luther King is bound to have been one of those moments that effectuated some change in the minds of many. King’s famous ‘I have a dream speech’ is one of the
51 A. Etzioni, ‘The Normativity of Human Rights’, 190
52 L. Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, 19
53 Idem, 19
54 Idem, 20
55 We will intentionally refrain from using the term ‘enlightened’ in opposition to darkness or blindness. This is a conscious choice due to the often made association with Western enlightenment thinking.
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historical events that stands out as representative of changing moral standards. It is unrealistic to believe that this was the event that changed the minds of so many. It is impossible to point to a single cause as having effectuated any great change. Instead, speeches such as this one, as well as those held by other civil rights activists have played their part in a historical process of transformation of a moral standard, namely that the color of our skin ought to be irrelevant in our pursuit of happiness. The feminist movement and the subsequent implementation of women’s rights is a similar case. Furthermore, historically, the declaration of such rights precedes or lies at the precipice of their society-wide acceptance and implementation. Therefore, we may say that declarations precede normalization. To illustrate, rights for black Americans were declared in the civil rights act of 1964, yet no one will argue that this solved issues of segregation and racism. The declaration served as a catalyst for normalization, as a legal tool that allowed for the criminalization of racism. Additionally, it is difficult to pinpoint a time when open moral dialogues concerning racial equality started. We can reasonably assume that the plight for equal rights originated in the black community. Open moral dialogues gradually convinced an increasing amount of white Americans of the black community’s plight, feeling an inner conviction of sorts. The movement as a whole, including civil unrest, served as a catalyst for open dialogues. This ultimately culminated in the civil rights act of 1964. A declaration draws a line, pushing those that have not accustomed to the new norm into the sphere of the illegal; it therefore provides the strongest possible legal incentive to accept the new rights of others. It also explains why something as self-evident as Human Rights still finds itself proclaimed. A proclamation is an echo of the conviction felt so strongly in so many that they feel obliged to shout it from the rooftops in an attempt to effectuate change and implementation. A declaration of rights is not just a message to the citizens of a nation; it is aimed at the world as a whole.
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“For Human Rights to become self-evident, ordinary people had to have new understandings that came from new kinds of feelings.” – Lynn Hunt 56
Our view of Human Rights throughout this thesis is one of compatibility with any and all cultures.
Further, we have established that Human Rights are in essence a pragmatic agreement on what we call ‘humane government’. Humane is the classification we give to that part of the individualisticcommunitarian scale of governance that successfully unites and balances the interests of the individual with those of the community. To argue our case of universal cultural compatibility, we may learn a lot from the way in which Human Rights developed in the West. Indeed, an argument for selfevidence undermines itself. Yet, analyzing their historical development in search of sources remains relevant. It primarily provides insights into the circumstances necessary for such a development. One may defend the position that the arguments we develop in this field will be inevitably connected to the West and will therefore be nothing more than western circumstances that are impossible to detach from their place and time. Yet we are involved in an attempt to argue for universalism.
Ascribing the historical sources of Human Rights to an inherently Western cultural development, as some may, eliminates immediately the position of universalism. We will not deny the Western character of the developments described below, nor will we deny their connection in space and time to the culturally informed societal structures of the west. Nevertheless, we will argue below that the development of Human Rights occurred largely because of a rebranding of what we might call human interest. A significant portion of our analysis will focus on the meaning and use of empathy in the enlightenment age arts, predominantly literature. Lynn argues that the realization that all those around us are emotional beings capable of their own specific joys and grievances originated in the increased literary interest of the 18 th century.
57 That is to say that it is not the first time that such feelings were the subject of the arts, but it is the first time they firmly took root in the vast majority of the population. This expansion of our empathetic qualities gave rise to the realization that on the level of the self, we were all equals. As a historical source of Human Rights, expanded empathy is not an inherently Western cultural phenomenon. The expanded notion of empathy may be informative of, but does not necessarily lead to, Western liberal democracy. Describing the historical sources of
Human Rights therefore remains interesting. Our findings will allow us to point to similar changes amongst different cultures later on. Such an expansion of empathy is highly informative of interpersonal relations. Yet the gap between these very basic changes and the onset of the Western democratic model of governance is large and definitely leaves room for interpretation. The space between the onset of the sources of Human Rights and their development into a cultural-political system is paved with many roads leading to different destinations. Western liberal democracy is certainly not the only one to fall under the purview of humane government.
56 L. Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, 34
57 This can be consider the thesis of Lynn Hunt’s book: Inventing Human Rights
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Literature and the Rise of Empathy
The definition of empathy is the ability to recognize, and share in someone else’s emotions. It is a human emotion that allows us to transport ourselves as it were into another body so that we may experience all that that person endures. Empathy, in contrast with the ability to simply identify with another person, is highly emotional. To feel empathy towards another person is to imagine sharing fully in their experiences and behavior. Moreover, these feelings need to be present when faced with people (or characters) from a wide variety of social classes, professions, economic standing, and both genders. The ability to do this became widespread in Western Europe in the 18 th century.
Lynn Hunt has identified three novels that appeared just before the revolutionary movements of the
United States and France. They are Samuel Richardson’s Pamela (1740) and Clarissa (1747-48) and
Rousseau’s Julie (1761).
58 Lynn has chosen these novels because she considers it no accident that they were all published immediately prior to the explosion of the debate on rights.
Rousseau’s Julie takes on the form of an epistolary novel. In it, the characters are given new freedom in expressing their emotions. The form of the letter allows for an in-depth exploration of an individual’s feeling. Written from a first-person perspective, the letter-format allows the reader to identify with the characters by jumping in to their very thoughts. The description of a character’s thought-process, their inner-reflections and decision making process is exposed. For the first time in history, the epistolary novel allowed for a true insight into the autonomous self of another human being. Most novels of the time, including the three mentioned above had a particular focus on yearning for autonomy. The lead character, Julie, caught the imagination of almost everyone that read the book. Coming to regard her as a close personal friend, many fans wrote letters to Rousseau explaining how they had cried at her death and sobbed at her separation from her true love. They understood, as it were, her passions, sorrows and desire for control over her own life. This identification also occurred in many male readers, even though the main character is a woman.
Interestingly, we can say that the prime quality of the epistolary novel is its ability to give an extremely detailed account of a character’s personality. Moreover, the degree of detail is so high that it creates an image of a character that is very close to the self. “Through the fictional exchange of letters, in other words, epistolary novels taught their reader nothing less than a new psychology and in the process laid the foundation for a new social and political order” 59
The character is similar because it shows the same emotions, reactions, fears, desires, and difficulties people find in themselves struggling with in everyday life. Ultimately then, the greatest achievement of these works was to demonstrate the innate nature of the autonomous self as existing in everyone, capable of individual deliberation. If the personality of the writing character is constructed through the portrayal of his or her emotions, than certainly our own notion of self is constructed in a similar manner; it comes from within, at the very least, it is experienced as such. By making the character an equal of the reader in all its complexity, soon people realized that there may be many differences between them, but they were equal in the autonomy of the self. Indeed, the main characters of the three books: Pamela, Clarissa, and Julie became individuality personified for many an 18 th century reader. The epistolary novel made allowed for complete characters. No longer did the book consist of the servant-girl, lord, king, husband, and father. Traditional literary roles were substituted by fully
58 L. Hunt, Inventing Human Rights,35 - 69
59 Idem, 28-29
24

formed individuals, whose profession was nothing more than a single aspect of their persona. Hunt writes: “as a consequence, they came to see others – people they did not know personally – as like them, as having the same kinds of inner emotions” 60
The issue of morality was heavily discussed at the time with two opposing camps emerging. On the one hand there were those who claimed that empathy for heroines tormented by emotions such as
Julie would cause people (especially girls) to act in a way incompatible with virtue. Proponents argued that the books would lead to increased adultery because readers were likely to imitate what they read, causing society wide decay of morals. On the other hand there were those that believed the books had a positive effect. Amongst them was Diderot, who compared Richardson to the likes of
Homer and Sophocles. It was the belief of this group that the empathy people developed for the characters led to an increased sense of compassion. Alongside sympathy, both emotions positively contribute to morality. Diderot explained his experience reading Clarissa as an intense emotional learning during which he discovered not only the autonomy of the self in Clarissa, but his own self too. He now feels an increased separation from others while simultaneously understanding how similar he is to others in his autonomy. Hunt points out that it is here that Diderot discovers that
‘inner feeling’ necessary to Human Rights.
61
Crucially, this debate was one that centered on the essence of morality. Those that argued the degenerative aspects of the book pointed out that a life driven by passions and emotions could only lead to vice and lack of virtue. It should come as no surprise that the books were blacklisted by the
Vatican and other religious authorities. Indeed, the few clerics that wrote positively about them did so anonymously. The books caused people to argue that the ordinary lives of regular people were in itself the foundation for morality. They in fact believed that the source of a moral life lay in the interior feelings of the self. Moreover it was believed that the passions and emotions described in the novels could transform the inner nature of an individual to produce an enhanced morality.
Finally, “they believed that the inner nature of humans provided grounding for social and political authority. Traditionally, this grounding was found in God.” 62 The source for morality could now be found in the profane, rather than ‘higher’ times.
Human Rights have not developed solely out of literature; nor does the development of individuality start in the 18 th century literary form. Yet there is no doubt that the epistolary novel has acted as a great catalyst. It instilled in people a very basic sense of equality. It is from here that Human Rights thinking would jumpstart. Hunt formulates this point in the form of a question:
“In this way, reading novels created a sense of equality and empathy through passionate involvement in the narrative. Can it be coincidental that the three greatest novels of psychological identification of the eighteenth century – Richardson’s Pamela (1740) and Clarissa (1747 – 48) and Rousseau’s Julie
(1761) – were all published in the period that immediately preceded the appearance of the concept of
“the rights of man”?” 63
60 Idem, 40
61 Idem, 54 - 55
62 Idem, 50 - 58
63 Idem, 39
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The Autonomy of Self
While the novel may have awoken the spirit of autonomy in many readers, philosophy developed it into one of the main enlightenment ideals. A century earlier, social contract theory gained ground.
Figures such as Locke and Grotius defined society as a contract between autonomous men. Society would be based on this agreement, rather than on obedience to the religious hierarchical system that had dominated for so long. Locke and Rousseau both translated this into new theories of education.
Their aim was to create autonomous men out of young boys so that they would function well within the construct of the contract.
“Educational theory, shaped most influentially by Locke and Rousseau, therefore shifted from an emphasis on obedience enforced through punishment to the careful cultivation of reason as the chief instrument of independence” 64
Additionally, Rousseau called on parents to protect their children from psychological influences.
Political and social pressures should therefore be kept out, the child’s soul required protection.
Practical examples of reform at the time also point towards an increased importance of autonomy. In
1790, special inheritance privileges awarded to the first son were removed. Fathers lost exclusive control over their children. The following year saw a law pass that required children, both male and female, to inherit equally. The age of adulthood was lowered from 25 to 21 and more importantly, divorce became legal and available on equal terms to both genders. The revolutionary aspect of
French political life towards the end of the 18 th century meant that it developed at a somewhat higher pace than in Britain. Yet here too, reforms were instigated that point towards a greater emphasis on the autonomous individual; and while divorce did not become readily available to the
British public until well into the 19 th century, it became accepted quickly in its North-American colonies. Indeed, Thomas Jefferson argued that the pursuit of happiness required the option of divorce and was therefore a natural right. Importantly, he argued that divorce as a natural right of equality to women. To Jefferson, marriage was primarily a contract between people, both of whom should be able to dissolve it if the other party breaks the agreement.
65
The debate around the individual nature of Human Rights that exists today was also present in the early days of the age of rights. Indeed, enlightenment philosophers soon realized that their new found focus on autonomy needed to be reconciled somehow with a sense of community. We find that Scottish philosopher Francis Hutcheson employed the term sympathy. We should note at this point that ‘empathy’ did not exist as a word in the English language of the 18 th century. Indeed, sympathy may have an overtone of charity in our age, it didn’t back then. For Hutcheson, sympathy was the moral faculty that enabled a social life. The faculty of sympathy allowed humanity to share in its pleasures, enlarging them in the process. According to Adam Smith, sympathy allowed one to imagine being in another person’s shoes. We understand another’s suffering only when we use our imagination. Yet according to Smith, we become true moral beings only when we realize that others look at us, and imagine themselves to be in our shoes too. In other words, rather than being the
64 Idem, 60
65 Idem, 61 - 64
26

sympathizer, one can also be the object of sympathy. This realization constructs an ‘impartial moral spectator’ within the self. This then functions as a moral compass.
66
These developments worked in favor of many groups. The rise of the novel was used to plea the abolitionist case for example. Yet women were consistently left out. It is important to emphasize that fact as it is a clear example of the developmental nature of rights. A distinction was made in revolutionary France between civil and political rights. Men and women alike enjoyed the civil rights.
These included the right to property and also covered equality reforms such as the right to divorce mentioned above. The continuing inequality between men and women was based on the idea that women (and other disenfranchised groups) were only passive citizens incapable of political decision making. Political rights were awarded only to the (white) male segment of society. The situation may be best described in the words of George Orwell: “All are equal, but some are more equal than others”.
67 Ironically, the sentence was written as a satirical way of describing communism almost two centuries later, seen by many as the ideological counterweight to the liberal-democratic system that developed out of the Enlightenment. Not only were women not awarded the same political rights as men, the issue was barely discussed at all. The abolition movement gained ground quickly in the
United States, and the French revolutionaries too were quick to extend rights to oppressed groups.
Yet it seems that society, in one way or another, was not ready to discuss the idea that women perhaps should not be considered dependents of men, or that their status should not be solely defined by their birth. They saw women as capable of autonomy on a moral level but did not tie this to their deserving political rights. Even Thomas Jefferson, rightfully considered a visionary in the expansion of rights could never imagine extending political rights to women. His version of democracy extended political rights to as many (white) men as possible. African Americans and women to him fell into the category of the passive citizen.
68
In conclusion, we have shown how an increased focus on the morally autonomous individual in literature through the epistolary novel gave rise to an extended form of empathy that incorporated new views on the autonomous individual and the self. It enacted a psychological change in the minds of the European and North American citizen that made them realize a basic equality amongst them.
The realization that all other people they encountered in everyday life possessed a unique inner self jumpstarted the rights movement. Enlightenment thinking came to see the autonomy of the individual as its primary achievement. Politically, autonomy found its way into the declarations and constitutions surrounding revolutionary movements in France and the North American colonies. Civil rights such as the right to property were extended to many groups in society, including (former) slaves and women. Political rights on the other hand were given only to white men. If we may use such generalizations, it seems that Western culture was not ready to move to full equality.
66 Idem, 65 - 66
67 G.Orwell, Animal Farm
68 L. Hunt, Inventing Human Rights,66 – 69
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Charles Taylor and Modernity
We began our discussions by positing the self-evident nature of Human Rights. Furthermore we have stated that this self-evidence needs to be discovered by people for them to become susceptible to it.
To use the terminology of Etzioni, populations need to be lifted from a state of blindness through open moral dialogues. In the previous chapter we have tried to show that the tipping point in this process in the West can best be found in the epistolary novel of the 18 th century. The ideas propagated through these influential works therefore offer us a novel insight in the changing psychology of people. Yet our thesis speaks of globalization as the primary reason for the inevitable spread of Human Rights. Inevitably therefore, our aim is to pinpoint the aspects of globalization that further the cause of Human Rights. Literature, influential as it may be, cannot be this main aspect.
Indeed we refer to it as a tipping point, a means of effectuating real change within the circumstances of 18 th century Europe. Although not a means in the traditional sense of the word in that it was employed by some (higher) power. We must zoom out and focus on the bucket rather than the drop that made it spill.
The author that has done a lot of research into the development of what he calls the ‘Modern Moral
Order” is Charles Taylor 69 . His book, A Secular Age, traces the broad social changes that have led
Western civilization from an enchanted to a disenchanted world over the past 500 years or so.
Ultimately, his goal is to explain why secularism did not lie within the realm of possibilities of a16th century French agricultural worker. The order and logic that dominated society did not allow for it, and the option as such did not belong to the social imaginary of the time. Although the focus of
Taylor’s research lies in secularism, there are many parallels to be found with the development of
Human Rights. Although we must emphasize at this point that it is not the case that Human Rights have developed because of secularism or vice versa. As we will see, many of the developments that contributed to the possibility of secularism have likewise facilitated the development of Human
Rights. We will, in the pages below, extrapolate aspects of A Secular Age and use them in our own narrative. Ultimately, his thesis is that the Modern Moral Order creates a social imaginary that allows for a greater sense of personal autonomy, disbanding the traditional hierarchical ties thereby allowing for a much broader scope of religious positions. The book consists of close to 800 pages and discusses a myriad of processes linked to this development. I have selected the Modern Moral Order advanced by Taylor as a main source for this thesis because it combines issues of individualism with broad economic and political changes into a single order. I have mentioned earlier that research into universal moral values needs to combine scientific studies into a ‘unified field theory’. Taylor’s work on the Modern Moral Order closely resembles what I mean by that term borrowed from theoretical physics.
69 C. Taylor, A Secular Age, 159
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Free Agency and the Demise of Hierarchy
New modes of thinking about the organization and purpose of society rose to the foreground of western philosophy in the 17 th century. Most notably, Locke and Grotius advocated the idea that society exists to facilitate cooperation and mutual benefit between its members. Writing about the nature of society, its purpose and its origin, we inherently make statements about a moral order, indeed it involves prescription. Taylor notes that ‘the underlying idea of moral order stresses the rights and obligations which we have as individuals towards each other, even prior to or outside of the political bond’.
70 The moral order thus tells us something about the very nature of our society.
Indeed the order of things is prescribed by it and forms in itself the basis for our political organization. Liberalism derives this order from the nature of individual human beings. This moral order has consequently developed over the past 400 years and in the process expanded along two lines. First, it has experienced expansion in the sense that it has become the dominant moral order of western society. Indeed, there are but few groups who can be thought to lie outside of it and even those that can often be considered as enclaves separated from mainstream society. Secondly, the order has made progressively heavier demands on its subjects. Taylor suggests that this has happened through a series of “redactions”, gradually expanding the moral order to what it is today.
71
The moral order as discussed here should be seen as very broad. Besides forming a justification for democratic rule, the way in which you greet your neighbor and address your elders, it involves creating a meaning behind the ordering of society. Taylor believes we can make the distinction here between order in society in terms of basic security, inter-personal relationships and the functioning of government institutions and a different order that underlies all this. He illustrates this well by comparing the Modern Moral Order to another that existed throughout different parts of history.
The historical moral order was categorized above all else by the notion of hierarchy. Moreover, the existing hierarchy had a meaning to it, an innate justification that needed to be maintained to avoid chaos. In this sense, the King was ordained by God to rule the people where at the same time, the order prescribed the place of a farmer to provide the nation with crop and serve the army in times of war. The laity had the task of protecting the country from evil through worship. Society was thus organized in such a manner that every individual had its proper role. Parallels were believed to exist between the order of human society and the order of nature. If one were to upset one, it would unavoidably have repercussions in the other. Therefore, while we may say that in the Modern Moral
Order in which we all have our place, and we all work in mutual service to one another, the vital difference between the traditional and moral orders is individual mobility. When the day comes that
I decide that I no longer wish to work in the academic community but would rather do missionary work in South-East Asia, I can. Had I lived in 15 th century France, leaving the village to explore the world would not only be unheard of, it would have caused outrage in the community due to it upsetting the order of things, as a peasant I was never meant to leave. The hierarchy spoken of here indeed encompassed everything from the division of labor to the ruling of the country. Taylor mentions that we see remnants of this order in language. We speak for example of ‘the king is in his kingdom’ and ‘the lion among animals’. Saying therefore that the 15 th century French peasant is not
meant to do something has further implications than we accord the use of language today. Indeed, if
70 Idem, 159
71 Idem, 160
29

he were to move away from the village, he would upset the moral order and cause a ripple effect that would transcend the human realm, threatening much more than just himself, or even his village.
In a sense, we may say that there existed a clear sense of predestination from which an individual could not digress without risking upsetting the natural order of things.
72
According to Taylor, this move from a moral order based on hierarchy to one of individualism can be seen as the first (1) aspect of the Modern Moral Order. It first rose to prominence as a theory of rights and legitimate rule and sees society as established for the sake of its members who serve each other in mutual benefit. Philosophers such as Locke and Grotius considered it possible to be a proper moral agent outside of larger society. Hierarchical complementarity was not required for a moral existence. The social nature of humans was reconnected to this theory through the work of
Rousseau, Hegel, and Marx. Yet these are, according to Taylor, still to be considered redactions of the
Modern Moral Order because they retain the core element of mutual, non-hierarchical complementarity, in other words: mutual service between equal individuals. Secondly (2), political society should be seen as an instrument that facilitates the exchange mutually beneficial services between citizens. Since this is its only task, political society concerns itself with matters of national security, and creating further conditions that favor the mutually beneficial behavior of its citizens. It does not create a society in which citizens are most likely to behave in a virtuous manner. Political society does not exist to direct its citizens to a particular lifestyle; it merely creates circumstances for them to live as free agents. Political society exists for the ordinary life. Thirdly (3), the service provided by political society to its constituents is evaluated in terms of defending rights. This was already shortly mentioned at point (1) above, but it should indeed be seen as a characteristic in its own right. Freedom is the most important subject of defense, Taylor argues. Moreover, the very legitimacy of political society is based on the consent by its subjects thus pointing towards the high value attached to freedom. Amongst the citizens, freedom is considered an essential good for living out their purpose as free agents. Freedom isn’t just right, human agency demands it, and citizens are conscious of it. Finally (4), the points above should be applied to all citizens equally. Equality is in no sense clearly defined, indeed just a century ago, women were not seen as capable of politics.
Nevertheless, as a rejection of the hierarchical system, equality takes up a prominent spot in the
Modern Moral Order. In conclusion, Taylor mentions that the overall ethic of this new moral order is informed by a combination of a demand for the ideal (non-hierarchical, equal) order of mutual benefit, as well as a new self-understanding of human agency that requires freedom. 73
72 Idem, 163-164
73 Idem, 170 - 171
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The Social Imaginary
One of the most important terms in Taylor’s philosophy is ‘social imaginary’. Taylor writes that a definition cannot easily be given because we are speaking of something that is imagined. As opposed to a theory, which is constructed, it is not clearly defined. However, Taylor writes:
“I am thinking rather of the ways in which they imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations which are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images which underlie these expectations” 74
The word that may spring to mind here is order. Indeed, one of the things it encompasses is the implicit understanding of the moral order that one lives in. Furthermore, this understanding is dominant amongst large groups of people to the extent that it is dominant in society. The important thing to understand here is that social imaginaries are accepted by the whole of society, rather than belonging to a minority of scholars, which is often the case with academic theory. Furthermore, because it is a common understanding, the social imaginary also provides legitimacy and understanding to many of our actions. We vote because we understand it to be a social practice through which we elect a legitimate government to run the country. We further understand that in our liberal democratic state, everyone has a vote in the matter that will be counted equally to others.
Our social imaginary also allows us to understand when a certain practice or event is out of line.
When a politician is caught buying votes, we know it to be illegitimate, and we understand that it does not fit within the socio-political order that we live in. It is not the way the system is meant to work. We can therefore say that there are norms that are known to us implicitly. Furthermore, besides noticing infractions, we can also imagine the ideal/type situation. In regards to elections, this ideal would suggest that every citizen has voted, every candidate has had equal representation in the media, and each citizen has come to their vote completely autonomous from the influence of other citizens. This, of course, is a utopian view of democracy, and one that will most likely never see the light of day. Nevertheless, our ability to imagine it, to know that this is ultimately how things should be, is an essential element of our social imaginary. Our understanding is both factual and normative.
We understand both how things tend to go and also how they, ideally, should be. 75
As explained so far, the social imaginary thus makes sense of particular practices in society, but
Taylor takes it further. His conception of a social imaginary includes our understanding of our place in the grander scheme of things, our place within the order that is. This involves amongst other things an implicit understanding of social space. We do not carry around a literal map or a theoretical description listing all different groups of people, their preferences, distastes, and the likes. On the contrary, our understanding of social space is something that lies within us. It is inherent to who we are as members of society and it allows us to behave appropriately. We know that it would be frowned upon to interrupt a lecturer with a question or to be on the phone in the cinema. The social imaginary therefore contains a common social repertory from which we can all draw at any time, ensuring that we all behave according to certain implicit rules. Without this common repertory, citizens would constantly misunderstand one another resulting in an unstable and insecure society.
Furthermore, this common repertory allows for the positioning of oneself in comparison to others
74 Idem, 171
75 Idem, 171-172
31

around us. By having an implicit understanding of the mechanisms that structure society and define what actions are appropriate, individuals have the ability to continuously see themselves in relation to other people, institutions, and other loci of power. This ability means that we are able to see not only ourselves, but also our compatriots, and our nation as a whole as part of a larger predicament.
We can evaluate our place in space and time by relating it to the historical struggles a nation has been through, by comparing ourselves to the nations around us or even far away. In conclusion then, the social imaginary is an important part of an individual’s consciousness that can be seen as that common understanding of who we are as individuals, a people, and a nation, sometimes even a species. Yet at the same time it functions as a map of social space, informing us of the various ways we can behave and the effects we may expect from it. In practice we may see evidence of our comparative capabilities during demonstrations when we carry flags of nations that we see as examples. Alternatively, other nations or forms of power may be referred to symbolically, through signs with clever puns, cartoons, and so forth.
76 A good example would be the Greenpeace flag, or the candle wrapped in thorns used by Amnesty International, or even the rainbow flag as an international sign of ‘gay pride’.
Charles Taylor’s narrative is one that seeks to show how theories that were held by the
Enlightenment elites gradually went through a process of redactions only to eventually become an integral part of the social imaginary of Western countries. In other words, that which was once a theory that ran counter that which was generally accepted over time became not only the opinion of the majority, it almost stopped being an opinion to the extent that large groups in society simply take them for granted, unconscious of their meaning or historical origin. This phenomenon is what must happen in other parts of the world for humane governance to take root. To reiterate what I have already mentioned in the introductory pages, it is my firm belief that certain aspects of modernity are subject to globalization. This in turn, to use current terminology, will inadvertently have an effect on the social imaginary of peoples around the globe. Yet, tempting as it may be, we can’t afford to skip ahead, we must first further define the Modern Moral Order. We will do this by following Taylor in his analysis of three forms of social self-understanding. These are: “(1) the economy, (2) the public sphere, and (3) the Sovereign people.” 77 Taylor follows this by adding a chapter on democratic selfrule, after all, he follows developments in the West. I have argued along the work of Twiss that democracy is not a necessary condition for humane government. We will argue below that it also does not necessarily follow from the other elements on the Modern Moral Order.
76 Idem, 173
77 Idem, 176
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Economic Primacy
It should not come as a surprise that the economy is deemed to be such a vital element. First we have but to look at current societies that exist within the Modern Moral Order to conclude that the capitalist model pervades our everyday lives. Authenticity is often based on what individuals consume; the clothes they buy, the music they listen to, and the brands with which they associate.
Second, we have so far already mentioned the importance of a society based on exchange of mutually beneficial services. Since the exchange of mutually beneficial services and individualism are mainly considered, we will discuss the economic primacy of the Modern Moral Order.
Taylor explains that in the early stages of the onset of the Modern Moral Order divine providence was still accepted by virtually everyone as the main causal factor for the order of life. It would not be until the 20 th century, most notably until the horrors of the two world wars, that this idea was cast aside by large segments of western society. Nevertheless, although God remained, the manner in which his design was interpreted was subject to significant change. We see the ideas of Grotius and
Locke reflected in the dominant view of order which shifted towards mutual-benefit. In the former view, everything rightly had its place. God’s design was perfect in every sense, from the stars in the sky to a human’s liver or a dove’s beak. All was created by God to fulfill its proper function. In the hierarchical world view, the world was therefore seen as a harmonious whole, in which different parts of society were not evaluated on the basis of their function, but rather their meaning. These differing meanings existed in complete harmony with one another. So the place of the king was justified through his divine appointment, rather than functionality, such as maintaining a safe and stable society. Once the focus shifted onto the exchange of services, the King could no longer rely on his divine appointment as a sole reason for power. Indeed, the King himself must also provide a service to his people, and while the hierarchical order still has a presence here, it is in itself not enough. In this early transition period between the two orders, from the late 16 th century until the revolutionary movements of the 18 th century, both remain distinctly visible. The King still rules as an absolute monarch but is aware of the duties he has towards his people. Indeed, social contract theory has clearly had an influence. In relation to government, the hierarchical order thus shifted from an absolute monarchy that need not even consider its own duties, to an absolute monarch who is at the very least aware of the service he is meant to fulfill for his country, and finally to a revolution in which the monarchy is no longer deemed appropriate and indeed signifies the end of the primacy of hierarchy. The economy became a metaphor for the organization of society in which individuals exchanged goods. This consequently developed into the economy being seen as the dominant part of society and also as a great source of power for governments. As Taylor notes, once Holland and
England had started to develop economically, the surrounding nations could not stand idly by. On an individual level, this shift placed a larger emphasis on the securing of life and the means to it. It is the dawn of materialism. Due to governments realizing that their power lay in direct connection with their nation’s productivity, they began to restructure society in such a way that it facilitated the production of goods, and exchange of services as much as possible. In other words, the economic development required new modes of thought on the political level as well. Taylor writes of order becoming a demand that needs to be met on both a political and a spiritual level. The latter was due to the belief that all Christians needed to be good Christians. Moreover, everyone was equally capable of achieving such a feat. This differed from older systems, predominantly catholic, that saw the monastic life as a ‘higher’ calling which therefore merited more virtue. By instilling an egalitarianism amongst Christians, the normal life needed to be at the very least, if not more so, as
33

sacred and capable of virtue as any other life. Spiritually therefore, the Modern Moral Order contains a shift that sanctifies everyday life. In Taylor’s narrative, this sanctification is monumental for two reasons:
“It has two facets: it promotes ordinary life, as a site for the highest forms of Christian life; and it also has an anti-elitist thrust: it takes down those allegedly higher modes of existence, whether in the church (monastic vocations), or in the world (ancient-derived ethics which place contemplation higher than productive existence). The mighty are cast down from their seats, and the humble and meek are exalted.” 78
Describing the normal life as going through a process of sanctification is a choice of words that fits well in a narrative concerning secularization in the West. However, I think it suffices to say that the ordinary life was normalized in the sense that it came to stand at an equal footing with the monastic or aristocratic life. It is normalized in the sense that it is no longer considered to be less virtuous than other, non-regular, forms of life. Taylor may use sanctification to point at the virtuous perception of regular life. Nevertheless, it suffices to say that the former hierarchical forms were simply no longer at work. The ordinary life itself becomes a simple means in the exchange of mutual benefit.
Depending on one’s philosophical bend, ordinary life was raised to the level of the formerly sacred, or the formerly sacred was brought down to the level of the ordinary life. Either way, the religious overtone that comes with ‘sacred’ is unnecessarily euro-centric to our purposes. Let us rather speak of the normalization of ordinary life in that it came to be considered equal to religious asceticism and other forms of life. Within the realm of economics, we have thus seen two major shifts. First, we see an increasing primacy of economics in our lives as well, as well as an increasing focus on the family.
Secondly, due to the normalization of ordinary life, social and political equality have become fundamental to our way of life. The first main redactions had thus come to pass, and we see the hierarchical order disappear step by step. The new found focus on the harmonization of interests and mutual exchange of services continued to develop in the 18 th century and was reason enough for some great optimism amongst the intellectual elites. Much like we have the democratic peace theory in International Relations these days, in 18 th century Europe, one spoke of ‘Le doux commerce’.
Proponents of this theory like Voltaire, and Mandeville, held that an economically driven nation was less likely to divulge in the scourge of war as this would ultimately have a destructive influence on the accumulated wealth of a nation.
“The new economically-centered notion of natural order underlies the doctrine of harmony of interests. It even came to be projected onto the universe, for it is this which is reflected in the eighteenth-century vision of cosmic order, not as hierarchy of forms-at-work, but as a chain of beings whose purposes mesh with each other.” 79
Taylor continues to theorize that new economic primacy is the basis the Modern Moral Order. Even though we will still discuss the concepts of a sovereign people, and the public sphere, the economy is the facet that in itself has become a synonym for society as a whole. Society is the exchange of services between citizens and as such it manages production, exchanges and consumption through laws and regulations. Rather than the economy relating only to those that control it, the
78 Idem, 179
79 Idem, 180
34

authoritative aristocracy; it now grasps the entire sphere of coexistence that comprises our society and defines how we are linked to each other. Rather than friend or acquaintance, we often refer to someone as a colleague, a fellow student, our boss, the butcher, the grocer, or the mechanic; a vast amount of terms common in our modern language refer specifically to the service the other may provide us with. We find the ultimate form of this behavior in our modern conception of networking.
The only goal of which is to get to know as many people as possible that might one day be able to provide you with some service. Indeed, networking is the mutual exchange of services pur sang.
80
We also find in the economy an objectification of social reality. The idea of collective agency is fundamental to our modern self-understanding and as a legitimization of representative government. The existence of such agency in the new economic order is not immediately clear. In a system of mutual service, we consider ourselves to be individual agents and in no sense unified into one body or institution. Due to laws and regulations the patterns of individuals may become predictable, yet none of them has any real insight into these processes. As a result, Taylor claims the social sciences came to be approached much like the natural sciences. Processes and events could be studied, statistics could be compiled, and this would lead us to the sort of information required to better our system. Taylor calls it the objectification of social reality. By taking the divine providence out of social reality and considering it merely the outcome of human agency, it seems natural that societies would want to map that which they have imposed on themselves. Mapping a society can be done only through the type of objectified social scientific research suggested here. The two go hand in hand, when a nation like England or Holland develops a strong economy, other nations will want to know how they managed such a feat. The drive for economic power forces societies to map the resources they have in order to achieve an economically viable efficiency that will provide them with an advantage over their neighbor. Before continuing Taylor’s analysis of the Modern Moral Order, we will use Michel Foucault to come to a better understanding of power relations between citizens and government.
Power Relations and Foucault
We find in the work of Foucault a further exploration of the objectification of society. Moreover, he connects the issue to the formation of power relations between government and citizenship.
Ultimately, the objectification of realty is explained as having given rise an intricate system of control: the carceral system. Since we will be discussing the advent of the Modern Moral Order in
China, a formerly closed, totalitarian country, methods of population control are relevant to our questions. Michel Foucault published his famous work The Birth of the Prison in France in 1975. The book is an in depth analysis of the historical development of the prison system and its punishments.
Most notably, Foucault describes the shift from a punitive to a correctional system of incarceration.
He describes how Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon is essentially the blueprint for maintaining political and economic power. Governments, it is theorized, have much to gain from almost totalitarian control over their own populations. However, this control is exercised in the form of disciplines and the creation of ‘docile bodies’. They constitute an intricate system of institutions, punishment and examinations. Through observance, then, a government gains greater insights into the strengths and
80 Idem, 180 - 181
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weaknesses of its population which it can correct through the disciplines. I believe that Foucault touches upon the same issues as Taylor when the latter speaks of an objectified reality. In explaining the nature of the disciplinary system, Foucault writes:
“The disciplinary institutions secreted a machinery of control that functioned like a microscope of conduct; the fine analytical divisions that they created formed around men an apparatus of observation, recording and training.” 81
Foucault is not mentioned here in order to discuss the dangers of government power, nor do we wish to spend any time on the nature of our punitive system. The core element of the book that resounds in the quote above is that the nature of government has changed. In a society based on the social contract and a mutual exchange of services, governments are required to take a disciplinary approach to its populations. Societies were no longer seen as organized through meaningful forms awarded by the divine. The new reality is a more rational and calculating one in which governments effectively gain power, and the upper hand over competing nations, through an effective workforce.
“Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes the same forces (in political obedience).” 82
The new found freedom of individuals, exemplified by the fading away of the former hierarchical moral order and the rise of a society based an exchange of services is limited by the power of government. Freedom is restricted through discipline and the creation of docile bodies in order to create a sense of freedom while outlining the limits of this freedom by the practice of hierarchical observation (the gaze), normalizing judgment, and examination. The latter combines the first two into power/knowledge. These three elements taken together therefore allow the government to inspect an individual and find out what he has learnt or what state his health is in. At the same time, by combining the gaze with examination and normalization, it controls the behavior of the individual through “the deployment of force and the establishment of truth.” 83 Because the carceral system pervades the whole of society, the disciplines are always at work. Precise norms are prescribed through the disciplines and freedom remains only within the realm of the accepted norms. Deviation is not only punished when it comes in the form of a criminal act. The disciplines in that they consist of normalization, observation, and examination, continuously modify behavior into compliance with the prescribed norm. The carceral system’s nature has not only switched from punishment to reform, as it pervades society it now involves a preemptive element that actively shapes individuals to prevent them from veering away from the norm.
“ Historically, the process by which the bourgeoisie became in the course of the eighteenth century the politically dominant class was masked by the establishment of an explicit, coded and formally egalitarian juridical framework, made possible by the organization of a parliamentary, representative regime. But the development and generalization of disciplinary mechanisms constituted the other, dark side of these processes. The general juridical form that guaranteed a system of rights that were egalitarian in principle was supported by these tiny, everyday, physical mechanisms, by all those
81 M. Foucault, The Birth of the Prison, 173
82 Idem, 138
83 Idem, 184
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systems of micro-power that are essentially non-egalitarian and asymmetrical that we call the disciplines.
” 84
The disciplines in effect, do not try to control who we are, but rather who we will become. I believe this to be quite vital in our understanding of the Modern Moral Order. The ‘everything is dangerous’ 85 approach that Foucault takes in his work is not something I subscribe to. Nevertheless I believe Taylor and Foucault strike the same cord in their analysis of an objectified reality. Taylor describes how the government came to see its citizens while Foucault tries to explain exactly how this influenced the power-relationship between the two. With the downfall of absolutist monarchy, and the demystification of order, governments bore one main responsibility towards their citizens: the facilitation of the exchange of services. This new goal required new methods, described by
Foucault:
“What was then being formed was a policy of coercions that act upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behavior. The human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it. A ‘political anatomy’, which was also a
‘mechanics of power’, was being born; it defined how one may have a hold over others’ bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed and the efficiency that one determines. Thus discipline produces subjected and practiced bodies, ‘docile’ bodies.” 86
The aspect of Foucault’s theory that is of most value to our efforts here is the formative element of the disciplines that keeps citizens ‘in check’. It is a powerful tool that ensures the stability of a nation by providing a perceived sense of freedom while at the same time controlling the norm of society.
Where totalitarian societies such as the former Soviet Union directly limit freedom of citizens in an effort to quell disobedience; the disciplinary system provides freedom in order to ensure obedience and ultimately political / economic stability. In the Foucauldian sense, real freedom does not effectively exist but is merely perceived. In other words, citizens find themselves governed through their own freedom. This of course is the paradox of liberal democracy, limiting freedom in order to ensure it. This paradox is clearly visible in my own definition of freedom of speech: ‘One has freedom of speech so long as one does not use that freedom to take that same freedom away from others’.
The freedoms of those that wish to limit the freedoms of others end up being necessarily limited themselves through government control. The ‘docility’ spoken of by Foucault therefore amounts to a limitation on the freedom of citizens that becomes so ingrained in their ‘bodies’ that they are blissfully unaware of their own conformation to the norm. The institutions within which the individual is disciplined (the military academy, hospital, school, university, factory, etc,) are all regulated by their corresponding human sciences, such as: Medicine, Psychology, and Sociology. In the words of Taylor:
84 Idem, 222
85 Actual quote: ‘My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous. Which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my point leads not to
apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism’, M. Foucault, ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics’
86 M. Foucault, The Birth of the Prison, 138
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“And so this age also sees the beginnings of a new kind of objectifying social science, starting from
William Petty’s Survey in Ireland in the mid-seventeenth century, the collection of facts and statistics about wealth, production and demography, as the basis for policy” 87
The Public Sphere and the Common Consciousness
The economy is the primary factor in the Modern Moral Order as described by Charles Taylor. The second element discussed concerns the public sphere. It is defined as that common space in which public opinion is formed. What this means is that to a large extent, the public sphere is an imagined space. It is the accumulation of all the different spaces in society in which people meet and exchange opinions. This exchange of ideas is most visible as it appears in the media. Editorials in newspapers reflect varying opinions concerning the same topic. At the same time, these editorials may be discussed by small groups of people at other social gatherings such as a football match, or in a coffee house. The various aspects of this sphere intercommunicate. A politician may make a statement in the morning newspaper and consequentially the late night talkshow will discuss that statement that evening. The debates held at all these different levels and involving different people are constitutive to the formation of public opinion which is considered to be the single outcome of this myriad of debates. Debates may have different outcomes when considered individually, yet overall public opinion is deemed to represent the majority of a nation’s citizenship. However, public opinion needs to be imagined as such in order to truly exist. If the public sphere is not seen as a platform in which all views are expressed, then the population will not imagine its outcome to be the general view.
“Unless all the dispersed discussions are seen by their participants as linked in one great exchange, there can be no sense of their upshot as ‘public opinion’.” 88
Taylor portrays common space as being a place in which people who have never met can understand themselves to be engaged in a larger discussion. These topical spaces represent spaces in which people come together for a common focus or purpose. A coffee-house may be a common space for conversation. A football match might be a space for cheering on a team. The common purpose may be ritual such as a church service. But whatever the purpose may be, important is that these common spaces represent common action or focus, as opposed to merely being convergent. The common space referred to here is topical-common space. It concerns spaces in the material world such as the mentioned football match, or church service. Public opinion differs from these as there is no one place, event, or action in which it is to be found, there is no assembly involved. As a constitutive of different locales, it loses its specificity. Taylor therefore describes public opinion as meta-topical space.
“But the public sphere as we have been defining it, is something different. It transcends such topical spaces. We might say that it nits together a plurality of such spaces into one larger space of nonassembly.” 89
87 C. Taylor, A Secular Age, 182
88 Idem, 186
89 Idem, 187
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Meta-topical space had already existed in the form of the state and the Church, nevertheless, the formation of the public sphere as an all-encompassing meta-topical space within which public opinion is formed is novel, and represents an important change in the social imaginary.
In 18 th century Europe, the citizens involved in the formation of public opinion, those participating in the public sphere, all belonged to the intelligentsia of their respective countries. The enlightened bourgeoisie discussed economics, politics, world affairs and other relevant matters. The public sphere exists outside of politics and can be considered sovereign in this context; that is, in a free society. Due to the independent nature of the public sphere, the fact that views emerging from it were the product of open and critical effect caused public opinion to gain a normative status. In light of social contract theory, it was deemed that governments should take notice and act accordingly. In other words, public opinion was the enlightened voice of the people in the face of the government.
Government does not only have the moral duty towards citizens to listen to them, it is considered in their interest to do so due to the enlightened nature of public opinion. Wisdom on the part of government is then the first reason for listening to public opinion. We have already touched upon the second but let us clarify it nevertheless. The second reason stems from social contract theory; if a government has a duty towards its citizens, a moral duty even, than listening to their ‘opinion’ certainly falls within this purview.
“Government is then not only wise to follow opinion: it is morally bound to do so. Governments ought to legislate and rule in the midst of a reasoning public.” 90
In order to provide additional support for the argument that the formation of this new public sphere is indeed novel to 18 th century Europe, Taylor points to one difference which he considers to be vital.
It lies in the fact that the public sphere is considered to lie wholly outside political power. In previous political systems, the ancient Greek polis, the Roman republic, and others may very well have had opinions formed through informal discussions, meetings at gladiator games, the forum, or any other place of frequent visitation in those times. However, the opinions that found their way through to the political decisions makers were the opinions of those themselves involved in politics. In other words, the ‘opinion’ formed in this way did not exist independently from governing power, it was not
‘imagined’ to exist outside of it as the will of the people: public opinion. This is why both objectified social reality and now the formation of the public sphere are considered by Taylor to be two major strides, two changes in the social imaginary, of the long march in the advent of the Modern Moral
Order.
The existence of the public sphere outside of politics as a sovereign aspect of society requires further explanation. If indeed it carries with it a normalizing power that requires government to turn a listening ear, we should ask ourselves what the public sphere needs to be in order to achieve such a feat. Answering this question with ‘meta-topical space’, or ‘sovereign’ is not enough. Taylor carefully uses the term radical secularity as the defining aspect of the new public sphere. Secular in this sense is not meant as a simple description of a separation of state and religion, or even the absence of religion as such. Instead, secular is used in relation to ‘the order of things’. It describes the society as imagined by its population, the space it inhabits in the time, the grander scheme of things. As already mentioned, before the Modern Moral Order, society was highly hierarchical. Moreover, the order
90 Idem, 189
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within which we imagined ourselves to live was a transcendent one. Transcendence and secularity are both rather ambiguous terms, susceptible to a great number of definitions that depend on the context in which it is used. For this reason it is vital that we clarify what Taylor means. Secularity in our sense relates to the association found in the public sphere and its relation to the structures within which it is formed. Taylor argues that in the hierarchical order, common actions carried out in the public sphere are inherently dependent on the structures in which they are formed. These structures can therefore not be changed through the public sphere because it is itself dependent on it.
“It is true that in a functioning public sphere, action at any time is carried out within structures laid down earlier. There is a de facto arrangement of things, but this arrangement doesn’t enjoy any privilege over the action carried out.” 91
The latter sentence embodies the difference between a public sphere in the Modern Moral Order and one that exists in hierarchically ordered societies. In current societies in the West, the structures in the public sphere exist with the only purpose of precipitating and facilitating action. In traditional societies, the structures within the public sphere are irreducibly part of the political system that supports it and therefore much harder to change. If we take a tribal society as an example, then the law of that tribe cannot be easily changed. It may change over time only by following the rules it itself prescribes, abolishing this law is synonymous to the abolition of the very foundation of the tribe.
“The abolition of the law would mean the abolition of the subject of common action, because the law defines the tribe as an entity.” 92
We can therefore point to a form of transcendence in the formation of the public sphere. The structures in traditional society are preconditions for common agency and action. The traditional law forms the fundament on which the public sphere is based; the latter cannot exist without the former, creating a transcendent foundation in society: the traditional law. This traditional element may be the law of the tribe, the law of God, or “a law which comes down to us since time out of mind”. 93 In the hierarchical order, common agency of a people is dependent on such transcendent traditions.
The radical secularity referred to by Taylor involves the elimination of the traditional transcendence.
“By contrast, in a purely secular association (in my sense), common agency arises simply in and as a precipitate of common action.” 94
The independent character of the public sphere can only arise within such secularity. It is the common agency of a people that needs to be separated from the political part of society. If common agency is defined in government, the abolition of the latter would inadvertently effectuate the abolishment of that very common agency. To be sure we use secularity here to describe the fading away of such traditional preconditions to common agency.
91 Idem, 193
92 Idem, 193
93 Idem, 192
94 Idem, 194
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“Where there is something which transcends the realm of those common actions this agency engages in, the association is non-secular. Where the constituting factor is nothing other than such common action – whether the founding acts have already occurred in the past, or are now coming about is immaterial – we have secularity” 95
It relates to our understanding of time and the history of our people. Traditional societies all have their founding moments, usually embodied in a heroic tale. We know the mythology of Romulus and
Remus, the founders of ancient Rome. When the Romans thought of the founders of their city, they did not see it as simply a historical event from which we are removed by a certain number of years.
Instead, there were two times that operated simultaneously. The founding stories of a country, that which greatly defines a people as a people, is placed on a higher, mythical level, as something to aspire to, but also something we can’t really achieve. “It is not just earlier, but in another kind of time, an exemplary time”.
96 Time had more than one dimension to it. The time in which we live, the
profane, is continuously transcended by this other dimension. Secularism in Taylor’s sense is the disappearance of this multi-dimensional view of time. It is the view that time is not held in place by anything or -one, whether it is eternity itself (Greek philosophy) or God. Eternity comes to be simply the endless continuation of profane time rather than: “an ascent into the unchanging, or a kind of gathering of time into a unity; hence the expression ‘hoi aiones ton aionon’, or ‘saecula saeculorum’.” 97
We may exemplify this further by taking a quote from St. Augustine: “For it seems to me that an
unjust law is no law at all” 98 . In Augustine’s perception of the order, the law is unjust because there is a transcendent power that acts as a legitimation for all law and common action: the just nature of
God. In the Modern Moral Order a law may be qualified as unjust merely because it is deemed through common action located in the profane, there is no transcendence.
We have mentioned earlier that the public sphere is to be seen as a meta-topical space. At the same time, we have said that it is not the first time such a meta-topical space has existed. Indeed, churches and the state can also be considered as such. However, the church and state were always imagined to exist within a multi-dimensional view of time. Government did not transcend the temporal in the flesh, yet its ruling position was legitimated through God, and therefore part of a ‘higher time’. In non-monarchical systems, such as a people defined by the law, there existed a direct connection with the higher times when this law was first established. Secularity then, is the rejection of such higher times and the structuring of history ultimately existing only in the profane. Time that exists horizontally, in which vertical slices may be taken out and grouped together, unrelated as they may be, on the simple basis of them as having occurred simultaneously. We see examples of this vertical grouping of time in the presentation of the eight o’ clock news bulletin, the daily newspaper, and other forms of modern media. Perhaps the most potent example of this is the modern internet blog.
Blogs are long lists of posts or events, related only to each other in their temporal distance from one another. Some blogs refrain even from contextualizing the events, they are merely continuous
95 Idem, 194
96 Idem, 194
97 Idem, 195
98 Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, 8
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horizontal timelines that may be updated at any moment.
99 So why does Taylor consider the development of the public sphere so fundamental to the Modern Moral Order? He argues that it is because it has profoundly changed our understanding of time as it relates to the existence of ourselves and of society. Our ´time-consciousness’ is altered to the point where we understand history to be free of higher meanings, a consciousness that is purged of meanings that lie outside of time itself, it has been emptied wholly and leaves only time in itself within which all forms of association are placed homogenously. “Such I want to argue is the case with the public sphere, and therein lies its new and (close to) unprecedented nature.” 100 This change did not however develop by any means on its own. Just as the objectification of social reality has a myriad of reasons for becoming what it has become, so too is the public sphere as an extra-political, secular, meta-topical space the result of different shifts. Many are the causes for this shift to occur, but considering the public sphere as a mere byproduct of various changes does not do justice to the transformation in our social imaginary that it embodies:
“An extra-political, secular, meta-topical space, this is what the public sphere was and is. And the importance of understanding this lies partly in the fact that it was not the only such, that it was part of a development which transformed our whole understanding of time and society, so that we have trouble even recalling what it was like before.” 101
The Sovereign People
The third step in Taylor’s long march concerns the conception of a people as an entity sovereign from politics. This is another mutation in the social imaginary of a nation and is heavily indebted to the economy as objectified reality and a conception of time as secular. For a population to change their governmental structure through revolution, the social imaginary needs to allow for a foundational act to happen in profane time. Taylor gives us the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688 as an example of how a seemingly new idea, that the king had lost legitimacy, was combined with a traditional understanding of meaning and bodies in his replacement by William of Orange. The English union of parliamentarians sought to explain the overthrow of King James II as a continuation of the traditional order. The collective act of defiance, if we may call it such, is founded in the mythical, non-secular times, it is a continuation of it that does not upset the meanings and forms associated with a traditional hierarchically constructed conception of time.
102
Similarly the plight of American revolutionaries was initially to reclaim their rights as Englishmen.
When the monarchy was broken with, authority passed to the remaining institutional framework:
Continental Congress. Ultimately, a new constitution is written and declares the new American
Republic to represent the will of the people with no reference to any pre-existing law that might establish them as a unified people. This classical foundation in earlier times as a source of legitimacy
99 The clearest examples of such a horizontal view of time are perhaps best found in the news coverage of catastrophes. Large news organizations such as CNN and the BBC promise their viewers minute by minute accounts of events passed as well as instant updates usually recognizable by their ‘breaking news’ categorization.
100 Idem, 196
101 Idem, 196
102 Idem, 196 - 197
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was entirely absent, thereby affirming that the American people had no need to conceive of themselves in relation to a higher order. The United States were established purely in secular times affirming, for the first time in history, the sovereignty of a people as a sole source of legitimacy for a government. At the same time there existed a source of continuity. In the face of oppressive monarchy, the main source of civil liberties for the colonists had been their state assemblies. When power was transferred from the monarchy to such institutional representation, it was in effect already accepted by colonists. The Federalist project required the establishment of an American people to mean more than just the sum of the individual states. The idea of a unified people existing before the declaration of independence required “the continuity in institutions and practices which allowed for the reinterpretation of past actions as the fruit of the new principles.” 103 This continuity was found in the already existing legitimacy of representative government which had formed under the oppressive government of the English Crown.
The paths along which nations transform their social imaginary to understanding the sovereign people to be the only source of legitimacy for government can be diverse. Taylor seeks to further clarify his ideas by analyzing the French revolution. Needless to say, the interaction between individuals and processes was very different there than in the United States. However, the outcome was the same. An important transformation in the social imaginary in the Modern Moral Order is therefore to see a people as a sovereign entity on which the legitimacy of government is solely based. It is clear that such a conception can only exist in a secular understanding of time. There can be no transcendence between the profane and higher times. Claiming the rights of Englishmen still connects to those higher times in that being an Englishmen means being a loyal subject to the crown.
103 Taylor, A Secular Age, 198
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In the previous chapter we have carefully traced Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age on the Modern Moral
Order. As should be clear, the Modern Moral Order is hard to define as it encompasses a myriad of changes and redactions to ideas that inform the social imaginary. Most importantly to our work however is that the onset of this moral order has led, amongst other things, to the development of
Human Rights. It is of course impossible to pin this development on any one event or process. We cannot say that the epistolary novel was responsible, nor can we say that the objectification of social reality embodied any sort of tipping point. As Taylor clearly states in his work, these are all but processes that influence the social imaginary, some are more effective than others. The idea that we will explore in the pages below is that current forces of globalization, driven primarily by a dominant economic system inadvertently export this Modern Moral Order. Globalization, much like secularity, and even Human Rights, is somewhat of an ambiguous term. Moreover, using ‘forces of globalization’ does not solve the ambiguity. The reason I use the term ‘forces’ is because I do think we can rightly speak of a force instead of a process, or development, when we see that it is effectuating cultural change. We will start by shortly identifying the forces we will be discussing.
First of all, we will be looking at the (1) economic aspect on the level of the state and its institutional organization. We will argue that the primary aspect of the Modern Moral Order, the objectification of social reality, finds an entrance into the social imaginary of every nation that opens its doors to the world economy. We will discuss why governments, wishing to be successful in the global market system need to necessarily adopt objectification and the social sciences in the way described above in the theory of Charles Taylor.
Secondly (2), and it is my belief that this aspect is key to our efforts, we will consider the individualizing effect of economic development and the influence of the internet on society. We will discuss the possibility of the internet becoming the focal point of the public sphere and the critical debate which it contains. The effect of the internet can be divided into two separate, yet to some extent simultaneous effects: (a) the individualization of citizens, and (b) the creation of an ‘extrapolitical, secular, meta-topical space’.
The aspect of individualization relates largely to the advent of social networking sites throughout the world, as well as the access this creates to outside sources of autonomy for the self; such as: fashion, music, and sub-cultures in general. In relation to what has so far been said on the spreading of humane government, the internet provides a means for open moral dialogues by subverting the traditional media outlets through personalized blogs, independent news websites, and so forth. We will argue that these new spaces will increase the political heterogeinity of an individual’s surroundings and experiences, creating new opportunities for ethical reflection through open moral dialogues.
Thirdly (3), we will need to show how the onset of individualization, the creation of the public sphere online, and the objectification of social reality necessarily leads to the falling apart of traditional hierarchical structures to be replaced by one in which government revolves around the mutual exchange of services.
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Internet, Censorship, and Choosing Cases
In developing a theory about the advent of humane government throughout the world as a result of open moral dialogues, it is difficult to limit the places discussed. I consider the internet to be the main vessel for the forces causing an increased individualization. My theory therefore relies, above all else, on access to this technology. The question concerning the internet is not whether we will eventually have universal access for all of mankind, but rather whether this access will be free from government intervention. In other words, the largest hurdle on the way to humane government is censorship. It is so important precisely because it censors what we have been calling open moral dialogues. Through restriction of information, it can substantially diminish the chances of a people discovering our universal moral values. Internet censorship by governments is a fairly recent development. Most of us will have heard of the ‘great firewall of China’ 104 , and will associate it with the blocking of Western websites such as facebook. To assess the power governments have to censor the internet, we will look primarily at the strongest such state currently in existence: China. This will be to show what internet censorship is currently capable of in its strongest form and to assess whether it can be considered an insurmountable obstacle in the creation of a public sphere. To be sure, I do not aim to portray China as ultimately informative of how developments might occur throughout the world. But it is an important step in the cross-cultural analysis of the onset of the
Modern Moral Order.
Alternatively, we will also need to look at cases in which the internet has already shown its force in the absence of stringent government censorship. Most suitable for these discussions will be recent cases such as the Iranian ‘green revolution’ in 2009, and the number of protests that occurred earlier this year unified in ‘the Arab Spring’.
As a main source of censorship data, we will refer to the recently published report by the French
NGO ‘Reporters sans Frontieres’ (RSF): Internet Enemies.
105 The report is valuable not because it shows statistics on, for example, how many bloggers, or ‘netizens’ 106 have been jailed by a particular government, but rather because of the discussion held within the report on the powers of censorship, and the ability of people to circumvent these barriers. It also provides an analysis of the role new forms of media, such as twitter, have played in facilitating mass protests.
Economic Development and Consequences for Governance
The question asked in this chapter is to what extent, states across the globe experience a directional development in the organization of governance as a result of the objectification of reality. This question is asked in the context of the notion that all states have an inherent wish towards development. In other words, every government has the ultimate goal to strengthen itself. In the
104 This is a term used by certain media as a description of the enormous amounts of websites blocked by the
Chinese government. The pun obviously being that it is a virtual replica of the Great Wall of China with the intention of keeping unwanted cultural influences outside of the ‘gates’. It has even led to the creation of a website that allows users to check in real-time if a certain website or domain address is blocked by the Chinese government. It can be found at: http://www.greatfirewallofchina.org/ (last accessed: August 9th, 2011)
105 RSF, Internet Enemies
106 ‘Netizen’ is a term used by RSF intended to mean ‘citizen of the internet’
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search for power, nations seek to acquire new technologies and develop new sectors of business through industrialization. We can safely say that industrialization, first developed in 18 th century
England, has become the norm for development. Indeed, economic development engenders the rise of industry. Additionally, industrialization requires a ‘Technology and the rational organization of
labor’.
107
Realist theory of International Relations can be famously summed up in three words: statism, survival, and self-help.
108 In this view, the global system of states is an anarchic one. There exists no police force, the individual actors (states) are inherently dependent on themselves and are therefore necessarily inclined towards the accumulation of power. To survive, governments need to develop and adopt the strengths of those more powerful. To maximize strength, governments are required to run as efficiently as possible in order to maximize mobilization of resources. The objectification of social reality spoken of above does exactly that. It allows governments to map the resources available to them, and at the same time assess where their strengths and weaknesses lie in order to develop where needed. We may compare this to a game of poker, we may not know precisely what cards are in the hands of our contestants, but we had better know the cards in our own hands before placing any bets. The objectification of social reality through the social sciences and statistics allows governments to better understand and improve the hand they’ve been dealing with.
Consequentially the primary aspect of Taylor’s Modern Moral Order has become a precondition for success in the international realm. The most successful examples of economic development in the
20 th and early 21 st centuries have proven this. We look at Singapore, China, and India, but also the
Soviet Union under Stalin in the late 1920’s. All of these are examples of successful industrialization managed through a rational organization of labor.
109 Yet, these examples also show that political and economic rights for individuals are by no means a requirement. In other words, we know that objectification of social reality is a requirement for the accumulation of power in the international realm.
Moreover, what we have just argued applies only to the level of government. The idea behind
Taylor’s philosophy is that this objectification finds its way into the social imaginary of the entire population, that it changes inherently how we look at society, and how we understand time. One does not necessarily follow from the other. However, it has laid the basis for such a change to occur; at the very least, it has made such a change possible.
Foucauldian Discipline in Developing Nations
The objectification of social reality has further consequences. Creating a map of social reality and its resources is not the only thing that contemporary global economics has driven governments towards, it also provides a strong incentive to actively alter social composition in an attempt to maximize resources. This is what Foucault meant when he described the disciplines in Discipline and
Punish (1975). Economic competition causes governments to normalize their populations by unifying
107 F. Fukuyama, The End of History, 89
108 J. Baylis, S. Smith, P. Owens, The Globalization of World Politics
109 F. Fukuyama, The End of History, 90
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them under the banner of a single country and by ensuring a level of commonality between citizens.
As discussed above, this is called normalization, allowing for individual freedom only between certain parameters that are deemed acceptable, straying beyond them results in being categorized as abnormal with differing consequences. Human Rights activists in China can be sent to psychiatric detention facilities in which they are sometimes forced to take medication.
110 Their cause is redefined as non-Chinese, their psyche as abnormal; the social sciences are hard at work. A carceral system develops to keep citizens in check as nations develop. Hierarchical conceptions such as membership of a tribe, family, or other associations are weakened in the light of national unity.
Governments seeking economic power require their peoples to function as one, undivided by traditional forms of kinship which act only as an obstacle to full mobilization and efficiency. It is in the interest of governments to elevate national citizenship above traditional associations causing the latter to gradually disappear in favor of this new order not surprisingly expressed in economic terms:
‘mutual exchange of service’. Globalization has normalized the state as economic facilitator, effectively condemning the traditional hierarchical organization to being an outdated, non-effective form of governance, incompatible with today’s world.
The question is no longer if nations will enter the Modern Moral Order, but when; a question inevitably dependent on political stability and therefore national unity. Countries that do not manage to sustain a stable national government are often referred to as ‘failed states’.
Globalization and Individualism
Cross-cultural scholarship has given a lot of attention to individualism and collectivism. When we speak of rights, this divide is especially important. Liberal Western states are considered to be individualistic, while other societies are considered, for different reasons, to be collectivistic. A country such as Afghanistan, where tribal relations are more important to the political landscape than national movements can be considered collectivistic. Another example would be China where although tribalism may not rule, many citizens would consider themselves to be collectivist and proudly consider it a Chinese tradition. With China experiencing rapid economic growth and modernization, and progressively opening up to foreign cultural influences, sociological research has been done to study the effects of these developments on individualism and collectivism in China.
Research done by Jia-xue has shown that there is a shift towards individualization in almost every aspect of social, political and economic life, as well as in the educational system in China. This research has focused on the younger generation of Chinese citizens, those considered to be part of the “Post-80’s generation”.
111
110 This is mentioned on the blog of Amnesty International. Available online at: http://blogs.amnesty.org.uk/blogs_entry.asp?eid=7859 (last accessed: August 16 th , 2011)
111 CAO, Jiazue, ‘The Analysis of Tendency of Transition’, 42 - 43
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Modernity and broader national changes
Jia-xue provides an overview of the research that has been done into the main contributing factors in the shift to individualism. They are: (1) economic development, (2) affluence of individuals, (3)
Modes of production, (4) mobility, (5) travelling and education, and (6) Mass Media 112
It is concluded from this list that individualism can be generally said to be a consequence of economic development. A better economy leads to more affluent citizens which in term makes them more independent with more access to varying modes of production (opening up a business), greater mobility and greater opportunities in education. Naturally, the more mobile and affluent, the more one is able to travel. Additionally, mass media exposes and individual to a more diverse field of opinions and cultural influences which tends to inform a greater individualism. We know that China has opened up economically, and that it has pushed through changes on a national level to make its population more competitive. Foreign investment was gradually allowed, collective farms were abolished, (some) state-owned companies were privatized, and the so called “iron rice bowl” was removed. Furthermore, on an educational level, China’s government has worked hard at increasing college education amongst its population, achieving an increase in enrollment of about 10% each year for the past decade or so. Furthermore, the style of teaching is being changed to match the more individualistic nature of the Western system.
113 This can be seen in the ‘Chinese College English
Curriculum Requirements’, which emphasizes the importance of individualism: “The development of individualized study methods and the autonomous learning ability on the part of the students. The
new model should enable students to select materials suited to their individual needs” 114
Naturally, Mass Media has also developed greatly, in large part due to increased internet access. As internationalization increases and people have more income to spare, the demand for various sources of entertainment rises, the internet fills a large part of this need. Furthermore, many Chinese families now enjoy watching Western TV shows and movies.
“As a result of gaining more access to the great amount of information through the internet, TV, newspapers and the media, Chinese people have become much better informed, which provides them with more alternatives and choices in life” 115
Developments in the Individual
These changes on the economic, educational and mass media level have had their influence on
Chinese social life. We clearly see the effects of individualization and perhaps not surprisingly a social development leading to a model that is increasingly akin to the West. The family structure is one
112 Idem, 45 - These have been extracted from the research of different academics. They are:
(1) G.H. Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences; H.C. Triandis, Individualism and Collectivism; J. Allik, A. Realo,
‘Individualism-Collectivism and Social Capital’; (2) K. Yang, ‘Will Societal Modernization’; (3) G.H. Hofstede,
Culture’s Consequences; (4) H.C. Triandis, Individualism and Collectivism; (5) H.C. Triandis, Individualism and
Collectivism; and (6) F.L.K. Hsu, Rugged Individualism Reconsidered
113 Idem, 46
114 X.Y. Zhang, N.Z. King, ‘College English Curriculum Requirements’; quoted in: CAO, Jiazue; “The Analysis of
Tendency of Transition’, 46
115 Idem, p. 46
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such aspect, even in rural areas, families with their only child often live separately from their own parents, thus creating the nuclear family. Divorce rates have skyrocketed with an increase of 21.2% between 2003 and 2004. Although privacy is not a right, such one might be used to in a European country, Chinese citizens are increasingly sensitive about handing out personal details. Many would not openly share their income, family ties, business details, or even their age. Parental supervision has weakened, granting children more freedom in exploring personal relationships and keeping personal information to themselves. This latter fact is exemplified in that Chinese schools are now more likely to hand out report cards to students directly rather than post the grades on a bulletin board.
116
One of the legislative level we see reform such as the implementation of property rights in 2007, the
‘Regulations on the Administration of Commercial Franchises’ which encourages public –private sector collaboration on large-scale projects of 2007, and the anti-monopoly law of 2008.
117
The “post-80s generation” provides a good case to predict what the future has in store for China.
Being born between 1980 and 1995, this generation has never know the hardships under Mao that their parents have gone through. They are the first generation to only know the times of economic development, their attitude towards life is therefore positive and their interests increasingly individualized. Jia-zue splits the effects of this new individualization into two categories: (1) Attitude towards life, and (2) Self-Oriented Life Style.
118
Attitudes towards life
The removal of the iron rice bowl, which made it near impossible for Chinese employers to fire their workers, has increased worker mobility in China. The younger generation is more comfortable with the idea of changing jobs. They are therefore more likely to do so. They are furthermore not afraid of uncertainty and many college graduates change jobs within a year of graduation. Additionally, the comfort with uncertainty can be seen in spending habits; the younger generations tends to spend more than they have causing a situation in which many live from paycheck to paycheck. This is not because they are poor, but because they spend their money on luxury goods such as ipods and fashion. Finally, this generation tends to marry and have children at a later age, preferring to “enjoy more freedom and pleasures in life” 119
Self-Oriented Life Style
Chinese youth have developed a strong interest in personalized fashion. This is expressed through personalized ringtones on mobile phones, personalization of clothing through self-made accessories, new hairstyles and the formation of slangs. As is true in the Western case, parents often find these new lifestyle choices difficult to understand. There is also a considerable increase in mobility and travelling. Those children born to affluent urban families tend to travel around the country and even abroad while the urban post-80s generation tends to travel from rural to urbanized areas of the country for work, education, or both. International exchange programs or full-time enrollment at a
116 Idem, 47
117 B.M. Owen, S. Sun, W. Zheng, ‘China’s Competition Policy’, 231 - 265
118 CAO, Jiazue; “The Analysis of Tendency’, 47
119 Idem, 47 - 48
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foreign educational system is equally popular. In 2005, 81 000 Chinese students were enrolled in
Australia, forming the largest foreign student community in the country. Further elements of individualization are found in the generation’s fondness of creating personalized blogs and DV shows.
120 Chinese youth also tends to attain a personal taste in relation to bars and clubs. The post-
80’s generation has developed its own forms of music, literature and the arts. Authors such as
Hanhan and Guo Jingming are good examples. In terms of music, a mix of pop, rick and metal has occurred that expresses the aspirations and ambitions of this new generation. Furthermore, it is argued that this new generation values freedom of speech. 121
“Many of these young people would like to express their own opinions on politics, events, and sex and are brave to point out problems, and require and protect equal rights in families, schools, and other situations.” 122
Further research was done by Robert L. Moore. In his 2005 paper, he explores the post-80’s generation which he calls ‘generation Ku’. Much of his findings are similar to those mentioned by Jia-
Zue but his focus is more on the use of language and slang. ‘Ku’ itself is a new Chinese slang term used as a term of approval; much like ‘cool’ would in Western cultures. What is interesting about his findings is the way in which the Chinese youth express their individualism verbally. It is shown that they rarely use the term individualistic itself, but rather prefer to speak of freedom (ziyou). In the same research, questionnaires were handed out to both parents and their adolescent children asking them to compare their lives to their parent or child and indicate the largest difference between growing up now and then. The majority of the adolescents answered with “we have more freedom”, while the parents answered “we were poorer”. We see a generational change in these formulations as the parents are more focused on living standards while the youth appreciates the new freedoms that were extended to them.
123
Without providing any judgment regarding either individualism or collectivism, this research clearly shows that individualization is taking place. Moreover we have seen that the expressions of such individualism can only occur in a situation of increased wealth. We can therefore claim that this new individualism is the result of the modernization of the Chinese economy and the increased affluence this brought. As living standards go up, more time and resources tend to be spent on the development of the self. The traditional ties of the family are replaced by those characteristic of the
Modern Moral Order. Individualism has been equally affected by the private property law mentioned above and the increased competition between workers that arose out of the removal of the iron rice bowl. Collectivism is weakened as citizens are given incentives to excel, both at work and in the educational sphere. Society sees a rise in the options for differentiation between individuals. The
Chinese case is significant because it provides an example of a truly non-Western nation that is going through a process of rapid modernization. The effects of modernity on the individual citizen can now be analyzed in a cross-cultural way, which is exactly what has been done by Jia-zue. Individualism is thus shown not to be a product of modernity specific to the West; and capable of arising even out of
120 DV stands for ‘Digitalized Video’ and refers to homemade shows uploaded on websites such as youtube (or the Chinese equivalent ‘tudou.com’) as well as podcasts and other forms of internet based sharing.
121 Idem, 48
122 Idem, 48
123 R.L. Moore, ‘Generation Ku’, 373 - 375
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the most collectivist of cultures. Individualism, it seems, is an intricate part of the moral Modern
Moral Order.
Alongside these changes in access to information, I would like to make a further suggestion. Namely, as citizens become more individualized, the differences between themselves and their peers equally become more apparent. The general setting within which one understands everyday life comes to be experienced as more pluralistic. Individualization thus leads to more and increasingly distinct lines of separation. So while we have seen in Hunt’s analysis that individualization leads to a greater appreciation for the autonomy of the self in others, it likewise emphasizes the vast amount of differences between individuals. I would argue that a greater awareness of these differences contributes to what we have called open moral dialogues in that they reveal a much greater amount of values and opinions an individual can subscribe to.
Internet and the Public Sphere
Having discussed the influence of modernization and the internet on the development of individualism, we must now turn to its effects on the creation and development of the extra-political, secular, meta-topical space: the public sphere.
The effects of the internet on political participation are controversial. Research done on the matter is inadvertently rather recent. The internet itself has only existed for roughly two decades and its mainstream position in western societies is even more recent. We have not been able to study the long term effects, nor can we with any certainty say how the internet will develop. Unfortunately, research on the internet has focused in large part on its relationship to democracy. Does the internet influence the democratic process? Does it lead to increased political discussion and exposure to more opinions? Overall, there are two main hypothesis under research. The first is the ‘selective exposure thesis’, the second is the ‘weakened boundaries thesis’.
124
The selective exposure hypothesis can be broadly said to hold the idea that individuals are less likely to experience political heterogeneity on the internet than in the traditional public sphere because of selectivity. Users will search online for people with similar opinions and in the process eliminate alternatives from their sphere of influence. This theory is old and suggests that people seek out similar minded individuals because they require cognitive consistency. This would then lead to increased political fragmentation. This theory is by no means uncontested. Huckfeldt suggested in
2007 that people may not be as inherently opposed to political difference as suggested. Research has shown that people, while looking for likeminded messages, do not actively seek to avoid opinions that run counter to their own.
125 However, we must note that this research was done before the rise of the internet. Further research has shown that individuals that describe themselves as heavily partisan are much more likely to search for likeminded individuals compared to non-partisan
124 J. Brundidge, ‘Encountering ‘Difference’ in the Contemporary Public Sphere’, 681
125 L. Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance; R.J. Rhine, ‘The 1964 Presidential Election’; D.O. Sears, J.L.
Freedman, ‘Selective Exposure to Information’
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‘independents’. As Jennifer Brundidge summarizes: “Yet there is little evidence that people are using the internet to actively avoid political difference.” 126
The second thesis is a much more positive one and sees the internet as a medium that weakens social boundaries to promote political heterogeneity. The thesis contains four separate arguments which will be summarized shortly below. The first is that the geographic boundaries of the traditional public sphere are no longer relevant. One may argue over whether or not individuals are inclined to seek out such diversity, but there can be no argument against the idea that the internet provides the opportunities. The pluralism found online expresses itself not only in people but most of all in ideas.
There are many political ideologies that may not be present in the specific locality of the individual, but they are online. To give an extreme but poignant example, it would be difficult for me to find a white supremacist in my neighborhood, but it would be easy online.
127
A second argument is that the traditional boundaries between spaces of communication are weakened. Internet users read the news on the same site that they use for political discussion. They discuss and read an opinion almost directly after reading the news, blurring the line between the two. The use of comments, links, and social networking means that one crosses over from one space to another much quicker. In the traditional public space, one might read the newspaper at home and venture into a café in the evening where the news would be discussed. Now it becomes possible to read the news, share it with a friend, and comment on the article before they have even read it, thereby blurring the difference between what is news and what is opinion.
128
The third argument suggests that political exposure occurs in non-political spaces. For example, an individual may be targeted by political advertisement concerning healthcare while doing research on breast cancer. Such exposure is seen in the material world as well. One is more likely to be exposed to diverse political opinions in an extra-political space such as the office compared to an already politicized space such as a party conference or a chat-room.
129
Finally, research has been done to show that the internet weakens social boundaries to the extent that they develop weak ties to other individuals. These lie in contrast to the former tightly knit communities and provide individuals with better and more diverse access to political opinions.
130
Brundidge 131 further informs us that Boase, Horrigan, and Rainie argue that internet use might transform communities inhabiting “socially and spatially dispersed networks through which they maneuver to be sociable, to seek information, and give and get help.” 132
Through these four arguments, the weakened social boundaries thesis suggests that the internet functions in such a way so as to expose individuals to a larger diversity of political opinions. Reading the arguments can make the thesis come across as very convincing but we must keep in mind that the selective exposure thesis still holds some ground and that the weakened social boundaries thesis
126 J. Brundidge, ‘Encountering ‘Difference’ in the Contemporary Public Sphere’, 681
127 B.L. Page, Who Deliberates?; L. Dahlberg, ‘Computer Mediated Communication’
128 P. Dahlgren, ‘The Internet, Public Spheres’; J. Brundidge, ‘Political Discussion and News Use’
129 D.C. Mutz, Hearing the Other Side; D.C. Mutz, P.S. Martin, ‘Facilitating Communication’; Schuefele et Al.
‘Social Structure and Citizenship’; Schuefele et Al. ‘Democracy based on Difference’
130 M.S. Granovetter, ‘The Strength of Weak Ties’
131 J, Brundidge, ‚Encountering ‚Difference‘ in the Contemporary Public Sphere‘, 686
132 J. Boase, J.B. Horrigan, B. Wellman, L. Rainie, The Strength of Ties
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is incomplete on a psychological level. We cannot conclude that in relation to individuals, the internet will “dramatically expand the heterogeneity of their political discussions” 133
In light of these contradictory findings, Jennifer Brundidge suggests a third hypotheses, namely the
‘inadvertency thesis’. This thesis suggests that while individuals are not lining up to engage in political discussions and are also unlikely to actively avoid political messages, they are inadvertently exposed to them. Three characteristics of the online world contribute to this inadvertency:
“(a) less than perfect online selective exposure strategies, (b) nonavoidance of encounters with political difference, and (c) weakened social boundaries between far flung geographic locations, between one discursive space and the next (blurred and porous boundaries creating increased
“interspatiality”), between political and apolitical spaces of communication, and between the private and public spheres” 134
Her research concludes with a number of interesting findings. It suggests that online news use and political discussion increase the heterogeneity of opinions people are exposed to. Furthermore, this contribution of the internet is more significant than that of traditional media, and face-to-face encounters. That is to say, in assessing the role of the internet in the formation of the public sphere, we can safely conclude that as a medium, it is capable of connecting otherwise separated individuals and their opinions more so than the traditional media. Nevertheless, it turned out that the number of people actively engaging in such behavior is quite small. In fact, there was an inverse relationship between internet use and exposure to political heterogeneity. This could be explained in that most people use the internet merely as a source of entertainment, much like TV which can have a negative effect on civic engagement. However, since the internet use variable was dichotomous (users vs. non-users) it is impossible to conclude this with any certainty. Additionally, online discussion boards are often moderated and evidence has been found to suggest that these discussion boards run the risk of becoming carefully controlled partisan enclaves in which the all-powerful moderator can select which comments to publish, and which ones to censor. Since this was the first study that attempted to find a direct relationship between the internet and people’s exposure to political difference, conclusions must be modest. Nevertheless, Brundidge writes:
“Although a great deal remains to be learned about how people engage with one another politically in an increasingly complex media environment, the results support the inadvertency thesis – online political discussion and news use are expanding the heterogeneity of political discussion networks rather than undermining them by providing a context in which exposure to political difference is likely to occur, at least on one occasion, whether or not it is explicitly selected.” 135
The research mentioned above has been conducted in the west, predominantly the United States, in relation to civic engagement and democracy. The political system within which the research is conducted therefore differs significantly from countries such as China and others where democratic government has not taken root. Nevertheless, it is highly significant to our endeavors. This is primarily the case because the internet is not limited to a single country and indeed exists as a global phenomenon: the World Wide Web. Therefore, conclusions drawn regarding increases in political
133 J, Brundidge, ‚Encountering ‚Difference‘ in the Contemporary Public Sphere‘, 686
134 Idem, 687
135 Idem, 694 - 696
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exposure apply to any individual browsing the myriad of available websites. An advertisement for universal healthcare is no less a political opinion in the United States as it is in China. Uncensored, these types of encounters would therefore equally influence political heterogeneity of discussion networks amongst Chinese and American individuals. Furthermore, I would suggest that evidence of political enclave formation is weakened significantly in a political culture where freedom of expression does not exist. Enclaves supporting the ruling ideology are very likely to appear, but enclaves of political opposition less so. Rather, opposition movements, diverse as they may be, are more likely to move between the different online spaces, leaving traces of opposition in their wake.
Uniting in different political discussion boards, websites, and other online modes of partisan community formation are simply too dangerous in light of government censorship and prosecution.
Before we continue, let us explore the implications of censorship on the role of the internet as a tool for increasing political heterogeneity in discussion networks.
The Internet and Government Censorship
Discussions surrounding the formation of a public sphere through the internet are by no means homogenous. The field is divided into those who see the internet as a pro-democratic force 136 and those who consider government control too large a hurdle to overcome.
137 However, similar to discussions mentioned above, these have focused primarily on the possibility of the formation of a public sphere as a (necessary) pre-cursor to democracy. In our research, the interest in the formation of the public sphere lies in its humanizing ability. Censorship may prevent the expression of direct criticism at Chinese state policy, and it may prevent a direct call for reform and more rights, but that does not lead to the conclusion that there is no room for open moral dialogues. As a space of nonpolitical social interaction however, it still exists. We will explore the notion that modern-day internet use in China will have the same humanizing effect on its population as the spread of the epistolary novel did on the peoples of Western Europe. The 18 th century novels were of course the drop that made the bucket spill and in no sense uniquely responsible for the development of Human
Rights discourse. What we have seen is that these literary works facilitated a psychological change that caused people to see their peers as equals in their being human. That is to say, they did not regard themselves as equals in their societal roles which were still hierarchically informed by the forms and meanings stemming from the Divine. Yet, there did occur a shift in which people recognized a basic equality their being human. We have referred to this as the discovery of ‘the self’ in others. This discovery does not stem from discussions that are necessarily political; instead they are a product of new social interactions, liberated from their hierarchical constraints. In Europe, this new liberalization expressed itself in the arts. In modern times however, traditional print media, including literature as a medium, are somewhat outdated and far more susceptible to government control than processes online. It is therefore the World Wide Web that to my mind will provide the vehicle for such change. Before we go down that path any further, we must first assess the limitations imposed on the web by stringent government control.
Since the internet is itself still in development and users are constantly exploring new options to circumvent the information monopoly upheld by repressive regimes, censorship itself is constantly being rediscovered in new methods. In the age of Google and other search engines, blocking a URL
136 L. Zhan, ‘Will the Internet Form the Public Sphere in China?’
137 S. Li, ‘The Online Public Space’
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(website address) is insufficient; through the use of keywords, alternatives are easily found. The
‘Great Firewall of China’ therefore combines the censorship if specific sites as well as the use of search terms considered ‘sensitive’. These currently include ‘Dalai Lama’, ‘Democracy’ and ‘Human
Rights’. These forms of censorship have been covered by mainstream Western media through cases involving Google, an American company. China has attempted to force Western companies operating in the country to adopt a form of self-censorship by threatening to shut down business operations.
The self-censorship of search engines facilitates the Chinese government in removing governmentcritical blogs and micro-blogs. 138
It may be easier to understand the far reaching censorship apparatus by giving some concrete examples surrounding recent international developments. Three days after the start of protests in
Egypt, the Chinese authorities added ‘Egypt’ and ‘Tunisia’ to the list of sensitive keywords, thereby blocking all search engine results linked to them. Likewise, the hashtag ‘#jan25’ used on microblogging sites such as Twitter and its Chinese counterparts was also blocked. It has further been reported that even the official news-wires from Chinese press Agency Xinhua were blocked. On
February 20 th of the same year, calls for a ‘Jasmin Revolution’ appeared online causing the Chinese authorities to quickly deploy additional security forces to Bejing and Shanghai, arrest those suspected of organizing the planned demonstrations, and add the word ‘jasmin’ to the growing list of sensitive keywords.
139
The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo provides further evidence of an intensified censorship. None of the traditional media mentioned the prize, foreign language media provided the reason. Chinese authorities had sent a message immediately after the news had arrived in Being that it was ‘forbidden to relay information’ on this topic. Furthermore, to this day, foreign media mentioning Liu Xiaobo have their signals jammed. The Chinese characters used in the dissident’s name or used to describe the Nobel prize have even been blocked from being used in
SMS. The Chinese authorities have further attempted to counter the use of proxy-servers used to circumvent the firewall blocking foreign websites. The foreign based developers of these popular software tools have reacted by launching updated versions of their program, thereby nullifying the preceding censorship effort.
140
New Forms of Censorship
The interplay between internet activism and government censorship, new methods are constantly being thought of and employed. The most recent developments point to the Chinese authorities taking a different approach to online activities. Lists of sensitive keywords and blocked websites can be considered passive forms of censorship, they occur after the fact. New efforts by the government therefore aim at drowning out dissident activities by creating a pro-government culture on the web.
The government has enlisted the help of bloggers who are paid to leave pro-government comments on the web. This group is sometimes referred to as the ’50-cent party’. Moreover, there are substantial reports that seem to indicate the authorities are encouraging state owned media, such as
Xinhua to expand internet activities. This includes the development of a national search engine which
138 RSF; Internet Enemies, 15 – 16,
139 Idem, 16
140 Idem, 16 – 17
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ideally would assume to leading position on the Chinese market thereby facilitating the control of information. The idea of paying bloggers to post pro-government messages in an attempt to drown out the voices of dissidents is a technique that has gained popularity with other oppressive regimes too including Iran and Russia. The idea seems to be that if one can’t remove unwanted voices, the best method is to effectively isolate them in a sea of pro-government activities.
141
Furthermore, Chinese authorities have attempted to tackle the issue of internet anonymity. It has become mandatory for Chinese citizens wishing to open a website or forum to report to local authorities and register by providing identification. The Assistant Director to the Department of
Propaganda, Wang Chen, was quoted as saying in May 2011 that the next logical step would be to extend this requirement to users of online chatrooms and forums. Cell-phone owners in China now also have to register their SIM with local authorities. There are roughly 320 million anonymously purchased cell-phones in China, these citizens have been given three years to register retroactively.
142
Censorship and Open Moral Dialogues
To assess whether or not open moral dialogues can occur in the context of censorship, let us evaluate whether or not China can be considered a society that is ‘opening up’. Several cases indicate that this is the case, and the internet plays a significant part. Internet search engine Google announced in March 2010 that it would no longer censor the results of its Chinese based website.
Instead, users were redirected to the Hong Kong based version. Naturally the website was censored and relations between the firm and Chinese authorities became tense. Nevertheless, Google’s operating license was extended and it still conducts business in the field of research and development. Microsoft and Yahoo are among the companies that as of 2010 still practices selfcensorship, but change is visible here as well. Microsoft has started giving out free licenses for its software to media organizations and NGO’s to stop governments from ceiling them under the pretense of fighting software piracy. More importantly, both companies have signed the ‘Code of
Conduct of the Global Network Initiative’ which seeks to promote good practice in countries that censor the internet. This coalition consists of multinational companies, NGO’s, and investment funds.
Corporate responsibility is of high value in this sense. Corporate responsibility can create a high amount of pressure to weaken censorship. In light of this, European commission vice-president and
Digital Agenda commissioner Neelie Kroes already called censorship a trade barrier. 143
All in all, we can conclude that while censorship practices severely limit online political activism, it too is subject to limitations. These occur as a result of a globalized marketplace where large multinationals can become pressured in their home countries to stop cooperating with oppressive policies. Second, citizens with a high degree of online savoir faire will continue to succeed in breaking down newly formed barriers. Censorship remains a targeted tool rather than being a totalitarian system of control. This in itself is a major limitation on its capabilities as the web, inhabited by a growing number of Chinese citizens is constantly growing, making it harder and harder to keep track
141 Idem, 17
142 Idem, 18
143 Idem, 19
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of all activities. Evaluating these matters leads one researcher to conclude that: “the internet, as a medium, has continued to provide ordinary citizens a public sphere to discuss public affairs and influence public policy, within certain limitations.” 144
The same paper reports on the Sun Zhigang case. As a young college graduate going to work, Zhigang was reportedly arrested and died three days later while in police custody. An online forum first reported on the incident which was then picked up on by a regional newspaper which subsequently investigated and reported its findings giving rise to a large society-wide debate in the country. The internet directly functioned as a medium in which ordinary citizens, as well as academics and high profile lawyers debated the case. Less than two months after the initial newspaper report, Premier
Wen Jiabao publicly abolished the law under discussion. This case is a prime example of how the internet is and can still be used as a means of supervising state power and commenting on public affairs.
145
At the same time, the authorities are also experimenting with ways of using the internet and other media as a source of legitimacy. This started as early in 1994 when a 13-minute discussion program was launched discussing various investigations and criticisms of public officials. At the time, more than 300 million people reportedly tuned in to watch, clearly showing that there is a demand for such debates in view of the public eye. In light of increased commercialization of the media, more newspapers and TV stations alike are looking for material that suits the demand of their public; social affairs definitely belongs in this category. Research (Xiaoping, 2002) has shown that such reporting is still limited but it has had the effect that many government institutions have attempted to standardize their routine practices and make them more transparent. It must be noted that such standardization has only taken place in regard to routine, every-day activities that are considered to lie in the purview of the media’s gaze. Critical analysis of non-routine government action can be, and still is, heavily censored. In September 2010, the Chinese authorities instigated a website that could be used by citizens to relay messages to the leadership regarding their concerns. Within a week, more than 20 000 comments had been left for President Hu Jintao relating to topics of corruption, the cost of housing, pollution, and the violation of civil liberties. The portal quickly became the subject of a number of rules which included not being allowed to post messages that could potentially ‘dishonor’ the state, or advocate civil liberties such as the right to assembly or demonstrations. Breaking these rules can result in a permanent disconnect of the user’s IP address.
This is significant in relation to the aforementioned anonymity issue. Since messages can’t be left using a foreign service, Chinese dissidents making use of foreign based proxy servers cannot leave messages. Authorities can therefore always trace who left a particular comment.
146
In such a large society, it is easy to find both positive and negative examples of media freedom but it is generally regarded to be the case that once freedoms have been granted, it is very difficult to return to a situation of total media control.
144 W. Chunzhi, B. Bates, ‘Online Public Sphere’ (page numbering unavailable)
145 Idem
146 RSF; Internet Enemies, 18
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“China will find, as have other countries, that once you allow access to a wider range of communication sources, and open the door to public expressing opinions [sic] and debating public issues is open, it is hard to reverse the course and return to a closed media system.” 147
Subject to censorship, the Habermasian public sphere described by Taylor has not formed. There are however clear signs that it is developing. Public opinion has mobilized to the point where it has had direct effect on policy choices. Open Moral Dialogues are thus clearly taking place. The discussions concerning the Sun Zhigang case were subject to existing limitations on the internet, yet the authorities did not respond by qualifying new words as ‘sensitive’, nor did it shut down forums and chatrooms where the topic was openly discussed. Certainly then, we may call the space in which public opinion was formed extra-political: the authorities did not actively intervene in the debate.
Even though it is likely that the Chinese authorities employed pro-government bloggers in an attempt to curve discussions in their favor, the outcome ensured the extra-political nature of the debate as imagined by the population. There can be no discussion that the internet as a space is meta-topical, if anything, this discussion has proven that internet in China does not merely function as an
‘entertainment highway’, but is also used as a source for information regarding socio-political issues.
In the Chinese case it is also clear that the predominant conception of time is a secular one. The authorities maintain that their source of legitimacy is the sovereign people, who are described as such in the Chinese constitution, indeed its full name is the ‘People’s Republic of China’. The constitution uses communist language, speaking of the ‘democratic dictatorship of the people’. We must not forget that communism was conceived of in Western Europe at a time when a secular view of time was already part of the social imaginary. A complete image of the onset of the Modern Moral
Order in China would require us to provide an in-depth analysis of Chinese historical developments surrounding the establishment of communist rule under Mao Zedong in 1949. We will not do this here and I don’t believe it to be fully necessary to our purposes. The conception of public opinion in the face of government action signifies that a traditional form of legitimacy is not accepted, the authorities are required to ‘explain themselves’, to gain legitimacy in the eyes of their population.
This proves to my mind the development of a social imaginary that has established, or is in the process of establishing, the people of China as a sovereign entity vis-à-vis government. Oppressive policies cannot change the social imaginary of a people; it can only prevent collective action on behalf of the people. To a certain extent, oppression limits the expression of sovereignty, not its conception. Although this is not entirely true since the sovereignty of a people is established in its collective action. The Sun Zhigang case provides some evidence that such collective action has become part of the social imaginary of the Chinese people thereby providing evidence that ‘the sovereign people’ are at the very least developing. Moreover, the development of a ‘sovereign people’ as distinct from government implies the occurrence of open moral dialogues which are necessary to the formation of opinion that runs counter to government practice.
147 W. Chunzhi, B. Bates, ‘Online Public Sphere’
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Legitimacy in Communitarian Societies
The individual as a free agent lies central to liberal ideology. Each citizen is free to make his or her choice regarding the legitimacy of government. To measure the legitimacy of a government, liberal though nevertheless finds ways to aggregate these individual opinions. This can be measured through elections, the use of public opinion polls, or even the absence of rebellion. Traditionally, legitimacy is analyzed in terms of the aggregate of intra-individual judgments. The thesis advanced by
Amitai Etzioni, discussed here, is one that advances the idea that when the legitimacy of an act is discussed, references are made to predominantly collective processes.
“The question is not whether a given number of persons have decided that a given act is legitimate, but whether a given polity (drawing on communal processes, for instance on meetings in the agora or town-hall meetings) has so concluded.” 148
Etzioni argues that he view of the individual as autonomous in liberalism translates to the conception of the individual as the ultimate normative arbitrator. Communitarianism disagrees and posits the idea that the individual is not autonomous and that the self instead reflects the normative culture of a given community. Personal choice is largely influenced by this normative culture and hence loses autonomy. In this view, judging the legitimacy of a given act requires one to take into account the normative culture affecting the arbitrator.
“Thus, the large number of Americans killed each year by guns reflects not merely or even primarily a personal conclusion by many millions of individual Americans that owning a gun is part of the birthright, but rather a culture that favors private gun ownership, that legitimates laws that allow ready access to guns.” 149
Etzioni argues that the individual cannot be seen as an isolated atom. Nor is it a socially embedded entity such as communitarians may argue. Instead the individual is continuously shaped by the communal environment while also maintaining self-shaped characteristics. Moreover, the individual is often unaware of the influence of communal factors. These influences are embedded in moral education, persuasion by others, and leadership and are informative of both initial preferences
(childhood) and the development of them in later life. 150 An example is provided when we analyze culinary preferences in children. Every child is born with a disposition towards eating. As a means of survival, food is necessary. Similarly, they prefer warmth over cold. A very young child does not necessarily mind what he/she eats. Choices to eat kosher or halal meat, enjoy vegan cuisine, or soul food are culturally informed. They are tastes a child develops under the influence of his/her direct community and not a product of free choice. This preference persists beyond the childhood stages of life, showing that adults are not suddenly immune to communal influences. This observation leads
Etzioni to ask the question what processes shape and re-shape the notion of legitimacy in people.
151
The answer to this question lies in a term used before: moral dialogues. Liberal thought echoed in the idea of the public sphere found in Taylor assesses the formation of public opinion and legitimacy
148 A. Etzioni, ’On Communitarian and Global Sources of Legitimacy’, 108
149 Idem, 109
150 A. Etzioni, The New Golden Rule
151 A. Etzioni, ‘On Communitarian and Global Sources of Legitimacy’, 110
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in terms of rational deliberations. Individuals exchange and weigh information leading to reasoned arguments en enlightened understandings. These opinions are widely found in literature concerning deliberative democracy. Etzioni quotes Gutmann and Thompson who write that deliberators must be:
“self-reflective about their commitments … and open to the possibility of changing their minds or modifying their positions at some time in the future if they confront unanswerable objections to their present point of view” 152
This view insinuates that the individual is conscious of all the factors that influence their choice and is consequently able to change any and all such positions. The argument advanced by Etzioni on the other hand points to emotions and communal influences over which we as individuals have much less control as a significant contributing factors in choice and deliberation. Choice and legitimacy are then a product of communal and individual processes which occur through moral dialogues. Etzioni admits that there have been no systematic social scientific study of this particular topic and conclusions can only be drawn from reports in the media and personal observation. In his case, observations of deliberations at a wide variety of venues ranging from the British parliament and US congress, to faculty meetings at universities. His findings suggest that communities reach shared understandings about legitimacy through “a give-and-take that combines passion with normative arguments.” 153 Superficial analyses of moral dialogues concerning topics such as the death penalty further suggest that such deliberations have no clear beginning and ending and are instead an ongoing process subject to heated discussions. The ‘opinion’ that emerges is itself open to criticism and may, as a result of new argumentation, be changed. Moral dialogues are hard to define, yet they share a broad set of characteristics with the public sphere discussed above. We see this clearly in the description by Etzioni of the spaces it occupies:
These dialogues take place by linking millions of local conversations (between couples, in neighborhood bars, in coffee-or teahouses, around water coolers at work) into society-wide networks and shared public focal points. They take place during regional and national meetings of many thousands of voluntary associations in which local representatives engage in dialogue; in state, regional, and national party caucuses; in state assemblies and in Congress; and increasingly via electronic link (such as groups that meet on the Internet.) 154
Etzioni further argues that many societies have opened up to such dialogue. Globalization, summarized in increased migration and travel, the rise of global media, increased levels of education and the widening of people’s faze from the local to the regional, national, and even global public affairs have led even to trans-national moral dialogues. Examples of such internationalized deliberations can be found in a widely accepted concern for the environment, and, following transnational moral dialogues, a near-global understanding arose that the 2003 Iraq invasion was unlawful. Further such shared beliefs are developing in relation to child-pornography, the use of landmines, and whale hunting. The global aspect of these deliberations is not that every individual is involved, but that the outcomes are transnationally accepted. A communitarian answer to the
152 Idem, 111
153 Idem, 112
154 Idem, 112
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question who the main agents of legitimacy are thus focuses on communities rather than individuals.
Communities then, are the legitimizing force, but we are left with the question what normative criteria can be used to verify this legitimacy. Without such normative criteria, we would arrive at a situation in which an act is deemed legitimate simply because the community believes it to be. Any serious attention to such a position will prove it to be untenable. Communities have legitimized many horrible things throughout history, including the subjugation of African peoples into slavery, or the tradition of honor killings as it occurs to this day in certain parts of the world. An entire community may be convinced that a woman who is considered to have gravely dishonored her family name should be killed; “but outsiders can and do pass normative judgments of their own. One approach to finding transcultural sources of legitimacy is the overlapping consensus, arguing that different groups of people with a different moral core values can reach consensus on the legitimacy of a political act.
Etzioni argues however, that such agreements are unstable because they are not based on the same notions and convictions but merely on shared interests, most likely of a temporal nature. Shared core values on the other hand are much more stable and robust. This leads to one a rather complicated question:
“Which overarching, possibly universal, values can provide a basis for transcommunal, normative judgments in general, and that which is legitimate in particular?” 155
This basis is found in self-evident moral claims of the kind described in the beginning stages of this thesis. The most poignant example of such a claim is found in the extra moral responsibly individuals have to their own children over the children of others. Such a moral claim is so self-evident that it requires no reflection. Surely such reflection does occur, but only after it has been accepted as legitimate, moreover, the vast majority of people will find such reflections unnecessary. “The claim is simply too self-evident” 156 Etzioni provides further evidence of such moral precepts found in the work of some social scientists. James Q Wilson has provided evidence of a ‘moral sense’ that guides people towards these values. Fairness is one of the values that diverse groups of people might similarly find themselves drawn towards. We are reminded that fairness is equally the moral precept that the research opening this thesis project points to as being innate in children across the globe.
Furthermore, Frances Harbour has compiled a list of primary values that includes ‘justice, beneficence, special beneficence to compatriots, subordinating interests of individual to group, good faith and veracity, courage, and self-control.’ 157 Etzioni reports having asked 400 different groups amongst different cultures whether or not children should be taught to tell the truth under most conditions (allowing for some exceptions such as when a lie could save the life of people); the response he got was one of confusion, people did not see a question because the answer was selfevident. We find a similar self-evidence in our obligation to preserve our planet. International discussions are not centered around the question if something needs to be done, but how. The obligation to leave this world in a decent state for the next generation is a universal value. No nation denies the normative commitment to nature, but limit their actions based on ideological arguments concerning the best method of approaching the issue, or, by claiming their level of economic development renders them unable to live up to this requirement. We have already mentioned the normalization of Human Rights in the international community and the tendency of violating nations
155 Idem, 114
156 Idem, 116
157 Idem, 116
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to become defensive about their actions, providing evidence that adherence is considered the norm, a universally accepted value. Etzioni divides the self-evidence thesis into two:
“(a) those who recognize these sources of normativity do not base them on rational deliberations but
‘automatically’ see their moral validity (as illustrated by the response to the question about lying), and (b) that those who do not share this moral sense will do so if allowed open access to moral dialogues.” 158
I agree with Etzioni that point (a) has only been so far supported through introspection and informal observation. It relates only to the mode or absence of deliberation, not to inherent worth of the moral stance at hand. Point (b) on the other hand is pivotal in finding proof for the universality of these moral values. The methodology available to such an endeavor is limited but not impossible to find. The crux is found in the process by which societies open up. This applies to both totalitarian and theocratic states. The only test in this sense, is the test of time. If societies that open up to the globalized world, allowing for the population to enter into continuous moral dialogue, systematically move towards acceptance of these values, then their universal nature would be supported.
Unfortunately, Etzioni notes, ‘large scale studies of such changes seem unavailable’.
158 Idem, 117
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This thesis has attempted to provide an insight into the process by which societies open up to moral dialogue. We began by discussing the self-evidence of human rights as discussed by researchers including Hunt, Etzioni and Henkins. We proceeded by showing, through the work of Sumner B.
Twiss, that human rights are best conceived of as a concept that is open to interpretation. Humane governance occupies a limited space on the imagined scale with individualism and communitarianism as the extremes on either side. Humane government is then a balance that avoids the negative aspects associated with either extreme.
Discussing the ‘invention’ of Human Rights in the west led us to assess the discovery of the autonomous self through the work of Lynn Hunt on the epistolary novel. The Modern Moral Order, central to our thesis, has been shown to consist of increased levels of individualization, the objectification of social reality, the development of the Habermasian public sphere, and the conception of the citizenship of a nation as a sovereign entity.
In order to provide clear evidence of the universal nature of this Modern Moral Order, we have shown through the analysis of multiple studies concerning China that the aspects forwarded by
Taylor in his study of western culture are developing in a similar interdependent way. In other words, we have tried to show that the economic development of a nation, within a globalized system, creates a similar process in which industrialization leads to the objectification of social reality.
Moreover, we have provided evidence that China’s ‘opening up’ has led to increased levels of individualization in its post-80’s generation as contrasted with their parents. This study not only showed an increased interest in the development of an authentic self through fashion, music, and the development of slang (ku), but also the popular use of the word ‘ freedom’. Furthermore, research has shown that this new generation values its new freedoms much more than the older generation that focuses on increased living standards. We have also seen that the objectification of social reality has led to, amongst other things, the improvement and standardization of the Chinese educational system. Increased affluence as a result of economic development led to increased migration and travel, as well as the development of the media. These are amongst the factors considered to be contributive to individualization.
Overall the onset of the Modern Moral Order in China seems to have very similar results in terms of social changes compared to those of the west. The increased levels of mobility and the value this new generation puts on freedoms and the authentic self are clear evidence that the traditional hierarchical order is disappearing.
We have further explored the role the internet plays in the development of the public sphere. More importantly, we have assessed, using China as a case-study, to what extent totalitarian regimes are capable of censoring unwanted internet activities and to what extent these influence the creation of the public space and the possibility for open moral dialogues. Censorship practices were found to be focused on political dissidence, and to often occur after the fact. That is, censorship is responsive, rather than preventative. The preventative elements that do exist, such as the firewall, list of sensitive keywords, and an attempt to create a pro-government online culture are so far incapable of preventing online dissent. Moreover, we have seen that multinational companies based in the West seem increasingly unwilling to cooperate with China’s censorship. Additionally we have seen that
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Euro-commissioner Neelie Kroes stated that censorship functions as a trade barrier. Censorship therefore has the potential to hurt China’s economic development, a factor that could limit censorship practice in the long run.
The Chinese case provides strong evidence that the internet is a powerful technological tool capable of forming the public sphere in any nation that develops widespread internet access. As a powerful, economically strong, centralized state, China has the most resources at its disposal for censorship practices. Despite its far-reaching hand, the Chinese authorities have not been able to prevent the internet from developing into a public sphere capable of forming public opinion and influencing policy.
Fundamentally however, the individualism, increased focus on the authenticity and an emphasis on newly received freedoms, the post-80s generation shows that open moral dialogues are taking place.
Chinese society is no longer a closed totalitarian system. We have further seen that the Chinese people are developing the concept of being a sovereign entity that functions as the sole source of legitimacy for government. Although evidence is limited, the cases cited clearly show that the internet is used as a public sphere to discuss public issues albeit under certain limitations.
Nevertheless, it is significant that such debate has been shown to influence public policy making.
With the exception of democratic self-rule, all of the elements of Taylor’s Modern Moral Order are thus shown to be developing. Additionally, the development of the Modern Moral Order has been shown to give rise to open moral dialogue. The existence of universal moral values and their discovery through open moral dialogues can only be proven by showing that societies that open up systematically move in the direction of these values. This thesis has not provided a systematic study since we have only analyzed developments in one country. Nevertheless, in light of the similarity between current developments in China and the historical onset of the Modern Moral Order in western culture, I believe we have provided compelling evidence for believing that China is moving in the direction of accepting the universal moral values associated with the concept of humane government. If this assertion is correct, than we have provided evidence of the existence of shared moral values between two very different cultures. This does not yet prove a definite moral universalism, but it shows their validity in at least two very different cultures thereby providing a clear case for the suggestion that they are indeed universal.
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