Природа и карактер
ратова у
послехладноратовском
свету
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I Појам и врсте рата
II Различита схватања узрока рата
III Карактер и природа ратова у
послехладноратовском свету
IV Литература
I Појам и врсте рата
“Одлучујуће средство у политици
је насиље. Свако ко не успева ово
да схвати је... политичко дете”
(Макс Вебер)
Историјат ратова
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Од преко 3 300 година познате историје, само раздобље у току 200 година прошло је без ратова
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У току 5 500 година историје, водило се преко 14 500 ратова, у којима је погинуло око 4 милијарде људи
(Швајцарски научници)
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Since 1815 there have been between 224 and 559 wars, depending on the definition of war that is used (Mingst
2004: 198).
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Број жртава је огроман: 17. век- 3 милиона; 18. век- 5, 2 милиона; 19. век- 5, 5 милиона; Први светски рат10 милиона мртвих, 20 милиона рањених и осакаћених; други светски рат- 55 милиона мртвих, 35
милиона рањених; Током хладног рата у свету у развоју вођено је 127 ратова у којима је убијено 21, 9
милиона људи (Андреја Милетић, Рут Сивард)
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“После краја хладног рата, велики рат је постао мање вероватан, али су се регионални и домаћи сукоби
одржали са увек присутним притиском на државе изван и међународне институције да интервенишу. Од
111 сукоба који су се водили од краја хладног рата до почетка новог века, 95 су били унутардржавни, а у
девет случајева догодила се и страна интервенција. Више од 80 државних актера је било укључено, као и
две међународне организације, и 200 невладиних актера” (Џозеф Нај)
Историјат ратова према Мајклу
Хауарду
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Ратови витезова
Ратови плаћеника
Ратови трговаца
Ратови професионалаца
Ратови револуције
Ратови нација
Ратови технолога
Нуклеарно доба
Сајбер ратови?
Појам и дефиниција рата
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“Рат је најоштрији облик друштвених сукоба,
у коме се, непосредном употребом оружане
силе између држава, њихових савеза или
организација, покушавају да остваре
одређени политички циљеви победом над
противничком страном и њеним
принуђивањем да прихвати услове
победника.” (Андреја Милетић, “Рат”, у,
Енциклопедија политичке културе,
Савремена администрација, Београд, 1993,
стр. 953)
 ‘a
state of usually open and declared
armed hostile conflict between states
or nations’. (Webster’s Dictionary)
 ‘organised violence carried on by
political units against each other’
(Bull 1977: 184).
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It is possible to argue that war is simply any form of armed violence between groups
of people, but it is valid to ask what sorts of goals are involved and how much
violence is required for an armed clash to be called a ‘war’.
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Is a clash between two street gangs in which several people are killed, really the
same phenomenon as a military conflict between two or more states in which
millions are deliberately killed?
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Choosing a particular threshold can also seem arbitrary, as with the influential
Singer and Small definition which requires a war to involve at least 1,000 battle
deaths per year. By this token the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War between Argentina
and the United Kingdom would barely qualify, though few would argue that that
conflict was not a war.
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Some sense of scale is clearly needed, but perhaps Quincy Wright’s less specific
formulation is still reasonable, that war is ‘a conflict among political groups,
especially sovereign states, carried on by armed forces of considerable magnitude,
for a considerable period of time’ (Wright 1968: 453).
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Рат је оружани сукоб међу државама а не
између приватних лица или њихових група.
Рат није”однос човека према човеку, већ
државе према држави.” (Русо)
Рат је сукоб између политичких друштаваполитичке групе које још нису државе, као и у
државно необликованим друштвима (Вјатр)
Проблематика унутардржавних ратова
IUS AD BELLO ET IUS IN BELLO
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Физичка и “вољна” димензија рата
Физичка принуда као средство, а воља као циљ рата
Намера да се води рат (ANIMUS BELLIGERENDI)
Рат обухвата не само “стварну борбу” него и “читаво
раздобље у коме је видљива спремност на њу.” (Томас
Хобс)
Повезаност рата и политике
Бријан/Келогов пакт – 1928. године
Забрана употребе силе и претње силом- члан 2, став 4,
Повеље УН
Врсте ратова:
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Међудржавни и унутардржвни ратови
Нападачки и одбрамбени ратовиНапaдачки (Blietzkrieg, превентивни рат
(preventive war), предухитрујући рат
(preemptive war)
Кратки и дуготрајни ратови
Фронтални и герилски или партизански
ратови
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Локални, регионални, светски
Средишњи и периферни
Копнени, поморски, ваздушни и
свемирски (ратови звезда)
Ограничени и тотални (неограничени)
Конвенционални и нуклеарни
Праведни и неправедни
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Специјални рат и психолошки рат
Сукоби ниског интензитета и
посреднички ратови
Царински рат
“Хладни” и “топли” ратови
Рат као метафора
Preemptivni
(preduhitrujući) i
preventivni ratovi
Проф. др Драган Р.
Симић
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Državni sekretar Danijel Vebster je 1837. godine
povodom poznatog slučaja sa brodom „Karolina“
(Carolina Incident), odredio okolnosti pod kojima
je preduhitrujuće delovanje opravdano, ističući da
to pravo može da se koristi kada je država
suočena sa: „Trenutnom, neodoljivom
potrebom... Koja ne ostavlja prostor za izbor
sredstava niti vremena za razmišljanje.“
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Posle iskustva od 11. 09. 2001. godine, Amerika više jednostavno
ne sme da čeka da se ovakve pretnje materijalizuju, jer bi onda, po
rečima Buša i Čejnija, bilo prekasno da se reaguje. Odvraćanje i
zastrašivanje kao deo hladnoratovskog strateškog arsenala i načina
mišljenja treba da budu zamenjeni tzv. anticipativnom
samoodbranom; drugim rečima, SAD sebi daju odrešene ruke,
moralno i pravno opravdanje takođe, da preduzmu pruduhitrujuće
udare „što dalje od svojih obala“ protiv država, organizacija i/ili
pojedinaca koji mogu da ugroze bezbednost Amerike i njenih
saveznika. Posebno u naše vreme kada postoje realni izgledi da
oružje za masovno uništavanje dođe u ruke terorista, ne sme se
čekati da ona budu upotrebljena, pa da se steknu uslovi za legalnu i
legitimnu samoodbranu. Premda i dalje kod ovakvih objašnjenja
ostaje nejasno, da li će, kada i gde neprijatelj zaista napasti, odlike
novih oružja i fanatizam terorista ne daju pravo na pasivnost, tvrdili
su zagovornici preemptivnih udara.
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Ono što je, međutim, izazvalo raspravu povodom prava na
anticipativnu samoodbranu, na način kako je obrazložena u
Strategiji nacionalne bezbednosti SAD iz 2002. godine, ticalo se
najviše mogućnosti eventualne zloupotrebe ovog prava (pravo na
samoodbranu je, inače, uređeno u Povelji Ujedinjenih nacija, u
članovima 2(4) i 51.). Drugim rečima, postavilo se i jedno suštinsko
pitanje: nije li ovako široko tumačeno i samododeljeno pravo na
preduhitrujuće delovanje, zapravo, paravan za vođenje preventivnih
ratova? Ovde je, razume se, važno praviti razliku između onoga
kako države treba da se ponašaju u međusobnim odnosima u cilju
očuvanja međunarodnog sistema i međunarodnog poretka i pouke
o značaju preventivnog delovanja u načelu iskazanog, između
ostalog, i u poslovici da je „vrednija jedna unca prevencije nego
funta lečenja“.
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Oto fon Bizmark, koji je često posezao za
ratom kao nastavkom politike drugim
sredstvima, govorio je da mu preventivni rat
izgleda „kao izvršiti samoubistvo iz straha
od smrti“
Чарлс Кегли,
Грегори Рејмонд
Преемптивни (предухитрујући)
ратови
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The Six Day War between Israel and an alliance of Egypt, Syria,
Jordan, and Iraq was a classic case of preemption (see Reiter,
1995:16–19). Tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbors had
been growing throughout the spring of 1967, and reached their
zenith in May when Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser
undertook a series of actions that raised fears in Tel Aviv of an
imminent attack. Besides mobilizing his troops and cementing
military ties with Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, Nasser ordered the UN
Emergency Force to leave the Sinai, where it had been deployed
since the 1956 Suez War as a buffer between Egypt and Israel.
Furthermore, he announced a blockade of the Strait of Tiran,
Israel’s vital waterway to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, and
proclaimed that his goal in any future war with Israel would be the
destruction of the Jewish state. Assuming an invasion was
forthcoming and survival doubtful if Egypt landed the first blow, the
Israelis launched a surprise attack on June 5, which enabled them
to win a decisive victory.
Првентивни ратови
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the Third Punic War (Prvi punski rat (264 - 241 BC); Drugi
punski rat 218-201 B. C.) between Rome and Carthage
(149–146 B.C.E.) illustrates preventive warfare. Although
reduced to the status of a minor power by losses to the
Romans in two previous wars, Carthage had undergone an
economic resurgence during the first half of the second
century, which led some Roman leaders to worry about its
future ambitions. Consumed with the fear that Carthage
would regain its former strength and eventually threaten
Rome, Marcus Porcius Cato ended every speech to the
Roman Senate by proclaiming: ‘‘Carthage must be
destroyed!’’ Heeding his advice, Rome annihilated Carthage
in a brutal, unprovoked military campaign.
Рат у Ираку из 2003. године
Џозеф Нај
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Ukoliko postoji nedvosmislena i dovoljna pretnja teritorijalnom
integritetu i političkom suverenitetu jedne države, ona mora
delovati odmah, ili kasnije neće biti prilike za delovanje.
Pretnja mora biti, međutim, neposredna. Takav argument ne
bi opravdao, na primer, sovjetsku intervenciju u Avganistanu.
Postoji razlika između preemptivnih i preventivnih ratova.
Preemptivni napad dogadja se kada je opasnost neposredna.
Do preventivnog rata dolazi kada su državnici uvereni kako je
rat bolje voditi sada nego kasnije. Kao što smo videli, 1914.
godine takvo preventivno razmišljanje uticalo je na nemački
generalštab. Mnogi su se bojali da će, ako bi čekali do 1916.
godine, Rusija biti suviše jaka da bi Šlifenov plan uspeo
Збигњев
Бжежински
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A ni мesanje dvaju razlicitih koncepata - prethodnog
(preemptive) i preventivnog (preventive) djelovanja nije
pomoglo razjasnjavanju stvari. U Poglavlju 5 dokumenta 0
Nacionalnoj sigurnosnoj strategiji za 2002. godinu kojije
razmatralo Nacionalno vijece za sigurnost, naslovljenom
Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and
Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction (Sprijeeimo
naie neprijatelj« da prijete nama, naiim saveznicima i naiim
prijateijima oruijem za masovno unistavanje), ova dva pojma
koriste se kao istoznacnice. Zamjenik drtavnog tajnika za
obranu dodatno je zamaglio stvar izjavivsi 2. prosinca 2002.
na International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) kako
"svako tko misli da mi moiemo c!ekati do trenutka kada
imamo pouzdane infonnacije da se napad sprema, nije nis~a
naucio iz 11. rujna".
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Ipak, razlika izrnedu prethodnog i preventivnog vrlo je vain a
za medunarodni poredak i ne bi smjela biti izgubljena iz vida.
Ona podrazumijeva razliku izmedu, npr. izraelske odluke
izlipnja 1967. da preduhitri (preempt) arapski napad za koji
su arapske snage okoncavale pripreme i izraelskog zracnog
napada 1981. godinena nuklearni reaktoru Osiraqu s ciljem
sprecavanja (prevent) Iraka u stjecanju nuklearnog oruzja, U
prvom slucaju djelovalo se po izravnoj prijetnji; u drugom se
sprijecilo da do prijetnje uopce dode. Na isti se nacin i napad
SAD-a na Irak 2003. godine moida moie sagledavati kao
preventivan (preventive) protiv neke buduce "ozbiljne i
rastuce prijetnje" (kako je to nazvao predsjednik Bush), ali
sigurno nekao djelovanje da se preduhitri (preempt) neki
konkretan, izravan iracki napad.
“Ratovi treće
vrste”(Kalevi
Holsti)
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U slučaju ratova treće vrste, rec je o unutrašnjim
sukobima najčešće uzrokovanim etnoverski mrazlozima,
ili sukobima koji su izbili usled borbe za izraženiju
autonomiju, veća prava ili za odvajanje od već postojeće
države putem njenog razbijanja. Unutrašnji ratovi
predstavljaju u naše doba novu bezbednosnu pretnju
koja zahteva drukčije odgovore od dobro poznatih
klasičnih, vojnih sredstava - iako su po mestu izbijanja
takvi nasilni sukobi unutrašnji, posledice ovakvih ratova
treće vrste utiču na bezbednost u njihovom bližem i
širem okruženju, kao i na međunarodnu bezbednost.
Asimetrični ratovi
Martin Ewans
Conflict in Afghanistan- A Study in
Asymmetric Warfare
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In the wake of the attacks of 11 September 2001,
as well as during the ensuing invasions of
Afghanistan and Iraq, much has been heard of the
concept of ‘asymmetric warfare’.
Broadly speaking, this purports to describe a
means of fighting through which a weaker power
can offset or neutralise the strengths of a more
powerful opponent by applying what strengths it
has to its opponent’s weaknesses.
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The concept is as old as history and could, for
example, be used to typify the encounter between
David and Goliath. It fits set battles between
trained and organised armies, as, for example,
the Battle of Agincourt of 1415, where a stronger
force including armoured horsemen was defeated
by a weaker force using the armour-piercing
longbow. More frequently, however, it is used to
describe situations in which formal state power is
confronted by non-state or guerrilla activity.
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Since the beginnings of nation-state formation in the
seventeenth century, asymmetric warfare has been the
exception rather than the rule, except possibly in colonial
environments. As states developed and became embroiled in
warfare, so they made greater use of regular armies. These
were equipped with progressively more sophisticated
weaponry, and became increasingly permanent and
professional. Mechanisation, which began during the First
World War, became the principal characteristic of inter-state
‘conventional’ warfare from the Second World War onwards.
This meant that warfare became both more expensive and
more destructive, until, with the development of nuclear
weapons, the scale of destruction and expense became selfdefeating. In a nuclear war, there would be no winners.
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In 9 AD, three Roman legions commanded by Publius
Quinctilius Varus were destroyed in the Teutoburger Wald by
German tribesmen, having been lured onto terrain in which
they were unable to deploy the tactical formations which
would have rendered their superiority irresistible. Among the
most spectacular of more recent examples were the Boer
and Vietnam Wars, where the use of asymmetric tactics
against regular forces was supplemented by political and
public relations activity. The ability to erode the stronger
power’s will to fight by adducing a moral dimension to the
conflict is a valuable asset in an asymmetric context. For both
parties, to ‘win hearts and minds’ is a significant step towards
success.
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In recent years, with major inter-state warfare largely stalemated, the main
focus has been on asymmetric warfare. While ‘conventional’ warfare has
not been precluded – Iraq/Iran, India/Pakistan, Britain/Argentina,
Iraq/Kuwait – it has generally been either short-lived or has been kept
within strictly local limits, or both. The threat currently facing the ‘elite’
countries, mainly of Europe and North America, as well as the centres of
superior power in the Third World, does not now arise from open warfare
betweennations. In its place is a threat from non-state organisations, some
based in known localities, as for example Chechnya and Kashmir, others,
notably al-Qa ida, with no readily accessible focus of command or activity.
Their ability seriously to challenge major state power is doubtful, but their
potential to inflict material damage and loss of life is undeniable, the more
so if they should gain access to weapons of mass destruction or can find
means to disrupt the extensive and intricate infrastructure on which modern
societies depend. A discussion of the nature of asymmetric warfare and the
applicability to current circumstances of the lessons to be learnt from its
past employment, is thus one of considerable contemporary interest, if not
urgency.
Ratovi četvrte
generacije
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Fourth Generation Warfare is defined as conflicts which involve the
following elements:
Are complex and long term.
Terrorism
A non-national or transnational base, highly decentralized.
A direct attack on the enemy's culture.
Highly sophisticated psychological warfare especially through
media manipulation and lawfare
All available pressures are used - political, economic, social and
military.
Occurs in low intensity conflict, involving actors from all networks.
Non-combatants are tactical dilemmas.
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The concept was first described by the authors William S.
Lind, Colonel (US Army), Captain (USMC), Colonel (US
Army), and Lieutenant Colonel (USMCR) in a 1989 Marine
Corps Gazette article entitled “The Changing Face of War:
Into the Fourth Generation”.
The generations of warfare described by these authors are:
1st Generation: tactics of line and column; which developed
in the age of the smoothbore musket.
2nd Generation: tactics of linear fire and movement, with
reliance on indirect fire.
3rd Generatin: tactics of infiltration to bypass and collapse
the enemy's combat forces rather than seeking to close with
and destroy them; and defence in depth.
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In brief, the theory holds that warfare has
evolved through four generations: 1) the
use of massed manpower, 2) firepower, 3)
maneuver, and now 4) an evolved form of
insurgency that employs all available
networks—political, economic, social,
military—to convince an opponent’s
decisionmakers that their strategic goals
are either unachievable or too costly.
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The theory went through a second incarnation
when the notion of nontrinitarian war came into
vogue; but it failed to examine that notion
critically. The theory also is founded on myths
about the so-called Westphalian system and the
theory of blitzkrieg. The theory of 4GW reinvented
itself once again after September 11, 2001 (9/11),
when its proponents claimed that Al Qaeda was
waging a 4GW against the United States.
War of Necessity
and War of Choice
Richard N. Haas, War of Necessity,
War of Choice: A Memoir of two Iraq
Wars, Simon & Schuster, New York,
2009
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“Wars can be defined any number of ways: civil
wars, wars of national liberation, world wars, cold
wars, counterinsurgencies, a global war on
terrorism, wars of attrition, defensive wars,
nuclear wars, limited wars, just wars and
preventive wars all come to mind. What these and
other such descriptions tend to reflect is scale,
purpose, duration, the means employed, the
nature of conflict, and / or nature of undertaking.”
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“There is however, another way to think about
war. Wars can be either be viewed as essentially
unavoidable, that is acts of necessity, or just the
opposite, reflecting conscious choice when other
reasonable policies are available but are deemed
to be less attractive… History offers us numerous
examples of each. Any list of modern wars of
necessity from the American Perspective would
include World War II and the Korean War. Wars of
choice undertaken by the United States would
include Vietnam, Bosnia, Kosovo and a Century
before, the Spanish-American War.”
What characterizes Wars of necessity?
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The most common situation involves self-defense.
More generally, wars of necessity involves the
most important national interests, the absence of
promising alternatives to the use of force, and the
certain and considerable price to be paid if the
status quo is stand. Wars of necessity do not
require assurances that the overall results of
striking or resisting will be positive, only the
assessment that the results of not so doing will be
unacceptably negative and large.
What characterizes Wars of Choice?
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Wars of Choice tend to involve stakes or interests
that are less clearly “vital”, along with the
existence of viable alternative policies, be they
diplomacy, inaction, or something else but still
other than the use of military force. One result is
that wars of choice tend to increase the pressure
on the government of the day to demonstrate that
the overall or net results of employing force will be
positive, that is, that the benefits outweigh the
costs. If this test cannot be meet, the choice will
appear to be ill-advised and in fact most likely is
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Menachem Begin, the former prime minister of Israel,
differentiated between what he called “wars of choice” and
“wars of no alternative”
Maimonides, one of the great scholars in the annals of
Judaism, wrote more than eight century ago of wars he
judged to be obligatory and those he termed optional. The
former were those waged by the king for narrowly defined
religious cases and in self-defense, i. e. “to deliver Israel from
the enemy attacking him”. He distinguished such necessary
wars from those discretionary conflicts undertaken buy a king
against neighboring nations “to extend the borders of Israel
and to enhance his greatness and prestige”
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The distinction between wars of necessity and
wars of choice is obviously heavily subjective,
inevitably reflecting an individual’s analysis and
politics.
I introduced the phrases into the Iraq war debate
in an op-ed in the Washington Post on November
23, 2003, five months after I left the
Administration. The piece argued that the first Iraq
war was a classic war of necessity, the second a
classic war of choice.
Cyber Warfare
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In the spring of 2007, when Estonian authorities moved a
monument to the Red Army from the center of its capital city,
Tallinn, to the outskirts of town, a diplomatic row erupted with
neighboring Russia. Estonian nationalists regard the army as
occupiers and oppressors, a sentiment that dates to the long
period of Soviet rule following the Second World War, when
the Soviet Union absorbed all three Baltic states. Ethnic
Russians, who make up about a quarter of Estonia’s 1.3
million people, were nonetheless incensed by the statue’s
treatment and took to the streets in protest. Estonia later
blamed Moscow for orchestrating the unrest; order was
restored only after U.S. and European diplomatic
interventions.

But the story of the “Bronze Statue” did not end there. Days
after the riots the computerized infrastructure of Estonia’s
high-tech government began to fray, victimized by what
experts in cybersecurity termed a coordinated “denial of
service attack. A flood of bogus requests for information from
computers around the world conspired to cripple (Wired) the
websites of Estonian banks, media outlets, and ministries for
days. Estonia denounced the attacks as an unprovoked act
of aggression from a regional foe (though experts still
disagree on who perpetrated it—Moscow has denied any
knowledge). Experts in cybersecurity went one step further:
They called it the future of warfare.


The attack on Estonia’s “paperless government” (BBC) was one of the
most publicized hacks in recent computing history. But it wasn’t the first
case of cyber espionage, nor the most egregious. It’s the “tip of the
iceberg of the quantity and quality of attacks that are going on,” says
O. Sami Saydjari, president of the Cyber Defense Agency, a security
consultant, and a former Pentagon computer security expert. Israel,
India, Pakistan, and the United States have all been accused of
launching similar attacks on adversaries.
China, however, may be the most active. Washington has accused the
Chinese of hacking into government computer networks at the U.S.
Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense—in some instances
making off with data. But accusations of Chinese cyber-meddling
reached a crescendo in June 2007, when, according to the Financial
Times, hackers broke into a Pentagon network that serves the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, briefly shutting it down.

Another technique is the use of “malware,”
“spyware,” and other malicious programs
imbedded into computer systems to steal
information without user knowledge. The
software is designed to hide undetected
and siphon information from its host—
everything from secrets stored on personal
computers to Pentagon military mainframes


Less common but far more worrisome are cyber attacks
aimed at critical infrastructure—like nuclear-power-plant
control systems, banks, or subways
According to a tally by the Heritage Foundation, a
conservative Washington think tank, the hackers may
already be winning: In 2007 the Department of
Homeland Security logged an estimated 37,000
attempted breaches of private and government
computer systems, and over 80,000 attacks on
Pentagon systems. Some hacks “reduced the U.S.
military’s operational capabilities,”

Economist Borg says the biggest threat from cyber attacks
may be economic. He estimates a shutdown of electric power
to any sizable region for more than ten days would stop over
70 percent of all economic activity in that region. “If you can
do that with a pure cyber attack on only one critical
infrastructure, why would you bother with any traditional
military attack?” CSIS’ Lewis takes a less alarmist view. “The
U.S. is a very big set of targets, and some of our important
networks are very secure. So you could inflict damage on the
U.S. but it wouldn’t be crippling or decisive,” he says. “I’ve
seen people who say a cyber attack could turn the United
States into a third-world nation in a matter of minutes. That’s
silly. We have to be realistic about this.”
II Различита
схватања узрока рата
Узроци рата
Нивои анализе у међународним
односима и узроци рата
Нивои анализе



Анализа на нивоу појединца
Анализа на нивоу државе
Анализа на нивоу система
Анализа на нивоу појединца









Проблематика људске природе- воља за моћ
Когнитивни фактори- Људи нужно доносе одлуке унутар граница оног
што свесно знају и оног што хоће да разматрају (когнитивна
конзистентност и когнитивна дисонанца, wishful thinking, систем
националних уверења, стереотипи, аналогије)
Психолошки чиниоци- Теорија фрустрација- агресија
Биолошки чиниоци- сличности са животињама,питања пола,
Организационо понашање (Role behavior, Понашање појединца у
групама)
Идиосинкретичко понашање (људи као индивидуе)- Позитивне и
негативне личности- активне и пасивне, физичко и ментално здравље,
его и амбиције,
Политичка историја и лична искуства
Перцепције- оперативна реалност
Августин, Спиноза, Фридрих Ниче, Ханс Џ. Моргентау, Рандал Швелер
Анализа на нивоу државе







Природа државе као узрок рата
Да ли су неке државе склоније рату а неке не
Теорија демократског мира и комплексне
међузависности
Милитаризам
Екстернализација унутрашњих сукоба
Решавање унутрашњих сукоба помоћу
ратова
Имануел Кант, Ричард Кобден, Томас Пејн,
Вудроу Вилсон, Мајкл Дојл, Брус Расет
Анализа на нивоу система








Природа међународног система као узрок рата
Анархична природа међународног система
Борба за успостављање и очување равнотеже снага
Економски чиниоци на нивоу међународног система
Проблеми у биосфери – ратови због ресурса
Power Transition Theory
Капитализам и империјализам
Жан- Жак Русо, G, Lows Dickinson, Кенет Волц, Џон
Џеј Миршајмер
III Карактер и природа
ратова у
послехладноратовском
свету

If, as some have argued, war has indeed taken on new forms in the postcold war era, or perhaps has even seen an evolution in its essential nature,
then it is necessary to compare these recent examples with traditional
forms and interpretations of war in order to determine what, if anything, has
changed and what are simply contemporary manifestations of an ancient
phenomenon.

This is not as straightforward an exercise as might at first appear. War is a
form of organized human violence, and when conducted by states using
significant quantities of personnel, materiel, and firepower, it is
comparatively easy to recognize. But at the lower end of the spectrum of
violence it begins to overlap with other forms of conflict, such as terrorism,
insurgency, and criminal violence, and clear distinctions and definitions
become harder to maintain.

War always involves violence, but not all violence can be described as war.
Violence is a necessary, but not a sufficient, requirement for a conflict to be
defined as a war.



Wars are fought for reasons. The Western
understanding of war, following Clausewitz, sees
it as instrumental, a means to an end.
Wars in this perspective are not random
violence; they reflect a conscious decision to
engage in them for a rational political purpose.
They are rationalized by those who initiate them
by appeal to belief and value systems.


War is a form of social and political behaviour.
This was one of the central arguments of
Clausewitz.
It remains true at the start of the twenty-first
century, but only if we operate with a broad and
flexible understanding of what constitutes politics.
As our understanding of politics, and the forms it
can take, has evolved in the post-modern era, we
should expect the same to be true of the
character of war since that is itself a form of
politics.

The political nature of war has been evolving in recent
decades under the impact of globalization, which has
increasingly eroded the economic, political, and cultural
autonomy of the state. Contemporary warfare takes place in
a local context, but it is also played out in wider fields and
influenced by non-governmental organizations,
intergovernmental organizations, regional and global
media, and users of the Internet. In many ways,
contemporary wars are partly fought on television, and the
media therefore have a powerful role in providing a
framework of understanding for the viewers of the conflict.

One effect of the constant coverage of
international violence by the global media may be
to gradually weaken the legal, moral, and political
constraints against the use of force by making it
appear routine, and thereby reverse the moral
questioning of war that was a feature of the
second half of the twentieth century. The advent
of such ‘war fatigue’ might make recourse to war
appear a normal feature of international relations.

Michel Foucault called the institution of war ‘the
military dimension of society’ (1996: 415). This is
because the conduct of war requires a society to
cooperate in performing complex tasks on a large scale.
Societies can fight wars because they are able to
cooperate at the internal level. On the other hand, they
feel themselves compelled to fight other societies
because they oft en find it difficult to cooperate at the
external level. The very act of fighting outsiders may
make it easier to cooperate internally. Unless a war is
highly unpopular domestically, there is a sense in which
a state at war is also a state at peace.

War is both highly organized and a highly
organizing phenomenon. In the words of the
sociologist Charles Tilly (1975: 42), ‘war made the
state, and the state made war’. The machinery of
the state derived historically from the
organizational demands of warfare, and modern
states owe their origins and development to a
large degree to the effects of earlier wars. The
modern state was born during the renaissance, a
time of unprecedented violence.

The high point of this evolution was the Thirty Years War,
which racked Europe from 1618 to 1648. By the end of that
conflict Europe was entering a new phase of historical
development, modernity, which would come to dominate
international history for the next three hundred years before
giving way to post-modernity in the late twentieth century.
Modernity had many features and, as Clausewitz noted, each
age has its own dominant characteristic form of war, which
reflects the era in which it occurs, though there will also be
other forms reflecting cultural and geographical realities. Th
ere was therefore a form of warfare that was typical of
modernity.

The period of modernity was characterized
by the rise of nationalism and increasingly
centralized and bureaucratic states with
rapidly rising populations, by the scientific
and industrial revolutions, and by the
growth of secular ideologies with messianic
visions and an intolerance of opposing
metanarratives and, broad overarching
ideologies, such as Marxism.

The result was industrialized warfare on a
massive scale, in which civilian populations as
much as enemy soldiers were seen as legitimate
targets, a process that culminated in the nuclear
attacks on Japan in 1945. At the same time,
another feature of warfare during the modern
period was that, at least in the conflicts between
the developed states, it was governed by rules.

For many analysts of war, war’s nature, as the
use of organized violence in pursuit of political
goals, always remains the same, and is unaltered
even by radical changes in political forms, in the
motives leading to conflict, or technological
advances (Gray 1999b: 169). For Colin Gray, if
war’s nature were to change, it would become
something else, so he, like Clausewitz, insists that
all wars have the same political nature, one
fundamentally based on the idea that war is a
political act, the use of force for conscious
political ends.


For Clausewitz and Gray, there is an important distinction
between the nature and the character of war. The former
refers to the constant, universal, and inherent qualities that
ultimately define war throughout the ages, such as violence,
chance, and uncertainty. The latter relates to the
impermanent, circumstantial, and adaptive features that war
develops and that account for the different periods of warfare
throughout history, each displaying attributes determined by
socio-political and historical preconditions, while also
influencing those conditions.
Clausewitz also distinguished between the objective and
subjective nature of war, the former comprising of the
elements common to all wars and the latter consisting of
those features that make each war unique.
The revolution in military affairs (RMA)

The concept of the revolution in military affairs
became popular after the dramatic American
victory in the 1991 Gulf War. The manner in
which superior technology and doctrine appeared
to give the United States an almost effortless
victory suggested that future conflicts would be
decided by the possession of technological
advantages such as advanced guided weapons
and space satellites.

The former US Secretary of Defense,
William Cohen, defined an RMA as ‘when a
nation’s military seizes an opportunity to
transform its strategy, military doctrine,
training, education, organization,
equipment, operations and tactics to
achieve decisive military results in
fundamentally new ways’ (quoted in Gray
2002: 1).

Most of the RMA literature focuses on the
implications of developments in technology. In
the conflicts in Kuwait (1991), Serbia (1999), and
Iraq (2003), American technology proved vastly
superior to that of its opponent. In particular,
computing and space technology allowed the US
forces to acquire information about the enemy to
a degree never before seen in warfare, and
allowed precision targeting of weapon systems.
Asymmetric warfare


Asymmetric warfare exists ‘when two combatants are so
different in their characters, and in their areas of comparative
strategic advantage, that a confrontation between them
comes to turn on one side’s ability to force the other side to
fight on their own terms. . . . The strategies that the weak
have consistently adopted against the strong often involve
targeting the enemy’s domestic political base as much as his
forward military capabilities.
Essentially such strategies involve inflicting pain over time
without suffering unbearable retaliation in return.’ (L.
Freedman (1998), ‘Britain and the Revolution in Military
Affairs’, Defense Analysis, 14: 58)

Th e increasing importance of information in warfare may be
a validation of Clausewitz’s argument that the form of war
reflects the culture and technologies of the age. Alvin and
Heidi Toffler (1993) argue that the way a society makes war
reflects the way it makes wealth. Starting with the very
invention of agriculture, every revolution in the system for
creating wealth triggered a corresponding revolution in the
system for making war. Therefore, to the extent that a new
‘information economy’ is emerging, this will bring with it a
parallel revolution in warfare. In the Information Age,
information is the central resource for wealth production and
power, and the RMA is the inevitable outgrowth of basic
changes in the form of economic production.

The American approach has been to attempt to
win wars quickly by applying overwhelming force,
and to use the industrial and technological
strength of the United States to minimize
casualties. Yet the reality of war is that it is never
clean or bloodless. Even in the age of smart
weapons and space technology, war remains a
brutal and bloody undertaking where political
objectives are achieved through the infliction of
human suffering on a major scale.

Benjamin Lambeth warns that, “a revolution in military affairs”
cannot be spawned merely by platforms, munitions,
information systems and hardware equities. These necessary
but insufficient preconditions must be supported by an
important set of intangibles that have determined war results
since the days of Alexander the Great—namely, clarity of
goals backed by proficiency and boldness in execution. In the
so-called “RMA debate”, too much attention has been
devoted to technological magic at the expense of the
organisational, conceptual and other human imputs needed
to convert the magic from lifeless hardware into combat
outcomes.’ (B. S. Lambeth (1997), ‘The Technology
Revolution in Air Warfare’, Survival, 39: 75)
Post-modern war

If war is a reflection of its age, as Clausewitz
argued, then contemporary warfare should reflect
key aspects of postmodernity. A number of
authors have suggested that this is in fact the
case, that the world is undergoing a dramatic
evolution into post-modernity and that this will
inevitably lead to a radical redefinition of war
itself. Global society is moving from the modern to
the postmodern age.

For several decades and is the result of a wide range of
economic, cultural, social, and political changes that are
altering the meaning of the ‘state’ and the nation. It has been
marked by a shift from production to information as a core
output of advanced economies. As this happens, it will affect
the character of war. In some parts of the world the state is
deliberately transferring functions, including military functions,
to private authorities and businesses. In other areas, these
functions are being seized from the state by other political
actors. At the same time, globalization has weakened the
‘national’ forms of identity that have dominated international
relations in the past two centuries, and reinvigorated earlier
forms of political identity and organization, such as religious,
ethnic, and clan loyalties.


The greatly increased role of the media is
one feature of this evolution.
Another post-modern development has
been the increasing ‘outsourcing’ of war.

Privatized Military Firms (PMFs) sell a wide range of
war-related services to states, overwhelmingly in the
logistical and security roles rather than direct combat.
Hundreds of PMFs have operated in more than 50
countries since the end of the cold war. The growth of
PMFs reflect a broader global trend towards the
privatization of public assets. Through the provision of
training and equipment, PMFs have influenced the
outcomes of several recent wars, including those in
Angola, Croatia, Ethiopia, and Sierra Leone. PMFs
played a signifi cant role in the 2003 US-led invasion of
Iraq.


For some authors in the late 1990s, the possibility
of casualty-free or virtual war seemed to be
becoming a possibility.
From the NATO perspective, the 1999 war
against Yugoslavia over Kosovo appeared to be
just such a conflict, a ‘virtual’ war in which the
NATO forces attempted to employ their
technological superiority in such a way as to
reduce the risk of casualties to the absolute
minimum.

For the Kosovan and Serbian victims of ethnic violence on
the ground and the Serbian victims of allied air attacks, the
war was anything but ‘virtual’. As Freedman points out in
relation to the temptations of the RMA, the new technologies
do not ‘offer the prospect of a virtual war by creating a
situation in which only information matters so that there is
never any point in fighting about anything other than
information. … War is not a virtual thing, played out on
screens, but intensely physical. That is why it tends to
violence and destruction’ (Freedman 1998: 78). War’s very
nature involves the use of violence.


Edward Luttwak has suggested that the world has
entered a new age of post-heroic warfare ‘easily
started and fought without restraint’ (Luttwak
1995: 110).
The effects of the industrial revolution, along with
the advent of popular democracy and modern
bureaucracy, had combined to ‘nationalize’ war to
involve the whole of society. Raymond Aron
(1954: 19) called this hyperbolic war, where the
growing scale and intensity of war is driven by the
pressure of industrial and technological advances

Martin Shaw (2003: 23) uses the term
‘degenerate wars’ to capture the continuity
of contemporary wars with the genocidal
total wars of the twentieth century.
Globalization and war

‘The impact of globalisation is visible in many of the new
wars. The global presence in these wars can include
international reporters, mercenary troops and military
advisers, diaspora volunteers as well as a veritable “army” of
international agencies ranging from non-governmental
organisations (NGO’s) like Oxfam, Save the Children,
Médicin sans Frontières, Human Rights Watch and the
International Red Cross, to international institutions like the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
the European Union (EU), the United Nations Children’s
Fund (UNICEF), the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organisation for African
Unity (OAU) and the United Nations itself, including
peacekeeping troops.’(Kaldor 1999: 4)
New wars

Mary Kaldor has suggested that a category of new wars has
emerged since the mid-1980s. The driving force behind these new
wars is globalization, ‘a contradictory process involving both
integration and fragmentation, homogenization and diversification,
globalization and localization’ (Kaldor 1999: 3). These conflicts are
typically based around the disintegration of states and subsequent
struggles for control of the state by opposing groups, who are
simultaneously attempting to impose their own definition of the
national identity of the state and its population. Just as earlier wars
were linked to the emergence and creation of states, the new wars
are related to the disintegration and collapse of states, and much of
the pressure on such states has come from the effects of
globalization on the international system. In the past decade, 95 per
cent of armed conflicts have taken place within states rather than
between them.

The new wars occur in situations where the economy of the
state is performing extremely poorly, or even collapsing, so
that the tax revenues and power of the state decline
dramatically, producing an increase in corruption and
criminality. As the state loses control, access to weapons and
the ability to resort to violence is increasingly privatized and
paramilitary groups proliferate, organized crime grows, and
political legitimacy collapses. One of the effects of these
developments is that the traditional distinction between the
‘soldier’ and the ‘civilian’ become blurred or disappear
altogether

For Kaldor, a significant feature of these conflicts
is the combatants’ focus on questions of identity,
which she see as being a result of the pressures
produced by globalization. In the post-modern
world there has been a breakdown of traditional
cleavages based on class and ideology, and a
greater emphasis on identity and culture. To the
extent that war is a continuation of politics,
therefore, war has become increasingly driven by
questions of culture and identity. A major cause of
the wars since 1990 has been the demands of
various groups for national selfdetermination.

The relationship between identity and war is also
shifting in terms of the gender and age of the
combatants. The ‘feminization’ of war has grown
as women have come to play increasingly visible
and important roles, from auxiliaries in the late
modern period, to direct front-line roles in the
post-modern period, from uniformed military
personnel to female suicide bombers. Children
have also become more visible as participants
rather than non-combatants in war.

Child soldiers can be found on every continent,
but have been particularly prevalent in recent
African conflicts. In the civil war in Sierra Leone,
nearly 70 per cent of the combatants were under
the age of 18. Children fight in around threequarters of today’s armed conflicts, and may
make up 10 per cent of current armed combatants
(Brocklehurst 2007: 373). Nearly one third of the
militaries that use child soldiers include girls in
their ranks.

Mark Duffield argues that the non-state dimension
of much contemporary warfare is striking and that
describing such conflicts as ‘internal’ or ‘intrastate’ is misleading since the combatants oft en
are not attempting to impose a political authority
in the traditional sense. The use of statist
terminology is therefore too limiting, leading him
to propose the alternative terminology of postmodern conflict (Duffi eld 1998: 76), although
the use of the term in this way is also rather
constraining.

The relationship of terrorism campaigns to
war is also important. The war on terror
can be seen simply as a metaphor for an
intense national commitment against Al
Qaeda, but it can also be seen as a
recognition that a long duration military–
terrorist campaign and the
countermeasures taken by the target group
are a form of warfare in the sense

These complex interrelationships of nontraditional actors are not limited to insurgents or
criminal gangs. Because of the prevalence of
humanitarian interventions and the belief that
economic development acts as a deterrent to war,
aid organizations, UN agencies, armed forces,
and private security firms are increasingly
networked in areas such as the Balkans, Africa,
and the Middle East.
‘Third tier’ states

Steven Metz groups the world’s states into three ‘tiers’ for the purpose of predicting
likely future forms of conflict. Those of the first tier are the states which have
effective functioning economies and political systems, and exhibit high degrees of
internal stability and external law-abiding behaviour. The democracies of the North
Atlantic region are typical of this group. Second-tier states exhibit periodic instability,
and may have areas within their territory where the government does not exercise
internal sovereignty. However, the state is not in danger of collapse. Third-tier
states are marked by crisis. There are considerable areas where the central
government has lost control and non-governmental armed forces are operating. In
such areas, the ‘warlords’ or other groupings neither exercise full control over the
areas they dominate, nor contribute to the stability of the country as a whole, which
is therefore essentially ungovernable. War in such areas will typically ‘involve
substate groups fighting for the personal glory of the leader, or wealth, resources,
land, ethnic security or even revenge for real or perceived past injustices’. Such
conflicts may involve groups representing different ethnic or communal groupings
and ‘the fighting will usually be undertaken with lowtechnology weapons but fought
with such intensity that the casualty rates may be higher than in conventional
warfare, especially among civilians caught up in the fighting’. (Craig Snyder and J.
Johan Malik (1999), ‘Developments in Modern Warfare’, in C. Snyder (ed.),
Contemporary Security and Strategy (London: Macmillan): 204)

The end of the cold war has not significantly altered the
dominant patterns of war that have been in place for the past
fi ft y years. The ‘new’ forms of conflict are for the most part
not new as such, but have received more Western attention
since the end of the cold war. While they are oft en
characterized by great brutality, the absence of heavy
weaponry and superpower support means that casualty
levels are markedly lower than during the cold war. RMA
technologies have dramatic potential, but have so far had
little impact outside US operations. While war is less common
and less deadly than in the 1945–92 period, it remains a
brutal and inhumane form of politics.
Литература:
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