Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
The War on Terror: Fighting al-Qacida in
Iraq, the Afghan Taliban, al-Qaicda in the
Islamic Magrib and al-Qacida in the
Arabian Peninsula
Eric Davis
davis@polisci.rutgers.edu
http://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/davis
http://new-middle-east.blogspot.com/
The BLaST IU Liberty 17 Fellowship
2013 Summer Institute
American Institute for History Education
June 20, 2013
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
What are our main questions?
 What are the primary causes of war, terrorism
and violence in the Middle East?
 How has terrorism been caused by the internal
politics of nations in the Middle East?
(domestic correlates)
 How have terrorism in the Middle East been
influenced by forces outside the Middle East,
e.g., US foreign policy? (external correlates)
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
What are our main questions?
 Because Middle East is the most unstable area
in the world, how can terrorism be combatted?
 What policies should the US follow in a new
world of limited budgets and “war fatigue”?
 What challenges does the US military face in
confronting new types of asymmetric warfare?
 What types of training and weapons systems
will be most effective in countering terrorism?
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Lineages of the 1991 Gulf War:
Backdrop for terrorism in Iraq
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Origins of 1991 (or Second) Gulf War
 US supported the regime of Shah Mohammed Reza
Pahlavi in Iran (ruled 1941-1979)
 The Shah was extremely repressive (and Westernized)
ruler who was culturally alienated from Iranians
 Shah imprisoned and tortured his people and US did
nothing to end his repressive rule
 When Shah restored to power in 1951, Iranians were
hostile to US for its political support of his regime
 New regime of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was
very hostile to US and still hostile today (see Argo)
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Origins of 1991 (or Second) Gulf War
 Gulf War represented cross-currents of rising
Islamic militancy and global need for oil
 Saddam tried to destroy Iran’s Islamic Republic and
make Iraq the main military power in Persian Gulf
 Iran-Iraq War reflected Saddam Husayn’s political
ambitions to become regional hegemon and his ego
 When it invaded on Aug. 2, 1990, Iraq claimed that
Kuwait was its 19th province that had been separated
illegally from Iraq by Great Britain in 1920 (“lines in
the sand”); GB had Mandate over Iraq -1920-1932
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi
(overthrown 1979)
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
1991 Gulf War and Oil
 It can be argued that US partially responsible for
1980-88 Iran-Iraq War and 1991 Gulf War
 If US had pressured Shah to democratize, there
would have been no Islamic Revolution in 1978-79
 If the Shah hadn’t been overthrown, Iraq wouldn’t
have dared attack Iran with its powerful armed forces
 Support for the Shah, who the US returned to power
in a 1953 coup, demonstrates that supporting
authoritarian regimes is a counterproductive policy
 The Islamic Republic of Iran has become the US’
most implacable enemy in Middle East
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
1991 Gulf War and Oil
 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War was extremely costly
 Saudi Arabia and Kuwait lent Iraq funds during the
war to prevent an Iranian victory
 After war ended, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait now
feared 1,000,000 man battled-tested Iraqi army
 Saudi Arabia and Kuwait demanded loans be repaid
and increased oil output, driving down oil prices
 Saddam had promised Iraqis that prosperity would
return after Iran-Iraq War ended, but he was unable to
keep his promise given declining oil prices
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Iraqi
Invasion
plan for
Kuwait,
August
1990
(note names
of Iraqi
military units)
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Iraq in Kuwait: Aug. 1990-Jan. 1991
 Iraqi army quickly defeated Kuwaiti forces
 Kuwaiti royal family and army fled to Saudi Arabia
and Gulf states
 Iraq thought it had “green light” for invasion from
US after Saddam Husayn met with Ambassador April
Glaspie (http://dvmx.com/glaspie.html)
 However, US and allies felt Saddam could not be
allowed to control Persian Gulf’s oil wealth and
formed UN coalition to evict Iraq from Kuwait
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait led to UN coalition
 Important to compare the international effort
of 1991 (UN) and Afghanistan (NATO) with
the US’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 (US and UK)
 1991 Gulf War coalition led by the US
included important Arab allies, Egypt and
Syria, demonstrating that Arab states had
differing interests and would not support Iraq
 Iraq broke Arab League’s cardinal rule that no
Arab League member seize another Arab state
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait led to UN coalition
 Iraq tried to manipulate anti-Israeli sentiment
 Saddam thought that attacking Israel with
SCUD missile attacks on its cities would force
it to respond with an attack on Iraq
 Once Israel joined the war, Saddam thought
Arab supporters of US/UN would support Iraq
 Saddam added “God is Great” (Allahu Akbar)
to the Iraqi flag to manipulate Islamist
sentiments against US-led UN coalition
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Images (and
Stereotypes)
of the Gulf War
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War
 Saddam Husayn was still in power because US led
coalition refused to overthrow his Bacthist regime
 US allowed Iraq to use helicopter gun ships to
brutally repress a massive popular uprising (Intifada)
 US forces ordered not to help insurgents, and to blow
up ammunitions dump so rebels couldn’t seize them
 UN sanctions (1991-2003) after war meant to force
Iraq to destroy Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
 Iraq’s national economy and education system
collapsed during 1990s under weight of UN sanctions
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Images from the 1991 Uprising (Intifada)
Mass grave of Iraqis killed in 1991 uprising and bodies of those found after 2003
“Highway of
Death” – Kuwait,
January 1991
Kurds displaced from Iraq to Turkey during Intifada
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Why did US not overthrow Saddam in 1991?
 US feared that only Saddam could keep Iraq from
fragmenting after the Gulf War
 If Iraq split up, Turkey, Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia
might try and seize parts of country and its oil wealth
 Because Iraq is a major oil producer, and occupies
strategic position , US feared foreign takeover of parts
of the country, e.g., by Turkey, Syria or Iran
 This US action was a major strategic blunder because
Saddam rebuilt his repressive security apparatus, using
oil smuggled out of Iraq despite 1990s UN sanctions
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
What are the takeaways of the Gulf War?
 International efforts are most effective, esp.
when involve building political coalitions
 The Gulf War didn’t have an “American face”
 Don’t do a half way job – the US should have
supported the Iraqi uprising after the war
 By leaving Saddam in power, US let hundreds
of thousands of Iraqi die in Feb.-Mar. uprising
 Decision made Iraqis very suspicion of US
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
How did the Gulf War impact terrorism?
 It destroyed Iraq’s economy and education
system allowing criminal and terrorist groups to
exploit the social and political decay
 It weakened the power of the central state
 It undermined nationalism and led Iraqis to turn
to sectarian entrepreneurs (ethnic & religious)
 It enabled foreign powers - KSA, Arab Gulf
states and Iran - to promote radicalism in Iraq
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
The Iraq War of 2003
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Iraq prior to the 2003 War
 Saddam Husayn’s Bacthist regime very weak after
1991 Gulf War bombings and national uprising
 Many Bacthist officials killed during the Intifada
 Saddam tried to “Islamicize” and “retribalize” Iraqi
society to gain support of traditional forces
 Economic and educational decline, and Saddam’s
policies that promoted traditional forces, led to rise
of conservative Islamist movements
 Educated middle and professional classes decimated
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Iraq prior to the 2003 War
 Collapse of national economy encouraged oil
smuggling and transformation of the Iraqi
economy into a large criminal enterprise
 Oil smuggling and the sale of ancient
artifacts became the main source of wealth
 Many criminal organizations claimed that
they were Islamic charities assisting the poor
 These criminal organizations were hostile to
US invasion of March 2003
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Images from US
“Shock and Awe”
campaign
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
“Shock and Awe” vs. “Hearts and Minds”
 “Shock and Awe” campaign gave US false sense of
victory in Iraq
 Military unaware that massive firepower and bombing
was not enough to win in Iraq
 With volunteer army and decline in enlisted personnel,
US military thought technology could compensate for
reduced force levels
 Only130,000 troops sent when 400,000 recommended
 Anticipating rapid US victory, Saddam had insurgency
ready, with weapons caches/funds in areas loyal to him
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
April-May 2003: Losing Hearts and Minds
 Donald Rumsfeld said in Baghdad in April
2003 that massive looting was part of “untidy”
aspect of freedom and that “stuff happens”
 Such comments did not build Iraqi trust
regarding US efforts to build democracy in Iraq
 US military only secured Ministry of Defense
(Republican Palace) and Ministry of Oil
 This policy reinforced Iraqi view that US
invaded Iraq to control its oil wealth
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
April-May 2003: Losing Hearts and Minds
 All other ministries were destroyed and Iraq
Museum, with priceless artifacts, was looted
 After 5 days and repeated calls, Iraq Museum
was finally secured by American troops
 Looting undermined Iraqi confidence in US
which already suspect for not supporting 1991
uprising
 Iraqis did not trust US statements about
wanting to build democracy in their country
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Baghdad looting:
April 2003
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
US troops guarding Ministry of Oil,
destruction of Ministry of Culture
and Baghdad looters
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
CPA policies and hearts and minds
 Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) governed
Iraq from May, 2003-June 2004
 CPA disbanded 385,000 Iraq army against advice of
US military and Iraqi politicians
 National police were dismissed and 125,000 state
factory workers fired
 Agriculture subsidies eliminated in August 2003,
forcing many farmers to migrate to urban areas
 While CPA mandated salary increases helped
employed middle classes, their policies hurt poorer
Iraqis, the majority of the population
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Why did US follow bad policies in Iraq?
 Most US officials sent to Iraq had little knowledge of
the country and spoke no Arabic
 US took advice of Iraqi expatriates, many of whom
had personal agendas and had been in Iraq for decades
 US wanted complete control in Iraq, and thus focused
on eliminating Bacthists from all positions of power
 US didn’t make distinction between high Bacthist
officials and large number of Iraqis who forced to join
the party, but who really despised Saddam’s regime
 De-Bacthification led to disastrous consequences as
Iraq lost many highly proficient technocrats
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Freedom without order: the insurgency and
the Mahdi Army
 Insurgency began in summer of 2003 in north-central
Iraq among Sunni Arabs in al-Anbar Province
 In south, Muqtada al-Sadr’s (Shiite) Mahdi Army
(JAM) immediately challenged US in 2003
 Donald Rumsfeld refused to admit an insurgency
existed until fall of 2003
 Having excluded Iraq experts and State Department
Arabists, and relying on a small military force, US was
headed for defeat in Iraq by 2006
 Insurgency helped by high unemployment of youth,
caused in part by CPA’s policies
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Muqtada al-Sadr
and the Mahdi
Army
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
US force levels and ethnic cleansing
 April 2003 looting destroyed many government
offices, thereby undermining state’s effectiveness
Inadequate US force levels and lack of national police
made it impossible to control “sectarian entrepreneurs”
 Iraqi government’s neglect of agriculture created large
rural exodus, and no urban jobs
 Ethnic cleansing occurred in poorer neighborhoods,
but esp. in those with large in-migration of youth from
rural areas
 With lack of security and no state services, Iraqis
forced to turn to sectarian organizations
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
US troops guarding Ministry of Oil,
destruction of Ministry of Culture
and Baghdad looters
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
What caused situation in Iraq to turn around?
 al-Qacida overplayed its hand in Sunni Arab
triangle, killing Iraqis and stealing their wealth
 Rise of “Awakening” movement among Sunni Arab
tribes in al-Anbar Province destroyed al-Qacida in
less than a year
 Mahdi Army declared a truce in August 2007 that
led to calm in Baghdad and southern Iraq
 In March 2008, Iraqi army suppressed JAM in Basra,
Baghdad and the Shiite south of Iraq
 Surge helped as well through embedding additional
30,000 US troops in residential neighborhoods
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Abd al-Sattar Abu Risha and his
brother, Ahmad Abu Risha, leaders
of the Sons of Iraq (Anbar Awakening)
al-Qaicda leader al-Mus’ab al-Zarqawi (d. 2006)
The Anbar Awakening
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Ahmad Abu Risha
current leader
Abd al-Sattar Abu Risha
founder of Sons of Iraq
Sons of Iraq checkpoints
Images from the “Awakening” – aka “Sons of Iraq”
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Documented civilian deaths from violence
112,972 – 123,628 (Monthly table)
Further analysis of the WikiLeaks' Iraq War Logs
may add 12,000 civilian deaths.
http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Why role did PRTs play in stabilizing Iraq?
 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have not
been given enough credit for role in reducing violence
 PRT role dramatically increased by Gen. David
Petreaus (Ph.D, International Relations Princeton
University), with new counter-insurgency approach
 PRTs followed new “bottom up” approach, listening
to Iraqis and implementing their goals and agendas
 Iraqis feel respected because they define development
goals and projects, while US helps implement them
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
US policy in Afghanistan,
2001-2012
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Images of
Afghanistan
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Who are the Taliban?
 “Taliban” means “students” in Pashto
 Pashtuns are 40% of Afghan population and
Taliban are almost entirely Pashtun
 Movement popular when seized power in 1996
because ended warlord control of economy
 Warlords had charged tariffs on roads in their
territory and hurt national economy
 Warlords brutal- when one raped young girl and
hung by Taliban, movement seen as virtuous
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
How is the US confronting the Taliban and
al-Qacida in Afghanistan?
 US largely ignored Afghanistan after military
overthrow of Taliban regime after 9/11
 In 2001, US/West promised Afghanistan much
development aid, but delivered relatively little
 Few alternative economic opportunities are
available to farmers beyond poppy production
 Regional warlords continued to exploit
peasants after Taliban regime was overthrown
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
The role of “neighborhood effects”
 In both Iraq and Afghanistan, neighbor states do not
want to see political stability and democracy prevail
 Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia have attempted to
undermine Iraq
 Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have attempted to
undermine Afghanistan
 Saudi Arabia has funded many Taliban “madrasas”
which really not schools, but military training camps
 US military strategy needs to be sensitive to the
political environment in fighting wars in Middle East
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan
 Pakistan concerned with lack of its ability to control
Pashtuns in its remote northwestern provinces
 Inter-Security Services (ISI) – Pakistan’s CIA - has
been Taliban’s main supporter since 1990s
 Pakistan state wants to promote Pashtun interest in
Afghanistan so Pakistani Pashtuns do not seek
independent state carved out of its NW provinces
 Pakistan’s “double game”: partially supports US war
on terror, while supporting Taliban at same time
 US and NATO forces cannot defeat Taliban when
they enjoy a safe haven in Pakistan
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Geopolitics of Taliban Movement
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
The Afghan political
leadership
Afghani president
Hamid Kharzai
Taliban leaders, including Mullah Abdul
Salaam Zareef (center)
Taliban flag
Fugitive Taliban leader Mullah Omar (perhaps)
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Why has Taliban gained strength since 2006?
 Government corruption has alienated many
Afghans; undermined their faith in democracy
 Pres. Hamid Karzai has allowed his relatives to
engage in massive corruption
 al-Qacida has rebuilt its strength along the Afghan
border with Pakistan, with many Arab fighters
 Political instability and fear of India has undermined
ability of Pakistan army to fight al-Qacida
 Many new, younger Taliban leaders have joined the
movement since 2001
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
What is Taliban’s relationship with al-Qacida?
 Taliban has split into 3 movements
1) Mullah Omar group (older leadership); 2) proPakistan wing; 3) group tied to al-Qacida
 Split represents tribal, generational and ideological
conflicts within Taliban
 As in Iraq, al-Qacida has alienated many Pakistanis
and Afghanis through seizing property and imposing
harsh version of Islamic “law”
 “Pragmatic” wing of Taliban wants to negotiate and
end to war, break with al-Qacida, and end quest for
supranational “Caliphate,” i.e., Pan-Islamic state
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
US and NATO forces in Afghanistan
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
What were the results of Afghan War?
 US/NATO will leave Afghanistan with a
corrupt and dysfunctional political system
 Only 2 choices remain: Taliban or warlords
 Pakistan & Iran will become more involved
in Afghan politics
 Central gov’t may be unable to exploit its
large natural resource base due to instability
 Afghan women will suffer when West leaves
 Opium trade will remain main resource
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
The War in North Africa
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Why has al-Qacida spread to North Africa?
 AQIM (al-Qacida in Islamic Maghrib) exploits
weakness of state structure in Saharan states,
e.g., Mali, Chad and Niger
 AQIM exploits poverty and unemployment and
smuggles drugs, cigarettes and contraband
 Exploits tribal & regional divisions in region
 Difficult for states that poor, have weak central
governments and small armies to control vast
areas of Saharan desert
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
AQIM hostages in Niger Sept. 2010
Mokhtar Ben Mokhtar – AQIM
leader killed (Mar 2, 2013)
Terrorist movements in North Africa (Maghrib)
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
How did the current crisis begin?
 Mali was a poor but democratic nation-state
 Central gov’t in Bamako had little control in
north where Tuareg tribal groups disaffected
 US trained Malian army which staged a coup
 Coup created instability which enabled AQIM
to join with Tuareg and Arab fighters in north
 Group known as Ansar al-Din (“Followers of
Religion”) – AQIM splinter – took over north
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
The attack on cIn Ameras
 Ansar al-Din staged attack on Algerian natural
gas facility near Mali-Algerian border
 Many foreign contractors and workers killed
when Algerian special forces recaptured plant
 Because natural gas key to its economy, attack
seen as major threat to Algeria
 Terrorists has planned on blowing up facility
 Attack moved problem beyond that of the
internal instability of local nation-states
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Images from the Attack on Timbuktu, Mali
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
BAMAKO (AFP) June 12, 2012 – A Timbuktu
man accused of drinking alcohol was given 40
lashes Monday by members of an Islamist group
that has seized the north Malian city and imposed
Islamic law there, witnesses said.
“A young man has just been lashed 40 times for
drinking alcohol. The whipping took place in the
Timbuktu market,” a resident told AFP by phone.
“He is injured and was taken to hospital,” the
resident added, asking not to be identified….
A man and woman accused of having a child out of wedlock were given 100 lashes
each in Timbuktu on June 20, and Ansar Dine has destroyed all the city’s bars.
The group has also demolished most of the ancient city’s shrines to Muslim saints,
which the jihadists consider idolatrous.
Another Islamist group, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa
(MUJAO), has burnt cigarettes, whipped smokers and forbidden people to play
football or watch television in territory under its control, provoking violent
protests in May in the northern city of Gao.
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
al- Qacida in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP)
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Why is there terrorism in Yemen?
 Unlike other countries in Arabian Peninsula
(AP), Yemen is very poor and a unstable state
 Country split along tribal, regional and
confessional (Sunni and Shiite) lines
 Yemeni dictator, Ali Abdallah Salih, very
corrupt and authoritarian and ruled 32 years
 Saudi Arabia and Iran became involved n
Yemeni politics, complicating matters
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Drone strikes
in Yemen
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
US citizen, Anwar al-Awlaki, killed in Yemen
al-Qa’ida in the
Arabian Peninsula
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
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Yemen and civil liberties
 US counter-terrorism has become heavily
dependent on drones
 Drones cut US military casualties and cost
much less than conventional military operations
 Drones can have serious side effects on local
populations where civilians are killed as well
 Was the killing of 4 US citizens who AQAP
members legal in terms of rule of law?
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Expenditures for Iraq and Afghanistan
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
US expenditures
in
Afghanistan and
Iraq, 2001-2009
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
The Public Opinion Environment
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Images from
the December
2005 elections
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Iraqi attitudes towards religious leaders after 2003
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
What were Iraqi attitudes
towards religion and politics
after fall of Saddam Husayn?
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
All sects see democracy as improving quality of life
Making Iraq more democratic will likely improve services and our quality of life.
Making Iraq more democratic would likely make services worse and hurt our quality of life.
80
75
70
60
64
61
40
20
20
18
12
16
0
Total
Kurds
Shia
Sunni
Page 75 | Greenberg Quinlan Rosner
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Now, I am going to read you a list of concerns that some people may have. Please tell me which
TWO of these are the most important for the government to address.
Jobs dominates as leading concern
Jobs and unemployment
56
Security
36
29
Basic services like electricity and water
22
Corruption
High prices
12
Sectarianism
11
Education
10
Infrastructure development
10
8
Health care
Page 76 | Greenberg Quinlan Rosner
0
20
40
60
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Poster promoting Muslim-Christian Unity, Baghdad, 2011
( Shiite martyr Husayn on left and Jesus Christ on right)
Department of Political Science
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Iraqi Sunni and Shiite clerics at joint religious
conference, Baghdad, June 4, 2007
Department of Political Science
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Sunni & Shi’a Muslim Clerics attend
Christian Mass in Baghdad in Christmas
in a show of unity, Dec. 26, 2007
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
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Iraqi Sunni and Shiite Muslims pray
together in Baghdad, May 2013
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
2012 poll: 67% of Americans feel Iraq War “was not worth it”
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Views on intervention in Afghanistan
 June 2012 Chicago Council on Global Affairs poll
found 67% to 32% thought war not worth fighting
 CCGA poll found only 3 in 7 respondents feel war
has made US safer from terrorism
 78% said US’ allies not doing enough in Afghanistan
 Steven Kull’s Feeling Betrayed: The Roots of Muslim
Anger at America shows that support for terrorism
highly correlated with anger towards US
 Kull’s research includes public opinion polls from
Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Pakistan, Iran and Indonesia
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Summary thoughts: fighting terrorism in the
Middle East
 Military force must continue to be core
element of US efforts to fight terrorism
 “Shock and Awe” strategies of limited utility
 US military units need to be highly mobile
and work with local pro-American forces
 Military efforts alone cannot defeat terrorism
 US needs new counter-insurgency strategy
that goes beyond military force
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Summary thoughts: fighting wars politically
 Unless local populaces support US and West, military
force will not succeed
 US aid agencies (e.g., USAID) will need to become
more involved in reconstruction efforts in countries
like Iraq and Afghanistan
 International efforts will be needed to provide
development aid and fight domestic corruption
 Unless governments in nations facing threats from
radical forces provide social services and act in a civic
manner towards citizenry, war on terror cannot be won
Department of Political Science
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Rutgers University
Summary thoughts: lessons learned
 US does not have the resources and manpower
to fight wars on multiple fronts
 Key to success in fighting radicalism abroad
will be extent to which US can internationalize
this effort
 Creating international coalitions will lessen
US presence in counter-terrorism and counter
insurgency efforts and take pressure off our
shrinking resource base in manpower and funds