1
THE NUCLEAR WASTE DIRECTIVE: CONTENTS AND SOME REFLECTIONS ON
ITS PEER-REVIEW MECHANISM
Nuria Prieto Serrano1
ENRESA, Spain
INITIAL NOTE:
For clearness, hereinafter the following terms will be used:






“Nuclear Waste Directive”: Council 2011/70/EURATOM of 19 July 2011 establishing a
Community framework for the responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive
waste; OJ L 199/48.
“2009 Nuclear Safety Directive”: Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom of 25 June 2009
establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations, OJ L 172/18.
“2014 Amendments”: Council Directive amending Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a
Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations. Not published to date of
drafting this study, made public through the web of the European Commission 2.
“Joint Convention”: Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety
of Radioactive Waste Management (IAEA INFCIRC/546, 24 December 1997).
“Convention on Nuclear Safety”: IAEA INFC1RC/449, 5 July 1994
“EC”: European Commission
Abstract
This paper intends to be an introduction to the Nuclear Waste Directive, not only describing its
provisions, but also indicating its added value as compared with the international regime and
finally focusing on one aspect which, in the opinion of the author, becomes very challenging in
the transposition process of this Directive: the organization of peer-reviews.
Introduction
In the European Union, the situation of radioactive waste management varies very much from
Member State to Member State. All Member States generate radioactive waste, either in nuclear
power production and/or as a result of radioisotope applications in medicine, industry,
agriculture, research and education; and to date they are all parties to the Joint Convention.
However, the completeness of their national framework for radioactive waste management and
the magnitude of their radioactive waste management programmes are very different depending
on their characteristics and energy policies. A number of reasons well explained in the Impact
Assessment text of the Nuclear Waste Directive 3 lead the EC to present a proposal of, and to the
Council to adopt it.
The contents of the Waste Directive
1
Ms Nuria Prieto Serrano is a lawyer in ENRESA, the public company in charge of spent fuel and radioactive waste
management in Spain, since 2003. She has been a Seconded National Expert in the European Commission during the
years 2010 to 2012 (DG ENER, Unit D2). Currently she is the Chairperson of the INLA Working Group 5 on
“Radioactive Waste”.
2 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/safety/safety_en.htm
3 Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the revised proposal for a Council Directive (Euratom) on the
Management of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste, SEC(2010) 1289 final, 3.11.2010
2
Values, Scope and Definitions
If we had to determine what fundamental values are reflected in the Nuclear Waste Directive,
we would refer to a triple “pillar”: safety, responsibility towards future generations and
transparency (see Article 1, Subject matter, where this triple concept corresponds to the first
three paragraphs, and the fourth paragraph declares its character supplementary to the basic
safety standards).
The Nuclear Waste Directive applies to all stages of management of spent fuel and radioactive
waste, where “all stages” means handling, pretreatment, treatment, conditioning, storage and
disposal of radioactive waste, excluding off-site transportation (Article 3, definition of
“radioactive waste management”). The following types of waste are excluded from the scope of
application (Article 2):
1. Radioactive waste not arising from civilian activities; i.e. military waste, in line with
European jurisprudence4.
2. Waste from extractive industries which may be radioactive and falls within the scope of
Directive 2006/21/EC. The rules of radiation protection are applicable to these wastes.
3. Authorized releases, as stated by the respective national nuclear regulators in
accordance with the rules of radiation protection at national and Community level.
The definitions under Article 3 are not identical, but in line with those of the Joint Convention
and the corpus of Euratom law, mainly the 2009 Nuclear Safety Directive. In particular, the
definition of “nuclear installation” under the 2009 Nuclear Safety Directive covers inter alia
spent fuel storage facilities and “storage facilities for radioactive waste that are on the same site
and are directly related to nuclear installations”, but not all facilities devoted to radioactive
waste management. This means that, for example, disposal facilities are not nuclear installations
from the point of view of the 2009 Nuclear Safety Directive. In the Nuclear Waste Directive,
any facility or installation the primary purpose of which is radioactive waste management is
considered as a “radioactive waste management facility”; the Directive also applies to disposal
facilities, as it concerns in a general manner facilities and activities related to radioactive waste
management.
General principles, including the export control regime
Article 4 of the Nuclear Waste Directive establishes the general principles of spent fuel and
radioactive waste management. The State’s ultimate responsibility for management implies
inter alia that the State must not only implement a national framework (including policies and
strategies), but also take care of the waste where the generator does no longer exist or is
impossible to determine (this specific obligation, as reflected in article 21.2 of the Joint
Convention, is however not literally reflected in the Directive). This responsibility is not only or
a factual nature, but also of an economic nature, so that States are obliged to contemplate in its
funding systems provisions for financing “exceptional cases” of management such as premature
closure of facilities or radioactive waste, the generator of which does not exist anymore5. This
kind of responsibility is understood “without prejudice” of the prime responsibility of the
licence holder (see recital 25).
4
Commission vs. United Kingdom, C-61/03 and C-65/04.
ENSREG Final Guidelines for MS Reports to the Waste Directive, paragraph
http://www.ensreg.eu/sites/default/files/HLG_p(201427)_137%20Final%20guidelines%20for%20MS%20Reports%20to%20the%20Waste%20Directive.pdf
5
63:
3
The State’s ultimate responsibility and prime responsibility of the licence holder are based on
concepts developed by the IAEA. Remarkably, the English edition of the Nuclear Waste
Directive makes a distinction between the “prime” responsibility of the licence holder in the
sense of safety (Article 7.1) and its “primary” responsibility in a wider sense (in a general
manner covering the liabilities connected to the waste generation, for example also financial
liabilities, Article 5.1.f).
A manifestation of the ultimate responsibility of the State is reflected in Article 4(2): Where
radioactive waste or spent fuel is shipped for processing or reprocessing to a Member State or
third country, the ultimate responsibility for the safe and responsible disposal of those materials,
including any waste as a by-product, shall remain with the Member State or third country from
which the radioactive material was shipped.
Another manifestation of it can be found in the exports control regime. The original intention of
the EC in the first draft proposal of the Nuclear Waste Directive would have been to establish an
export ban for spent fuel and radioactive waste, in line with the existing ban in hazardous
waste6. However, this proposal was not accepted at the level of the Atomic Questions Group of
the EU Council, and the final text resulting from those negotiations establishes the following:
-
-
-
The general principle shall be the disposal in the Member State where the radioactive
waste was generated, or the disposal shared upon agreement of several Member States.
An exception to this principle is the possibility to conclude an international agreement
with a third country, being this a party to the Joint Convention, provided that this
country has equivalent levels of safety to those established by the Nuclear Waste
Directive, and “the disposal facility in the country of destination is authorised for the
radioactive waste to be shipped, is operating prior to the shipment, and is managed in
accordance with the requirements set down in the radioactive waste management and
disposal programme of that country of destination”. Taking into account that no
disposal sites are operative in the world for high level waste, this is de facto a ban on
the export of such type of waste.
An “exception to the exception” is the return of sealed sources to the manufacturer and
the agreements of return of spent fuel used for research to USA or the Russian
Federation in the frame of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (see recital 15).
A further exception was foreseen in respect of the shared facility of Slovenia and
Croatia (see recital 36), which at the time of the adoption of the Nuclear Waste
Directive was not a member of the EU yet –this exception no longer being such-.
Before this control regime was adopted, the only constraints for the export of radioactive waste
where those based on the Joint Convention (art. 27 (2): A Contracting Party shall not licence
the shipment of its spent fuel or radioactive waste to a destination south of latitude 60 degrees
South for storage or disposal) and on the Shipments Directive7 (art. 16), which prohibits the
export of radioactive waste to African, Caribbean or Pacific countries, in line with the Cotonou
Agreement8, to a destination south of latitude 60 south or to a third country which does not have
Reference to Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 of 14 June on shipments of waste and the so called “Basel Ban”: see
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/shipments/index.htm
7 Council Directive 2006/117/Euratom of 20 November 2006 on the supervision and control of shipments of
radioactive waste and spent fuel
8 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/cotonou-agreement/index_en.htm
6
4
the resources to manage the radioactive waste safely, “in the opinion of the competent
authorities of the Member State of origin”. The regime has been, thus, very much reinforced.
The rest of principles enumerated in Article 4 of the Nuclear Waste Directive are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Waste minimization
Consideration of the interdependencies
Safety in the long term with passive safety features
Graded approach
Polluter pays
Evidence-based and documented decision-making process
Of these, principles number 1 and 2 are contained in very similar terms in the Joint Convention9.
The waste minimization is defined by the IAEA as “the process of reducing the amount and
activity of radioactive waste to a level as low as reasonably achievable, at all stages from the
design of a facility or activity to decommissioning, by reducing waste generation and by means
such as recycling and reuse, and treatment, with due consideration for secondary as well as
primary waste (…) [The concept] should not be confused with volume reduction”10. At a later
stage in this study, further reference will be made to the concept of “interdependencies”.
The need of passive safety features in the long term (i. e. making use of components, whose
functioning does not depend on an external input such as actuation, mechanical movement or
supply of power11) is not present in the Joint Convention in the same extend, although it is
mentioned in the IAEA general safety requirements for predisposal management of waste12, and
among the specific safety requirements that the IAEA enumerates for the disposal of radioactive
waste13.
The graded approach is defined by the IAEA as “a process or method in which the stringency of
the control measures and conditions to be applied is commensurate, to the extent practicable,
with the likelihood and possible consequences of, and the level of risk associated with, a loss of
control”14 and is contemplated in the IAEA fundamental safety principles formulated in 200615.
The polluter pays principle is not contained in the Joint Convention, which requires the
Contracting Parties to ensure the adequacy and availability of the funds for management,
decommissioning and institutional controls after closure, regardless of their private or public
nature16.
The evidence-based and documented decision-making process justifies the need of a safetycase17, which will be imposed as a requirement for the license holder in Article 7(3) under the
9
Joint Convention, Articles 4 for spent fuel and 11 for radioactive waste.
Minimization, Waste, IAEA Safety Glossary 2007 Edition
11 Passive component, IAEA Safety Glossary 2007 Edition
12 Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste, GSR Part 5, IAEA 2009; See 1.8 and 4.13.
13 Disposal of Radioactive Waste – SSR, IAEA 2011; Requirement 5: Passive means for the safety of the disposal
facility (3.21–3.25).
14 IAEA Safety Glossary 2007 Edition
15 Fundamental Safety Principles, SF-1 IAEA 2006.
16 Article 22, Human and Financial Resources: “adequate financial resources are available to support the safety of
facilities for spent fuel and radioactive waste management during their operating lifetime and for decommissioning”,
and “financial provision is made which will enable the appropriate institutional controls and monitoring
arrangements to be continued for the period deemed necessary following the closure of a disposal facility”.
17 Safety case: A collection of arguments and evidence in support of the safety of a facility or activity, (…) [It] will
normally include the findings of a safety assessment, and will typically include information (including supporting
10
5
more confusing name of “safety demonstration” (see also recital 34 of the Directive). This
aspect will be further explained in this study.
The national framework
The national framework as established by Article 5 of the Directive is the national legislative,
regulatory and organizational framework that allocates responsibility and provides for
coordination between relevant competent bodies. This national framework must be subject to
continuous improvement taking into account operating experience, insights gained from
evidence which fundaments the safety cases and the development of relevant technology and
research. It includes a number of elements:
1. A national programme;
2. National arrangements for safety;
3. A system of licensing, including the prohibition of spent fuel or radioactive waste
management activities without a license
4. A system of control, a management system, regulatory inspections, documentation and
reporting obligations, also contemplating the post-closure periods of disposal facilities;
5. Enforcement actions
6. Allocation of responsibility to the bodies involved in the different steps; giving primary
responsibility to the generators of the spent fuel or radioactive waste or, under specific
circumstances, to a licence holder to whom this responsibility has been entrusted by
competent bodies;
7. National requirements for public information and participation;
8. A financing scheme for spent fuel and radioactive waste management
The concept of “national framework” is directly inspired by the Joint Convention, where Article
19 establishes similar requirements for the “legislative and regulatory” frameworks of the
Contracting Parties, with the exception of three elements –the national programme, the
transparency requirements and the financing scheme-, which are not present in the
“frameworks” as regulated by the Joint Convention. In a parallel way, the 2009 Nuclear Safety
Directive also develops the concept of national framework, this time inspired by the Convention
on Nuclear Safety. Remarkably, neither the 2009 Nuclear Safety Directive, nor the 2014
Amendments, have included in the national framework the requirements for public information
and participation18.
The interpreters of the Nuclear Waste Directive in different fora have conceived the “national
framework” of Article 5 as the necessary “infrastructure”, an intermediate layer between the
general principles established in Article 4 and the political solutions that the national
programme provides. The natural link between the national framework of Article 5 and the
national programme regulated in Articles 11 and 12, is the fact that the national programme is
the first of the requirements that the national framework must have.
evidence and reasoning) on the robustness and reliability of the safety assessment and the assumptions made therein.
IAEA Safety Glossary 2007 Edition
18 The 2009 Nuclear Safety Directive includes essentially the elements of the “national framework” of the Nuclear
Waste Directive, except, as has been explained, the national programme, the allocation of responsibilities, the
transparency requirements and the financing schemes. Taking into account that the national programmes and the
provisions on decommissioning funding are specific for radioactive waste, one would have expected that the two
remaining elements (allocation of responsibilities and transparency) would have been incorporated in the 2014
Amendments.
However,
only
the
allocation
of
responsibilities
has
been
introduced.
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/safety/safety_en.htm
6
Figure 1: The pyramid of contents of the Nuclear Waste
Directive
Source: NAPRO Guidelines for the establishment and notification of
National Programmes,
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/forum/risks/doc/waste_disposal/do
cs/napro_guide_web.pdf
Obligations in respect of the regulatory body and the license holders
Article 6 of the Nuclear Waste Directive sets out the obligation for the Member States to
establish and maintain a competent regulatory authority in the field of safety of spent fuel and
radioactive waste management. The regulator must be “functionally separate from any other
body or organization concerned with the promotion or utilization of nuclear energy or
radioactive material, including electricity production and radioisotope applications, or with the
management of spent fuel and radioactive waste, in order to ensure effective independence from
undue influence on its regulatory function”. It must be given the legal powers and human and
financial resources necessary to fulfil its obligations. The formulation is very similar to that of
the 2009 Nuclear Safety Directive and in essence similar to that of the Joint Convention (Article
20), with an important addition in the Nuclear Waste Directive: while both the Directive and the
Joint Convention require “effective independence”, only the Directive makes clear that this
consists of being “functionally separate from any other body (…) concerned with the promotion
or utilization of nuclear energy”. This requirement has still been reinforced in the 2014
Amendment.
Obligations for the license holders are set out in Article 7 of the Nuclear Waste Directive. The
first paragraph of this Article entrusts the license holder with prime responsibility for safety that
cannot be delegated, in similar (but not equal) terms to the Joint Convention (art. 21). As has
been said, the prime responsibility of the license holder for safety is the very first of the
Fundamental Safety Principles as compiled by the IAEA in 200619.
The following two paragraphs of this Article do not have a correspondence in the Joint
Convention and only partially in the 2009 Nuclear Safety Directive, although the 2014
Amendments have elaborated further this requirement. On the one hand, license holders must
“regularly assess, verify and continuously improve, as far as is reasonably achievable, the
safety of the radioactive waste and spent fuel management facility or activity in a systematic
and verifiable manner. This shall be achieved through an appropriate safety assessment, other
arguments and evidence”. The concept of safety assessment is the one elaborated by IAEA in
the corresponding General Safety Requirements20.
19
20
IAEA, SF-1, 2006: Fundamental Safety Principles.
IAEA, GSR-4, 2009: Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities.
7
Furthermore, paragraph (3) imposes the safety demonstration as a part of the licensing process.
Although there seems to be no common understanding under the term “safety demonstration”, it
is assumed to be equivalent to the “safety case” as defined by the IAEA 21. In any case, the
application of the safety demonstration is measured under the yardstick of the graded approach
as a general principle, as the Recital 34 of the Nuclear Waste Directive explains.
The concept of “integrated management systems” is defined by the IAEA Glossary as “A single
coherent management system in which all the component parts of an organization are
integrated to enable the organization’s objectives to be achieved”22. This concept supersedes
that of “quality assurance” established in Article 23 of the Joint Convention. The same Glossary
defines “quality assurance” as “the function of a management system that provides confidence
that specified requirements will be fulfilled”, and lately there is a full identification between the
concepts of “quality assurance” and “management system” (again, the Glossary: “The term
management system has been adopted in the revised standards instead of the terms quality
assurance and quality assurance programme”). This means that the element of “being
integrated”, i.e. the quality of being “single and coherent” and interlinking “all the component
parts of an organization to enable the objectives to be achieved”, is an addition of the Nuclear
Waste Directive. Remarkably enough, neither the 2009 Nuclear Safety Directive nor the 2014
Amendments use the term “integrated” when requesting a management system in this respect
(Article 6). The apparent conclusion is that the adjective “integrated” in the context of
radioactive waste makes reference to the necessary interdependencies in the chain of radioactive
waste management, where all the stages from generation to disposal are necessarily interrelated
and determinant for each other (see recital 30 of the Nuclear Waste Directive and IAEA GSR323).
To conclude with this topic: the “management system” is quoted in the Nuclear Waste Directive
in the context of Article 5, where the national framework needs to include “(d) a system of
appropriate control, a management system, regulatory inspections”, etc. The meaning of
“management system” in the more general context of the national framework (Art. 5) is different
to that of the “integrated management system” as an obligation of the license holder (Art. 7).
However, both concepts are linked, because the performance of the license holder is part of the
wider management system at the level of the national framework and in particular within the
national programmes.
The provision for the license holder to provide for and maintain adequate financial and human
resources finds a direct correspondence in the Joint Convention (art. 22) and in the 2009
Nuclear Safety Directive.
Article 8 of the Nuclear Waste Directive imposes for all parties involved in the management of
spent fuel and radioactive waste –not only the operators- the obligation to provide for and
maintain adequate financial and human resources. This is to be understood in a wide sense,
including efforts for research and development (see recitals 38 and 39).
21
Ms. Ute Blohm-Hieber, Head of the relevant Unit at the European Commission at the time of negotiations of the
Nuclear Waste Directive, affirms so in her article “The Radioactive Waste Directive: a necessary step in the
management of spent fuel and radioactive waste in the European Union”. OECD-NEA, NLB n. 88 (Volume 2011/2),
quoting, as a reference, the IAEA SSG-23 “The safety case and safety assessment for radioactive waste disposal”
(still as a draft as she wrote her article) and the IAEA SSR-5 “Disposal of Radioactive Waste”.
22 IAEA Safety Glossary 2007 Edition
23 IAEA, GSR-3, 2006: The management system for facilities and activities
8
The question of the decommissioning funds
The reader might be familiar with the failed attempt of the EC to adopt the two Safety
Directives in 2003 in the experience known as “Nuclear Package”24. The ambitious plan of the
EC to regulate on decommissioning funding was one of the reasons for the failure of these
proposals25. As a consequence, the EC had to be satisfied by adopting a Recommendation in
200626 accompanied by a Guide in 2010. In addition to this, the EC emits periodically
Communications to the European Institutions and working documents about the use of
decommissioning funds –the latest, in 2013, comparing Member States practices with the
measures proposed in the Recommendation27.
In this context, the provisions on funding for decommissioning and waste management in the
Nuclear Waste Directive are limited to Article 9, which makes this brief statement: “Member
States shall ensure that the national framework require that adequate financial resources be
available when needed for the implementation of national programmes referred to in Article 11,
especially for the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste, taking due account of the
responsibility of spent fuel and radioactive waste generators”. This provision is to be
understood in the context of the polluter pays principle as established by Article 4 and the
aforementioned Recommendation and documents (and by the fact that financial provisions are
also a part of the national framework, art. 5.1.h, and national programmes, art. 12.1.h and i)
The obligations on transparency
Article 10 of the Nuclear Waste Directive establishes two kinds of transparency obligations (see
recital 31). The first of them is about the information that the Member States must provide to
the workers and the general public, in particular the regulatory body, in accordance with
national and international law and “provided that this does not jeopardise other interests such
as, inter alia, security”. This first paragraph is drafted in almost identical terms to the
corresponding article in the 2009 Nuclear Safety Directive –the 2014 Amendment has amplified
it to a big extend-. The second paragraph deals with the right of public participation which must
be made “effective” in the decision-making process regarding spent fuel and radioactive waste
management. This second paragraph, not contemplated in the 2009 Nuclear Safety Directive,
but already present in the 2014 Amendments, was considered as a novelty in the Nuclear Waste
Directive and presented as the way in which the principles of the Aarhus Convention were made
applicable under the Euratom Treaty28. Indeed, the Nuclear Waste Directive went beyond the
2009 Nuclear Safety Directive in the purpose for transparency, adding this important element to
the subject-matter of Article 1(3).
General information about the “Nuclear Package” at http://www.eu-energy.com/Nuclear%20package.html See also
the article by Derek M. Taylor, who was Head of the relevant Unit at the European Commission at the time of the
proposals: Nuclear safety in an enlarged European Union. The European Commission’s “Nuclear Package”
available at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/studies/doc/other/nuclear_engineer_dmt.pdf
25 Nuria Prieto Serrano: “La seguridad nuclear en la era de las revisiones inter-pares y las autoevaluaciones: la
nueva directiva de seguridad nuclear”, Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, n. 37, September-December 2010
(English abstract, Nuclear Safety in the Era of Peer Reviews and the Self-assessments: the New Directive on Nuclear
Safety)
available
at
http://www.cepc.gob.es/gl/publicaci%C3%B3ns/revistas/revistaselectronicas?IDR=4&IDN=1267&IDA=35690).
26 Commission Recommendation of 24 October 2006 on the management of financial resources for the
decommissioning of nuclear installations, spent fuel and radioactive waste (2006/851/Euratom).
27 The Recommendation, the Guide and the documents quoted are all available at
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/decommissioning/decommissioning_en.htm
28 Ute Blohm-Hieber: The Radioactive Waste Directive: a necessary step in the management of spent fuel and
radioactive waste in the European Union. OECD-NEA, NLB n. 88 (Volume 2011/2).
24
9
The reason for the special regard to public participation in the area of waste management, which
was ab initio not regulated in “pure” nuclear safety, is the fact that the site selection of facilities
becomes specially delicate in the case of long-term storage and disposal sites, where the active
involvement of the stakeholders, and in particular the municipalities, is key in the consideration
that these facilities will long for decades, if not “the eternity”29. This has converted the site
selection for storage and disposal facilities in the spearhead of the studies of formula for public
participation in the nuclear sector (even in the energy sector, as the recent E-Track initiative
shows30), with important works on this issue conducted by the OECD-NEA, the European
Commission and other relevant fora.
At least! The national programs
If we had to determine which is the most important element of the Nuclear Waste Directive, the
one that makes a unique instrument of it and brings real added value to the international
regulation lead by the Joint Convention (apart from the fact that it converts an international
obligation into EU acquis), that would be the figure of the national programmes. In the spirit of
recital 28 (Member States should establish national programmes to ensure the transposition of
political decisions into clear provisions for the timely implementation of all steps of spent fuel
and radioactive waste management from generation to disposal), the national programmes
constitute an element of the national framework (art. 5) and must be adopted and regularly
reviewed and updated by the Member States (art. 11), being subject to peer review (art. 14.3). In
the pyramid already represented as Figure 1, the national programmes would stand in the basis,
the layer of the “real solutions” in practice:
Figure 1: The pyramid of contents of the Nuclear Waste
Directive
Source: NAPRO Guidelines for the establishment and
notification of National Programmes,
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/forum/risks/doc/waste_d
isposal/docs/napro_guide_web.pdf
Quoting (again) the European Commission: “No matter how developed the legal and
organizational framework of a State might be, the safe and responsible management of spent
fuel and radioactive waste can only be achieved once the government is committed to develop
policies and ensure their transposition into practical long-term solutions”31. In a sentence
vaguely inspired by Saint Paul (Corinthians, “The Way of Love”): “If I have an impeccable legal
system with a competent nuclear regulator, efficient and safe operators and adequate funding…
but I don’t have the policy, I am nothing”. This idea is in the willingness of the EC since at least
Reference to the documentary film “Into the Eternity”,
http://www.intoeternitythemovie.com/
30 http://www.nuclear-transparency-watch.eu/media/e-track.html
31 Ute Blohm-Hieber, article referred, NLB n. 88 (Volume 2011/2).
29
directed
by
Michael
Madsen:
10
one decade, and was already in the spirit of the original “Nuclear Package” until it has finally
crystallized. Ensuring that the Member States have a policy embodied in a national programme
subject to European control means that the times for “wait and see” policies have finalized32.
Article 12 of the Nuclear Waste Directive enumerates the elements that the national
programmes must have:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
The overall policy objectives;
Significant milestones and clear timeframes for their achievement
Inventory (…) in accordance with appropriate classification of the radioactive waste
The concepts or plans and technical solutions for spent fuel and radioactive waste
management from generation to disposal;
The concepts or plans for the post-closure period of a disposal facility’s lifetime;
The research, development and demonstration activities needed;
The responsibility for the implementation of the national programme and the key
performance indicators to monitor progress;
An assessment of costs
The financing scheme(s) in force;
The transparency policy or process;
If any, the agreement(s) concluded with a Member State or a third country, including on
the use of disposal facilities.
A further precision made in the Nuclear Waste Directive is that the national programme may be
contained in a single reference document or a set of documents (Recital 28).
The uniqueness of the national programme as a mandatory element in this Directive, that
confers the Nuclear Waste Directive not only a purely legal, but also a political dimension, does
not mean that the figure of “national programmes” were not developed in other international
instruments. In particular, the IAEA has developed the Guide “Policies and Strategies for
Radioactive Waste Management”33, distinguishing between the terms “policy” (particular goals
or requirements for the safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste) and “strategy”
(the ways and methods used to implement the policy) and acknowledging that a “national plan”
is, in fact, a combination of both. It explains a series or reasons for which it is desirable to have
explicit national policy and strategy statements and provides an indication of what might be
contained in them. However, neither this Guide nor any other international instrument
constitutes a mandate for the States to adopt and regularly review national programmes for the
management of their spent fuel and waste.
The originality of the national programmes as contemplated in the Nuclear Waste Directive lies
on the fact that, from now, this obligation is a part of the EU acquis, with the possibility for the
EC, as guardian of the Treaties, to deliver a reasoned opinion if it considers that a Member State
has failed to fulfil an obligation under EU law, and ultimately to bring the matter before the
Court of Justice of the European Union (Article 258 TFEU).
32
33
See Impact Assessment of the Waste Directive: Brussels, 3.11.2010, SEC(2010) 1289 final.
No. NW-G-1.1, IAEA 2009
11
A Working Group called “NAPRO” has been constituted in the European Nuclear Energy
Forum (ENEF)34 and has elaborated Guidelines for the establishment and notification of
national programmes35. This document is of high interest, in particular for those Member States
which have not developed such programmes until now. It facilitates the understanding of the
different elements enumerated in Article 12 and proposes a general structure for a national
programme.
The NAPRO Guidelines focus very much in the concept of “interdependencies” to explain how
the different steps of radioactive waste management are interrelated, in such a way that every
step in the different route needs to be perfectly in accordance with preliminary and subsequent
steps, leading to disposal in an adequate repository. In the following diagram, the different
routes would correspond to different waste streams and possibly to different waste types:
Figure 2: Management routes to illustrate interdependencies in radioactive waste management
Source: NAPRO Guidelines for the establishment and notification of National Programmes,
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/forum/risks/doc/waste_disposal/docs/napro_guide_web.pdf
The concept of “interdependencies” is key in the elaboration of national programmes, as also
the Guidelines elaborated by ENSREG show36. In these Guidelines, it is further explained how
the decisions taken at every step of the management route are conditioned by information flows
taking place in a way that is not only unidirectional (from generation to disposal) but indeed
bidirectional. That would mean that the characteristics of the disposal facilities available
34
ENEF gathers all relevant stakeholders in the nuclear field: governments of the 27 EU Member States, European
Institutions including the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, nuclear industry,
electricity consumers and the civil society. See http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/forum/forum_en.htm
35 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/forum/risks/doc/waste_disposal/docs/napro_guide_web.pdf
36 ENSREG is a high level group of senior officials from the Member States’ regulatory authorities or nuclear safety
authorities. Senior representatives of the European Commission are also part of the group. In addition, Council of the
European Union, Switzerland, Norway, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. It was constituted by
Commission Decision of 17 July 2007 (2007/530/Euratom). See Final Guidelines for MS Reports to the Waste
Directive
at
http://www.ensreg.eu/sites/default/files/HLG_p(201427)_137%20Final%20guidelines%20for%20MS%20Reports%20to%20the%20Waste%20Directive.pdf
12
determines the steps of the management process from the very moment where the waste is
generated and recorded in the inventories. Thus, a more realistic representation of the
interrelation of decisions taken in the waste management process would be according to this
diagram:
Figure 3: Information flows in the decision making process in radioactive waste management
Source: ENSREG Final Guidelines for MS Reports to the Waste Directive
http://www.ensreg.eu/sites/default/files/HLG_p(201427)_137%20Final%20guidelines%20for%20MS%20Reports%20to%20the%20Waste%20Directive.pdf
The following quote from this document describes very well the referred mechanism:
“While “material flows” are in principle downstream, i.e. from the waste generation
step until disposal, both upstream and downstream flows have to be managed to
effectively deal with the interdependencies of all radioactive waste management steps.
Downstream “information flows” can inform e.g. the development of disposal solutions
for existing waste streams and for a prospective waste inventory. Upstream
“information flows” can inform e.g. the waste characterisation and processing
programmes in accordance with waste disposal requirements.
ENSREG understands these interdependencies to be at different levels, such as:



the technical level (e.g. adequate waste characterisation and waste processing
for storage and disposal);
the financial level (e.g. assessment and generation of the financial means
required for all subsequent management steps); and,
the legal level (e.g. definition of responsibilities and accountabilities of various
actors at subsequent management steps, with possible transfer of
responsibilities between parties).”
Thus, elaborating a national programme can be compared with assembling a complex puzzle
where all the pieces at all technical, financial and legal level must fit.
The European Commission’s review of national programmes
The national programme must be notified to the Commission at any date from the adoption of
the Directive, but not later than 23 August 2015 (Article 15.4). This communication is, indeed,
13
the first but not the only one foreseen. Article 13 of the Directive requires Member States to
notify to the Commission their national programmes “and subsequent significant changes”
(which does not imply a regular periodicity), and confers to the Commission the right of
requesting clarification “and/or express its opinion on whether the content of the national
programme is in accordance with Article 12” within six months of the date of notification. The
Member State has in turn six months to provide the requested clarification and/or inform the
Commission of any revision of the national programme. Reading paragraph 4 of Article 13 a
sensu contrario, if in this process the Commission were not convinced by the policy adopted by
the Member State, it could deny the provision of financial or technical assistance to the Member
State. As a matter of fact, the Commission has the power to judge upon the completeness of the
national programme in accordance with the Directive and within the limits of this Article 13,
which is not per se a right to question the national policies (as far as they comply with the
general principles established in the Directive).
The peer-review processes
The provisions of the Nuclear Waste Directive, like of any other Directive, need to be
transposed into national law. Article 15 of the Nuclear Waste Directive requires Member States
to perform this task before 22 August 2013 and inform the European Commission thereof. As
has been said, for the communication of the national programmes the Directive establishes a
different date: August 2015 at the latest.
The reporting obligations are contained in Article 14 of the Directive. For the first time by 23
August 2015, and every 3 years thereafter (that is to say, this time periodically), Member States
must submit a report to the Commission on the implementation of the Directive. On the basis of
those reports, the Commission submits to the European Parliament and the Council a report on
progress made and an inventory of radioactive waste and spent fuel present in the territory of the
EU and future prospects.
The reports that must be delivered in the context of Article 14.2 should not be confused with the
notification of the national programmes already described for Article 13. While the reporting
obligations take place on a regular basis (every three years), the notification of the national
programmes is requested once by August 2013 and afterwards only if significant changes are
introduced. In one case (Article 14.1), the Member States are expected to prepare national
reports covering, preferably Article by Article, the scope of the whole Directive and explaining
how its provisions have been transposed37.
The reports referred to in Article 14.2 are thought to be the evolution of the so called “Situation
Reports” that up to now the Commission has submitted to the European Institutions38, and that
also served for the purpose of communication to the public. Up to now, the Situation Reports
have focused mainly on the inventories –in the last cases, not only present but also future
prospects of generation of waste-; they have also provided valuable information about the
institutions and bodies in charge of waste management in the Member States. With this
mandate, their scope becomes wider as it involves the whole provisions of the Nuclear Waste
Directive and major space for comparison and analysis is open. No such report has been drafted
37
See ENSREG Guidelines referred.
The Situation Reports were first developed as a part of the “Community plan of action in the field of radioactive
waste”. For the last of them, namely the Seventh Situation Report, see SEC(2011) 1007 final under
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/waste_management/doc/seventh_situation_report_corr_version_without_cover_pa
ge.pdf
38
14
to date, but we can expect to find in them wider comparisons of the national framework and
policies of the Member States.
As regards the communication of inventories, the fact that the Member States have different
national classification systems in place does not help in the data analyses, as the European
Commission and the different fora have acknowledged39. Up to now, a Commission
Recommendation of 1999 has been used for the purpose of communicating inventories in the
Situation Reports40; but from now on, the preferred reference will be the IAEA Safety Guide of
200941.
To finish this description of the Directive, the obligations of performance of self-assessments
and submissions to peer-review are contained in Article 14.3 and must take place periodically,
at least every ten years. The subjects of assessment and peer-review shall be the national
framework, competent regulatory authority, national programme and its implementation
(whereas the English version of the Directive seems to make a distinction, as if the national
programme would not have to be necessarily subject to peer-review42; however, this distinction
seems to be of no significance for ENSREG43). The outcomes of any peer review shall be
reported to the Commission and the other Member States, and may be made available to the
public where there is no conflict with security and proprietary information.
Some challenges in the peer review processes
The workload involved in drafting reports and participating in peer-reviews: a challenge or a
problem? To use the right word: problem.
A first and obvious concern for the civil servants of the Member States is the accumulation of
work that the two Safety Directives involve, not only as regards the drafting of reports, but also
vis-à-vis the peer-review conceived as common work in the EU. In the Joint Convention,
national reports of considerable extend must be prepared every three years (article 30 of the
Joint Convention) and review meetings are celebrated periodically at the IAEA Headquarters to
discuss the reports submitted by other Contracting Parties and to seek clarification of them.
Additionally, those Member States having nuclear power must meet a similar obligation under
the Convention on Nuclear Safety (art. 21). On top of that, the Euratom legal frame seems now:
 to duplicate the number of national reports: one report on implementation of the
Directive every three years following art. 14.1 Nuclear Waste Directive, which in the
case of the 2014 Amendments is “reduced” to two reports between 2014 and 202044;
39
See for example page 9 of the Seventh Situation Report (SEC(2011) 1007 final) . See also in the referred ENSREG
Guides the Appendix 2 “Reporting of inventories under the Waste Directive” (ENSREG “Final Guidelines for MS
Reports to the Waste Directive”, HLG_p(2014-27)_137)
40 Commission Recommendation of 15 September 1999 on a classification system for solid radioactive
waste, 1999/669/EC, Euratom
41 "Classification of Radioactive Waste", General Safety Guide, IAEA, Vienna 2009.
42 The literacy of Article 14.3. states: “Member States shall periodically, and at least every 10 years, arrange for selfassessments of their national framework, competent regulatory authority, national programme and its
implementation, and invite international peer review of their national framework, competent regulatory authority
and/or national programme, etc.”
43 See for example the minutes of the 26th meeting of ENSREG in fine:
http://www.ensreg.eu/sites/default/files/HLG_M(201426)%20Final%20Minutes%20of%20the%2026th%20ENSREG%20meeting%20.pdf
44 The 2009 Nuclear Safety Directive establishes: Article 9. Reporting. 1. Member States shall submit a report to the
Commission on the implementation of this Directive for the first time by 22 July 2014, and every three years
thereafter, taking advantage of the review and reporting cycles under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. In 2014 this
provision has been replaced by: Member States shall submit a report to the Commission on the implementation of this
15

and to increase significantly the number of peer reviews, every ten years as articles 14.3
of the Nuclear Waste Directive and 8e.1 of the 2014 Amendments show –additionally,
the 2014 Amendments introduce the obligation to invite “topical peer reviews” every
six years (Article 8e.3).
This is quite a challenge for the civil servant of a Member State having a medium-sized nuclear
power programme; and a real problem for non-nuclear small-sized Member States with limited
resources devoted to nuclear regulation. The only good news in the Nuclear Waste Directive
seems to be that the peer-reviews in this context take place “only” once every ten years (unlike
the more frequent peer-reviews in the frame of the Joint Convention). That is to say: whereas
the national reports about transposition must be prepared every three years, they do not
“provoke” an immediate review meeting (unlike in the Joint Convention). Although no
experience has been made to date on the “Euratom peer review meetings”, it is to expect that the
documentary material used for their preparation will consist of at least the national reports of
compliance with the Directive (and each Member State will have prepared three of them during
the ten years interval), plus the national programme enacted by every Member State.
Summarizing, the notification and reporting obligations under the Nuclear Waste Directive can
be represented in this –quite discouraging– diagram (the process on the Nuclear Safety
Directive must be added where applicable):
Figure 4: The reporting and notification obligations under the Nuclear Waste Directive
Source: Presentation by the EC, The National Programmes and the obligations of transposition, notification &
reporting in the Nuclear Waste Directive; Workshop on the contents and implementation of the National Programmes
(25-26 September 2012, Brussels),
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/forum/risks/doc/waste_disposal/docs/workshop/notification/25.9.,_ubh,_notificatio
n_and_reporting_nwd.pdf
Directive for the first time by 22 July 2014, and then by 22 July 2020. Recital 24 of this amendment explains: With a
view to simplifying the legislation and reducing the administrative burden, the reporting obligation for the Member
States should be made less onerous both as regards the frequency of reporting and the content of the reports…
16
The good news for the civil servant seems to end here. If he or she could have expected to use
the documentation already prepared in the frame of the Joint Convention (the so called “national
reports”) to submit it with minor changes to the European Commission, a quick look into the
material available will vanish this illusion: the ENSREG Final Guidelines for MS Reports to the
Waste Directive warns:
It should be noted that while the Waste Directive and Joint Convention have the same
overall objective of the safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste, they have
different addressees and scopes. While the Joint Convention focuses on safety and is
more descriptive, the Waste Directive is both safety and policy oriented including policy
establishment and implementation through the national programme. As a result, the
National Reports to the Joint Convention are more detailed and are prepared for the
purpose of the Peer Review Meetings, while those under the Waste Directive are about
the implementation of the Directive i.e. to demonstrate to the Council and to the
European Parliament the progress made including in the long-term context.
A comparison of the Articles of the Waste Directive and those of the Joint Convention
(…) demonstrates that while there are some similarities in the obligations under the
Waste Directive and Joint Convention, there are also some fundamental differences, etc.
Thus, when Article 14.1 of the Nuclear Waste Directive uses the words “taking advantage of the
review and reporting under the Joint Convention”, this expression should not lead to false
expectations. The European Commission will not accept recycled national reports (done for the
IAEA) for this purpose; as neither will it accept the submission of simple transposition tables
instead of the reports45.
What kind of, and how many peer-reviews?
A superficial reading of the Directives on Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Waste suggests that one
and the same peer-review process, adequately adapted to the national needs, could be valid to
cover the obligations of Articles 14.3 (Waste) and 9.3 (Safety) or 8e (Safety in 2014
Amendments). Again, this assumption becomes less evident after a more careful consideration
of the peer-review obligations in both Directives.
The 2009 Nuclear Safety Directive already disregards the concept of a “holistic” peer review:
Member States shall at least every 10 years arrange for periodic self-assessments of their
national framework and competent regulatory authorities and invite an international peer
review of relevant segments of their national framework and/or authorities with the aim of
continuously improving nuclear safety. Outcomes of any peer review shall be reported to the
Member States and the Commission, when available. As will be explained in the following
paragraphs, this statement is amended in 2014.
The Recital 21 of the 2009 Nuclear Safety Directive contains interesting reflections about the
nature of the peer-reviews and merits to be quoted here:
Article 15.3 of the Nuclear Waste Directive: “Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the
main provisions of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive and of any subsequent
amendments to those provisions”.
45
17
In the past, self-assessments have been carried out in Member States in close
connection with international peer reviews under the auspices of the IAEA as
International Regulatory Review Team or Integrated Regulatory Review Service
missions. These self-assessments were carried out and these missions were invited by
Member States on a voluntary basis in the spirit of openness and transparency. Selfassessments and accompanying peer reviews of the legislative, regulatory and
organisational infrastructure should be aimed at strengthening and enhancing the
national framework of Member States, whilst recognising their competencies in
ensuring nuclear safety of nuclear installations on their territory. The self-assessments
followed by international peer reviews are neither an inspection nor an audit, but a
mutual learning mechanism that accepts different approaches to the organisation and
practices of a competent regulatory authority, while considering regulatory, technical
and policy issues of a Member State that contribute to ensuring a strong nuclear safety
regime. The international peer reviews should be regarded as an opportunity to
exchange professional experience and to share lessons learned and good practices in
an open and cooperative spirit through advice by peers rather than control or
judgement. Recognising a need for flexibility and appropriateness in regard to different
existing systems in Member States, a Member State should be free to determine the
segments of its system being subject to the specific peer review invited, with the aim of
continuously improving nuclear safety.
Some conclusions can be extracted from this recital:
 The Institutions of the EU are aware that the peer-reviews exceed the capabilities of the
EC to lead their organization; therefore, the peer-reviews are conceived more as an
international rather than a purely European instrument.
 The character of the peer-review as a “learning mechanism rather than inspection or
audit” is highlighted. The recommendations made to a Member State after concluding a
peer-review, according to this, should be regarded as “incentive” proposals.
 Reference is made to IRRT or IRRS suggesting that this kind of missions (or of a
similar type) could be invited here.
The 2014 Amendments strengthen the provisions on peer reviews. The provision to invite peerreviews as described in the 2009 Nuclear Safety Directive is deleted and instead a new Article
(8e) is introduced. This new Article makes reference to peer-reviews at least of three types:
 Paragraph 1 refers to “international peer review of relevant segments of their national
framework and competent regulatory authorities” at least every ten years (This is
presumably the same type of peer-reviews that existed in the 2009 Nuclear Safety
Directive).
 Paragraph 3 introduces the concept of “topical peer reviews”, this time every six years.
The first topical peer review must start in 2017, and subsequent topical peer reviews
must take place at least every 6 years thereafter (This seems to be a new type of peerreview and it is explained in recital 23 of the 2014 Amendments).
 According to paragraph 4, Member States will also have to organise an international
peer review of the installation, in case of an accident and major safety problems.
The author of this study must now confess certain astonishment in view of this proliferation of
peer-reviews. The press-note of the EC accompanying the publication of the 2014 Amendments
18
focuses on the topical peer-reviews of the third paragraph being organized every six years and
does not refer at all to the peer-reviews of the first type46. However, as far as paragraph 1 is not
repealed, my understanding of the new article 8e is that the peer-reviews of paragraph 1 and 3
coexist.
Again, the recitals at the 2014 Amendment help in the clarification of this new concept of
“topical peer review” (recital 23):
Member States, through their competent regulatory authorities making relevant use of
ENSREG, and building on the expertise of the WENRA, should every six years define a
methodology, Terms of Reference and a time frame for Peer Reviews on a common
specific technical topic related to the nuclear safety of their nuclear installations. The
common specific technical topic to be considered should be identified among the
WENRA safety reference levels or on the basis of operating experience feed-back,
incidents and accidents and technological and scientific developments. Member States
should perform a national self-assessment and make arrangements for common peer
reviews by other Member States' competent regulatory authorities of their national selfassessment.
Now direct reference is made as regards the role of WENRA as the source of safety reference
levels for the peer-reviews.
Let’s now come to the Nuclear Waste Directive. The recitals of this Directive (in particular
recital 40) do not reflect that implication, neither of IAEA through IRRS missions on the
regulatory side, nor to the use of WENRA reference levels. However, the recourse to IAEA
and/or other international providers of peer-review services seems clear, in particular since
Euratom and IAEA sign a Memorandum of Understanding on 17th September 201347. The
cooperation among the EC and the IAEA is of course not new, and this Memorandum of
Understanding has its roots in instruments such as the Cooperation Agreement of 1976 and the
Joint Statement of 2008. The areas of cooperation are defined in its Article II (safety standards,
regulatory framework, installation safety, radiation protection, spent fuel and radioactive waste,
etc.). This includes the provision of IAEA peer-reviews for both Directives for those Member
States that so request.
In a parallel way, ENSREG and the IAEA have also signed a Memorandum of Understanding
for International Peer Review Missions in EU Member States in June 201148. This MoU
concerns IRRS missions – up to now only for the Safety Directive- where IAEA commits itself
“to establish, manage and implement the European IRRS programme, as part of the global
IRRS programme, taking into account ENSREG’s policies”.
From what has been said, it seems clear that the IRRS missions (or an adaptation of them) will
be offered to fulfil the peer-reviews obligations in both Directives. The MoU between ENSREG
and the IAEA concerns in principle only the Nuclear Safety Directive, but it could be widened
46
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-464_en.htm
A Commission Decision of 5th September 2013 [C(2013) 5641 final] authorizes the conclusion of this
Memorandum. The details and text are available in http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/safety/safety_en.htm
48 http://www.ensreg.eu/node/293
47
19
to cover also the Nuclear Waste Directive49. There is, however, a small inconvenient in the
direct recourse to IRRS missions in the case of the Nuclear Waste Directive. As has been
explained, the Nuclear Waste Directive concerns the “infrastructure” on radioactive waste
management given in a Member State; this corresponds with the concept of “National
Framework” of Article 5 and, if the reader remembers the pyramid represented in Figure 1 of
this study, the second layer of it. This “layer” can be subject to IRRS or other types of peerreviews focused on safety (in this case, on the safety of radioactive waste management).
However, the Nuclear Waste Directive has another dimension: the political one, which is
reflected in the national programmes. That would be, referring again to Figure 1, the basis of the
pyramid. The policies on radioactive waste management as reflected in the national programme
are not susceptible to be examined with the same tools than the “pure” safety aspects. In the
context of ENSREG and the IAEA, this fact has been acknowledged and it has been suggested
that a new kind of missions could be needed. The possibility of simply expanding the scope of
IRRS missions is regarded with skepticism and the IAEA is contemplating the possibility of
creating a new kind of missions to cover those policy aspects50.
A number of questions on the nature and references used for such peer-reviews on the national
programmes arise then. In the same way as IAEA has produced a solid corpus of safety
standards, not many texts concern the subject of policies in radioactive waste management. An
IAEA Guide on policies and strategies has been mentioned in this study51; but this does not
stand the fact that such Guide is only one instrument, not integrated in the corpus of IAEA
Safety Standards and having recommendatory nature. Apart from it, there are few legal sources
or standards that the IAEA could use as a basis for evaluation of the European policies. No need
to say that concerns might arise in some Member States if an international organization outside
the EU would send international experts (in principle, not necessarily European) to evaluate
European policies.
Final considerations
All these questions may raise a certain anxiety in the reader who, in principle, would have
expected that the major aspects concerning the transposition of the Nuclear Waste Directive
were in a reasonable stage of “maturity”. Important aspects in the organization of the peerreviews in both Directives are still pending definition and nuclear lawyers are not always aware
of them. During the next few years, we will assist to the major definition, and finally the
celebration of the “Euratom peer-reviews” in the frame of both the Nuclear Waste and the
Safety Directives, in the hope for them to become a real instrument for enhancement of nuclear
safety and –in the case of the peer-reviews of the national programmes- a more efficient policymaking towards solutions that really take the needs of future generations into account. In
principle, the idea of combining the IAEA expertise in the organization of peer-reviews with the
robust Euratom legal framework can lead to very positive results. However, the cooperation of
both organizations must be done in the willingness of optimizing work and serving to a common
purpose. Whether the peer-reviews become such a positive instrument, or on the contrary they
49
See the Minutes of the 26th ENSREG meeting on 16 January 2014 published in internet:
http://www.ensreg.eu/documents?view_filter_1=18
50 See the Minutes of the 26th ENSREG meeting on 16 January 2014 published in internet:
http://www.ensreg.eu/documents?view_filter_1=18
51 No. NW-G-1.1, IAEA 2009
20
turn out to be a bureaucratic orchestration of presentations and paperwork, will depend on the
common sense and the real wish to cooperate of all the parties involved.