Accounting, Pricing and Profit Distribution:
Account Books and Regulations of a State-owned Wine Enterprise in
Southern Song China
Meng Zhang
UCLA, History Department
Songren Yijian contains precious primary materials for Song liquor policies.
The object of this study is the accounting record of the state-owned Shuzhou
Brewery and Yaxi wine shop from early 1163, which was the only set of firm-level
account record that is extant for the Song dynasty. There are several tentative
findings: First, the state demanded keli qian as the theoretical revenue from selling
the wine produced from the rice and other raw materials provided by the
prefecture government. “Theoretical revenue” means that the revenue was
calculated by multiplying the quantity of wine by the officially set selling price.
Secondly, Keli qian, the theoretical return to the prefecture government’s
investment, was actually distributed proportionally among the central government,
several circuit-level agencies, and the prefecture. Thirdly, the official price, rather
than determining the real prices undertaken by the consumers, only served as a
uniform accounting standard. This means that the “theoretical revenues” extracted
by the state was in fact much higher that the actual revenue from selling the
quantity of wine produced from the materials contributed by the prefecture
government. The way in which the state adjusted the share of the revenues from
state-owned enterprises was through changing the official price, instead of directly
announcing a change of the share of revenue that it claimed. It alerts us to the
possibility that the official prices that showed up in Song Dynasty official records
might not be the real prices for the customers. It may well be the case that this
accounting practice applied not only to wine, but also to tea, salt and other
commodities controlled under the state monopoly or monopsony.
Key Words: Songren Yijian, State-ownership, Southern Song, Liquor Policies, Profit
Distribution
1.
State Management of Wine Industry in Song China: A General Picture
Que -jiu 榷酒 refers to the state monopoly on wine production and
monopsony on sales. Monopolistic wine management had been in place shortly for
twice in the period of Han, under the reign of Emperor Wu and Wang Mang
1
respectively. Que-jiu had never been a common practice until late Tang, when state
had to exploit monopolistic wine revenues to meet the increasing military expenses
after the chaos of Anlushan rebellion. The Que-jiu practice was inherited by four but
one of the five consecutive reigns after the fall of Tang, and subsequently got
expanded and enforced under the rule of Song dynasty. State-owned breweries
were set up in regions where wine sales could reach a certain threshold; for places
where wine sales were low (below 3000 guan per year), private agencies, known as
jiuhu 酒户, were allowed to bid for the franchise to produce and sell wine within a
certain region1.
Official breweries were set up both in prefectures and in counties. Sometimes
the official brewery and the commercial tax agency were combined together,
collecting commercial taxes as well as producing and selling wine, known as
Jiushuiwu 酒税务. Shuzhou was such a case. As to the raw materials used
in the official breweries, according to qing yuan tiao fa shi lei, if
the location of the official brewery was also where the prefecture
granary was located, the needed rice and other materials should be
provided by the prefecture granary; this by large applied to breweries
located in the seat of a prefecture or county government. For example,
the Shuzhou brewery was located in Huaining county, which is the seat
of Shuzhou prefecture. Shuzhou brewery received a portion of rice from
the prefecture granary. Official breweries that were located far from
local granaries should estimate the budget on a yearly basis and
Huarui Li, Song Dai Jiu De Sheng Chan He Zheng Que 宋代酒的生产和征榷
(Baoding: Hebei da xue chu ban she, 1995), p.109-12, 79.
1
2
appropriate rice out of the two-tax revenues in nearby places. If that
was still not enough, breweries could purchase rice and other materials
from the market, known as dimai 籴买2.
Official breweries might set up
separate wine shops just for sale.
As mentioned, besides official breweries, the government allowed
private agencies to compete for the right to run a franchised brewery
and sell wine within a certain region. Especially, when official
breweries in remote areas went into distress, they were normally sold
to private agencies. The system was called maipu 买扑. Maipu was a kind
of tax farming. Contractors were committed to turn in certain amount of
annual revenues to the government. An auction system was developed to
select the highest bid in early Northern Song, and was later reformed
and popularized during and after New Policies period. The quota of
revenues due to the state was determined by the previous year amount
and prices offered by the contractors in the auction.3
There were also small retailers called paihu 拍户 (also known as
jiaohu 脚户 or bohu 泊户 ). They purchased wine from official breweries
or private franchises. Official breweries always appointed their paihu
with a specific sales region. According to the changwu statues (场务令),
there seemed to be a sales quota for official breweries’ paihu; they
2
Shenfu Xie, Qingyuan Tiao Fa Shi Lei 庆元条法事类 (1968), 卷三六《场务》.
See Li, Song Dai Jiu De Sheng Chan He Zheng Que 宋代酒的生产和征榷, Chapter 8
"mai pu zhi du", p.198-227.
3
3
might purchase on credit from the official breweries and repay later4.
In the case of Shuzhou, Shouzhou Yaxi wine shop 衙西酒店 had a fixed
paihu who sold wine in Huodian area, referred to as “Huodian paihu”
in daily account journals.
Not only illegal private production would face penalization according to the
law, wine produced by each official brewery could only be traded within in its
specified local area; transgressions would be penalized in the same manner as
illegal private production. Unlike salt and tea, whose production were concentrated
in certain circuits and would provide for the whole country, each county had its
own official brewery. “Prohibited area 禁地” referred to the regions “within 25 li to
a capital city, within 20 li to a prefecture capital, within 10 li to a county or town”.
Private production up to one sheng within the prohibited area would be physically
penalized by forty beatings by bamboo rod; penalization would be upgraded one
level for every five more sheng of private production, until the amount of illegal
produce reaches 5 shi, in which case the convict would be banished to serve in the
same city without being branded in face. 5
Before the New Policies were implemented in the Xining reform era of 10681077, wine management was under the Yeast Section in the Ministry of Revenue of
the State Finance Commission (三司户部司曲案). The Yeast Section was one of the
most arduous among the twenty-four sections of the State Finance Commission.
Xie, Qingyuan Tiao Fa Shi Lei 庆元条法事类, 卷三六 《场务令》. “拍户卖酒有定额，
不得亏减，于官务支酒，多先赊账，酒出售后再纳官钱。”
5 Yifan Yang, tao Tian, and jianguo Dai, Zhong Guo Zhen Xi Fa Lv Dian Ji Xu Bian. Di Yi
Ce. Qing Yuan Tiao Fa Shi Lei 中国珍稀法律典籍续编 第一册 庆元条法事类 (Ha er
4
bin: Hei long jiang ren min chu ban she, 2002), 卷 28 《榷货总类》(p.395).
4
The Ministry of Revenue 户部 was in charge of setting revenue quotas for
nationwide breweries, establishing new breweries and determining which official
breweries should be tendered to private operations through open auction. During
the New Policies period, the management of official breweries and private
franchises were separated into two systems, with the Ministry of Revenue still in
charge of official breweries while the Court of the National Granaries 司农寺 in the
center and Stabilization Fund Supervisorate (常平司) on the circuit level started to
claim the revenues from the expanded privately franchised breweries. The new
bureaucratic institution established in 1082 reunited these functions under the
new Ministry of Revenue, though the Left Section 左曹 and Right Section 右曹 of
the Ministry of Revenue were still highly separated and under supervisions of
different chancellors. The Left Section inherited most functions of the old State
Finance Commission, while the Right Section inherited most functions of the old
National Granaries6.
Entering the Southern Song, the Ministry of revenue underwent further
reorganizations, with the combined Left and Right sections supervised normal
revenues from both official breweries and private franchises. Besides, an added
branch under the Ministry of Revenue, the Treasury Branch (jin-bu 金部), came to
control the newly introduced supplementary and capitation taxes, collectively
known as Jingzongzhi qian 经总制钱. A very large portion of jingzongzhi qian came
from wine sales. Moreover, beyond its duty as a supervisor, in 1137 the Ministry of
Revenue also started to appropriate money from the jingzongzhi qian as the initial
capital investment to directly own and run some breweries, known as 户部赡军酒
6
Li, Song Dai Jiu De Sheng Chan He Zheng Que 宋代酒的生产和征榷, p. 129-32.
5
库, which might be referred to as center-owned breweries as distinguishable from
the official breweries owned by prefectures or military units7.
In early Northern Song, revenues from the wine business were largely
retained in the prefecture governments. After all, official breweries were by large
prefecture-owned. Prefecture governments provided the breweries’ paid-in capital,
expended rice from the prefecture granary, and undertook daily expenses. In
return, revenues from the official breweries were retained in prefecture finance
under the name of “xisheng qian 系省钱”. In Song, xisheng qian was the main
financial resource for prefecture government. Xisheng, literally means that the
money belonged to the State Finance Commission, asserting the central ownership
over local finance. Xishengqian were stationed in prefecture store house, called
Junziku 军资库, which was under the supervision of the controller-
general (tongpan 通判)8. On the circuit level, only the fiscal commissions 转运司
were involved in wine management by recommending intendants for official
breweries. The circuit fiscal commission, as an intermediate financial agency
between the central and prefectural government, was mainly a supervisor and
transmitter. It did reallocate financial resources across prefectures under its
jurisdiction, for the purpose of which the fiscal commission maintained a certain
amount of financial resources under the name of “yiyong qian 移用钱”. However, as
a means of check and balance, the central government intently limited the financial
power of circuit fiscal commissions. Not only the amount of yiyong qian drawn from
prefectures was strictly limited to no more than one third of the residuals after the
Ibid., p.133-34.
Weimin Bao, Song Dai Di Fang Cai Zheng Shi Yan Jiu 宋代地方财政史研究
(Shanghai: Shanghai gu ji chu ban she, 2001), p.46-75.
7
8
6
prefecture’s subventions of the fixed quota to the center9, the fiscal commissions
were restricted from setting up any storehouses on the circuit level; even
yiyongqian was stored in prefecture storehouses and was only withdrawn by the
fiscal commission when a cross-prefecture transfer payment was to be made. In
other words, in terms of account keeping and personnel management, fiscal
commissions could be counted as an intermediate unit; but their power was rather
limited in terms of direct command of resources. In sum, before the New Policies
era, national finance was within a single system, with the State Finance Commission
三司 in the center, the fiscal commission supervisorate 转运使 on the circuit level,
and the prefecture magistrates on the local level10.
Wine management on the circuit level also went through great changes in the
New Policies period and during the transition to Southern Song. As Bao Weimin
has argued, by the Southern Song, a second system parallel to the “fiscal
commission——prefecture magistrate system” has come to be established, with the
judicial commissions on the circuit level and the controller-general on the
prefecture level. The “judicial commission——controller-general” system was set up
to meet the needs of the central government to extract revenues from prefectures
more efficiently, since it wouldn’t incur the same conflicts of interests between the
central government demands and local financial needs as the “financial commission
——prefecture magistrate” system faced. After all, the prefecture magistrate was the
one that was in charge of most local revenues and expenses, and the financial
commissioner did have to answer to the needs of the prefectures under his
Xie, Qingyuan Tiao Fa Shi Lei 庆元条法事类, 卷三 O《上供-厩库敕》.“诸转运司
除诸州依格上供数外，移用物钱侵过本州有额上供所余三分之一者，徒二年。”
9
10
Bao, Song Dai Di Fang Cai Zheng Shi Yan Jiu 宋代地方财政史研究, p. 12-45.
7
jurisdiction and reallocate yiyong qian if necessary. By the time of Southern Song,
the ambiguity nature of the financial commission as both an agency of the center
and as a responder to local needs had already transformed, and the local nature of
the financial commission had become increasingly prominent. 11 During the
Southern Song, the most important levy that went through the “judicial commission
——controller-general” system to reach the central state was the jingzongzhi qian12.
Wine revenues due to the central finance under the name of jingzongzhi qian were
beyond the reach of prefecture magistrates, and went through the hands of the
controller-generals and judicial commissioners to reach the capital13.
2.
Shuzhou Brewery Documents in “Song Ren Yi Jian”
The specific topic of this investigation is the accounting records of the state-
run Shuzhou Brewery and Yaxi Wine shop from January to February 1163.
Although we know from the surviving Qin and Han period local archives that
all provincial and county yamen, even small border posts, kept extensive archives
containing records of all aspects of official documents, almost no trace of a local
archive survived from the end of the Tang to the Qing. Songren Yijian 宋人佚简14
(literally, lost records of a Song writer) might be counted as an exception. Songren
Ibid., p. 35-43, 118-40.
Jingzongzhi qian referred to the collection of Jingzhi qian and the Zongzhi qian.
Jingzhi Agency 经制司 was founded in 1121, on the eve of the fall of the Northern
Song. The Jingzhi superintendant raised the official price for wine and yeast, raised
seven kinds of touzi qian and claimed them as central revenue. The Regulatorgeneral 总制司 was founded in 1135, in the name of investigating liabilities of all
level governments to the central finance, claimed another twenty some revenue
items as belonging to the central government.
13 《宋史》卷一七九《食货下一》州县收纳总制司的酒课“以宪臣领之，通判敛之，
11
12
季终送输”。
14
Song Ren Yi Jian 宋人佚简, (Shanghai: Shanghai gu ji chu ban she, 1990).
8
Yijian contains official correspondences and regulations from the Shuzhou
prefecture archive for the years of 1162-64, which were found on the reverse side
of the pages in one edition of Wang Anshi’s essays. Shanghai guji chu ban she has
published these documents into a five-volume collection in 1990. Most Relevant
for our purpose here is the fifth volume, which contains precious materials for wine
industry management in Shuzhou. Specifically, documents directly related to wine
management include the following:








Daily Journals of Shuzhou Brewery, from the fifteenth day in the
twelfth moon in the thirty-second year of the Shaoxing era to the
seventh day in the first moon in the first year of the Longxing
era (from January 21 to February 11, 1163). 舒州酒务日状 (×20)
Usual Practices and Regulation of Shuzhou Brewery 在城酒务造酒则
例 (×1)
Usual Practices and Regulation of Yaxi Wine Shop 衙西店卖酒收趁则
例(×1)
Revenues and Subventions of Shuzhou Commercial Tax Agency 在城税
务趁办祖额分隶诸司窠名解发数目等事 (×1)
Estimated Yearly Account of Gongshi Wine House 公使酒库一岁约计收
支钱物帐 (×1)
Notice on sending Shuzhou Brewery and Commercial Tax Agency
handbook 在城酒税务须知册申状(×1)
Notice on sending Yaxi Wine Shop handbook 衙西酒店须知册申状 (×1)
Notice on sending Xugong County Wine House handbook 许公镇酒库须
知册申状 (×1)
Sun Jimin and Wei Lin have reorganized, punctuated, renamed and
annotated the Shuzhou documents15. They corrected and retrieved eight
mismatched documents, including six daily journals, the Estimated
Yearly Account of Gongshi Wine House, and the Usual Practices and
15
Jimin Sun and Lin Wei, Nan Song Shuzhou Gong Du Yi Jian Zheng Li Yu Yan Jiu 南
宋舒州公牍佚简整理与研究 (Shanghai: Shanghai gu ji chu ban she, 2011).
9
Regulation of Shuzhou Brewery. The correction of the Usual Practices
and Regulation of Shuzhou Brewery is the most significant. This
document recorded the guideline and accounting rules of the brewery,
but the original document was severely mismatched so as to affect
understanding (see Appendix B)16. Documents used in this study were
based on Sun and Wei (2011); please see Appendix A for a detailed list.
Shuzhou was a prefecture in Huainan West Circuit, which is the
frontier facing Jurchen Jin in the North. There were nineteen official
breweries within the jurisdiction of Shuzhou. The Shuzhou Brewery
mentioned in the documents was in Huaining County, the prefecture sit.
Prefecture government controlled the Shuzhou Brewery directly. Other
official breweries were under the management of county governments.
The Shuzhou Brewery and the Commercial Tax Agency were combined,
named 在城酒税务. The monitor of the brewery and tax agency was Liu
Shouyan 柳寿彦, ranking “chengzhonglang 成忠郞”, which was a low
central military rank. The main responsibility of a monitor was to
guarantee that revenues should be reported daily to the prefecture
government.17 According to the personnel regulation, official breweries
with annual revenues over 3,000 guan should be appointed with one to
four monitors by the central government. If the annual revenues reached
Ibid., p. 26-29, 101-03. See original document NO. 27, revised document NO. 1
17 《宋史职官志》“监当官”：诸州军随事置官，其征榷场务岁有定额，岁终课其额
16
以登耗以为举刺。凡课利所入，日具数以申于州。
10
30,000 guan, local officials had the right to recommend clerks as
monitors.18 The annual revenue handed to the government from Shuzhou
Brewery was 25,584 guan, thus the appointment of a central low-level
military official as the general monitor was in accordance with the
regulation.19
Table 1 Monitors (监当官) and Superindentents (专一提点官) in Shuzhou
在城酒税务
在城酒务
衙西酒店
舒州州院
甲仗库
秤斗库
物料库
作院
粮料院
签厅
柳寿彦
汪舜举
盛存之
冯德
王琮
侯立
朱佺
成忠郞
右文林郎 右文林郎 修五郎
进义副尉 武节郎
右文林郎
司法参军 录事参军 兵马都监 本州指使 兵马舒州 观察支使
兼在城巡
都监兼在
检
城巡检
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Under the general monitor, there were also specialized
superintendents for each official brewery or wine shop, who performed
as executive managers and were responsible for the accuracy in the
daily accounting journals. At the end of each daily journal of the
Shuzhou Brewery, we see the inscription of “右文林郎司法参军专一提点酒
务汪舜举”. Wenlinlang is a ninth-grade civil rank, the prefix “you”
18
Li, Song Dai Jiu De Sheng Chan He Zheng Que 宋代酒的生产和征榷, p. 179-83.
《宋会要辑稿》食货二零之八“旧制，诸道榷酤课满三万贯，举官监临”.
19 Usual Practices and Regulation of Shuzhou Brewery, see Sun and Wei, Nan Song
Shuzhou Gong Du Yi Jian Zheng Li Yu Yan Jiu 南宋舒州公牍佚简整理与研究, p.101.
11
indicates that the holder of the rank was not a degree holder in the
civil examination. Sifa Canjun, or judicial officier, is a prefectural
government position.20
The brewery also had a clerk, Cai Qing 蔡青, and
a chief wine maker, Hu Zhuan 胡僎, who prepared the daily journals. The
daily journals of Shouzhou Brewery also included revenues from the Yaxi
Wine shop, but we know from the “Usual Practices and Regulation of
Yaxi Wine Shop 衙西店卖酒收趁则例” that the Yaxi Wine Shop had its own
monitors and superintendent21. As shown in Table 1, by collecting all
the occasions where one monitor or superintendent showed up in all the
Shuzhou documents, we can see that it was not uncommon for one to
monitor more than one state organs.
3.
The Structure of the Shuzhou Brewery Daily Journals
In this section, we’ll start with the structure of and information contained in
the sixteen daily journals.
Following Li Weiguo (2007) and Li Hurarui (1995), we take December 21 as
an example, the original text of which is reproduced in Appendix C. All the daily
journals were uniformly formatted. Table 2 has listed all the important items that
Yanming Gong, Song Dai Guan Zhi Ci Dian 宋代官制辞典 (Beijing: Zhonghua shu
ju : Xin hua shu dian Beijing fa xing suo fa xing, 1997).
21 The two monitors of Yaxi Wine Shop were “修武郎、权兵马都监、兼衙西店 冯
德” and “进义副尉、本州指挥使、兼监衙西店 王琮”. Xiuwulang is also a military
rank, ranking higher than the monitor of Shuzhou Brewery. Jinyi Fushi is a no-grade
military rank. Quan bingma dujian and benzhou zhihui were both prefectural
military positions. The superintendent of the Yaxi Wine Shop was “右文林郎、录事
参军、提点衙西酒店 盛存之”. The rank of youwenlinlang was the same as the
superintendent of the Brewery; lushi canjun was also a prefectural position.
20
12
were included in the daily journals, as shown in column (1). Column (2) is the
numbering of the items to facilitate explanation. Column (3) indicates how the
amount of each item can be generated, which will be explained in more detail in
what follows. Column (4) is the case of December 21, which can be verified with
Appendix C. Column (5) presents the average values for each item calculated from
all the sixteen daily journals.
13
Table 2 The Structure and Information of Daily Journal
14
Now let’s look at the items in column (1) more closely. Every daily journal
starts by stating the daily total revenue [1], as a sum of revenues from the Shuzhou
Brewery [2] and revenues from the Yaxi Wine shop [3]. The nature and revenues of
Yaxi Wine shop will be left for Section 5.
Revenues from the Shuzhou Brewery [2] were comprised of revenues from
wine sales [4] and revenues from yeast sales [21]. For yeast sales, typically, only
the number of sold yeast cakes, the price (30 wenzu for each, i.e. 39 wensheng for
each), and the calculated revenue in terms of wensheng were presented. After that,
there was one sentence indicating that these revenues were to be turned over to
the circuit fiscal commission, jingzongzhi agency, and the stabilization fund
supervisorate. The specific amount of subventions to each agency was not
indicated.22 But from the Usual Practices and Regulation of Shuzhou Brewery,
we could know how the share of each agency was determined: for each
yeast cake sold (39 wensheng), the circuit fiscal commission took 21.9
(56%), the Jingzongzhi agency took 14.6 (38%), the stabilization fund
supervisorate took 2.4 (6%).
The real challenge is the on understanding the revenues from wine sales, that
is, the shaded part in Table 2, which will be the focus of Section 4. I will try to
answer two questions in the following sections:
1)
If we were the accountants of the Shuzhou Brewery, how would we generate
the daily journals? What were the procedures to follow? How should we
A typical entry for yeast sale reads like “卖槽牌肆拾个，每个收钱叁拾文足，展
计共收钱壹贯伍伯伍拾玖文省，系分隶转运、经总制钱并常平司钱数。”
22
15
determine how much of the revenue should be turned in to each government
agency?
2)
If we can discover such an account keeping procedure, what sense shall we
make of it? What does such a procedure tell us about the logic and customs of
state wine management?
4.
Modeling Account Keeping for Brewery Wine Sales
As shown in Table 2, revenues from wine sales were divided into four parts:
to pay the six daily keli [7], to reimburse the breweries’ expenses on raw materials
[14], extra jingzongzhi qian[19], and residuals (could be either positive or negative)
[20].
4.1. The Six Daily Keli
The Six Daily Keli (日申课利钱六项) correspond to what is usually referred to
as “Keli Qian 课利钱”. The Usual Practice and Regulation indicated the annual “zu’e
qian 祖额钱”23of Shuzhou brewery was 25,583,580 wensheng. The figure was not
the annual total revenues from wine sales, but the yearly total amount of the six keli,
which is about 68% of total sales. Taking a year as 365 days, it means that daily keli
qian should be around 70,092, which was very close to the average amount of six
daily keli from the daily journals, 69,077.
The six daily keli were the following items:
a. Xisheng Qian 系省钱 belonged to the Shuzhou Prefecture.
According to the Usual Practice and Regulation, daily average subvention to the
zu’e qian was a figure calculated from revenues in previous years, which served
as a revenue quota for state-owned enterprises to fulfill.
23
16
prefecture should be about 28,862. The average xisheng qian from the daily
journals was 29,173, which was about 42% of the total six daily keli.
b. Jingzongzhi Qian 经总制钱 belonged to the central government,
which took the largest share of the six daily keli (about 47%).
c. Daily Factory Mangement Expenses 本务日支雇夫、作匠、物料等.
d. Yiyong qian 移用等钱 was the subvention to the circuit fiscal
commission.
e. Subvention to the statlization fund supervisorate 常平续添酒钱.
f. Prefecture Touzi 本州头子钱. According to the uanfu Statues 元
符令(1098-1100), 50% of Touzi qian should be under the name of
prefecture Xisheng qian, which means it would be included in the
national account; the other 50% should be under the disposal of the
prefecture while the central government wouldn’t interfere (不系省).
But according to the Shuzhou archive, Touzi qian was divided among the
center government (82%), the circuit fiscal commission (14%) and the
prefecture (4%). Apparently, the half-half division between center and
local was no long feasible in Southern Song.
The Usual Practices and Regulations of the Shuzhou Brewery included a section
on how wine sales revenues should be shared among different government
agencies. However, there were structural differences between the Ususal Practices
and Regulations and the actual daily journals, which make the patterns calculated
from the former not a readily applicable guidance to compare with the latter. As
shown Table 3, in the Ususal Practices and Regulations, revenue from the sale of
17
each sheng of wine (officially 194 wensheng) should all be turned in as the six daily
keli. In other words, from the Ususal Practices and Regulations, it looks as if the
brewery should receive all raw materials from the prefecture, thus did not need to
purchase out of their own purse, which could explain why revenues from sales
would not be directed to item [14] “to reimburse the breweries’ expenses on raw
materials” as was case in reality.
Table 3 Subventions of Wine Revenues according to the "Usual Practices and
Regulations of Shuzhou Brewery"
18
Table 4 Reorganized Subventions of Wine Revenues according to "Usual
Practices and Regulation of Shuzhou Brewery"
It is important to keep in mind that the revenue subvention patterns in the
Ususal Practices and Regulations only addressed the six daily keli. So shares taken
by each agency calculated from the Ususal Practices and Regulation (e.g.
subventions to the Shuzhou Prefecture takes 40.5%) is comparable to the share of
that agency in “six daily keli [7]” rather than its share in the amount of “revenue
from wine sales [4]” when calculating from daily journals (in the case of
“subventions to the Shuzhou Prefecture [8]”, it means that [8]/[7], rather than
[8]/[4] should be used to compare with 40.5%).
Before we do such comparisons, there is one more technical adjustment to
make the information from the Ususal Practices and Regulations and the data from
the daily journals more readily comparable. As shown in Table 3, for the item f.
Touzi Qian, the Usual Practices and Regulations has given detailed divisions on this
item: for every 8 touzi qian, 6.6 went to jingzongzhi (f.1), 1.1 went to the fiscal
commission (f.2), and the rest 0.3 was for the prefecture finance (f.3). Judging from
19
the name, f.3 is the one that corresponded to “f. Prefecture Touzi” in Table 2. If we
do the adjustment of combining together jingzongzhi qian (b and f.1, shaded green)
and combining together subventions to the fiscal commission (d and f.2, shaded
orange), we get Table 4, which is structurally readily comparable with the data
from daily journals.
Compositions of the six daily keli calculated from the sixteen daily journals
are presented in Table 5. The principle is to take the least variable item as most
possible to be a fixed proportion. From column a, b, d, e, f, we can see that the
shares are pretty constant, with reasonably low spread. Moreover, the proportions
are very close to the values in Table 4, which also help justify the adjustment done
for Table 3. These are the first group of relationships that we can propose most
confidently, as shown in row 10-14 in Table 2:
20

Xisheng qian [9]= Six Daily Keli [7]×42%

Jingzongzhi qian [10]= Six Daily Keli [7]×47%

Subvention to the circuit fiscal commission [11]= Six Daily Keli [7]×2%

Subvention to the statlization fund supervisorate [12]= Six Daily Keli [7]×1.34%

Prefecture touzi 本州头子钱 [13]= Six Daily Keli [7]×0.2%
Table 5 Compositions of the Six Daily Keli
Share of Each Subvention in Total Six Levies (%)
Date
a. Subvention
to Shuzhou
Prefecture
b. Jingzongzhi
Levy
c. Daily
Mangement
Expense
d. Subvention e. Subvention to f. Prefecture
to Circuit Fiscal the Statlization Touzi
Commission
Fund
[8]/[7]
[9]/[7]
[10]/[7]
[11]/[7]
[12]/[7]
[13]/[7]
15-Dec
41.8%
47.1%
7.6%
1.92%
1.34%
0.19%
16-Dec
41.6%
47.1%
7.9%
1.92%
1.34%
0.19%
17-Dec
40.9%
47.1%
8.6%
1.92%
1.34%
0.19%
20-Dec
42.0%
47.1%
7.5%
1.92%
1.34%
0.19%
21-Dec
42.2%
48.5%
7.3%
1.92%
1.34%
0.19%
22-Dec
42.6%
47.0%
7.0%
1.91%
1.34%
0.19%
23-Dec
42.5%
47.1%
6.9%
2.01%
1.33%
0.19%
24-Dec
42.9%
47.1%
6.5%
1.92%
1.34%
0.19%
25-Dec
43.1%
47.1%
6.3%
1.92%
1.34%
0.19%
26-Dec
42.0%
47.1%
7.5%
1.92%
1.34%
0.19%
27-Dec
42.0%
47.1%
7.5%
1.92%
1.34%
0.19%
28-Dec
42.4%
47.1%
7.1%
1.92%
1.34%
0.19%
1-Jan
42.5%
47.1%
6.9%
2.01%
1.33%
0.19%
2-Jan
42.6%
47.0%
7.0%
1.91%
1.34%
0.19%
3-Jan
42.2%
47.1%
7.3%
1.92%
1.34%
0.19%
7-Jan
42.0%
47.1%
7.5%
1.92%
1.34%
0.17%
MEAN
42.2%
47.2%
7.3%
1.93%
1.3%
0.2%
STD
0.51%
0.35%
0.52%
0.03%
0.00%
0.00%
Normalized STD
1.2%
0.8%
7.2%
1.7%
0.2%
2.1%
Note 1 Normalized STD is calculated as standard deviation normalized by the mean, which allows comparing
more appropriately the spread of the distribution of a variable with a large mean with the spread of the
distribution of another variable with smaller mean and correspondingly smaller standard deviation.
These numbers were largely comparable with case of Qingyuan Prefecture in
119724, with Xisheng Qian taking 40%, Jingzongzhi qian taking 42%, circuit fiscal
commission taking 2.8%. The main difference was that Qingyuan had a rice
purchasing department 籴米司, which took 15.2% of keli qian. Since there was this
24
Bao Qing Siming Zhi 宝庆四明志, (Shanghai: Shanghai gu ji chu ban she,
1987). 卷五《叙赋上》宝庆三年(1197) 庆元府都酒务酒利分隶则例.
21
rice-purchasing department, the Qingyuan Brewery might not have needed to
purchase rice from the market on its own as the Shuzhou Brewery did. We could
guess that the share of keli qian in total wine sales revenues would be higher than
the case of Shuzhou, since the brewery might not need to be repaid for raw
material expenses. But there was no concrete information on this.
Column 3 in Table 5 presents the share of daily management expense, which
included employee wages and material incidentals. This expense had been constant
(5000 wensheng per day) in all the sixteen daily journals. The Usual Practices and
Regulation illustrated how the number of employees and wages were determined:
“From March to the end of November, we sell normal wine. 12 workers are hired,
the wage is 250 wensheng per worker per day; and one wine maker is hired, the
wage is 300 wensheng per day. From December to the end of February, we sell
boiled wine. 15 workers are hired, the wage is 250 wensheng per worker per day;
one wine maker is hired, the wage is 300 wensheng.” Since the daily journals were
all written in December and January, we would expect boiled wine was being sold.
However, the price of wine in the daily journal was 194 wensheng per sheng, which
was the price of normal wine. So we are not sure how many workers were being
employed. Wage expenses should be either 3300 or 4050, according to the Usual
Practices and Regulations, thus expense on other material incidentals other than
those listed in the daily journals should be between 950 and 1700.
Although was have figured out how the six daily keli were divided, the basic
question of how the share of six daily keli in the total sales revenue was determined
remained unanswered. Noticing that it was the prefecture government that shared
raw material cost with the brewery, xisheng qian was in practice an investment
return. The share of xisheng qian could only be understood in the context of cost-
22
profit analysis, which will also lead us to answer the question of how the amount of
the six daily keli was determined. We will do these in the following sections.
4.2. Cost Analysis from “tiepei”
Based on the information provided in the second component of wine
revenues, the “raw material expenses of the brewery ([14] in Table 2)”, we will be
able to know the cost undertaken by the brewery and the prefecture government
respectively, which is the basis for calculating the share of wine sale revenues
directed to reimburse the brewery’s raw material expenses and for revealing the
profit margin of the brewery as a firm and the prefecture government as an
investor.
Though not included in Table 2, the section on raw material expenses in the
daily journals included not only the cost incurred by the brewery, called tiepei 贴陪,
but also the amount paid by the prefecture government on all three raw materials,
namely rice, yeast, firewood and other incidentals. A typical section on tiepei, as
exemplified in the December 21 daily journal, reads like the following:
“The brewery shared the cost of extra rice, yeast and firewood consumed. The
total is 27,380 wensheng. Details are listed as follows:
Rice: besides the 354 sheng received from the prefecture granary, the brewery
purchased 991 sheng. The price is 160 wensheng/dou (i.e. 16 wensheng/sheng).
Money paid on rice was 15,856 wensheng.
Matches: besides the 1,065 wensheng paid by the prefecture government, the
brewery expensed 2,980 wensheng.
Yeast: besides the 63.5 jin received from the prefecture government, the
brewery purchased 178 jin. For each jin of yeast, the total cost in 48 wensheng, which
includes the cost of wheat, labor cost and other incidentals. So the total monetary
cost is 8,544 wensheng.”25
25
See Appendix C for the original text.
23
Table 6 Dec 21. Material Cost Analysis
Summarizing the information provided in the narrative above, we have Table
6. Column (1) shows the prices for rice and yeast, which were fixed in all the daily
journals. Column (2) and (4) present the amount of rice and yeast paid by the
government and the brewery respectively. Column (3) and (5) present the
monetary cost undertaken by the government and the brewery respectively.
Column (6) and (7) show the total quantity of raw materials consumed and the
total monetary cost. Column (8) is the share paid by the government for each item,
which calls for our attention. With very few exceptions, the shares undertaken by
the government for each of the three items were always consistent26. Besides these
cost on raw materials, “c. daily management expense”, one of the six daily keli, was
also a cost item. As mentioned, the daily management expense had been constantly
5000 wensheng per day. Adding together the raw material cost and the
management cost, we can have the total daily variable cost.
Even in cases where the shares taken by the government in the three items were
different (Dec 16, Dec 22, Jan 3, and Jan 7), the difference is within 1%. Moreover,
in three of the four cases (except Dec 22), the difference was in the item of “yeast”,
where the brewery paid more money than claimed from the revenue and had to
wait for future reimbursement (marked by the terms of “少钱”, “侯次日收还” in the
journal). So the inaccuracy is understandable.
26
24
Li Huarui’s analysis on the cost decomposition based on Shuzhou brewery
archive incurred an obvious mistake (see the table on p. 319 in Li 1995)27. The raw
material cost shared by the government was put as a constant of 26% for all the
dates, which cannot even be supported by the data in the same table. As much as
we hope it to be the case, the government’s share was not a constant, though the
variation was indeed quite small. According to my calculation, the mean of
government’s share is 27%, with a standard deviation of 1% (see column (4) of
Table 7). A comprehensive cost decomposition table similar to the one in Li’s book
was present in Appendix D.
Table 7 Relationships of Rice Quantity and Total Material Cost
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Yeast/Rice
matches
etc/rice
Raw
Materials
Cost/Rice
% of
Material
Cost paid by
Gov
Date
15-Dec
16-Dec
17-Dec
20-Dec
21-Dec
22-Dec
23-Dec
24-Dec
25-Dec
26-Dec
27-Dec
28-Dec
1-Jan
2-Jan
3-Jan
7-Jan
Mean
STD
17.9
17.9
18.0
17.9
18.0
17.9
17.9
18.0
17.9
18.0
17.9
18.0
17.8
17.9
17.9
18.4
18.0
0.12
2.9
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.1
0.34
27.5
27.7
27.6
27.6
27.6
27.6
27.6
27.6
27.6
27.7
27.6
27.6
27.5
27.6
27.6
27.8
27.6
0.07
26%
26%
25%
26%
26%
27%
28%
28%
29%
26%
27%
28%
29%
28%
27%
27%
27%
0.01
Note 2 Column (1), “Yeast/Rice” is the total quantity of yeast consumed measured by jin over the total quantity
of rice consumed measured by 100 sheng. Column (2), “Firework/Rice” is the total monetary cost on matches,
oil and other incidentals over the quantity of rice consumed measured by sheng. Column (3), “Raw Material
Cost/Rice” is the total monetary cost on rice, yeast, matches etc. over the quantity of rice measured by sheng.
Column (4), “% of Material Cost paid by Gov” is the share of total material cost undertaken by the prefecture
government.
27
Li, Song Dai Jiu De Sheng Chan He Zheng Que 宋代酒的生产和征榷, p. 319.
25
After clarifying this misunderstanding, we shall dig deeper into the raw
material cost, which will lay the foundation for estimating total cost based on the
amount of rice consumed. It is noticeable that there is a constant proportional
relationship between the three raw material costs. The Usual Practices and
Regulations said the following on wine production: “For each 100 sheng of rice, we
use18 jin of yeast, 5 jin of matches, and half liang of oil”. The proportion of yeast to
rice was well supported by the data from the daily journals, as shown in column (1)
in Table 7. The part on matches and oil cannot be directly testified, as there was no
mention of either the price or the quantity of matches and oil. However, as shown
in column (2) in Table 7, the total monetary cost on matches, oil and other
incidentals is proportional to the quantity of rice consumed, confirming indirectly
that line in the Usual Practices and Regulations. Now that the regulation and the
data confirmed each other, we can go one step forward. Column (3) presents a
rather stable relationship between the total material cost and the quantity of rice
consumed, which is reasonable given that the official purchasing prices of rice and
yeast were constant, the amount of yeast and the cost of matches were
proportional to rice. So for each sheng of rice used in production, 27.6 wensheng
would be expensed. Though the government’s share was not constant, for the
purpose of estimation, 27% is good enough. Summarizing these observations,
estimation method for material cost given the quantity of rice is shown in Table 8.
26
Table 8 Estimation Method for Material Cost
Modeling Material Cost
Unit Price
(wensheng)
Quantity
Cost (wensheng)
Rice 糯米
16 per sheng
[5]
[5]×16
Matches etc 火柴物料
N/A
N/A
[5]×3
Bran 麸麴
48 per jin
[5]×18%
[5]×8.6
Item
Total Raw Material Cost [CM]
Raw Material Cost Paid by the Prefecture
Government 省司支破 [Cgov]
Raw Material Cost Paid by Brewery 贴陪
[14]
[5]×27.6
[CM]×27%
[CM]×73%
4.3. Profit Margins
Based on the cost analysis, we are ready to calculate the profit margin for: (1)
the brewery as a firm;(2) the prefecture government as an investor; (3) all
government agencies as a whole.
For the firm as a whole, the total variable cost was the raw material cost plus
daily management cost, while the return was the total revenues from wine sales.
For the prefecture government, its variable cost was the share it took in the raw
material cost, while the return was one of the six daily keli, xisheng qian. For all the
government agencies as a whole, the cost was the same as for the prefecture
government, since the prefecture government was the only agency that invested;
while the return is the rest five of the six daily keli (all but daily management cost)
plus “extra subventions to jingzongzhi”. The result is shown in Table 9. Taking the
brewery as a business, the profit margin over daily variable cost was 146%. For the
prefecture government as an investor, the return to its daily investment was 196%.
Taking all the different levels of government agencies as whole, the return to its
27
daily investment was 620%. As high as these numbers appear, we need to
remember that only daily variable cost was taken into account.
Table 9 Profit Margins
4.4. Coincidence or Necessity?
Up to now, we have gone over the sub-components of the “six daily keli” and
the brewery’s tiepei on raw material cost, which together took the giant share in
the revenues from wine sales (94%). So once the amount of rice is known, we are
now able to estimate the section on tiepei. And once the total amount of the six
daily keli is known, we are able to decide how this amount is to be divided into six
shares. The question remains to be how the share of the six daily keli in the total
wine revenues (about 68%) was decided.
I will present several constant or nearly constant relationships discovered in
the daily journals, which will lead us to a tentative answer. Firstly, there were
28
several constant relationships that were directly detectable from the daily journals
and required no further calculation:
1) zhengjiu quantity 计卖正酒 [6]= maoshu 卖酒毛数 [5] (sheng) ×40%
This relationship was apparent in every daily journal. The report on wine
sales of the brewery always started this way: “卖酒壹拾叁硕肆斗伍升
(1345)，毛数，计卖正酒伍硕叁斗捌升(538)” as in the case of December
21 (see Appendix C).
2) maoshu 卖酒毛数 [5]= total rice used in production (sheng)
3)
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑥 𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑠 [7]
𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑒 (194 𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑔)
=
𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑒 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
For 3), now it may looks puzzling why we should care about how much
zhengjiu the amount of keli was equivalent to. But actually this number is not from
my calculation, but was demonstrative in the daily journals. After reporting the
total amount of the six daily keli, there was a sentence stating how many shengs of
zhengjiu this amount was equivalent to. For example, in the case of December 21, it
says: “日申课利钱陆项，共陆拾捌贯伍伯捌拾无文叁分省，计卖正酒叁硕伍斗肆
升半”(see Appendix C). This is not the only occasion where the amount of money
was represented by the quantity of zhengjiu it was equivalent to. In the Usual
Practice and Regulation of Shuzhou Brewery, when stating the annual and daily
quota of keli, the monetary amount was also represented by the equivalent amount
of zhengjiu: “契勘祖额钱贰万伍仟伍伯捌拾叁贯伍伯捌拾文省(25,583,580)，其钱
作叁伯陆拾日，每日多寡不定. 今约度每日卖钱柒拾壹贯陆拾伍文省(71,065)，计
卖正酒叁硕陆斗柒升贰合(367.2)”(see Appendix B).
29
The wording is an important hint. From 1) and 3) above, we have seen all the
occasions involving the Shuzhou Brewery where the word “zhengjiu” showed up. In
section 5, we will see the mentions of “zhengjiu” in the documents on Yaxi Wine
Shop, which provided more direct evidence on what zhengjiu was standing for. To
leak out the result, maoshu is the actual quantity of wine sold within the day at the
actual market price. Zhengjiu, on the other hand, is the “official” quantity of sales
calculated based on the official price. The price of 194 wensheng was the official
price for account keeping and subvention purposes, not the actual sale price in the
market. Because the official price was about 2.5 times the real price, so zhengjiu is
40% of maoshu. The actual price should be around 77 wensheng (=194/2.5).
Detailed argument to support this bold allege will be provided in Section 5, after
additional necessary supporting information from the Yaxi Wine Shop is
introduced.
Besides the three apparent relationships above, the share of the six daily keli
in the total sales revenue also presented an almost constant pattern as shown in
Table 10. The average share of the total six daily keli in wine revenues was 67.9%.
As shown in column (4), the share of the total six daily keli in wine revenues can be
very well approximated by dividing the share of total material cost undertaken by
the prefecture government by 40% (the result is column (3)).
30
Table 10 The Share of Keli in Wine Sales Revenue
Date
15-Dec
16-Dec
17-Dec
20-Dec
21-Dec
22-Dec
23-Dec
24-Dec
25-Dec
26-Dec
27-Dec
28-Dec
1-Jan
2-Jan
3-Jan
7-Jan
Mean
STD
(1)
(2)
(3)
% six levies % Gov in (2)÷40%
in revenue Material
Cost
65.6%
26.1%
65.3%
65.1%
25.9%
64.7%
62.9%
25.1%
62.8%
65.4%
26.1%
65.3%
65.9%
26.3%
65.8%
67.4%
27.0%
67.6%
68.9%
27.6%
69.0%
69.3%
27.7%
69.3%
71.7%
28.7%
71.7%
65.8%
26.2%
65.5%
68.3%
27.3%
68.3%
70.5%
28.2%
70.6%
73.5%
29.1%
72.8%
70.7%
28.3%
70.7%
69.0%
27.5%
68.7%
67.2%
26.7%
66.8%
67.9%
27.1%
67.8%
2.6%
1.1%
2.6%
(4)
(1)-(3)
0.3%
0.5%
0.1%
0.1%
0.1%
-0.2%
-0.1%
0.0%
0.0%
0.3%
0.0%
0.0%
0.6%
0.1%
0.3%
0.4%
0.1%
0.2%
Note 3 Column (1) is the share of the total six daily keli in wine revenues. Column (2) is the share of total
material cost undertaken by the prefecture government, which is the same as column (4) of Table 7. Column
(3) is the result by dividing the percentages in column (2) by 40%. Column (4) is the difference between
column (1) and column (3).
This pattern might not be a mere coincidence if my hypothesis that the price
in the daily journals was just the official price and that maoshu was the actual
amount of wine being sold is right. I will provide more evidence to support this
hypothesis in the next section. For the time being, let’s first accept this hypothesis
to hold and see how it works.
We will use the following symbols:
R: the total amount of rice used
%𝑮𝒈𝒐𝒗 : The share of total material cost taken by the government
𝑷𝑶 : The official selling price of wine, which was 194 wensheng in the brewery
31
𝑷𝑨 : The actual selling price of wine
We make the following hypotheses:
𝑯𝟏 : The wine production in the brewery had a rice-wine ratio around 1:1. We
will take 1:1 in calculation for convenience. So given the rice used is R, the amount
of wine produced would be R.
𝑯𝟐 : 𝑃𝐴 = 𝑃𝑂 × 40% = 77 𝑤𝑒𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑔.
The production regulation for the Yaxi Wine Shop provided circumstantial
evidence for 𝐻1 and 𝐻2 , which will be introduced in Section 5.
𝑯𝟑 is about principal for government agencies to claim keli qian: Keli qian (i.e.
the total amount the six daily keli) was the theoretical revenue from selling the
wine produced with the rice and other materials provided by the state, i.e. the
prefecture government. By “theoretical revenue”, I mean the revenue was
calculated by multiplying the quantity of wine by 𝑷𝑶 .
Given H1 and H2 , the total revenue from sales would be:
Revenue = 𝑅 × 𝑃𝐴 = 𝑅 × (𝑃𝑂 × 40%) = (𝑅 × 40%) × 𝑃𝑂 = 𝑚𝑎𝑜𝑠ℎ𝑢 ×
official price
Given H1 , H2 and H3 , the total amount the six keli would be:
𝐾𝑒𝑙𝑖 𝑄𝑖𝑎𝑛 = 𝑅 × %𝑮𝒈𝒐𝒗 × 𝑃𝑂
So the share of keli qian in total revenue would be:
𝐾𝑒𝑙𝑖 𝑄𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑅 × %𝑮𝒈𝒐𝒗 × 𝑃𝑜 %𝑮𝒈𝒐𝒗
=
=
(𝑅 × 40%) × 𝑃𝑂
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
40%
This explains the findings in Table 10. Notice that this explanation is built on
the three hypotheses. In the next section, we will see more evidence why H1 and H2
should hold. And in the conclusion part of Section 6, I will try to weave all the
findings together to show the plausibility of all three hypotheses.
32
5. Gongshi Wine House
5.1. Gongshi Qian and Gongshi Wine house
As having introduced in the first section, a prefecture’s financial resource
mainly came from Xisheng Qian, which was the part of national income that was
retained locally. Xisheng Qian nominally still belonged to the central government,
and was in principle a part of national accounting, as indicated by the name
“Xisheng” (belonging to the state financial commission, literally). So although
Xisheng Qian was stored in local storehouses, the prefecture government was
somewhat limited in their ability to dispose the money as they wished. Besides
Xisheng Qian, prefectures had some other incomes under different account items,
which, though small in amount compared to Xisheng Qian, did give the prefectures
more liberty in disposal. In general, these items were referred to as “Buxisheng Qian”
(not belonging to the State Financial Commission, literally), which were used for
prefecture government miscellaneous expenses. Some examples of buxisheng qian
included gongshi qian 公使钱(public relations fees), touzi qian 头子钱, maiguzhi
qian 卖故纸钱(revenues from selling used official documents), etc. We have seen
that one source of revenue for touzi qian was wine sales, though only taking a very
small share of wine revenue. Gongshi qian was mainly used to entertain officials
visiting or going through the prefecture and to subsidize inferior officials. There
were two main sources for gongshi qian: state granted gongshi qian (正赐公使钱)
and gongshi storehouse money (公使库钱). The state granted gongshi qian was
appropriated from national finance as an already expensed item so that prefectures
33
had more liberty in using it. To make up the shortage of state granted gongshi qian,
prefectures were allowed to setting up a separate storehouse, gongshi ku, to
reserve some revenues for public relation expenses28.
Similar to the gongshi storehouse, prefectures were allowed to set up a
separate brewery to produce non-commercial goingshi wine 公使酒, which was the
wine used in official entertaining and gift-giving. Gongshi wine was also used to
reward the militia. In principle, goingshi wine shouldn’t be sold in the market. In
Southern Song, as the state was no longer able to grant gongshi qian to the
prefectures, local governments were allowed to set up goingshi wine houses (公使
酒库) and sell some gongshi wine in the market to make up the shortages of
goingshi qian. That is to say, wine sale revenues from gongshi wine houses all went
to the prefecture government.29
According to “Estimated Yearly Account of Shuzhou Gongshi Wine House”30, the
yearly revenue from wine sales was 35,000,000 wensheng. Annual rice
consumption was more than 4100 shuo, of which 1000 shuo was appropriated
from the prefecture granary and most of the rest was purchased from the market.
Annual consumption of yeast was 54,000 jin. Based on the Gongshi Wine House’s
consumption of raw materials and annual revenue, Li Huarui reached the
conclusion that “Shuzhou Gongshi Wine House consumed more than twice the rice
28
Bao, Song Dai Di Fang Cai Zheng Shi Yan Jiu 宋代地方财政史研究, p.50-61.
29
Li, Song Dai Jiu De Sheng Chan He Zheng Que 宋代酒的生产和征榷, p.267-72.
30《公使酒库具一岁约计收支钱物等事》.
Document NO.34 in Song Ren Yi Jian 宋
人佚简. Revised document NO.6 in Sun and Wei, Nan Song Shuzhou Gong Du Yi Jian
Zheng Li Yu Yan Jiu 南宋舒州公牍佚简整理与研究.
34
used in the Shuzhou brewery”. This statement was based on a misunderstanding on
the “the Usual Practice and Regulation of Shuzhou Brewery”, which was in effect not
a full statement of all the production and sales in the brewery but only on the share
that was collected as keli qian. The annual amount of rice used in the brewery was
alleged to 1800 shuo in the Usual Practice and Regulation of Shuzhou Brewery.
However, I argue that the 1800 shuo was only the amount of rice correspondent to
“zhengjiu”, which was 40% of the total amount of rice used. So the yearly
consumption of rice in the Shuzhou Brewery should be around 4500 shuo.
Supporting this argument, if we multiply the average daily consumption of rice in
the sixteen daily journals (13.12 shuo) by 365 days, we have an annual figure of
4735 shuo. Similarly, the “annual revenue” of the Shuzhou Brewery was alleged to
be 25,583,580 as the figure of zu’e suggested in the Usual Practice and Regulation of
Shuzhou Brewery. However, as I have argued in section 4.1, this number was not the
annual total revenues from wine sales, but the yearly total amount of the six keli,
which is about 68% of total sales as calculated from the daily journals. So the
annual sales of Shuzhou Brewery should be around 37,622,912 (25,583,580 over
0.68). If my argument is correct, the production scales of the Gongshi Wine House
and the Shuzhou Brewery were close.
5.2. The Yaxi Wine Shop
The nature of the Yaxi Wine shop seemed to be one of the Gongshi wine
houses. Its production followed the practice stipulated in the Gongshi Wine House
regulation. The prefecture government provided all the paid-in-capital. Daily cost
of production would be reimbursed from the sales, while net profit would be
35
forwarded to the prefecture storehouse every quarter.31 The average daily revenue
of Yaxi Wine Shop was 63,786 wensheng from the daily journals. According to the
Usual Practices and Regulations of Yaxi Wine Shop, the quota of daily net profit had
been 30,000 wensheng and was recently lifted to 35,000; and the daily expense on
wages of the managers and workers was 3,600 wensheng. The shop received all the
raw materials it needed from the prefecture granary except for some yeast, which
cost on average 1027 wensheng per day. Although it seemed that the daily revenue
could hardly meet the net profit quota in most of the days covered by the available
daily journals, but considering seasonal effects, it still could be said that the
numbers were close. The central government had no share in the shop’s revenues
under the name of Jingzongzhi qian, which added to the probability that the Yaxi
Wine shop was a Goingshi wine house owned by the prefecture.
In the Usual Practices and Regulation of Yaxi Wine Shop, we can obtain
information on the practice of wine production, the information of which was not
available for the Shuzhou Brewery due to document fragmentation. It produced
two kinds of wine, boiled wine and new wine. The difference between the materials
for boiled wine and new wine was only that boiled wine used more matches. For
both boiled wine and new wine, 100 sheng of rough wine could generate 90 sheng
final product, consuming 100 sheng of rice and 16 jin of yeast. So the rice-wine ratio
31
《衙西店状为具申卖酒收趁则例事》:”依公使酒库则例造酒，沽买收钱，不以
多少，存留本钱 在库，循环做本…籴买柴、米、物料并支破雇夫等工食钱外，每
日净息钱三十贯文，逐旬作钞，起付州省库交纳,应付支遣官兵.近准使贴指挥，
增作三十五贯文省”. Document NO. 28 in Song Ren Yi Jian 宋人佚简. But as shown
in the daily journals, it seemed that all the revenues, not only net profit, were to be
turned over to the prefecture government; and correspondingly, the Yaxi Wine
Shop received all the raw materials it needed from the prefecture granary except
for some yeast, which the shop purchased from the market and got reimbursed. So
whether this was just for account keeping purposes or the Yaxi Shop did turn over
all the revenues to the prefecture government, it made no big different in effect.
36
was 10:9 in the Yaxi Wine Shop. Although we don't know this information for the
Shuzhou Brewery, it shouldn’t deviate too much from this ratio.
The section on pricing in the Usual Practices and Regulation of Yaxi Wine Shop
also gives important hint on our understanding of Shuzhou Brewery, especially the
wording:
For each sheng of new wine, we officially collect 150 wenzu (i.e. 195
wensheng). But in fact 2.5 sheng is to be sold for that 150 wenzu, of which 1
sheng is zhengjiu, 1.5 sheng is haojiu.32
Now we see familiar terms of zhengjiu showing up in the document of Yaxi
Wine Shop, with a counterpart called “haojiu”. For each sheng of zhengjiu, actually
2.5 sheng wine was sold. The price of 195 wensheng was just the official price for
account keeping and subvention purposes, not the actual sale price in the market.
The actual price should be 78 wensheng (195/2.5). That is to say, if 1 sheng of wine
was sold in the market at 78 wensheng, in the account, since the price was fixed at
195 wensheng, the accountant would record that 0.4 sheng zhengjiu was sold, with
0.6 sheng of haojiu being written down too. This seems to be just a word game with
no real effect. But when subventions to the government got involved, this word
game did serve the purpose of the central government in claiming more revenues
as in the case of the Shuzhou brewery, which we will discuss in the next section.
Revenues of the Yaxi Wine Shop were from two source: the main Yaxi Shop
(衙西正店) contributing on average 37% and the Huodian franchiser (豁店拍户)
contributing the rest 63%. Besides the normal new wine (195 wensheng/sheng),
both the main shop and the huodian franchiser were selling a kind of bottled wine
at the price of 104 wenshen each. One bottle contained 1 sheng of wine. There was
“一、卖酒则例：
煮酒每壹升正收钱壹佰柒拾文足，共卖酒壹升贰合：正酒壹升；耗酒贰合。
新酒每壹升正收钱一百五十文足，共卖酒贰升伍合：正酒壹升；耗酒壹升伍合。”
32
37
no mention of maoshu or zhengjiu for the bottled wine as there were for the normal
wine in bulk, and the revenues from sales were directly included into the daily
journals. So the price of 104 wensheng each should be the actual selling price. For
the production of bottled wine, the rice-wine ratio was 100:85, which was lower
compared to the wine in bulk. So it was reasonable that the bottled wine was being
sold at a higher price. In fact, its price should be even higher as it included the
bottle. This adds evidence to my argument that the real selling price for the normal
new wine should be 78 wensheng/sheng, instead of 195. Because otherwise, the
higher quality bottled wine would be cheaper than the bulk wine.
6. Conclusion: a hypothesis to knit the story
Price information from the Yaxi Wine Shop discussed in the last section solves
a puzzle for the Shuzhou Brewery, that is, what are the meanings of zhengjiu and
maoshu. On the one hand, if zhengjiu is the actual account of wine sale within the
day, why going through the trouble of calculating it by taking 40% of maoshu? How
can we explain the constant relationship that maoshu and the amount of rice used
always equaled each other? Although we can explain this by saying that one unit
one rice produces 0.4 unit of wine, but this wine-rice ratio is way too low for the
production level in Southern Song, in other words, the production technique at that
time has not yet reached such high level of efficiency and alcohol concentration.
The common wine-rice ratio in Song is around 1:133. From the Yaxi Wine shop, we
see that the ratios were 1:0.9 or 1:0.85. On the other hand, if as Li Weiguo
suggested, maoshu was the amount of wine sold and the daily journal only reported
33
Sun and Wei, Nan Song Shuzhou Gong Du Yi Jian Zheng Li Yu Yan Jiu 南宋舒州公牍
佚简整理与研究, p.26-28,101-03.
38
40% of the total revenue as the profit due to the government34, how shall we
understand why the other 60% of revenues did not even show up in the daily
journal, and the brewery’s expense on tiepei was reimbursed out of the 40% profit
rather than out of the 60% retained revenue? The idea of retaining 60% of revenue
in the brewery could not be supported by any entries in the official regulation.
Moreover, why was the unit price for bulk wine so much higher that the bottled
wine? In short, my conjecture is that maoshu IS the actual amount of wine being
sold, while zhengjiu is the implicated amount of wine based on the official price. To
have this conclusion make sense, there is a key point to be acknowledged: the
official price is not the real sale price.
In Southern Song, the official price for state-owned breweries increased
dramatically. From 1128 to 1139, price for high-quality wine increased by 78 wen,
medium quality wine by 38 wen, boiled wine by 60 wen35. A generally held implicit
belief among scholars who criticized the exploitative nature of the price lifting
policy towards consumers was that the official price was also the real selling price
in the market. In my opinion, the government-set official price, rather than
determining the real prices undertaken by the consumers, was actually a way to
expand the government share in the wine revenues. This is because the
government claimed revenue from selling the amount of wine produced from the
rice it provided for the brewery.
34
Weiguo Li, "Shao Xing Mo Long Xing Chu Shu Zhou Jiu Wu Gong Wen Yan Jiu 绍兴
末隆兴初舒州酒务公文研究," in Song Dai Chai Zheng He Wen Xian Kao Lun (2007),
P. 109-10.
35 Li, Song Dai Jiu De Sheng Chan He Zheng Que 宋代酒的生产和征榷, p. 78-84.
“Table of Official Wine Price Increases in Song” (song dai tian jiu jia yi lan biao)
39
Suppose the hypotheses 1 and 3 proposed in Section 4 hold. Namely, the wine
production in the brewery had a rice-wine ratio around 1:1, and Keli qian was the
theoretical revenue from selling the wine produced with the rice and other
materials provided by the prefecture government. Let’s stimulate a scenario of
official price lifting. For coefficients to be used in this simulation, say that the
original price was 77/sheng, which is also the actual selling price in the market; the
prefecture government provides 357 sheng of rice and the correspondent other
raw materials daily, which was the sample average from the daily journals; for
every 1 sheng of rice used in production, the associated raw material cost including
rice, matches, yeast etc. would be 27.6, which was the main finding in section 4.2.
For convenience, we only consider material cost of production in the simulation. Of
course we can also choose other sets of coefficients for demonstration, the basic
pattern will be the same.
Within this set up, the amount of levy due would be 77×357=27489, as shown
in column A in Table 11. Now the official price is lifted to 100/sheng, and the actual
selling price remains the same, as scenario in column B. The amount of keli due to
the government now increases to 35700 (=100×357), however, the revenue from
selling the 357 sheng of wine remains to be 27489. So there is a deficit of 8211 to
fulfill. The solution is for the brewery to purchase raw materials on its own, sell the
extra wine, and use the net profit to make up the keli deficit. The selling price for
the extra wine is still 77 per sheng; the production cost is 27.6 per sheng of rice, i.e.
27.6 per sheng of wine produced since one sheng of rice will produce one sheng of
wine as in Hypotheses 1. So the amount of extra rice purchased by the brewery
should satisfy the relationship that “deficit in keli= extra rice×(selling price-unit
cost)=extra rice×(77-27.6)”, so we have the result in row (8). The brewery will
40
purchase 166 sheng of rice and all the yeast, matches and other incidentals
associated with such amount of rice following the normal production practice. So
the summed amount of rice used in production will be 357+166=523 sheng, which
is the “maoshu”. Now we can also know the share of raw material taken by the
government is 68%, the amount of tiepei is 4587.5, the total revenue is 40288, and
this means that zhengjiu=revevue/official price=40288/100=403 sheng. The share
of keli in the total sales revenue will decrease from 100% to 89%.
Table 11 Simulating Scenarios of Official Price Lifting
Simulating Official Price Lifting
A
(1)
actual selling price
fixed
(2)
official price
input variable
(3)
rice provided by Gov (sheng)
sample average
(4)
keli qian due to the Gov
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
77
77
77
77
77
77
77
77
194
77
100
130
160
194
194
194
357
357
357
357
357
357
357
357
(2)×(3)
27489
35700
46410
57120
69258
69258
69258
69258
(5)
actual revenue from selling wine
(1)×(3)
produced from official rice
27489
27489
27489
27489
27489
27489
27489
27489
(6)
deficit to make up
0
8211
18921
29631
41769
41769
41769
41769
(7)
production cost associated with
sample average
1 sheng of rice
27.6
27.6
27.6
27.6
27.6
27.6
27.6
27.6
(8)
tiepei rice amount
(6)÷((1)-(7))
0
166
383
600
846
874
965
1071
(9)
total rice consumed = maoshu
(3)+(8)
357
523
740
957
1203
1231
1322
1428
(10) share of Gov paid raw material
(3)÷(9)
100%
68%
48%
37%
30%
29%
27%
25%
(11) cost of tiepei
(8)×(7)
0
4587.5
10571
16555
23337
24123
26640
29560
(12) additional revenue
(8)×(1)
0
12799
29492
46186
65106
67301
74322
82467
(13) total revenue
(5)+(12)
27489
40288
56981
73675
92595
94790
101811
109956
(14) share of keli in total revenue
(4)÷(13)
100%
89%
81%
78%
75%
73%
68%
63%
(15) zhengjiu
(13)÷(2)
357
403
438
460
477
489
525
567
(16) extra
(13)-(11)-(4)
0
0
0
0
0
1408
5913
11138
(4)-(5)
Note 4. Additional wine produced from tiepei should be able to cover the additional cost and the amount of keli
in shortage. So for row (8), the amount of tiepei rice will produce the same amount of wine, which should
satisfy: (8)×(actual selling price (1)- production cost associated with 1sheng of rice (7))=(8)×(77-27.6)=deficit
to make up (6).
If we continue increasing the official price to 130, 160, and finally to the price
in the daily journals, 194, we gradually approach those coefficients similar to the
real case of the Shuzhou Brewery. These simulations were shown in column C, D,
and E in Table 11. When the price is lifted to 194, the share of keli in total revenue
drops to 75%. Notice that for the simulations in columns A to E, precisely speaking,
we have the brewery produce exactly the amount of wine just enough to meet the
41
government’s demand for keli. On this basis, if the price is lifted to 194, the share of
raw material cost taken by the government is 30%. If the brewery produces more
than this minimum requirement, then the share of the raw material cost taken by
the government would be lower than 30%, the share of keli in total revenue would
be lower than 75%, and most importantly, there will be some extra revenue left
after paying the keli and repaying the tiepei, as shown in column F, G, H. In these
three columns, I’m controlling the share of the raw material cost taken by the
government, and have the amount of tiepei rice change correspondingly. Other
calculation methods are the same. From the sample, the share of the raw material
cost taken by the government has a maximum of 29%, a minimum of 25%, and the
average is 27%. As the percentage falls, the extra in row (16) increases. The extra is
exactly where the “extra subventions to Jingzhongzhi qian”（[19] in Table 2）
comes from. In other words, extra profit is generated when the brewery invests
more than necessary to meet the requirement for keli. And most, if not all, of this
extra profit is taken away by the central government under the name of extra
Jingzongzhi Qian. That is to say, this extra income for the central government comes
without any investment from the state, since it is generated from the extra
investment of the brewery.
Following the style of column F—H, a more comprehensive modeling based
on the real data from the sixteen daily journals is presented in Appendix E. The two
input variables are rice provided by the government and the share of material cost
taken by the government. It can be verified that the result is pretty close to the real
case. Especially, notice that Appendix E is sorted by the share of material cost taken
by the government from largest to smallest. Accordingly, the modeled result
displayed that the share of keli in total revenue drops while the amount of extra
42
revenue increased. The real data conformed to this pattern too. As shown in Table
12, after sorting by the share of government in paying for material cost, we see
both the real and the modeled share of keli in total sales revenue decreasing from
about 73% to 63%. The modeled percentage is indeed quite close to the real case,
which supported our hypothesized price lifting process.
Table 12 Sorted Comparison of Modeled and Real Share of Keli in Revenue
Sorted Comparison of Modeling and the Real Case
Date
1-Jan
25-Dec
2-Jan
28-Dec
24-Dec
23-Dec
3-Jan
27-Dec
22-Dec
7-Jan
21-Dec
26-Dec
20-Dec
15-Dec
16-Dec
17-Dec
% Gov in
material
cost (real)
29.1%
28.7%
28.3%
28.2%
27.7%
27.6%
27.5%
27.3%
27.0%
26.7%
26.3%
26.2%
26.1%
26.1%
25.9%
25.1%
% keli in
revenue
(Real)
73.5%
71.7%
70.7%
70.5%
69.3%
68.9%
69.0%
68.3%
67.4%
67.2%
65.9%
65.8%
65.4%
65.6%
65.1%
62.9%
% keli in
revenue
(Modeled)
73.4%
72.3%
71.2%
71.1%
69.9%
69.5%
69.2%
68.8%
68.1%
67.3%
66.3%
66.0%
65.8%
65.8%
65.2%
63.3%
In conclusion, this study alerts us to the possibility that the official prices that
showed up in Song Dynasty records might not be the real prices for the customers.
The official price served as a uniform accounting standard. Moreover, the way in
which the state adjusted the share of the revenues from state-owned enterprises
was through changing the official price, instead of announcing the change in
percentage directly. It may well be the case that this accounting practice applied
43
not only to wine, but also tea, salt and other goods under state monopoly or
monopsony.
Appendix A List of Songren Yijian Documents Used36
Document Title
Number
(original)37
Number
(revised)
Dec 15 Daily Journal
29, 54
2
Dec 16 Daily Journal
30
3
Dec 17 Daily Journal
31
4
Dec 20 Daily Journal
32
Dec 21 Daily Journal
33
Dec 22 Daily Journal
35
Dec 23 Daily Journal
36
Dec 24 Daily Journal
37
Dec 25 Daily Journal
38
Dec 26 Daily Journal
39
Dec 27 Daily Journal
40
Dec 28 Daily Journal
41
Jan 1 Daily Journal
46
Jan 2 Daily Journal
47
Jan 3 Daily Journal
48, 51
Jan 7 Daily Journal
49
Usual Practices and Regulation of Shuzhou Brewery
27
Usual Practices and Regulation of Yaxi Wine Shop
28
Revenues and Subventions of Shuzhou Commercial Tax Agency
10
Estimated Yearly Account of Gongshi Wine House
34
5
8
1
6
Document NO. (56,42)(revised no. 7), 43, 45, 50 are daily journals for three days
(dates not specified). Not included for their incompleteness.
37 The original number is numbering of the document in the 1990 Song Ren Yi Jian
宋人佚简. If there is a revised number, it indicates that document is corrected in
36
Sun and Wei, Nan Song Shuzhou Gong Du Yi Jian Zheng Li Yu Yan Jiu 南宋舒州公牍
佚简整理与研究. The revised number links to Part II of the book, “wen shu cuo jian
fu 文书错简复原”.
44
Notice on sending Shuzhou Brewery and Commercial Tax Agency
handbook
5
Notice on sending Yaxi Wine Shop handbook
8
Notice on sending Xugong County Wine House handbook
9
Appendix B Usual Practice and Regulation of Shuzhou Brewery38
南宋绍兴三十二年（1162）十一月舒州在城酒务状为申具酒务造酒则例、请到米
本、趁办诸司官钱数目等事
在城酒务:
谨具酒务造酒则例、请到米本、趁办诸司官钱数目开申下项，须至申闻者：
一、契勘祖额钱贰万伍仟伍伯捌拾叁贯伍伯捌拾文省，其钱作叁伯陆拾日，每日
多寡不定，今约度每日卖钱柒拾壹贯陆拾伍文省，计卖正酒叁硕陆斗柒升贰合。
如遇天寒、雨雪、冷热及热闹月份，实卖钱数不等，约度不定，自有日逐实收钱
数文状申知使府照会，逐旬起解。
一、本务年计合用糯米壹仟捌伯硕，系赴州仓请，递年约请到壹阡陆伯硕。
一、本务造酒则例
支糯米壹硕，麸麴壹拾捌斤，火柴伍拾斤，油半两。
（以上第 43 页）
[中缺]
常酒壹升卖钱壹伯肆拾玖文足，展计壹伯玖拾肆文省。
正钱 壹伯肆拾叁文足，展计 壹伯捌拾陆文省：
课利钱 玖拾陆文：
省司钱 柒拾捌文陆分，
作匠等工食钱 壹拾肆文捌分省，
移用钱 贰文陆分省；
经总制钱 捌拾柒文肆分；
常平司钱 贰文陆分；
头子钱 陆文足，展计 捌文省：
总经制钱 陆文伍分柒厘省；
漕司等钱 壹文贰分省；
本州钱 叁分叁厘省。
煮酒壹升卖钱 壹伯陆拾捌文足，展计 贰伯壹拾玖文省。
38
Document NO.27 in Song Ren Yi Jian 宋人佚简, p.43-36. Revised Document NO.1
in Sun and Wei, Nan Song Shuzhou Gong Du Yi Jian Zheng Li Yu Yan Jiu 南宋舒州公
牍佚简整理与研究, p.101-04. As Sun and Wei demonstrated in the revised
document, the right sequence should be page 43, 45, 44, 46.
45
正钱 壹伯陆拾文足，展计 贰伯捌文省：
课利钱 壹伯壹拾文贰分省：
省司钱 捌拾伍文玖分，
移用钱 贰文陆分省，
（以上第 45 页）
作匠等公食钱 贰拾壹文柒分省；
经总制钱 玖拾肆文贰分省；
常平司钱 贰文陆分；
头子钱 捌文足，展计 壹拾壹文省：
总经制钱 玖文壹分省；
漕司等钱 壹文肆分省；
本州钱 伍分省。
一、本务卖槽壹斤省则收钱捌文足，展计壹拾文肆分省：
转运司钱 肆文伍分足，展计 伍文捌分伍厘省；
经制钱 叁文足，展 叁文玖分省；
常平司钱 伍分足，展 陆分伍厘。
一、本务卖常酒月份，每日合用杂工壹拾贰名，每名日支工食钱 贰伯伍拾文省；
酒匠壹名，日支工食钱 叁伯文省，自三月为头至十一月终。
一、本务卖煮酒月份，每日合用杂工壹拾伍名，每名日支工食钱 贰伯伍拾文省；
酒匠壹名，日支工食
（以上第 44 页)
钱 叁伯文省，自十二月为头至二月终。
一、本务合解州库系省钱，若依祖额钱约度，每一日趁钱 贰拾捌贯捌伯陆拾贰文
省，一旬共趁钱 贰伯捌拾捌贯陆伯贰拾文省。其钱遇有天寒、雨雪、冷净及热闹
月份趁办不定，本务自有日收实卖到钱数申知使府，每旬解发；若依前项祖额逐
旬趁办，钱数委是约度不定。
右谨申具闻，谨状。
绍兴三十二年十一月（此处有朱文押印） 日专匠蔡青、胡僎
成忠郞、监在城酒税柳寿彦
（以上第 46 页）
46
Appendix C Shuzhou Brewery Daily Journal, December 21, 1162 39 40
绍兴三十二年(1162)在城酒务申舒州使府状为具申十二月二十一日卖酒事
在城酒务：
今具十二月二十一日卖酒下项：
一： 共收酒务、衙西酒店钱壹伯柒拾壹贯柒伯柒拾壹文省:
酒务共收卖酒、卖槽钱壹伯伍贯陆伯陆拾陆文省：
一：卖酒壹拾叁硕肆斗伍升，毛数，计卖正酒伍硕叁斗捌升，每升收
钱壹伯肆拾玖文足，展计共收钱壹伯肆贯壹伯柒文，计用糯米壹拾
叁硕肆斗伍升。
c：
系省钱贰拾捌贯玖伯叁拾叁文叁分省，赴州军资库纳；
经总制钱叁拾叁贯贰伯捌文捌分省，赴通判衙纳；
移用等钱壹贯叁伯壹拾伍文壹分省，赴通判衙纳；
常平司钱玖伯壹拾玖文陆分省，赴（以上第 62 页）州常平库
纳；
本州头子钱壹伯贰拾捌文伍分省，赴州公使库纳；
本务日支雇夫、作匠、物料钱伍贯文省。
贴陪加耗酒米、麴、物料等钱三项，共钱贰拾柒贯叁伯捌拾文省，
系籴买到下项米、麸麴、火柴价钱：
Following Li Weiguo (2007) and Huarui (1995), the daily journal of December 21
is presented here. See Li, Song Dai Jiu De Sheng Chan He Zheng Que 宋代酒的生产和
39
征榷, p. 349-51 Li, "Shao Xing Mo Long Xing Chu Shu Zhou Jiu Wu Gong Wen Yan
Jiu 绍兴末隆兴初舒州酒务公文研究," p. 97-122. Formatting in the original file, such
as starting new lines when encountering names of superior offices, are not kept
here.
For all other 16 daily journals, please see Li, Song Dai Jiu De Sheng Chan He Zheng
Que 宋代酒的生产和征榷, p. 321-28.
40 As Sun and Wei (2011) has demonstrated persuasively, the December 21 daily
journal (Document NO.33, which included page 62—64 of the original file) in the
“Song Ren Yi Jian” published in 1990 by Shanghai gu ji chu ban she is fragmented.
The daily journal of December 21 should include page 62—64, plus page 66. So the
December 21 daily journal presented here is a reproduction of the revised
document NO. 5 in Sun and Wei, Nan Song Shuzhou Gong Du Yi Jian Zheng Li Yu Yan
Jiu 南宋舒州公牍佚简整理与研究. Fortunately, the difference is only the ending
address, which is negligible for our purpose here.
47
糯米，除省司支破叁硕伍斗肆升，贴陪玖硕玖斗壹升，每斗计
钱壹伯陆拾文省，共收钱壹拾伍贯捌伯伍拾陆文省；
火柴，除省司支破壹贯陆拾伍文省，贴陪贰贯玖伯捌拾文省；
麸麴，除省司支破陆拾叁斤半，贴陪壹伯柒拾捌斤，每斤计元
造麦本、人工磨脚、物料等钱肆拾捌文省，共钱捌贯伍伯
肆拾肆文省。
除日申课利、贴陪米麴钱外，有剩钱贰贯陆拾玖文贰分省，其钱旋
还拾贰月拾叁日拾肆日麸麴钱数。
贴解经总制钱陆贯柒拾贰文伍分省，赴通判衙纳。
已上本日除分隶诸司并贴陪米麴等钱外，实解系省钱贰拾捌贯玖伯
叁拾叁文叁分省，赴军资库纳。
一：卖槽牌肆拾个，每个收钱叁拾文足，展计共收钱壹贯伍伯伍拾玖
文省，系分隶转运、经总制钱并常平司钱数。
（以上第 63 页）
衙西店共收钱陆拾陆贯壹伯伍文省，数内卖瓶子酒壹硕。每酒捌斗伍升，
计用米壹硕。共用米壹硕壹斗玖升半，每硕用麸麴壹拾斤，其麴系支衙西
店发到支破外，用细面麴陆斤，共柒斤，每斤计钱壹伯伍拾文省，共壹贯
伍拾文省。系买到本务占压麴外，实解陆拾伍贯伍拾伍文省，赴军资库纳。
衙西正店卖钱贰拾叁贯陆伯叁拾柒文省，系本店径解赴军资库纳。
常酒贰硕伍斗，毛数，计卖正酒壹硕，每升收钱壹伯伍拾文足，展
计共收钱壹硕玖贯肆伯捌拾壹文省;
瓶子酒肆拾个，每个收钱捌拾文足，展计共收钱肆贯壹伯伍拾陆文
省。
豁店拍户卖酒钱肆拾贰贯肆伯陆拾捌文省。
常酒肆硕陆斗伍升，毛数，计卖正酒壹硕捌斗陆升，每升收钱壹伯
伍拾文足，展计共收钱叁拾陆贯贰伯叁拾肆文省；
瓶子酒陆拾个，每个收钱捌拾文足，展计共收钱陆贯贰伯叁拾肆文
省。
右谨具申
使府，伏乞
照会。谨状。
（第 64 页）
绍兴三十二年十二月二十一日专匠蔡青、胡僎
右文林郎，司法参军，专壹提点酒务汪舜举
48
Appendix D Shuzhou Brewery Cost Break-down
Shuzhou Brewery Cost Analysis
Adjustment of Li Huarui's calculation on page 319 of "Song dai jiu de sheng chan he zheng que"
Total Rice Cost (sheng, wensheng)
Date
Total
Variable
Cost
15-Dec
16-Dec
17-Dec
20-Dec
21-Dec
22-Dec
23-Dec
24-Dec
25-Dec
26-Dec
27-Dec
28-Dec
1-Jan
2-Jan
3-Jan
7-Jan
Mean
STD
40520.0
39833.8
38079.0
41252.0
42157.0
42947.0
42586.0
44366.0
44186.0
41087.0
39980.0
40801.0
40170.0
41085.0
40562.0
40554.0
41260.4
1589.1
Brewery
Total Rice
Paid
Total Rice
Cost
Gov Paid Gov Paid
Brewery
Money
Consume (wenshen
Rice
Money % of Gov Purchase (wenshen
d (sheng)
g)
(sheng) (wensheng)
Exp
(sheng)
g)
1290.0
1256.0
1197.5
1312.5
1345.0
1372.5
1362.5
1425.0
1420.0
1305.0
1267.5
1295.0
1277.5
1307.5
1287.5
1277.5
1312.4
58.0
20640.0
20096.0
19160.0
21000.0
21520.0
21960.0
21800.0
22800.0
22720.0
20880.0
20280.0
20720.0
20440.0
20920.0
20600.0
20440.0
20998.5
927.6
338.0
327.0
301.0
343.0
354.0
370.0
375.0
395.0
407.0
343.0
346.0
365.0
375.0
370.0
355.0
343.0
356.7
25.1
5408.0
5232.0
4816.0
5488.0
5664.0
5920.0
6000.0
6320.0
6512.0
5488.0
5536.0
5840.0
6000.0
5920.0
5680.0
5488.0
5707.0
402.2
26%
26%
25%
26%
26%
27%
28%
28%
29%
26%
27%
28%
29%
28%
28%
27%
27.2%
1.1%
952.0
929.0
896.5
969.5
991.0
1002.5
987.5
1030.0
1013.0
962.0
921.5
930.0
902.5
937.5
932.5
934.5
955.7
38.5
15232.0
14864.0
14344.0
15512.0
15856.0
16040.0
15800.0
16480.0
16208.0
15392.0
14744.0
14880.0
14440.0
15000.0
14920.0
14952.0
15291.5
615.7
Matches and other Material Cost (wensheng)
Bran Yeast Cost (jin, wensheng)
Matches
&
Brewery
% of
Brewery
Material
Gov Paid
Paid
Matche &
Bran Yeast
Gov Paid
Paid
% of Bran
Percentage
% of
% of Rice Cost
Money
Money
% of
Material Bran Yeast
Cost
Money
Brewery Money
% of Yeast Cost Salaries
% of
of Total
Brewery
Cost in (wenshen ( wenshen % of Gov (wenshen Brewery Cost in Quantity (wenshen Gov Paid (wenshen % of Gov Purchase (wenshen Brewery in Total (wenshen Salaries in Cost Taken
Exp
Total Cost g)
g)
Exp
g)
Exp
Total Cost
(jin)
g)
(jin)
g)
Exp
(jin)
g)
Exp
Cost
g)
Total Cost by Gov
73.8%
74.0%
74.9%
73.9%
73.7%
73.0%
72.5%
72.3%
71.3%
73.7%
72.7%
71.8%
70.6%
71.7%
72.4%
73.2%
72.8%
1.1%
50.9%
50.4%
50.3%
50.9%
51.0%
51.1%
51.2%
51.4%
51.4%
50.8%
50.7%
50.8%
50.9%
50.9%
50.8%
50.4%
50.9%
0.3%
3792.0
3786.0
3599.0
3948.0
4045.0
4179.0
4098.0
4278.0
4274.0
3927.0
3804.0
3897.0
3834.0
3933.0
3874.0
3834.0
3943.9
181.7
986.0
990.0
903.0
1032.0
1065.0
1173.0
1128.0
1188.0
1225.0
1032.0
1041.0
1098.0
1128.0
1113.0
1069.0
1032.0
1075.2
80.6
26%
26%
25%
26%
26%
28%
28%
28%
29%
26%
27%
28%
29%
28%
28%
27%
27.2%
1.1%
2806.0
2796.0
2696.0
2916.0
2980.0
3006.0
2970.0
3090.0
3049.0
2895.0
2763.0
2799.0
2706.0
2820.0
2805.0
2802.0
2868.7
116.8
49
74.0%
73.9%
74.9%
73.9%
73.7%
71.9%
72.5%
72.2%
71.3%
73.7%
72.6%
71.8%
70.6%
71.7%
72.4%
73.1%
72.8%
1.1%
9.4%
9.5%
9.5%
9.6%
9.6%
9.7%
9.6%
9.6%
9.7%
9.6%
9.5%
9.6%
9.5%
9.6%
9.6%
9.5%
9.6%
0.1%
231.0
225.3
215.0
235.5
241.5
246.0
243.5
256.0
254.0
235.0
227.0
233.0
227.0
234.0
231.0
235.0
235.6
10.3
11088.0
10951.8
10320.0
11304.0
11592.0
11808.0
11688.0
12288.0
12192.0
11280.0
10896.0
11184.0
10896.0
11232.0
11088.0
11280.0
11318.0
485.9
60.0
58.1
54.0
61.5
63.5
66.0
67.5
71.0
73.0
61.0
62.0
66.0
65.0
66.0
63.0
62.0
63.7
4.5
2880.0
2789.8
2592.0
2952.0
3048.0
3168.0
3240.0
3408.0
3504.0
2928.0
2976.0
3168.0
3120.0
3168.0
3024.0
2976.0
3058.9
217.7
26%
25%
25%
26%
26%
27%
28%
28%
29%
26%
27%
28%
29%
28%
27%
26%
27.0%
1.1%
171.0
167.2
161.0
174.0
178.0
180.0
176.0
185.0
181.0
174.0
165.0
167.0
162.0
168.0
168.0
173.0
171.9
6.7
8208.0
8162.0
7728.0
8352.0
8544.0
8640.0
8448.0
8880.0
8688.0
8352.0
7920.0
8016.0
7776.0
8064.0
8064.0
8304.0
8259.1
319.0
74.0%
74.5%
74.9%
73.9%
73.7%
73.2%
72.3%
72.3%
71.3%
74.0%
72.7%
71.7%
71.4%
71.8%
72.7%
73.6%
73.0%
1.1%
27.4%
27.5%
27.1%
27.4%
27.5%
27.5%
27.4%
27.7%
27.6%
27.5%
27.3%
27.4%
27.1%
27.3%
27.3%
27.8%
27.4%
0.2%
5000.0
5000.0
5000.0
5000.0
5000.0
5000.0
5000.0
5000.0
5000.0
5000.0
5000.0
5000.0
5000.0
5000.0
5000.0
5000.0
12.3%
12.6%
13.1%
12.1%
11.9%
11.6%
11.7%
11.3%
11.3%
12.2%
12.5%
12.3%
12.4%
12.2%
12.3%
12.3%
12.1%
0.5%
26%
26%
25%
26%
26%
27%
28%
28%
29%
26%
27%
28%
29%
28%
27%
27%
27.1%
1.1%
Appendix E Modeling
(1)
(2)
actual
official
selling price price
fixed
A
B
C
D
E
77
77
77
77
77
--
F
G
H
1-Jan
25-Dec
2-Jan
28-Dec
24-Dec
23-Dec
3-Jan
27-Dec
22-Dec
7-Jan
21-Dec
26-Dec
20-Dec
15-Dec
16-Dec
17-Dec
77
77
77
77
77
77
77
77
77
77
77
77
77
77
77
77
77
77
77
input
variable
77
100
130
160
194
fixed
194
194
194
194
194
194
194
194
194
194
194
194
194
194
194
194
194
194
194
(3)
(4)
rice
keli qian
provided by due to the
Gov
Gov
(sheng)
sample
average
357
357
357
357
357
input
357
357
357
375.0
407.0
370.0
365.0
395.0
375.0
355.0
346.0
370.0
343.0
354.0
343.0
343.0
338.0
327.0
301.0
(2)×(3)
27489
35700
46410
57120
69258
-69258
69258
69258
72750
78958
71780
70810
76630
72750
68870
67124
71780
66542
68676
66542
66542
65572
63438
58394
(5)
(6)
actual
deficit to
revenue
make up
from selling
wine
produced
from
official rice
(1)×(3)
27489
27489
27489
27489
27489
-27489
27489
27489
28875
31339
28490
28105
30415
28875
27335
26642
28490
26411
27258
26411
26411
26026
25179
23177
(4)-(5)
0
8211
18921
29631
41769
-41769
41769
41769
43875
47619
43290
42705
46215
43875
41535
40482
43290
40131
41418
40131
40131
39546
38259
35217
(7)
(8)
production tiepei rice
cost
amount
associated
with 1
sheng of
rice
sample
(6)÷((1)-(7))
average
27.6
0
27.6
166
27.6
383
27.6
600
27.6
846
-(3)/(10)-(3)
27.6
874
27.6
965
27.6
1071
27.6
912
27.6
1012
27.6
939
27.6
928
27.6
1029
27.6
984
27.6
937
27.6
921
27.6
998
27.6
941
27.6
991
27.6
967
27.6
970
27.6
957
27.6
937
27.6
897
50
(9)
total rice
consumed
= maoshu
(3)+(8)
357
523
740
957
1203
-1231
1322
1428
1287
1419
1309
1293
1424
1359
1292
1267
1368
1284
1345
1310
1313
1295
1264
1198
(10)
share of
Gov paid
raw
material
(3)÷(9)
100%
68%
48%
37%
30%
input
29%
27%
25%
29.1%
28.7%
28.3%
28.2%
27.7%
27.6%
27.5%
27.3%
27.0%
26.7%
26.3%
26.2%
26.1%
26.1%
25.9%
25.1%
(11)
cost of
tiepei
(8)×(7)
0
4588
10571
16555
23337
-24123
26640
29560
25170
27926
25912
25614
28414
27171
25855
25418
27554
25978
27362
26692
26765
26401
25861
24758
(12)
additional
revenue
(8)×(1)
0
12799
29492
46186
65106
-67301
74322
82467
70221
77908
72290
71458
79270
75802
72132
70912
76871
72474
76335
74467
74671
73655
72147
69071
(13)
total
revenue
(5)+(12)
27489
40288
56981
73675
92595
-94790
101811
109956
99096
109247
100780
99563
109685
104677
99467
97554
105361
98885
103593
100878
101082
99681
97326
92248
(14)
(15)
(16)
share of
zhengjiu
keli in total
revenue
(4)÷(13)
100%
89%
81%
78%
75%
-73%
68%
63%
73%
72%
71%
71%
70%
69%
69%
69%
68%
67%
66%
66%
66%
66%
65%
63%
(13)÷(2)
extra
(13)-(11)-(4)
357
403
438
460
477
--
0
0
0
0
0
--
489
525
567
511
563
519
513
565
540
513
503
543
510
534
520
521
514
502
476
1408
5913
11138
1176
2364
3089
3140
4641
4757
4742
5012
6027
6366
7555
7644
7775
7708
8028
9096
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