Fiscal and Monetary Policy Fiscal and Monetary Policy The Nature of Fiscal Policy THE NATURE OF FISCAL POLICY The purpose of fiscal policy correcting fine a fundamental disequilibrium tuning Government finances budget deficits and surpluses financing the a deficit PSNCR UK public-sector deficits/surpluses: 1979–2001 Year 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 PSNCR (£bn) % of GDP 12.5 6.3 11.4 5.0 10.6 4.2 5.3 1.9 11.1 3.7 10.3 3.2 Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 7.6 2.1 2.6 0.7 –1.2 –0.3 –11.5 –2.4 –9.1 –1.8 –1.3 –0.2 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 PSNCR (£bn) 7.0 28.6 43.2 39.4 35.4 24.8 % of GDP 1.2 4.7 6.7 5.8 4.9 3.3 Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 PSNCR (£bn) (–ve = surplus) % of GDP (–ve = surplus) 11.9 1.5 –6.4 –0.7 –1.8 –0.2 –37.3 –4.0 –2.7 –0.3 PSNCR (£bn) (–ve = surplus) % of GDP (–ve = surplus) Year UK public-sector deficits/surpluses: 1979–2001 Year 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 PSNCR (£bn) % of GDP 12.5 6.3 11.4 5.0 10.6 4.2 5.3 1.9 11.1 3.7 10.3 3.2 Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 7.6 2.1 2.6 0.7 –1.2 –0.3 –11.5 –2.4 –9.1 –1.8 –1.3 –0.2 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 PSNCR (£bn) 7.0 28.6 43.2 39.4 35.4 24.8 % of GDP 1.2 4.7 6.7 5.8 4.9 3.3 Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 PSNCR (£bn) (–ve = surplus) % of GDP (–ve = surplus) 11.9 1.5 –6.4 –0.7 –1.8 –0.2 –37.3 –4.0 –2.7 –0.3 PSNCR (£bn) (–ve = surplus) % of GDP (–ve = surplus) Year UK public-sector deficits/surpluses: 1979–2001 Year 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 PSNCR (£bn) % of GDP 12.5 6.3 11.4 5.0 10.6 4.2 5.3 1.9 11.1 3.7 10.3 3.2 Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 7.6 2.1 2.6 0.7 –1.2 –0.3 –11.5 –2.4 –9.1 –1.8 –1.3 –0.2 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 PSNCR (£bn) 7.0 28.6 43.2 39.4 35.4 24.8 % of GDP 1.2 4.7 6.7 5.8 4.9 3.3 Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 PSNCR (£bn) (–ve = surplus) % of GDP (–ve = surplus) 11.9 1.5 –6.4 –0.7 –1.8 –0.2 –37.3 –4.0 –2.7 –0.3 PSNCR (£bn) (–ve = surplus) % of GDP (–ve = surplus) Year UK public-sector deficits/surpluses: 1979–2001 Year 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 PSNCR (£bn) % of GDP 12.5 6.3 11.4 5.0 10.6 4.2 5.3 1.9 11.1 3.7 10.3 3.2 Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 7.6 2.1 2.6 0.7 –1.2 –0.3 –11.5 –2.4 –9.1 –1.8 –1.3 –0.2 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 PSNCR (£bn) 7.0 28.6 43.2 39.4 35.4 24.8 % of GDP 1.2 4.7 6.7 5.8 4.9 3.3 Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 PSNCR (£bn) (–ve = surplus) % of GDP (–ve = surplus) 11.9 1.5 –6.4 –0.7 –1.8 –0.2 –37.3 –4.0 –2.7 –0.3 PSNCR (£bn) (–ve = surplus) % of GDP (–ve = surplus) Year UK general government expenditure as % of GDP 50 Annual growth rate (%) 48 46 44 42 40 38 36 34 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 UK general government expenditure as % of GDP 50 Annual growth rate (%) 48 46 44 42 40 38 36 34 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 UK general government expenditure by function (%) H I J K General public services 4.4% K Housing, etc 3.6% Recreation, etc 1.7% Environment 0.9% J Public order 5.1% H K J I H H I J K General public services 5.1% Housing, etc 1.5% Recreation, etc 1.0% Environment 0.7% I Public order 5.6% Social protection Economic affairs 36% 6.4% conomic Affairs 7.7% Social protection 39.0% Defence 7.3% Defence 10.1% Other 14.2% Other 7.3% Education 10.9% 1991 Health 12.3% Education 11.5 % Health 14.2% 1999 UK general government expenditure by function (%) H I J K General public services 4.4% K Housing, etc 3.6% Recreation, etc 1.7% Environment 0.9% J Public order 5.1% H K J I H H I J K General public services 5.1% Housing, etc 1.5% Recreation, etc 1.0% Environment 0.7% I Public order 5.6% Social protection Economic affairs 36% 6.4% conomic Affairs 7.7% Social protection 39.0% Defence 7.3% Defence 10.1% Other 14.2% Other 7.3% Education 10.9% 1991 Health 12.3% Education 11.5 % Health 14.2% 1999 General government deficits/surpluses and debt as % of GDP General government deficits (–) or surpluses (+) General government debt Average 1990–95 Average 1996–2001 Average 1990–95 Average 1996–2001 Belgium –6.4 –1.8 128.9 117.3 France –4.3 –2.4 48.5 64.3 Ireland –2.6 +2.2 84.2 52.4 –10.2 –2.7 115.4 115.5 Japan –0.8 –5.7 68.8 108.7 Netherlands –4.2 0.0 75.8 64.2 Sweden –6.1 +1.2 65.3 67.8 UK –5.3 –0.4 52.1 57.4 USA –4.5 +0.1 72.9 66.0 Euro area –5.1 –1.9 66.8 75.7 Italy General government deficits/surpluses and debt as % of GDP General government deficits (–) or surpluses (+) General government debt Average 1990–95 Average 1996–2001 Average 1990–95 Average 1996–2001 Belgium –6.4 –1.8 128.9 117.3 France –4.3 –2.4 48.5 64.3 Ireland –2.6 +2.2 84.2 52.4 –10.2 –2.7 115.4 115.5 Japan –0.8 –5.7 68.8 108.7 Netherlands –4.2 0.0 75.8 64.2 Sweden –6.1 +1.2 65.3 67.8 UK –5.3 –0.4 52.1 57.4 USA –4.5 +0.1 72.9 66.0 Euro area –5.1 –1.9 66.8 75.7 Italy THE NATURE OF FISCAL POLICY The purpose of fiscal policy correcting fine a fundamental disequilibrium tuning Government finances budget deficits and surpluses financing a deficit the PSNCR the national debt and public-sector debt Getting budget deficits down? Budget deficits as a % of GDP 9 7 5 3 1 -11992 -3 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Getting budget deficits down? Budget deficits as a % of GDP 9 7 5 3 France 1 -11992 -3 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Getting budget deficits down? Budget deficits as a % of GDP 9 7 5 3 Germany France 1 -11992 -3 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Getting budget deficits down? Budget deficits as a % of GDP 9 7 Italy 5 3 Germany France 1 -11992 -3 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Getting budget deficits down? Budget deficits as a % of GDP 9 7 Spain Italy 5 3 Germany France 1 -11992 -3 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Getting budget deficits down? Budget deficits as a % of GDP 9 Belgium 7 Spain Italy 5 3 Germany France 1 -11992 -3 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Getting budget deficits down? Budget deficits as a % of GDP 9 Belgium 7 Spain Italy 5 3 Germany Netherlands 1 -11992 -3 France 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 National Debt (as % of GDP) National Debt 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 National Debt (as % of GDP) National Debt 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 45 UK 40 35 30 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 National Debt (as % of GDP) National Debt 80 75 70 65 USA 60 55 50 45 UK 40 35 30 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 National Debt (as % of GDP) National Debt 80 Euro area 75 70 65 USA 60 55 50 45 UK 40 35 30 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 THE NATURE OF FISCAL POLICY Public-sector deficits or surpluses and the government’s fiscal stance fiscal stance and the state of the economy the structural balance Automatic fiscal stabilisers tax stabilisers benefits stabilisers National income and the size of the public-sector deficit or surplus G, T Tax revenue SURPLUS DEFICIT O Gov. expenditure (incl. benefits) Y1 Y THE NATURE OF FISCAL POLICY Public-sector deficits or surpluses and the government’s fiscal stance fiscal stance and the state of the economy the structural balance Automatic fiscal stabilisers tax stabilisers benefits stabilisers Discretionary fiscal policy THE NATURE OF FISCAL POLICY Public-sector deficits or surpluses and the government’s fiscal stance fiscal stance and the state of the economy the structural balance Automatic fiscal stabilisers tax stabilisers benefits stabilisers Discretionary fiscal policy changing government expenditure THE NATURE OF FISCAL POLICY Public-sector deficits or surpluses and the government’s fiscal stance fiscal stance and the state of the economy the structural balance Automatic fiscal stabilisers tax stabilisers benefits stabilisers Discretionary fiscal policy changing government expenditure changing taxes A cut in taxes: (a) lump-sum taxes W, J W1 O Y A cut in taxes: (a) lump-sum taxes W, J W1 W2 O Y A cut in taxes: (a) lump-sum taxes W, J W1 W2 DT x mpcd O Y A cut in taxes: (b) cut in tax rates W, J W1 O Y A cut in taxes: (b) cut in tax rates W, J W1 W2 O Y A cut in taxes: (b) cut in tax rates W, J W1 W2 DT x mpcd O Y Fiscal and Monetary Policy The Effectiveness of Fiscal Policy EFFECTIVENESS OF FISCAL POLICY Effectiveness of automatic stabilisers adverse the supply-side effects problem of fiscal drag Discretionary policy: problems of forecasting the magnitude of the effect effects on other injections and withdrawals crowding out The monetary effects of fiscal policy W, J W J1 O Y1 (a) The goods market Y The monetary effects of fiscal policy Rate of interest W, J MS W r1 L1 J1 O Y1 (a) The goods market Y O Money (b) The money market The monetary effects of fiscal policy Rate of interest W, J MS An expansionary fiscal policy W J2 J1 O Y1 Y2 (a) The goods market Y r1 L1 O Money (b) The money market The monetary effects of fiscal policy Rate of interest W, J MS An expansionary fiscal policy r2 W J2 J1 O Y1 Y2 (a) The goods market Y Effect on the demand for money r1 L2 L1 O Money (b) The money market The monetary effects of fiscal policy Rate of interest W, J MS MS2 An expansionary fiscal policy r2 W J2 J1 O Y1 Y2 (a) The goods market Y Accommodating increase in the money supply r1 L2 L1 O Money (b) The money market EFFECTIVENESS OF FISCAL POLICY Effectiveness of automatic stabilisers adverse the supply-side effects problem of fiscal drag Discretionary policy: problems of forecasting the magnitude of the effect effects on other injections and withdrawals crowding size out of the multiplier and accelerator effects EFFECTIVENESS OF FISCAL POLICY Discretionary fiscal policy: problems of timing and time lags various policy time lags may be destabilising Fiscal policy: stabilising or destabilising? Real national income Path (a): no intervention 3 4 3 2 4 2 1 1 O Time Fiscal policy: stabilising or destabilising? Real national income Path (a): no intervention Path (b): policy stabilises 3 4 3 2 4 2 1 1 O Time Fiscal policy: stabilising or destabilising? Real national income Path (a): no intervention Path (b): policy stabilises Path (c): policy destabilises 3 4 3 2 4 2 1 1 O Time EFFECTIVENESS OF FISCAL POLICY Discretionary fiscal policy: problems of timing and time lags various policy time lags may be destabilising Side-effects of discretionary fiscal policy EFFECTIVENESS OF FISCAL POLICY Discretionary fiscal policy: problems of timing and time lags various policy time lags may be destabilising Side-effects of discretionary fiscal policy Changing government expenditure versus changing taxes Fiscal and Monetary Policy Varieties of Monetary Policy VARIETIES OF MONETARY POLICY The policy setting historical current approaches to monetary policy approach to monetary policy Control of money supply over medium and long term control of banks’ liquidity ratio restricting size of PSNCR Short-term monetary control: the alternatives The demand for and supply of money Rate of interest MS r1 L O Q1 Money The demand for and supply of money Rate of interest M S' MS r2 r1 L O Q2 Q1 Money VARIETIES OF MONETARY POLICY Techniques to control money supply preliminary decisions: statutory or prudent ratios? what to control: monetary base or broad money? open-market operations funding variable minimum reserve ratios Effect of raising the minimum reserve ratio from 10% to 20% Initial position: 10% reserve ratio Liabilities Deposits £100bn Assets Reserve assets Advances, etc. Total £100bn Total £10bn £90bn £100bn Effect of raising the minimum reserve ratio from 10% to 20% Initial position: 10% reserve ratio Liabilities Deposits £100bn Assets Reserve assets Advances, etc. Total £100bn Total £10bn £90bn £100bn New position: 20% reserve ratio Liabilities Deposits Total £50bn Assets Reserve assets Advances, etc. £10bn £40bn £50bn Total £50bn VARIETIES OF MONETARY POLICY Techniques to control money supply preliminary decisions: statutory or prudent ratios? what to control: monetary base or broad money? open-market operations funding variable minimum reserve ratios Techniques to control interest rates VARIETIES OF MONETARY POLICY Techniques to control money supply preliminary decisions: statutory or prudent ratios? what to control: monetary base or broad money? open-market operations funding variable minimum reserve ratios Techniques to control interest rates statutory base rates VARIETIES OF MONETARY POLICY Techniques to control money supply preliminary decisions: statutory or prudent ratios? what to control: monetary base or broad money? open-market operations funding variable minimum reserve ratios Techniques to control interest rates statutory base rates operations in discount and repo markets Bank of England operations in the bill and gilt repo markets to raise interest rates D by banks Rate of discount S1 by B. of E. r1 O Bills (a) Bank of England sells more bills Bank of England operations in the bill and gilt repo markets to raise interest rates Rate of discount S1 by B. of E. S2 by B. of E. D by banks r2 r1 O Bills (a) Bank of England sells more bills Bank of England operations in the bill and gilt repo markets to raise interest rates Rate of discount / gilt repo rate D1 by B. of E. r1 S by banks O Bills and gilts (b) Bank of England buys fewer bills / gilts Rate of discount / gilt repo rate Bank of England operations in the bill and gilt repo markets to raise interest rates D2 by B. of E. D1 by B. of E. r2 r1 S by banks O Bills and gilts (b) Bank of England buys fewer bills / gilts VARIETIES OF MONETARY POLICY Techniques to control money supply preliminary decisions: statutory or prudent ratios? what to control: monetary base or broad money? open-market operations funding variable minimum reserve ratios Techniques to control interest rates statutory base rates operations in discount and repo markets Credit rationing Fiscal and Monetary Policy Problems of Monetary Policy PROBLEMS OF MONETARY POLICY Medium and long-term control over the money supply: reducing PSNCR automatic the fiscal stabilisers desire to cut taxes difficulty in cutting government expenditure PROBLEMS OF MONETARY POLICY Practical difficulties in short-run control of the money supply problems with statutory cash ratios without statutory cash ratios problems with with controlling broad liquidity statutory reserve ratios without the with monetary base control statutory reserve ratios effect on interest rates The effect on interest rates of a change in demand for money: money supply kept at fixed level by the authorities Rate of interest MS r1 r L' L O Money PROBLEMS OF MONETARY POLICY Problems with credit rationing Goodhart's law bank resistance stifles competition distortionary effects on economy Problems with controlling interest rates inelastic demand for loans An inelastic demand for loans Rate of interest Assume that the authorities want to reduce the demand for money to Q2 r1 Demand for loans O Q2 Q1 Loans Rate of interest An inelastic demand for loans A large rise in the rate of interest (to r2) will be necessary r2 r1 Demand for loans O Q2 Q1 Loans PROBLEMS OF MONETARY POLICY Problems with credit rationing Goodhart's law bank resistance stifles competition distortionary effects on economy Problems with controlling interest rates inelastic demand for loans unstable demand for money PROBLEMS OF MONETARY POLICY Problems with credit rationing Goodhart's law bank resistance stifles competition distortionary effects on economy Problems with controlling interest rates inelastic demand for loans unstable demand for money possible conflict between domestic goals and exchange-rate goals PROBLEMS OF MONETARY POLICY Using monetary policy problems of using it to manage aggregate demand using it to keep to a target inflation exchange money rate supply Fiscal and Monetary Policy ISLM Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy Equilibrium in both the goods and money markets Rate of interest LM re IS O Ye National income ISLM ANALYSIS OF FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY Fiscal policy and ISLM analysis shifting effect the IS curve on interest rates and national income ISLM analysis of fiscal and monetary policy Rate of interest LM r1 IS O Y1 National income ISLM analysis of fiscal and monetary policy LM Rate of interest Expansionary fiscal policy r2 r1 IS2 IS1 O Y1 Y2 National income ISLM ANALYSIS OF FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY Fiscal policy and ISLM analysis shifting the IS curve effect on interest rates and national income Monetary policy and ISLM analysis shifting effect the LM curve on interest rates and national income ISLM analysis of fiscal and monetary policy LM1 LM2 Rate of interest Expansionary monetary policy r1 r3 IS O Y1 Y3 National income ISLM ANALYSIS OF FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY Fiscal policy and ISLM analysis shifting the IS curve effect on interest rates and national income Monetary policy and ISLM analysis shifting the LM curve effect on interest rates and national income Fiscal and monetary policy together ISLM analysis of fiscal and monetary policy LM1 Rate of interest Expansionary fiscal and monetary policy LM2 r1 IS2 IS1 O Y1 National income Y4 ISLM ANALYSIS OF FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY Analysis under Keynesian assumptions effectiveness of fiscal policy Rate of interest Keynesian analysis of fiscal and monetary policy LM Expansionary fiscal policy IS2 IS1 O Y1 Y2 National income ISLM ANALYSIS OF FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY Analysis under Keynesian assumptions effectiveness of fiscal policy ineffectiveness of monetary policy Keynesian analysis of fiscal and monetary policy Rate of interest Expansionary monetary policy LM1 LM2 IS O Y1Y2 National income ISLM ANALYSIS OF FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY Analysis under Keynesian assumptions effectiveness of fiscal policy ineffectiveness of monetary policy Analysis under monetarist assumptions ISLM ANALYSIS OF FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY Analysis under Keynesian assumptions effectiveness of fiscal policy ineffectiveness of monetary policy Analysis under monetarist assumptions ineffectiveness of fiscal policy Monetarist analysis of fiscal and monetary policy LM Rate of interest Expansionary fiscal policy IS2 IS1 O Y1Y2 National income ISLM ANALYSIS OF FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY Analysis under Keynesian assumptions effectiveness of fiscal policy ineffectiveness of monetary policy Analysis under monetarist assumptions ineffectiveness effectiveness of fiscal policy of monetary policy Monetarist analysis of fiscal and monetary policy LM1 LM2 Rate of interest Expansionary monetary policy IS O Y1 Y2 National income Fiscal and Monetary Policy Fiscal and Monetary Policy in the UK UK growth, unemployment and inflation: 1920-2002 % Growth 10 30 25 20 5 15 10 0 5 -5 0 -5 -10 1920 1925 1930 1935 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 -10 UK growth, unemployment and inflation: 1920-2002 % Growth 10 30 25 20 5 15 10 0 5 -5 0 -5 -10 1920 1925 1930 1935 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 -10 UK growth, unemployment and inflation: 1920-2002 % 10 Growth Unemployment % 30 25 20 5 15 10 0 5 -5 0 -5 -10 1920 1925 1930 1935 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 -10 UK growth, unemployment and inflation: 1920-2002 % 10 Growth Unemployment Inflation % 30 25 20 5 15 10 0 5 -5 0 -5 -10 1920 1925 1930 1935 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 -10 UK Macroeconomic performance: 1921 – 99 Unemployment (% of labour force) Inflation (% increase in RPI) Growth (% increase in real GDP) 1921–38 13.4 –1.5 2.1 1950–69 1.6 4.0 2.8 1970–99 7.6 8.0 2.0 UK Macroeconomic performance: 1921 – 99 Unemployment (% of labour force) Inflation (% increase in RPI) Growth (% increase in real GDP) 1921–38 13.4 –1.5 2.1 1950–69 1.6 4.0 2.8 1970–99 7.6 8.0 2.0 UK Macroeconomic performance: 1921 – 99 Unemployment (% of labour force) Inflation (% increase in RPI) Growth (% increase in real GDP) 1921–38 13.4 –1.5 2.1 1950–69 1.6 4.0 2.8 1970–99 7.6 8.0 2.0 FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY IN THE UK Attitudes towards demand management Keynesian demand management in the 1950s and 1960s stop–go policies monetarist criticisms Demise of fine tuning in the 1970s the causes of stagflation demand management policies in the 1970s the rise of monetarism Selected monetary indicators: 1969–2001 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Change in M4 (%) (1) 5.1 11.5 16.0 23.7 22.3 11.1 12.4 11.2 14.7 15.0 14.1 17.2 20.9 12.1 12.7 13.2 13.0 15.6 16.7 17.3 18.0 11.8 5.8 3.6 4.6 4.7 9.9 9.5 11.9 8.3 4.2 8.3 6.7 PSNCR (£m) (2) –527 –219 1 196 1 829 4 121 6 447 10 167 8 923 5 474 8 416 12 502 11 432 10 573 5 547 11 070 10 342 7 625 2 630 –1 172 –11 426 –9 131 –1 288 7 003 28 623 43 168 39 425 35 446 24 778 11 851 –6 395 –1 781 –37 316 –2 665 Inflation (%) (3) 5.4 6.3 9.4 7.3 9.1 16.0 24.2 16.5 15.9 8.3 13.4 18.0 11.9 8.6 4.6 5.0 6.1 3.4 4.2 4.9 7.8 9.5 5.9 3.7 1.6 2.4 3.5 2.4 3.1 3.4 1.6 2.9 1.8 Interest rate: 20-year bonds (4) 9.1 9.2 8.9 9.0 10.7 14.8 14.4 14.4 12.7 12.5 13.0 13.8 14.7 12.9 10.8 10.7 10.6 9.9 9.5 9.4 9.6 11.1 9.9 9.1 7.9 8.1 8.3 8.1 7.1 5.5 4.7 4.7 4.8 Real interest rate (5) 3.7 2.9 –0.5 1.7 1.6 –1.2 –9.8 –2.1 –3.2 4.2 –0.4 –4.2 2.8 4.3 6.2 5.7 4.5 6.5 5.3 4.5 1.8 1.6 4.0 5.4 6.3 5.7 4.8 5.7 4.0 2.1 3.1 1.8 2.0 FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY IN THE UK Monetarism in the early 1980s medium-term financial strategy the recession of the early 1980s assessment of the monetarist experiment return to discretion in mid 1980s Targeting the exchange rate its advantages and disadvantages shadowing the German mark membership of the ERM (1990–2) exit from the ERM FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY IN THE UK Return to domestic-orientated policies targeting inflation: 1993–7 Policies of the Labour government 1997 fiscal policy the 'Golden Rule' Comparison with EU Stability and Growth Pact monetary policy Bank of England inflation target ECB targets effectiveness policies of recent monetary and fiscal Fiscal and Monetary Policy Rules versus Discretion RULES VERSUS DISCRETION Case against discretion time lags over-correction government may ignore long-term consequences Case for rules help to reduce inflationary expectations create a stable environment for investment and economic growth RULES VERSUS DISCRETION Case against rules can cause severe fluctuations in interest rates and can cause greater instability which rule to choose? rules may conflict rules may become unsuitable Case for discretion fine tuning can be improved by better forecasting and quicker-action RULES VERSUS DISCRETION Inflation targeting use of inflation targets around the world Who sets explicit targets and monitoring ranges for the exchange rate, money and inflation Source: The Use of Explicit Targets for Monetary Policy: Practical Experiences of 91 economies in the 1990s, (Bank of England, August 1999) Who sets explicit targets and monitoring ranges for the exchange rate, money and inflation Source: The Use of Explicit Targets for Monetary Policy: Practical Experiences of 91 economies in the 1990s, (Bank of England, August 1999) Who sets explicit targets and monitoring ranges for the exchange rate, money and inflation Source: The Use of Explicit Targets for Monetary Policy: Practical Experiences of 91 economies in the 1990s, (Bank of England, August 1999) Who sets explicit targets and monitoring ranges for the exchange rate, money and inflation Source: The Use of Explicit Targets for Monetary Policy: Practical Experiences of 91 economies in the 1990s, (Bank of England, August 1999) Source: Bank of England RULES VERSUS DISCRETION Inflation targeting use of inflation targets around the world weaknesses of money supply targets RULES VERSUS DISCRETION Inflation targeting use of inflation targets around the world weaknesses of money supply targets weaknesses of exchange rate targets RULES VERSUS DISCRETION Inflation targeting use of inflation targets around the world weaknesses of money supply targets weaknesses of exchange rate targets relative strength of inflation targets RULES VERSUS DISCRETION Inflation targeting use of inflation targets around the world weaknesses of money supply targets weaknesses of exchange rate targets relative strength of inflation targets Issues with inflation targets RULES VERSUS DISCRETION Inflation targeting use of inflation targets around the world weaknesses of money supply targets weaknesses of exchange rate targets relative strength of inflation targets Issues with inflation targets choice what of the target level? central point or ceiling? RULES VERSUS DISCRETION Issues with inflation targets (cont.) who sets the target? changing multiple a the target targets Taylor rule for setting interest rates ADI curves based on different Taylor rules Curve ADI1: based on Taylor rule giving relatively high weight to stable inflation Rate of inflation (P) . .P b 1 .P a targe t ADI1 O Y1 Y 0 National income ADI curves based on different Taylor rules Curve ADI1: based on Taylor rule giving relatively high weight to stable inflation Curve ADI2: based on Taylor rule giving relatively high weight to stable real national income Rate of inflation (P) . .P b 1 c .P a targe t ADI1 ADI2 O Y1 Y2 Y 0 National income RULES VERSUS DISCRETION Issues with inflation targets (cont.) who sets the target? changing multiple a the target targets Taylor rule for setting interest rates targeting inflation and the money supply RULES VERSUS DISCRETION Issues with inflation targets (cont.) who sets the target? changing multiple a the target targets Taylor rule for setting interest rates targeting basing inflation and the money supply interest rates on forecasts of inflation RULES VERSUS DISCRETION Issues with inflation targets (cont.) who sets the target? changing multiple a the target targets Taylor rule for setting interest rates targeting inflation and the money supply basing interest rates on forecasts of inflation the problem of deflation