Evening Exercises
When you are not debating and rules for tomorrow’s practice debates
Darcell will be supervising student research and fielding student questions in the Gilchrest Lounge.
And, practice rounds for tomorrow will be released at 7:30pm.
Thus, Aff should disclose by roughly 7:45pm. Neg should disclose by 8pm. Please reasonable about this if
someone is late due to having given a speech.
Lab time after 8pm should either be used to prep for tomorrow’s debate or to continue research.
For tomorrow’s practice debate. We have had SO many debates about ethics… and K’s… and a lot of
your coaches want a balance that features policy arguments. So – for tomorrow only:
 Aff cannot read bigotry or privacy – even as add-ons.
 Neg cannot read K’s
 Aff must use one of the plan texts #1-6
Schedule for evening speeches
Will – all 2A’s… in Gilchrest Porch.
6:40pm
whomever the 2A is for team: Anthony-Ritik
6:50pm
whomever the 2A is for team: Tristan-Rush
7pm
whomever the 2A is for team: Michael-Alex B.
7:10pm
whomever the 2A is for team: Saya-Niti
7:20pm
whomever the 2A is for team: Manav-Alex
7:30pm
whomever the 2A is for team: Harris-Max
7:40pm
whomever the 2A is for team: Kelsey-Aishanee
7:50pm
whomever the 2A is for team: Grace Heather-Ally
8pm
whomever the 2A is for team: William-Akash
8:10pm
whomever the 2A is for team: Alanna-Katherine
8:20pm
whomever the 2A is for team: Eshaan-Ribhu
8:30pm
whomever the 2A is for team: John F. –Sachet
8:40pm
whomever the 2A is for team: Julian-Ben
8:50pm
whomever the 2A is for team: Megan-Brian
9pm
whomever the 2A is for team: Adi-Akhil
9:10pm
whomever the 2A is for team: Lauren-Serena
Lauren – half of the 2N’s…. in room: Yakeley Lounge E120
7:00pm
whomever the 2N is for team: Anthony-Ritik
7:10pm
whomever the 2N is for team: Tristan-Rush
7:20pm
whomever the 2N is for team: Michael-Alex B.
7:30pm
whomever the 2N is for team: Saya-Niti
7:40pm
whomever the 2N is for team: Manav-Alex
7:50pm
whomever the 2N is for team: Harris-Max
8pm
whomever the 2N is for team: Kelsey-Aishanee
8:10pm
whomever the 2N is for team: Grace Heather-Ally
Strauss – other half of the 2N’s… in room: Yakeley E26 (basement – go downstairs in
Yakeley)
7:00pm
whomever the 2N is for team: William-Akash
7:10pm
whomever the 2N is for team: Alanna-Katherine
7:20pm
whomever the 2N is for team: Eshaan-Ribhu
7:30pm
whomever the 2N is for team: John F. –Sachet
7:40pm
whomever the 2N is for team: Julian-Ben
7:50pm
whomever the 2N is for team: Megan-Brian
8pm
whomever the 2N is for team: Adi-Akhil
8:10pm
whomever the 2N is for team: Lauren-Serena
If you are a 2A Speaking in front of Will
Background info
Here are the rules for tonight’s speech





4 minute speech
2AC can’t kick either advantage
2AC must read at least one add-on.
2AC must read conditionality bad
2AC must declare how much time they intend to spend on each page. You have these
decided prior to arriving – so as to help us keep on schedule.
 Assume the Aff read plan text #2 – and also *did* read inherency and solvency.
 PLEASE NOTE THAT THE AFF IS – IN THIS EXAMPLE – READING BOTH THE CYBER *AND* THE
FINANCIAL MARKET SCENARIOS AS INTERNAL LINK TO THE INDIAN ECONOMY.
 Here is the set-up:
Here is your 1AC
Advantage One - India
The US can alter India’s surveillance practices by pressuring global internet companies
to demand privacy. But, Google hypocrisy only works when US domestic spying
declines.
Wong ‘13
Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human
Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on
Global Internet Freedom. She conducted much of the organization’s work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular
focus on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning Committee of the Global
Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances corporate responsibility and human rights in the
technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights
in China (HRIC). There, she contributed to the organization’s work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of
expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law – “ Surveillance and the Corrosion of
Internet Freedom” - July 30, 2013 - Published in: The Huffington Post and also available at the HRW website at this address:
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/30/surveillance-and-corrosion-internet-freedom
Defenders of US and UK surveillance programs argue that collecting metadata is not as problematic as “listening to the content
of people’s phone calls” or reading emails. This is misleading. Technologists have long recognized that metadata can reveal incredibly sensitive information, especially if it is
collected at large scale over long periods of time, since digitized data can be easily combined and analyzed. The revelations have also exposed glaring
contradictions about the US Internet freedom agenda. This has emboldened the Chinese state media, for example, to cynically denounce US
hypocrisy, even as the Chinese government continues to censor the Internet, infringe on privacy rights, and curb anonymity online. Though there is hypocrisy on both sides, the
widening rift between US values and actions has real, unintended human rights consequences. For the human rights
movement, the Internet’s impact on rights crystalized in 2005 after we learned that Yahoo! uncritically turned user account
information over to the Chinese government, leading to a 10-year prison sentence for the journalist Shi Tao. The US government
forcefully objected to the Chinese government’s actions and urged the tech industry to act responsibly. In the end, that incident
catalyzed a set of new human rights standards that pushed some companies to improve safeguards for
user privacy in the face of government demands for data. US support was critical back then, but it is
hard to imagine the government having the same influence or credibility now. The mass surveillance scandal has damaged
the US government’s ability to press for better corporate practices as technology companies expand globally. It
will also be more difficult for companies to resist overbroad surveillance mandates if they are seen as
complicit in mass US infringements on privacy. Other governments will feel more entitled to ask for the
same cooperation that the US receives. We can also expect governments around the world to pressure companies to store user data locally or maintain a local
presence so that governments can more easily access it, as Brazil and Russia are now debating. While comparisons to the Chinese government are overstated, there is reason to
worry about the broader precedent the US has set. Just months before the NSA scandal broke, India began rolling out a centralized
system to monitor all phone and Internet communications in the country, without much clarity on
safeguards to protect rights. This development is chilling, considering the government’s problematic use of sedition and Internet laws in recent arrests. Over the last
few weeks, Turkish officials have condemned social media as a key tool for Gezi Park protesters. Twitter has drawn particular ire. Now the
government is preparing new regulations that would make it easier to get data from Internet companies and identify
individual users online. The Obama administration and US companies could have been in a strong position to push back in
India and Turkey. Instead, the US has provided these governments with a roadmap for conducting secret, mass
surveillance and conscripting the help of the private sector.
(Note to students: “conscripting” means compulsory enlistment of companies for state service.)
Independently, US bulk surveillance sets precedent that causes indiscriminate
surveillance in India.
Sinha ‘14
(et al; Authors Include: G. Alex Sinha, Aryeh Neier fellow with the US Program at Human Rights Watch and the Human Rights
Program at the American Civil Liberties Union. Sinha holds a J.D. from New York University’s School of Law. This includes a
specialization as a Scholar from NYU’s Institute for International Law & Justice. The author also holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy
University of Toronto. Additional authors include - Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno, US Program deputy director at Human
Rights Watch, who participated in some of the research interviews; and Andrea Prasow, deputy Washington Director at Human
Rights Watch, who also participated in one of the research interviews and provided key contacts. Human Rights Watch is an
independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the
cause of human rights for all. From the Report: WITH LIBERTY TO MONITOR ALL How Large-Scale US Surveillance is Harming
Journalism, Law and American Democracy – This report is based on extensive interviews with some 50 journalists covering
intelligence, national security, and law enforcement for outlets including the New York Times, the Associated Press, ABC, and
NPR. JULY 2014 – available at: http://www.hrw.org/node/127364)
The questions raised
by surveillance are complex. The government has an obligation to protect national security, and in some
cases, it is legitimate for government to restrict certain rights to that end. At the same time, international human rights and
constitutional law set limits on the state’s authority to engage in activities like surveillance, which have the potential to
undermine so many other rights. The current, large-scale, often indiscriminate US approach to surveillance carries
enormous costs. It erodes global digital privacy and sets a terrible example for other countries like India,
Pakistan, Ethiopia, and others that are in the process of expanding their surveillance capabilities. It also damages
US credibility in advocating internationally for internet freedom, which the US has listed as an important
foreign policy objective since at least 2010. As this report documents, US surveillance programs are also doing damage to
some of the values the United States claims to hold most dear. These include freedoms of expression and association, press
freedom, and the right to counsel, which are all protected by both international human rights law and the US Constitution.
India’s surveillance is not narrowly-targeted. This indiscriminate, bulk collection hurts
India’s financial markets. It also becomes a honeypot for cyber-attacks.
Trivedi ‘13
Anjani Trivedi. The author holds a Master Degree in Journalism from the University of Hong Kong and a Bachelor’s Degree in
Mathematics from MIT. The author has previously held internships at the New York Times and CNN International. This piece
internally quotes Meenakshi Ganguly, The South Asia director for Human Rights Watch; Anja Kovacs of the Internet Democracy
Project; and Sunil Abraham, executive director of India’s Centre for Internet and Society. “In India, Prism-like Surveillance Slips
Under the Radar” – Time Magazine – 6-30-13 - http://world.time.com/2013/06/30/in-india-prism-like-surveillance-slips-underthe-radar/#ixzz2YpWhRsrB
CMS is an ambitious surveillance system that monitors text messages, social-media engagement and phone calls on landlines and
cell phones, among other communications. That means 900 million landline and cell-phone users and 125 million Internet users. The project, which is being implemented by
the government’s Centre for Development of Telematics (C-DOT), is meant to help national law-enforcement agencies save time and avoid manual intervention, according to the Department of Telecommunications’ annual report.
This has been in the works since 2008, when C-DOT started working on a proof-of-concept, according to an older report. The government set aside approximately $150 million for the system as part of its 12th five-year plan,
although the Cabinet ultimately approved a higher amount. Within the internal-security ministry though, the surveillance system remains a relatively “hush-hush” topic, a project official unauthorized to speak to the press tells
TIME. In April 2011, the Police Modernisation Division of the Home Affairs Ministry put out a 90-page tender to solicit bidders for communication-interception systems in every state and union territory of India. The system
Civil-liberties groups concede that states often need
to undertake targeted-monitoring operations. However, the move toward extensive “surveillance capabilities enabled by digital communications,” suggests
requirements included “live listening, recording, storage, playback, analysis, postprocessing” and voice recognition.
that governments are now “casting the net wide, enabling intrusions into private lives,” according to Meenakshi Ganguly, South Asia director for Human Rights Watch. This extensive communications surveillance through the likes
of Prism and CMS are “out of the realm of judicial authorization and allow unregulated, secret surveillance, eliminating any transparency or accountability on the part of the state,” a recent U.N. report stated. India is no stranger to
censorship and monitoring — tweets, blogs, books or songs are frequently blocked and banned. India ranked second only to the U.S. on Google’s list of user-data requests with 4,750 queries, up 52% from two years back, and
removal requests from the government increased by 90% over the previous reporting period. While these were largely made through police or court orders, the new system will not require such a legal process. In recent times,
India’s democratically elected government has barred access to certain websites and Twitter handles, restricted the number of outgoing text messages to five per person per day and arrested citizens for liking Facebook posts and
tweeting. Historically too, censorship has been India’s preferred means of policing social unrest. “Freedom of expression, while broadly available in theory,” Ganguly tells TIME, “is endangered by abuse of various India laws.” There
is a growing discrepancy and power imbalance between citizens and the state, says Anja Kovacs of the Internet Democracy Project. And, in an environment like India where “no checks and balances [are] in place,” that is troubling.
The potential for misuse and misunderstanding, Kovacs believes, is increasing enormously. Currently, India’s laws relevant to interception “disempower citizens by relying heavily on the executive to safeguard individuals’
constitutional rights,” a recent editorial noted. The power imbalance is often noticeable at public protests, as in the case of the New Delhi gang-rape incident in December, when the government shut down public transport near
protest grounds and unlawfully detained demonstrators. With an already sizeable and growing population of Internet users, the government’s worries too are on the rise. Netizens in India are set to triple to 330 million by 2016,
according to a recent report. “As [governments] around the world grapple with the power of social media that can enable spontaneous street protests, there appears to be increasing surveillance,” Ganguly explains. India’s junior
minister for telecommunications attempted to explain the benefits of this system during a recent Google+ Hangout session. He acknowledged that CMS is something that “most people may not be aware of” because it’s “slightly
technical.” A participant noted that the idea of such an intrusive system was worrying and he did not feel safe. The minister, though, insisted that it would “safeguard your privacy” and national security. Given the high-tech nature
new system comes
surveillance system is not only an
“abuse of privacy rights and security-agency overreach,” critics say, but also counterproductive in terms of security. In the process
of collecting data to monitor criminal activity, the data itself may become a target for terrorists and criminals — a
“honeypot,” according to Sunil Abraham, executive director of India’s Centre for Internet and Society.
Additionally, the wide-ranging tapping undermines financial markets, Abraham says, by compromising
confidentiality, trade secrets and intellectual property. What’s more, vulnerabilities will have to be built into the existing cyberinfrastructure to make way for such a
system. Whether the nation’s patchy infrastructure will be able to handle a complex web of surveillance and networks, no
one can say. That, Abraham contends, is what attackers will target.
of CMS, he noted that telecom companies would no longer be part of the government’s surveillance process. India currently does not have formal privacy legislation to prohibit arbitrary monitoring. The
under the jurisdiction of the Indian Telegraph Act of 1885, which allows for monitoring communication in the “interest of public safety. The
Scenario #1 – is Financial Markets
Financial markets key to India’s Economy.
Goyal ‘14
Dr. Sakshi Goyal, former Faculty member at the Kaling Institute of Management Studies, Faridabad, Haryana (India). “Indian
Financial Markets: A Global Perspective” - Journal of Business Management & Social Sciences Research (JBM&SSR) - Volume 3,
No.6, June 2014 - ISSN No: 2319-5614. Available at:
http://www.borjournals.com/a/index.php/jbmssr/article/viewFile/1729/1078
Financial markets are a vital part of an economy making it possible for industry, trade and commerce to
flourish without any obstacle in terms of resources. Today most economies around the world are judged by the performance of
their financial markets. The financial markets have indicators in place that reflect the performance of companies whose securities are traded in those markets. The financial markets also serve a vital
purpose in the growth and development of a company, which wants to expand. Such companies with expansion plans and new projects are in need of funding and the financial market serves as the best platform from which a
company can determine the feasibility of such possibilities
Krishnan (2011) mentioned that, the economic literature acknowledged that efficient and developed financial markets could lead to
increased economic growth by improving the efficiency of allocation and utilization of savings in the economy. Better functioning financial systems ease the external financing constraints that impede firm and industrial expansion.
There is a growing body of empirical analyses, including firm-level studies, industry-level studies, individual country
studies, and cross-country comparisons, which prove this strong, positive link between the functioning of the
financial system and long-run economic growth. In addition, they better allocate resources, monitor managers and exert corporate
control, mobilize savings, and facilitate the exchange of goods and services”. A capital market is a market for securities (debt or equity), where business enterprises
“
(companies) and governments can raise long-term funds. It is defined as a market in which money is provided for periods longer than a year as the raising of short-term funds takes place on other markets (e.g., the money market).
The capital market includes the stock market (equity securities) and the bond market (debt) The capital market of a country can be considered as one of the leading indicators in determining the growth of its economy. As
mentioned by C.Rangarajan, Ex Governor, RBI (1998), “The growth process of any economy depends on the functioning of financial markets which also helps to augment its Capital formation. According to Professor Hicks, the
industrial Revolution in England was ignited more by the presence of liquid financial market than the technological investment”. He writes interestingly- “What happened in the Industrial Revolution is that the Range of fixed capital
goods that were used in production Began noticeably to increase. But fixed capital is sunk; it is embodied in a particular form, from which it can only gradually be released. In order that people should be willing to sink large
amounts of capital it is the availability of liquid funds which is crucial. This condition was satisfied in England ...by the first half of the eighteenth century The liquid asset was there, as it would not have been even a few years earlier
“ Thus, liquidity is a very important component of Financial Market and plays a very vital role in the long run economic development of any country as it helps not only in promoting the savings of the economy but also to adopt an
effective channel to transmit various financial policies by creating liquidity in the market. Therefore Financial System of any country should be well developed, competitive, efficient and integrated to face all shocks. The financial
system and infrastructure of any country at any time can be considered as the result of its own peculiar historical evolution. This evolution is resulted by continuous interaction between all the participants existing in the system and
public policy interventions. The evolution of Indian financial markets and the regulatory system has also followed a similar path. India began with the central bank, Reserve Bank of India (RBI), as the banking sector regulator, and
the Ministry of Finance as the regulator for all other financial sectors. Today, most financial service providers and their regulatory agencies exist. The role of regulators has evolved over time from that of an instrument for planned
development in the initial stage to that of a referee of a relatively more modern and complex financial sector at present. Over this period, a variety of financial sector reform measures have been undertaken in India, with many
important successes. An important feature of these reforms has been the attempt of the authorities to align the regulatory view the needs of the country and domestic factors. These reforms can be broadly classified as steps taken
towards: a) Liberalizing the overall macroeconomic and regulatory environment within which financial sector institutions function. b) Strengthening the institutions and improving their efficiency and competitiveness. c) Establishing
and strengthening the regulatory framework and institutions for overseeing the financial system.The history of Indian capital markets spans back 200 years, around the end of the 18th century. It was at this time that India was
under the rule of the East India Company. The capital market of India initially developed around Mumbai; with around 200 to 250 securities brokers participating in active trade during the second half of the 19th century. There are
a number of factors that have paved path for India market growth. After the economic liberalization, policies were undertaken in the 1990s, the economy of the country has been steadily rising which has led to more demands and
supply circles. This has introduced diverse market sectors and industries in the country, which has led to a competitive consumer market. Through this research paper, an attempt is made to understand the evolution of Global
financial system with more emphasis on Indian markets. It also aims to study the global perspective of financial markets of any country and to understand that how a country’s financial markets is integrated with the other world
markets. Also the concept of efficiency is highlighted which says that a country whose financial markets are well integrated with the world markets are more efficient as compared to one whose financial markets are not very well
integrated. Lastly the paper concludes by leaving scope and opportunities to understand these global concepts in an easier way to the reader and further can be used for extensive research. A financial system or financial sector
the areas of surplus to the areas of deficit. A Financial System is a composition of various institutions, markets, regulations and laws, practices, money
manager, analysts, transactions and claims and liabilities. Indian Financial market can be considered as one of the oldest across the globe and is experiencing favorable
time during the recent years, which have prospered the economy of the country to a great extent. Presently, India
functions as an intermediary and facilitates the flow of funds from
is rated by six international credit rating agencies, namely Standard and Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s Investor Services, FITCH, Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS), the Japanese Credit Rating agency (JCRA), and the Rating and
Investment Information Inc., Tokyo( R&I).
Scenario #2 – is Cyber-hacking
A hack on the CMS will eventually succeed. That escalates to mass de-stabilization of
India.
Dilipraj ‘13
Mr E. Dilipraj is a Research Associate at Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi. He is also pursuing his PhD at the Centre for
Latin American Studies from JNU, New Delhi. This evidence is internally quoting Sunil Abraham, who is the Executive Director of
the Bangalore based research organisation, the Centre for Internet and Society. The Centre for Internet and Society is a nonprofit research organization that works on policy issues relating to freedom of expression, privacy, accessibility for persons with
disabilities, access to knowledge and IPR reform, and openness. Sunil Abraham also founded Mahiti in 1998, a company
committed to creating high impact technology and communications solutions. Sunil was elected an Ashoka fellow in 1999 to
'explore the democratic potential of the Internet' and was also granted a Sarai FLOSS fellowship in 2003. Between June 2004
and June 2007, Sunil also managed the International Open Source Network, a project of United Nations Development
Programme's Asia-Pacific Development Information Programme serving 42 countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Between
September 2007 and June 2008, he managed ENRAP an electronic network of International Fund for Agricultural Development
projects in the Asia-Pacific facilitated and co-funded by International Development Research Centre, Canada. Also internally
quoting Mr. Sachin Pilot, India’s Minister of State for Communications and Information Technology. Modified for potentially
objectionable language. “CYBER WARFARE AND NATIONAL SECURITY” - AIR POWER Journal Vol. 8 No. 3, MONSOON 2013 (JulySeptember) – available at: http://www.academia.edu/7534559/CYBER_WARFARE_AND_NATIONAL_SECURITY__AN_ANALYSIS_OF_INCIDENTS_BETWEEN_INDIA_AND_PAKISTAN
security providers for the cyber space have
always been lacking in vigilance to provide security to their country’s cyber networks and infrastructures. Sunil
Abraham, Executive Director of the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society, said during an interview to ‘Al Jazeera,’ “The Indian
government has a very low level of cyber awareness and cyber security. We don’t take cyber security as
seriously as the rest of the world”. The problem of cyber attacks by the hacking groups would not be a big problem if it
stopped with the hacking and defacing of websites. But, in reality, it moves on to the next stages. The same
people who carry out hacking and website defacing jobs may get involved in cyber espionage and data
mining against their enemies. These people may also volunteer their expert services to the terrorist organisations in return for
money and other forms of remuneration. According to a cyber security professional working with one of India’s
intelligence agencies, We once sat down to check the Delhi [internet] Backbone. We found thousands of systems compromised. All
were government systems, Research and Analysis Wing, Intelligence Bureau, Military Intelligence... we don’t realise how much damage has already happened. The lack
of awareness and the lethargic approach in monitoring and providing security to the cyber networks by India led to thousands of compromised computers across the country. The
infection ranges from small Viruses, Botnets to that of Stuxnet level malwares which can hamper the total
operations of the network connected to the compromised computer. It has been observed that out of the 10,000 Stuxnet infected
Indian computers, 15 were located at critical infrastructure facilities. These included the Gujarat and Haryana Electricity Boards and an ONGC offshore oil rig. Though Stuxnet
reached the networks of these infrastructures, thankfully, it did not activate itself on them. In other
While aggression is the only tactic followed by the hacker groups in both countries, on the contrary, the
words, India was only a few flawed lines of code away from having its power and oil sectors crippled
(destroyed). The list of new malwares goes on – Stuxnet, Flame, Duqu, etc – and many more are in the process of coding; their abilities to operate as cyber
weapons are incredible and, at the same time, unbearable, if not protected against properly. Assuming that the hacker groups get access such
malwares, then the situation would become extremely dangerous for the national security as it is equivalent to terrorists getting
access to nuclear weapons. While talking about the same, Mr. Sachin Pilot, Minister of State for Communications and
Information Technology said: The entire economies of some countries have been (destroyed) paralysed by
viruses from across the border. We have to make ourselves more resilient. Power, telecom, defence, these areas are
on top of our agenda. A careful study of the series of hacking on one another’s websites and networks by the private hacking groups of India
and Pakistan would reveal a basic fact that something which started as a small act of hate has now taken on a much
different shape in the form of personal revenge, economic profits, a race to show off technical supremacy, and anti-national propaganda. This was
very much evident from one unwanted event that disturbed the internal security of India in August 2012. The Indian government was alerted by the exodus after thousands of people from the
northeast gathered at railway stations in various cities all over the country after being threatened by the rounds of SMS and violent morphed pictures that were being circulated on more than
100 websites. The SMS threatened the northeastern people living in various cities in India of a targeted attack on them, asking them to go back to their homeland, whereas the pictures
circulated on the internet were images of some violent bloodshed. Out of the various SMS that were in circulation, one said: It is a request to everyone to call back their relatives, sons and
daughters in Bangalore as soon as possible. Last night, four northeastern guys were killed by Muslims in Bangalore (two Manipuri, two Nepali). Two Nepali girls were kidnapped from Brigade
Road. The reports say that from August 20, marking Ramzan, after 2 pm, they are going to attack every northeastern person. The riot started because of the situation in Assam.32 Another SMS
said: Many northeast students staying in Pune were beaten up by miscreants believed to be Muslims following the Assam riots. Heard that it is happening in Muslim areas like Mumbai, Andhra
Pradesh, Bangalore. At Neelasandra, two boys were killed and one near passport office.33 The Government of India reacted soon on this matter and a 43-page report was prepared by
intelligence agencies along with the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) and India Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-IN) which traced several doctored images to
Pakistan. The origins of these morphed images were later traced back in specific to Lahore, Rawalpindi and other Pakistani cities by the Indian intelligence agencies. "From all available forensic
Another senior official who has been involved in
India's Pakistan watch for several years said, It has been happening for several months now. This is a low cost, very effective way
of destabilising us. They don't need to send terrorists and explosives to create mayhem. Internet has been a
very effective platform for instigating communal divisions in India. They also have a multiplier effect, first
resulting in anger and hatred, then riots and, finally, many taking to terrorism. This act of unnecessary involvement by Pakistan-based elements is seen as cyber terrorism and
cyber psychological warfare against India to cause internal security disturbance and eventually to create a huge crisis in the country. This incident which
evidence, we are fairly convinced that all those postings came from Pakistan," said an official of NTRO.
created major turmoil in the internal security of the country is the biggest example of the adverse effects of wrong use of cyber technology.
(Note to students: “CMS” – internally referenced – is India’s new surveillance system. “CMS” stands for
“Central Monitoring System”.)
Indian economic or political upheaval sparks nuclear war with Pakistan – risks of
accident, miscalc, and unauthorized theft all increase.
Busch ‘4
Please note that an updated edition of this book was re-released in Feb of 2015, but the original date was placed in the citation.
Dr. Nathan Busch, Professor of Government and co-director of the Center for American Studies at Christopher Newport
University. The author holds a Ph.D. in International relations from the University of Toronto and an MA in Political Science
from Michigan State University. The author previously held the position of Research Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and also held the position of Visiting Faculty, National
Security Office, Los Alamos National Laboratory. This piece of evidence internally quotes George Perkovich, a South Asia expert
at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It also internally quotes François Heisbourg. He chairs the Geneva Centre
for Security Policy and the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. His career has included positions in
government (member of the French mission to the UN, international security adviser to the Minister of Defence), in the defense
industry (vice-president of Thomson-CSF; senior vice president for strategy at Matra Défense Espace) and in academia
(professor of world politics at Sciences-Po Paris, director of the IISS). He is also a member of the International Commission on
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and has sat on a number of national and international blue-ribbon bodies. From
the book: No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation - p. 202-209
In addition, because
the Indian military currently has little experience handling nuclear weapons, the risks of
accidental use could be very high during a crisis situation, at least for some time to come. If the order were given to prepare India's
nuclear weapons for possible use, the military (perhaps in conjunction with India's nuclear scientists) would need to assemble the warheads rapidly; mate them to
the deliver)' vehicles (gravity bombs or missiles); and prepare them for use, either by loading them into bombers or by aiming the missiles and preparing them for
launch. All these procedures require training and precision, and, given the early stages of India's new command-and-control arrangements, it is not at all clear that
the Indian military would be able to carry them out safely under extreme time constraints.194 If India decided to develop a rapid-response capability, some of these
dangers would be lessened, but more serious dangers would be introduced. In particular, there would be a significantly increased risk of an accidental launch of
nuclear-armed missiles. India
would need to engage in a great deal of additional research into safety mechanisms
to prevent such an accidental launch, and it is simply not known how much effort India is devoting, or
will devote, to this area.195 Because the Prithvi and the two-stage Agni-I missiles contain a nonstorable liquid fuel, it would be impossible to deploy
the current configuration of either missile to allow for a rapid response. This significantly reduces the likelihood of these missiles being launched accidentally during
normal circumstances, though the
risks of accidental launches would probably increase significantly if they were fueled during a
crisis situation. As noted, however, India has conducted several successful flight tests of the Agni and Agni-II missiles. Because these missiles use a solid fuel, they
could be deployed in a rapid-response state. If India were to choose such a deployment option, the risks of an accidental launch could increase significantly. These
risks would depend on the extent to which India integrates use-control devices into its weapons to prevent accidental launches, but there is little evidence that India
is currently devoting significant efforts to develop such use-control devices.196 Furthermore, even if India intends to develop such use-control devices, if a nuclear
crisis were to arise before India had developed them, it still might be tempted to mate warheads on its missiles. If India does decide to weaponize its arsenal, it still
remains to be seen what type of deployment option it would choose. According to a statement in November 1999 by India's foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, India
would not keep its weapons on a "hair-trigger alert," though he did suggest that these weapons would be dispersed and made mobile to improve their chances of
surviving a first strike.197 If this statement is true, then the risks of accidental launch would be relatively small during normal circumstances.198 But these risks
would increase significantly during crisis situations, when India would presumably mate the warheads to the missiles.199 If the military still has not been given
physical control over the warheads, this would further reduce risks of accidental use during peacetime, though the transfer of nuclear weapons to the military
during a crisis could significantly increase the risks of an accident due to the military's inexperience in handling the nuclear weapons.200 What deployment option
Pakistan might adopt depends in part on India's weapon deployment. It appears that if India were to adopt a rapid-response option, Pakistan would probably adopt
a similar missile deployment, thereby increasing the risks of an accidental launch of its nuclear weapons as well. But even if India were to deploy its weapons (in
field positions) withour the warheads mated, concerns about survivability might nevertheless cause Pakistan to adopt a rapid-response capability. If such an event
were to occur, the risks of Pakistani accidental missile launches could be quite high, especially because it is unlikely that Pakistan currently has the technical capacity
to integrate sophisticated launch controls into its missile designs. Just
as in India, it is also unlikely that Pakistan's nuclear
devices are designed to minimize risks of accidents.201 Because Pakistan's warheads are based on an
early Chinese warhead design, they probably do not contain one-point safety designs, IHE, or fire-resistant
pits. If Pakistan were to assemble its nuclear warheads, there could be an unacceptable risk of an
accidental detonation of its nuclear weapons. Moreover; if Pakistan were to mate nuclear warheads to its missiles, either because it chose
to establish a rapid-response capability or because of an ongoing nuclear crisis, then similar concerns would exist about accidental launches of Pakistani nuclear
weapons. The current
risks of unauthorized use of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan are probably relatively small
because they have a very small number of nuclear weapons and those weapons are tightly controlled by their nuclear establishments. But there are a number of
factors that could increase risks of unauthorized use in the future. Although both India and Pakistan currently possess nuclear
weapons that could be delivered by aircraft, and are both actively developing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, none of their weapons appear to contain
sophisticated use-control devices to prevent unauthorized use. Instead, the nuclear
controls in both countries appear to be based on
guards, gates, and guns. As we have seen in the Russian and Chinese cases, while the "3 G's" might be sufficient during
normal circumstances, they are particularly vulnerable during political, economic, and social upheavals. The
Russian case has demonstrated that severe domestic upheavals can undermine central controls and weaken the infrastructures that previously
maintained the security for nuclear weapons. In particular, such upheavals can undermine the loyalty of guards and
workers at nuclear facilities, especially if the state collapses economically and can no longer afford to pay those
employees. Neither India nor Pakistan appears to have taken the necessary steps to prevent such
weaknesses from arising in their nuclear controls. Because Indian and Pakistani nuclear controls rely on the "3
G's" while reportedly lacking personnel reliability programs, there could be a significant risk of thefts of nuclear weapons
during severe upheavals. The Russian analogy is particularly relevant in the Pakistani case. The Pakistani state is far from stable. After the nuclear
tests in 1998 and the military coup in 1999, the Pakistani economy came close to collapsing and remained quite unstable for the next several years.202 In the
aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States removed economic sanctions and approved nearly $1 billion in international foreign aid to
Pakistan. But with a debt burden of nearly $39 billion, massive economic disparities, and continuing low levels of foreign investment, there still is significant cause
for concern about the prospects for Pakistan's long-term political and economic stability.203 If the Pakistani state were to fail, there could be significant risks of a
collapse in its nuclear controls. Were such an event to occur, there could be an extreme risk of thefts of nuclear weapons or of nuclear weapons falling into the
hands of Islamic militants.204 In the events following the September 11 attacks and President Musharraf's decision to support U.S. military strikes in Afghanistan,
there were serious concerns about a potential collapse of Pakistani nuclear controls. These concerns were spurred by reports of public riots, a close affiliation
among some elements of the Pakistani military and intelligence community with the Taliban regime and al Qaeda, and the tenuous hold that Pakistani president
Musharraf appears to have in Pakistan.205 In October 2001, President Musharraf took significant steps to centralize his control by removing high-level military and
intelligence officers with ties to the Taliban, but analysts have nevertheless continued to raise concerns about Musharraf's ability to maintain control.206 Due to the
seriousness of these risks, President Musharraf ordered an emergency redeployment of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, and the United States has offered to advise
Pakistan on methods for securing its nuclear stockpile. ' If the U.S. military strikes in Afghanistan had extended for a longer period, Musharraf might have found it
increasingly difficult to remain in power and reign in the more extreme elements in his country. One also cannot
rule out the possibility that
terrorists might choose to target nuclear facilities in India and Pakistan, especially if domestic instability
were to increase. Both India and Pakistan have serious problems with domestic terrorism.208 These terrorists are increasingly well-armed and have
targeted critical infrastructures and military bases in the past.209 Although current defenses at both Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons storage facilities are
probably sufficient to defend against most terrorist attacks,210 the physical protection systems at other nuclear facilities might be less effective.211 Moreover, if
the defenses
at the most sensitive facilities were weakened by domestic upheavals, then the risks of successful
terrorist attacks—either for purposes of theft or sabotage—could increase significantly. But even if such extreme events did not
occur, the tightly controlled decision-making and underdeveloped command-and-control structures in both India and Pakistan could potentially allow unauthorized
use, particularly during crises. In India, some of these risks have been minimized by the formalization of its command structure, though the military units are still
fairly inexperienced with handling these weapons.212 Moreover, because
India probably still lacks clearly defined, detailed operational procedures and
established, resilient communication channels, there would still be a fairly high risk of unauthorized use arising
from confusion or miscommunication during a crisis. These concerns will probably remain for some time to come, though the specific
risks could eventually be improved, depending on the training the military receives and the degree of professionalism among the troops. Because Pakistan is
currently under military rule, and its nuclear weapons are controlled by the military, one would expect a better coordination of nuclear decision-making and
command-and-control systems. Nevertheless, there are potential problems with Pakistani command and control as well. The lack of a clear operational use
doctrine, combined with inadequate C3I could increase the risks of unauthorized use during crises: "there is no enunciated nuclear doctrine, nor are there decisionmaking and communications systems adequate for either strategic or tactical command and control in the nuclear environment. Nuclear targeting information
could not be passed in time to be of use in a rapidly changing situation, which would increase the probability of own-troop strikes by tactical [nuclear] missiles."213
The risks or unauthorized use would increase if India and Pakistan were to deploy their weapons on ballistic missiles. Risks of decapitation and questions about the
survivability of the nuclear forces would probably cause both India and Pakistan to deploy mobile systems if they were to operationalize their nuclear forces. These
systems would significantly increase difficulties in command and control, especially because their weapons lack use-control devices.214 In addition, because of the
risks of decapitation, Pakistan is likely to adopt a "delegative" system, where the authority to launch nuclear weapons is given to a number of military officials.215
As the number of people authorized to launch nuclear weapons increases, so does the risk of a use of nuclear weapons that has not been commanded by the
central authorities.216 The
greatest concerns have been raised about a possible inadvertent use of nuclear weapons
in South Asia. The combined effects of mutual mistrust, very short flight times for missiles, continual armed conflicts along their borders, and few reliable
CBMs make the risks of inadvertent use quite severe, especially during crisis situations. According to George Perkovich, a South Asia
expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Kargil proved that having nuclear weapons
would not deter new conflicts. It also showed that unless such conflicts themselves were prevented, the possibility of an accidental or deliberate
nuclear exchange would also increase given both states' relatively poor systems of intelligence surveillance and nuclear command and control."217 Due to
continual mistrust between the two countries, each would be likely to misinterpret military movements, missile
tests, or accidental detonations as an impending attack by the other side. The risks of misinterpreting each other's motives are
compounded by the vulnerability of their nuclear forces and the short flight times of the forces to key targets. For example, because the runways at Pakistani Air
Force bases could be destroyed by a conventional air strike or nuclear attack,218 India could effectively eliminate Pakistan's nuclear bomber capability. During
an acute crisis, Pakistan might be faced with a "use them or lose them" dilemma, in that it would need to
attack rapidly or lose its ability to retaliate altogether. For this reason, Pakistani officials would be extremely
suspicious of any Indian actions that could be interpreted as preparations for an attack. Because the flight time
of Indian bombers is approximately ten minutes, Pakistani leaders would have a very limited amount of time to decide whether to launch their own attack.219
These conditions thus create an ongoing environment in which inadvertent use is quite possible. In addition, both countries have unreliable intelligence systems,
which have repeatedly misinterpreted the other's intentions. For example, during the Brasstacks incident, Pakistani intelligence reported that India's exercise was
merely a cover for an attack. Meanwhile, Indian intelligence overlooked the defensive nature of the Pakistani troops' position. These intelligence failures caused
each side to escalate the tensions unnecessarily. In addition, their intelligence systems have sometimes failed to detect major troop movements altogether. As we
have seen, during the Brasstacks crisis, Indian surveillance planes did not detect Pakistani troops positioned at their border for two weeks. And in the 1999 Kargil
war, Indian intelligence failed to detect the Pakistani invasion until several months after they had positioned themselves at strategic locations in the Kargil heights.
These intelligence failures could have two consequences. First, if either side were surprised by comparatively benign actions (such as Pakistan's defensive
positioning during the Brasstacks crisis), it would be more likely to overreact and mistakenly conclude that an attack is imminent. And second, if one side (especially
Pakistan) is confident that an invasion would not be detected at first, it might be more likely to launch attacks across the border: Each of these scenarios would
greatly increase the risks of nuclear escalation.220 Presumably owing to the massive intelligence failure prior to the 1999 Kargil war, however, India has recently
made significant investments in its intelligence-gathering capabilities, which could reduce risks of such failures by India in the future.221 The
dangers of
miscalculations and intelligence failures are increased by the crude early-warning systems employed by
both countries, particularly Pakistan. Several incidents serve to illustrate this point. First, prior to Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistan
reported that it had detected an air force attack on its radars and warned that it had mated a number of warheads to its Ghauri missiles.222 While this report might
have been circulated in order to justify their nuclear tests, circulating such a report could have caused India to mate weapons to its missiles, greatly increasing the
risks of inadvertent use (as well as accidental and unauthorized use). Another, perhaps more troubling, incident occurred prior to the U.S. missile strike on
Afghanistan in August 1998. The United States sent a high-level U.S. official to Pakistan because it feared Pakistan would detect the missile and interpret it as an
Indian strike. Pakistan never even detected the missile, however. Scholars have pointed out that this incident emphasizes not only the U.S. concern about
inadvertent nuclear war between India and Pakistan, but also that Pakistan's early-warning system "has serious flaws, and such shortcomings are more likely to
foster nervousness than calm. To the extent that they lack reliable early-warning systems, India or Pakistan could base launch decisions on unreliable sources,
increasing the chance of mistakes."223 But even if India and Pakistan had reliable early-warning systems, the risks of inadvertent war would still be extremely high.
If Indian or Pakistani radars detected aircraft headed toward them, they would have very little time to decide what to do before the aircraft reached their targets. In
addition, because there would be a great deal of uncertainty about whether attacking bombers carried conventional or nuclear weapons, the attacked side
(especially Pakistan) could
face a "use them or lose them" scenario and be tempted to launch a nuclear
attack to ensure that its nuclear capability was not destroyed.224 Thus, even if India and Pakistan do not deploy nuclear
weapons on missiles, the risks of an inadvertent use in these circumstances could be extremely high. If India and Pakistan were to deploy their nuclear weapons on
missiles (a scenario that is quite likely, given the vulnerability of Pakistani airfields and India's stated need for deterrence against the People's Republic of China), the
risks of inadvertent use would become even worse. Because the flight time for ballistic missiles between the two countries is less than five minutes,225 Indian and
Pakistani leaders would have virtually no time to decide what action to take (or perhaps even to launch a retaliatory strike) before the missiles hit their targets.226
The psychological effect on the two countries would be tremendous. According
to Francois Heisbourg, once theater missiles are deployed in
South Asia, the strategic situation will resemble the Cuban missile crisis, except that it "would be permanent rather than temporary, would occur without adequate C3I in place, and with political leadership located less than five minutes from
mutual Armageddon."227
(Note to students: “3 G’s” – internally referenced – stands for “guards, gates, and guns” as a security
measure to protect an installation. “C3I” – also internally referenced – stands for “Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence”).
Even a limited nuclear war between India & Pakistan causes extinction – smoke and
yields prove
Toon ’07
(et al, O. B. Toon -- Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences, Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics, University
of Colorado, Boulder, CO, -- “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of
individual nuclear terrorism” – Atmospheric Chemistry & Physics – April 19th -- http://www.atmos-chemphys.net/7/1973/2007/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf)
We assess the potential damage and smoke production associated with the detonation of small nuclear
weapons in modern megacities. While the number of nuclear warheads in the world has fallen by about a factor of three since its peak in 1986, the number of
nuclear weapons states is increasing and the potential exists for numerous regional nuclear arms races. Eight countries are known to have nuclear weapons, 2 are
constructing them, and an additional 32 nations already have the fissile material needed to build substantial arsenals of low-yield (Hiroshima-sized) explosives.
Population and economic activity worldwide are congregated to an increasing extent in megacities, which might be targeted in a nuclear conflict. We
find
that low yield weapons, which new nuclear powers are likely to construct, can produce 100 times as
many fatalities and 100 times as much smoke from fires per kt yield as previously estimated in analyses for full
scale nuclear wars using high-yield weapons, if the small weapons are targeted at city centers. A single “small” nuclear detonation in an
urban center could lead to more fatalities, in some cases by orders of magnitude, than have occurred in the major historical conflicts of many countries. We analyze
a regional nuclear exchange involving 100 15-kt explosions (less than 0.1% of the explosive yield of the current global nuclear
arsenal). We find that such an exchange could produce direct fatalities comparable to all of those worldwide in World War II, or to
those once estimated for a “counterforce” nuclear war between the superpowers. Megacities exposed to
the likely outcome of
atmospheric fallout of long-lived radionuclides would likely be abandoned indefinitely, with severe national and international implications. Our analysis shows that
smoke from urban firestorms in a regional war would rise into the upper troposphere due to pyro-convection.
Robock et al. (2007) show that the smoke would subsequently rise deep into the stratosphere due to atmospheric heating , and then might induce
significant climatic anomalies on global scales. We also anticipate substantial perturbations of global
ozone. While there are many uncertainties in the predictions we make here, the principal unknowns are the type and scale of conflict that might occur. The
scope and severity of the hazards identified pose a significant threat to the global community. They deserve
careful analysis by governments worldwide advised by a broad section of the world scientific community, as well as widespread public debate. In the 1980s, quantitative studies of the
consequences of a nuclear conflict between the superpowers provoked international scientific and political debate, and deep public concern (Crutzen and Birks, 1982; Turco et al., 1983;
Pittock et al., 1985). The resulting recognition that such conflicts could produce global scale damage at unacceptable levels contributed to an ongoing reduction of nuclear arsenals and
improvements in relationships between the major nuclear powers. Here we discuss the effects of the use of a single nuclear weapon by a state or terrorist. We then provide the first
comprehensive quantitative study of the consequences of a nuclear conflict involving multiple weapons between the emerging smaller nuclear states. Robock et al. (2007) explore the climate
changes that might occur due to the smoke emissions from such a conflict. The results of this study show that the potential effects of nuclear explosions having yields similar to those of the
weapons used over Japan during the Second World War (WW-II) are, in relation to yield, unexpectedly large. At least eight countries are capable of transport and detonation of such nuclear
devices. Moreover, North Korea appears to have a growing stockpile of warheads, and Iran is suspiciously pursuing uranium enrichment – a necessary precursor to weapons construction.
Thirty-two other countries that do not now have nuclear weapons possess sufficient fissionable nuclear materials to construct weapons, some in a relatively short period of time. For these
nations, a regional conflict involving modest numbers of 15-kiloton (kt, the TNT explosive yield equivalent) weapons to attack cities could cause casualties that exceed, in some cases by orders
of magnitude, their losses in previous conflicts. Indeed, in some case, the casualties can rival previous estimates for a limited strategic war between the superpowers involving thousands of
weapons carrying several thousand megatons (Mt) of yield. Early radioactive fallout from small nuclear ground bursts would leave large sections of target areas contaminated and effectively
uninhabitable. (Hiroshima and Nagasaki were attacked by airbursts, which will not deposit large amounts of local radiation unless it is raining. They were continuously inhabited.) Because of
the smoke released in fires ignited by detonations, there is a possibility that 100 15-kt weapons used against city centers would produce global climate disturbances unprecedented in recorded
human history (Robock et al., 2007). An individual in possession of one of the thousands of existing lightweight nuclear weapons could kill or injure a million people in a terrorist attack. Below
we first discuss the arsenals of the existing, and potential, nuclear powers. We then describe the casualties due to blast and to fires set by thermal radiation from an attack on a single megacity
with one low yield nuclear weapon. Next we discuss the casualties if current and projected arsenals of such weapons were ever used in a regional conflict. We then discuss the impact of
radioactive contamination. Finally, we describe the amounts of smoke that may be generated in a regional scale conflict. At the end of each of these sections we outline the associated
uncertainties.
We have attempted to employ realistic scenarios in this analysis. However, we do not have access to the war
plans of any countries, nor to verifiable data on existing nuclear arsenals, delivery systems, or plans to develop, build or deploy nuclear weapons. There are
obviously many possible pathways for regional conflicts to develop. Opinions concerning the likelihood of a regional nuclear war range from highly improbable to
apocalyptic. Conservatism in such matters requires that a range of plausible scenarios be considered, given the availability of weapons hardware and the history of
regional conflict.
In the present analysis, we adopt two potential scenarios: i) a single small nuclear device detonated in a city center by terrorists;
and ii) a regional nuclear exchange between two newly minted nuclear weapons states involving a total of 100 low yield (15-kt) detonations. We do not justify these
most citizens and politicians today are aware of the potential disaster of an Israeli-Iranian-Syrian
nuclear confrontation, or a Indian-Pakistani territorial confrontation. Moreover, as nuclear weapons knowledge and implementation
scenarios any further except to note that
proliferates, the possible number and combinations of flash points multiplies. The fact that nuclear weapons of the type assumed here have been used in past
hostilities substantiates the idea that such scenarios as we propose are executable.
The new Freedom Act won’t solve US image. Protections from the original version do
solve, even without protections for persons outside the US.
Ries ‘14
(Internally quoting Zeke Johnson, director of Amnesty International's Security & Human Rights Program. Also internally quoting
Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human
Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on
Global Internet Freedom. She conducted much of the organization’s work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular
focus on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning Committee of the Global
Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances corporate responsibility and human rights in the
technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights
in China (HRIC). There, she contributed to the organization’s work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of
expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law. Also internally quoting Center for
Democracy and Technology Senior Counsel Harley Geiger – Brian Ries is Mashable’s Real-Time News Editor. Prior to working at
Mashable, Brian was Social Media Editor at Newsweek & The Daily Beast, responsible for using Twitter, Facebook, and Tumblr
to cover revolutions, disasters, and presidential elections. During his time at The Daily Beast, he contributed to a team that won
two Webby Awards for “Best News Site”. “Critics Slam 'Watered-Down' Surveillance Bill That Congress Just Passed” - Mashable May 22, 2014 – http://mashable.com/2014/05/22/congress-nsa-surveillance-bill/)
As a result, many
of its initial supporters pulled their support. “We supported the original USA Freedom act,
even though it didn’t do much for non-US persons,” Zeke Johnson, director of Amnesty International's
Security & Human Rights Program told Mashable after Thursday's vote. He described the original
version as “a good step to end bulk collection.” However, in its current version, it's not even clear that
this bill does that at all, Johnson said. He added that Congress left a lot of "wiggle room" in the bill — something he
said is a real problem. "Where there is vagueness in a law, you can count on the administration to exploit it," Johnson
said. However, Laura W. Murphy, director of the ACLU Washington Legislative Office, took a more positive view of the bill. "While far from perfect, this bill is an
unambiguous statement of congressional intent to rein in the out-of-control NSA," she said in a statement. "While we share the concerns of many — including
members of both parties who rightly believe the bill does not go far enough — without it we would be left with no reform at all, or worse, a House Intelligence
Committee bill that would have cemented bulk collection of Americans’ communications into law." The Electronic Frontier Foundation simply called it "a weak
attempt at NSA reform." “The
ban on bulk collection was deliberately watered down to be ambiguous and
exploitable,” said Center for Democracy and Technology Senior Counsel Harley Geiger. “We withdrew support for USA FREEDOM
when the bill morphed into a codification of large-scale, untargeted collection of data about Americans
with no connection to a crime or terrorism.” And Cynthia Wong, senior Internet researcher at Human Rights
Watch, said, “This so-called reform bill won’t restore the trust of Internet users in the US and around the
world. Until Congress passes real reform, U.S. credibility and leadership on Internet freedom will
continue to fade.”
Unlike the current Act, the original bill does solve US image. This holds even if plan’s
about bulk collection – instead of every surveillance practices.
HRW ‘14
(Internally quoting Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for Human Rights Watch. Before
joining Human Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of
their Project on Global Internet Freedom. She conducted much of the organization’s work promoting global Internet freedom,
with a particular focus on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning
Committee of the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances corporate responsibility and
human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights
Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC). There, she contributed to the organization’s work in the areas of business and human
rights and freedom of expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law. Human Rights
Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and
advance the cause of human rights for all. “US Senate: Salvage Surveillance Reform House Bill Flawed” - Human Rights Watch May 22, 2014 – http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/22/us-senate-salvage-surveillance-reform)
It is up to the US Senate to salvage surveillance reform, Human Rights Watch said today. The version of the USA Freedom
Act that the US House of Representatives passed on May 22, 2014, could ultimately fail to end mass data collection. The version
the House passed is a watered-down version of an earlier bill that was designed to end bulk collection of
business records and phone metadata. The practice has been almost universally condemned by all but the US security establishment. “This socalled reform bill won’t restore the trust of Internet users in the US and around the world,” said Cynthia Wong,
senior Internet researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Until Congress passes real reform, US credibility and
leadership on Internet freedom will continue to fade.” The initial version of the bill aimed to prohibit bulk
collection by the government of business records, including phone metadata. The bill only addressed one component of the
surveillance programs revealed by the former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden, that of US record collections. However, it had broad
support as a first step, including from Human Rights Watch. On May 7, a diluted version of the bill passed unanimously out of the House
Judiciary Committee, followed by Intelligence Committee approval on May 8. While better than alternative bills offered, the version the House passed could
leave the door wide open to continued indiscriminate data collection practices potentially invading the privacy
of millions of people without justification, Human Rights Watch said.
Advantage Two - Humint
The squo relies Big Data surveillance. That means info overload & less HUMINT.
Volz, 14
(Dustin, The National Journal, “Snowden: Overreliance on Mass Surveillance Abetted Boston Marathon Bombing: The former
NSA contractor says a focus on mass surveillance is impeding traditional intelligence-gathering efforts—and allowing terrorists
to succeed”, October 20, 2014, ak.)
Edward Snowden on Monday suggested
that if the National Security Agency focused more on traditional
intelligence gathering—and less on its mass-surveillance programs—it could have thwarted the 2013
Boston Marathon bombings. The fugitive leaker, speaking via video to a Harvard class, said that a
preoccupation with collecting bulk communications data has led to resource constraints at U.S.
intelligence agencies, often leaving more traditional, targeted methods of spying on the back burner. "We
miss attacks, we miss leads, and investigations fail because when the government is doing its 'collect it
all,' where we're watching everybody, we're not seeing anything with specificity because it is impossible to
keep an eye on all of your targets," Snowden told Harvard professor and Internet freedom activist Lawrence Lessig. "A good
example of this is, actually, the Boston Marathon bombings." Snowden said that Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev were pointed out by
Russian intelligence to U.S. officials prior to the bombings last year that killed three and left hundreds wounded, but
that such actionable intelligence was largely ignored. He argued that targeted surveillance on known
extremists and diligent pursuit of intelligence leads provides for better counterterrorism efforts than
mass spying. "We didn't really watch these guys and the question is, why?" Snowden asked. "The reality of that is
because we do have finite resources and the question is, should we be spending 10 billion dollars a year on
mass-surveillance programs of the NSA to the extent that we no longer have effective means of traditional
[targeting]?" Anti-spying activists have frequently argued that bulk data collection has no record of
successfully thwarting a terrorist attack, a line of argument some federal judges reviewing the NSA's programs have also used
in their legal reviews of the activities. Snowden's suggestion—that such mass surveillance has not only failed to directly stop
a threat, but actually makes the U.S. less safe by distracting resource-strapped intelligence officials from
performing their jobs—takes his criticism of spy programs to a new level. "We're watching everybody that we have no
reason to be watching simply because it may have value, at the expense of being able to watch specific people
for which we have a specific cause for investigating, and that's something that we need to look carefully
at how to balance," Snowden said.
Big Data kills human-intel – which is key to overall US operations.
Margolis ‘13
Gabriel Margolis – the author presently holds a Master of Arts (MA) in Conflict Management & Resolution from UNC
Wilmington and in his final semester of the program when this article was published in the peer-reviewed journal Global
Security Studies . Global Security Studies (GSS) is a premier academic and professional journal for strategic issues involving
international security affairs. All articles submitted to and published in Global Security Studies (GSS) undergo a rigorous, peerreviewed process. From the article: “The Lack of HUMINT: A Recurring Intelligence Problem” - Global Security Studies - Spring
2013, Volume 4, Issue 2http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Margolis%20Intelligence%20(ag%20edits).pdf
The United States has accumulated an unequivocal ability to collect intelligence as a result of the technological advances of the 20th
century. Numerous methods of collection have been employed in clandestine operations around the world
including those that focus on human, signals, geospatial, and measurements and signals intelligence. An infatuation
with technological methods of intelligence gathering has developed within many intelligence organizations, often
leaving the age old practice of espionage as an afterthought. As a result of the focus on technical methods, some of
the worst intelligence failures of the 20th century can be attributed to an absence of human intelligence. The
21st century has ushered in advances in technology have allowed UAVs to become the ultimate technical intelligence gathering
platform; however human intelligence is still being neglected. The increasing reliance on UAVs will make
the United States susceptible to intelligence failures unless human intelligence can be properly
integrated. In the near future UAVs may be able to gather human level intelligence, but it will be a long time before classical espionage is a
thing of the past.
BW and nuclear use coming. HUMINT is key to stay-ahead of these risks.
Johnson ‘9
Dr. Loch K. Johnson is Regents Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia. He is editor of the journal "Intelligence
and National Security" and has written numerous books on American foreign policy. Dr. Johnson served as staff director of the
House Subcommittee on Intelligence Oversight from 1977 to 1979. Dr. Johnson earned his Ph.D. in political science from the
University of California at Riverside. "Evaluating "Humint": The Role of Foreign Agents in U.S. Security" Paper presented at the
annual meeting of the ISA's 50th ANNUAL CONVENTION "EXPLORING THE PAST, ANTICIPATING THE FUTURE", New York
Marriott Marquis, NEW YORK CITY, NY, USA, Feb 15, 2009 – available via:
http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/0/6/6/p310665_index.html
The world is a dangerous place, plagued by the presence of terrorist cells; failed or failing states; competition for scarce
resources, such as oil, water, uranium, and food; chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, not to mention bristling arsenals
of conventional armaments; and deep-seated animosities between rival nations and factions. For self-protection, if for no other
reason, government officials leaders seek information about the capabilities and—an especially elusive topic—the intentions of those
overseas (or subversives at home) who can inflict harm upon the nation. That is the core purpose of espionage: to
gather information about threats, whether external or internal, and to warn leaders about perils facing the homeland. Further, the secret services hope to
provide leaders with data that can help advance the national interest—the opportunity side of the security
equation. Through the practice of espionage—spying or clandestine human intelligence: whichever is one's favorite term—the
central task, stated baldly, is to steal secrets from adversaries as a means for achieving a more thorough
understanding of threats and opportunities in the world. National governments study information that is available in
the public domain (Chinese newspapers, for example), but knowledge gaps are bound to arise. A favorite metaphor for intelligence is the jigsaw
puzzle. Many of the pieces to the puzzle are available in the stacks of the Library of Congress or on the Internet; nevertheless, there will continue to be several
missing pieces—perhaps the most important ones. They may be hidden away in Kremlin vaults or in caves where members of Al Qaeda hunker down
in Pakistan's western frontier. The public pieces of the puzzle can be acquired through careful research; but often discovery of the missing secret pieces has to
rely on spying, if they can be found at all. Some things— "mysteries" in the argot of intelligence professionals—are unknowable in any definitive way, such as who is likely to replace
the current leader of North Korea. Secrets, in contrast, may be uncovered with a combination of luck and skill—say, the number of Chinese nuclear-armed submarines, which are vulnerable to
Espionage can be pursued by way of human agents or with machines, respectively known
inside America's secret agencies as human intelligence ("humint," in the acronym) and technical intelligence ("techint"). Humint consists
satellite and sonar tracking.
of spy rings that rely on foreign agents or "assets" in the field, recruited by intelligence professionals (known as case officers during the Cold War or. in more current jargon, operations
officers). -_
Techint includes mechanical devises large and small, including satellites the size of Greyhound buses, equipped with fancy cameras and listening
devices that can see and hear acutely from orbits deep in space; reconnaissance aircraft, most famously the U-2; unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones, such as the Predator—often
armed with Hellfire missiles, allowing the option to kill what its handlers have just spotted through the lens of an onboard camera); enormous ground-based listening antennae, aimed at
enemy territory: listening devices clamped surreptitiously on fiber-optic communications cables that carry telephone conversations; and miniature listening "bugs" concealed within sparkling
cut-glass chandeliers in foreign embassies or palaces.
Techint attracts the most funding in Washington, D.C. (machines are costly, especially heavy
satellites that must be launched into space), by a ratio of some nine-to-one over humint in America's widely estimated S50 billion annual intelligence budget. Human spies, though, continue to
be recruited by the United States in most every region of the globe. Some critics contend that these spies contribute little to the knowledge of Washington officials about the state of
only human agents can provide insights into that most vital of all
national security questions: the intentions of one's rivals— especially those adversaries who are well
armed and hostile. The purpose of this essay is to examine the value of humint, based on a review7 of the research literature on intelligence, survey data, and the author's
international affairs; other authorities maintain, though, that
interviews with individuals in the espionage trade. The essay is organized in the following manner: it opens with a primer on the purpose, structure, and methods of humint; then examines
some empirical data on its value; surveys more broadly the pros and cons of this approach to spying; and concludes with an overall judgment about the value of agents for a nation's security.
Those impacts cause extinction.
Ochs ‘2
Richard - Chemical Weapons Working Group Member - “Biological Weapons must be Abolished Immediately,” June 9,
http://www.freefromterror.net/other_.../abolish.html]
Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the
genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or
vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in
comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear
weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the
other hand, can
get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these
doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the
Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they
can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical
weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical
extermination is over, it is over. With
nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive
elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that,
bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could
persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such
plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION
IS NOW POSSIBLE.
Plan solves and is reversible. Less Big Data means conventional and targeted human
intel.
Walt, 14
(Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, “The Big
Counterterrorism Counterfactual Is the NSA actually making us worse at fighting terrorism?”,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/11/10/counterterrorism_spying_nsa_islamic_state_terrorist_cve, November 10,
2014, ak.)
The head of the British electronic spy agency GCHQ, Robert Hannigan, created a minor flap last week in an article he wrote for the Financial Times. In effect,
Hannigan argued that more robust encryption procedures by private Internet companies were unwittingly aiding terrorists such as the Islamic State (IS) or al Qaeda,
by making it harder for organizations like the NSA and GCHQ to monitor online traffic. The implication was clear: The more that our personal privacy is respected
and protected, the greater the danger we will face from evildoers. It's a serious issue, and democracies that want to respect individual privacy while simultaneously
keeping citizens safe are going to have to do a much better job of reassuring us that vast and (mostly) secret surveillance capabilities overseen by unelected officials
such as Hannigan won't be abused. I
tend to favor the privacy side of the argument, both because personal freedoms are hard to get
back once lost, but also because there's not much evidence that these surveillance activities are making us
significantly safer. They seem to be able to help us track some terrorist leaders, but there's a lively debate among scholars over whether tracking and
killing these guys is an effective strategy. The fear of being tracked also forces terrorist organizations to adopt less efficient communications procedures, but it
doesn't seem to prevent them from doing a fair bit of harm regardless. So
here's a wild counterfactual for you to ponder: What
would the United States, Great Britain, and other wealthy and powerful nations do if they didn't have these vast
surveillance powers? What would they do if they didn't have armed drones, cruise missiles, or other implements of destruction that can make it
remarkably easy (and in the short-term, relatively cheap) to target anyone they suspect might be a terrorist? Assuming that there were still violent extremists
plotting various heinous acts, what would these powerful states do if the Internet was there but no one knew how to spy on it? For starters, they'd
have to
rely more heavily on tried-and-true counterterrorism measures: infiltrating extremist organizations and
flipping existing members, etc., to find out what they were planning, head attacks off before they
occurred, and eventually roll up organization themselves. States waged plenty of counterterrorism
campaigns before the Internet was invented, and while it can be difficult to infiltrate such movements and find their vulnerable points,
it's not exactly an unknown art. If we couldn't spy on them from the safety of Fort Meade, we'd
probably be doing a lot more of this.
(Note to students: Fort Meade – internally referenced – is a United States Army installation that’s home
to NSA and other intelligence agencies.)
More funding WON’T solve. Data overload overwhelms intel and guarantees ongoing
resource failures.
Tufekci ‘15
Zeynep Tufekci is a fellow at the Center for Information Technology Policy at Princeton University, an assistant professor at the
School of Information and Department of Sociology at the University of North Carolina, and a faculty associate at the Harvard
Berkman Center for Internet and Society. “Terror and the limits of mass surveillance” – Financial Times’ The Exchange - Feb 3rd
http://blogs.ft.com/the-exchange/2015/02/03/zeynep-tufekci-terror-and-the-limits-of-mass-surveillance/
The most common justification given by governments for mass surveillance is that these tools are
indispensable for fighting terrorism. The NSA’s ex-director Keith Alexander says big data is “what it’s all about”. Intelligence
agencies routinely claim that they need massive amounts of data on all of us to catch the bad guys, like the French brothers who assassinated the cartoonists of
Charlie Hebdo, or the murderers of Lee Rigby, the British soldier killed by two men who claimed the act was revenge for the UK’s involvement in the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. But
the assertion that big data is “what it’s all about” when it comes to predicting rare events is not supported
by what we know about how these methods work, and more importantly, don’t work. Analytics on massive datasets can be
powerful in analysing and identifying broad patterns, or events that occur regularly and frequently, but are singularly
unsuited to finding unpredictable, erratic, and rare needles in huge haystacks. In fact, the bigger the haystack — the more
massive the scale and the wider the scope of the surveillance — the less suited these methods are to finding such
exceptional events, and the more they may serve to direct resources and attention away from
appropriate tools and methods. After Rigby was killed, GCHQ, Britain’s intelligence service, was criticised by many for failing to stop his killers, Michael
Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale. A lengthy parliamentary inquiry was conducted, resulting in a 192-page report that lists all the ways in which Adebolajo and
Adebowale had brushes with data surveillance, but were not flagged as two men who were about to kill a soldier on a London street. GCHQ defended itself by
saying that some of the crucial online exchanges had taken place on a platform, believed to be Facebook, which had not alerted the agency about these men, or the
nature of their postings. The men apparently had numerous exchanges that were extremist in nature, and their accounts were suspended repeatedly by the
platform for violating its terms of service. “If only Facebook had turned over more data,” the thinking goes. But that is misleading, and makes sense only with the
benefit of hindsight. Seeking larger volumes of data, such as asking Facebook to alert intelligence agencies every time that it detects a post containing violence,
would deluge the agencies with multiple false leads that would lead to a data quagmire, rather than clues to impending crimes. For
big data analytics
to work, there needs to be a reliable connection between the signal (posting of violent content) and the event (killing
someone). Otherwise, the signal is worse than useless. Millions of Facebook’s billion-plus users post violent content every day, ranging
from routinised movie violence to atrocious violent rhetoric. Turning over the data from all such occurrences would merely flood the
agencies with “false positives” — erroneous indications for events that actually will not happen. Such data overload is not without
cost, as it takes time and effort to sift through these millions of strands of hay to confirm that they are, indeed, not needles — especially when we don’t even
know what needles look like. All that the investigators would have would be a lot of open leads with no resolution, taking away
resources from any
real investigation. Besides, account suspensions carried out by platforms like Facebook’s are haphazard, semi-automated and unreliable indicators. The
flagging system misses a lot more violent content than it flags, and it often flags content as inappropriate even when it is not, and suffers from many biases. Relying
on such a haphazard system is not a reasonable path at all. So is all the hype around big data analytics unjustified? Yes and no. There are appropriate use cases for
which massive datasets are intensely useful, and perform much better than any alternative we can imagine using conventional methods. Successful examples
include using Google searches to figure out drug interactions that would be too complex and too numerous to analyse one clinical trial at a time, or using social
media to detect national-level swings in our mood (we are indeed happier on Fridays than on Mondays). In contrast, consider the “lone wolf” attacker who took
hostages at, of all things, a “Lindt Chocolat Café” in Sydney. Chocolate shops are not regular targets of political violence, and random, crazed men attacking them is
not a pattern on which we can base further identification. Yes, the Sydney attacker claimed jihadi ideology and brought a black flag with Islamic writing on it, but
given the rarity of such events, it’s not always possible to separate the jihadi rhetoric from issues of mental health — every era’s mentally ill are affected by the
cultural patterns around them. This isn’t a job for big data analytics. (The fact that the gunman was on bail facing various charges and was known for sending hate
letters to the families of Australian soldiers killed overseas suggests it was a job for traditional policing). When confronted with their failures in predicting those rare
acts of domestic terrorism, here’s what GCHQ, and indeed the
NSA, should have said instead of asking for increased surveillance capabilities: stop
asking us to collect more and more data to perform an impossible task. This glut of data is making our job harder, not
easier, and the expectation that there will never be such incidents, ever, is not realistic.
Here is the 1NC
I am thinking.
-
T
Politics
Cplan – Wyden
Adv
Adv
First Off - 1NC violation – “Super-minimization”
Extra-Topicality:
Violation: Part of plan is “super-minimization”. That reduces capture and storage –
which isn’t surveillance.
Bennett ‘13
(Colin J. Bennett, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University' of Victoria, British Columbia, Global Surveillance and
Policing, Ed. Zureik and Salter, p. 132-133)
Have I been the subject of surveillance or, more precisely, 'dataveillance' [Clarke 1989]. Again, the literature would suggest that any
capture of personal information (however benign) constitutes a surveillance process. Surveillance, Lyon contends, is 'any
collection and processing of personal data, whether identifiable or not, for the purposes of influencing or managing those whose data have been garnered.' It is
simply the outcome of the 'complex ways in which we structure our political and economic relationships' (2001: 2). Marx (1938) It has also argued that there is a
'new surveillance' - routine, everyday, invisible and pre-emptive. Linked to this broad definition is the power of classification and sorting. It is a powerful means of
creating and reinforcing social identities and divisions [[Candy 1993H I.yon 20031. Without dissenting from these judgements, two insights suggest themselves as a
result of the case studies above. First, my
personal data (so far as I know) has not been processed for any purpose beyond that of
ensuring that I am a valid passenger on the days and flights reserved. It has not been analysed, subjected to any
investigation, manipulated or used to make any judgement about me. No doubt, a certain amount of data
mining of de-identified information occurs within the industry to analyse general travel patterns and demands. No doubt, had I not
opted out under the Aero-plan privacy policy, my data might have ended up with a variety of Aeroplan's partners, and I might have received related, and unrelated,
is a fundamental difference between the routine capture, collection
and storage of this kind of personal information, and any subsequent analysis of that information from which
decisions (benign or otherwise) might be made about me. The new process for API/PNR analysis serves to highlight the distinction. As a
promotional materials. It seems, however, that there
passenger, when I return to Canada, that information is automatically transferred ahead of my arrival to the CCRA's Passenger Assessment Unit at the Canadian
crucial process, therefore,
is not the capture and transmission of the information, but the prior procedures, and the assumptions that
underpin them, about who is or is not a high-risk traveler. Surveillance might be 'any collection and processing of
personal data, whether identifiable or not.' If we are to use such a broad definition, however, we need to find
another concept to describe the active intervention of human agents who then monitor that data to make
decisions about individuals. 'Surveillance' conflates a number of distinct processes. To describe what has
happened to me as surveillance perhaps serves to trivialize the real surveillance to which some individuals,
perhaps with 'risky' surnames and meal preferences, can be subjected during air travel. Surveillance is, therefore, highly
contingent. If social scientists are to get beyond totalizing metaphors and broad abstractions, it is absolutely
necessary to understand these contingencies. Social and individual risk is governed by a complicated set of organizational, cultural, technological,
airport, and it is systematically analysed. Anybody within a 'high-risk' category is then subject to further investigation. The
political and legal factors. The crucial questions are therefore distributional ones: Why do some people get more 'surveillance' than others |[ Bennett nd Raab 1997
2003)? But to address those questions, it is crucial to conduct the kind of finely tuned empirical studies such as the one attempted above.
Reasons to Vote:
One - Their interpretation’s too broad. Affs could claim that transparency measures or
appointing pro-privacy FISC attorneys would “curtail surveillance”. That’s imprecise
and hurts Neg counterplan options. It skews the round by artificially boosting Aff
solvency.
Two – Extra-T is a voter. If it weren’t, the Aff could add infinite extra-topical planks at
“no cost”. We’d have use all our speech time just to get back to ground zero. That
skews true assessments of the Aff.
Second Off - Wyden Committee Cplan
The United States federal government should conduct a full, public investigation into
the domestic surveillance of Americans by United States intelligence agencies. This
investigation should be modeled after the Church Committee, headed by Senator Ron
Wyden, and tasked with producing a report to Congress outlining recommendations
for appropriate legislative and regulatory reforms.
The counterplan solves the case and is net-beneficial.
First, it results in sustainable reforms and rebuilds public trust in government.
Church Committee Alums 14 — Counsel, Advisers, and Professional Staff Members of the Church
Committee including Chief Counsel Frederick A.O. Schwarz Jr., Loch Johnson, John T. Elliff, Burt Wides,
Jim Dick, Frederick Baron, Joseph Dennin, Peter Fenn, Anne Karalekas, Michael Madigan, Elliot Maxwell,
Gordon Rhea, Eric Richard, Athan Theoharis, and Christopher Pyle, 2014 (Open Letter to Congress and
the President, March 17th, Available Online at
https://www.eff.org/files/2014/03/16/church_committee_-_march_17_2014__0.pdf, Accessed 07-082015, p. 1-2)
In 1975, the public learned that the National Security Agency (NSA) had been collecting and analyzing
international telegrams of American citizens since the 1940s under secret agreements with all the major
telegram companies. Years later, the NSA instituted another "Watch List" program to intercept the
international communications of key figures in the civil rights and anti-Vietnam War movements among
other prominent citizens. Innocent Americans were targeted by their government. These actions were
only uncovered—and stopped—because of a special Senate investigative committee known as the
United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities, commonly known as the Church Committee.
We are former members and staff of the committee and write today as witnesses to history and as
citizens with decades of collective experience in Congress, the federal courts, the executive branch, and
the intelligence community. We write today to encourage Congress to create a Church Committee for
the 21st Century—a special investigatory committee to undertake a thorough, and public, examination
of current intelligence community practices affecting the rights of Americans and to make specific
recommendations for future oversight and reform. Such a committee would work in good faith with
the president, hold public and private hearings, and be empowered to obtain documents. Such
congressional action is urgently needed to restore the faith of citizens in the intelligence community
and, indeed, in our federal government.
The actions uncovered by the Church Committee in the 1970s bear striking similarities to the actions
we've learned about over the past year. In the early 1970s, allegations of impropriety and illegal activity
concerning the intelligence community spurred Congress to create committees to investigate those
allegations. Our committee, chaired by Senator Frank Church, was charged with investigating illegal and
unethical conduct of the intelligence community and with making legislative recommendations to
govern the intelligence community's conduct. The bipartisan committee's reports remain one of the
most searching reviews of intelligence agency practices in our nation's history.
Our findings were startling. Broadly speaking, we determined that sweeping domestic surveillance
programs, conducted under the guise of foreign intelligence collection, had repeatedly undermined the
privacy rights of US citizens. A number of reforms were implemented as a result, including the creation
of permanent intelligence oversight committees in Congress and the passage of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act.
Even though our work was over 30 years ago, our conclusions seem eerily prescient today. For example,
our final report noted:
We have seen a consistent pattern in which programs initiated with limited goals, such as
preventing criminal violence or identifying foreign spies, were expanded to what witnesses
characterized as "vacuum cleaners," [end page 1] sweeping in information about lawful
activities of American citizens. The tendency of intelligence activities to expand beyond their
initial scope is a theme, which runs through every aspect of our investigative findings.
The need for another thorough, independent, and public congressional investigation of intelligence
activity practices that affect the rights of Americans is apparent. There is a crisis of public confidence.
Misleading statements by agency officials to Congress, the courts, and the public have undermined
public trust in the intelligence community and in the capacity for the branches of government to provide
meaningful oversight.
The scale of domestic communications surveillance the NSA engages in today dwarfs the programs
revealed by the Church Committee. Indeed, 30 years ago, the NSA's surveillance practices raised similar
concerns as those today. For instance, Senator Church explained:
In the case of the NSA, which is of particular concern to us today, the rapid development of
technology in this area of electronic surveillance has seriously aggravated present ambiguities in
the law. The broad sweep of communications interception by NSA takes us far beyond the
previous Fourth Amendment controversies where particular individuals and specific telephone
lines were the target.
As former members and staff of the Church Committee we can authoritatively say: the erosion of public
trust currently facing our intelligence community is not novel, nor is its solution. A Church Committee
for the 21st Century—a special congressional investigatory committee that undertakes a significant and
public reexamination of intelligence community practices that affect the rights of Americans and the
laws governing those actions—is urgently needed. Nothing less than the confidence of the American
public in our intelligence agencies and, indeed, the federal government, is at stake.
Second, investigation before legislation is the only way to avoid circumvention. The
counterplan solves; the plan doesn’t.
Bump 13 — Philip Bump, Staff Writer at the Wire—an Atlantic publication, former Writer for Grist,
former Senior Designer at Adobe Systems, 2013 (“How Do You Solve a Problem Like NSA?,” The Wire—
an Atlantic publication, November 1st, Available Online at
http://www.thewire.com/politics/2013/11/how-do-you-solve-problem-nsa/71154/, Accessed 07-082015)
Legal roadblocks
Advocates of the NSA's surveillance, like Feinstein, are quick to point out that what the NSA is doing is
legal. It is overseen by (largely acquiescent) intelligence committees in the House and Senate. It is
approved by the Department of Justice and White House. It is given a stamp of approval by the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court in a purposefully one-sided process. But, as American history has
repeatedly shown, "legal" doesn't always correlate to "appropriate." And in this case, the assessment
that the tools fall within the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment essentially hasn't been challenged
before the Supreme Court.
The NSA says it wants to collect metadata on every phone call in the United States, and that the Patriot
Act's Section 215 lets it do so. The FISC agrees. Therefore, these activities are legal — despite the author
of the Patriot Act asserting that the data collection exceeds the boundaries of the law. Doesn't matter.
The NSA and a secret court interpret the law to allow the NSA to conduct all of the activity that's
mentioned in this article. A majority of members of Congress are not disposed to challenge this
interpretation. There exist proposals that, unlike Feinstein's, would actually block certain NSA behavior,
but they aren't likely to be make it into law without being watered down by amendments.
We reached out to staff attorneys from two of the organizations that have been most fervent in their
critiques of the NSA's surveillance tools, asking them how, given the power, they'd revise the
government's surveillance tools to ensure that public privacy was maintained. The question we posed:
Knowing that the NSA is experienced at massaging laws to meet their needs, what legislation might
prevent that?
Alex Abdo, staff attorney at the American Civil Liberties Union, advocated transparency above all else.
"Our country's founders believed that tyranny could be prevented through checks and balances. I think
the same holds true today." For that to happen, though, people need to know what's happening.
[I]t should mean that the public has access to significant or novel legal interpretations issued by
the FISC. That would have gone a long way toward preventing the 215 program, because
Congress and the public would have been able to judge the lawfulness and necessity of the
government's programs for themselves.
"In short," Abdo said, "our privacy rights shouldn't be interpreted away in secret. … Secrecy has its place,
but it should not be used as an excuse to keep any branch of government or the public out of the debate
entirely. This type of solution is also key to long-term legitimacy."
In the 1970s, following revelations of domestic surveillance by the NSA — and rampant abuses by other
intelligence services — the Church Committee was formed in the Senate in an effort to better determine
the guidelines under which the agencies should operate. There were eventually other steps: the 1978
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act itself, which codified some of the committee's findings, and
President Ronald Reagan's 1981 executive order extending the agencies' power while adding some new
boundaries. (The vast majority of the NSA violations revealed in the Snowden leaks were violations of
this order.)
Kurt Opsahl, senior staff attorney at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, suggested revisiting the idea of
forming a new Congressional commission to tackle these issues. "If Congress has the political will," he
told us, "it can easily write language to stop bulk collection." But:
[T]o really be sure that Congress can legislate well, we really need a new Church Commission. …
The key idea behind a new Church Committee would be to investigate first, and then legislate
later with a better understanding. It may not result in restrictions that will be effective for all
time, in light of technologies not dreamed about now, but it's the right thing to do now.
Neither Opsahl nor Abdo, you'll notice, are advocating specific proposals since without further
exploration of what's actually happening, it's difficult to draw policy. The most important part of
Opsahl's statement, though, is the first part. "If Congress has the political will." The Senate Intelligence
Committee, in passing the tweaks encompassed in the FISA Improvements Act has shown a lack of will
to try and figure out how to create new limits on the NSA's activity. But perhaps the most obvious
example of a lack of will comes from Feinstein's House counterpart, Rep. Mike Rogers of Michigan. In a
hearing this week, he confronted American University law professor Steve Vladeck, as reported by
MSNBC.
Rogers: I would argue the fact that we haven’t had any complaints come forward with any
specificity arguing that their privacy has been violated, clearly indicates, in 10 years, clearly
indicates that something must be doing right. Somebody must be doing something exactly right.
Vladeck: But who would be complaining?
Rogers: Somebody who’s privacy was violated. You can’t have your privacy violated if you don’t
know your privacy is violated.
This is a corollary to the Supreme Court's rejection, earlier this year, of a lawsuit targeting the NSA. The
Court ruled that the plaintiffs weren't affected by the surveillance and therefore couldn't sue; assured
by the government that those being watched would be told — and so could knowingly bring a suit — the
Court threw out the case. It then turned out that the government wasn't informing people that NSA
surveillance generated the evidence against them.
Rogers lacks the political will to figure out how to rein in the NSA so that the privacy of Americans using
email or Google or Tor is ensured. The will to study the problem may emerge as leaks continue and
political pressure builds. As Rogers might note, you can't fix your surveillance system until you know
that your surveillance system needs to be fixed. Assuming it can be fixed at all.
Third Off – Cuba Politics
Cuban normalization will pass with an ambassador confirmed – PC key
-Will pass warrants: general momentum (which outweighs everything), public support, and previous
progress
-Yes push – demands of Congress and press conferences
-Obama’s PC is high – Supreme Court victories on the ACA and same-sex marriage + SC speech
Milbank 7/5 {Dana, politics columnist based at The Washington Post and MSNBC, former senior
editor of The New Republic, B.A. cum laude in political science (Yale), “Obama spending his windfall of
political capital on Cuba,” Herald Net, 2015,
http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20150705/OPINION04/150709675#THUR}
“This,” President Obama
said in the Rose Garden on Wednesday as he announced the restoration of diplomatic relations
with Cuba, “is what change looks like.” This echo of his 2008 campaign theme was self-congratulatory but deserved,
coming at a time of unexpected hope late in his presidency. In the space of just over a week, Obama's tired
tenure came back to life. He bested congressional Democrats and got trade legislation on his desk. The Supreme Court
upheld the signature achievement of his presidency — Obamacare — and thereby cemented his legacy.
The high court also made same-sex marriage legal across the land following a tidal change in public opinion that Obama's
own conversion accelerated. Had the court's decisions not dominated the nation's attention, Obama's eulogy
Friday for those slain in a South Carolina church, and his extraordinary rendition of “Amazing Grace,” would have itself been one of
the most powerful moments of his presidency. It is little surprise, then, that this lame duck's job
approval rating hit a respectable 50 percent this week for the first time in two years in a CNN poll, and his
disapproval rating dropped to 47. The good tidings of the past week have been arguably more luck than achievement for Obama, but he
deserves credit for his effort to use the momentum of his victories to revive what had been a moribund
presidency. When you earn political capital, as George W. Bush liked to say, you spend it. This is why it was
shrewd of the surging Obama to demand new action from Congress on Cuba. “Americans and
Cubans alike are ready to move forward; I believe it's time for Congress to do the same,” he said, renewing his call
to lift the travel and trade embargo. “Yes, there are those who want to turn back the clock and double down on a policy of isolation, but it's
long past time for us to realize that this approach doesn't work. It hasn't worked for 50 years. ... So I'd ask Congress to listen to
the Cuban people, listen to the American people, listen to the words of a proud Cuban American, [former Bush commerce secretary] Carlos
Gutierrez, who recently came out against the policy of the past.” Fifteen minutes later, Obama lifted off from the South Lawn in Marine One on his way to Nashville,
where he tried to use the momentum generated by the Supreme Court Obamacare victory to spread the program to states where Republican governors have
resisted. “What I'm hoping is that with the Supreme Court case now behind us, what we can do is ... now focus on how we can make it even better,” he said, adding,
“My hope is that on a bipartisan basis, in places like Tennessee but all across the country, we can now focus on ... what have we learned? What's working? What's
not working?” He said that “because of politics, not all states have taken advantage of the options that are out there. Our hope is, is that more of them do.” He
urged people to “think about this in a practical American way instead of a partisan, political way.” This probably won't happen, but it's
refreshing
to see Obama, too often passive, regaining vigor as he approaches the final 18 months of his presidency. The
energy had, at least for the moment, returned to the White House, where no fewer than six network correspondents were
doing live stand-ups before Obama's appearance Wednesday morning. There was a spring in the president's step, if not a
swagger, as he emerged from the Oval Office trailed by Vice President Biden. Republican presidential candidates
were nearly unanimous in denouncing the plan to open a U.S. embassy in Havana. But Obama, squinting in the sunlight
the fight. “The progress that we mark today is yet another
demonstration that we don't have to be imprisoned by the past,” he said. Quoting a Cuban-American's view that “you
as he read from his teleprompters, welcomed
can't hold the future of Cuba hostage to what happened in the past,” Obama added, “That's what this is about: a choice between the future
and the past.” Obama
turned to go back inside, ignoring the question shouted by Bloomberg's Margaret Talev: “How will
you get an ambassador confirmed?” That will indeed be tricky. But momentum is everything in
politics — and for the moment, Obama
has it again.
Freedom act was delicate balancing act – ANY additional changes drain PC and
guarantee intense opposition – congressional leadership, GOP, law enforcement
Gross, 6/5 – Grant, Grant Gross covers technology and telecom policy in the U.S. government for the IDG News Service, and is based in
Washington, D.C., IDG News Service, PC World, 6/5/15, http://www.pcworld.com/article/2932337/dont-expect-major-changes-to-nsasurveillance-from-congress.html
What’s in the USA Freedom Act? Some critics have blasted the USA Freedom Act as fake reform, while supporters have called it the biggest
overhaul of U.S. surveillance program in decades. Many civil liberties and privacy groups have come down in the middle of those two views,
calling it modest reform of the counterterrorism Patriot Act. The law aims to end the NSA’s decade-plus practice of collecting U.S. telephone
records in bulk, while allowing the agency to search those records in a more targeted manner. The law also moves the phone records database
from the NSA to telecom carriers, and requires the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to consult with tech and privacy experts
when ruling on major new data collection requests from the NSA. It also requires all significant FISC orders from the last 12 years to be released
to the public. The new law limits bulk collection of U.S. telephone and business records by requiring the FBI, the agency that applies for data
collection, to use a “specific selection term” when asking the surveillance court to authorize records searches. The law prohibits the FBI and
NSA from using a “broad geographic region,” including a city, county, state or zip code, as a search term, but it doesn’t otherwise define
“specific search term.” That’s a problem, according to critics. The surveillance court could allow, for example, “AT&T” as a specific search term
and give the NSA the authority to collect all of the carrier’s customer records. Such a ruling from FISC would seem to run counter to
congressional intent, but this is the same court that defined all U.S. phone records as “relevant” to a counterterrorism investigation under the
old version of the Patriot Act’s Section 215. The USA Freedom
Act also does nothing to limit the NSA’s surveillance of
overseas Internet traffic, including the content of emails and IP voice calls. Significantly limiting that NSA program, called Prism in 2013
Snowden leaks, will be a difficult task in Congress, with many lawmakers unconcerned about the privacy rights of
people who don’t vote in U.S. elections. Still, the section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that authorizes those NSA foreign
surveillance programs sunsets in 2017, and that deadline will force Congress to look at FISA, although lawmakers may wait until the last minute,
as they did with the expiring sections of the Patriot Act covered in the USA Freedom Act. The House Judiciary Committee will continue its
oversight of U.S. surveillance programs, and the committee will address FISA before its provisions expire, an aide to the committee said.
Republican leaders opposed to more changes Supporters of new reforms will have to bypass
congressional leadership, however. Senate Republican leaders attempted to derail even the USA Freedom
Act and refused to allow amendments that would require further changes at the NSA. In the House,
Republican leaders threatened to kill the USA Freedom Act if the Judiciary Committee amended the bill to
address other surveillance programs. Still, many House members, both Republicans and Democrats, have pushed for new
surveillance limits, with lawmakers adding an amendment to end so-called backdoor government searches of domestic communications to a
large appropriations bill this week. Obama’s administration has threatened to veto the appropriations bill for several unrelated reasons, but
several House members have pledged to push hard to prohibit the FBI and CIA from searching the content of reportedly tens of thousands of
U.S. communications swept up in an NSA surveillance program targeting overseas terrorism suspects. Closing that surveillance backdoor is a top
priority for civil liberties groups, said Neema Singh Guliani, a legislative counsel with the American Civil Liberties Union’s Washington, D.C.,
legislative office. “We’ve had this statute that masquerades as affecting only people abroad, but the reality is that it sweeps up large numbers
of U.S. persons,” she said. Other changes possible Advocates and lawmakers will also push for a handful of other surveillance reforms in the
coming months. The changes most likely to pass make limited changes to surveillance programs, however. While
not tied to NSA surveillance, lawmakers will press for changes to the 29-year-old Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), a wiretap law
that gives law enforcement agencies warrantless access to emails and other communications stored in the cloud for more than six months. A
House version of ECPA reform counts more than half the body as co-sponsors. Still, tech companies and civil liberties groups have been pushing
since 2010 to have those communications protected by warrants, but
law enforcement agencies and some Republican
lawmakers have successfully opposed the changes. Another bill that may gain traction in coming months is the Judicial
Redress Act, a bill that would allow citizens of some countries to file lawsuits under the U.S. Privacy Act if government agencies misuse their
records. “The Privacy Act offers limited protections, even to Americans, but passage of this bill would be an important first step to addressing
especially European concerns that US privacy reforms won’t help them,” said Berin Szoka, president of free market think tank TechFreedom.
Public pressure, along with potentially new leaks, will be the key to driving any more surveillance changes, advocates said. “The public will for
mass surveillance laws was made very clear recently, and that’s partly why we saw much of Congress flock to whatever could be called
surveillance reform,” said Tiffiniy Cheng, a founder of digital rights group Fight for the Future. “No one is fooled by USA
Freedom—it’s a
weak piece of legislation that uses exceptions in legislative language to codify the NSA’s practice of
surveilling most people.” Congress has much work left to do, Cheng said by email. “After the recent showdown and public outcry, USA
Freedom is at best, seen as a beginning of surveillance reform, not the end,” she said.
Full diplomatic ties key to normalized relations – vital to improved regional stability
and counter-narcotics – status quo doesn’t solve and Obama has exhausted his
available actions
Bowman 7/1 {Michael, syndicated senate correspondent, “Global Chatter Greets US-Cuba
Announcement,” VOA, 2015, http://www.voanews.com/content/global-chatter-greets-us-cubarestoration-of-diplomatic-ties/2845227.html#THUR}
The restoration
of full diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba sparked overwhelmingly
positive reactions around the world, except in the United States, where opinions diverged widely. A spokesman for U.N. Secretary-General
Ban Ki-moon said he “welcomes the announcement today that Cuba and the United States will reopen embassies in Havana and Washington, D.C.” “The
restoration of diplomatic ties is an important step on the path toward the normalization of relations. The secretary-general
hopes that this historic step will benefit the peoples of both countries,” the spokesman added. For decades, Switzerland has served as a go-between for Washington
and Havana, housing the U.S. Interest Section in the Cuban capital. In a statement, the Swiss government said: “ Switzerland
strongly believes that
and the normalization process will overall be beneficial for the two states and contribute to
security, stability and prosperity in the region. Switzerland views the normalization of relations between Cuba and
the reopening of the two embassies
the U.S. as
very positive – not only for these two countries but for the whole region and for world stability.” ‘Incentivizing
a police state’ By contrast, reactions are decidedly mixed in Washington and across the United States. The Speaker of the House of Representatives, Republican
John Boehner, said in a statement, “The Obama administration is handing the Castros a lifetime dream of legitimacy without getting a thing for the Cuban people
being oppressed by this brutal communist dictatorship.” Echoing the criticism, Democratic Senator Robert Menendez, the son of parents who immigrated to
the U.S. from Cuba, said: “Our demands for freedoms and liberty on the island will continue to be ignored, and we are incentivizing a police state to uphold a
policy of brutality. A policy of the United States giving and the Castro brothers freely taking is
not in our national interest and not a responsible
approach when dealing with repressive rulers that deny freedoms to [their] people. An already one-sided deal that benefits the Cuban regime is becoming all the
more lopsided.” ‘New era of possibility’ House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi
disagreed. “Reopening embassies lays the
foundation for a new, more productive relationship with Cuba that can support and advance key American
priorities, including human rights, counter-narcotics cooperation, business opportunities for American companies,
migration, family unification, and cultural- and faith-based exchanges,” she said. “President Obama’s bold leadership has opened a new era of possibility in U.S.Cuban relations.” That
sentiment was echoed by Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy.
Improved efforts key to prevent cartels and Hezbollah attacks with WMDs
Pavlich ’11 (Katie, award-winning journalist, B.A. in broadcast journalism (University of Arizona), This
article quotes Douglas Farah (Senior Fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, B.A. in
Latin American Studies from Kansas) and Patrick Meehan (US representative on the Homeland Security
Committee), “A Growing Terror Threat: Hezbollah in Latin America,” TownHall Magazine, 7/8,
http://townhall.com/columnists/katiepavlich/2011/07/08/a_growing_terror_threat_hezbollah_in_latin
_america/page/full)
Americans think of terrorist activity, we think of Yemen, Pakistan, Palestine and other places in the Middle East, but we overlook the rapidly
increasing terrorism threat coming from Hezbollah operations taking place in Latin America. “This is a
very important issue we pay too little attention to,” Senior Fellow for the International Assessment and Strategy Center Douglas Farah told
lawmakers on Capitol Hill yesterday during a counterterrorism hearing. According to testimony given on Capitol Hill yesterday, Hezbollah, the most extensive
When
terrorist organization in the world, is operating along the U.S.-Mexico border and has vast
influence in Latin America. Hezbollah is anti-American and anti-Israeli, and the United States has been concerned about the group since the 1980s. Before
9/11,
Hezbollah, not Al Qaeda, was responsible for the majority of U.S. terrorism deaths, including the 1983 bombings of U.S. Marine
barracks and U.S. embassy in Beirut, in addition to a series of attacks in the '80s. Hezbollah is also Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires. In 1994 they bombed the Jewish community center in the
same responsible for countless attacks on Israel. In 1992, Hezbollah, with help from Iran, bombed the South American city. Those are just a handful of examples that don’t even account for the
Hezbollah makes Al Qaeda look like a minor league team,”
Meehan (R-Pa.) said. Hezbollah was created by Iran and has close ties to Syria. The group is also
backed by Venezuelan Dictator Hugo Chavez, who has a cozy relationship with Iran. “ Hezbollah, backed by Iran and Venezuela, is a determined enemy of the
United States that has made substantial progress in Latin America,” Ambassador and American Enterprise Institute visiting fellow
Roger Noriega said during the hearing, adding that he believes there will be an attack on U.S. personnel if nothing is done soon to
counter Hezbollah in Latin America. Hezbollah is the most prevalent terrorist organization in the world. The group operates in over 40 countries and on 5
continents, including operations in at least 15 U.S. cities and four major Canadian cities. In South America specifically, the group operates in the region where
Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay meet. Brazil is used as a major terrorism hub and cocaine is exchanged for weapons in Colombia. “Hezbollah
remains the premium terrorist organization in the world,” Farah said in testimony. Hezbollah is a very sophisticated terrorist group, with activity
beyond criminal. Intelligence shows the group started pushing its terrorism initiative into South America a
decade ago but upped its efforts in 2005, a new approach that is a threat to the United States.
Testimony showed Hezbollah is strategically positioning itself in order to possibly launch a response to
an Iranian attack either from the U.S. or Isreal on their nuclear program. Intelligence cited during the
hearing also shows the group is interested in obtaining weapons of mass destruction, which should be
taken seriously since the group has published entire books about how to build and use WMDs and terrorist
operations are justified by Hezbollah’s belief in Islam’s ongoing struggle with the West through violent jihad. Hezbollah has also been supplying explosives training to
Mexican drug cartels operating along the U.S.-Mexico border, and tunnels used in the area are near replicas of weapons-smuggling tunnels built by Hezbollah and used in
Lebanon. Since 2006, violence in Mexico has rapidly escaladed and cartels have become more ruthless. In addition, Mexican cartels are serving as source of
financing and easy entrance for the organization into the United States.
thousands of rockets Hezbollah has launched into Israel throughout the years. “
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence Rep. Patrick
Nuclear terrorist attack causes escalation – risks extinction directly and via retaliation
Hellman 8 (Dr. Martin E., professor emeritus of electrical engineering at Stanford University, The Bent,
Spring 2008, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf)
The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat of a full-scale nuclear war, yet this article focuses
primarily on the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before proceeding. A
terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon
would be a catastrophe of immense proportions: “A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central
Station on a typical work day would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars
in direct economic damage. America and its way of life would be changed forever.” [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix].
The likelihood of such an attack is also significant. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the
chance of a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David
Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, “We would never accept a situation
where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability
event, but we can’t live in a world where it’s anything but extremely low-probability.” [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of 85 national security
experts, Senator Richard Lugar found a median estimate of 20 percent for the “probability of an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring
somewhere in the world in the next 10 years,” with 79 percent of the respondents believing “it more likely to be carried out by terrorists” than
by a government [Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is not inconsistent with
the approach of this article. Because terrorism
is one of the potential trigger mechanisms for a full-scale nuclear
war, the risk analyses proposed herein will include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk,
the overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce whichever risk(s) warrant
attention. Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan). This article would be
incomplete if it only dealt with the threat of nuclear terrorism and neglected the threat of full-scale nuclear war. If both risks are unacceptable,
an effort to reduce only the terrorist component would leave humanity in great peril. In fact, society’s almost total neglect of the threat of fullscale nuclear war makes studying that risk all the more important. The Cost of World War III The danger associated with nuclear deterrence
depends on both the cost of a failure and the failure rate.3 This section explores the cost of a failure of nuclear deterrence, and the next section
is concerned with the failure rate. While other definitions are possible, this article defines a failure of deterrence to mean a full-scale exchange
of all nuclear weapons available to the U.S. and Russia, an event that will be termed World War III. Approximately 20 million people died as a
result of the first World War. World War II’s fatalities were double or triple that number—chaos prevented a more precise determination. In
both cases humanity recovered, and the world today bears few scars that attest to the horror of those two wars. Many people therefore
implicitly believe that a third World War would be horrible but survivable, an extrapolation of the effects of the first two global wars. In that
view, World War III, while horrible, is something that humanity may just have to face and from which it will then have to recover. In contrast,
some of those most qualified to assess the situation hold a very different view. In a 1961 speech to a joint session of the Philippine Congress,
General Douglas MacArthur, stated, “Global
war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. … If you lose,
you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess even the chance of the
winner of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide.” Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
expressed a similar view: “If deterrence fails and conflict develops, the present U.S. and NATO strategy carries with it a high risk that Western
civilization will be destroyed” [McNamara 1986, page 6]. More recently, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn4 echoed
those concerns when they quoted President Reagan’s belief that nuclear
weapons were “totally irrational, totally
inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.” [Shultz 2007]
Official studies, while couched in less emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll that World War III would
exact: “The resulting deaths would be far beyond any precedent. Executive branch calculations show a
range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i.e., 79-160 million dead) … a change in targeting could kill
somewhere between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each side .... These calculations
reflect only deaths during the first 30 days. Additional millions would be injured, and many would
eventually die from lack of adequate medical care … millions of people might starve or freeze during the
following winter, but it is not possible to estimate how many. … further millions … might eventually die
of latent radiation effects.” [OTA 1979, page 8] This OTA report also noted the possibility of serious ecological
damage [OTA 1979, page 9], a concern that assumed a new potentiality when the TTAPS report [TTAPS 1983] proposed that the ash and
dust from so many nearly simultaneous nuclear explosions and their resultant fire storms could usher in
a nuclear winter that might erase homo sapiens from the face of the earth, much as many scientists now believe
the K-T Extinction that wiped out the dinosaurs resulted from an impact winter caused by ash and dust from a large asteroid or comet striking
Earth. The TTAPS report produced a heated debate, and there is still no scientific consensus on whether a nuclear winter would follow a fullscale nuclear war. Recent work [Robock 2007, Toon 2007] suggests that even
a limited nuclear exchange or one between
newer nuclear-weapon states, such as India and Pakistan, could have devastating long-lasting climatic
consequences due to the large volumes of smoke that would be generated by fires in modern
megacities. While it is uncertain how destructive World War III would be, prudence dictates that we apply the same engineering
conservatism that saved the Golden Gate Bridge from collapsing on its 50th anniversary and assume that preventing World War III is a
necessity—not an option.
vs. India advantage
1. New Freedom Act is sufficient to solve US’s global credibility gap.
HRW ‘15
Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human
dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. “Strengthen the USA Freedom Act” - May 19, 2015 http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/19/strengthen-usa-freedom-act
As the Senate considers the USA Freedom Act this week, policymakers should strengthen it by limiting large-scale collection of records and reinforcing transparency
and carrying court reforms further. The
Senate should also take care not to weaken the bill, and should reject any
amendments that would require companies to retain personal data for longer than is necessary for business purposes. It has been two years since the
National Security Agency (NSA) whistleblower Edward Snowden unleashed a steady stream of documents that exposed the intention by the United States and the
United Kingdom to “collect it all” in the digital age. These revelations demonstrate how unchecked surveillance can metastasize and undermine democratic
institutions if intelligence agencies are allowed to operate in the shadows, without robust legal limits and oversight. On
Representatives approved
May 13, the US House of
the USA Freedom Act of 2015 by a substantial margin. The bill represents the latest attempt by Congress to rein in
one of the surveillance programs Snowden disclosed—the NSA’s domestic bulk phone metadata collection under Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act. The House vote
followed a major rebuke to the US government by the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which ruled on May 7 that the NSA’s potentially nationwide
dragnet collection of phone records under Section 215 was unlawful. Section 215 is set to expire on June 1 unless Congress acts to extend it or to preserve specific
powers authorized under the provision, which go beyond collection of phone records. Surveillance reforms are long overdue and can be accomplished while
protecting US citizens from serious security threats. Congress and the Obama administration should end all mass surveillance programs, which unnecessarily and
disproportionately intrude on the privacy of hundreds of millions of people who are not linked to wrongdoing. But reforming US laws and reversing an increasingly
global tide of mass surveillance will not be easy. Many of the programs Snowden revealed are already deeply entrenched, with billions of dollars of infrastructure,
contracts, and personnel invested. Technological capacity to vacuum up the world’s communications has outpaced existing legal frameworks meant to protect
privacy. The Second Circuit opinion represents an improvement over current law because it establishes that domestic bulk collection of phone metadata under
Section 215 of the Patriot Act cannot continue. Section 215 allows the government to collect business records, including phone records, that are “relevant” to an
authorized investigation. The court ruled that the notion of “relevance” could not be stretched to allow intelligence agencies to gather all phone records in the US.
However, the opinion could be overturned and two other appeals courts are also considering the legality of the NSA’s bulk phone records program. The opinion also
does not address US surveillance of people not in the US. Nor does it question the underlying assumption that the US owes no privacy obligations to people outside
its territory, which makes no sense in the digital age and is inconsistent with human rights law requirements. Even if the Second Circuit opinion remains good law,
congressional action will be necessary to address surveillance programs other than Section 215—both domestic and those affecting people outside the US—and to
create more robust institutional safeguards to prevent future abuses. The courts cannot bring about reforms to increase oversight and improve institutional
oversight on their own. Human
Rights Watch has supported the USA Freedom Act because it is a modest, if
incomplete, first step down the long road to reining in the NSA excesses. Beyond ending bulk records collection, the bill would begin to reform the
secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Court, which oversees NSA surveillance, and would introduce new transparency measures to improve oversight. In
passing the bill, the House of Representatives also clarified that it intends the bill to be consistent with the Second Circuit’s ruling, so as to not weaken its findings.
The bill is no panacea and, as detailed below, would not ensure comprehensive reform. It still leaves open the possibility of
large-scale data collection practices in the US under the Patriot Act. It does not constrain surveillance under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act nor Executive
Order 12333, the primary legal authorities the government has used to justify mass surveillance of people outside US borders. And the bill does not address many
modern surveillance capabilities, from mass cable tapping to use of malware, intercepting all mobile calls in a country, and compromising the security of mobile SIM
cards and other equipment and services. Nonetheless,
passing a strong USA Freedom Act would be a long-overdue step in the
right direction. It would show that Congress is willing and able to act to protect privacy and impose oversight
over intelligence agencies in an age when technology makes ubiquitous surveillance possible. Passing this bill would also help shift the
debate in the US and globally and would distance the United States from other countries that seek to
make mass surveillance the norm. On a global level, other governments may already be emulating the
NSA’s approach, fueling an environment of impunity for mass violations of privacy. In the last year, France, Turkey,
Russia, and other countries have passed legislation to facilitate or expand large-scale surveillance. If the
USA Freedom Act passes, it would be the first time Congress has affirmatively restrained NSA activities since
the attacks of September 11. Key supporters of the bill have vowed to take up reforms to other laws next, including
Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act.
2. Domestic not key. Plan can’t stop US surveillance on other countries. That’s
vital to credibility.
McCauley ‘13
Lauren McCauley, staff writer for Common Dreams. Previously, while writing for Newsweek, Lauren was nominated for the
2008 GLAAD Media Award for Digital Journalism, Common Dreams, 6-27-2013
https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2013/06/27-7
the international community has reacted to the disclosures with alarm. Revelations that the NSA has
been tapping the phone and internet communications of foreign individuals and governments has
spurred world leaders to denounce the global superpower as a 'hypocrite' and, in a number of instances, offer asylum or
However,
assistance to Snowden.¶ "The Prism-gate affair is itself just like a prism that reveals the true face and hypocritical conduct regarding Internet security of the country concerned," said Chinese
Ministry of National Defense Spokesperson, Colonel Yang Yujun.¶ Sir Tim Berners-Lee, one of the five individuals who is credited as being a 'father of the internet' agreed telling the London
Times newspaper that the 'insidious' spying by the United States was hypocritical in light of the US government's frequent 'policing' of other states.¶ "In the Middle East, people have been
given access to the Internet but they have been snooped on and then they have been jailed," he said. "It can be easy for people in the West to say 'oh, those nasty governments should not be
allowed access to spy.' But it's clear that developed nations are seriously spying on the Internet."¶ "It can be easy for people in the West to say 'oh, those nasty governments should not be
The dramatic international backlash is
a clear indication of the importance and severity of the leaked information and, in the interest of insuring that these revelations are not
allowed access to spy.' But it's clear that developed nations are seriously spying on the Internet." –Sir Tim Berners-Lee¶
eclipsed by more distracting headlines, below is a summary of what we know so far about the NSA's spy program.¶ Forbes columnist Andy Greenberg offers this run-down of leaked
documents published so far (bolding his own):¶ The publication of Snowden’s leaks began with a top secret order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) sent to Verizon on
behalf of the NSA, demanding the cell phone records of all of Verizon Business Network Services’ American customers for the three month period ending in July. [...]¶ In a congressional
hearing, NSA director Keith Alexander argued that the kind of surveillance of Americans’ data revealed in that Verizon order was necessary to for archiving purposes, but was rarely accessed
and only with strict oversight from Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court judges. But another secret document published by the Guardian revealed the NSA’s own rules for when it makes
broad exceptions to its foreign vs. U.S. persons distinction, accessing Americans’ data and holding onto it indefinitely. [...]¶ Another leaked slide deck revealed a software tool called Boundless
Informant, which the NSA appears to use for tracking the origin of data it collects. The leaked materials included a map produced by the program showing the frequency of data collection in
countries around the world. While Iran, Pakistan and Jordan appeared to be the most surveilled countries according to the map, it also pointed to significant data collection from the United
States.¶ A leaked executive order from President Obama shows the administration asked intelligence agencies to draw up a list of potential offensive cyberattack targets around the world. The
order, which suggests targeting “systems, processes and infrastructure” states that such offensive hacking operations “can offer unique and unconventional capabilities to advance U.S.
national objectives around the world with little or no warning to the adversary or target and with potential effects ranging from subtle to severely damaging.” [...]¶ Documents leaked to the
Guardian revealed a five-year-old British intelligence scheme to tap transatlantic fiberoptic cables to gather data. A program known as Tempora, created by the U.K.’s NSA equivalent
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) has for the last 18 months been able to store huge amounts of that raw data for up to 30 days. Much of the data is shared with the NSA.
[...]¶ Another GCHQ project revealed to the Guardian through leaked documents intercepted the communications of delegates to the G20 summit of world leaders in London in 2009. [...]¶
Snowden showed the Hong Kong newspaper the South China Morning Post documents that it said outlined extensive hacking of Chinese and Hong Kong targets by the NSA since 2009, with
61,000 targets globally and “hundreds” in China. [...]¶ The Guardian’s Glenn Greenwald has said that Snowden provided him “thousands” of documents, of which “dozens” are newsworthy.
And Snowden himself has said he’d like to expose his trove of leaks to the global media so that each country’s reporters can decide whether “U.S. network operations against their people
should be published.” So regardless of where Snowden ends up, expect more of his revelations to follow.¶ Further, on Thursday journalists Glenn Greenwald and Spencer Ackerman revealed
in a new Guardian exclusive that for ten years the US had conducted bulk collections of internet metadata, amassing information akin to 'reading one's diary' on both domestic and foreign
individuals.¶ And, in their own cataloging of 'what we know so far,' Pro Publica poses the question, "Is all of this legal?"¶ Recently leaked court orders reveal how the Department of Justice,
"through a series of legislative changes and court decisions," have evolved the parameters of the Patriot Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, enabling the expansive spy
program.¶ They write:¶ By definition, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court decides what it is legal for the NSA to do.¶ But this level of domestic surveillance wasn’t always legal, and the
NSA has been found to violate legal standards on more than one occasion. Although the NSA’s broad data collection programs appear to have started shortly after September 11, 2001, the
NSA was gradually granted authority to collect domestic information on this scale through a series of legislative changes and court decisions over the next decade. See this timeline of
loosening laws. The Director of National Intelligence says that authority for PRISM programs comes from section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Verizon metadata
collection order cites section 215 of the Patriot Act. The author of the Patriot Act disagrees that the act justifies the Verizon metadata collection program.¶ In March 2004, acting Attorney
General James Comey ordered a stop to some parts of the secret domestic surveillance programs, but President Bush signed an order re-authorizing it anyway. In response, several top Justice
Department officials threatened to resign, including Comey and FBI director Robert Mueller. Bush backed down, and the programs were at least partially suspended for several months.¶ In
2009, the Justice Department acknowledged that the NSA had collected emails and phone calls of Americans in a way that exceeded legal limitations.¶ In October 2011, the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court ruled that the NSA violated the Fourth Amendment at least once. The Justice Department has said that this ruling must remain secret, but we know it concerned
some aspect of the "minimization" rules the govern what the NSA can do with domestic communications. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court recently decided that this ruling can be
released, but Justice Department has not yet done so.¶ Civil liberties groups including the EFF and the ACLU dispute the constitutionality of these programs and have filed lawsuits to challenge
There do not appear
to be any legal restrictions on what the NSA can do with the communications of non-U.S. persons. Since a
them.¶ And regarding the aforementioned international backlash, Pro Publica responds to the question "What if I'm not American?"¶ All bets are off.
substantial fraction of the world’s Internet data passes through the United States, or its allies, the U.S. has the ability to observe and record the communications of much of the world’s
population.
The European Union has already complained to the U.S. Attorney General.
3. Countries don’t model U.S. policy – it’s a myth.
Moravcsik ‘5
Andrew - Professor of Government and Director of the European Union Program at Harvard University, January 31, 2005,
Newsweek, “Dream On, America,” lexis
Not long ago, the American dream was a global fantasy. Not only Americans saw themselves as a beacon unto nations. So did much of the rest of the world. East
Europeans tuned into Radio Free Europe. Chinese students erected a replica of the Statue of Liberty in Tiananmen Square. You had only to listen to George W.
Bush's Inaugural Address last week (invoking "freedom" and "liberty" 49 times) to appreciate just how deeply Americans still believe in this founding myth. For
many in the world, the president's rhetoric confirmed their worst fears of an imperial America relentlessly pursuing its narrow national interests. But the greater
danger may be a
delusional America--one that believes, despite all evidence to the contrary, that the American Dream lives
on, that America remains a model for the world, one whose mission is to spread the word. The gulf between how
Americans view themselves and how the world views them was summed up in a poll last week by the BBC. Fully 71 percent of Americans see the United States as a
source of good in the world. More than half view Bush's election as positive for global security. Other studies report that 70 percent have faith in their domestic
institutions and nearly 80 percent believe "American ideas and customs" should spread globally. Foreigners
take an entirely different view:
58 percent in the BBC poll see Bush's re-election as a threat to world peace. Among America's traditional allies, the figure is strikingly higher: 77 percent in
Germany, 64 percent in Britain and 82 percent in Turkey. Among the 1.3 billion members of the Islamic world, public support for the United States is measured in
single digits. Only Poland, the Philippines and India viewed Bush's second Inaugural positively. Tellingly, the anti-Bushism of the president's first term is giving way to
a more general anti-Americanism. A plurality of voters (the average is 70 percent) in each of the 21 countries surveyed by the BBC oppose sending any troops to
Iraq, including those in most of the countries that have done so. Only one third, disproportionately in the poorest and most dictatorial countries, would like to see
American values spread in their country. Says Doug Miller of GlobeScan, which conducted the BBC report: "President Bush has further isolated America from the
world. Unless the administration changes its approach, it will continue to erode America's good name, and hence its ability to effectively influence world affairs."
Former Brazilian president Jose Sarney expressed the sentiments of the 78 percent of his countrymen who see America as a threat: "Now that Bush has been reelected, all I can say is, God bless the rest of the world." The
truth is that Americans are living in a dream world. Not only do
others not share America's self-regard, they no longer aspire to emulate the country's social and economic
achievements. The loss of faith in the American Dream goes beyond this swaggering administration and its war in Iraq. A President Kerry would have had to
confront a similar disaffection, for it grows from the success of something America holds dear: the spread of democracy, free markets and international institutions-globalization, in a word. Countries
today have dozens of political, economic and social models to choose from. Anti-Americanism is
especially virulent in Europe and Latin America, where countries have established their own distinctive ways--none made in America. Futurologist Jeremy Rifkin, in
his recent book "The European Dream," hails an
emerging European Union based on generous social welfare, cultural diversity and respect for
international law--a model that's caught on quickly across the former nations of Eastern Europe and the Baltics. In Asia, the rise of autocratic
capitalism in China or Singapore is as much a "model" for development as America's scandal-ridden corporate culture. "First we emulate," one Chinese businessman
recently told the board of one U.S. multinational, "then we overtake."
4. India’s financial markets aren’t key to the economy and are resilient
Khan ‘13
Address by Mr H R Khan, Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India – “Indian financial markets – fuelling the growth of the
Indian economy” - Comments at the ADB Annual Conference, Greater NOIDA, Delhi NCR, 4 May 2013.
http://www.bis.org/review/r130514d.pdf
Dr. Arvind Mayaram, Secretary, Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Mr. S. Gopalakrishnan, President, Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), Mr.
Jignesh Shah, Chairman, CII National Committee on Financial Markets, Mr. Chandrajit Banerjee, Director General, CII, distinguished delegates. Let me start by
complimenting CII for selecting Indian Financial Markets: Fuelling the Growth of the Indian Economy as the theme of the session. It is now well known that a
well-developed financial sector plays an important role in economic growth. As John Hicks observed, the technology that
made industrial revolution in England possible was in existence for a long time before it was commercially exploited; it had to wait till the financial sector developed
well enough to make the necessary resources available1. But
it has to be recognized that while absence of a robust financial sector can retard
growth, financial development on its own cannot secure growth. Finance thus is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for economic growth. In India, we have traversed a long way since the economic reforms
started in the early 1990’s. The reforms of the early 90’s were focused on three pillars – Liberalization, Privatization and Globalization (LPG). The financial
sector has also undergone significant changes during the period to not only to support the rapid growth but also to do so without
disruptive episodes. Let me briefly mention some of these changes, if only to stress that our confidence to meet future
challenges is based on the bedrock of past achievements. I am deliberately not touching upon the issues relating to capital markets as they are not my areas
of competence.
5. India’s economy is resilient – almost nothing could shake it.
Wolf ‘11
Martin Wolf is a British journalist, widely considered to be one of the world's most influential writers on economics. He is the
associate editor and chief economics commentator at the Financial Times. He holds a a master of philosophy degree in
economics from Oxford - “In the grip of a great convergence” – Financial Times - January 4, 2011 http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:AU6qxSkE2FwJ:www.ft.com/cms/s/0/072c87e6-1841-11e0-88c900144feab49a.html+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us#axzz3d327QUO7
Until recently, political, social and policy obstacles were decisive. This has not been true for several decades. Why should these re-emerge? True, many reforms will
be required if growth is to proceed, but growth itself is likely to transform societies and politics in needed directions. True, neither China nor India may surpass US
output per head: Japan failed to do so. But they are far away today. Why should they be unable to reach, say, half of US productivity? That is Portugal's level. Can
China match Portugal? Surely. Of
course, catastrophes may intervene. But it is striking that even world wars and
depressions merely interrupted the rise of earlier industrialisers. If we leave aside nuclear war, nothing
seems likely to halt the ascent of the big emerging countries, though it may well be delayed. China and India are
big enough to drive growth from their domestic markets if protectionism takes hold. Indeed, they are big enough to
drive growth even in other emerging countries as well.
6. Hack won’t work – India’s cyber-defenses are strong and improving.
Times of India ‘10
(Internally citing senior military officials - “Cyber war: Indian Army gearing up” - Times of India - July 19, 2010 –
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/Cyber-war-Indian-Army-gearing-up/articleshow/6187297.cms)
The Indian Army is fighting attacks in the cyber world with electronic warfare capability of the "highest
standard", say officials pointing out that virtual strikes have shot up from hostile quarters in both sophistication and frequency. "The army is
cognisant of the threat to its cyber space from various state and non-state actors. But our network is well
secured in compliance with the highest standards of cyber security," a senior official in the military headquarters told IANS on
condition of anonymity. The official said the army has established an "impenetrable and secure wide area network
exclusively for its functioning". Officials in the 1.3 million force privately admit they are facing "next generation threats" and are rather worried over the complex
world of cyber warfare amid reports of Chinese and Pakistani spies targeting the Indian military establishment via the internet. Though attacks from hackers professional or amateur - can come from anywhere in the world, cyber onslaughts have been more frequent from China and Pakistan, which have reportedly been
peeking into India's sensitive business, diplomatic and strategic records. As per reports from the cyber industry, China and Pakistan hackers steal nearly six million
files worldwide every day. A report in the US-based Defence Systems magazine found that there were 25 million new strains of malware created in 2009. That
equals a new strain of malware every 0.79 seconds. The report underlines how the current cyber threat environment is dramatically changing and becoming more
challenging as the clock ticks. Howevever, the Indian army is confident. Revealing that secret
information had been secured with
unhackable electronic passwords, the official said various "cryptographic controls" have been incorporated in the wake of a significant number
of viruses, worms and other forms of malware. To address cyber defence, which is also under threat from terrorist outfits that have their own trained recruits,
officials said the army frequently upgrades its comprehensive cyber security policy to pro-actively deal with and anticipate these threats. The force has established
the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) to respond to attacks targeting the army's critical systems and infrastructure. Another official said the army has its
own cyber audit process conducted by cyber security personnel. "The audit is conducted in accordance with established security standards such as ISO 27001. Audit
of the network is a continuous and active process which helps identification and mitigation of vulnerabilities in a network to counter latest threats as also check the
network for cyber security policy compliance," he said. However, the official admitted there was no room for complacency in times of rapid technological change.
"In
the area of cyber space, the battle between hackers and defenders is an ongoing process, influenced by latest
army is constantly upgrading its network," he said.
technological developments. Due to the dynamic nature of threats, the
vs. HUMINT advantage
1. The haystack matters and solves BETTER than HUMINT. Turns the case.
Porter, 15
(R.C. Porter, Retired Intelligence Official with more than 33 years of experience in both the military and civilian affairs, M.S.
Middle Eastern Studies/National Security Policy Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University.
One year study program, National Defense University/Industrial College of the Armed Forces — National Security Resource
Management, 1994. B.A., Criminal Justice, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge Louisiana, May, 1979, “THE DUMBING
DOWN OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE; AND, WHY METADATA, AND THE ‘HAYSTACK’ MATTER — IN COMBATING TERRORISM AND
PROTECTING THE U.S. HOMELAND – ‘YOU NEED A HAYSTACK….TO FIND A NEEDLE’”,
http://fortunascorner.com/2015/05/11/the-dumbing-down-of-u-s-intelligence-and-why-metadata-and-the-haystack-matter-incombating-terrorism-and-protecting-the-u-s-homeland-you-need-a-haystack-to-find-a-needle/, May 11, 2015, ak.)
The above is the title of an Op-Ed by Gordon Crovitz in the May 11, 2015 edition of The Wall Street Journal. Mr. Crovitz begins by noting that
“FBI Director James Comey warned last week that the American Islamists who tried to assassinate free-speech advocates at a cartoon
exhibition near Dallas, Texas…..are not alone. There are “hundreds, maybe thousands” of
potential terrorists in the U.S.
haystack is the entire country,” he said. “We are looking for needles; but,
increasingly the needles are unavailable to us.” “The needles will be even harder to find, if Congress
weakens the Patriot Act, by reducing the intelligence available to national security,” and law enforcement
agencies. “With the rise of the Islamic State and its global recruiting tools, intelligence agencies should be allowed to join the
“big data” revolution,” Mr. Crovitz wrote. “Edward Snowden’s data theft raised privacy alarms; but, by now — it’s clear that no
one working for the National Security Agency (NSA), leaked confidential data — other than Snowden himself,” Mr. Crovitz
being inspired by overseas groups.” “The
correctly observes. “He evaded the 300 lawyers and compliance officers who monitor how NSA staff use data.” “POTUS Obama, last year,
recalled how the
9/11 hijackers escaped detection — because laws prohibited NSA from gathering and
connecting the dots. He explained that the Patriot Act was passed, to “address a gap identified after 911,” by
having intelligence agencies collect anonymous metadata — date, time, and duration of phone calls. But, POTUS Obama
reversed himself and now wants to gut the program,” Mr. Crovitz warns. “Instead of the NSA gathering call information,
phone companies would hold the data. With multiple, unconnected databases, the NSA would no longer be able
to access data to mine. There wouldn’t be dots to connect to threats. As for privacy, the phone
companies’ databases would be less secure than the NSA’S.” “Lawmakers will decide this month whether to extend the
Patriot Act or, to water it down. Instead, they should update it to maximize both privacy, and intelligence,” Mr. Crovitz argues. “Technology
now has the answer, if only politicians would get out of the way.” “Recent innovations in big data allow
staggering amounts of information to be collected and mined. These data deliver correlations based on an individually
anonymous basis. This work was originally done to support the chief revenue engine of the Internet — advertising. The technology generates
increasingly targeted marketing messages based on an individuals’ online activities.” “The techniques have other applications. Google used
them to become better than the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, at predicting flu outbreaks by monitoring search terms like “flu
medicine,” by location. Canadian researchers studied thousands of premature babies, and identified symptoms that precede fevers. Cities apply
predictive policing by mining online data to assign cops where they’re needed.” “The fast shift to self-driving cars is possible, because of data
transmitted among vehicles. Small drones share data that keep them from crashing into one another. A Brown University researcher discovered
how banks could use metadata about people’s cell phone usage to determine their creditworthiness.” “The
Patriot Act was written in
the NSA keep anonymous data about who is calling whom for five years;
but, it isn’t able to apply algorithms to find suspicious patterns. Analysts may examine call logs for
suspicious links, only if there is a pre-existing “reasonable, articulable suspicion” of terrorism, or another threat to
national security. There were 170 such searches last year,” [2014]. “Before the Snowden leaks two years ago,
Intelligence agencies had planned to ask Congress to broaden their access to anonymous data — so they
could use modern tools of big data. Technology has moved far ahead, leaving intelligence -gathering
stupider,” Mr. Crovitz wrote. “A measure of how far behind the technology curve the intelligence agencies have become is that one of the
2001, before any of these advances. It lets
would-be cartoon killers posted a message on Twitter beforehand, with the hashtag #TexasAttack. Law enforcement [authorities] didn’t spot it
until after the attack. In contrast, algorithms for delivering advertising parse signals such as hashtags to deliver relevant ads in real time…before
the online page loads.” “In their 2013 book, “Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work, And Think,” Viktor MayerSchonberger and Kenneth Cukier describe the history of information: “As centuries passed, we opted for more information flows rather than
less, and to guard against its excesses — not primarily through censorship; but, through rules that limited the misuse of information.” In
conclusion, Mr. Crovitz writes, “Congress
should insist that the NSA ensure its data are used properly — no more Snowdens — but, also
give the agency authority to catch up to how the private sector uses data. Politicians should update the
Patriot Act by permitting the intelligence use of data to prevent terrorism.” Mapping Terror Networks: Why
Metadata And The ‘Haystack’ Matters Philip Mudd, former Deputy Director of the CIA’s Counter-Terrorism Center, and Senior
Intelligence Adviser to the FBI, [at the time his article was published], wrote an Op-Ed in the Dec. 30, 2014 Wall Street Journal noting that the
CIA, FBI, and the entire U.S. Intelligence Community and national security establishment had devoted countless hours as to “how best can [we]
clarify [and posture ourselves regarding] the blurring picture of an emerging terror conspiracy [aimed at the United States] originating overseas,
or inside the United States. “How
can we identify the key players (network/link analysis) and the broader network of
their fundraisers [enablers], radicalizers, travel facilitators and others….quickly enough so that they can’t succeed?,” as
well as protect civil liberties. “And,” Mr. Mudd adds, “how do we ensure that we’ve ‘mapped’ the network enough to
dismantle it?; or at a minimum, disrupt it?” Mr. Mudd observes, “in essence, you need a haystack — in order to
find a needle.” Last year, Federal Appeals Court Judge William H. Pauley ruled NSA metadata collection lawful; and added, “the
government needs a wide net that can isolate gossamer contacts among suspected terrorists in an
ocean of seemingly disconnected data; HUMINT is the more desirable method of collecting this kind of information — but,
gathering critical HUMINT is often difficult and time consuming,” not to mention that the Obama administration has
been great at droning terrorists; but, hasn’t added a single individual to Guantanamo Bay Prison. Dead men tell no tales. You can’t get
critical HUMIINT — if you stick your head in the sand and refuse to establish an interrogation facility for
this very purpose. Treating terrorists as criminals to be tried in a ‘normal’ court of law is absurd, counterproductive, and dangerous. As Mr.
Mudd wrote at the time, “mapping a network of people is simple in concept; but, complex in practice: find the key operators, and then find the
support group. Map a network poorly, and you may miss peripheral players who will recreate a conspiracy after the core of conspirators are
arrested. The
goal,” Mr. Mudd said, “is to eliminate the entire spider-web of conspiracy; cutting off a piece like
an arm of a starfish, is a poor second choice — the starfish’s arm — regenerates.” “Investigators also
need an historical pool of data,” Mr. Mudd argued at the time, “that they can access only when they have
information that starts with a known, or suspected conspirator — in the middle of a spider-web they don’t fully
understand,” and is missing a few corners. Who is watchers is a legitimate concern; and, a healthy skepticism about government claims for
access to even more personal data…is desirable, warranted, and needed. But, the
further and further we move away — in time
— from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack here on the U.S. homeland — the more we seem to lose the raison d’
tere for why we passed the Patriot Act in the first place. As the Intelligence Community and Law Enforcement authorities with
respect to the mass collection of phone data are allowed to atrophy and erode — our ability to ferret out and discover potential terrorist
attacks against the U.S. homeland also decay. I am not sure I know the right answer as to where the balance lied — between the protection of
civil liberties, versus the requirement to collect ‘enough’ data — that enables our intelligence and law enforcement professionals to — connect
the dots. But, I think I know one thing for sure. If
we do suffer a large-scale terrorist event here at home — on the
scale of 9/11 or worse — and, it is determined that we likely would have been able to discover this event
before hand — if we had allowed a more reasonable big data mining strata — there will be hell to pay —
and, perhaps a Patriot Act on steroids. It is easy to criticize law enforcement and intelligence agencies desires for greater authority
and flexibility in regards to the collection of data; but, how you see it — depends on where you sit. If you are charged with protecting the
American homeland, it is a very difficult balancing act — with few clear answers.
2. Their Johnson card assumes Resource wars– but those won’t happen.
Victor ‘8
David G,- Adjunct Senior Fellow for Science and Technology, Council on Foreign Relations; Director, Program on Energy and Sustainable
Development @ Stanford “Smoke and Mirror” http://www.nationalinterest.org/PrinterFriendly.aspx?id=16530
MY ARGUMENT is that classic resource wars—hot conflicts driven by a struggle to grab resources—are
increasingly rare. Even
where resources play a role, they are rarely the root cause of bloodshed. Rather, the root cause usually lies in
various failures of governance. That argument—in both its classic form and in its more nuanced incarnation—is hardly a straw man, as Thomas
Homer-Dixon asserts. Setting aside hyperbole, the punditry increasingly points to resources as a cause of war. And so do social scientists and
policy analysts, even with their more nuanced views. I’ve triggered this debate because conventional wisdom puts too much emphasis on
resources as a cause of conflict. Getting the story right has big implications for social scientists trying to unravel cause-and-effect and often
even larger implications for public policy. Michael Klare is right to underscore Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, the only classic resource
conflict in recent memory. That episode highlights two of the reasons why classic resource wars are becoming rare—they’re expensive
and rarely work. (And even in Kuwait’s case, many other forces also spurred the invasion. Notably, Iraq felt insecure with its only access
to the sea a narrow strip of land sandwiched between Kuwait on one side and its archenemy Iran on the other.) In the end, Saddam lost
resources on the order of $100 billion (plus his country and then his head) in his quest for Kuwait’s 1.5 million
barrels per day of combined oil and gas output. By contrast, Exxon paid $80 billion to get Mobil’s 1.7 million barrels per day of oil and gas
production—a merger that has held and flourished. As the bulging sovereign wealth funds are discovering, it is easier
to get resources through the stock exchange than the gun barrel.
3. Alt cause – Human intel fails for other reasons.
O’Brien, 05- President and CEO of Artemis Global Logistics & Solutions, Former Graduate Research Assistant at the Jebsen Center for
Counter Terrorism Research, Former International Trade Specialist for the Department of Commerce (James, “Trojan Horses: Using Current U.S.
Intelligence Resources To Successfully Infiltrate Islamic Terror Groups”, International Affairs Review Vol. 14 No.2 Fall 2005)//KTC
Nevertheless, it
is easier to recognize HUMINT deficiencies than to fix them. This is especially true when reconstituting
There is no quick fix in resolving this deficiency. This
reality is recognized by both policy advisors and policy-makers, who propose long-term investments in
sectors spread over several agencies that have been allowed to corrode.
intelligence reform. A 2002 Congressional Research Service report exemplifies this mindset: While U.S. policymakers are emphasizing the need
for rapid intelligence overhaul to close the HUMINT deficit, the United States is fighting a War on Terror with other countries’ unreliable eyes.
142 · International Affairs Review First
is a renewed emphasis on human agents. Signals intelligence and imagery satellites
have their uses in the counterterrorism mission, but intelligence to counter terrorism depends more on human intelligence
(HUMINT) such as spies and informers. Any renewed emphasis on human intelligence necessarily will involve a
willingness to accept risks of complicated and dangerous missions, and likely ties to disreputable individuals who may be in positions
to provide valuable information. Time and patience will be needed to train analysts in difficult skills and languages.h
Unfortunately, the “time and patience” necessary to develop these operatives is not a luxury the United
States can afford. The 9/11 Commission Report describes the rapid nature and lack of warning that defines the current security environment:
National security used to be considered by studying foreign frontiers, weighing opposing groups of states, and measuring industrial might….
Threats emerged slowly, often visibly, as weapons were forged, armies conscripted, and units trained and moved into place…. Now
threats
can emerge quickly. An organization like al Qaeda, headquartered in a country on the other side of the earth, in a region so poor that
electricity or telephones were scarce, could nonetheless scheme to wield weapons of unprecedented destructive power in the largest cities of
the United States.i Furthermore, even
if the United States succeeds in developing the types of intelligence operatives
with the skill sets desired for an effective war against Islamic extremists, the capacity to penetrate these
groups will likely never be fully achieved. The problem is that Islamic terrorist groups are highly insulated from
outside intrusion because of their family-based and/or clan-based recruitment policies: “Ethnically based terrorist groups
recruit new members personally known to them, people whose backgrounds are known and who often have family ties to
the organization. Intelligence penetration of organizations recruited this way is extremely difficult.”j Even those
organizations that do not recruit exclusively through family ties, such as al Qaeda, still employ a severe level of
vetting that places an operative’s survival in jeopardy. Regional dialects, local cultural sensitivities and “six-degrees-of-separation” within
small populations all work against an operative attempting to secure a terrorist leader’s trust. Recognizing these difficulties, Rich Trojan Horses ·
143 ard Betts summarizes this operational reality: “More
and better spies will help, but no one should expect
breakthroughs if we get them. It is close to impossible to penetrate small, disciplined, alien organizations like
Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda, and especially hard to find reliable U.S. citizens who have even a remote chance of trying.”k
Nevertheless, the intelligence community should pursue HUMINT reform that will develop operatives with penetration potential, but
accessing the inner circles of terror groups may take years to materialize, or may even be impossible. For
example, if the operative is accepted by a terror group, he may be isolated or removed from the organization’s
hierarchy, leaving the operative uninformed as to what other groups within the same organization are planning, including the
cell within which he may be operating.l Therefore, recognizing the U.S. HUMINT deficiency, the lengthy process of
comprehensive reform, the unpredictable nature of terrorism as a constant imminent threat, and the insulated
structure of terrorist groups, the United States will need to employ creative methods to collect information
without jeopardizing long-term intelligence reform. Bruce Hoffman suggests “some new, ‘out-of-the-box’ thinking that would go beyond simple
bureaucratic fixes.”m One
possibility is taking a backdoor approach to penetrating various fundamentalist
terrorist organizations. SOLUTION PROPOSED: WORK WITH THE TOOLS WE HAVE The Backdoor One backdoor ripe for exploitation is
the dependence of Islamic extremists on illicit activities and services to fund, train, and/or facilitate their operations.n The “Achilles
heel” of terror groups is their dependence on criminal or other interconnected terrorist groups to
provide certain services to them, specifically weapons and drug smuggling. The United States should exploit this
dependence and has the capacity to do The “Achilles heel” of terror groups is their dependence on criminal or other interconnected
terrorist groups to provide certain services to them, specifically weapons and drug smuggling. 144 · International Affairs Review so. This
backdoor should be envisioned just as the name connotes: an alternative entrance that is easier to sneak into than the front door. In the world
of computer programming, a backdoor is “an undocumented way of gaining access to a program, online service or an entire computer system.
The backdoor is written by the programmer who creates the code for the program. It is often only known by the programmer. A
backdoor
is a potential security risk.”o When hackers discover backdoors in software programs, they exploit them. The
U.S. intelligence community should adopt the hackers’ approach; infiltration agents should be looking
for similar types of alternative access routes.
4. No NSA overload – Accumulo tech solves.
Harris ‘13
(Not Scott Harris, because large data sets do sometimes overwhelm him… But Derrick Harris. Derrick in a senior writer at
Gigaom and has been a technology journalist since 2003. He has been covering cloud computing, big data and other emerging
IT trends for Gigaom since 2009. Derrick also holds a law degree from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. This evidence is also
internally quoting Adam Fuchs – a former NSA employee that was involved in software design. “Under the covers of the NSA’s
big data effort” – Gigaom - Jun. 7, 2013 - https://gigaom.com/2013/06/07/under-the-covers-of-the-nsas-big-data-effort/)
The NSA’s data collection practices have much of America — and certainly the tech community — on edge, but sources familiar with the agency’s
technology are saying the situation isn’t as bad as it seems. Yes, the agency has a lot of data and can do some powerful
analysis, but, the argument goes, there are strict limits in place around how the agency can use it and who has access.
Whether that’s good enough is still an open debate, but here’s what we know about the technology that’s underpinning all that data. The technological
linchpin to everything the NSA is doing from a data-analysis perspective is Accumulo — an open-source
database the agency built in order to store and analyze huge amounts of data. Adam Fuchs knows Accumulo well because he helped build it during a
nine-year stint with the NSA; he’s now co-founder and CTO of a company called Sqrrl that sells a commercial version of the database system. I spoke with him
earlier this week, days before news broke of the NSA collecting data from Verizon and the country’s largest web companies. The
NSA began building
Accumulo in late 2007, Fuchs said, because they were trying to do automated analysis for tracking and discovering new
terrorism suspects. “We had a set of applications that we wanted to develop and we were looking for the right infrastructure to build them on,” he said.
The problem was those technologies weren’t available. He liked what projects like HBase were doing by using Hadoop to mimic Google’s famous BigTable data
store, but it still wasn’t up to the NSA requirements around scalability, reliability or security. So, they began work on a project called CloudBase, which eventually
was renamed Accumulo. Now, Fuchs said, “It’s
operating at thousands-of-nodes scale” within the NSA’s data centers.
There are multiple instances each storing tens of petabytes (1 petabyte equals 1,000 terabyes or 1 million gigabytes) of data and it’s the backend of the agency’s
most widely used analytical capabilities. Accumulo’s
ability to handle data in a variety of formats (a characteristic called “schemaless” in database
jargon) means the NSA can store data from numerous sources all within the database and add new analytic capabilities in
days or even hours. “It’s quite critical,” he added. What the NSA can and can’t do with all this data As I explained on Thursday, Accumulo is
especially adept at analyzing trillions of data points in order to build massive graphs that can detect the connections between them
and the strength of the connections. Fuchs didn’t talk about the size of the NSA’s graph, but he did say the database is designed to handle
months or years worth of information and let analysts move from query to query very fast. When you’re talking
about analyzing call records, it’s easy to see where this type of analysis would be valuable in determining how far a
suspected terrorist’s network might spread and who might be involved.
5. Aff exaggerates – NSA budget’s too small for untargeted mass data collection
Harris ‘13
(Not Scott Harris, because large data sets do sometimes overwhelm him… But Derrick Harris. Derrick in a senior writer at
Gigaom and has been a technology journalist since 2003. He has been covering cloud computing, big data and other emerging
IT trends for Gigaom since 2009. Derrick also holds a law degree from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. This evidence is also
internally quoting Adam Fuchs – a former NSA employee that was involved in software design. “Under the covers of the NSA’s
big data effort” – Gigaom - Jun. 7, 2013 - https://gigaom.com/2013/06/07/under-the-covers-of-the-nsas-big-data-effort/)
We’re not quite sure how much data the two programs that came to light this week are actually collecting, but the
evidence suggests it’s not that much — at least from a volume perspective. Take the PRISM program that’s gathering
data from web properties including Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Apple, Yahoo and AOL. It seems the NSA would have to be selective in
what it grabs. Assuming it includes every cost associated with running the program, the $20 million per year allocated to PRISM, according to
the slides published by the Washington Post, wouldn’t be nearly enough to store all the raw data — much less new datasets
created from analyses — from such large web properties. Yahoo alone, I’m told, was spending over $100
million a year to operate its approximately 42,000-node Hadoop environment, consisting of hundreds of petabytes, a few years ago.
Facebook users are generating more than 500 terabytes of new data every day. Using about the leastexpensive option around for mass storage — cloud storage provider Backblaze’s open source storage pod designs — just storing 500 terabytes of
Facebook data a day would cost more than $10 million in hardware alone over the course of a year. Using higherperformance hard drives or other premium gear — things Backblaze eschews because it’s concerned primarily about cost and scalability rather than performance —
would cost even more. Even at the Backblaze price point, though, which is pocket change for the
NSA, the agency would easily run over $20
million trying to store too many emails, chats, Skype calls, photos, videos and other types data from the other companies it’s
working with.
If you are a 2N Speaking in front of Lauren
or Strauss
Background and Rules
Speech = up to 5 mins long
You give a 2NC extending the politics disad – Cuba version.
You must:
-
Give an overview
Cover each point on the line-by-line
Budget more time vs. the most dangerous Aff threads.
The 1A was:




Packet Aff
plan text #2
Adv One – HUMINT (our lab’s version)
ADv Two – Global Internet Freedom – Democracy impact
Your 1NC shell was
Cuban normalization will pass with an ambassador confirmed – PC key
-Will pass warrants: general momentum (which outweighs everything), public support, and previous
progress
-Yes push – demands of Congress and press conferences
-Obama’s PC is high – Supreme Court victories on the ACA and same-sex marriage + SC speech
Milbank 7/5 {Dana, politics columnist based at The Washington Post and MSNBC, former senior
editor of The New Republic, B.A. cum laude in political science (Yale), “Obama spending his windfall of
political capital on Cuba,” Herald Net, 2015,
http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20150705/OPINION04/150709675#THUR}
“This,” President Obama
said in the Rose Garden on Wednesday as he announced the restoration of diplomatic relations
with Cuba, “is what change looks like.” This echo of his 2008 campaign theme was self-congratulatory but deserved,
coming at a time of unexpected hope late in his presidency. In the space of just over a week, Obama's tired
tenure came back to life. He bested congressional Democrats and got trade legislation on his desk. The Supreme Court
upheld the signature achievement of his presidency — Obamacare — and thereby cemented his legacy.
The high court also made same-sex marriage legal across the land following a tidal change in public opinion that Obama's
own conversion accelerated. Had the court's decisions not dominated the nation's attention, Obama's eulogy
Friday for those slain in a South Carolina church, and his extraordinary rendition of “Amazing Grace,” would have itself been one of
the most powerful moments of his presidency. It is little surprise, then, that this lame duck's job
approval rating hit a respectable 50 percent this week for the first time in two years in a CNN poll, and his
disapproval rating dropped to 47. The good tidings of the past week have been arguably more luck than achievement for Obama, but he
deserves credit for his effort to use the momentum of his victories to revive what had been a moribund
presidency. When you earn political capital, as George W. Bush liked to say, you spend it. This is why it was
shrewd of the surging Obama to demand new action from Congress on Cuba. “Americans and
Cubans alike are ready to move forward; I believe it's time for Congress to do the same,” he said, renewing his call
to lift the travel and trade embargo. “Yes, there are those who want to turn back the clock and double down on a policy of isolation, but it's
long past time for us to realize that this approach doesn't work. It hasn't worked for 50 years. ... So I'd ask Congress to listen to
the Cuban people, listen to the American people, listen to the words of a proud Cuban American, [former Bush commerce secretary] Carlos
Gutierrez, who recently came out against the policy of the past.” Fifteen minutes later, Obama lifted off from the South Lawn in Marine One on his way to Nashville,
where he tried to use the momentum generated by the Supreme Court Obamacare victory to spread the program to states where Republican governors have
resisted. “What I'm hoping is that with the Supreme Court case now behind us, what we can do is ... now focus on how we can make it even better,” he said, adding,
“My hope is that on a bipartisan basis, in places like Tennessee but all across the country, we can now focus on ... what have we learned? What's working? What's
not working?” He said that “because of politics, not all states have taken advantage of the options that are out there. Our hope is, is that more of them do.” He
urged people to “think about this in a practical American way instead of a partisan, political way.” This probably won't happen, but it's
refreshing
to see Obama, too often passive, regaining vigor as he approaches the final 18 months of his presidency. The
energy had, at least for the moment, returned to the White House, where no fewer than six network correspondents were
doing live stand-ups before Obama's appearance Wednesday morning. There was a spring in the president's step, if not a
swagger, as he emerged from the Oval Office trailed by Vice President Biden. Republican presidential candidates
were nearly unanimous in denouncing the plan to open a U.S. embassy in Havana. But Obama, squinting in the sunlight
the fight. “The progress that we mark today is yet another
demonstration that we don't have to be imprisoned by the past,” he said. Quoting a Cuban-American's view that “you
as he read from his teleprompters, welcomed
can't hold the future of Cuba hostage to what happened in the past,” Obama added, “That's what this is about: a choice between the future
and the past.” Obama
turned to go back inside, ignoring the question shouted by Bloomberg's Margaret Talev: “How will
you get an ambassador confirmed?” That will indeed be tricky. But momentum is everything in
politics — and for the moment, Obama
has it again.
Freedom act was delicate balancing act – ANY additional changes drain PC and
guarantee intense opposition – congressional leadership, GOP, law enforcement
Gross, 6/5 – Grant, Grant Gross covers technology and telecom policy in the U.S. government for the IDG News Service, and is based in
Washington, D.C., IDG News Service, PC World, 6/5/15, http://www.pcworld.com/article/2932337/dont-expect-major-changes-to-nsasurveillance-from-congress.html
What’s in the USA Freedom Act? Some critics have blasted the USA Freedom Act as fake reform, while supporters have called it the biggest
overhaul of U.S. surveillance program in decades. Many civil liberties and privacy groups have come down in the middle of those two views,
calling it modest reform of the counterterrorism Patriot Act. The law aims to end the NSA’s decade-plus practice of collecting U.S. telephone
records in bulk, while allowing the agency to search those records in a more targeted manner. The law also moves the phone records database
from the NSA to telecom carriers, and requires the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to consult with tech and privacy experts
when ruling on major new data collection requests from the NSA. It also requires all significant FISC orders from the last 12 years to be released
to the public. The new law limits bulk collection of U.S. telephone and business records by requiring the FBI, the agency that applies for data
collection, to use a “specific selection term” when asking the surveillance court to authorize records searches. The law prohibits the FBI and
NSA from using a “broad geographic region,” including a city, county, state or zip code, as a search term, but it doesn’t otherwise define
“specific search term.” That’s a problem, according to critics. The surveillance court could allow, for example, “AT&T” as a specific search term
and give the NSA the authority to collect all of the carrier’s customer records. Such a ruling from FISC would seem to run counter to
congressional intent, but this is the same court that defined all U.S. phone records as “relevant” to a counterterrorism investigation under the
old version of the Patriot Act’s Section 215. The USA Freedom
Act also does nothing to limit the NSA’s surveillance of
overseas Internet traffic, including the content of emails and IP voice calls. Significantly limiting that NSA program, called Prism in 2013
Snowden leaks, will be a difficult task in Congress, with many lawmakers unconcerned about the privacy rights of
people who don’t vote in U.S. elections. Still, the section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that authorizes those NSA foreign
surveillance programs sunsets in 2017, and that deadline will force Congress to look at FISA, although lawmakers may wait until the last minute,
as they did with the expiring sections of the Patriot Act covered in the USA Freedom Act. The House Judiciary Committee will continue its
oversight of U.S. surveillance programs, and the committee will address FISA before its provisions expire, an aide to the committee said.
Republican leaders opposed to more changes Supporters of new reforms will have to bypass
congressional leadership, however. Senate Republican leaders attempted to derail even the USA Freedom
Act and refused to allow amendments that would require further changes at the NSA. In the House,
Republican leaders threatened to kill the USA Freedom Act if the Judiciary Committee amended the bill to
address other surveillance programs. Still, many House members, both Republicans and Democrats, have pushed for new
surveillance limits, with lawmakers adding an amendment to end so-called backdoor government searches of domestic communications to a
large appropriations bill this week. Obama’s administration has threatened to veto the appropriations bill for several unrelated reasons, but
several House members have pledged to push hard to prohibit the FBI and CIA from searching the content of reportedly tens of thousands of
U.S. communications swept up in an NSA surveillance program targeting overseas terrorism suspects. Closing that surveillance backdoor is a top
priority for civil liberties groups, said Neema Singh Guliani, a legislative counsel with the American Civil Liberties Union’s Washington, D.C.,
legislative office. “We’ve had this statute that masquerades as affecting only people abroad, but the reality is that it sweeps up large numbers
of U.S. persons,” she said. Other changes possible Advocates and lawmakers will also push for a handful of other surveillance reforms in the
coming months. The changes most likely to pass make limited changes to surveillance programs, however. While
not tied to NSA surveillance, lawmakers will press for changes to the 29-year-old Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), a wiretap law
that gives law enforcement agencies warrantless access to emails and other communications stored in the cloud for more than six months. A
House version of ECPA reform counts more than half the body as co-sponsors. Still, tech companies and civil liberties groups have been pushing
law enforcement agencies and some Republican
lawmakers have successfully opposed the changes. Another bill that may gain traction in coming months is the Judicial
since 2010 to have those communications protected by warrants, but
Redress Act, a bill that would allow citizens of some countries to file lawsuits under the U.S. Privacy Act if government agencies misuse their
records. “The Privacy Act offers limited protections, even to Americans, but passage of this bill would be an important first step to addressing
especially European concerns that US privacy reforms won’t help them,” said Berin Szoka, president of free market think tank TechFreedom.
Public pressure, along with potentially new leaks, will be the key to driving any more surveillance changes, advocates said. “The public will for
mass surveillance laws was made very clear recently, and that’s partly why we saw much of Congress flock to whatever could be called
surveillance reform,” said Tiffiniy Cheng, a founder of digital rights group Fight for the Future. “No one is fooled by USA
Freedom—it’s a
weak piece of legislation that uses exceptions in legislative language to codify the NSA’s practice of
surveilling most people.” Congress has much work left to do, Cheng said by email. “After the recent showdown and public outcry, USA
Freedom is at best, seen as a beginning of surveillance reform, not the end,” she said.
Full diplomatic ties key to normalized relations – vital to improved regional stability
and counter-narcotics – status quo doesn’t solve and Obama has exhausted his
available actions
Bowman 7/1 {Michael, syndicated senate correspondent, “Global Chatter Greets US-Cuba
Announcement,” VOA, 2015, http://www.voanews.com/content/global-chatter-greets-us-cubarestoration-of-diplomatic-ties/2845227.html#THUR}
The restoration
of full diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba sparked overwhelmingly
positive reactions around the world, except in the United States, where opinions diverged widely. A spokesman for U.N. Secretary-General
Ban Ki-moon said he “welcomes the announcement today that Cuba and the United States will reopen embassies in Havana and Washington, D.C.” “The
restoration of diplomatic ties is an important step on the path toward the normalization of relations. The secretary-general
hopes that this historic step will benefit the peoples of both countries,” the spokesman added. For decades, Switzerland has served as a go-between for Washington
and Havana, housing the U.S. Interest Section in the Cuban capital. In a statement, the Swiss government said: “Switzerland
strongly believes that
the reopening of the two embassies
and the normalization process will overall be beneficial for the two states and contribute to
security, stability and prosperity in the region. Switzerland views the normalization of relations between Cuba and
the U.S. as
very positive – not only for these two countries but for the whole region and for world stability.” ‘Incentivizing
a police state’ By contrast, reactions are decidedly mixed in Washington and across the United States. The Speaker of the House of Representatives, Republican
John Boehner, said in a statement, “The Obama administration is handing the Castros a lifetime dream of legitimacy without getting a thing for the Cuban people
being oppressed by this brutal communist dictatorship.” Echoing the criticism, Democratic Senator Robert Menendez, the son of parents who immigrated to
the U.S. from Cuba, said: “Our demands for freedoms and liberty on the island will continue to be ignored, and we are incentivizing a police state to uphold a
policy of brutality. A policy of the United States giving and the Castro brothers freely taking is
not in our national interest and not a responsible
approach when dealing with repressive rulers that deny freedoms to [their] people. An already one-sided deal that benefits the Cuban regime is becoming all the
more lopsided.” ‘New era of possibility’ House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi
disagreed. “Reopening embassies lays the
foundation for a new, more productive relationship with Cuba that can support and advance key American
priorities, including human rights, counter-narcotics cooperation, business opportunities for American companies,
migration, family unification, and cultural- and faith-based exchanges,” she said. “President Obama’s bold leadership has opened a new era of possibility in U.S.Cuban relations.” That
sentiment was echoed by Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy.
Improved efforts key to prevent cartels and Hezbollah attacks with WMDs
Pavlich ’11 (Katie, award-winning journalist, B.A. in broadcast journalism (University of Arizona), This
article quotes Douglas Farah (Senior Fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, B.A. in
Latin American Studies from Kansas) and Patrick Meehan (US representative on the Homeland Security
Committee), “A Growing Terror Threat: Hezbollah in Latin America,” TownHall Magazine, 7/8,
http://townhall.com/columnists/katiepavlich/2011/07/08/a_growing_terror_threat_hezbollah_in_latin
_america/page/full)
Americans think of terrorist activity, we think of Yemen, Pakistan, Palestine and other places in the Middle East, but we overlook the rapidly
increasing terrorism threat coming from Hezbollah operations taking place in Latin America. “This is a
very important issue we pay too little attention to,” Senior Fellow for the International Assessment and Strategy Center Douglas Farah told
lawmakers on Capitol Hill yesterday during a counterterrorism hearing. According to testimony given on Capitol Hill yesterday, Hezbollah, the most extensive
When
terrorist organization in the world, is operating along the U.S.-Mexico border and has vast
influence in Latin America. Hezbollah is anti-American and anti-Israeli, and the United States has been concerned about the group since the 1980s. Before
9/11,
Hezbollah, not Al Qaeda, was responsible for the majority of U.S. terrorism deaths, including the 1983 bombings of U.S. Marine
barracks and U.S. embassy in Beirut, in addition to a series of attacks in the '80s. Hezbollah is also Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires. In 1994 they bombed the Jewish community center in the
same responsible for countless attacks on Israel. In 1992, Hezbollah, with help from Iran, bombed the South American city. Those are just a handful of examples that don’t even account for the
Hezbollah makes Al Qaeda look like a minor league team,”
Meehan (R-Pa.) said. Hezbollah was created by Iran and has close ties to Syria. The group is also
backed by Venezuelan Dictator Hugo Chavez, who has a cozy relationship with Iran. “Hezbollah, backed by Iran and Venezuela, is a determined enemy of the
United States that has made substantial progress in Latin America,” Ambassador and American Enterprise Institute visiting fellow
Roger Noriega said during the hearing, adding that he believes there will be an attack on U.S. personnel if nothing is done soon to
counter Hezbollah in Latin America. Hezbollah is the most prevalent terrorist organization in the world. The group operates in over 40 countries and on 5
continents, including operations in at least 15 U.S. cities and four major Canadian cities. In South America specifically, the group operates in the region where
Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay meet. Brazil is used as a major terrorism hub and cocaine is exchanged for weapons in Colombia. “Hezbollah
remains the premium terrorist organization in the world,” Farah said in testimony. Hezbollah is a very sophisticated terrorist group, with activity
beyond criminal. Intelligence shows the group started pushing its terrorism initiative into South America a
decade ago but upped its efforts in 2005, a new approach that is a threat to the United States.
Testimony showed Hezbollah is strategically positioning itself in order to possibly launch a response to
an Iranian attack either from the U.S. or Isreal on their nuclear program. Intelligence cited during the
hearing also shows the group is interested in obtaining weapons of mass destruction, which should be
taken seriously since the group has published entire books about how to build and use WMDs and terrorist
operations are justified by Hezbollah’s belief in Islam’s ongoing struggle with the West through violent jihad. Hezbollah has also been supplying explosives training to
Mexican drug cartels operating along the U.S.-Mexico border, and tunnels used in the area are near replicas of weapons-smuggling tunnels built by Hezbollah and used in
Lebanon. Since 2006, violence in Mexico has rapidly escaladed and cartels have become more ruthless. In addition, Mexican cartels are serving as source of
financing and easy entrance for the organization into the United States.
thousands of rockets Hezbollah has launched into Israel throughout the years. “
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence Rep. Patrick
Nuclear terrorist attack causes escalation – risks extinction directly and via retaliation
Hellman 8 (Dr. Martin E., professor emeritus of electrical engineering at Stanford University, The Bent,
Spring 2008, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf)
The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat of a full-scale nuclear war, yet this article focuses
primarily on the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before proceeding. A
terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon
would be a catastrophe of immense proportions: “A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central
Station on a typical work day would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars
in direct economic damage. America and its way of life would be changed forever.” [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix].
The likelihood of such an attack is also significant. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the
chance of a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David
Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, “We would never accept a situation
where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability
event, but we can’t live in a world where it’s anything but extremely low-probability.” [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of 85 national security
experts, Senator Richard Lugar found a median estimate of 20 percent for the “probability of an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring
somewhere in the world in the next 10 years,” with 79 percent of the respondents believing “it more likely to be carried out by terrorists” than
by a government [Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is not inconsistent with
the approach of this article. Because terrorism
is one of the potential trigger mechanisms for a full-scale nuclear
war, the risk analyses proposed herein will include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk,
the overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce whichever risk(s) warrant
attention. Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan). This article would be
incomplete if it only dealt with the threat of nuclear terrorism and neglected the threat of full-scale nuclear war. If both risks are unacceptable,
an effort to reduce only the terrorist component would leave humanity in great peril. In fact, society’s almost total neglect of the threat of fullscale nuclear war makes studying that risk all the more important. The Cost of World War III The danger associated with nuclear deterrence
depends on both the cost of a failure and the failure rate.3 This section explores the cost of a failure of nuclear deterrence, and the next section
is concerned with the failure rate. While other definitions are possible, this article defines a failure of deterrence to mean a full-scale exchange
of all nuclear weapons available to the U.S. and Russia, an event that will be termed World War III. Approximately 20 million people died as a
result of the first World War. World War II’s fatalities were double or triple that number—chaos prevented a more precise determination. In
both cases humanity recovered, and the world today bears few scars that attest to the horror of those two wars. Many people therefore
implicitly believe that a third World War would be horrible but survivable, an extrapolation of the effects of the first two global wars. In that
view, World War III, while horrible, is something that humanity may just have to face and from which it will then have to recover. In contrast,
some of those most qualified to assess the situation hold a very different view. In a 1961 speech to a joint session of the Philippine Congress,
General Douglas MacArthur, stated, “Global
war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. … If you lose,
you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess even the chance of the
winner of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide.” Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
expressed a similar view: “If deterrence fails and conflict develops, the present U.S. and NATO strategy carries with it a high risk that Western
civilization will be destroyed” [McNamara 1986, page 6]. More recently, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn4 echoed
those concerns when they quoted President Reagan’s belief that nuclear
weapons were “totally irrational, totally
inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.” [Shultz 2007]
Official studies, while couched in less emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll that World War III would
exact: “The resulting deaths would be far beyond any precedent. Executive branch calculations show a
range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i.e., 79-160 million dead) … a change in targeting could kill
somewhere between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each side .... These calculations
reflect only deaths during the first 30 days. Additional millions would be injured, and many would
eventually die from lack of adequate medical care … millions of people might starve or freeze during the
following winter, but it is not possible to estimate how many. … further millions … might eventually die
of latent radiation effects.” [OTA 1979, page 8] This OTA report also noted the possibility of serious ecological
damage [OTA 1979, page 9], a concern that assumed a new potentiality when the TTAPS report [TTAPS 1983] proposed that the ash and
dust from so many nearly simultaneous nuclear explosions and their resultant fire storms could usher in
a nuclear winter that might erase homo sapiens from the face of the earth, much as many scientists now believe
the K-T Extinction that wiped out the dinosaurs resulted from an impact winter caused by ash and dust from a large asteroid or comet striking
Earth. The TTAPS report produced a heated debate, and there is still no scientific consensus on whether a nuclear winter would follow a fullscale nuclear war. Recent work [Robock 2007, Toon 2007] suggests that even
a limited nuclear exchange or one between
newer nuclear-weapon states, such as India and Pakistan, could have devastating long-lasting climatic
consequences due to the large volumes of smoke that would be generated by fires in modern
megacities. While it is uncertain how destructive World War III would be, prudence dictates that we apply the same engineering
conservatism that saved the Golden Gate Bridge from collapsing on its 50th anniversary and assume that preventing World War III is a
necessity—not an option.
Their 2AC was
( ) It won’t pass – their Milbank ev only says Obama has momentum – not that
momentum means Cuba reforms to get through Congress.
( ) Cuba reforms won’t pass
Cowan 7/12 {Richard, syndicated politics columnist, “Mitch McConnell Thinks Congress Will Block
Obama's Efforts to Engage with Cuba,” Reuters via the Huffington Post – Politics, 2015,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/07/12/obama-cuba-relations_n_7780432.html#THUR}
The top U.S. Senate Republican said on Sunday that Congress is likely to block any nominee that President Barack
Obama names as ambassador to Cuba and retain broad economic sanctions, even as Obama
moves to establish diplomatic and economic ties with the Communist-run island. Senate Majority Leader Mitch
McConnell, interviewed on the "Fox News Sunday" television program, said the Senate is unlikely to confirm any U.S.
ambassador to Havana nominated by Obama. McConnell added, "There are sanctions that were imposed by
Congress. I think the administration will have a hard time getting those removed. This is a policy that there
is substantial opposition to in Congress." Last December, Obama announced he would use his executive powers to move toward more
normal relations with Cuba after a five-decade standoff. Those steps have included establishing diplomatic relations, an expansion of some travel from the United
States to Cuba, increasing the limit on remittances to Cuban nationals from those living in the United States and expanding some trade in goods and services. But it
would be up to Congress to allow normal travel and full trade. Republicans control both the Senate and
House of Representatives. Many Republican oppose Obama's moves toward better relations with Cuba,
claiming they only bolster Cuba's communist leaders. Republicans also fear alienating Cuban Americans
in Florida who have fled the island nation and are supporters of the Republican Party. Obama charted a new U.S. path toward Cuba with
the support of some Republicans, including freshman Senator Jeff Flake of Arizona. Obama said in March his moves were already paying dividends, saying that since
December the Cuban government had begun discussing ways to reorganize its economy. McConnell
has been a consistent critic of
Obama on a range of foreign policy fronts, including Cuba and U.S. participation in multilateral nuclear talks with Iran. "This president has been involved in ...
talking to a lot of countries: talk, talk, talk. And Cuba is a good example. He thinks that simply by engaging with them we get a positive result," McConnell said,
adding, "I don't see any indication that Cubans are going to change their behavior." Human
rights advocates have admonished Cuba
for abuses, including arbitrary imprisonment of political opponents, and Cuba's tight control of its economy also has been a
lightning rod for criticism.
( ) Iran thumps the DA – it tops the docket.
Kevin Liptak, 7/14/15, Kevin Liptak is the CNN White House Producer, “Now that he has a deal with
Iran, Obama must face Congress,” http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/14/politics/iran-nuclear-dealcongress-obama-block/
Obama has ticked off
another legacy-making item on his checklist -- as long as Congress doesn't get in his way.¶ Early Tuesday,
Obama launched a sales pitch to lawmakers who remain deeply skeptical of the nuclear deal. But while
Washington (CNN)With a historic deal meant to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions in place, President Barack
Congress retains the ability to nullify Obama's accord with Tehran, the high bar for action on Capitol Hill -- including building veto-proof
majorities in just over two months -- will make it difficult for opponents to block the President. ¶ In its most simplistic form, the deal means that
in exchange for limits on its nuclear activities, Iran would get relief from sanctions while being allowed to continue its atomic program for
peaceful purposes. Many
of the more technical points of the deal weren't available Tuesday morning, and
specifics could prove to be red flags for skeptical members of Congress, many of whom said they were
still reviewing the specifics of the plan.¶ Congress has 60 days to review the deal, and if it opposes it can pass a
resolution of disapproval to block its implementation. The administration now has five days to certify
the agreement and formally present the deal to Capitol Hill. The clock on that 60 day period will not start until the official
document is delivered to Capitol Hill.¶ The Republican controlled House has the votes to pass a resolution, but in
the Senate Republicans would need to attract support from a half a dozen Democrats.¶ Because
President Obama has already pledged to veto any bill to block the deal GOP leaders would need to
convince enough Democrats to join with them to override his veto -- a heavy lift. How the public views the deal
will be critical, as Members of Congress will be back home for several weeks this summer before any vote. ¶ While Obama on Tuesday
said he welcomed a "robust" debate over the deal's merits, he issued a warning to lawmakers
considering blocking the agreement, bluntly threatening to veto any measure that would prevent the
deal from going into effect.¶ "Precisely because the stakes are so high, this is not the time for politics," he said in an address from the
White House. "Tough talk from Washington does not solve problems. Hard nosed diplomacy, leadership that
has united the world's major powers, offers a more effective way of verifying Iran is not pursuing a
nuclear weapon."¶ Like the completion earlier this month of a diplomatic renewal with Cuba, the deal with Iran provides Obama a
tentative foreign policy achievement in the final year-and-a-half of his presidency. Both are built on the premise of engaging traditional U.S.
foes, a vow Obama made at the very beginning of his presidency when he declared to hostile nations the United States would "extend a hand if
you are willing to unclench your fist."¶ The deal -- which was finalized after almost two years of talks -- provides vindication for an
administration that's sought to emphasize diplomacy over military force.¶ Burns: "If we get a deal, we'll have to contain Iranian
power"¶ Burns: "If we get a deal, we'll have to contain Iranian power" 02:44¶ PLAY VIDEO¶ "This deal demonstrates that American
diplomacy can bring about real and meaningful change," Obama said Tuesday, adding later that the deal "offers an opportunity to move in a
new direction."¶ But even Obama himself has admitted there are risks inherent in striking an accord with a sworn U.S. enemy. Lawmakers,
many deeply wary of those risks, now have 60 days to digest the provisions included in the deal with Iran, a two-month review period Congress
insisted upon as the negotiations unfolded.¶ Obama was initially resistant to any congressional review of the Iran pact. But faced
with
overwhelming support among lawmakers for some kind of evaluation period, the White House
ultimately conceded that Congress could be able to review the final deal before it takes full effect.¶ It
won't be easy for Congress to inflict damage on the agreement. They must act quickly -- and the two-month period in
which they can scuttle the plan includes a month-long August recess, and only a handful of working
days.¶ Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker told reporters Monday he expects to start hearings
sometime shortly after the 60-day clock begins -- which will come sometime in the next five days, after
the Director of National Intelligence completes a number of certifications to Congress about the deal,
including that it meets U.S. non-proliferation objectives and does not jeopardize U.S. national security.¶
Corker said he wants first to ensure senators have ample time to read the agreement and its classified
annexes so they are "well versed" before hearing from the administration and any outside experts he
plans to call to testify.¶ Corker said he would like to complete hearings before the August recess -- which
begins Aug. 7 -- so lawmakers have the recess to consider their positions. Under this scenario, up or down votes on
the deal itself would not happen until mid-September, he said.¶ In the House, a similar process and timeframe is also expected.¶ Within the
60-day span, opponents of the measure must rally votes to either enact new sanctions against Iran, or to
disallow Obama from easing sanctions as part of the deal, measures the President would veto.¶ Overriding the
veto in Congress would require a two-thirds majority -- meaning in the Senate, Obama must only secure a
minimum of 34 votes in order for his deal to take effect. Additional time beyond the 60-day review period is included for Obama
to veto any legislation, and for Congress to muster support for an override.¶ If lawmakers fail to pass any new restrictions during the review
period -- which ends in mid-September -- the deal will go into place, and sanctions will be lifted in Iran.¶ Obama: Iran's path to nuclear
weapons will be cut off¶ Obama: Iran's path to nuclear weapons will be cut off 04:21¶ PLAY VIDEO¶ But among deeply skeptical senators, who
worry about Iran's support for terror groups and incarceration of Americans, even 34 Democratic votes in support of Obama aren't necessarily
assured.¶ "
( ) Fiat means that the plan pass without any Congressional opposition.
( ) There’s bipartisan momentum for curtailing surveillance
Weisman, 13 (Jonathan Weisman, political writer for NYT, 7-28-2013, "Momentum Builds against
N.S.A. Surveillance", New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/29/us/politics/momentumbuilds-against-nsa-surveillance.html, DA: 5-30-2015)
WASHINGTON — The movement to crack down on government surveillance started with an odd couple from Michigan,
Representatives Justin Amash, a young libertarian Republican known even to his friends as “chief wing nut,” and John Conyers Jr., an elder of
the liberal left in his 25th House term. But what began on the political fringes only a week ago has
built a momentum that even
critics say may be unstoppable, drawing support from Republican and Democratic leaders, attracting
moderates in both parties and pulling in some of the most respected voices on national security in the
House. The rapidly shifting politics were reflected clearly in the House on Wednesday, when a plan to defund the National Security Agency’s
telephone data collection program fell just seven votes short of passage. Now, after initially signaling that they were comfortable with the
scope of the N.S.A.’s collection of Americans’ phone and Internet activities, but not their content, revealed last month by Edward J. Snowden,
lawmakers are showing an increasing willingness to use legislation to curb those actions. Representatives Jim
Sensenbrenner, Republican of Wisconsin, and Zoe Lofgren, Democrat of California, have begun work on legislation in the
House Judiciary Committee to significantly rein in N.S.A. telephone surveillance. Mr. Sensenbrenner said on Friday that he
would have a bill ready when Congress returned from its August recess that would restrict phone surveillance to only those named as targets of
a federal terrorism investigation, make significant changes to the secret court that oversees such programs and give businesses like Microsoft
and Google permission to reveal their dealings before that court. “There
is a growing sense that things have really gone a-
kilter here,” Ms. Lofgren said. The sudden reconsideration of post-Sept. 11 counterterrorism policy has taken much of Washington by
surprise. As the revelations by Mr. Snowden, a former N.S.A. contractor, were gaining attention in the news media, the White House and
leaders in both parties stood united behind the programs he had unmasked. They were focused mostly on bringing the leaker to justice.
Backers of sweeping surveillance powers now say they recognize that changes are likely, and they are taking steps to make sure they maintain
control over the extent of any revisions. Leaders of the Senate Intelligence Committee met on Wednesday as the House deliberated to try to
find accommodations to growing public misgivings about the programs, said the committee’s chairwoman, Senator Dianne Feinstein, Democrat
of California. Senator Mark Udall, a Colorado Democrat and longtime critic of the N.S.A. surveillance programs, said he had taken part in serious
meetings to discuss changes. Senator Saxby Chambliss of Georgia, the ranking Republican on the panel, said, “We’re talking through it right
now.” He added, “There are a lot of ideas on the table, and it’s pretty obvious that we’ve got some uneasy folks.” Representative Mike Rogers,
a Michigan Republican and the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, has assured House colleagues that an intelligence policy bill he
plans to draft in mid-September will include new privacy safeguards. Aides familiar with his efforts said the House Intelligence Committee was
focusing on more transparency for the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which oversees data gathering, including possibly
declassifying that court’s orders, and changes to the way the surveillance data is stored. The legislation may order such data to be held by the
telecommunications companies that produce them or by an independent entity, not the government. Lawmakers say their votes to
restrain the N.S.A. reflect a gut-level concern among voters about personal privacy. “I represent a very
reasonable district in suburban Philadelphia, and my constituents are expressing a growing concern on the sweeping
amounts of data that the government is compiling,” said Representative Michael G. Fitzpatrick, a moderate Republican
who represents one of the few true swing districts left in the House and who voted on Wednesday to limit N.S.A. surveillance. Votes from the
likes of Mr. Fitzpatrick were not initially anticipated when Republican leaders chided reporters for their interest in legislation that they said
would go nowhere. As the House slowly worked its way on Wednesday toward an evening vote to curb government surveillance, even
proponents of the legislation jokingly predicted that only the “wing nuts” — the libertarians of the right, the most ardent liberals on the left —
would support the measure. Then Mr. Sensenbrenner, a Republican veteran and one of the primary authors of the post-Sept. 11 Patriot Act,
stepped to a microphone on the House floor. Never, he said, did he intend to allow the wholesale vacuuming up of domestic phone records,
nor did his legislation envision that data dragnets would go beyond specific targets of terrorism investigations. “The time has come to stop it,
and the way we stop it is to approve this amendment,” Mr. Sensenbrenner said. He had not intended to speak, and when he did, he did not say
much, just seven brief sentences. “I was able to say what needed to be said in a minute,” he said Friday. Lawmakers from both parties said the
brief speech was a pivotal moment. When the tally was final, the effort to end the N.S.A.’s programs had fallen short, 205 to 217. Supporters
included Republican leaders like Representative Cathy McMorris Rodgers of Washington and Democratic leaders like Representative James E.
Clyburn of South Carolina. Republican moderates like Mr. Fitzpatrick and Blue Dog Democrats like Representative Kurt Schrader of Oregon
joined with respected voices on national security matters like Mr. Sensenbrenner and Ms. Lofgren. Besides Ms. McMorris Rodgers,
Representative Lynn Jenkins of Kansas, another member of the Republican leadership, voted yes. On the Democratic side, the chairman of the
House Democratic Caucus, Representative Xavier Becerra of California, and his vice chairman, Representative Joseph Crowley of New York,
broke with the top two Democrats, Representatives Nancy Pelosi of California and Steny H. Hoyer of Maryland, who pressed hard for no votes.
On Friday, Ms. Pelosi, the House minority leader and a veteran of the Intelligence Committee, and Mr. Hoyer
dashed off a letter
to the president warning that even those Democrats who had stayed with him on the issue on Wednesday would
be seeking changes. That letter included the signature of Mr. Conyers, who is rallying an increasingly unified
Democratic caucus to his side, as well as 61 House Democrats who voted no on Wednesday but are now publicly signaling their
discontent. “Although some of us voted for and others against the amendment, we all agree that there are lingering questions and concerns
about the current” data collection program, the letter stated. Representative Reid Ribble of Wisconsin, a Republican who voted for the curbs
and predicted that changes to the N.S.A. surveillance programs were now unstoppable, said: “This was in many respects a vote intended to
send a message. The vote was just too strong.” Ms. Lofgren said the White House and Democratic and Republican leaders had not come to grips
with what she called “a grave sense of betrayal” that greeted Mr. Snowden’s revelations. Since the Bush administration, lawmakers had been
repeatedly assured that such indiscriminate collection of data did not exist, and that when targeting was unspecific, it was aimed at people
abroad. The movement against the N.S.A. began with the fringes of each party. Mr. Amash of Michigan began pressing for an amendment on
the annual military spending bill aimed at the N.S.A. Leaders of the Intelligence Committee argued strenuously that such an amendment was
not relevant to military spending and should be ruled out of order. But Mr. Amash, an acolyte of Ron Paul, a libertarian former congressman,
persisted and rallied support. Mr. Sensenbrenner and Ms. Lofgren said they were willing to work with the House and Senate intelligence panels
to overhaul the surveillance programs, but indicated that they did not believe those panels were ready to go far enough. “I would just hope the
Intelligence Committees will not stick their heads in the sand on this,” Mr. Sensenbrenner said.
( ) Political capital doesn’t exist and isn’t key to their DA- more likely winners win
Michael Hirsch ‘13, chief correspondent for National Journal. He also contributes to 2012 Decoded. Hirsh previously
served as the senior editor and national economics correspondent for Newsweek, based in its Washington bureau. He was also
Newsweek’s Washington web editor and authored a weekly column for Newsweek.com, “The World from Washington.” Earlier
on, he was Newsweek’s foreign editor, guiding its award-winning coverage of the September 11 attacks and the war on terror.
He has done on-the-ground reporting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other places around the world, and served as the Tokyo-based
Asia Bureau Chief for Institutional Investor from 1992 to 1994. http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-suchthing-as-political-capital-20130207
On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In
pundits will do what they always do
talk about
how
much political capital Obama possesses to push his program through this talk will have no bearing on
what actually happens
Three months ago
if someone had talked about
capital to oversee
both immigration and gun-control
this person would have been called crazy
In his first term
Obama
didn’t dare to even bring up gun control
And
yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s
political capital
chances are fair that both will now happen What changed In the case of gun control
Newtown
response, the
this time of year: They will
“
”
. Most of
over the next four years. Consider this:
having enough political
how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of
, just before the November election,
passage of
reform
seriously
Obama
legislation at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the election by 4 percentage
points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—
and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.)
, in a starkly
polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years.
, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law.
personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “
.
20 first-graders who were slaughtered in
?
”—
, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the
, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed
after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after t he massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was
shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.” As a result, momentum has appeared
to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun
laws. But one thing is clear: The political tectonics have shifted dramatically in very little time. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago.
Meanwhile
, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit
immigration
turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence
It has almost entirely to do
with
the
Hispanic vote
movement on immigration has come out of the
Republican Party’s introspection
of compromise on
reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this
—his political mandate, as it were.
just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney,
breakdown of the
in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29
at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the
recent
mainly
, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic
death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for
“mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s
mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But
the idea of political capita
that presidents and pundits often get it wrong.
capital
we know more than we really do about ever-elusive
political power
suddenly change everything
the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” The real problem is that
l—or mandates, or momentum—
is so poorly defined
“Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of
an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political
the
conveys that
unforeseen events can
is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It
concept of
, and it discounts the way
the idea
. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and
the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in
the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 electi on, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make
him (and the Democrats) stronger. But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth
depending on Obama’s handling of
his second-term goals depending on
about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice,
any
issue, even in a polarized time he could still deliver on
the breaks
political capital is, at best, an empty concept that almost nothing in the academic
literature successfully quantifies or even defines it.
Winning on one issue often changes the calculation
for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital
Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change
positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”¶
¶
particular
,
a lot of
,
his skill and
. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly wok e up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass
legislation and run successful presidencies say that
, and
“It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard
Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests.
. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he
wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors”
ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ
Sometimes, a clever practitioner of power can get more done just because he’s
aggressive and knows the hallways of Congress well. Texas A&M’s Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But one of the main reasons for that mandate (in
addition to Goldwater’s ineptitude as a candidate) was President Johnson’s masterful use of power leading up to that election, and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital. In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The
Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late 1963. Don’t focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers’ support
for a tax cut and appropriations bills the president needed. “One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtn’t to expend it on this,” Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was
called in those days.) Johnson replied, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?” Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act enacted, along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He a ppeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but
also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro records. “Momentum is not a mysterious mistress,” LBJ said. “It is a controllable fact of political life.” Johnson had the skill and wherewithal
to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.) And then th ere are the presidents who get the politics, and the issues, wrong. It was the last president before Obama who was just starting a
second term, George W. Bush, who really revived the claim of political capital, which he was very fond of wielding. Then Bush promptly demonstrated that he didn’t fully understand the concept either. At his first news conference after his 2004 victory, a confident-sounding Bush
declared, “I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it. That’s my style.” The 43rd president threw all of his political capital at an overriding passion: the partial privatization of Social Security. He mounted a full-bore public-relations campaign that
included town-hall meetings across the country. Bush failed utterly, of course. But the problem was not that he didn’t have enough political capital. Yes, he may have overestimated his standing. Bush’s margin over John Kerry was thin—helped along by a bumbling Kerry campaign that
was almost the mirror image of Romney’s gaffe-filled failure this time—but that was not the real mistake. The problem was that whatever credibility or stature Bush thought he had earned as a newly reelected president did nothing to make Social Security privatization a better idea in
most people’s eyes. Voters didn’t trust the plan, and four years later, at the end of Bush’s term, the stock-market collapse bore out the public’s skepticism. Privatization just didn’t have any momentum behind it, no matter who was pushing it or how much capital Bush s pent to sell it. The
mistake that Bush made with Social Security, says John Sides, an associate professor of political science at George Washington University and a well-followed political blogger, “was that just because he won an election, he thought he had a green light. But there was no sens e of any kind
of public urgency on Social Security reform. It’s like he went into the garage where various Republican policy ideas were hanging up and picked one. I don’t think Obama’s going to make that mistake.… Bush decided he wanted to push a rock up a hill. He didn’t understand how steep the
Obama may get his way
not because of
his reelection,
but because Republicans are beginning to doubt whether taking a hard line on fiscal
policy is a good idea
¶
¶
hill was. I think Obama has more momentum on his side because of the Republican Party’s concerns about the Latino vote and the shooting at Newtown.”
also
on the debt ceiling,
Sides says, “
,” as the party suffers in the polls.
THE REAL LIMITS ON POWER
Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span, of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this,
too, has nothing to do with political capital. Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much political capital passing the health care law in his first term. Bu t the real problem was that the plan was unpopular, the economy was bad, and the president didn’t
realize that the national mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010—haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout,
aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pockets—government-imposed health care coverage was simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and what ensued: two titanic fights over the
debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an issue that was out of sync with the country’s mood. Unlike Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reform was that it distracted the government’s attention from other
issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various congressional staffers told me at the time that their bosses didn’t really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the Dodd-Frank financialreform legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room, the aides said. Weighing the imponderables of momentum, the often-mystical calculations about when the historic moment is ripe for an issue, will never be a science. It is mainly intuition, a nd its
best practitioners have a long history in American politics. This is a tale told well in Steven Spielberg’s hit movie Lincoln. Daniel Day-Lewis’s Abraham Lincoln attempts a lot of behind-the-scenes vote-buying to win passage of the 13th Amendment, banning slavery, along with eloquent
attempts to move people’s hearts and minds. He appears to be using the political capital of his reelection and the turning of the tide in the Civil War. But it’s clear that a surge of conscience, a sense of the changing times, has as much to do with the final vote as all the backroom horsetrading. “The reason I think the idea of political capital is kind of distorting is that it implies you have chits you can give out to people. It really oversimplifies why you elect politicians, or why they can do what Lincoln did,” says Tommy Bruce, a former political consultant in Washington.
Consider, as another example, the storied political career of President Franklin Roosevelt. Because the mood was ripe for dramatic change in the depths of the Great Depression, FDR was able to push an astonishing array of New Deal programs through a largely compliant Congress,
assuming what some described as near-dictatorial powers. But in his second term, full of confidence because of a landslide victory in 1936 that brought in unprece dented Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, Roosevelt overreached with his infamous Court-packing proposal. All
of a sudden, the political capital that experts thought was limitless disappeared. FDR’s plan to expand the Supreme Court by putting in his judicial allies abruptly created an unanticipated wall of opposition from newly reunited Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. FDR thus
inadvertently handed back to Congress, especially to the Senate, the power and influence he had seized in his first term. Sure, Roosevelt had loads of popularity and momentum in 1937. He seemed to have a bank vault full of political capital. But, once again, a president simply chose to
take on the wrong issue at the wrong time; this time, instead of most of the political interests in the country aligning his way, they opposed him. Roosevelt didn’t fully recover until World War II, despite two more election victories. In terms of Obama’s second-term agenda, what all these
if he picks issues
there is no reason to think he can’t win far more victories than
careful
calculators of political capital believe is possible
If he can get some early wins
that
will create momentum, and one win may well lead to others. “Winning wins
shifting tides of momentum and political calculation mean is this: Anything goes. Obama has no more elections to win, and he needs to worry only about the support he will have in the House and Senate after 2014. But
mood will support—such as, perhaps, immigration reform and gun control—
that the country’s
any of the
now
emerging, one who has his agenda clearly in mind and will ride the mood of the country more adroitly.
, including battles over tax reform and deficit reduction. Amid today’s atmosphere of Republican self-doubt, a new, more mature Obama seems to be
—as he already has, apparently, on the fiscal cliff and the upper-income tax increase—
.” Obama himself learned some hard lessons over the past four years about the
falsity of the political-capital concept. Despite his decisive victory over John McCain in 2008, he fumbled the selling of his $787 billion stimulus plan by portraying himself naively as a “post-partisan” president who somehow had been given the electoral mandate to be all things to all
people. So Obama tried to sell his stimulus as a long-term restructuring plan that would “lay the groundwork for long-term economic growth.” The president thus fed GOP suspicions that he was just another big-government liberal. Had he understood better that the country was digging
in against yet more government intervention and had sold the stimulus as what it mainly was—a giant shot of adrenalin to an economy with a stopped heart, a pure emergency measure—he might well have escaped the worst of the backlash. But by laying on ambitious programs, and
following up quickly with his health care plan, he only sealed his reputation on the right as a closet socialist. After that, Obama’s public posturing provoked automatic opposition from the GOP, no matter what he said. If the president put his personal imprimatur on any plan—from deficit
reduction, to health care, to immigration reform—Republicans were virtually guaranteed to come out against it. But this year, when he sought to exploit the chastened GOP’s newfound willingness to compromise on immigration, his approach was different. He seemed to un derstand that
the Republicans needed to reclaim immigration reform as their own issue, and he was willing to let them have some credit. When he mounted his bully pulpit in Nevada, he delivered another new message as well: You Republicans don’t have to listen to what I say anymore. And don’t
worry about who’s got the political capital. Just take a hard look at where I’m saying this: in a state you were supposed to have won but lost because of the rising Hispanic vote. Obama was cleverly pointing the GOP toward conclusions that he knows it is already reaching on its own: If
you, the Republicans, want to have any kind of a future in a vastly changed electoral map, you have no choice but to move. It’s your choice.
( ) The Recent Freedom Act and the TPA prove “winner’s win”. Obama wanted both
laws – and got them both. Those successes made him look strong – and now it’s hard
to disagree with him. The Aff plan is just another victory.
( ) Forcing controversial fights key to Obama’s agenda- try or die for the link turn
Dickerson ’13
(John, Slate, Go for the Throat!, - 1/18 www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2013/01/barack_obama_s_second_inaugural_addre
ss_the_president_should_declare_war.single.html)
On Monday, President Obama will preside over the grand reopening of his administration. It would be altogether fitting if he stepped to the microphone, looked
down the mall, and let out a sigh: so many people expecting so much from a government that appears capable of so little. A second inaugural suggests new
beginnings, but this one is being bookended by dead-end debates. Gridlock over the fiscal cliff preceded it and gridlock over the debt limit, sequester,
and budget will follow. After the election, the
same people are in power in all the branches of government and they
don't get along. There's no indication that the president's clashes with House Republicans will end soon. Inaugural speeches
are supposed to be huge and stirring. Presidents haul our heroes onstage, from George Washington to Martin Luther King Jr. George W. Bush brought the Liberty
Bell. They use history to make greatness and achievements seem like something you can just take down from the shelf. Americans are not stuck in the rut of the
day. But this might be too much for Obama’s second inaugural address: After the last four years, how do you call the nation and its elected representatives to
common action while standing on the steps of a building where collective action goes to die? That bipartisan bag of tricks has been tried and it didn’t work. People
don’t believe it. Congress' approval rating is 14 percent, the lowest in history. In a December Gallup poll, 77 percent of those asked said the way Washington works
is doing “serious harm” to the country. The
challenge for President Obama’s speech is the challenge of his second term: how to be
great when the environment stinks. Enhancing the president’s legacy requires something more than simply the
clever application of predictable stratagems. Washington’s partisan rancor, the size of the problems facing government, and the
limited amount of time before Obama is a lame duck all point to a single conclusion: The president who
came into office speaking in lofty terms about bipartisanship and cooperation can only cement his legacy if he destroys the GOP. If he
wants to transform American politics, he must go for the throat. President Obama could, of course, resign himself to tending to the achievements of
his first term. He'd make sure health care reform is implemented, nurse the economy back to health, and put the military on a new footing after two wars. But he's
more ambitious than that. He ran for president as a one-term senator with no executive experience. In his first term, he pushed for the biggest overhaul of health
care possible because, as he told his aides, he wanted to make history. He may already have made it. There's no question that he is already a president of
consequence. But there's no sign he's content to ride out the second half of the game in the Barcalounger. He is approaching gun control, climate change, and
immigration with wide and excited eyes. He's not going for caretaker. How should the president proceed then, if he wants to be bold? The Barack Obama of the
first administration might
have approached the task by finding some Republicans to deal with and then start agreeing to
some of their votes. It's the traditional approach. Perhaps he could add a good deal more
schmoozing with lawmakers, too. That's the old way. He has abandoned that. He doesn't think it will work and he
doesn't have the time. As Obama explained in his last press conference, he thinks the Republicans are dead set on opposing
him. They cannot be unchained by schmoozing. Even if Obama were wrong about Republican
intransigence, other constraints will limit the chance for cooperation. Republican lawmakers worried
about primary challenges in 2014 are not going to be willing partners. He probably has at most 18 months before people start
dropping the lame-duck label in close proximity to his name. Obama’s only remaining option is to pulverize. Whether he succeeds in
passing legislation or not, given his ambitions, his goal should be to delegitimize his opponents. Through a series of clarifying fights over
controversial issues, he can force Republicans to either side with their coalition's most extreme elements or cause a rift in the
party that will leave it, at least temporarily, in disarray.
some of their demands in hope that he would win
( ) Not intrinsic – a policymaker could both focus on our plan and also pass the TPP.
( ) Cuba is not key to Latin America or Hezbollah.
( ) Our Humint advantage solves their impact – the only way to catch Hezbollah is end
data overload.
( ) No nuclear terror impact
Chapman 12 (Stephen, editorial writer for Chicago Tribune, “CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely,”
May 22, http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html)
A layperson may figure it’s only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard’s Graham Allison, in his book “Nuclear
Terrorism,” concludes, “On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable.” But remember: Afxter
Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought
more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second
strike. Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck
bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from
being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “the likelihood that
a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small.” The events required
to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or
fissile material, perhaps from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already
gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly
become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would
still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no
nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100
pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives.
Then comes the task of building a bomb. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power
tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus people
with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. Assuming the jihadists vault over those
Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the
time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the
entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance
someone will blab, back out or screw up. That has heartening implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a
minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, it probably won’t bother. None of this means we should
stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers
good reason to think that in this war, it appears, the
worst eventuality is one that will never happen.