COMPARATIVE PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION
MPA 503
LECTURE 30
ADMINISTRATIVE
ACCOUNTABILITY IN
PAKISTAN
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OMBUDSMAN
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THE 1973 CONSTITUTION PROVIDED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE INSTITUTION OF OMBUDSMAN (WAFAQI MOHTASIB)
BUT THIS DID NOT ACTUALLY COME ABOUT UNTIL THE 1983
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OFFICE OF WAFAQI MOHTASIB
PRESIDENTIAL ORDER.
THE MANDATE OF THE OMBUDSMAN IS TO ENSURE
BUREAUCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY: SPECIFICALLY ‘TO
DIAGNOSE, INVESTIGATE, REDRESS AND RECTIFY ANY
INJUSTICE DONE TO A PERSON THROUGH ADMINISTRATION’.
TO ENSURE INDEPENDENCE, THE OMBUDSMAN IS APPOINTED
FOR A FIXED FOUR-YEAR TERM BY THE PRESIDENT, CANNOT
BE REAPPOINTED AND CANNOT BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE
EXCEPT FOR MISCONDUCT.
IT IS TO FUNCTION AS A NON-PARTISAN, NON-POLITICAL
OFFICE. SERVICES ARE TO BE PROVIDED FREE OF COST AND
WITHOUT FORMALITIES; ANY CITIZEN CAN MAKE A
COMPLAINT TO THE OMBUDSMAN AND WHILE THIS SHOULD
BE MADE WITHIN THREE MONTHS OF THE ‘GRIEVANCE’, THE
OMBUDSMAN CAN USE HIS DISCRETION TO TAKE UP OLDER
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COMPLAINTS.
OMBUDSMAN
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IN RESPONSE TO A COMPLAINT THE OMBUDSMAN CAN
CALL WITNESSES, DEMAND DOCUMENTS, AND
CONSTITUTE AN INSPECTION TEAM TO SEARCH ANY
PREMISES.
THE OMBUDSMAN HAS THE POWER TO PUNISH FOR
CONTEMPT ANY PERSON WHO OBSTRUCTS HIS WORK.
WHERE A COMPLAINT IS FOUND TO BE JUSTIFIED, HE
CAN AWARD COSTS AND COMPENSATION/REFUNDS TO
THE AGGRIEVED PERSON.
THE FEDERAL OMBUDSMAN IS TO SUBMIT AN ANNUAL
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT WITHIN THE FIRST THREE
MONTHS OF THE NEXT CALENDAR YEAR.
THERE ARE MANY AGENCIES, NOTABLY THE DEFENSE
SERVICES AND PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION, WHICH
DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE FEDERAL OMBUDSMAN’S
JURISDICTION.
IN THESE CASES, THE OMBUDSMAN CAN USE INFORMAL
DISPUTE RESOLUTION TECHNIQUES TO BRING ABOUT
RECONCILIATION AND RESOLVE THE ISSUE.
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OMBUDSMAN
• THE OMBUDSMAN IS SUPPOSED TO OPERATE
INDEPENDENT OF THE EXECUTIVE, BUT ITS
DEPENDENCE FOR OPERATIONAL
REQUIREMENTS ON OTHER GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES UNDERMINES ITS AUTONOMY. E.G.
RE-APPROPRIATION OF AMOUNTS EXCEEDING
RS.50, 000 FROM ONE BUDGET HEAD TO
ANOTHER REQUIRED THE CONCURRENCE OF
THE FINANCE DIVISION.
• EARLY REPORTS INDICATE A LACK OF
AWARENESS ON THE PART OF THE PUBLIC
ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF THE FEDERAL
OMBUDSMAN, HOW IT COULD HELP THEM, AND
HOW THEY COULD ACCESS IT.
• AS A RESULT, THERE ARE NUMEROUS
COMPLAINTS REGISTERED WITH THE
OMBUDSMAN WHICH FALL OUTSIDE THE
OFFICE’S JURISDICTION.
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OMBUDSMAN
• THE OMBUDSMAN OFFICE WAS SET UP WITHOUT
RULES AND PROCEDURES IN PLACE, INCLUDING ANY
FOR PERMANENT STAFF, AND THESE WERE
DEVELOPED MUCH LATER/ARE STILL UNDER
PREPARATION.
• WEAK IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OMBUDSMAN’S
RECOMMENDATIONS HAS BEEN A MAJOR PROBLEM.
IN THE CASE OF FINDINGS FROM INDIVIDUAL
COMPLAINTS, FEDERAL AGENCIES TEND TO MAKE
REPRESENTATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT – A PRACTICE
WHICH PERSISTS DESPITE REPEATED DIRECTIONS
FROM THE PRESIDENT’S OFFICE NOT TO DO SO. THE
AGENCIES IGNORE GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS.
• WHILE PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT FALL
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL
OMBUDSMAN, FROM THE MOMENT IT WAS
ESTABLISHED IT RECEIVED MANY COMPLAINTS
RELATED TO PROVINCIAL AGENCIES.
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OMBUDSMAN
• AS PUBLIC AWARENESS OF THE
LIMITATIONS OF THE FEDERAL
OMBUDSMAN’S MANDATE, AND OF THE NEW
PROVINCIAL INSTITUTIONS GREW, SO THE
NUMBER OF PROVINCIAL COMPLAINTS
RECEIVED BY THE FEDERAL OMBUDSMAN
DECREASED.
• THE FEDERAL OMBUDSMAN’S INFORMAL
RESOLUTION EFFORTS ALSO SHIFTED FROM
PROVINCIAL AGENCIES TO OTHERS OUTSIDE
THE OMBUDSMAN’S JURISDICTION, E.G. PIA,
THE CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY.
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PAC
• THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE (PAC) SIGNIFIES
ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL CONSTITUENTS OF
PARLIAMENTARY DOMINION WHICH IS THE
CULPABILITY OF PUBLIC MONEY.
• THE EXAMINATION OF AUDITOR GENERAL’S REPORTS
FOR THE MINISTRIES, DIVISIONS, CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER INDEPENDENT AND SEMI- AUTONOMOUS
BODIES, IS ONE OF THE MAIN FUNCTIONS OF THE
PAC.
• THE PAC IS ONE OF THE STATUTORY ORGANS OF THE
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF PAKISTAN. ACCORDING TO
THE ARTICLE 171 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN, THE REPORT OF THE
AUDITOR GENERAL (AG) RELATING TO THE ACCOUNTS
OF THE FEDERATION SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO THE
PRESIDENT, WHO SHALL CAUSE THEM TO BE LAID
BEFORE THE PARLIAMENT
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PAC
THE STANDING PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEES (PAC) ARE
ESTABLISHED BY FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENTS TO EXAMINE THE ACCOUNTS OF
GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR AGENCIES AND OTHER
MATTERS.
• EACH PAC CONSISTS OF NOT MORE THAN 12 MEMBERS
ELECTED BY THE ASSEMBLY AND THE MINISTER FOR
FINANCE IS AN EX-OFFICIO MEMBER.
• IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY RULES OF
PROCEDURE ON STANDING COMMITTEE, THE PAC IS
REQUIRE TO ENSURE THAT:
o THE MONEYS SHOWN IN THE ACCOUNTS AS HAVING BEEN
DISBURSED WERE LEGALLY AVAILABLE FOR, AND
APPLICABLE TO THE SERVICE OR PURPOSE FOR WHICH
THEY WERE APPLIED.
o THE EXPENDITURE CONFORMS TO THE AUTHORITY WHICH
GOVERNS IT, AND EVERY RE-APPROPRIATION HAS BEEN
MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES FRAMED BY THE
MINISTRY OF FINANCE.
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PAC
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THE FEDERAL PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE OF THE
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SCRUTINIZING
THE ACCOUNTS SHOWING THE APPROPRIATION OF SUMS
GRANTED BY THE ASSEMBLY FOR EXPENDITURE BY THE
GOVERNMENT.
ONCE THE ACCOUNTS FOR A GIVEN FINANCIAL YEAR ARE
CONSOLIDATED, AND THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF PAKISTAN
(AGP) HAS FINALIZED REPORTS ON THESE, BOTH
ACCOUNTS AND AGP REPORTS ARE FORWARDED BY THE
MINISTRY OF FINANCE TO THE PRESIDENT, AND
THEREAFTER LAID BEFORE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
THROUGH A MOTION IN THE NAME OF THE MINISTRY OF
FINANCE.
ONCE THE ACCOUNTS FOR A GIVEN FINANCIAL YEAR ARE
CONSOLIDATED, AND THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF PAKISTAN
(AGP) HAS FINALIZED REPORTS ON THESE, BOTH
ACCOUNTS AND AGP REPORTS ARE FORWARDED BY THE
MINISTRY OF FINANCE TO THE PRESIDENT, AND
THEREAFTER LAID BEFORE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
THROUGH A MOTION IN THE NAME OF THE MINISTRY OF
FINANCE.
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PAC
• IN THE EVENT OF THE ASSEMBLY BEING DISSOLVED,
THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE REFERS THE ACCOUNTS
AND AUDIT REPORTS TO AN AD HOC PUBLIC
ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE, CONSTITUTED BY THE
MINISTRY OF FINANCE WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE
PRESIDENT.
• THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PUBLIC ACCOUNTS
COMMITTEE COMPRISES NOT MORE THAN NINETEEN
MEMBERS, AND IS CHAIRED BY THE MINISTER OF
FINANCE.
• ITS SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS ARE TO SCRUTINIZE THE
APPROPRIATION AND OTHER ACCOUNTS OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, AS WELL AS STATE
CORPORATIONS, AUTONOMOUS AND SEMIAUTONOMOUS BODIES, AND THE REPORTS OF THE
AUDITOR-GENERAL ON THESE, AND SATISFY ITSELF
THAT EXPENDITURE WAS IN ACCORDANCE TO THE
PURPOSE FOR WHICH FUNDS WERE PROVIDED.
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PAC
• IF ANY MONEY HAS BEEN SPENT ON ANY SERVICE IN
EXCESS OF THE AUTHORIZED GRANT OR
APPROPRIATION FOR THAT PURPOSE, THE
COMMITTEE IS TO EXAMINE THE CASE AND MAKE
SUCH RECOMMENDATIONS AS IT MAY DEEM FIT.
• THE REPORTS REPEATEDLY SHOW THE PUBLIC
ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE CRITICIZING GOVERNMENT
MINISTRIES AND DEPARTMENTS FOR DELAYING
INITIATION AND CONDUCT OF INVESTIGATIONS AND
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
• IN MANY CASES THESE LINGERED ON FOR SEVERAL
YEARS, BY WHICH TIME THE PERSONNEL INVOLVED
HAD RETIRED/PASSED-AWAY/ABSCONDED, AND
RECOVERY OF STOLEN PROPERTY WAS IMPOSSIBLE.
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PAC
• DELAYS IN CONDUCTING INVESTIGATIONS AND
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS IS AN IMPORTANT
CONTRIBUTORY FACTOR IN THE TENDENCY TO
WRITE OFF LOSSES DUE TO THEFT,
EMBEZZLEMENT, ETC., AND NOT PUSH FOR
RECOVERY OF THESE.
• THE PAC REPORTS SHOW A RANGE OF
‘IRREGULARITIES’ COMMITTED BY STAFF OF
MINISTRIES/DEPARTMENTS.
• SOME INVOLVE PERSONAL GAIN, BUT OTHERS ARE
SIMPLY A FAILURE TO CARRY OUT THEIR DUTY
PROPERLY.
• IN MANY CASES WHERE IRREGULARITIES ARE
IDENTIFIED BY A DEPARTMENT, RESPONSIBILITY IS
NOT FIXED ON PARTICULAR OFFICERS/STAFF.
WITHOUT THIS IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO TAKE
DISCIPLINARY ACTION,
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PAC
• THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE IS REQUIRED TO BE
PRESENTED WITHIN ONE YEAR FROM THE DATE ON
WHICH THE ASSEMBLY REFERRED TO IT UNLESS THE
ASSEMBLY EXTENDS THE PERIOD BY RESOLUTION.
• THE PAC SHOULD GIVE THE FINAL DECISION ON AUDIT
REPORTS.
• MOST OF THESE REPORTS HAVE NOT BEEN
CONSIDERED DUE MAINLY TO THE FOLLOWING
REASONS:
1) PACS ARE NOT CONSTITUTED OR INTERMITTENTLY
CONSTITUTED AFTER LONG DELAYS.
2) EVEN WHEN PACS ARE CONSTITUTED, MEETINGS ARE
VERY SELDOM HELD.
3) IN SOME CASES, A CHAIRPERSON HAS NOT BEEN
APPOINTED AND THEREFORE MEETINGS ARE NOT
CALLED.
4) IT HAS BEEN STATED THAT RESPONSIVENESS TO AUDIT
REPORTS HAS NEVER BEEN CONSIDERED AS A
PRIORITY.
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PUBLIC ACCOUNTS
COMMITTEE
(PAC)
THE PAC REPORTS HIGHLIGHT POOR
BUDGETING AND ACCOUNTING PRACTICES,
NOTABLY EXCESS EXPENDITURE, SAVINGS,
NON-SURRENDER OF SAVINGS,
UNAUTHORIZED APPROPRIATION, AND
FAILURE TO RECONCILE DEPARTMENTAL
FIGURES WITH THOSE OF THE AUDIT OFFICE.
• THE PAC MAY EXAMINE THE EXPENDITURES,
ADMINISTRATION, DELEGATED LEGISLATION,
PUBLIC PETITIONS AND POLICIES OF THE
MINISTRY CONCERNED AND ITS ASSOCIATED
PUBLIC BODIES AND MAY FORWARD ITS
REPORT OF FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE MINISTRY AND
THE MINISTRY SHALL SUBMITS ITS REPLY TO14
Auditor General of Pakistan
• THE AUDITOR-GENERAL IS APPOINTED BY
THE PRESIDENT AND IS RESPONSIBLE FOR
THE ACCOUNTING FUNCTION AND AUDITING
FUNCTION OF THE FEDERATION AND
PROVINCES.
• THIS SITUATION GIVE RISE TO A SERIOUS
CONFLICT OF INTEREST WHICH HAS BEEN
THE SUBJECT OF CRITICAL COMMENT BY
ADB AND OTHER DONORS OVER RECENT
YEARS.
• TO THE CREDIT OF THE GOVERNMENT, A
HIGH-LEVEL COMMITTEE HAS BEEN
APPOINTED TO REVIEW THIS SITUATION.
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Auditor General of Pakistan
• THE AUDITOR-GENERAL OF PAKISTAN IS
MANDATED TO ‘CERTIFY THE ACCOUNTS,
COMPILED AND PREPARED BY THE CONTROLLER
GENERAL OF ACCOUNTS OR ANY OTHER
PERSON AUTHORIZED IN THAT BEHALF, FOR
EACH FINANCIAL YEAR, SHOWING UNDER THE
RESPECTIVE HEADS THE ANNUAL RECEIPTS AND
DISBURSEMENTS.
• THE AUDITOR GENERAL IS EXPECTED TO BRING
ABOUT IMPROVEMENTS IN THE FINANCIAL
DISCIPLINE AND INTERNAL CONTROL
ENVIRONMENT IN THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENTS FOR MINIMIZING THE
POSSIBILITY OF WASTE AND FRAUD.
• HIS DEPARTMENT IS NOMINATED AS THE
SUPREME AUDIT INSTITUTE OF PAKISTAN.
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Auditor General of Pakistan
• THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF PAKISTAN IS
APPOINTED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE COUNTRY.
• HIS REPORTS ARE LAID BEFORE THE
NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL, AND DISTRICT
ASSEMBLIES AND ARE CONSIDERED IN THE
PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE OF THE
RESPECTIVE ASSEMBLIES.
• HIS MANDATE ENABLES HIM TO
STRENGTHEN THE LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT
BY PROVIDING AN INDEPENDENT AND
OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE PROCESS
OF GOVERNANCE BOTH AT THE FEDERAL
AND PROVINCIAL LEVELS
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Auditor General of Pakistan
• THE BUDGET OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL IS
CLASSIFIED AS “CHARGED” EXPENDITURE.
• ALL CHARGED EXPENDITURES ARE NOT
VOTED UPON BY THE PARLIAMENT.
• THIS ARRANGEMENT LENDS HIS
INSTITUTION A DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE.
• ABOUT 1500 QUALIFIED OFFICERS ASSIST
THE AUDITOR GENERAL IN THE DISCHARGE
OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES.
• THE DEPUTY AUDITOR-GENERAL AND THE
CONTROLLER GENERAL OF ACCOUNTS
REPORT TO THE AUDITOR-GENERAL.
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Auditor General of Pakistan
• THE ACCOUNTANT-GENERAL PAKISTAN
REVENUES AND THE ACCOUNTANT-GENERAL
OF EACH PROVINCE REPORT TO THE
CONTROLLER-GENERAL OF ACCOUNTS.
• THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 11000
EMPLOYEES IN THE AUDITOR-GENERAL’S
DEPARTMENT WITH 60% WORKING FOR
ACCOUNTS AND 40% WORKING FOR AUDIT.
• THERE IS A CONCERTED EFFORT BEING MADE
AT FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL LEVELS TO AT
LEAST BRING INTO QUESTION THE POWERS OF
AUDITOR-GENERAL.
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
BUREAU (NAB)
• THE NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU WAS
ESTABLISHED IN 1999, REPLACING THE EHTESAB
CELL CREATED UNDER THE EHTESAB ACT 1997 TO
INVESTIGATE CORRUPTION CASES.
• THE NAB ORDINANCE WAS PROMULGATED ON 16
NOVEMBER 1999, SOON AFTER THE OVERTHROW
OF THE NAWAZ SHARIF GOVERNMENT AND THE
ONSET OF MILITARY RULE.
• IN BROAD TERMS THE ORDINANCE PROVIDES FOR:
• INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CASES
RELATED TO CORRUPTION.
• RECOVERY OF OUTSTANDING LOANS FROM
DEFAULTERS.
• RECOVERY OF STATE MONEY AND ASSETS
MISAPPROPRIATED THROUGH CORRUPTION OR
REMOVED ABROAD.
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
BUREAU (NAB)
• A KEY MANDATE OF NAB IS TO RECOVER
STOLEN ASSETS TRANSFERRED ABROAD
AND BRING TO JUSTICE ACCUSED PEOPLE
WHO HAVE FLED ABROAD
• NAB’S APPROACH TO ENFORCEMENT HAS
CHANGED OVER TIME: FROM THE INITIAL
FOCUS ON HIGH-VALUE, HIGH-PROFILE
CORRUPTION CASES; TO MAKING MORE USE
OF PLEA BARGAINING; TO THE CURRENT
THREE-PRONGED APPROACH OF
AWARENESS, PREVENTION AND
ENFORCEMENT.
• OVERALL ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS NAB’S
FOCUS HAS BEEN ON RECOVERY RATHER
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THAN ACCOUNTABILITY
NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
BUREAU (NAB)
• NAB HAS HAD AN IMAGE PROBLEM SINCE IT WAS
CREATED. THIS PERSISTS DESPITE THE CHANGED
APPROACH TO ENFORCEMENT, AND CONSIDERABLE
EFFORTS TO COMMUNICATE ITS WORK AND ANTICORRUPTION MESSAGES.
• NAB HAS ALSO BEEN HAMPERED BY OTHER FACTORS
INCLUDING DIFFICULTIES IN RECOVERING
ASSETS/GETTING EXTRADITIONS FROM ABROAD;
PAKISTAN’S ‘UNDOCUMENTED’ ECONOMY WHICH
MAKES TRACING ASSETS DIFFICULT; AND LIMITED
GOVERNANCE REFORM
• THE NAB ORDINANCE EXTENSIVELY DEFINES
CORRUPTION AND CORRUPT PRACTICES, AND LAYS
DOWN APPLICABLE PUNISHMENTS. THESE INCLUDE
IMPRISONMENT, IMPOSITION OF FINES,
CONFISCATION OF PROPERTY, DISQUALIFICATION
FROM PUBLIC OFFICE.
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
BUREAU (NAB)
• NAB OPERATIONS FALL INTO THREE MAIN
FUNCTIONS: IDENTIFICATION AND
INTELLIGENCE; INVESTIGATION; AND
PROSECUTION.
• THE NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU HAS
ISSUED FIVE ANNUAL REPORTS SINCE IT WAS
SET UP.
• THESE REPORTS ASSESSES HOW THE SITUATION
HAS CHANGED FROM YEAR TO YEAR WITH
REGARD TO SPECIFIC THEMES OR ASPECTS OF
NAB FUNCTIONING, E.G. STAFF CAPACITY,
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
BUREAU (NAB)
• IN TERMS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE,
NAB COMPRISES SEVERAL WINGS:
• IDENTIFICATION AND INTELLIGENCE;
• INVESTIGATION MONITORING;
• PROSECUTION;
• RESEARCH ANALYSIS TRAINING;
• BANKING;
• OVERSEAS OPERATIONS;
• GENERAL ADMINISTRATION;
• EXPERTS;
• MEDIA.
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