[Draft Book Chapter]
South Asia in transition:
India-Sri Lanka relations in the twenty-first century
Arijit Mazumdar, PhD
Assistant Professor of Political Science
University of St. Thomas, MN
Minnesota International Relations Colloquium (MIRC)
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, MN
October 8, 2012
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South Asia in transition: India-Sri Lanka relations in the twenty-first century
Abstract: Although India’s relations with the other countries of the South Asian region have been the subject of
study for decades most of these studies have been limited to exploring single-issue areas. In addition, they do not
address recent developments like the impact of India’s economic rise, developments such as 9/11 and the democratic
transitions in several countries in the region. As a result, they present an incomplete picture of India’s relations with
these countries. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive overview of India’s relations with its
South Asian neighbor Sri Lanka in light of these recent developments.
Introduction
South Asia is assuming increasing importance in world politics in the post-Cold War era. Its significance
has grown considerably since 9/11. It is host to one of the world’s most intractable bilateral disputes, the
India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir. It has a substantial Muslim population residing in Pakistan,
Bangladesh and India. It has embraced economic liberalization programs leading to stronger links with
the rest of the world. Finally, its biggest country India is the world’s largest democracy, the second-most
populous country in the world, a nuclear weapons state with one of the world’s largest military force and
the third largest economy in the world after the US and China in terms of GDP (PPP). By virtue of its size
and population, India enjoys a position of regional dominance. Since its independence, India’s goals visà-vis South Asia have included: (1) maintenance of regional supremacy & stability, (2) denying extraregional actors a military foothold in South Asia, and (3) peaceful settlement of conflicts within the
region through talks between the domestic actors involved (Sen Gupta 1983: 20). India has displayed a
willingness to undertake coercive action whenever it felt that outside actors threatened its influence or
regional stability was threatened. Examples include: military intervention in East Pakistan (Bangladesh)
in 1971, annexation of Sikkim in 1975, embargo on Nepal during 1989-90 and peace-keeping operations
in Sri Lanka during 1987-90.
Given India’s size, power and actions its smaller neighbors are understandably apprehensive and
suspicious of India’s intentions. As a result of these two factors, India’s relations with its South Asian
neighbors (i.e., Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal) have been affected by several
disputes and problems. India’s relations with Pakistan have been marked by conflict and mistrust since
the two countries became independent in 1947. The dispute over the status of Kashmir is the major
sticking point in relations between the two countries. In recent times, there have been renewed efforts to
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arrive at a settlement on the most important disputes between the two sides, including Kashmir. The
transition from military to civilian rule in Pakistan in 2008 represent a new chapter in India’s relations
with Pakistan. However, impediments to peace continue to exist.
Afghanistan has long been treated as a country that is not part of South Asia. However, it is impossible to
understand India’s relations with South Asia, especially Pakistan, without reference to Afghanistan. Over
the past few decades, India had only limited influence in Afghanistan. In the aftermath of the fall of the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan, India has tried to raise its profile in the country by increasing contacts at
both the official and civilian levels in order to promote its interests there. Its primary goal in Afghanistan
is to undercut Pakistan’s influence over the nascent regime, which has contributed to increasing tensions
between the two rivals.
The independence of Bangladesh in 1971 was hailed in India as the birth of a secular, friendly ally on its
eastern border. However, celebrations soon became muted as India’s relations with the country rapidly
deteriorated in the background of disputes involving water sharing, illegal influx of Bangladeshis into
India and Bangladesh’s alleged support to insurgents groups active in north-eastern India. Today, these
issues continue to affect relations between India and Bangladesh as the latter attempts to consolidate
representative democracy based on multi-party elections. Recent political changes in Bangladesh and
developments in the region provide an opportunity for the two countries to address bilateral issues
bedeviling relations.
Nepal has been witness to dramatic developments during the past decade including a civil war, usurpation
of political authority by the monarchy, abolishment of monarchy and restoration of democratic rule and
subsequent political impasse associated with the process of writing a new constitution. These
developments have been anxiously watched by India. Although a friendship treaty between India and
Nepal sets the basis for a unique political and economic relationship, Nepal’s attempts to pursue an
independent and neutral foreign policy has created tensions with its larger southern neighbor (Garver,
1991). India’s overt and covert attempts to influence the political developments in Nepal have frequently
drawn the ire of Nepalese nationalists. India faces many challenges in attempting to build a new
relationship with Nepal as the latter attempts to create a stable democracy.
Finally, India’s relations with its southern neighbor Sri Lanka have been primarily conducted under the
shadow of the two-decade long civil war in that country (Bose 1994). The conflict has strained relations
between the majority Sinhalese community and the minority Tamil community of Sri Lanka. The main
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parties to the conflict included the Sinhalese-dominated Sri Lankan government and the rebel Tamil
Tigers, who were fighting for self-determination for the Tamil community. After its failure to enforce a
peace agreement between the two sides during the late-1980s, India has consistently rejected calls for
intervention and mediation. The ethnic strife in Sri Lanka has harmed regional peace and stability. The
end of the civil war provides an opportunity for India and Sri Lanka to take their relationship to a new
level.
Although India’s relations with the other countries of the South Asian region have been the subject of
study for decades, most of these studies have been limited to exploring single-issue areas and do not
discuss the impact of recent developments on India’s relations with other South Asian countries
(Chiriyankandath 2004; Grover 2001; Hilali 2001; Mehta 2009; Mohan 2004; Pant 2008; Tanham 1992;
Thornton 1992). These developments include India’s economic rise, developments like 9/11 and the
recent democratic transitions in several countries across the region. This chapter focuses on Sri Lanka.
The goal of this chapter is to answer the three-fold research question: What is the nature of the
relationship between India and Sri Lanka? What patterns are observed in the historical interactions
between India and Sri Lanka? Has India’s economic rise and developments such as 9/11 and the recent
political transition in Sri Lanka affected the nature of the relationship and altered the historical patterns of
interactions?
Sri Lanka: A Brief History
Britain granted Ceylon (Sri Lanka) independence in 1948, a year after India and Pakistan gained their
independence. The transfer of power was relatively peaceful compared to the violent events surrounding
the Partition of British India. During the first two decades after independence, Sri Lanka maintained its
erstwhile links with Britain, inheriting the British Westminster model of government, adopting English as
the official language, maintaining dominion status and signing a bilateral defense agreement. Apart from
India, Sri Lanka is the only country in South Asia that has a long tradition of civilian governments
directly elected by the people.
However, the poor treatment of the island’s minority Tamil community at the hands of the majority
Sinhalese community has tarnished Sri Lanka’s claims of being a representative democracy (Embree
1997). It has strained relations between the Sinhalese, who are primarily Theravada Buddhists and the
Tamils, who are primarily Hindus. The Tamils residing in the island’s north and central provinces, have
long complained of being treated as ‘second-class’ citizens. Using their numerical majority, the Sinhalese
created a unitary state that was pro-Sinhalese and pro-Buddhist, while systematically ignoring the
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legitimate political, social and economic grievances of the Tamils (Bose 1994). Political exclusion and a
deepening sense of alienation felt by the Tamils within the country ultimately led to a brutal and
destructive civil war beginning in 1983 and lasting until 2009. The civil war ended in the defeat of the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) or Tamil Tigers who were fighting for an independent state for
the Tamils of Sri Lanka.
As fighting intensified, Sri Lanka’s closest neighbor India intervened in the conflict in 1987. Home to
more than 50 million Tamils at the time, India had an important stake in the ongoing conflict on the
island. India was also unhappy about Sri Lanka seeking military assistance and training from extraregional actors, like the US, China and Israel during the civil war (Kodikara 1995). Ultimately, it was able
to pressure Sri Lanka to call off its military offensive against the Tamil Tigers and offer a political
package, which included the devolution of power to the Tamils in the northeast. In order to facilitate the
peace process it offered to send an Indian Peace-keeping Force (IPKF) to the island. However, the IPKF
soon became engaged in a firefight with the Tamil Tigers, who refused to disarm. India’s actions against
the Tamil Tigers upset the Tamils in both India and Sri Lanka. Sinhalese nationalists were also unhappy
with India’s unwelcome intervention in what they regarded was Sri Lanka’s internal affairs. Taking
advantage of this nationalist sentiment, the Marxist-Leninist Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) launched
an armed struggle against the Sri Lankan state, plunging the country into further instability. Previously,
the JVP had launched a failed insurrection in 1971. This time too, the government was able to subdue the
JVP. Today, the JVP is a legitimate political party, which has participated in democratic elections.
In March 1990, the deeply unpopular IPKF was withdrawn having failed to enforce the peace. Following
this debacle, India consistently rejected calls emanating from the island for intervention and mediation to
bring the conflict to an end. Bilateral relations were strained during much of the 1990s. Tamil Nadu-based
political parties also pressured successive central governments in India to limit ties with Sri Lanka.
However, relations have improved substantially over the past decade due to the burgeoning economic
relations between the two countries. The end of the civil war is an opportunity for India to deepen its
engagement with Sri Lanka and push for national reconciliation. New economic linkages, political
transition in Sri Lanka and greater US interest in the South Asian region, including Sri Lanka, provide
India with the opportunity to further consolidate its relationship with Sri Lanka. Following a background
section highlighting political developments in Sri Lanka, this paper attempts to examine these three new
developments that have the potential to reshape ties between the two countries.
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India-Sri Lanka Relations: Background
The Sinhalese, who constitute 74% of the total population, and Tamils, who constitute 18% of the total
population, are the two major ethnic communities in Sri Lanka.1 The other prominent community, the
Moors (7%), trace their lineage to the early Arab traders who settled in Sri Lanka prior to the sixteenth
century. They are Muslims, who primarily speak Tamil even though they are not ethnically Tamils.
Sinhala (official and national language) is spoken by 74% of the population, while Tamil (official and
national language) is spoken by 18% of the population. Buddhism (65%) and Hinduism (15%) are the
major religions. There are also a sizeable number of Muslims living on the island. Neither the Sinhalese
nor the Tamils are indigenous to Sri Lanka. The ancient Buddhist chronicles, Dipavamsa and
Mahavamsa, claim that the Sinhalese are descendants of Prince Vijaya and his followers who arrived on
the island during the 5th century BCE from West Bengal, India (DeSilva 1981). The first Tamil speakers
are also believed to have arrived in Sri Lanka around the same time. The indigenous people of the island,
the Veddas, have largely been assimilated over time.
Sri Lanka saw a succession of Sinhalese and Tamil kingdoms until the arrival of the Portuguese in the
sixteenth century CE. The Portuguese established their control in the coastal areas and aggressively
proselytized the locals (Little 1994: 11-12). They were replaced by the Dutch during the seventeenth
century CE, who controlled the coastal areas and some interior regions. The Dutch were in turn replaced
by the British during the end of the eighteenth century CE. Sri Lanka was then known as Ceylon. The
Crown assumed direct control of the island in 1802. The British extended their rule throughout the island
finally defeating the Kingdom of Kandy, which was the last Sinhalese stronghold, in 1815. They ruled the
island until its independence in 1948.
The roots of the ethnic conflict in modern Sri Lanka may be traced back to the colonial period. The
British colonial administration did not hide its belief in the superiority of Western culture and tradition.
English replaced Sinhala as the language of government and commerce. The island’s Buddhist Sangha
(community) believed that British colonial rule had broken the traditional links between Buddhism and
the State (Little 1994). Ancient myths and colonial-era resentment contributed to a Buddhist revival
movement in Ceylon. Beginning in the 1860s, anxiety about the future of Buddhism on the island led
some Buddhist leaders, like Anagarika Dharmapala, to respond aggressively to the spread of Western
ideas and religion. The movement fostered an ethnic consciousness among the island’s majority
community. The leaders argued that Sri Lanka was the last bastion of Buddhism in South Asia and it was
up to Sinhalese to don the mantle of ‘defenders of the faith’. Buddhism soon became an integral part of
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modern Sinhalese nationalism. Even today, Buddhist monks are actively involved in politics through
parties like the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) (Deegalle 2004).
The revival movement also portrayed Sinhalese and Tamils as adversaries locked in power struggle
throughout their history. The expansion of South Indian Tamil kingdoms into Sri Lanka and ancient tales
of heroic battles fought by the Sinhalese against Tamil rule were used to justify the argument that
Sinhalese culture had always been under threat. Many Buddhist leaders alleged that Tamils were
receiving preferential treatment from the British government. They were over-represented within the
lower rungs of the colonial administration, despite their minority status. This was because the Tamils
were more receptive to Western education and their knowledge of English (as a result of attending
missionary schools) helped them secure positions in the colonial administration. Cultural insecurity, loss
of privileges and Tamil success angered many Sinhalese (Kaplan 2010; Sabhlok 2002). The import of
Indian Tamils by the British government during the nineteenth and twentieth century, to work as
indentured laborers on the tea and rubber plantations of central Sri Lanka, made Sinhala nationalists and
Buddhists even more anxious that they would one day become a minority on the island.
Despite these developments, educated middle-class Sinhalese and Tamils united under the banner of the
Ceylon National Congress (CNC) to seek constitutional reforms from the British. The CNC was
established in 1919 under the leadership of Tamil leader Ponnambalam Arunachalam. However, as time
progressed, differences between the Sinhalese and Tamil communities complicated matters. The Tamils
favored communal representation, while the Sinhalese favored territorial representation. In 1931, the
Donoughmore Commission set up by the British ushered in constitutional reforms in Sri Lanka. The
Commission created a new constitution that remained in force from 1931-1947. The constitutional
reforms repudiated the demands of communal representation, established universal franchise on the island
and created a new State Council to replace the existing legislative council.
Following these reforms, it was inevitable that the Sinhalese community had the largest number of
representatives in the State Council. The insecurity regarding their status led some Tamils to establish the
All-Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC) in 1944, under the leadership of G.G. Ponnambalam. The ACTC
demand equal representation in the State Council, which was rejected by the British. During the same
year, the Soulbury Commission was established to carry out a second set of constitutional reforms. Britain
accepted a draft constitution submitted by the D.S. Senanayake-led Board of Ministers (who were
members of the State Council) (Wilson 1999). This later became the constitution of the independent
country of Ceylon in 1948. Ceylon inherited a set of majoritarian institutions from the British: a
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Parliament with a bicameral legislature and single-member district plurality electoral system. It lacked
substantive minority guarantees. The issue of minority rights was to be settled through talks between the
leaders of the two communities once the British left.
The first government of Sri Lanka was headed by D.S. Senanayake, the leader of the center-right United
National Party (UNP), which had a majority in Parliament. It did not take long for Sinhalese nationalists
to assert their dominant status. In 1948, the new Parliament passed the controversial Ceylon Citizenship
Act, which denied citizenship rights to over 700,000 Indian Tamils making them stateless. These Tamils
had been brought to work on tea and rubber plantations. The Sinhalese believed that this action would
correct the ethnic imbalance on the island. However, it caused much anguish among the Sri Lankan
Tamils. Later, the government reached an agreement with India to repatriate a limited number of Tamils
to India. The failure of the ACTC to prevent this action led to a section of its members breaking away to
form the Illankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK) or the Federal Party. The Federal Party, under the
leadership of S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, demanded a federal system in the country with constitutional
protection for Tamil language. However, Sinhalese nationalists were in no mood to concede to the
demands of the Tamils.
In 1956, Solomon Bandaranaike’s center-left Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) won the elections. The
SLFP had never been happy with the 1948 Soulbury Constitution, claiming that it was imposed by the
British on Ceylon. Fulfilling its election pledge, it passed the Sinhala Only Act in 1948, which declared
Sinhala as the sole official language of Ceylon. English would no longer be the official language of the
country as it was deemed to be a remnant of Ceylon’s colonial past (DeVotta 2005). The declaration of
Sinhala as the official language was welcomed by the Sinhalese nationalists and Buddhist leaders.
However, this action further alienated the Tamils. Their language had yet to receive official status and
English was no longer the ‘bridge’ language.
In 1972, a new constitution was adopted, which changed the name of the island to Sri Lanka and declared
it a republic with a unicameral legislature. At the same time, Buddhism was accorded a special status in
Sri Lanka. Although freedom of religion was recognized, the State was supposed to take an active interest
in supporting Buddhism and Buddhist institutions. During the 1970s, affirmative action policies favoring
the entry of Sinhalese in colleges and universities across the country further served to anger the Tamils.
The lack of concern on the part of the government for their plight increased ethnic tensions within Sri
Lanka.
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Frustrated by Sinhalese obduracy, a group of Tamil parties (including the ACTC and the Federal Party)
established the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) in 1976. During the same year, a separatist,
militant organization known as the LTTE was established, under the leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran.
Both organizations, representing moderate and extremist elements, demanded an independent state for the
Tamils of Sri Lanka. However, while the TULF favored negotiations with the Sinhalese leadership, the
LTTE believed that only by resorting to violence could the dream of an independent state be achieved.
The Tamil Tigers began attacking not only attacking government forces and Sinhalese citizens, but also
Tamil civilians who disagreed with their policies and tactics. Members of the moderate Tamil political
parties, including TULF, were also attacked by the Tamil Tigers.
It was not long before the Tamil Tigers were able to suppress opposition within the Tamil community
and claim that they were the sole representatives of the Tamil people. After 1977, India-Sri Lanka
relations worsened as Sri Lanka, under President Jayewardene, began to actively engage with the West.
This represented a threat to India’s regional hegemony. In order to put pressure on Sri Lanka, India
allowed the LTTE to set up training camps in Tamil Nadu. Indian intelligence agencies provided training
and logistical support to the LTTE. Pressure exerted by its own domestic Tamil constituency was also
responsible for India’s support to the LTTE.
In 1978, Sri Lanka transitioned from a Parliamentary system to a Semi-Presidential system.2 The UNP,
under the leadership of J.R. Jayewardene, used its two-third electoral majority in Parliament to make this
change possible. Arguing that the previous system was flawed, a new constitution was drafted for the
country by the government. The new political system was characterized by a strong executive, having the
power to appoint a Prime Minister and his cabinet from the majority party in Parliament. A proportional
representation electoral system replaced the single-member district plurality electoral system. The new
constitution created an even more centralized system. In the event that the President came from the same
party that had a majority in Parliament, he/she could easily control Parliament. The President could
control members of his/her party, through powers to nominate and remove members from Parliament.
He/she could also dissolve Parliament and call for fresh elections. This intense concentration of power at
the Center was completely at odds with Tamil demand for the decentralization of power (Wilson 1999).
In July 1983, following a Tamil Tiger ambush in which thirteen Sri Lankan soldiers died, Sinhalese mobs
went on a four-day rampage against Tamil civilians across the country. Hundreds of Tamils died in
countrywide rioting between 23-26 July, while thousands fled the country. The riots came to be described
as ‘Black July’. The authorities were slow to respond to the riots, which led many Tamils to allege that
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there was some degree of collusion between the government and the rioters (Kumaratanga 1996). Black
July was the immediate trigger for the civil war that was to engulf the country for the next 26 years. The
LTTE was able to wage its armed struggle through the financial support of the Tamil diaspora settled in
the US, Canada, UK, Australia and Scandinavian countries (La 2004; Fair 2005). The Tigers also
indulged in weapons smuggling, human trafficking, money laundering and provided assistance to other
insurgent groups around the world.
The primary reason for the descent into civil war was the intense ethnic polarization within the country
due to the treatment of Tamils (Adeney and Wyatt 2004; Bose 2004; DeVotta 2005; Embree 1997;
Kumaratunga 1996). Sinhalese politicians often competed with each other in projecting a hawkish
position towards the Tamil issue. Aggressive and uncompromising stands during campaigning were
rewarded by votes from the electorate. The majority community had used its dominant position to
marginalize the minority community. Political institutions within the country favored the Sinhalese,
disregarding minority interests. This undermined minority confidence in the institutions and eroded their
faith in democracy. No unifying idea of Sri Lankan nationhood emerged. In such an environment,
mobilization along ethnic lines was natural. In South Asia, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka face similar
problems with majoritarian institutions, but ethnic polarization in the latter has complicated the problem
and led to violent conflict.3
The Sinhalese believe that despite their majority status on the island, they are in fact a minority when
compared to the Tamils. This is because of the presence of more than seventy million Tamils in the Indian
state of Tamil Nadu. A complex mix of history, religion and ethnicity pushed the country towards civil
war. The LTTE was the result of the frustration felt by the younger generation of Tamils, who had
suffered socio-economic discrimination and political exclusion at the hands of the Sinhalese-dominated
polity (Embree 1997). Black July demonstrated that Tamils could never expect to be treated fairly by the
Sinhala-dominated government. Only an independent state of their own could protect their nation.
Violence appeared to be the only means to achieve this objective.
The first phase of the Sri Lankan civil war began in 1983. Many Tamils fled to India where they were
housed in government-run camps. By June 1987, Sri Lankan government forces had closed in on the main
Tamil Tiger stronghold in Jaffna peninsula in the north. Many Tamil civilians were in danger of being
caught in the crossfire between government forces and the Tamil Tigers. Faced with the possibility of a
humanitarian crisis, the Indian government requested the Sri Lankan government to halt military
operations. India was already concerned about the fact that Sri Lanka had drawn progressively closer to
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the West during the 1980s and even invited military and intelligence personnel from other countries to
advise its security forces during the civil war. However, bolstered by domestic support for the successful
offensive, Jayewardene refused to order a ceasefire. When India sent relief supplies through transport
ships, they were blocked by the Sri Lankan navy. Exasperated, Rajiv Gandhi’s government authorized the
Indian Air Force (IAF) to air drop supplies into the besieged town of Jaffna. This blatant violation of Sri
Lanka’s sovereignty forced Jayewardene to halt military operations and request talks with the Indian
government.
The two countries signed the Indo-Sri Lankan accord in July 1987 (See Appendix A). Under the terms of
the agreement, the Sri Lankan government would enter into talks with the Tamil Tigers aimed at
establishing a permanent ceasefire, devolve powers to provincial councils, merge the northern and eastern
provinces (subject to a national referendum) and grant official status to the Tamil language. These
measures would be incorporated into the thirteenth amendment to the Sri Lankan constitution (Bajoria
2009). In an exchange of letters, the Sri Lankan government also agreed to consult India prior to inviting
foreign military personnel to advise/train its security forces and assured it that extra-regional actors would
not be allowed to establish a military foothold in Sri Lanka (See Appendix B). In return, India would end
its support to the Tamil Tigers and send the IPKF to help disarm the Tamil militant groups, including the
LTTE.
However, the IPKF failed in its mission to enforce the peace. Both the Sinhalese and Tamil community
were unhappy about India’s growing involvement in Sri Lanka. Ultimately the troops were withdrawn in
March 1990 by the new government that came to power in India. In May 1991, a female Tamil suicide
bomber assassinated Rajiv Gandhi in Sriperumbudur, Tamil Nadu, India during election campaigning.
India listed the LTTE as a terrorist organization in 1992. Others, including the US (1997), UK (2000) and
Canada and the EU (2006) have done the same. India’s declaration meant that it could not serve as a
neutral third party to facilitate talks between the Sri Lankan government and LTTE in later years. Hence,
it was not in favor of becoming directly involved in the peace process in Sri Lanka during 2002-06.
The thirteenth amendment to the constitution was meant to be a blueprint of a political settlement in Sri
Lanka. Although it was passed by the Sri Lankan parliament in November 1987, the amendment was not
fully implemented and Sinhalese nationalists have long called for its repeal. Although completed, there
was no nationwide referendum to approve the merger of the northern and eastern provinces. In 1990,
following a motion in the council calling for an independent Tamil state (Eelam), President Ranasinghe
Premadasa dissolved the northeastern provincial council and imposed central rule on the province. In
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October 2006, the country’s Supreme Court ruled Jayewardene’s proclamations enabling the ‘temporary’
merger of the northern and eastern provinces null and void. In January 2007, the government de-merged
the North and East.
Over the years, talks between successive Sri Lankan government and LTTE failed to bring an end to the
violence. Each side blamed the other for refusing to compromise. During her second term, President
Chandrika Kumaratunga invited the Norwegian government to facilitate talks between the two warring
sides. The process began in 2002 but lack of progress forced the Norwegians to withdraw in 2006.
President Mahinda Rajapakse, who came to power in 2005, led Sri Lanka during the last phase of the
conflict. The civil war finally came to an end in May 2009 with the military defeat of the LTTE and the
death of Prabhakaran, but not before several thousand Tamil civilians died in the final days of fighting.
New Trends and Transformations
Rajapakse came to power through the support of the JHU and the JVP. A nationalist hardliner, he soon
advocated a military solution to the Tamil insurgency. Currently, Rajapakse is basking in the glory of the
victory over the LTTE. The international community is trying to persuade the government to respond to
the historical grievances of the Tamils but the government has shown little inclination to do so. What is
unmistakable though is that Sri Lanka is a country in transition. The end of the civil war is an opportunity
for India to deepen its engagement with Sri Lanka and push for national reconciliation. Following the
IPKF debacle, India decided to adopt a ‘hands-off’ policy to the conflict on the island. Later, through
trade and investment, India has attempted to rebuild relations. New economic linkages, political transition
and greater US interest in the South Asian region provide India with the opportunity to further consolidate
its relationship with Sri Lanka. The focus of this section is to examine the new developments that have
the potential to reshape ties between the two countries.
Economic Linkages
Sri Lanka has been witness to the longest civil war in South Asia. The experience of countries that have
been affected by civil war during the Cold War period suggests that domestic conflicts have a very
destructive impact on economic development. However, Sri Lanka appears to be an anomaly in this
regard. The average annual growth rate during the civil war (1983-2009) was about 4.86% (World Bank
2012). Since its independence, Sri Lanka has achieved remarkable success on most human development
indices. Successive governments have wisely invested in education and healthcare (Pradhan 2001).
Today, Sri Lanka has a better record in human development than its larger neighbor India. The civil war
did not appear to have a substantial impact on the economy. Trade with the international community has
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expanded in recent times. India and Sri Lanka have seen a substantial increase in bilateral commercial
relations over the past two decades. The civil war did not hamper growth of trade ties between the two
countries.
Trade between the two countries can be traced back to ancient times. During the colonial period, British
India and Ceylon traded with each other but the nature of trade revolved around the requirements of
Empire and the needs of the colonial power (Weerakoon and Thennakoon 2006). After independence,
both India and Sri Lanka adopted inward-looking economic policies. Both countries engaged in limited
trade with each other. Like many other post-colonial countries, India and Sri Lanka wanted to achieve a
degree of self-reliance. Socialist policies were implemented and the government was to play a major role
in the management of the economy. The public sector would be the engine of growth. Through the use of
import-substitution industrialization (ISI) strategies the two countries hoped to develop their economies.
However, economic growth stalled by the mid-1970s. The limitations of ISI forced a rethink among the
Sri Lankan elite regarding their autarkic economic policies. In 1977, under the leadership of Jayewardene,
Sri Lanka became the first country in South Asia to embark on the path of economic liberalization. The
economic liberalization policies included opening up to foreign trade and investment, deregulation,
privatization, reduction in currency controls and tax reforms. India was not entirely happy with the reorientation of the Sri Lankan economy. Sri Lanka’s greater economic engagement with the rest of the
world was deemed a threat to India’s interests in South Asia. Although the economic policies it adopted
resulted in lower domestic and foreign investment and limited trade with the West, India still persisted
with ISI.
Sri Lanka’s move towards an outward-oriented economy also created other problems for India. During
the 1980s, there was a marked reduction in bilateral trade. Indian goods were less competitive compared
to goods imported from the Far-East and South-East Asia. Also, Sri Lanka began to look to the West as
markets for its exports (Weerakoon and Thennakoon 2006). The weakening economic links between the
two countries during the 1980s contributed to the strain in political relations as well. Economic ties are
therefore an important element in India’s relations with its neighbors. India could not leverage economic
ties to persuade the Sri Lankan government to halt military operations in Jaffna Peninsula in 1987. The
Sri Lankan establishment believed that its links with countries outside the region would provide the
country some protection from Indian hegemony. Under the circumstances, India had to resort to coercion
(violate Sri Lanka’s airspace) in order to convince Sri Lanka to halt the offensive.
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India began its own economic liberalization program during the early-1990s. Trade between the two
countries slowly began to pick up. In 1994, the countries of South Asia signed the South Asian
Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) to promote trade and economic cooperation in the region.
However, the Sri Lankan business community was frustrated with the slow progress on implementing
SAPTA measures. This was primarily due to the acrimonious relations between India and Pakistan and
fear among some of the smaller regional countries that trade with India may destroy their economies. The
Sri Lankan government and business community believed that there was scope for expansion of exports
to India, beyond what was envisaged in SAPTA (Harilal and Joseph 1999). As a result, the two countries
signed a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) in December 1998. The FTA was implemented in March
2000.
The FTA was meant to provide duty-free and duty-preferential access to goods produced in two countries.
Import tariffs would be gradually eliminated over a period of eight years. India and Sri Lanka would both
maintain negative lists to protect certain sensitive domestic industries. India had 429 items on the negative
list, while Sri Lanka had 1180 items on its negative list. Each country would extend
concessions/preferences to all other commodities. The FTA also articulated the Rules of Origin (ROO)
content to ensure a minimum local content in goods being imported by a country. This was to avoid the
prospect of third-party goods being imported through each other’s territory. However, the terms for Sri
Lanka were liberal. Only 35% local content was sufficient (reduced to 25% if Indian content). There were
also safety clauses that would protect certain domestic industries, especially the agricultural industry.
Also, India agreed to relax tariffs on Sri Lanka’s major exports like textile items, tea and ready-made
garments.
India-Sri Lanka trade has grown in recent times (See Table 1). Both countries have benefitted from the
FTA. India faces less competition from other countries in exporting to Sri Lanka due to its duty-free and
duty-preferential access. India also hopes to demonstrate to the other countries of South Asia that
economic linkages represent the basis for a strong relationship and it is possible for smaller countries to
trade with India. At the same time, Sri Lanka benefits from its trade and association with the larger
economy of India. Sri Lanka was able to export a number of products to the hitherto protected Indian
market (Harilal and Joseph 1999). A number of Sri Lankan companies have successfully entered the
Indian market. These companies sell industrial and commercial products like tea, biscuits, furniture,
footwear, machinery, herbal products, etc.
14
Table 1: India-Sri Lanka Trade Statistics, 2006-2011 (in US$ million)
S. no.
Year
Indian exports Indian
to Sri Lanka
Total trade
India’s trade
imports from
balance
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
1.
2006-07
2,258.3
470.33
2,728.63
+1787.96
2.
2007-08
2,830.43
634.96
3,465.39
+2,195.47
3.
2008-09
2,425.92
356.57
2,782.49
+2,069.35
4.
2009-10
2,188.01
392.19
2,580.2
+1,795.81
5.
2010-11
4,039.90
501.73
4,541.62
+3,538.17
with
Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, 2012
Most of the trade between the two countries has been in goods and not services. The bulk of India’s
exports to Sri Lanka include petroleum products and transport equipment, while India imports tea, coffee,
edible oil, spices and electrical machinery. India has emerged as one of the most important trading partner
of Sri Lanka. It is the largest importer to Sri Lanka and among the top export destinations for Sri Lankan
products. The trade pattern in goods has also changed since the signing of the FTA. Prior to the 1990s,
agricultural products, food and beverages, cotton, machinery, etc. were the main Indian imports into Sri
Lanka. In recent times, motor vehicles parts, mineral fuel, pharmaceutical and cement are the major
imports. In 2010, India was Sri Lanka’s largest trading partner. It was the fourth largest export
destination, constituting 5.5% of Sri Lanka’s total exports (Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2012). It is the
largest importer of goods to Sri Lanka, constituting 19.1% of the latter’s total imports.
The success of the FTA has encouraged the two countries to negotiate a Comprehensive Economic
Partnership Agreement (CEPA) to further boost trade in services and investment (Muralidhar Reddy
2008). Preliminary discussions between the two countries involve reducing the number of items on the
negative list. India has offered to reduce the number of items on its negative list from 429 to 315, while
Sri Lanka has offered to reduce the number of items on its negative list from 1180 to 1148. More sectors
of the economy will be opened up for trade. The ROO criteria will be further relaxed. India will also
remove non-tariff barriers (NTBs) like port restrictions, sales tax, laboratory testing, certification and
phytosanitary regulations. There have been concerns expressed by some sections of the business
community in Sri Lanka regarding the CEPA, which has slowed the progress of talks. Trade in services
15
and liberalization of investment regulations may harm some domestic sectors and companies. However, it
is expected that these concerns will be addressed in the near future and the CEPA will be signed soon.
Expansion of bilateral trade has also facilitated Indian investment in Sri Lanka. In 2010, India was the
largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) to Sri Lanka with $110 million (Central Bank of Sri
Lanka 2011). Indian investors are eager to utilize Sri Lanka’s preferential duty access to Indian markets.
India has emerged as one of the largest investors in Sri Lanka. Major investments are concentrated in the
steel, cement, tourism and tourism-related infrastructure, information technology, telecom, textiles and
garments, food products, rubber products, financial services and retail petroleum sectors. Majority of
investment is in the services sector in Sri Lanka (Kelegama and Mukherji 2007).
Indian companies like Indian Oil Corporation (through its Sri Lankan subsidiary Lanka Indian Oil
Corporation), Apollo Hospitals, TATA group, CEAT, State Bank of India (SBI) and ICICI have a strong
presence in Sri Lanka. More than 50% of Indian investments in South Asia are in Sri Lanka. Many of
these companies make products in Sri Lanka which are then exported to India. Sri Lanka has emerged as
both a destination for Indian products as well as a manufacturing center for Indian companies. In the ten
years since the signing of the FTA, both bilateral trade and Indian investment in Sri Lanka have increased
substantially (Daniel 2010). It is expected that the CEPA will further boost bilateral trade and Indian
investment in the services sector of Sri Lanka.
In the post-civil war period, India has provided development assistance to Sri Lanka (Weerakoon and
Thennakoon 2006). The assistance includes infrastructure projects and humanitarian assistance. India has
provided development credit for rail infrastructure in Sri Lanka. It is also undertaking the development of
Kankesanthurai harbor and Jaffna airport, both in northern Sri Lanka. Improving electricity connectivity
between the north and the rest of the country is another important project. It is also involved in small
projects related to education, health and transport connectivity. On the humanitarian side, it has provided
$110 million worth of family relief packs, emergency medical units, medicines, material to construct
temporary housing for displaced persons, tractors and other machinery, agricultural implements and seeds
and financing de-mining teams to help rebuild the north and east, which have been devastated by the civil
war. It has also expanded the number of educational scholarships to Sri Lankan students to study in
Indian colleges and universities.
Tourism in Sri Lanka has received a huge boost as a result of closer ties between the two countries
(Kelegama and Mukherji 2007). In 2011, Sri Lanka recorded its highest ever tourist arrivals of 855,975,
an increase of over 30% compared to the previous year (Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2011). The largest
16
number of these arrivals was from India (171,374). The economic rise of India has led to the growth of a
large middle class with disposable incomes, contributing to these high numbers. The decision of Sri
Lanka to grant ‘visa-on-arrival’ to Indian tourists and a bilateral agreement to increase the number of
flights from Indian cities to Sri Lanka has made it easier for Indians to travel Sri Lanka. The greater
number of tourist arrivals has necessitated development of the tourism-related infrastructure. This has
brought Indian investment in the hospitality sector and created jobs for locals.
One of the few problems in the economic relationship involves the dispute over fishing by Indian trawlers
in Sri Lankan northern waters. Over time, fishing stocks in the Indian territorial waters have become
depleted, forcing Indian fishermen to venture deeper into Sri Lankan waters. In the past, the Sri Lankan
navy and coast guard did not assert its rights to territorial waters. It was primarily concerned with tracking
LTTE attack boats and supply ships rather than arresting Indians who had inadvertently crossed into its
territorial waters to fish. Also, not many ships ventured out into these waters for fear of being attacked by
LTTE attack boats. Sri Lankan fishing stocks are now under threat, forcing the Sri Lankan authorities and
fishermen to pay more attention to the problem. In addition, the Sri Lankan government is keen to ensure
that there is no resurgence of violence in the north and therefore carrying out intensive patrolling to
interdict any LTTE vessels that may be carrying supplies to Jaffna peninsula.
The intensive patrolling has posed problems for Indian fishermen. Mechanical failures or weather-related
problems can sometimes take them accidently across into Sri Lankan territorial waters. There have been
several instances of Indian fishermen being arrested by the Sri Lankan coast guard and naval authorities,
including some instances of firing that has resulted in injuries and deaths. Most of the casualties happen
to be from the state of Tamil Nadu across the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay. This has become an emotive
issue for Tamil Nadu and the state government has asked the central government to demand a stop to such
attacks. In response, both countries have established a Joint Working Group (JWG) on Fisheries to sort
out the matter (Radhakrishnan 2011). Solutions include coordinated patrolling, installing GPS devices on
fishing boats and talks between fishermen of the two countries. Good relations between the two countries
have opened up the possibility to address thorny issues through diplomacy.
Despite the economy’s steady growth during the civil war, the conflict did create problems for Sri
Lanka’s economy. Lower investment, disruptions in trade and commerce and lower revenues from
tourism were observed during the civil war period (Pradhan 2001). The militarization of the economy was
inevitable. However, since the end of the war, even these challenges are no longer obstacles to Sri
Lanka’s economic development. India is in a position to benefit from the improvement and re-orientation
17
of the Sri Lankan economy. Trade, investment and economic assistance to Sri Lanka are the backbone of
the developing relationship.
Indo-Sri Lankan bilateral economic ties represent an excellent model of how a larger country can develop
a productive relationship with a smaller country. Regional integration in South Asia has been hampered
by territorial disputes and insecurity about India’s intentions and actions. The bilateral relationship
between India and Sri Lanka was not immune to such problems. However, the two countries have shown
that it is possible to push aside contentious bilateral issues and work towards building a strong economic
partnership. This in turn helps the two countries better understand each other’s concerns, fears and
vulnerabilities. The ‘trust deficit’ is reduced and it is possible to address issues like the firing on Indian
fishermen through talks, instead of passionate outbursts.
It is no surprise that a downturn in bilateral relations accompanied weak economic relations between the
two countries during the 1980s. President Jayewardene felt he could ignore India’s calls for halt in
military operations in 1987 because a downturn in relations would not have a significant impact on Sri
Lanka’s economy. Contrast this with India’s vote in favor of a US-sponsored resolution at the UN Human
Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva, which called for Sri Lanka to investigate allegations of human
rights abuses and war crimes during the last days of the civil war. Even though Sri Lanka railed against
the West accusing it of interference in its internal affairs, its criticism of India was muted. It was clear that
the Rajapakse government did not want to alienate an important economic partner like India. Today, even
Sinhalese nationalists who were up in arms against Indian intervention in 1987 welcome India’s
involvement in Sri Lanka. India’s prompt assistance to Sri Lanka during the 2004 Asian Tsunami also
earned it the goodwill of the people. The perception of India as ‘big brother’ insensitive to Sri Lanka’s
concerns is slowly disappearing. Economic linkages have contributed to the transformation of bilateral
ties.
Political Transition4
Fareed Zakaria (2007) has argued that democracies around the world may be classified according to
‘liberal’ or ‘illiberal’. He argues that democracy involves both the process of selection of government by
the people and the tradition that seeks to protect the individual and/or minority groups from coercion by
state, church or society. Illiberal democracies lack the latter quality. They are characterized by strong
(elected) rulers, weak political parties, weak system of checks and balances and arbitrary use of power. It
is a system in which the forces of communism, fascism, nationalism, religion and ethnicity threaten
liberalism and use the democratic process to attain political power. The introduction of democracy in
18
divided societies with intense ethnic preferences forments conflicts because it is easy to mobilize people
on the basis of identity, particularly because there is space available for indulging in this kind of mass
politics.
As mentioned before, Sri Lanka has a long tradition of civilian rule and representative democracy.
However, Sri Lanka is not a model democracy. In fact, it is more accurate to use the term ‘illiberal
democracy’ to describe the political system of the country. The high degree of centralization of power,
executive dominance, state repression, long-standing deprivation of the country’s Tamil minority and
systematic intimidation of opposition parties, ordinary citizens and media persons have posed questions
about the quality of democracy in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka has faltered in the task of state-building and
nation-building because of a lack of unifying national identity. The unequal treatment of Tamils in the
allocation of government resources and dominance of the government, bureaucracy and military by the
Sinhalese has alienated the minority community (Embree 1997).
The classification of Sinhalese as the ‘permanent majority’ and Tamils as the ‘permanent minority’ has
polarized the country along ethnic lines. Discrimination on the basis of religion and language and weak
redressal mechanism for grievances has worsened the problem. The legitimacy of the state in diverse
societies depends upon its ability to accommodate this diversity by building a multi-layered identity for
its citizens (Sabhlok 2002). The goal is to link the citizens of diverse groups with each other as well as
link citizens with the state. However, the state in Sri Lanka has been fashioned by the interests and
preferences of the majority group, without due consideration to minority groups. The imposition of a
unitary Sri Lankan nationhood (based on Sinhalese aspirations and identity) has encouraged Tamil
mobilization, which in turn has contributed to ethnic conflict.
The orderly transfer of power without any violence and the adoption of democracy provided little
indication that the country would be engulfed by civil war within a few decades. However, the limited
constitutional safeguards for minority rights and the creation of a unitary and centralized state sowed the
seeds of future conflict. The emergence of Sinhalese nationalism, supported by the masses and the
Buddhist clergy during the 1950s contributed to insecurity among the Tamils.
Adeney and Wyatt (2004) have claimed that if dominant groups create a political system in which all
groups have the opportunity of effective representation then the process of democratic consolidation is
easier. It is the responsibility of political parties to integrate the population by cutting across social
cleavages. Unfortunately, this has not happened in Sri Lanka. In fact, far from articulating a unified
19
national ideology the two major political parties of the country, the UNP and SLFP, have competed with
each other to prove to the electorate that they are the party capable of protecting the Sri Lankan nation
(and Sinhalese-Buddhist interests).
A majoritarian, exclusionary system has been perpetuated. There is consensus within the majority
community regarding the identity of the state and no substantive guarantees are provided to the minority
community (Imtiyaz and Stavis 2008). Political institutions have failed to fulfill their basic functions, i.e.,
encourage trust between groups and allow for effective representation of interests of different groups
within society (DeVotta 2005). The majority community has usually disregarded minority interests and
grievances. This is contrary to the arguments of democratic theorists that all stake-holders (including
minorities) must be involved in the decision-making process before decisions become binding on them
(Dahl 1989; Dryzek 1996; Young 2000). Even when the representatives of the majority community have
promised to address the grievances of the Tamil community, they have backed down due to opposition
from within the more militant sections of their own constituency.
In addition, the electoral rules have also contributed to ethnic polarization. First, the proportional
representation electoral system prevents any one party from emerging with a majority in Parliament.
Fringe parties can play the role of ‘kingmaker’ in Sri Lanka through their support to one of the two larger
parties within a coalition government. Ultra-nationalist and pro-Buddhist parties, who opposed any kind
of concession to Tamils, play an important role in government formation. It is no surprise that under these
circumstances, the larger political parties are not interested in antagonizing these groups for fear of losing
power. Second, in the national elections, people choose not only a party but also candidates. Individual
candidates from the same party sometimes run against each other. In order to set themselves apart, each
candidate attempts to project a more hawkish stance on the question of Tamil rights. An environment of
intense ethnic polarization provides incentives for politicians to engage in ‘ethnic outbidding’ (DeVotta
2005).
During the long civil war within the country, the state imposed draconian laws to maintain public order.
The colonial-era Public Security Ordinance and the Prevention of Terrorism Act (1978) provided security
forces with broad powers to search, arrest, and detain suspects (Wedagedara 2011). The liberal use of
these laws has tarnished Sri Lanka’s human rights record. They have been used not only against Tamil
militants, but also suspected Tamil sympathizers, ordinary citizens (both Tamils and Sinhalese), media
persons and opposition members. The declaration of a state of emergency in Sri Lanka in 1971 further
eroded civil rights within the country. Although, the state of emergency was finally withdrawn in
20
September 2011, some of the emergency laws continue to be in force. Emergency laws have been retained
and used to control/suppress political dissent. The recent attacks against protesting trade union workers
and media personnel, allegedly by individuals connected to the regime, point to a disturbing trend. There
have been several abductions and killings of opposition members and ordinary civilians since Rajapakse
took over power (Kaplan 2010: 204-205). As such, Sri Lanka has seen the development of a weak
democracy.
Since the end of the civil war, there were hopes that the Rajapakse government would take steps to
strengthen democracy within the country and initiate the process of national reconciliation by addressing
historical Tamil grievances. However, there appears to be a drift towards greater authoritarianism in Sri
Lanka instead of greater liberalization (Goodhand 2012). Rajapakse’s government has embarked on a
program of political centralization and regime consolidation in Sri Lanka. Rajapakse’s SLFP-led United
People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) government has an almost two-thirds majority in Parliament. In
September 2010, it was able to pass the eighteenth amendment to the Constitution in Parliament, which
removed the sentence that mentioned term limits for the President. It also proposed the appointment of a
parliamentary council that would decide the appointment of independent posts like commissioners of
election, human rights, and Supreme Court judges. This parliamentary council would work under the
direction of the President giving him power over appointment of such officials.This ongoing process of
centralization of power has been deemed necessary to address the enormous challenges associated with
economic reconstruction and national reconciliation.
The Rajapakse government believes that the roots of Tamil alienation lie in the absence of economic
opportunities for young Tamils living in the north and east. In their opinion, the Tamil Tigers were
terrorists and bandits, masquerading as freedom fighters. The Tamil question is an economic issue not a
political problem. As such, the government has begun an economic reconstruction project in the north to
prevent a resurgence of the militancy. It believes that this project will help it gain Tamil support. The
Rajapakse government has made some concessions like conducting elections to choose members of the
provincial council in the demerged Eastern province and the establishment of the Lessons Learnt and
Reconciliation Committee (LLRC), but these measures have been largely limited in effecting political
change within the country.
The eastern provincial council created in 2008 lacks substantive powers, including jurisdiction over law
and order and land rights. Three years after the end of the civil war there is still no provincial council in
the Tamil-majority northern province. The LLRC was established to investigate allegations of human
21
rights violations by security forces and Tamil Tigers during the conflict, especially allegations that the
military engaged in indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas in the final days of the civil war. These
actions were believed to have led to the death of thousands of Tamils who were caught in the crossfire
between the government forces and the Tamil Tigers. The LLRC report blamed the Tamil Tigers for the
deaths of Tamil civilians accusing them of using the latter as human shields, while largely exonerating
government forces. The report angered not only the Tamils but also the international community.
Flush with success derived from the elimination of the Tamil Tigers, Rajapakse is at the height of his
power. A new political dynasty, dominated by President Mahinda Rajapakse and his brothers Gotabhaya
Rajapakse (retired army officer and current defense secretary), Basil Rajapakse (cabinet minister of
economic development) and Chamal Rajapakse (speaker of Parliament), has emerged during the postcivil war period (Dukkipati and Schaffer 2010). The post-war economic boom and the end of the LTTE as
an insurgent organization have led most Sinhalese to turn a blind eye to the curtailment of civil rights
within the country. The majority seems to have accepted that certain repressive measures continue to be
necessary to consolidate the gains made by the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and to prevent the
resurgence of violence within the country. The concentration of power in the hands of the Rajapakse
family, a divided opposition, a fearful media and an apathetic citizenry has meant that any impetus for
change has to come from outside the country.
The slow progress in investigating allegations of deliberate shelling against Tamils during the last days of
the civil war has earned Sri Lanka the ire of the international community. Donor countries have attempted
to put pressure Sri Lanka to address this issue. In March 2012, the UNHRC adopted a US-sponsored
resolution calling on the Sri Lankan government to take follow-up action on the LLRC recommendations
regarding allegations of extra-judicial killings by security forces during the civil war, demilitarize the
north and initiate the process of finding a political settlement to ensure lasting peace in Sri Lanka
(Hariharan 2012). Previously, a UN advisory panel had submitted a report alleging that thousands of
civilians caught in the crossfire perished during the last days of the civil war due to shelling by the Sri
Lankan military. The UNHRC resolution passed with western countries and India supporting it, while
China and Russia opposed it.
The Sri Lankan government reacted strongly to what it called interference in its own affairs. The
government claimed that Sri Lanka had already done quite a lot in terms of investigating human rights
allegations. The government pointed out that it faced huge challenges in the north. The development of
infrastructure, demining of large areas and the rehabilitation and resettlement of around 300,000
22
internally-displaced individuals (IDPs) were the priority (Samarasinghe 2009). The government had
expected that the victory against the Tamil Tigers would be seen as a red letter day in the global war
against terrorism. It felt that it had shown the international community how to wage against terrorism. As
such, it was stung by western criticism of its human rights record. Anger was particularly directed against
the West, while there was praise for China’s support to Sri Lanka.
India’s support for the resolution came as a surprise to many. Some in Sri Lanka felt that domestic
compulsions, i.e., pressure from Tamil Nadu-based political parties, including the government’s coalition
partner the DMK, forced it to vote in favor of resolution (Radhakrishnan 2012). However, the reasons are
not so simple. India wanted to see the demise of the LTTE because it felt that the organization was an
impediment to reconciliation. However, the issue of Tamil security and political rights has always been of
central concern to India (Jain 2010). It has favored the devolution of power to regional units within the
framework of a united Sri Lanka. Unlike the Rajapakse government, India believes that the reconciliation
process should not be delayed in favor of economic reconstruction. It is also not just a domestic problem
of Sri Lanka since more than 100,000 Sri Lankan Tamils, who fled the civil war, continue to live as
refugees in India.
The Indian government had become increasingly frustrated by its failure to persuade the Rajapakse
government to initiate a genuine process of reconciliation (Pattanaik 2012). The vote was a signal to Sri
Lanka that although India understood the challenges that Sri Lanka faced, it would not tolerate
Rajapakse’s efforts to sweep the issue under the carpet. In fact, India’s vote in favor of the resolution was
not just out of concern about human rights violations but based on the belief that such a declaration would
assist the process of reconciliation and facilitate dialogue in Sri Lanka (Sultana 2012). In addition, India
was upset about the fact that despite promising that the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution would
be the basis of national reconciliation, the government had done little to implement it. In fact, Rajapakse
himself was talking about a vague ‘home-grown’ solution to the Tamil question (Dayaratne 2011). The
government appeared to be appeasing ultra-nationalist and religious forces both inside and outside
Parliament. It was not impressed by claims that the SLFP could not achieve a consensus among the
parties in Parliament. The Rajapakse government had also refused to engage in substantive talks with the
Tamil National Alliance (TNA), a coalition of Tamil parties, which India believed was the genuine
representative of Tamil people in Sri Lanka. Finally, the support for the resolution was also meant to
convey India’s displeasure at the slow progress of finalizing the CEPA. Nevertheless, India was able to
successfully modify the language of the resolution so as not to offend Sri Lanka too much. Support to the
resolution was consistent with India’s traditional stand on the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka.
23
Sri Lanka has escaped the fate of countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh, by remaining a representative
democracy even through the darkest days of the civil war. But Sri Lanka shows all the characteristics of
an illiberal democracy. The civil war eroded civil rights and weakened democracy within the country. In
the post-civil war period, India’s engagement with Sri Lanka is necessary in order to arrest the movement
towards authoritarianism in Sri Lanka and another possible downturn in relations. Both the West and
India have a shared interest in seeing peace and stability in Sri Lanka, and by extension the South Asian
region. India has signaled that it would not turn a blind eye to the situation in Sri Lanka and expects that
the government will relax emergency laws and effect genuine national reconciliation in Sri Lanka.
The situation in Sri Lanka appears grim at present. However, there are reasons to be positive about the
prospects of the development of a ‘liberal’ democracy in Sri Lanka. The increasing spotlight on nepotism
and corruption under the Rajapakse government, media scrutiny regarding the government’s human rights
record, western pressure, the end of the civil war, the participation of Tamil parties in national elections,
the break-down of war-time alliance between Sinhalese parties and India’s insistence that national
reconciliation become a priority for the Sri Lankan government are having a positive effect (Uyangoda
2010). The Indian government believes that the end of the civil war represents the best opportunity for Sri
Lanka to not only work towards national reconciliation, but also address the challenges facing democracy
within the country.
In the past, the civil war adversely affected relations between the two countries. Even though there was
some improvement during the 1990s, the scope of the relationship remained limited. Today, bilateral ties
can finally be conducted free from the shadow of the civil war. Both countries are now in a position to
pursue a comprehensive political, economic and security relationship, which was difficult during the civil
war. India wants to see a united, democratic, peaceful and stable Sri Lanka, which is crucial for regional
stability. In pursuit of this objective, India should continue to persuade Sri Lanka to undertake political
liberalization and work towards addressing Tamil grievances.
United States in South Asia
During the Cold War, Sri Lanka was part of the non-aligned world and hence had limited interactions
with the US. It did not loom large in US security calculations. With respect to South Asia, Afghanistan,
Pakistan and India were priority states for the US during the Cold War. However, after economic
liberalization during the late-1970s, Sri Lanka began to cultivate a strong relationship with the West,
including the US. The US soon became an important export destination for its garment products. In 2011,
24
total bilateral trade amounted to $2.4 billion up 13.4% over the previous year (Office of the United States
Trade Representative 2012).
Sri Lanka enjoyed a positive trade balance with the US in 2011 as it exported $2.1 billion worth of goods,
while importing $307 million worth of goods. In order to address the trade deficit, the US government is
in the process of negotiating with the GoSL to reduce the high tariffs on US agricultural products, open
the Sri Lankan market for agricultural biotechnology products, provide transparency in government
procurement and enforce intellectual property rights. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the US
amounted to $130 million in 2010 (Office of the United States Trade Representative 2012). Greater
market access for US companies is expected to lead to higher volumes of investment. The US government
has provided development assistance through USAID and was one of the major contributors to the
international tsunami aid in 2004.
During the civil war, the US refused to supply lethal military weapons to the GoSL because of concerns
regarding its human rights record and the fear that such weapons could cause more civilian casualties
(Mumtaz 2004). In 1997, the US Department of State designated LTTE as a foreign terrorist organization.
Following 9/11, the US and other western countries placed restrictions on the ability of the LTTE to raise
funds through the Tamil diaspora. This factor was crucial in choking off arms and ammunition for the
LTTE leading to its military defeat. Since Sri Lanka’s independence, the US has always supported the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. It wants to see a solution to the ethnic conflict within
the framework of a united Sri Lanka. It has supported the reconstruction process in the island. It has
encouraged the GoSL to take measures to resettle the IDPs of the civil war at the earliest. It has voiced its
support for the process of ethnic reconciliation on the island. The US has also expressed concern about
the continuing Sri Lankan military presence and lack of a functioning provincial council in the north.
In recent times, the alleged human rights violations related to the final stages of the civil war have been of
primary concern for the US (Vaughn 2011). Following the UN advisory panel report in 2011 calling for
investigations into alleged war crimes committed by both the GoSL forces and the Tamil Tigers, the
GoSL established the LLRC. However, the LLRC’s recommendations have yet to be implemented.
Frustrated by the lack of progress on the issue, the US sponsored a resolution in the UNHRC calling upon
the GoSL to implement the recommendations (Schaffer 2012). This action has strained bilateral relations.
Rajapakse’s government suspects that the US wants to divide the island. For Sinhalese nationalists and
Buddhist leaders, the actions of the US feed into the narrative that the majority community in the island is
under siege.
25
Through the UNHRC resolution, western countries have indicated that there can be no reconciliation
without accountability. A few have suggested an independent investigation into the allegations of human
rights violations during the last days of the civil war. In July 2010, the EU suspended preferential
treatment for Sri Lankan imports because the GoSL had yet to properly investigate human rights
violations. The loss of the “Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)-plus” benefits would mean higher
tariffs on imports from Sri Lanka, which are worth about $1.56 billion annually. Sri Lanka’s garment and
fisheries industries would be hurt the most with some tariffs jumping from zero or near zero to as high as
18 percent (Bajaj 2010).
The GoSL believes that economic development, not a political settlement will lead to lasting peace on the
island (Schaffer 2012). It believes that the primary reason for the ethnic conflict is the lack of economic
development in the northern and eastern provinces. Therefore, addressing the economic issues will reduce
alienation among Tamils. Responding to political grievances is subordinate to the larger task of economic
development. The GoSL is also aggrieved by US insistence on addressing the human rights and
reconciliation issues. It believes that the US should be lauding Sri Lanka’s successful prosecution of its
war on terrorism and would project it as a model for other countries. It finds it difficult to understand why
the US would be voicing support for what it believes are pro-Eelam forces within the country. The
Rajapakse government’s belligerence has strained relations with Western countries. Some countries have
called for an independent investigation, but if the government continues to stonewall then there may even
be calls for an international probe. The government cannot afford to be isolated by the international
community, especially the US.
The interests of the US and India coincide to a large degree with regard to Sri Lanka. In recent times, the
US has recognized that India is a major player in South Asia and accepted its hegemony over the region
(except when it comes to Pakistan). It has coordinated with India to achieve its objectives in South Asia,
including Sri Lanka. It is dependent on India’s support to maintain pressure on the GoSL to address
human rights concerns. It has attempted to articulate its concerns utilizing both bilateral and multilateral
forums. Like India, the US has also supported the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka but wants to
see measurable progress in the reconciliation process and greater accountability regarding human rights.
The US wants the GoSL to act with a sense of urgency to deal with the growing problems in the northern
province. It is also concerned about the growing authoritarianism on the island and continuing attacks on
media persons and journalists. It is concerned about the lack of access to individuals settled in
government-run camps and the relatively slow process of their resettlement (Vaughn 2011). For the most
26
part, it has attempted to use quiet diplomacy, instead of public condemnation to encourage the GoSL to
respond to its concerns. The US does not want to seem to be coercing Sri Lanka because this may alienate
the populace. It wants to remain engaged in Sri Lanka and no let any single issue dominate the agenda.
Sri Lanka has already suffered from the loss of the EU ‘GSP-plus’ treatment. It was in danger of losing
the GSP trade benefits provided by US as well due to concerns about worker rights in Sri Lanka.
However, following a review of practices in Sri Lanka in 2012 the Office of US Trade Representative
declared that the government had made noteworthy efforts to address worker rights issues over the past
few years.
Apart from an interest in the human rights accountability, ethnic reconciliation and the resettlement and
reconstruction process in the post-civil war period, the US is drawn to Sri Lanka because of its strategic
location of the island in the Indian Ocean (Mumtaz 2004). Maritime trade routes between Persian Gulf
and South-East Asia pass through Sri Lanka’s Colombo port. A majority of India’s imports from the
Persian Gulf pass through Colombo port. In addition to India, China has also expanded its presence in Sri
Lanka leading both the US and India to adopt a more conciliatory approach to Sri Lanka. The two
countries fear that pushing Sri Lanka too hard on the issue of human rights violations and national
reconciliation would be counter-productive since it would drive the country into the arms of China.
Already, press reports in Sri Lanka have hailed China as a ‘true friend’ of the country for its vote against
the UNHRC resolution (De Alwis 2010).
In recent times, China has emerged as the largest supplier of military weapons and equipment to Sri
Lanka (International Crisis Group 2011). During the civil war, China supplied fighter-aircrafts, air
surveillance radars and anti-aircraft guns to Sri Lanka. When India refused to provide military aid to Sri
Lanka, China stepped in to help Sri Lanka out. The GoSL has more than once expressed its gratitude for
this support, even as India and the US refused to supply lethal weapons and equipment to it. China has
enhanced its profile in Sri Lanka (Jain 2010: 149). Chinese cover allowed the GoSL to bring the civil war
to a successful conclusion despite western pressure to halt the military offensive. After the civil war
ended, China prevented the UNSC from considering a resolution regarding allegations of human rights
violations by Sri Lankan forces (De Alwis 2010). It strongly opposed the UNHRC resolution in March
2012. China has provided development assistance to the island country in terms of grants and loans. In
2009, China emerged as the largest aid donor to Sri Lanka. It is an important trading partner and lender
for Sri Lanka. Unlike the West, China did not tie the expansion of commercial relations to progress on
human rights and political settlement.
27
China is engaged in rebuilding the infrastructure of the war-ravaged country. The primary hub of Chinese
activity in Sri Lanka today is Hambantota port located in the south of the island (Das 2010). It is the
closest port to commercial shipping routes between the Persian Gulf and South-East Asia. The Chinese
government has sanctioned over $300 million for the development of the first phase of the project, which
include building oil and gas terminals and berth and terminal facilities. China is believed to be interested
in developing Hambantota port because it would provide refueling and docking facilities for Chinese
merchant ships traveling along the shipping routes (Kaplan 2010: 195).
However, Chinese involvement in this project has raised concerns in India. This project is seen as an
essential element of China’s ‘string of pearls’ strategy that involves the development of ports across the
South-East and South Asian region (Kaplan 2010). The Hambantota project appears similar to other
Chinese port development projects like Gwadar (Pakistan), Chittagong (Bangladesh) and Sittwe and
Kyaukpyu (Myanmar). Some sections of India’s strategic community believe that China is attempting to
‘encircle’ India through these projects and undermine its regional hegemony. Instead of serving as
refueling and docking stations for merchant ships, these ports are expected to be utilized by the Chinese
navy. India is also concerned about the possibility of the Chinese navy gaining access to Trincomalee
harbor on the eastern side of the island. The harbor has been coveted by many foreign navies in the past
because of its large size and all-weather access to all types of ships. Using the harbor as a base, any large
navy could easily project force and monitor maritime traffic throughout the Indian Ocean.
Growing Sri Lanka-China relations has accelerated India’s engagement with Sri Lanka. Fears about being
‘outflanked’ by the Chinese have forced India to pay greater attention to its South Asian neighbor.
However, there is little reason for India to be excessively worried about Chinese influence in Sri Lanka.
In reality, China has a legitimate interest in ensuring the security of its maritime trade routes to the
Persian Gulf (Kaplan 2010). Although Chinese investment, equipment and personnel are helping develop
Hambantota port, once the project is complete there will not be any Chinese presence. India needs to
understand that unlike Afghanistan, Pakistan (through Pakistan-administered Kashmir), Nepal and
Bhutan, Sri Lanka does not share a land border with China. It is thousands of miles away, with no direct
road or rail access. As such, China’s influence on Sri Lanka would therefore be relatively limited
(Hariharan 2012).
Sri Lanka cannot afford to depend solely on China for its needs. India is after all the largest investor and
trade partner. The Sri Lankan tourism sector is dependent on tourists arriving from India in large
numbers. India is also the only neighbor of Sri Lanka. Unlike China, Sri Lanka and India share language,
28
ethnic and cultural ties, beyond commercial ties (Das 2010). In addition, the US and EU are important
trading partners. Since Rajapakse’s government is interested in rebuilding Sri Lanka, support from India
and the Western countries is crucial. It should be understood that China would also not want to unduly
provoke India as its own commercial relations with that country are stronger than ever. China is India’s
largest trading partner and as the relationship grows, it is expected that China will be mindful of India’s
sensitivities regarding its regional interests.
The US is also apprehensive about China’s growing influence in Sri Lanka. At present, the US is in the
process of trying to persuade Sri Lanka to respond to its concerns. It has also declared support for the
growth of a strong democracy in Sri Lanka. For India, US engagement in Sri Lanka serves to keep the
pressure on the Rajapakse government to respond to human rights accountability and national
reconciliation issues. In conjunction with the US, India hopes to persuade the Rajapakse government to
reverse the recent trend of centralization of power in Sri Lanka. It also hopes that US engagement will
help it to maintain influence in Sri Lanka and be a counter-weight to China. It is true that India is to some
degree wary about growing US influence in South Asia, but since the regional interests of the two
countries coincide to a large degree US presence has been welcomed.
Both the US and India can work together to usher in change in Sri Lanka. The US could pressure Sri
Lanka to respond to allegations of human rights violations and initiate a national reconciliation process,
while India can appear supportive and sympathetic to Sri Lanka’s concerns (essentially both countries can
play the ‘good cop/bad cop’ routine). A ‘carrot-and-stick’ approach may help bring about changes in Sri
Lanka. However, both the US and India must take care not to marginalize or isolate Sri Lanka. As
mentioned before, the GoSL could seek Chinese assistance to deflect pressure, but geographic and
political realities will mean that whatever Chinese assistance that comes will be limited in nature.
The US and India should understand that even if they don’t push Sri Lanka, the latter may still pursue
greater engagement with China. As such, both the US and India should support the process of democratic
consolidation in Sri Lanka. There is little possibility of alienating Sri Lanka because the latter would not
want to jeopardize its traditionally close ties with the US and India. The two countries should support the
emergence of a strong civil society in Sri Lanka. The strong state in the country can only be ‘balanced’
through an active civil society that can hold the government accountable. Ethnic reconciliation will be a
slow process but the two countries should insist that Sri Lanka stay the course and not brush the issue
under the carpet.
29
Reversing the process of centralization of power, assisting in reconstruction and rebuilding and initiating
national reconciliation is necessary for India to develop a comprehensive relationship with Sri Lanka. The
recent US involvement in Sri Lanka’s affairs is a positive development for India. It is expected to give a
push to the Rajapakse government to reform. It would also be a hedge against greater Chinese influence
in the South Asia region. Much like US involvement in other countries, its interactions with Sri Lanka are
likely to produce changes within the domestic political system (not just democratic transition) of the
country and assist in the process of re-orientation of India’s ties with its southern neighbor. Greater US
engagement in Sri Lanka serves India’s interests through encouragement of national reconciliation,
support for democratic norms, and controlling Chinese influence. This is expected to contribute to further
growth in bilateral ties between India and Sri Lanka.
Summary and Conclusion
Since ancient times, India and Sri Lanka have shared deep cultural and economic ties. Dravidian culture
and Buddhism spread to the island from India. Two distinct ethnic groups, the Sinhalese and Tamils have
made the island home. Although there are records of historical battles between Sinhalese and Tamil
kingdoms, the relationship between the two groups have been relatively cordial through the centuries.
During the nineteenth century, a strong Buddhist revival movement and Sinhalese nationalism strained
relations between the majority community and the Tamils. After independence, successive Sinhalesedominated governments implemented laws that favored the majority community, while ignoring the
interests of the Tamils. The marginalization and frequent pogroms against Tamils set the stage for the
civil war in Sri Lanka. After thousands of deaths, the twenty-six year-long war finally came to an end in
2009.
Both India and Sri Lanka gained independence from the British around the same time. They inherited
political institutions and democracy from the British. However, the paths of the two countries diverged
significantly during the decades after independence. In Sri Lanka, the Tamils struggled to receive a fair
treatment from the state. India could not remain immune to the events taking place in Sri Lanka. The
political status of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka soon became an issue of concern for India. India’s
acceptance of some plantation Tamils inadvertently set the stage for continuing Indian involvement in the
ethnic conflict on the island. Relations between the two countries were cordial until the late-1970s, when
Sri Lanka began to pursue an economic liberalization program and drew closer to the West.
Around the same time, militant Tamil groups, including the LTTE, began a campaign of violence against
the state. Uneasiness about Sri Lanka’s growing links with extra-regional actors and concerns about the
30
plight of Sri Lanka’s Tamil citizens forced India to intervene in 1987. However, the intervention proved a
failure and strained bilateral relations. Later, India adopted a ‘hands-off’ policy towards the ethnic
conflict on the island. Bilateral trade grew during the first decade of the twenty-first century, but India
refused to supply arms to the Sri Lankan military or mediate in the civil war. India welcomed the end of
the civil war not least because it was happy at the military defeat of the LTTE, which it felt was not
representative of the Tamils and was a stumbling block towards achieving national reconciliation in Sri
Lanka.
The end of the civil war provides both countries an opportunity to reshape ties. There are several reasons
for this. First, there is less fear about the ethnic conflict spilling over into Tamil Nadu. Second, the
military defeat of the LTTE is a victory against international terrorism in the region. Third, India is now
in a position to engage Sri Lanka without the baggage of the civil war. Tamil Nadu-based political parties
can no longer pressure India to restrict ties with Sri Lanka claiming that Indian economic and military
assistance would contribute to more deaths among Sri Lankan Tamils. Fourth, there is greater opportunity
to develop economic ties now. The FTA provides both countries with the framework to enhance trade and
investment links. When the CEPA is finalized, it would help Indian investors gain access to more services
sectors in Sri Lanka. The end of the civil war would also lead to less disruption in trade and create a better
investment climate in Sri Lanka.
Fifth, India can now explore the possibility of defense cooperation with Sri Lanka. The Indian Navy is
particularly interested in gaining access to Trincomalee harbor, but this would only be possible after the
development of strong ties between armed forces of the two countries. This was not possible during the
civil war, again because of opposition from Tamil Nadu-based political parties. Sixth, there is less
opportunity (or need) for Sri Lanka to develop military links and/or alliances with extra-regional actors.
India’s refusal to provide weapons and equipment to the Sri Lankan forces during the civil war forced the
GoSL to look to other states. This was one of the major concerns of India and contributed to the downturn
in bilateral relations. Seventh, the pressure exerted by the US on Sri Lanka regarding human rights
violations and reconciliation serves India well. Together with the US, India is in a position to persuade the
Sri Lankan government to reverse the trend of centralization of power and relax emergency laws. The
strengthening of democratic forces on the island will have a positive impact on bilateral ties. Finally, the
Indian government can finally pressure the GoSL to fully implement the provisions of the thirteenth
amendment, which represents a possible blueprint for securing political and economic rights for the Tamil
minority. In the past, the GoSL could claim that it was engaged in a civil war and any political settlement
would have to wait until the LTTE was defeated. Now that the war is over, the GoSL has no excuse but to
seriously consider the full implementation of the thirteenth amendment.
31
Majoritarian institutions in Sri Lanka have failed to cater to the demands of the minority/opposition
groups within these countries. A ‘winner-takes-all’ system has contributed to a situation where there is
little consensus on issues like national ideology, the nature of the state, economic policy and foreign
relations. In Sri Lanka, majoritarian institutions contributed to ethnic polarization between the majority
Sinhalese and minority Tamils, resulting in violent conflict. Since the 1990s, Sri Lanka has attempted to
build a strong economic relationship with India. This is the result of greater capacity and dynamism of the
Sri Lankan economy. The challenge for India and Sri Lanka is to now craft a bilateral relationship that
builds on the existing economic links. Currently, India-Sri Lanka relations are better than they have ever
been. However, it will require political will on both sides to ensure that bilateral political issues, sidelined
earlier in favor of economic ties, are addressed to mutual satisfaction. If this is the case then it is quite
likely that India-Sri Lanka relations may become a model for India’s relations with other South Asian
countries in the future.
Notes
1
The civil war in Sri Lanka has hampered the process of carrying out census in the Tamil-dominated North and
East. The 2001 census was therefore deemed to have grossly understated the number of Sri Lankan Tamils. As such,
the Government of Sri Lanka revised the Tamil population estimate. They were believed to constitute 18% of the
total population of the island, as reported by the CIA World Factbook (2012).
2
The semi-presidential system includes a president and a prime minister who work together to govern the country.
The President is directly elected by the people. He/she appoints the Prime Minister, who is the leader of the party
with the majority in Parliament, and therefore responsible to the legislature. Sometimes, the President and Prime
Minister may come from different political parties, a situation known as ‘cohabitation’.
3
Gurr (1993, 2000), Horowitz (2000) and Linz and Stepan (1996) have argued that political exclusion of cultural
groups may lead to erosion of democracy and ethnic conflict.
4
Unlike the other smaller countries of South Asia, Sri Lanka has a long tradition of civilian rule and representative
government. There has not been a break in civilian rule since independence. However, with the conclusion of the
civil war Sri Lanka is a country undergoing change. As such, this section is titled ‘political transition’ instead of
‘democratic transition’. Nevertheless, some of the challenges that Sri Lanka’s democracy faces today are not
altogether different from the challenges facing the fledgling democracies of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan and
Nepal.
32
Appendix A
Agreement between the Government of India and the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri
Lanka
Colombo, 29 July 1987
The President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, His Excellency Mr. J.R. Jayawardene,
and the Prime Minister of the Republic of India, His Excellency Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, having met at
Colombo on July 29, 1987.
Attaching utmost importance to nurturing, intensifying and strengthening the traditional friendship of Sri
Lanka and India, and acknowledging the imperative need of resolving the ethnic problem of Sri Lanka,
and the consequent violence, and for the safety, well being, and prosperity of people belonging to all
communities in Sri Lanka.
Have this day entered into the following agreement to fulfill this objective.
IN THIS CONTEXT,
1.1 Desiring to preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka:
1.2 Acknowledging that Sri Lanka is a "multi-ethnic and a multi-lingual plural society" consisting, inter
alia, of Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims (Moors) and Burghers:
1.3 Recognising that each ethnic group has a distinct cultural and linguistic identity which has to be
carefully nurtured:
1.4 Also recognising that the Northern and the Eastern Provinces have been areas of historical habitation
of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples, who have at all times hitherto lived together in this territory
with other ethnic groups:
1.5 Conscious of the necessity of strengthening the forces contributing to the unity, sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, and preserving its character as a multi ethnic, multi lingual and multi
religious plural society in which all citizens can live in equality, safety and harmony, and prosper and
fulfill their aspirations:
2. Resolve that
2.1 Since the government of Sri Lanka proposes to permit adjoining provinces to join to form one
administrative unit and also by a referendum to separate as may be permitted to the Northern and Eastern
Provinces as outlined below:
2.2 During the period, which shall be considered an interim period (i.e. from the date of the elections to
the Provincial Council, as specified in para 2.B to the date of the referendum as specified in para 2.3) the
Northern and Eastern Provinces as now constituted, will form one administrative unit, having one elected
Provincial Council. Such a unit will have one Governor, one Chief Minister and one Board of Ministers.
33
2.3 There will be a referendum on or before 31st of December 1988 to enable the people of the Eastern
Province to decide whether:
A) The Eastern Province should remain linked with the Northern Province as one administrative unit, and
continue to be governed together with the Northern Province as specified in para 2.2 or:
B) The Eastern Province should constitute a separate administrative unit having its own distinct
Provincial Council with a separate Governor, Chief Minister and Board of Ministers
The President may, at his discretion, decide to postpone such a referendum.
2.4 All persons who have been displaced due to ethnic violence or other reasons, will have the right to
vote in such a referendum. Necessary conditions to enable them to return to areas from where they were
displaced will be created.
2.5 The referendum when held will be monitored by a committee headed by the Chief Justice, a member
appointed by the President, nominated by the Government of Sri Lanka, and a member appointed by the
President, nominated by the representatives of the Tamil speaking people of the Eastern Province.
2.6 A simple majority will be sufficient to determine the result of the referendum.
2.7 Meetings and other forms of propaganda, permissible within the laws of the country, will be allowed
before the referendum.
2.8 Elections to Provincial Councils will be held within the next three months, in any event before the
31st December 1987. Indian observers will be invited for elections to the Provincial Council in the North
and East.
2.9 The Emergency will be lifted in the Eastern and Northern Provinces by August 15, 1987. A cessation
of hostilities will come into effect all over the Island within 48 hours of the signing of this Agreement. All
arms presently held by Militant Groups will be surrendered in accordance with an agreed procedure to
authorities to be designated by the government of Sri Lanka.
Consequent to the cessation of hostilities and the surrender of arms by Militant Groups, the Army and
other security personnel will be confined to barracks in camps as on 25th May 1987. The process of
surrendering of arms and the confining of security personnel and moving back to barracks shall be
completed within 72 hours of the cessation of hostilities coming into effect.
2.10 The government of Sri Lanka will utilise for the purpose of law enforcement and maintenance of
security in the Northern and Eastern Provinces the same organisations and mechanisms of government as
are used in the rest of the country.
2.11 The President of Sri Lanka will grant a general amnesty to political and other prisoners now held in
custody under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and other Emergency Laws, and to Combatants, as well as
to those persons accused, charged and/or convicted under these Laws. The government of Sri Lanka will
make special efforts to rehabilitate militant youth with a view to bringing them back into the mainstream
of national life. India will co-operate in the process.
2.12 The government of Sri Lanka will accept and abide by the above provisions and expect all others to
do likewise.
2.13 If the framework for the resolutions is accepted, the government of Sri Lanka will implement the
relevant proposals forthwith.
34
2.14 The government of India will underwrite and guarantee the resolutions, and co-operate in the
implementation of these proposals.
2.15 These proposals are conditional to an acceptance of the proposals negotiated from 4.5.1986 to
19.12.86. Residual matters not finalised during the above negotiations shall be resolved between India
and Sri Lanka within a period of six weeks of signing this Agreement. These proposals are also
conditional to the government of India co-operating directly with the government of Sri Lanka in their
implementation.
2.16 These proposals are also conditional to the government of India taking the following actions if any
Militant Groups operating in Sri Lanka do not accept this framework of proposals for a settlement,
namely,
A) India will take all necessary steps to ensure that Indian territory is not used for activities prejudicial to
the unity, integrity and security of Sri Lanka.
B) The Indian Navy/Coastguard will co-operate with the Sri Lanka Navy in preventing Tamil Militant
activities from affecting Sri Lanka.
C) In the event that the government of Sri Lanka requests the government of India to afford military
assistance to implement these proposals the government of India will co-operate by giving to the
government of Sri Lanka such military assistance as and when requested.
D) The government of India will expedite repatriation from Sri Lanka of Indian citizens to India who are
resident here, concurrently with the repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees from Tamil Nadu.
E) The government of Sri Lanka and India will co-operate in ensuring the physical security and safety of
all communities inhabiting the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
2.17 The government of Sri Lanka shall ensure free, full and fair participation of voters from all
communities in the Northern and Eastern Provinces in electoral processes envisaged in this Agreement.
The government of India will extend full co-operation to the government of Sri Lanka in this regard.
2.18 The official language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala. Tamil and English will also be official
languages.
3. This Agreement and the Annexures thereto shall come into force upon signature
In witness whereof we have set our hands and seals hereunto.
Done in Colombo, Sri Lanka, on this the twenty ninth day of July of the year one thousand nine hundred
and eighty seven, in duplicate, both texts being equally authentic.
Junius Richard Jayawardene, President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka Rajiv Gandhi,
Prime Minister of the Republic of India
Source: Tamilnation.org
Annexure to the 1987 India-Sri Lanka Agreement
1. His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India agree that the referendum
mentioned in paragraph 2 and its sub-paragraphs of the Agreement will be observed by a representative of
the Election Commission of India to be invited by His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka.
35
2. Similarly, both Heads of Government agree that the elections to the Provincial Council mentioned in
paragraph 2.8 of the Agreement will be observed and all para military personnel will be withdrawn from
the Eastern and Northern Provinces with a view to creating conditions conducive to fair elections to the
Council.
3. The President, in his discretion, shall absorb such para military forces, which came into being due to
the ethnic violence, into the regular security forces of Sri Lanka.
4. The President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India agree that the Tamil Militants shall
surrender their arms to authorities agreed upon to be designated by the President of Sri Lanka. The
surrender shall take place in the presence of one senior representative each of the Sri Lanka Red Cross
and the India Red Cross.
5. The President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India agree that a Joint Indo Sri Lankan Observer
Group consisting of qualified representatives of the government of Sri Lanka and the government of India
would monitor the cessation of hostilities from 31 July 1987.
6. The President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India also agree that in terms of paragraph 2.14
and paragraph 2.16 (C) of the Agreement, an Indian Peace Keeping Contingent may be invited by the
President of Sri Lanka to guarantee and enforce the cessation of hostilities, if so required.
Source: Tamilnation.org
Appendix B
Exchange of letters between the President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister of India
July 29, 1987
Excellency,
Please refer to your letter dated the 29th of July 1987, which reads as follows:Excellency,
Conscious of the friendship between our two countries stretching over two millennia and more, and
recognising the importance of nurturing this traditional friendship, it is imperative that both Sri Lanka and
India reaffirm the decision not to allow our respective territories to be used for activities prejudicial to
each other's unity, territorial integrity and security.
2. In this spirit, you had, during the course of our discussion, agreed to meet some of India's concerns as
follows:I) Your Excellency and myself will reach an early understanding about the relevance and employment of
foreign military and intelligence personnel with a view to ensuring that such presences will not prejudice
Indo Sri Lanka relations.
II) Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka will not be made available for military use by any country
in a manner prejudicial to India's interests.
36
III) The work of restoring and operating the Trincomalee Oil Tank will be undertaken as a joint operation
between India and Sri Lanka.
IV) Sri Lanka's agreement with foreign broadcasting organisations will be reviewed to ensure that any
facilities set up by them in Sri Lanka are used solely as public broadcasting facilities and not for any
military or intelligence purposes.
3. In the same spirit, India will:
I) Deport all Sri Lankan citizens who are found to be engaging in terrorist activities or advocating
separatism or secessionism.
II) Provide training facilities and military supplies for Sri Lanka security services.
4. India and Sri Lanka have agreed to set up a joint consultative mechanism to continuously review
matters of common concern in the light of the objectives stated in para 1 and specifically to monitor the
implementation of other matters contained in this letter.
5. Kindly confirm, Excellency, that the above correctly sets out the Agreement reached between us.
Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.
Yours sincerely, sgd Rajiv Gandhi
His Excellency,
Mr. J.R. Jayawardene,
President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka,
Colombo.
This is to confirm that the above correctly sets out the understanding reached between us.
Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.
sgd J.R. Jayawardene President.
His Excellency, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of the Republic of India, New Delhi.
Source: Tamilnation.org
37
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