POL 1000 – Lecture 9:
Branches of Government
Sean Clark
Lecturer, Memorial University
Doctoral Fellow, CFPS
Winter Session, 2012
Lecture Arc
 1. Legislatures.
 2. Executives.
 3. Judiciaries.
The Branches of Government
 Govt consists of 3 core functions.
 Legislature: pass laws.
 Aristotle: ‘good laws make good men.’ Locke: ‘wherever laws ends, tyranny begins.’
 Executive: direct affairs of govt.
 A permanent bureaucracy of officials assists them in this.
 Judiciary: interpret laws when disagreements arise.
 Degree of separation btn branches varies by political system.
 US: concerted effort to separate, emphasis on ‘checks & balances.’
 Canada: executive & legislature fused together under PM.
 Result is remarkably different politics, even when otherwise similar.
 Can & US share many cultural values, econ, etc. But face remarkably different
politics.
 Relative strength of branch varies.
 Some branches are relatively powerless (i.e. China’s legislature subservient
to the poliburo) while others tremendously powerful (i.e. US Congress & $).
 Reflects both constitutional design & practice.
 This strength depends on:
 resources at their disposal (particularly $--who controls the purse strings?),
 multiplicity & collegiality of actors, &…
 existence of veto players (those who can derail process themselves).
 How autonomous is branch? Is it appointed? Can another branch overrule it?
Legislatures
 Central task is to produce laws.
 Representatives of public meet to approve or deny proposed legislation.
 Plus, opposition keeps watch over govt (‘scrutiny’).
 Clause-by-clause review is useful: ‘11 Cdn govt forced to concede former Justice Min Irwin
Cotler had useful improvements to legislation (even if originally ignored).
 Perhaps most important job is to keep track of spending. Need to hold govt to account.
 Generally create indp officers of parl to help (i.e. CBO in US or Budget Office in Can).
 Reps need not be elected. Often (i.e. China & Burma) are controlled or even
appointed by the executive, thus are tokens.
 Relative power & autonomy thus vary by regime.
 Either one ‘house’/chamber (unicameral), or two (bicameral).
 Bills usually must pass both upper & lower, though sometimes separate
responsibilities (US: Reps = $, Senate = treaties).
 Today, lower houses tend to be popularly elected, thus supreme (viewed as more legitimate than
generally appointed upper houses).
 Is root of complication of senate reform: elected upper house would, in democ societies,
become an indp centre of power, w its own legitimacy—thus potential for gridlock btn the 2
equal houses (vs previous ability of the lower house to override the upper house).
 Reason for two:

Original: provided check for nobles (i.e. UK’s House of Lords vs Commons).


Sober 2nd thought (less member turnover = more expert scrutineers)
Upper house can represent minority interests (i.e. Cdn Senate by region, not population of Commons).


Ensured the wealthy a say no matter who elected.
Is how got small regions in Can & US to agree to federations.
 Legislators debate the merits of bills, use committees (permanent/’standing’,
ad hoc, or joint) to monitor govt activity, & rep the public interest.
 Follows rules generally from constitution or their own design.
 I.e. US constxn: each house is to draw up own rule (thus each has own—incredibly powerful—
Rules Committee).
Executives
 Executives play two chief roles.
 1. Head of state.
 Titular, ceremonial function.
 Represent & maintain unity in the polity (provides someone to salute to, & to, at
least theoretically, resolve any legislative impasse).
 Elected (i.e. US, Indian, Polish president).
 Directly by people (i.e. US, France, Brazil, & Argentina).
 Indirectly, by the legislature (i.e. India, Germany, & Israel).
 Hereditary (i.e. UK, Dutch, Swedish, Japanese monarchies).
 Self-Selection (i.e. Castro in Cuba, Kagame in Rwanda).
 Conquerors tend to put themselves in charge.
 As move away from direct election, actual power weakens dramatically
(that is, the more ceremonial the role), at least in democracies.
 2. Effective role.
 In charge of implementing legislature’s laws (run day-to-day operations
of govt).
 Supported by cabinet (collection of ministers who run govt departments).
 Roles either held by same person or is split executive.
 Parliamentary system: ceremonial & effective roles separate (i.e. 2
people).
 Presidential: roles fused, thus just 1 person.
Parliamentarism
 Again, a parliamentary executive is split.
 1. Head of State (ceremonial).
 Queen & her rep Gov Gen usually now just for show (though King-Byng ’26 & ’09
Prorogation were exceptions).
 ‘The Queen reigns, though she does not rule.’ Rep-by-pop House of Commons now seen as
supreme (has democ legitimacy).
 Was evolution from king to Senate to Commons (i.e. UK PMs once from House of Lords).
 2. Head of Government (effective/chief executive).
 Selected thru parliamentary process (legislature--not public--directly invests power
to leader; sometimes w special investiture vote).
 Govt is therefore responsible to parliament—must keep its ‘confidence’ (i.e. pass its legislation
in defence, $, & specific ‘confidence motions’).
 Ministers are agents of parliament for advising the crown, dismissable by parliament
when judged necessary. Thus if fail to keep confidence, the govt falls.
 PM in charge of running cabinet. Is ‘prime’ of these cab ministers.
 Parl tradition: after election (/3-5yrs), largest party gets to form govt.
 If lack majority & can’t keep parliament’s confidence, Queen/Gov Gen can ask next
largest party to form, or just dissolve parl.
 Decision generally based on time (i.e. if just few months, not likely to force new election—i.e.
’26: GG Byng invites Meighen to form govt after King fails to keep confidence).
 Threat of dissolution works in reverse as well—PM has power to dissolve parliament—at least
some time after election, thus is risk to everyone (opposition could lose MP job, too).
 Is way of keeping minority govts in line (i.e. Can 2006-2011).
 PM has 'dissolution power’ = BOTH sides forced to get along.
 Can also improve legislative position: i.e. Koizumi ’05: calls election 2 yrs before end, as
his postal reforms stalled. Gets new, more amenable, slate.
Parliamentarism, II
 Ease of maintaining legislature’s confidence depends on
parliament’s composition (assuming can keep party whipped).
 Majority: leading party has 50%+1 seats.
 Minority: leading party has most seats, but not majority (thus has
to convince others to support them).
 Coalition: govt made up of 2 parties who together = 50%+1.
 Member parties get a seat at the cabinet table, by common agreement.
 Virtues:
 Flexibility (nonconfidence = can change PM without election).
 Often will seek new mandates, but ‘caretaker’ govts can last for long (i.e.
Churchill, Brown post Blair).
 Powerful (when have majority, PM commands both legislature &
executive = bills get passed when have majority).
 Vices:
 Centralization = danger (nothing to stop PM).
 Flexibility can = turbulence (hello Italy).
Presidentialism
 Again, presidential executive is fused.
 1. Head of State (ceremonial).
 US president receives 21-gun salutes.
 2. Head of Government (effective, chief executive).
 US president heads up cabinet.
 Is selected directly by the public, for a specific term (popular in
Latin Amer, after US model).
 Thus exists indp of legislature. Can only be impeached (removed) by
leg for egregious behaviour.
 Presidential indp = strength AND weakness.
 Divided govt = tyranny less likely to emerge (usually is central fear, i.e. US in
1780s, Latin Amer in 1820s).
 Bolivar: “elected kings with the name of presidents.”
 Plus, is always a stable govt (president will be there tomorrow; no Italy).
 However, is also possibility of branch-vs-branch logjam (‘legislative gridlock’).
 Separation of exec & leg = little incentive to work together (Pres can’t kick legislators out
of cabinet, can’t threaten new elections, doesn’t control budget = Congress isn’t afraid).
 Presidential vetoes & legislative overrides are costly & time-consuming.
 Hamilton: “It may perhaps be said that the power of preventing bad laws includes
that of preventing good one…But this objection will have little weight w those who
can properly estimate the mischiefs of that inconstancy and mutability in laws.
Judiciaries
 C. Court system is to adjudicate disputes (interpret & apply the law).
 Arbitrates conflicts regarding:
 Constitutionality (new laws agree w fundamental charters?).
 Litigation (when private citizen fight over interpreting contracts).

Courts to decide who is right, & what damages are to be accorded.
 Damages can be simple compensation (i.e. Can) or punitive (i.e. US).
 US ‘Big Tobacco’ settlement: $206bn over 25yrs.
 Criminal Code (sets punishment for those who transgress codes of right & wrong;
parliament’s laws—though executive arrests, prosecutes, & imprisons the guilty).

But up to judges to weight the evidence & apply the penalties.
 Require indp to be effective & just (‘scales of justice’ must be blind).
 Thus justices (generally) given freedom from other branches (i.e. long-tenure, obstacles to
removal, etc).

I.e. US Constxn: cannot reduce pay. Earn for life.
 Alexander Hamilton: is the weakest branch in practice since it controls
neither the sword or the purse.
 Yet have seen increased role in 20th C.
 US & Canadian courts have been particularly active.
 US school desegregation (Brown v Education ’54) & Civil Rights movt in many ways
initiated by Supreme Court.

‘Separate but equal’ deemed not in accordance w Constitution.
 Abortion (Roe v Wade ‘73 & R. v Morgentaler ‘76).
 2011 Insite decision.
 Some, however, worry about this increased activism.
 If many judges are unelected, should they have such power?