Geopolitische
Rahmenbedingungen
Contents
1. Military over-extension
2. Consequences of political change
3. The economic costs of the Eastern Bloc
Military over-extension
• “the power of states may be indexed by
the expansion, contraction, or stability of
state boundaries over long periods of time.
This powers depends on the ability of a
government to concentrate more military
forces at any point within these boundaries
than any rival can bring to bear”
RANDALL COLLINS The Future Decline of the Russian Empire. Weberian
Sociological Theory, Cambridge: CUP, p. 186
Military over-extension
• „Marchland“ and „interior“ States
• A “marchland” state is surrounded by mountains, plains
or water in more than one direction. It is therefore less
vulnerable to attacks.
• An “interior” state faces militarily capable states more
than one side. It is therefore more vulnerable to attacks.
Collins 1986: 187-8
• Russia went from a “marchland” state to an “interior”
state during its historic expansion.
Collins 1986: 195
Military over-extension
• Sino-Soviet Split
• Mao and Kruschev have different ideas about the future direction of
world communism.
• In late 1960‘s the Soviets positioned troops, heavy artillery and
missiles on the Chinese border. Actual fighting breaks out twice in
1969.
• The Soviet Union even broadcast radio messages into China
warning of the nuclear capability.
LORENZ M. LÜTHI (2008), The Sino-Soviet Split, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 340-1
• “the degree of over-extension that exists on several fronts has kept
the Soviet military budget extremely high even in peace time.”
Collins 1986: 200
Military over-extension
• Ethnic Nationalism
• Problems increase when trying to maintain
control of ethnicities that are separated
from the dominating power by another
ethnic group.
Collins 1986: 200
Military over-extension
From Columbia University:
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00maplinks/overview/ethnicmaps/centralasia
_ethnic_PC.jpg
Military over-extension
•
The Afghanistan War
1.
•
Perception Effects
leaders perceived less favourably the usefulness military intervention. Despite
punishments, many soldiers avoided service.
2.
•
Military Effects
Conditions in Afghanistan and the lack of housing and adequate medical care on
their return cause many returning soldiers (Afghantsty) to join protest movements
and groups.
3.
•
Legitimacy Effects
War perceived by many non-Russians as a “Russian War being fought by nonRussians.”
Some leaders in Central Asia speak out against the war and are replaced by
Russians, thus causing violent protests.
•
4.
•
Glasnost Effects
Increasingly independent reporting of events by the press throughout the 1980‘s.
RAFAEL REUVENY and ASEEM PRAKASH (1999). The Afghanistan war and the breakdown of the Soviet
Union. Review of International Studies, 25, p.694
Military over-extension
•
Conclusion
•
“The activation of military crises in any area
opens up vulnerabilities in other areas.”
Collins 1986: 201
•
“[the situation in Poland] fits logically with a
situation in which the Russians are hesitant to
intervene because of expensive commitments
in Afghanistan”
Collins 1986: 201-2
Consequences of political
change
• The Perfect Empire
• Colonies should provide a reliable ally by contributing to the
defence burden and enhancing empires power in the international
system
• Colonies should be cheap to administer but increase economic
stability
• Finally they should be seen by the domestic population as an
asset
VALERIE BUNCE (1985), The Empire Strikes Back: The Evolution of the Eastern Bloc from a
Soviet Asset to a Soviet Liability. International Organization, Vol. 39, No. 1, p. 3.
Consequences of political
change
• Stalin’s control over the colonies
• The Soviet Union had gained control in these countries, through socalled liberation.
• The Soviet Union had the largest role in the creation of the
communist parties in Eastern Europe.
• The Soviet Union demonstrated in 1948 that it was in control of the
leadership selection, and it preferred Moscow-trained communists
• The Soviet Union was the hegemon because it had succeeded in
isolating the area which it dominated from the international system.
Bunce 1985: 6
Consequences of political
change
Eastern Europe‘s remaining an asset to the Soviet Empire
depended on four pre-conditions:
1.
Rapid economic growth in the client states
2.
Continued Soviet control over world communism
3.
Continued abilities of Eastern European parties to
maintain their control
4.
Continuing congruence between the political interests of the
Soviet and East European elites
Bunce 1985: 8-9
Consequences of political
change
• De-Stalinisation
• The end of the personality cult and one
man rule
• The of random mass terror.
• Reconciliation with Josip Tito.
• The acknowledgement of crime committed
under Stalinism.
NORMAN DAVIES (1996), Europe: A History, London: Pimlico, p. 1091.
Consequences of political
change
• Consequences of de-Stalinisation
• The criticism of Stalin and reconciliation
with Tito undermined the authority of many
elites.
• Loosening of authoritarian controls leads
to increased demands for further reforms
Consequences of political
change
• Hungary 1953-56
• 1953: Imre Nagy was installed as Prime Minister, and
was told to pursue a new course. Among the reforms
were to be reduce the brutality of the secret police (ÁHV)
• 1955: Nagy‘s reforms went too far and were seen as a
threat to Soviet ideals. He was replaced by hardliner
Hegedűs.
• 1956: In June in Poznań, Poland a mass strike takes
place. Emboldening those in Hungary angry at Nagy’s
replacement.
CHARLES GATI (2008), Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest and the 1956
Hungarian Revolt, Chicago: Stanford University Press, p. 24-5
Consequences of political
change
• Hungary 1956
• Protesters were not pro-democracy but
nationalists who aimed to imitate Tito’s model of
a nationalist form of socialism.
• The Soviets were pushed out, however when
Nagy stated Hungary’s intention to leave the
Warsaw Pact.
Gati 2008: 3
Consequences of political
change
• Conclusion
• Loosening of constraints on society caused increasing
demands from below.
• Aspects of de-Stalinisation undermined many regimes
and led to social upheaval.
• Such protest movements as those in Hungary, before
that in the DDR (1953), Poznań (1956) and then later in
Prague (1968), took an economic, political and military
toll on the Soviet Union, because of its monopoly on
resources in all of these areas.
Economic costs of the Eastern
Bloc
Eastern Europe‘s remaining an asset to the Soviet Empire
depended on four pre-conditions:
1.
Rapid economic growth in the client states
2.
Continued Soviet control over world communism
3.
Continued abilities of Eastern European parties to
maintain their control
4.
Continuing congruence between the political interests of the
Soviet and East European elites
Bunce 1985: 8-9
Economic costs of the Eastern Bloc
Maintenance of power in Stalinist society
Political power
Strong
economic
perfomance
Control of
economic
resources
High investment and
low consumption
Economic costs of the Eastern Bloc
• Consequences of de-Stalinisation
• East European leaders aware of their strategic
importance to the Soviet Union demanded help
from Moscow in order to ensure stability.
• The Soviet Union began to subsidise products
and materials traded with the Eastern Bloc.
Therefore increasing consumption. This policy
continued throughout the 1960’s.
Bunce 1985: 12
Economic costs of the Eastern Bloc
• Economic slow-down
• Soviet growth hit post-war low of 5% between 1961 and
1965.
This is caused by:
• Costs of having extended aid programs to regimes in
trouble
• Eastern Europe was unable to produce products that the
Soviet Union needed, nor the quality that it required.
Bunce 1985: 15
Economic costs of the Eastern Bloc
• Brezhnev’s economic initiatives
• Clients states were encouraged to implement more
economic plans.
• Client states pressured to specialise, so that the north
would focus on production of consumer goods and
machine tools and the south on raw materials and
agriculture.
• To encourage quality improvements and take some of
the pressure of the Soviet Union, trade conditions with
the west were improved and Eastern Europe was able to
trade in world markets.
Bunce 1985: 15
Economic costs of the Eastern Bloc
• Consequences of Brezhnev’s initiatives
• Specialisation helped to ensure that the countries of Eastern Europe
were too inflexible for the turbulence of world markets
• Eastern European states were unable to keep up with market prices,
therefore running up a trade deficit.
• The technology they needed in order to raise productivity was
unavailable in the Bloc.
• The raw materials and other goods that the Soviet Union were
producing were desired in the world markets, however they had to
supply these goods at artificially low prices to their client states.
Bunce 1985: 33
Economic costs of the Eastern Bloc
Estimated implicit Soviet trade subsidies to Eastern Europe (in million (1982)
US dollars)
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
From: Vanous and Marrese 1982, quoted in Bunce (1986) p.15
Bulgaria
Czech.
DDR
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Economic costs of the Eastern Bloc
Soviet Trade with the West
60
50
40
Imports (billion US$
1982 value)
30
Exports (billion
US$, 1982 value)
20
10
Bunce 1985: 36
19
81
19
80
19
79
19
78
19
77
19
73
19
71
0
Economic costs of the Eastern Bloc
C
on
ia
d
Un
i
ie
t
So
v
R
om
an
la
n
Po
un
g
ar
y
R
H
ak
lo
v
os
ze
ch
Bu
lg
a
Bunce 1985: 43
G
D
ia
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
ria
%
Total Western Debt by End Year 1980 as Percentage
of Hard Currency Export earnings
Economic costs of the Eastern Bloc
The ratio of payments (interest and principal due) to exports of
goods and services earnings in Western interaction
120
100
%
80
Poland
60
Soviet Union
40
20
0
1970
Bunce 1985: 40
1977
1980
Economic costs of the Eastern Bloc
• Polish Crisis
• Edward Gierek replaced Wladyslaw Gomulka in 1970,
promising to build a new Poland based on consultation
and communication, involving a degree of freedom of
speech, and with a modern economy.
• Western credit would be used to buy western technology.
• These reforms were initially very successful.
HELENE SJURSEN (2003), The United States, Western Europe and the Polish
Crisis: International Relations in the Second Cold War, Basingstoke: MacMillan, p. 22
Economic costs of the Eastern Bloc
• Polish Crisis
• 1973 Oil crisis meant that markets for Polish products
dried up.
• However, Poland still required Western products and
thus more credits.
• Gierek kept food prices at 1970 level until 1976, when he
raised average food prices by 60%, provoking protests.
• Under pressure Gierek back-tracked and lowered the
prices again.
Sjursen 2003: 22
Economic costs of the Eastern Bloc
• Polish Crisis
• 1979 global recession made the economic situation for Poland even
worse. Gierek was forced to raise food and energy prices again.
• on 14th of August 1980 the Inter-Factory Strike Committee was setup, and various demands were made of the government, including
freedom of speech, right to strike and the release of political
prisoners.
• The government gave in to almost all of the demands so that on the
31st August the Gdansk agreement was signed.
• In the following month Gierek was ousted.
Sjursen 2003: 28
Economic costs of the Eastern Bloc
• Polish Crisis
• Solidarity trade union came into being in 1981 following Gdansk
Agreement.
• In 1982 martial law was declared and Solidarity outlawed due to the
threat of invasion by the Soviets and there was a brutal repression
of its members.
• The mid-1980’s were characterised by massive shortages in food,
housing and energy which fuelled bitterness against the regime.
• With the introduction of Glasnost and Perestroika the threat of
invasion disappeared. Talks between Solidarity and the government
took place. The result was semi-free elections which ended in
humiliation for the government.
Economic costs of the Eastern Bloc
Maintenance of power in Stalinist society
Political power
Strong
economic
perfomance
Control of
economic
resources
High investment and
low consumption
Economic costs of the Eastern Bloc
Political power
threatened due
to high prices
and worsened
working conditions
Weak
economic
Perfomance
caused by
inflexibility
Control of
economic weakened
as debts need to be
paid
High consumption
allowed in order
to prevent dissent
CONCLUSIONS
• From the death of Stalin until its eventual
collapse, the Soviet Union was being
increasingly stretched. It’s huge size and
powerful enemies meant it was
economically and militarily costly to defend
it’s borders. The increasing political and
economic weakness of the Eastern Bloc
was a drain on Soviet resources and
played a huge role in its eventual collapse.