Combating Terrorism in Irregular Forces: Lessons from Algeria and Sri Lanka
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Contents
The Million Dollar Question………………………………………………………………………2
The Possible Solution……………………………………………………………………………..2
Definitions…………………………………………………………………………………………3
Terrorism………………………………………………………………………………….4
Counter-terrorism…………………………………………………………………………4
Hard Power………………………………………………………………………………..5
Soft Power…………………………………………………………………………………6
Counter-insurgency………………………………………………………………………..6
Research Methodology……………………………………………………………………………7
Literature Review………………………………………………………………………………….9
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE)
Background………………………………………………………………………………12
Terrorist Activity…………………………………………………………………………13
Government Action………………………………………………………………………16
Lessons Learned…………………………………………………………………………19
Front de Libération Nationale (FLN)
Background………………………………………………………………………………21
Terrorist Activity…………………………………………………………………………22
Government Action………………………………………………………………………26
Lessons Learned…………………………………………………………………………31
Policy Implications, Lessons, and Recommendations…………………………………………..32
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………….34
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………..35
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The Million Dollar Question
Today, decision makers are faced with difficulty in addressing irregular forces. These
irregular forces may be anything from an organized terrorist organization to a rebel insurgency to
a violent non-state actor. The U.S. military has dealt with unconventional warfare often in the
past two decades in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In all three theatres, our military was faced
with irregular forces. In Afghanistan and Iraq, these forces utilized terrorism in an attempt to
achieve political goals. Should the military be used to end such threats to national security?
The Possible Solution
The purpose of this project is to examine the utility of a strategy of counter-terrorism
(CT) in achieving a nation’s foreign policy objectives by examining how counter-terror was used
in the Algerian War by the French military against the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and
in Sri Lanka against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE). In Algiers, the French failed
and the FLN prevailed. In Sri Lanka, the Tamil Tigers admitted defeat in 2009. The focus of this
thesis will be to draw out underlying themes in both historical case studies, determine which
objectives were met and which objectives failed. These lessons will be applied back to
contemporary debate on whether or not counter-terrorism is a viable option for a state to exercise
foreign policy and how policy may need to change to deal with future threats.
While CT hard power may be sufficient to check an immediate national security threat,
the following case studies suggest that military action is insufficient to resolve the underlying
causes upon which insurgent movements and terrorist organizations are based. The research
question for this thesis is what CT lessons are learned from historical studies of Sri Lanka and
Algeria? My hypothesis is that CT hard power was effectively used to strain irregular forces, but
not sufficient to ultimately defeat them.
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The Sri Lankan and Algerian cases point to several key similarities in combating
terrorism. For instance, propaganda and media attention proved to be crucial for the victorious
combatant in both conflicts. Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) political leaders desperately
sought international attention to alleviate the pressure being applied to the organization by the
French military. The FLN accomplished this by staging attacks and worker strikes in time to
coincide with UN General Assembly meetings. Likewise, the Sri Lankan government capitalized
on international attention brought about by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE)
assassinations on key Sri Lankan and Indian leaders by isolating LTTE financial assets and safe
havens abroad. Another learning point gained from Sri Lanka and Algeria was the use of
concentrated military might by the government. The LTTE was utterly crushed when the
government applied heavy pressure with determined military offenses which were clearly
designed to destroy the rebels. Similarly, the French army enjoyed much success by employing
mobile hunting teams in rural areas to pursue FLN rebels.
Both cases also illustrate one glaring fact: CT hard power is necessary, but insufficient.
This is not a comprehensive, historical view of CT. However, both case studies do illustrate that
CT hard power is effective at limiting terrorist activities, but CT hard power cannot be applied to
solve political problems that are the root of all insurgencies or terrorist organizations and a
combination of hard and soft power is often the most effective way to end modern conflicts.
Definitions
Several terms must be defined to avoid confusion due to the fact that varying and
contrasting ideas exist on terrorism and counterterrorism. Therefore, the next segment will
describe terrorism, counterterrorism, and irregular forces in context for the case studies. The
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foundations of this essay rely on one’s understanding of exactly what terrorism, counterterrorism (CT), and CT alternatives entail.
Terrorism
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington DC, the
phrase “terrorism” has become a buzzword that evokes an emotional response within the U.S.
The world community has dealt with terrorism before and the American population reached the
same conclusions as the rest of the world: terrorism is politically heated, often effective, and very
deadly. Terrorism is largely considered a dirty method of warfare and those who utilize terror as
a strategy to achieve a political goal are illegitimate brigands. In reality, terrorism is simply a
part of warfare.1 Dr. Bruce Hoffman, the director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism, states
that the US Department of Defense defines terrorism fairly clearly in saying that terrorism is “the
unlawful use of- or threatened use of- force or violence against individuals or property to coerce
or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological
objectives.”2 I will rely on this definition, because it is the most comprehensive description of
terror.
Counter-terrorism (CT)
Several definitions exist on how to classify on CT, but many experts3 can agree that CT
consists of two types of power: hard and soft power. CT utilizes hard and soft power to eliminate
terrorist organizations through negotiations, military action, or economic sanctions. The average
1
John Lynn. Battle: A history of Combat and Culture. Boulder: Westview Press, 2003. Epilogue.
Bruce Hoffman. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. 38.
3
Specifically, Joseph Nye, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and Brigitte L. Nacos
2
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American today would probably classify counter-terrorism as military strikes, but in reality the
hard power capability is a only small part of the total spectrum of CT operations.
Hard Power
Military hard power is the a-typical response when counter-terrorism options are
assessed. Hard power options vary and should be carefully considered when choosing the correct
response to irregular forces (terror organizations, insurgencies, guerrillas, etc.). Military reprisal
attacks can be undertaken when the enemy is in control of a nation-state or significant regions in
a state.4 Military preemption strikes are undertaken to destroy the enemy in advance to avoid an
imminent attack.5 Elite commando units can also be utilized to attack terrorist training grounds
and hunt down terrorists.6 Assassinations, or targeted killings, are attacks carried out to eliminate
leaders of terrorist organizations or irregular forces.7
Nonmilitary hard power is also an option. This consists of economic sanctions imposed
on states that support irregular forces or violent non-state actors. Economic or financial sanctions
are used to strangle irregular forces’ financial assets. This includes prohibiting the exportation or
importation of goods to or from targeted regions, stopping financial and other assistance, and
freezing financial accounts.8
4
Brigitte L. Nacos. Terrorism and Counterterrorism. 4th Edition. 191
Carlotta Gall. “Evidence Points to Civilian Toll in Afghan Raid,” New York Times, September 9, 2008.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/08/world/asia/08afghan.html?_r=1&hp=&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print
6
Nacos, 195.
7
Deborah Sontag, “Israel Acknowledges Hunting Down Arab Militants.” New York Times, December 22, 2000, A12.
8
Nacos, 199.
5
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Soft Power
Soft power is a more subtle alternatives to military or economic hard power options.
Examples of soft power include deterrence, diplomacy, conciliation, and peace.9 Deterrence is
simply dissuading terrorist organizations from action if the government can put the terrorists’
political goals at risk.10 Diplomacy is almost necessary to analyze the views of terror groups.
This involves third party negotiations and helps solve specific terrorist situations.11 Like hard
power, soft power options must be closely examined in order to determine the course of action
most likely to lead to positive results.
Counter-insurgency (COIN)
The most popular alternative to CT is counter-insurgency operations (COIN). COIN is an
approach designed to solve the underlying political, social, and economic problems of an
insurgency by separating the population from insurgent forces, building political infrastructure,
and eliminating insurgent forces (CT). A primary difference between COIN and any form of CT
is the concentration on the population. COIN forces tend to give attention to winning the support
of the population while CT forces usually fixate on the irregular forces using terrorism. David
Galula, a successful French commander in the rural regions of Algeria, notes that population
support is key and it is gained through an active minority siding with the governmental power.12
By this definition, COIN and CT share considerable overlaps, particularly with key COIN
aspects and CT soft power. The problem with COIN is that it is extremely costly and time
9
Nacos, 200-207.
Ibid, 200.
11
Ibid, 201.
12
David Galula. “Counterinsurgency in the Hot Revolutionary War,” Chewing Sand, 2nd Edition. New York: Learning
Solutions. 2008. 213-214.
10
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consuming, often taking years or even decades to bear fruit, all the while draining public
patience and possibly damaging the state’s image in the world community.
Research Methodology
I will use a historical case study as my research methodology to explore the possibilities
of counter-terrorism as a viable foreign policy stance. These case studies will be analyzed in a
historical context including a brief history of the situation, terrorist actions, government (CT)
actions, and the lessons learned each case study. The underlying themes in both case studies will
be underscored and examined in the recommendations section.
As argued by candidate Joe Biden during the 2008 Democratic primary debate, counterterrorism can be a viable method to eliminate terrorism through direct military action against
terrorist organizations. Combating terrorism is an inherently difficult progress, made even more
difficult by a lack of suitable metrics to gauge success and failure that policy makers need to
justify such action. The metrics for the two case studies are based on the definitions of hard and
soft power. Specifically, these case studies analyze whether or not the government troops
ultimately defeated the irregular forces opposing them. The types of questions that need to be
asked are: did the government effectively use soft power to bring the irregular forces to the peace
table? Was hard power effectively used to defeat the armed branches of the irregular forces?
Who did the international community side with? These questions all help illustrate how the
governments of Sri Lanka and France dealt with irregular forces using terrorism.
The two case studies I have chosen are the French in the Algerian War and the Sri
Lankan forces fighting against the LTTE (Tamil Tigers) in Sri Lanka. Both cases have what I
believe to be clear-cut examples of strategic level CT: one successful (Sri Lanka) and one failure
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(Algiers). These cases are interesting because both the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) were unconventional armed forces in pursuit of
political goals. These political aspirations by both the FLN and LTTE were not sought after
exclusively by terrorist strategies, but knowingly used terror to mobilize their respective
populations.
Other cases that I decided not to pursue include Sendero Luminoso in Peru, Chinese
communists in the Chinese civil war, and the Vietcong in Vietnam. The Vietcong utilized terror
to control the population, but the Vietnam War has too much American influence for my
purposes as I wanted case studies with virtually no American footprint. The Chinese civil war
was eliminated simply because I found it to be much more of an insurgency and terror tactics did
not seem to be part of an overall strategy. The Sendero Luminoso model was thrown out because
it is still ongoing. The Peruvian government has come close to destroying Sendero in the mid1990s, but the government has proved inept at ending the conflict in the foreseeable future.
In both cases, the historical background must be described and any outlying factors
unique to the individual case need to be identified. It is also important to note that what worked
in Algiers will not necessarily work in Sri Lanka as each case is uniquely different. The cultural
landscape and political climate all dictate the viability of proposed solutions. The perspective for
this thesis will be that of the CT forces, so any success or failure will be relative to the CT forces.
In Algiers, French forces attempted to quell the violence started by the FLN with force.
In the city itself, the French were tactically successful. Rebel leaders were killed or captured en
masse and the FLN body count was rising. However, tactical success could not be translated to
strategic progress in achieving the French goals of maintaining Algeria as an extension of the
Combating Terrorism in Irregular Forces: Lessons from Algeria and Sri Lanka
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French state in northern Africa. This case will be interesting because CT worked extremely well
on the tactical level (according to Alexander’s framework), but failed to defeat the FLN
politically.
Sri Lanka is a case in which the government ultimately won, forcing the rebels into
submission with a massive military offensive. The infamous Tamil Tigers fought for decades
against the Sri Lankan government, utilizing suicide bombers and assassinations to intimidate
government officials. Of note, the Tamil Tigers only bombed military or political targets and
attempted to avoid civilian casualties when possible.13 This study will help in looking at the
possible reasons for strategic success in thwarting a terror-based insurgency.
Literature Review
The common themes in this essay will be centered on the successful/unsuccessful usage
of CT techniques as well as successful/unsuccessful countermeasures taken by different terror
organizations to combat CT forces. These CT techniques can include targeted killings,
innovative tactics, international coordination, and increasing intelligence gathering assets.
The definitions piece will supply the foundation and focus for the research on both case
studies in order to prevent gaps in the theory of CT. While this is a CT-centered essay, COIN
must also be addressed as an alternate method of achieving similar results. In most situations
dealing with irregular forces, insurgencies, and terrorist organizations the population is divided.
Usually somewhere between 10-20% of the population is active in supporting the irregular force,
60-80% is a passive middle ground, and 10-20% are die hard government supporters. The
difference between CT and COIN is what aspect of the population is addressed. CT focuses on
13
Kledja Mulaj. Violent Non-state Actors in World Politics. New York: Columbia UP, 2010
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limiting the 10-20% of the active population supporting the irregular force through a
combination of hard and soft power. COIN is concentrated on the 60-80% of the passive middle
ground. COIN seeks to alienate the passive middle ground from the active supporters of the
irregular force.
Terror organizations and insurgencies that utilize terror tactics vary from country to
country. However, they can usually be classified by their ruthless acts of violence and dedication
to their particular cause. Oftentimes, as in Sri Lanka, Algiers, and current US operations, these
terror organizations take the form of guerrillas fighting in the frontiers. In Afghanistan, the
Taliban fighters currently engaging US troops are deeply entrenched in their ideals. This is no
different than the FLN fighting for an Algeria free from French occupation or the Tamil Tigers
rising up against the Sinhalese majority for an independent Tamil state. These thoughts and ideas
drove these groups to terrorist tactics, even suicide attacks, to achieve their strategic goals. These
organizations are able to place a huge amount of pressure on the local government. According to
Robert Taber, “Guerrillas who know their trade and have popular support cannot be eliminated
by the means available to most governments. And on the other hand, few governments can stand
the political, psychological, and economic stresses of guerrilla warfare…”14 This is put in this
thesis merely to emphasize the importance of choosing an appropriate strategy that will be
effective at combating irreconcilable zealots.
Common themes of CT operations include, but are not limited to, targeted killings against
cell leadership, intense intelligence gathering operations, direct action raids on strong points, and
reducing the number of terrorist attacks on the government and population. In keeping with the
chosen definition of CT operations for this thesis, all of these themes have the singular purpose
14
Robert Taber. The War of the Flea. London: Paladin. 1970. 14-33.
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of diminishing a terror group’s ability to operate. This is done by both whittling away at
infrastructure and manpower. This is why CT is often referred to as “hard power” due to its
tangible, kinetic nature.15 CT operations are also focused on the group itself rather than the
population within the state.
COIN themes include nation building, population cooperation, and direct action against
military branches of terror cells. COIN operations are focused more on the population in an
attempt to indirectly influence support for an insurgency or terror cell. The main idea of COIN is
to win the support of the population; thereby destroying the insurgency’s recruiting pool. In
theory, this will result in a united stand against the insurgency led by the people.16 In order to
build infrastructure and protect the people from the terror group, the government must conduct
kinetic operations against the insurgency to prevent any massed groupings and disrupt
coordination between cells.
This research falls much closer to the CT side when comparing CT and COIN. CT hard
and soft power are quite different, but used to achieve the same goal of eliminating a terrorist
threat. The LTTE and FLN cases show many striking lessons and will be revealed at the end of
each study.
15
James J. F. Forest. Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives.
Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007. Xvi.
16
David Galula. “Counterinsurgency in the Hot Revolutionary War,” Chewing Sand, 2nd Edition. New York: Learning
Solutions. 2008. 213-214.
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Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
Background
The LTTE, more commonly known as the Tamil Tigers, was a Sri Lankan insurgency
organization that engaged the Sri Lankan government in armed conflict from the early 1970s
until it was militarily defeated in 200917. Velupillai Prabhakaran, the founder of the LTTE, chose
the tiger as the symbol of the resistance because of the similarities between the tiger and the
Tamil people. The LTTE adopted a strategy of terrorism that included suicide bombings,
assassinations, and attacks on military, political, and government targets.18 This eventually led to
condemnation by the world community and the downfall of the LTTE.
Sri Lanka, a small island south of India in the Indian Ocean, was under colonial British
control until February 4, 1948.19 The Tamils received preferential treatment under British rule
although the Sinhalese made up the vast majority of the Sri Lankan population. This obvious
favoritism created an ethnic schism that would manifest itself once the Sinhalese majority took
control after the British departure. In 1956, the ruling Sinhalese majority passed laws that
included forcing Tamils to learn Sinhalese, restrictions on higher education institutions, and civil
service.20 The Tamils believed that these laws were acts of discrimination and in the early 1970s,
violence erupted in the form of Velupillai Prabhakaran. Prabhakaran was a young, idealistic
Tamil who attempted to assassinate a moderate Tamil mayor in Jaffna from February 1971 until
his success in July 1975, which was a marked beginning to Tamil violence in Sri Lanka.21 With
17
18
19
Mulaj, 381.
Ibid, 384.
Alexander, 152.
Alexander, 152.
21
Ibid 153.
20
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his success, Prabhakaran established the LTTE as the militant wing of the Tamil United
Liberation Front (TULF)22 and so began the armed struggle for an independent Tamil state.
Terrorist Activity
While Prabhakaran was engaging in small-scale terror attacks, the Sri Lankan
government sought to negotiate with the Tamils in order to bring an end to the rising levels of
violence. In January 1984, Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene convened the All Party
Conference in the capital of Colombo. Indira Ghandi, then the Indian Prime Minister, was set to
mediate between the ruling United National Party (UNP), Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP),
TULF, and five smaller Tamil political groups.23 This in and of itself sets the LTTE apart from
many other terrorist organizations in that it was a direct part of several peace talks with the Sri
Lankan government.24 The conference resulted in a failure, as the Tamils demanded one-third of
the land and two-thirds of the coastline of Sri Lanka for itself which the government promptly
refused.25
During the actual conference, the LTTE began a massive and unfortunate wave of ethniccleansing against Sinhalese farmers in the rural northern regions of Sri Lanka. On November 30,
1984 the Tigers attacked two Sinhalese farming villages (the Dollar and Kent farms) killing more
than one hundred civilians while they slept.26 These villages were in the areas desired by the
Tamils for demarcation and marked the first regular attack on a Sinhalese community. The Sri
Lankan government vowed vengeance after the LTTE shot and killed one hundred twenty
22
The TULF was, at the time, the political party which represented the Tamil people in Colombo’s political
structure.
23
Alexander, 154.
24
Mulaj, 386.
25
Alexander, 153.
26
Ibid, 155
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Sinhalese Buddhist pilgrims and injured eighty-five others in the May 14, 1985 attack on the
sacred precincts of the Sri Maha Bodhi in Anuradhapura.27 The purpose of these terrorist attacks,
and later suicide attacks, was to cause panic and chaos among civilians and also to confirm “the
inefficacy of the administration, demoralize law enforcers, and boost morale among the Tigers
and their followers.”28
For the next fourteen years, the LTTE carried out their violent terror campaign by
murdering government ministers, local politicians, and moderate Tamil leaders.29 The LTTE
attacked naval vessels, oil tankers, the Colombo airport, the Colombo World Trade Center and
Central Bank, the Sri Lankan Joint Operations Command, and even the most sacred Sri Lankan
Buddhist shrine.30 Perhaps the most controversial tactic employed by the LTTE was the
invention of the suicide belt and introducing women as suicide bombers.31 While the statistics on
the number of suicide attacks vary depending on the source, there were somewhere between 143
and 191 suicide attacks from 1987 to 200132. The Sri Lankan president was assassinated by a
Black Tiger suicide squad in 199333 and the Tigers were even successful in assassinating former
Indian Prime Minister Rajiz Ghandi in 1991.34
The LTTE struggle can be broken down into several phases. The first phase (1983-1987)
consisted of six insurgent groups that utilized terror tactics and the Sri Lankan military35. During
this time, the LTTE trained cadres, gathered weapons and equipment, established means of
27
Ibid, 155
Senadhira Sugeeswara. “Suicide Bombings: The Case of Sri Lanka,” in Security and Terrorism: Suicide Bombing
Operations, Vol. 5, 2007, p. 34.
29
Ibid, 36.
30
Mulaj, 384.
31
FBI-Taming the Tamil Tigers. http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/january/tamil_tigers011008
32
Mulaj, 385.
33
Ibid 405
34
Alexander, 160-162.
35
Mulaj, 402
28
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income through expatriates, and made valuable ties with the Indian government.36 During the
second phase (1987-1990) the LTTE shifted its focus from building infrastructure and support to
an offensive organization. The 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Agreement brought 70,000 Indian
peacekeepers to Sri Lanka to combat the LTTE through counterinsurgency operations, which the
LTTE vowed to defeat.37 By the time of the Indian withdrawal, nearly 10,000 LTTE fighters
were mobilized and established control over the north and east of Sri Lanka as a result of the
Indian departure.38 The third phase (1990-1995) brought about the assassination of Rajiv Ghandi,
the former Indian Prime Minister, by a suicide bomber. This led to an Indian ban on the LTTE
and labeled it as a terrorist organization.39 Later, in 1993, the Sri Lankan president was
assassinated by a Black Tiger suicide squad.40 From 1995 to 2002, the LTTE boosted its military
campaign by dedicating itself to guerrilla warfare during the fourth phase of armed conflict, once
again supplemented with terror attacks on military and government assets. From 2002 until 2008,
the LTTE called for and broke several cease fires in order to buy time and space from the
government onslaught set at ending the war through military means. However, in 2008 the Sri
Lankan government officially denounced the Cease-fire Agreement and utterly defeated the
LTTE through an extended military campaign in the north.41 This campaign resulted in 4,318
LTTE cadres killed after 1 January 2008 which was drastically more than the 3,345 cadres killed
36
Ibid 402-403.
Ibid 403; See also “Statistics on civilians affected by war from 1974-2004.” (PDF). NorthEast Secretariat On
Human Rights (NESOHR). January 2006.
38
Ibid 405
39
Ibid 405; See also “Suicide terrorism: a global threat.” Jane’s Information Group. 20 October 2000.
40
Ibid 405
41
Ibid 408
37
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in all of 2007 and the 2,319 fatalities in 2006.42 On 17 May 2009, what was left of the LTTE
surrendered to the Sri Lankan Army in Vellamullaivaikkal.43
Government Action
The Sri Lankan government undertook several different methods in order to halt the
conflict with the LTTE. Various presidential administrations attempted numerous techniques
ranging from political negotiations to cease-fire agreements to direct military action against
LTTE strongholds.
With mounting tensions, sparked by communal uprisings in Tamil neighborhoods, the Sri
Lankan government called for the All Party Conference (APC) in Colombo in January 1984.44
The APC considered several proposals that were centered on appeasing both the Sri Lankan
government and the Tamil minority. The proposals centered on creating separate regional
councils in the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka, which were populated primarily by
Tamils.45 The government was willing to grant autonomy to the country’s districts by creating
district councils at the local governmental level.46 Ultimately, the Tamil delegates rejected these
suggestions of the APC because the eastern and northern provinces were separated.47 This
separation between the north and east was important because it would weaken Tamil power in
the central government of Colombo. Plans to resume the talks in 1985 were made, but never
carried out due to a genocidal campaign executed by the LTTE against Sinhalese civilians in late
42
Ajit Kumar Singh, “Locked in Carnage,” South Asia Intelligence Review, 49, 16 June 2008, p. 3.
Emily Wax, “Sri Lankan rebels admit defeat, vow to drop guns,” Washington Post, 18 May 2009.
44
Counterterrorism strategies, p. 154
45
Ibid, 154.
46
Ibid
47
Ibid
43
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1984.48 As a result of the failed APC and the ethnic cleansing, Colombo escalated its kinetic
strikes against the LTTE and sought foreign aid from pro-Western states including Israel49, South
Korea, and others in Southeast Asian.50
Peace talks again resumed in July and August 1985, again with Indian mediators but this
time held in Thimpu, Bhutan. These negotiations were conducted directly with Colombo and the
LTTE, but to no avail when the LTTE and TULF leaders walked out of the meeting.51
Negotiations continued to fail when the TULF put forward a set of proposals on January 30,
1986.
In January 1987, the Sri Lanka government placed an embargo on northern and eastern
provinces. This embargo prevented the transport of fuel, food, and other essentials coupled with
an escalation of attacks by Sri Lankan security forces in LTTE-held northern and eastern
sectors.52 Between May 26 and June 2, 1987 the government undertook Operation Liberation, a
concentrated military offensive combining land, air, and naval units, and was successful in taking
control of Vadamarachy and parts of LTTE-controlled Jaffna.53
The government attempted to use Indian peace keeping forces to suppress the LTTE with
the signing of the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord on July 29, 1987.54 At its peak, the Indian Peace
Keeping Force (IPKF) numbered 70,000 and closed Tamil safe havens in Indian territory.55 The
48
Ibid 154-155
Israel specifically provided counterterrorism advisors to the Sri Lankan Army in order to provide expert guidance
on effective techniques for combating the LTTE.
50
Alexander, p. 155
51
Ibid
52
Ibid; See also D. Hellmann-Rajanayagam. The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity. Franz Steiner Verlag,
1994. 164.
53
ibid
54
Ibid 158
55
Ibid; See also “History of Organisation.” University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) UTHR(J).
49
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IPKF authorities declared that “If any military groups operating in Sri Lanka do not accept this
framework (Indo-Lanka Peace Accord) of proposals for a settlement, India will take all
necessary steps to ensure that Indian territory is not used for activities prejudicial to the unity,
integrity, and security of Sri Lanka.”56 By 1990, the IPKF had withdrawn from Sri Lankan soil.
When Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga came to power following the assassination
of President Premadasa, she began an attempt at more peace talks. In her attempt to build “a
society without any discrimination where all the minority communities would enjoy equal rights
as equal citizens,”57 Kumaratunga announced a cease-fire. The LTTE broke the cease-fire in a
declaration on April 19, 1995 and subsequently attacked military personnel around the country,
killing over 250 people.58 Kumaratunga declared these attacks a “temporary setback” and sought
to bring the LTTE to the negotiating table. However, by June 1995, even Kumaratunga declared
that the government would militarily defeat the LTTE.59
While the Sri Lankan military was tactically successful in many counterterrorist
operations against LTTE strongholds, Colombo won impressive political victories when foreign
states began declaring the LTTE as a terrorist organization. The Indian ban on May 14, 1992
following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi and the US labeling the
LTTE as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization” (FTO) on October 8, 1997 froze key LTTE assets
abroad.60 The UN Security Resolution 1373, enacted on September 28, 2001, advised all UN
members to suppress financial aid to several terrorist organizations, the LTTE listed prominently
56
Quoted in Rohan Gunaratna and Arabinda Acharya, “India’s Role in Ethnic Crisis in Sri Lanka,” p. 641.
Avta Singh Bhasin, India in Sri Lanka, p. 266.
58
Alexander, p. 162
59
Ibid 163
60
Ibid 165
57
Combating Terrorism in Irregular Forces: Lessons from Algeria and Sri Lanka
Clark 19
among them.61 The 9/11 attacks on the United States in New York and Washington DC led to
intense international attention focused on terrorist organizations and insurgent groups that
utilized terror tactics. The government was directly involved with forcing a lull in violence by
applying political pressure on the LTTE that lasted from 2002 until the assassination of Foreign
Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar on August 12, 2005. Kadirgamar was essential in coordinating
bans on the LTTE and freezing LTTE assets with foreign powers and his death galvanized the
international community as well as strengthened the resolve of Colombo to end the LTTE
influence.
Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected president in November 2005 with the promise of
revisiting the Cease-fire Agreement (CFA) brokered by Norway in February 2002.62 The CFA
called for a “federal solution to the crisis in Sri Lanka with the creation of a semi-autonomous
province under Tamil leadership.”63 However, after six years of no results, Colombo abrogated
the CFA and pursued a strict military strategy until the LTTE was defeated in 2009. Rajapaksa
ordered a full-scale military offensive that drove the LTTE from the east and continued pursuing
the LTTE remnants into its northern strongholds. This offensive eventually led to the surrender
of the LTTE and an end to large-scale civil strife in Sri Lanka.
Lessons Learned
The Sri Lankan government was eventually successful in destroying the LTTE through
military means. However, a combination of hard and soft power was used throughout Colombo’s
campaign to eliminate the LTTE. Sir Lanka certainly used methods that coincide with classic CT
hard power, namely kinetic operations against rebel strongholds, intelligence operations against
61
UN Security Resolution 1373
Mulaj, 407.
63
Ibid
62
Combating Terrorism in Irregular Forces: Lessons from Algeria and Sri Lanka
Clark 20
the LTTE, and economic sanctions on LTTE-held areas. These economic sanctions pressured the
LTTE leadership to call for a cease-fire. Unfortunately, the government did not take advantage of
the pressure the sanctions caused and the LTTE rebuilt and outfitted itself for a new campaign
against the government. This does not take away from the effectiveness of the economic
sanctions. The LTTE was totally destroyed through kinetic military action in early 2009. This
speaks well for the effectiveness of the Sri Lankan military when given a clear mission to destroy
LTTE leadership and strongholds in the northern and eastern territories of Sri Lanka.
Sri Lankan strategy also involved many soft power methods, though not always effective.
Several Sri Lankan leaders attempted to negotiate the Tamil minority throughout the existence of
the LTTE. The reason these negotiations failed was clearly because the LTTE was asking for
such a large piece of land for such a small portion of the population. Denying LTTE-held sectors
essential supplies caused LTTE leadership to call for numerous cease-fires, which ended terrorist
activity for short spurts of time, but never permanently. The government was also quite effective
at denying the LTTE its assets abroad. By having the world community label the LTTE as a
terrorist organization, Colombo won de facto support from the UN and essentially outlawed the
LTTE in other states. This action led to many states freezing LTTE assets and critically limited
the LTTE’s ability to continue operations.
The main lessons highlighted from the Sri Lankan case study are that there is no
replacement for military hard power. If a government is able to wholly destroy an irregular force
through kinetic operations, then this must be the course of action taken by the government. This
course of action is the only sure way to ensure the total destruction of irregular forces and no
concessions need occur. This study also illustrates the utility of limiting resources available to
the irregular force. The LTTE was much more active before Colombo applied economic and
Combating Terrorism in Irregular Forces: Lessons from Algeria and Sri Lanka
Clark 21
international pressure. Economic hard power, diplomacy, and deterrence were effective at
limiting the LTTE but were insufficient to end operations.
Front de Libération Nationale (FLN)
Background
The Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) was a military-politico organization that fought
the French authority in Algeria from 1954-1962. The FLN adopted a strategy of terrorism that
included kidnapping, mass murder, torture, mutilation of captured French military personnel,
raids on key military or political targets, and assassinations.64 This overall strategy caused the
already war weary65 French government to abandon hope for a French solution and directly led
to Algerian independence.
The war for Algerian independence began in 1954, but several key events throughout the
French occupation help understand both the French standpoint in holding Algeria and the native
Algerian’s desire for freedom through any means. The newly restored French monarchy was in
crisis in 1830 and needed popularity boost. Foreign conquest was the easy answer and as a result,
the French invaded Algeria after an unsuccessful naval blockade.66 Moderate leaders soon took
power in the French monarchy, establishing a parliament, and attempted to withdraw from
Algeria. However, a parliamentary commission examined the Algeria situation and concluded
that although French policy, behavior, and organization in Algeria were failures, the occupation
64
Armed Conflict Events Data: Algerian War of Independence 1954-1962.
http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/alpha/algeria1954.htm
65
The French were engaged in the First Indochina War from 1946-1954. This manifested itself by stiffening French
resolve to hold on to Algeria at first, but eventually the population grew tired of nearly consistent conflict from
1940-1962.
66
Country Studies: France in Algeria, 1830-1962. http://countrystudies.us/algeria/18.htm
Combating Terrorism in Irregular Forces: Lessons from Algeria and Sri Lanka
Clark 22
of Algeria should continue for “the sake of national prestige.”67 France annexed the occupied
areas of Algeria as a colony in 1834 and immediately began colonization.68
Tensions arose in Algeria between French colonists and Algerian nationals with the
conclusion of World War II. A 5,000-strong parade in the market town of Setif to celebrate the
German surrender on May 8, 1945 turned into a violent struggle when French gendarmeries69
attempted to seize banners attacking French colonial rule.70 As a response, Algerians slaughtered
103 European settlers in the neighboring countryside and wounded a hundred more.71 The
French military and police finally restored order on May 13, but subsequently carried out several
reprisals including summary executions, bombing inaccessible Muslim villages with French
aircraft, and shelling Kerrata with a naval cruiser.72 Pied noir73 vigilantes lynched local Algerian
prisoners and randomly shot Muslims not in compliance with army orders to wear white arm
bands.74 These reprisals killed somewhere between 1,02075 (French estimate shortly after the
massacre) and 45,000 people (as claimed by Radio Cairo). Alistair Horne states that 6,000 was
the number settled on by moderate historians, but is only an estimate.76 The Setif massacre
altered the Franco-Algerian relations beyond the point of repair and paved the way for revolution
and open war.
Terrorist Activity
67
Ibid.
Ibid.
69
Gendarmeries are French military police force charged with police duties of keeping the peace.
70
Ted Morgan. “My Battle of Algiers.” P 26.
71
Alistair Horne. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962. New York: The Viking Press, 1977. 27.
72
Morgan, 26.
73
The term literally means “black feet” and is of unknown origin, but was slang for French settlers.
74
Morgan, 26.
75
Tubert Report.
76
Horne, 27.
68
Combating Terrorism in Irregular Forces: Lessons from Algeria and Sri Lanka
Clark 23
The FLN was a conglomeration of several different nationalists groups who joined
together under the FLN guise in order to engage the French colonial government in armed
resistance for the independence of Algeria.77 The FLN was not the only political party in Algeria
demanding reform, but quickly eliminated any rivals through violence and assassinations.78 The
FLN began its attack on the government on November 1, 1954 when several maquisards
(guerrillas) launched coordinated attacks across Algeria on military installations, police posts,
warehouses, communications facilities, and public utilities.79 The attack was carried out in
conjunction with a statement released by the FLN from Cairo which called for a “restoration of
the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and social, within the framework of the principles of
Islam.”80
A major turning point in the conflict occurred in the August 1955 Phillippeville massacre
in which 123 civilians, including old women and babies.81 FLN policy before this attack was to
only engage military and government-related targets, but the local FLN commander of the
Constantine region deemed a drastic escalation in force was needed.82 The government
responded by killing a claimed 1,273 guerrillas.83 According to the FLN, 12,000 Muslims were
killed in retaliatory attacks by the police, armed forces, and vigilante groups.84
The FLN’s top leadership met in Algeria’s Soummam Valley in the summer of 1956 to
assess the source of the revolution. FLN strategy was largely unsuccessful at this point and
77
Library of Congress Online. A Country Study: Algeria; War of Independence, FLN. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgibin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+dz0037)
78
Ibid.
79
Library of Congress Online. A Country Study: Algeria; War of Independence. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgibin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+dz0036)
80
Ibid.
81
Ibid.
82
Ibid.
83
Ibid.
84
Ibid.
Combating Terrorism in Irregular Forces: Lessons from Algeria and Sri Lanka
Clark 24
progress was poor throughout 1954 and 1955. At the time, the FLN was engaged in poorly
coordinated and inconsequential rural guerrilla attacks that the French simply dismissed as
“traditional banditry.”85 This meeting was called the Soummam Congress and founded Le
Comité de Coordination et d'Exécution (CCE).86 The CCE was an executive congress to
coordinate the affairs of the conflict and determined to take the conflict to the capital city of
Algiers for a campaign of urban terrorism.87 A key motive for this new direction was vengeance
for two key events. The first was the decision made in June 1956 by Robert Lacoste, the French
resident minister in Algiers, to guillotine condemned FLN prisoners.88 The second event was a
bombing attack carried out by European extremists on a house in the Casbah of Algiers, resulting
in nearly one hundred casualties.89 The CCE determined that urban terrorism, carried out by the
Zone Autonome d'Alger (ZAA)90, was the best response to give legitimacy to the newly installed
CCE leadership. Terrorism then became a way to mobilize and control action.91 The CCE
thought of urban terrorism as a “fundamentally political strategy” that was a sound
demonstration of “the supremacy of politics over military strategy, which was a second premise
agreed to at Soummam.”92
The two key figures in devising and implementing an urban terrorism strategy were Larbi
Ben M’Hidi and Ramdane Abane. M’Hidi believed that “only urban terrorism could win popular
support in Algeria and recognition abroad.”93 Abane’s convictions were similar, desiring to base
85
Martha Crenshaw. The Effectiveness of Terrorism in the Algerian War. 488.
Ibid. 485.
87
Ibid.
88
Ibid.
89
Ibid.
90
The ZAA was the FLN underground network in Algiers which was led by Yacef Saadi.
91
Ibid. 486.
92
Ibid. 486-487.
93
Yves Courrière. La guerre d'Algérie, vol. 2, Le temps des léopards (Paris : Fayard, 1969), 394-395.
86
Combating Terrorism in Irregular Forces: Lessons from Algeria and Sri Lanka
Clark 25
the struggle on mass participation and unite all Algerians.94 On terrorism and the media, Abane
famously observed, “Is it preferable to our cause to kill ten enemies in an oued (dry river bed) of
Telergma when no one will talk of it, or a single man in Algiers which will be noted the next day
by the American press?”95 Abane also wanted to begin urban terrorism operations to “accelerate
repression”, which is to say provoke a counterterrorism response from the French.96 He
understood that a provocation of French repression was a necessary evil which would ultimately
force the population into the arms of the FLN. Both Abane and Ben M’Hidi felt that victory was
close, that terrorism would mobilize the masses, and that terrorism would accelerate the end to
the war by intimidating the French and result in an independent Algeria.97
The FLN also knew that garnering international attention was key to gaining
independence and incorporated this into part of its strategy. The FLN called for a general strike
of all Muslim businesses in Algiers in January 1957 to coincide with a meeting of the UN
General Assembly.98 Lacoste quickly called on the French Tenth Paratroop Division under
General Jacques Massu to take control of the situation. Massu was an ardent defender of torture
techniques used to gain intelligence from Algerian operatives.99 The French government’s
indirect endorsement of torture, coupled with the public outcry of conscription and distress over
the cost of the conflict, contributed to the growing unpopularity of the war in France.100 .
International pressure was also mounting to grant Algeria independence. The unpopularity of the
94
Crenshaw, 487.
Quoted in Roland Gaucher, Les Terroristes (Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1965). 262.
96 Khalfa Mameri. Rambane Abane: Héros de la guerre d'Algérie. (Paris : L’Harmattan, 1988). 132-138.
97 Crenshaw, 488.
95
98
Mohammed Harbi. Le F.L.N. mirage et réalité: origines à la prise de pouvoir (1945-1962) (Paris :
Editions Jeune Afrique, 1980). 197.
99
General Jacques Massu. La vraie bataille d'Alger. (Paris : Plon, 1971). 166-170.
100
Bernard Droz and Evelyne Lever. histoire de la guerre d'Algérie, 1954-1962. (Paris : Editions du Seuil, 1982).
148.
Combating Terrorism in Irregular Forces: Lessons from Algeria and Sri Lanka
Clark 26
war at home brought General Charles de Gaulle back to power in 1958.101 At first, de Gaulle
embodied the hopes of Europeans and the professional military element in Algeria by stating
“long live French Algeria” at a speech in Mostaganem.102 However, de Gaulle later changed his
stance in 1959 by stating that the future of Algeria would be “self-determination,” essentially
meaning that France was willing to give up Algeria.103 In 1961, de Gaulle reopened negotiations
with the FLN at Evian in May 1961. The French called for a cease-fire on March 19, 1962.
During the Evian Accords called for all European colonists in Algeria to become full-fledged
Algerian citizens or be classified as aliens.104 The decisions made at Evian were subsequently
approved by the French electorate in a 91 percent vote in a referendum in June 1962.105 On July
1, 1962, 6 million Algerians out of 6.5 million cast votes for independence. De Gaulle
announced Algeria’s independence on July 3, 1962 marking an end to the conflict. 106
Government Action
The government’s counterterrorism response to the violence in Algeria gradually moved
from government-sponsored reprisals to targeted killings, torture during interrogations, and
helicopter raids. The return of de Gaulle to French politics restored a relative moderate to the
hardliners who had once been in charge of the French presence in Algeria. De Gaulle paved the
way for an independent Algeria and the fruition of FLN efforts since 1954.
101
Nuenlist, Christian, Anna Locher, and Garret Martin. Globalizing De Gaulle: International Perspectives
on French Foreign Policies, 1958-1969. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2010. 227.
102
Library of Congress Online. A Country Study: Algeria; War of Independence: de Gaulle.
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+dz0041)
103
Ibid.
Ibid.
105
Ibid.
106
Ibid.
104
Combating Terrorism in Irregular Forces: Lessons from Algeria and Sri Lanka
Clark 27
The November 1, 1954 FLN attacks prompted the French minister of interior, François
Mitterrand, to respond with the statement, “the only possible negotiation is war.”107 This was an
echo of Premier Pierre Mendès’ policy towards losing Algeria. Mendès declared on Novermber
12, 1954 in front of the National Assembly that “One does not compromise when it comes to
defending the internal peace of the nation, the unity and integrity of the Republic.”108 These
statements epitomize the all-important French perspective when discussing Algeria: Algeria is a
part of France and must be kept in order to preserve French honor.109 The recent loss of
Indochina in 1954 and the eventual losses of Morocco and Tunisia in 1956 strengthened French
resolve to maintain Algeria as an integral piece of France.110
The politicians called for war and the FLN answered by slaughtering hundreds of piednoirs at Phillippeville.111 In response to FLN attacks on European settlers, the French colonial
government began several reprisals that resulted in yet more needless deaths, most of which had
not been involved in the initial FLN attack. The Phillippeville massacre also gave Governor
General Robert Lacoste an excuse to abolish the Algerian Assembly. Lacoste went on to rule
Algeria by decreelaw and granted the French military presence immense power.112 The arrest of
several external FLN political leaders in October 1956 caused the remaining leaders to harden
their stance in the conflict. Lacoste also increased military operations and began to guillotine
107
Library of Congress Online. A Country Study: Algeria; War of Independence. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgibin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+dz0036)
108
Ibid.
109
Crenshaw, 479.
110
Ibid.
111
Library of Congress Online. A Country Study: Algeria; War of Independence. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgibin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+dz0036)
112
Library of Congress Online. A Country Study: Algeria; War of Independence: Phillippeville.
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+dz0038)
Combating Terrorism in Irregular Forces: Lessons from Algeria and Sri Lanka
Clark 28
convicted FLN members in Algiers.113 This political decision made by Lacoste led to the FLN
adoption of urban terrorism in 1956-1957.
The combat from 1956-1957 was extremely one-sided, seeing the demise of the ZAA.114
Lacoste instated General Jacques Massu in response to the general strike. Massu’s Tenth
Paratroop Division were given freedom by Lacoste to pacify Algeria by any means possible.115
Paratrooper units sealed off Muslim quarters of Algiers and began to systematically interrogate
and register or arrest Muslim inhabitants.116 Colonel Yves Godard designated himself the chief
of police in the city and seized police records. On Godard’s first day as police chief, paratroopers
arrested fifteen hundred suspects.117 However, only fifty of these suspects were turned over to
the police to be charged with crimes.118
The paratroopers also engaged in torture in order to extract information. Crenshaw states
that “Although torture was common in Algeria from the beginning of the rebellion, the method
assumed a critical importance in the French response to urban terrorism.” Massu actually
institutionalized the use of torture into a systematic form of interrogation. 119 The use of torture
was highly effective from a tactical perspective, resulting in the annihilation of the ZAA in
Algiers. The French intelligence network relayed the information garnered from torture
interrogations to the paratroopers, who totally dismantled the ZAA leadership.120
113
Crenshaw, 488.
Harbi, 199.
115
Crenshaw, 489-490.
116
Ibid.
117
Jacques Delarue, “La police en paravent et au rampart,” in La guerre, ed. Rioux, 260.
118
Ibid.
119
Massu, 166-170.
120
Harbi, 199.
114
Combating Terrorism in Irregular Forces: Lessons from Algeria and Sri Lanka
Clark 29
In fact, French military intelligence seized an opportunity to finish off the ZAA during
the ZAA’s flight from Algiers into the countryside. While the ZAA was fleeing into the
countryside, French counterintelligence convinced the rural FLN leaders that all of the FLN
students and intellectuals fleeing from the city were actually French agents.121 This resulted in
the rural FLN leaders enacting widespread torture and a bloody purge on the alleged “traitors.”122
The CCE was not even safe, with the French capturing and executing Ben M’Hidi in
February 1957.123 The other mastermind behind FLN’s urban terrorism campaign, Ramdane
Abane, was forced to flee Algeria due to persistent French pressure and was assassinated by rival
FLN members in Morocco in 1957.124
France also sought to dissuade outside foreign powers from supporting the FLN.
Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser earned the scorn of the French government for openly
supporting the FLN with material and political assistance to fulfill his view of “pan-Arabism.”125
This manifested itself with French involvement in the Suez Crisis of November 1956 in an effort
to topple Nasser from power and cut off Nasser’s support, which some French analysts believed
to be “the most important element in sustaining continued rebel activity in Algeria.”126 French
military units were also stationed at the Moroccan and Tunisian borders to guard against
infiltration by the 30,000 trained FLN fighters poised at the border.127 The best known of these
lines was designed and implemented by General Raoul Salan, the commander of the French
121
Droz and Lever, 209.
Ibid.
123
Crenshaw, 489.
124
Harbi, 205.
125
Library of Congress Online. A Country Study: Algeria; War of Independence: Phillippeville.
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+dz0038)
126
Ibid.
127
Ibid.
122
Combating Terrorism in Irregular Forces: Lessons from Algeria and Sri Lanka
Clark 30
army in Algeria. This line was called the “Morice Line” and consisted of an electrified fence,
barbed wire, and mines stretching over a 320 kilometer portion of the Tunisian border.128
In late 1957, Salan instituted a system of quadrillage.129 Quadrillage divided the country
into sectors, each permanently garrisoned by troops. Within each quadrillage, the garrisoned
troops were responsible for suppressing rebel operations within their particular sector.130 Salan’s
strategy was successful in reducing FLN terrorism, but tied down large numbers of troops in a
static defense. The French also concentrated segments of the rural population in large camps
under military supervision. In an official capacity, this was done to protect the villagers from
FLN extortion but was also to prevent sympathetic villagers from aiding FLN rebels.131
1958 saw the reinstatement of de Gaulle as the French leader as well as a shift in tactics
by the French military in Algeria. The army switched from a dependence on quadrillage to using
mobile forces to deploy on massive search and destroy missions against FLN military
strongholds.132 The next year, Salan was replaced by General Maurice Challe, who greatly
suppressed major rebel resistance. Challe landed serious blows on the FLN military
establishment by deploying extremely mobile “hunting commandos” in American helicopters to
effectively sweep the countryside region by region.133 Though effective, this strategy consumed
massive amounts of resources. Over 600,000 troops were stationed in Algeria in 1959.134 French
reports guess that between 1958 and 1960, the FLN military cadre had been cut in half.135 The
128
Library of Congress Online. A Country Study: Algeria; War of Independence: Conduct of War.
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+dz0039)
129
Ibid
130
Ibid.
131
Ibid.
132
Ibid.
133
Locher, Nuenlist, and Martin. 228.
134
Ibid.
135
Ibid.
Combating Terrorism in Irregular Forces: Lessons from Algeria and Sri Lanka
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FLN’s own reports note the grave reduction in both combat potential and organizational
structure.136 Challe’s air mobile units pounded FLN rebels, but the surviving members of the
cells merely evaporated back into the rural population and were nearly impossible to root out
once assimilated into the population. As early as 1959, Challe realized that the French could not
militarily defeat the FLN because the FLN’s mission was political.
De Gaulle gradually made successions to the FLN since his return to office in 1958,
culminating in the cease-fire in 1961 and subsequently granted the Algerians independence
following the Evian Accords in the summer of 1962. After popular elections voted
overwhelmingly for an independent Algeria, the French pulled out and the FLN had won.
Lessons Learned
The French carried out a successful counterterrorism strategy against the FLN. The
French military, despite brutal tactics in gaining information and reprisal attacks, completely
dismantled the ZAA in Algiers and executed the Challe Plan in the rural areas to deny the FLN a
safe haven. Despite these tactically successful endeavors, the French military was never able to
gain the population’s support. A failure to identify the population as essential to success doomed
the French military to defeat. Implementation of a COIN strategy would have alleviated this and
possibly led to a French success. A COIN strategy would have focused on the population rather
than the FLN. Due to the violent actions of the FLN towards neutral Algerians, the government
had an opportunity to alienate the population from the FLN. In hindsight, it was the FLN who
was successful at alienating the French government from the population. Constant tension
between European settlers and Muslim Algerians led to several atrocities on both sides, but the
136
Ibid.
Combating Terrorism in Irregular Forces: Lessons from Algeria and Sri Lanka
Clark 32
colonial government did nothing to keep the peace and usually added fuel to the fire with reprisal
attacks on the Muslim population. Torture interrogation tactics led to unrest in France and the
international community, leading to more supporters of the rebel cause.
The French were quite successful utilizing hard power methods. The helicopter
commando raids harried the FLN close to the brink of destruction. In fact, the ZAA was virtually
destroyed through kinetic military action in Algiers and was forced to leave the city. However,
the resiliency of the FLN prevented the French military from completely destroying the FLN
leadership and infrastructure. The FLN strongholds in neighboring states allowed the FLN
leadership sanctuary that remained out of French reach.
The French showed little to no use of soft power techniques until the end of the conflict.
Once de Gaulle took power, French objectives in Algeria gradually shifted towards selfdetermination. The peace talks during the cease-fire were successful and led to peace. This
shows that soft power can lead to a successful CT campaign. However, due to one of the
America’s bedrock international relations policy of negotiating with terrorists this does not seem
a viable option for US foreign policy.
Policy Implications, Lessons, and Recommendations
Given the announced troop withdrawals from both Afghanistan and Iraq, new strategies
must be analyzed to keep up with current foreign policy objectives. The strategic decision made
by the Obama administration could easily define his entire presidency: will he continue to pursue
a COIN-oriented method or switch to a purely counter-terror approach to continue the Global
War on Terror and ensure security for the US? The main question here is to determine whether
or not the US can effectively carry out its foreign policy through a strictly counter-terror
Combating Terrorism in Irregular Forces: Lessons from Algeria and Sri Lanka
Clark 33
approach. This question is invaluable to US policy makers because of its strategic implications
on future military training and operations, foreign relations, and budgeting.
The implications of a counter-terror based approach could be immense. Militarily, new
training programs would need to be implemented in order to prepare for more kinetic operations.
Expensive training methods of foreign internal development (FID) could be abandoned by
conventional units, but the ability to conduct FID operations must not be wholly abandoned.
More funds would need to be routed to existing special operations forces already outfitted for
counter-terror missions, but the overall budget would be less.
If our military is significantly decreased in size and capability, the question should be
poised as to whether or not the US has the means to continue its current foreign policy standard
of dealing with terrorists. Should CT operations indeed prove to be insufficient, then our sphere
of influence could significantly decrease due to our inability to project power. Limiting our
current foreign policy objectives is a viable option for policy makers.
However, we also need to take into account the soft power aspects of CT. Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates urges current and future policy makers to resurrect America’s soft power
capabilities, arguing that “military force alone cannot defend America’s interests around the
world.”137 Hillary Clinton, the current Secretary of State, also acknowledges a return to a soft
power approach towards terror and using the phrase “smart power”:
The president-elect and I believe that foreign policy must be based on a marriage of principles and
pragmatism, not rigid ideology. On facts and evidence, not emotion or prejudice. Our security, our
vitality, and our ability to lead in today’s world oblige us to recognize the overwhelming fact of our
interdependence.
137
Defense Secretary Robert Gates made these remarks in his Landon Lecture at Kansas State University,
November 26, 2007. The text of the lecture is available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/spech.aspx?speechid=1199, accessed March 22, 2011.
Combating Terrorism in Irregular Forces: Lessons from Algeria and Sri Lanka
Clark 34
We must use what has been called “smart power,” the full range of tools at our disposaldiplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural- picking the right tool, or combination of
tools, for each situation. With smart power, diplomacy will be the vanguard of foreign policy.”138
This shift from hard power to soft power would reopen negotiations with Iran, North
Korea, Syria, Lebanon and more. The Sri Lankan case study offers insight into the benefits of
negotiations, peace talks, cease-fires, economic sanctions, and condemnation by the international
community.
Conclusion
The proponents of CT offer alluring evidence and ideas, but CT can be quite problematic.
The two case studies analyzed, while not definitive by any means, offer several key lessons to be
learned. Once again, it is imperative to understand that not all lessons are universal. While
negotiations eventually worked in Algeria, they were never successful in Sri Lanka. This is
because the political climate in both states was very different. The LTTE were simply asking too
much of the Sri Lankan government. In contrast, the French government shifted its goals and
negotiated with the FLN that resulted in self-determination.
The international community’s role is also important. The Sri Lankan government was
very effective at bringing the UN on board and labeled the LTTE as a terrorist organization. This
led to frozen LTTE assets and the denial of safe havens in India for LTTE cadre to rest and refit.
Likewise, the FLN was quite effective at gaining popular support in the world community. The
FLN framed itself as the victims of French imperialism that the UN was sympathetic towards.
138
Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton made these remarks during her testimony at secretary of state designee
before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s confirmation hearing on January 13, 2009. For transcript,
see http://www.npr.org/templates/story.php?storyId=99290981, accessed March 22, 2011.
Combating Terrorism in Irregular Forces: Lessons from Algeria and Sri Lanka
Clark 35
This research concludes that hard military power will only rarely solve the underlying
problems of irregular forces. Hard military power will only work as a strategy if the irregular
forces can be completely destroyed. Soft power remains quite helpful in impacting irregular
groups, but remains largely insufficient to make lasting effects. The current administration
appears to be on the pathway to soft power in order to end future conflicts with irregular forces,
but hard power should never be wholly abandoned. A balance must be maintained in order to
effectively use CT methods to achieve our foreign policy goals.
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