Constitutional Law I
The Administrative State
April 21, 2006
Administrative Agencies
Utility

Administrative State arose by necessity
 breadth of federal gov’t and regulations
 develop institutional expertise
Const’l Framework


Admin. agencies are part of executive branch
 subject to Jackson 3-zone structural approach
Exercising power delegated by congress
 If acting within delegation, then zone-1
 if acting outside delegation, then zone-2 or zone-3
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Examples of Admin Agencies
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Functions of Admin Agencies
Executive functions

administer/enforce federal law
Quasi-Legislative Functions

promulgate rules, regulations,
& (micro) policy
 congress can override by statute
Quasi-Judicial Functions

adjudicate disputes involving agency functions
 agency courts hear “public
rights” cases
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Why Agencies have such power
Complete separation of power not feasible

Some degree of law-making is inevitable in
 Executing laws
 Deciding cases

Some degree of adjudicating also inevitable in
 Administering laws
As result, most agencies are in Exec Branch

basic functions are executive
 enforce congressional and Presidential policy

Because of their integrated functions
 agencies need to be in the branch
with the most flexible SoP oversight
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Non-Executive Agencies
Art. I: Congressional agencies and offices


Example: CBO, Library of Congress, GAO
cannot exercise these functions
 executive
 judicial
 legislative (surprise) see INS v. Chadha

can assist congress w/ research, advice, etc.
Art. III: Judicial agencies and offices


Ex: judicial council, magistrates
no Art. I, II, or III functions,


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can assist courts (recommendations)
Ancillary lawmaking functions
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Non-Delegation Doctrine
Schechter Poultry v. United States (1935)

NIRA authorizes President
 to implement “Code of Fair Competition” as proposed
by (private) Industry group

Delegation of legislative power
 Invalid if unfettered discretion
 Valid if limited (guided) discretion
“Intelligible
principle”
 NIRA imposes few policy standards
principle
Panama Refining v. Ryan (1935)

Cong. authorizes President to prohibit “hot oil”
 Bare Presidential policy; not “executing” any law
 Policy not specifically set by congress
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Gonzales v. Oregon
(2006)
Preemption by Federal Agencies


“Laws of the US” include rules & regulations
So long as they are valid
Validity of Agency Action

Separation of Powers
 What zone is agency in?
 Is agency exercising quasi or core legislative power?

Federalism
 Is federal gov’t exercising an enumerated power?


Apply famiar doctrines, such as Lopez, Printz, S.Dak v. Dole
Individual Rights
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Gonzales v. Oregon
(2006)
Chevron v. NRDC (1984)


Agencies can exercise only delegated power
Step 1: Is scope of delegation clear from stat?
 Pure question of law for courts to decide
 Apply traditional rules of statutory construction


including Gregory v. Ashcroft and other const’l principles
Step 2: If statute is ambiguous, defer to agency
 Agencies have discretion to interpret the scope of
their own power
 So long as reasonable
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Gonzales v. Oregon
(2006)
Ashcroft’s “interpretive rule”


“assisting suicide is not a 'legitimate medical
purpose' “
Interpretation of CSA
 drugs allowed only if they have a "currently accepted
medical use," "in the course of professional practice."
Chevron

Step 1: Does delegated authority of AG include
defining accepted medical practice?
 No, only to implement 5 statutory factors

If not, don’t get to Step 2.
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